the beginning of community: politics in the face of disagreement

THE BEGINNING OF COMMUNITY:POLITICS IN THE FACE OF DISAGREEMENT

B K E-D

Rawls’ requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies which they believe canbe justified in ‘public reason’ depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. Thisis a valuable ideal, and thus citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But it is not always possible tofind the common ground that we would need in order to do so, and thus we should reject Rawls’strong claim that we have an obligation to defend our views in public reason. Because I recognizethat we have strong reasons to conduct our political enquiry within the guidelines of politicalliberalism, but deny that we always have an obligation to do so, one might call my view ‘permissivepolitical liberalism’.

In our society people disagree about what is valuable and how we ought tolive. We need to figure out how to understand and organize our relation-ships in the face of this. Politics, the question of how to organize ourrelationships as fellow citizens, presents us with one inevitable form of theproblem. This paper deals solely with this form: given that we disagree, howshould we organize our collective political life? Though the question is aboutcollective organization, I am particularly interested in the implications forindividuals. I ask how each of us should conceive our relationship to othercitizens, and what obligations we should thus take ourselves to have.

This paper engages the view about disagreement in politics articulated byJohn Rawls in Political Liberalism.1 Rawls holds that while citizens of liberaldemocracies disagree about many things, we must agree on what counts as areason for political purposes. This agreement supplies us with what Rawlscalls ‘public reason’. I refer to the view that citizens should aim to justifypolicy positions using the shared premises of public reason as political

liberalism. Rawls and others embrace a version of this view which I callstrict political liberalism. This variant adds that citizens have an obligation tosupport only policies they believe they can justify with the common groundof public reason. They violate this obligation when, in defending their

1 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia UP, ), henceforth PL.

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policy views, they appeal to value claims about which there is reasonabledisagreement.2

I am sympathetic with the ideal of the relationship of citizens which strictpolitical liberalism advances. We misunderstand such relationships if we donot appreciate the value of achieving this ideal, and we have reason to tryto achieve it. Further, I agree that strict political liberalism tells us how toachieve the ideal, and so we have reason to follow its norms. But I partcompany with strict political liberals in rejecting the claim that this idealimposes on us an obligation to follow the norms. I believe that the ideal is notalways achievable. When we cannot achieve it, we should admit our failureto realize an important value. Regret over this is appropriate, but we havenot violated an obligation to our fellow citizens. Because I recognize that wehave strong reasons to conduct our political enquiry within the guidelines ofpolitical liberalism, but deny that we have an obligation always to do so, onemight call my view permissive political liberalism.

Strict political liberals hold that when we legislate or publicly advocateour political views on fundamental questions, our justifications must not relyon the truth of our own worldview. Rather, we should limit ourselves to con-siderations which all reasonable people agree count as reasons for politicalpurposes. In §I I argue that the justification of this claim relies on a certainideal of political relationships. I ask in §II exactly what we would need toagree on to achieve these relationships. In §III I explain the importance ofthe modifier ‘reasonable’, discussing why it is needed and how to determinewho counts as reasonable. In §IV I discuss the prospects for achieving therelevant agreement. Although the ideal of public reason is practical, provid-ing guidance in many cases, it cannot settle all fundamental political issues.Then reasonable people must, with regret, fall back on something else.

I. THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT

I.. The persistence of disagreement

Rawls’ view is paradigmatic of a certain pessimism about the possibility ofagreement. He holds that when competent adults reason freely they will

POLITICS IN THE FACE OF DISAGREEMENT

© The Author Journal compilation © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly

2 Other defenders of strict political liberalism include R. Audi, in R. Audi and N. Wol-terstorff, Religion in the Public Square (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, ), pp. –, –,–, and ‘The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship’, Philo-sophy and Public Affairs, (), pp. –; J. Cohen, ‘Deliberation and DemocraticLegitimacy’, and ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, both in J. Bohmanand W. Rehg (eds), Deliberative Democracy (MIT Press, ), pp. –, –; C. Larmore,‘Political Liberalism’, Political Theory, (), pp. –.

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come to various and conflicting conclusions about what is of value and howwe should live.3 He calls the objects of disagreement comprehensive doctrines.Comprehensive doctrines are more or less complete ways of understandingthe world, human beings, and what is of worth. They are what I have beencalling worldviews. Most religious traditions and some philosophical systemsare comprehensive doctrines or worldviews. Rawls counts thoroughgoingutilitarianism and his own comprehensive liberalism among the latter.

Strict political liberals affirm that disagreement about which compre-hensive doctrine is true or best stems from the vexing nature of the questionsthey address, not merely from epistemic irresponsibility on the part of some.Rawls (PL, pp. –) explains this persistent disagreement by what he calls‘the burdens of judgement’. These include the complexity of assessingevidence, the difficulty of determining what evidence is relevant, the judge-ment needed to weigh various reasons, the vagueness of our concepts, andthe influence of our past experience. The burdens of judgement ensure thattwo open-minded interlocutors, both aiming in good faith to discover thetruth and adhering to their epistemic responsibilities, may form conflictingviews. Thus reasonable people cannot always come to agreement, even inprinciple. Rawls thinks that disagreement normally persists even when allhave reasoned well.

This places out of reach one attractive possibility for political community.On this view, the point of political community is to share in a common wayof life, based on a shared sense of what is valuable. I think that many people,on all parts of the political spectrum, pine for this model of political life, andunderstandably so.4 Relationships that meet this description are among themost satisfying and valuable possible. But, along with strict political liberals,I reject the idea that we can achieve this politically.

In fact, reasonable disagreement does more than place this model of civicrelations out of our reach. It ensures that we should not even try to achieve itor approximate to it. We may, of course, try to convince one another of ourworldviews by making our best cases for them. But we must recognize thatwe cannot thereby succeed in fully bringing about consensus on values.With convincing one another out of the question, other means to agreementcould only be some kind of non-rational conditioning or repression. Theseare objectionable, especially in the hands of the state. For instance, wemight at least approximate to nation-wide consensus by severely limitingparents’ rights to educate their children and instituting compulsory publiceducation that aimed to inculcate a particular view in all.5 This would

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3 Cf. Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, p. .4 See, e.g., A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame UP, ).5 See G. Coq, New York Times, January , Section A, p. .

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amount to the state selecting and aiming to establish a single way of life notpresently accepted by all citizens. It is unclear why we should think that thestate has the authority or competence to make such a selection.

Thus we should abandon an ideal for civic relations which requires com-prehensive agreement on values and ways of life. The ideal we seek is onefor relations with those with whom we disagree.

I.. The reciprocity criterion

But according to Rawls, there is a problem about how any constitutionaldemocracy can tolerate the disagreement which it cannot eradicate.6 Thisproblem arises for him because he thinks that part of accepting constitutional

democracy is accepting what he calls the ‘criterion of reciprocity’.7 This is thedemand that we justify policy proposals on fundamental matters, thosehaving to do with what Rawls calls the basic structure of society, only byappeal to considerations which we think that others could reasonably agreeare reasons. I can understand this demand only if I know what it means forme to think that it would be reasonable for others to accept my reasons. If itsimply means thinking my reasons are good ones, not merely attempts atmanipulation, then the criterion does not forbid appeal to reasons groundedin the truth of particular worldviews.8 If it means, rather, that others wouldhave to be able to accept these reasons as true and applicable while remain-ing committed to their own worldviews, the reciprocity criterion does havethis implication. Strict political liberals must take the criterion in this latterway, since only this interpretation explains how the criterion makes dis-agreement problematic. Our comprehensive doctrines might seem the mostnatural, or even inevitable, source of justification for our own political views.But when we disagree about these, this source of justification is placed offlimits and we require some other grounds of justification. Among the mostimportant projects of strict political liberalism is the identification of thissource. §III below examines attempts to do this.

But here I am concerned with what makes this project pressing. Even ifwe accept that the criterion of reciprocity holds that citizens should notappeal to their comprehensive doctrines to support fundamental policy



6 Rawls casts the problem in terms of stability. J. Cohen, ‘A More Democratic Liberalism’,Michigan Law Review, (), pp. –, and S. Freeman, ‘Political Liberalism and thePossibility of a Just Democratic Constitution’, in his Justice and the Social Contract (Oxford UP,), pp. –, provide helpful exegesis of this understanding. I defend an account ofcitizens’ obligations, believing this is importantly related to but more purely normative thanthe stability issue.

7 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard UP, ), p. ; cf. PL, pp. xliv, xlvi, li.8 Cf. the discussion of Raz in Freeman, ‘Public Reason and Political Justification’, in his

Justice and the Social Contract, pp. –, at pp. –.

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positions, we have not yet been shown why we should accept such an obliga-tion. Rawls’ claim that commitment to this criterion is part of a commit-ment to constitutional democracy is far from obvious. Surely commitment toconstitutional democracy requires affirmation of the rule of law and fairdemocratic procedures for enacting laws. As part of this, it requires recogni-tion of certain political rights, to vote, hold office and propose laws, and,plausibly, rights to free speech, free press, and free assembly. But someonecould be committed to all this but not to the further thought that citizensshould govern themselves by the strong reading of the reciprocity criterion.9It is far too strong to claim that a polity in which citizens do not acknow-ledge and govern themselves by this obligation fails to that extent to qualifyas a constitutional democracy.

One of Rawls’ own distinctions, that between concept and conception,can help to make clear what is missing. Suppose we think that the concept ofa constitutional democracy is just that of government by rule of law, under aconstitution that designates democratic procedures for determining furtherlaws. A conception of constitutional democracy fills this out, arguing thatvarious rights and obligations of citizens would need to be recognized inorder to realize the concept.10 But it is essential to give arguments in movingfrom concept to conception. If we think that the right conception includesthe strong reading of the reciprocity criterion, we must be able to say why.Asserting that it is part of the definition is not illuminating.

I.. The liberal principle of legitimacy

An idea which Rawls invokes elsewhere, the liberal principle of legitimacy,might be thought to provide the key to making this move. The liberalprinciple of legitimacy holds (PL, p. ) that

Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordancewith a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal mayreasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable totheir common human reason ... all questions arising in the legislature that concern orborder on constitutional essentials, or basic questions of justice, should also be settled,so far as possible, by principles and ideals that can be similarly endorsed.

The principle is that when we exercise political power in ways that bearon constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, we must do so ongrounds which all reasonable people could accept. For citizens, voting andadvocacy would count as such exercises of power, so here Rawls is

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9 See, e.g., C.J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge UP, ). Cf.R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard UP, ), pp. –, and Freedom’s Law: the MoralReading of the American Constitution (Harvard UP, ), pp. –.

10 Cf. Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’.

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concerned, in part, with the question of citizens’ obligations. It may look asif the principle of legitimacy could ground the criterion of reciprocity.11

As it stands, though, the principle of legitimacy has exactly the sameproblem as the criterion of reciprocity: it can be read in two ways, one ofwhich seems clearly part of the conception of constitutional democracy andthe other of which does the work that the argument needs. The first takes‘constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice’ to include only thepolitical rights listed above, those that are part of the functioning of a con-stitutional democracy. But this way of reading the criterion requires nothingmore than a constitution enshrining these rights. We thus would not violatethis weak reading of the principle of legitimacy if we appeal to our world-views to justify either these rights or our political views on other matters,such as education, poverty, war, abortion, family structure, environmentalpolicy, etc.

On the other hand, if these and other issues are included in ‘matters ofbasic justice’, then the criterion does exclude grounding our political viewson these matters in the truth of our worldviews. I think that Rawls means usto read the criterion this way. But, like the strong reading of the reciprocitycriterion, this more ambitious version of the liberal principle of legitimacyneeds a defence which is thus far lacking. Someone who thinks that a regimeis illegitimate when individual citizens justify policy by appeal to theircomprehensive doctrines needs to say more about what is problematic aboutdoing so. Packing this content into the very idea of a liberal constitutionaldemocracy is unhelpful. It has no tendency to persuade someone who is notantecedently sympathetic to the view that citizens have an obligation not toappeal to their worldviews.

I.. Civic friendship

I hold that an apparently minor element of Rawls’ view does the importantwork of explaining the appeal of strict political liberalism. Rawls believesthat the political relation in a constitutional democracy should have acertain character, which he calls civic friendship.12 This understanding ofrelations between citizens arises from his conception of the state as a fairsystem of co-operation among free and equal citizens. In friendships, wecharacteristically act co-operatively as equals, rather than trying to mani-pulate or control one another. We view one another as persons who have



11 Freeman, ‘Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Constitution’, pp. –, and‘Public Reason and Political Justification’, pp. , . M.J. Perry, Religion in Politics: Consti-tutional and Moral Perspectives (Oxford UP, ), p. , argues that the principle of legitimacy justis the criterion of reciprocity. Eberle endorses this claim.

12 Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, in his Collected Papers (Harvard UP, ),p. ; cf. PL, p. li.

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the authority to make valid claims, not merely as obstacles to or tools forattaining our own ends. This is the aspect of friendship which informs thenotion of civic friendship: we realize the ideal of civic friendship if we ex-ercise the power of the state co-operatively with all reasonable citizens.

Commitment to public reason follows from this ideal. Co-operationrequires us to understand ourselves as reasoning with, not merely for, others.This sets parameters on what counts as a good reason for the state to act: itshould act only on considerations which all reasonable citizens recognize asreasons. Failing this, it fails to be a co-operative endeavour of all, andbecomes an exercise of power over those who do not recognize its reasons assuch. The aim of acting co-operatively with our fellow citizens thus gives usreason not to support legislation which is justified only if our own worldviewis true. That is, the value of civic friendship provides reason to govern our-selves by the ideal of public reason.

Rawls contrasts the co-operative understanding of the civic relationshipwith another, which one might call the agonistic conception. On this concep-tion, fellow citizens are, to the extent that they disagree with us, understoodas enemy combatants in a struggle to impose our views. We try to gaincontrol of the power of the state in order to override their claims andaccomplish our own ends. Rawls (‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’,p. ) associates the agonistic conception with those who want to ‘embodythe whole truth in politics’, that is, to use their own comprehensive doctrinesas a basis of reasons for political policies.

Given these options, it seems not only that we should prefer civicfriendship, but that to reject it would be unjust. Justice demands that werecognize each citizen’s claims on the state; the agonistic conception doesnot acknowledge any minority claims. However, there are two problemswith the contrast between civic friendship and the agonistic conception.First, the contrast is not exhaustive. There is space between a commitmentto act only on considerations which are also acceptable to others, given theirworldview, and a total disregard for their claims. One thing in this space isthe belief that the interests of others give me reasons, without commitmentto act only on grounds they would recognize as reasons. This attitude neednot be paternalistic. I may acknowledge that important among theirinterests is the ability to guide their own lives, including participation incollective life, according to considerations they recognize as reasons. To theextent that it acknowledges and highly values this interest, this attitude willhave much in common with civic friendship. But I might think that otherclaims override the interest in self-determination in particular circum-stances. When I vote in such circumstances, I may justify myself on groundswhich I know others reject. Believing that this is permissible is entirely

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compatible with rejecting the idea that others should be regarded as mereobstacles to my ends.13

Secondly, identified with wanting to impose the whole truth in politics,the agonistic conception groups together attitudes which should be keptdistinct. Imposing the whole truth might involve using the power of govern-ment to enforce one’s own conception of the good, requiring everyone tolive in ways that acknowledge the values one recognizes. This conceptually,and in most cases substantially, differs from wanting to organize politicalrelations in the way one’s own worldview recommends. The two come apartwhenever someone’s worldview does not recommend using state power tocoerce people into living in accord with that very doctrine. Rawls’ owncomprehensive liberalism is like this, and so are many religious worldviews.These views contain a distinction between considerations which count asreasons in guiding one’s own life, and those which count as reasons inpolitics. Agents who want to impose the whole truth in this second sensewould think it proper to justify their policy positions by appeal to their ownworldview, the part of it that makes claims about how to set up the politicalsociety. They thus would reject Rawls’ ideal of public reason. But they neednot endorse the objectionable view about state power embodied by the firstattitude here. This too suggests the availability of attitudes that differ fromcivic friendship, without falling into the agonistic conception.

The variety of possible attitudes towards our fellow citizens raises thepossibility of relations besides civic friendship which do not violate the ob-ligations of liberal citizenship. We can affirm this possibility, even whileagreeing with Rawls that civic friendship realizes values which these otherrelations lack.

It is worth asking, though, why someone might group quite differentrelationships between citizens together in a category eschewed as objection-able. I think that some philosophers disregard the distinctions because theyare impressed by a common feature of the alternatives to co-operation. Itseems that there are only two options for state power: that it be exercised co-operatively together, or coercively by some over others. Some might regardthe latter option as so objectionable that the distinctions among the attitudeswith which we might do it pale by comparison.

I agree that the alternatives to co-operation involve coercion of fellowcitizens, and that this counts rather heavily against them. But I amnevertheless unsure that we must, or can, completely avoid them. I discussthe reasons for these doubts in §IV. But if I am right in thinking that we



13 Cf. Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, on the ‘aggregative’conception of democracy.

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cannot always achieve the ideal of co-operation, then the distinctions amongthe remaining options become quite important.

I shall set aside for now the question whether co-operation is the onlyacceptable way to interact with fellow citizens, and grant that it is at leastthe guiding ideal for political relations in the face of persistent disagreement.Other things being equal, it would be best if the state could be a co-operative exercise of power by all reasonable citizens. This gives an answerto the question why we need to agree on what would count as a reason forpolitical purposes: agreement is a necessary condition of the best civicrelationships. If this is right, then it would be valuable to achieve agreementand we have reason to try. But it has not been shown that we have anobligation to succeed.14 In fact, nothing guarantees that success is alwayspossible. We may simply lack the common ground we need to settle allimportant political issues.

We should thus understand Rawls’ position in Political Liberalism andfollowing articles as in part an expression of hope – the hope that we shallagree on enough to exercise state power co-operatively and so stand inrelations of civic friendship. Though I share Rawls’ sense that fair co-operation is the ideal, I am somewhat less optimistic that we have enoughcommon ground to realize it across the board. I think that we are often – farmore often than not – able to overcome our disagreements, but I do notthink that this option is always available to us.

But before assessing the possibility of agreement, we need to know whatthe relevant agreement looks like. This raises two questions: what exactly dowe need to agree on, and with whom do we need to agree to realize thehope? The next two sections discuss these issues.

II. THE OBJECTS OF AGREEMENT

II.. A reason for political purposes

Suppose we are able to act co-operatively if and only if we can justify ouractions to one another. Then co-operation requires agreement on whatcounts as justifying the action. This explains why reasonable disagreementamong comprehensive doctrines is problematic. If A’s justification of funda-mental policy proposals appeals to considerations which count as reasonsonly if A’s own worldview is correct, A cannot co-operate with people who

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14 On the face of it, this looks much like Eberle’s view. But important differences arise fromour respective emphases on respect and co-operation. On my view, we have reason not onlyto try respectfully to justify to others the positions which we in any case hold, but also to shapethese positions in ways that allow for co-operation.

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dissent from this view. But considerations grounded in the truth of our ownworldview provide the natural source of reasons for us. What we recognizeas a reason often depends on the comprehensive doctrine we accept.Comprehensive hedonistic consequentialists, for instance, take it that theyhave reason always to maximize overall happiness. If we hold fixed theircommitment to the doctrine of hedonistic consequentialism, we could notexpect them to think anything else.

Thus co-operation in the political sphere depends on circumscribing aclass of reasons which should be recognized by the state for the purpose of

political action. This category must take into account the value of agreementin the political sphere, and the obstacles to it. Co-operation will be possibleif and only if we can agree on what should fall into this category.

I think that it is most helpful to understand Rawls’ term political conception

as referring to a person’s view about the content of this category ofreasons.15 A political conception takes as a parameter a view about what thestate is and is for, and in the light of this provides a way of conceiving ofwhat is good for or valuable to people, for the purposes of political delibera-tion. Rawls holds (‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, pp. ff.) thatwhat we need consensus on is which political conceptions count as reason-able. We may disagree about which political conception is best, but if wecan agree about which are reasonable, then we agree about which consid-erations it is reasonable to take into account for political purposes. This iswhat we need in order to co-operate.

This view is that we need to agree on what counts as reasons for enactingpolicies, but not on which policies would be best.16 There are two worriesone might have about this characterization of the agreement which weneed. The first is why we need to agree on what counts as reasons, ifwe could agree about how to settle the substantive issue. If we have the sameview about what the state should do, why do we also need a shared viewabout why the state should do it? Rawls is unhappy with this idea because itleaves open the possibility of merely strategic agreement. We might, for



15 I am agnostic about this as an interpretation of Rawls. I suggest that it provides the bestway to make sense of the structure of the view, and see what could move someone who wasnot antecedently sympathetic to accept it. On interpretation, cf. Freeman, who takes it (‘PublicReason and Political Justification’, p. ) to be part of the characterization of a politicalconception that it is ‘freestanding’. Cohen, ‘A More Democratic Liberalism’, pp. –, treats‘freestandingness’ as a desideratum for political conceptions, and has a reading closer to mine.

16 Rawls is very clear that he does not think that a commitment to public reason is sufficientto secure agreement on substantive issues. See PL, pp. liiiff., and ‘The Idea of Public ReasonRevisited’, pp. ff., esp. –. Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Demo-cracy’, holds that the procedures of deliberative democracy are sufficient to settle somesubstantive questions. But most of his examples have to do with securing basic liberties for all,issues which Rawls settles by circumscribing the class of reasonable political conceptions.

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example, agree to a policy of religious toleration, but some might do so onlybecause they are members of a minority that lacks the power to impose itsviews. In this case it is easy to see the worry about the reason supporting thepolicy. If the less powerful faction gets the upper hand, its members willreverse the policy of toleration. They do not see the fact that a policy is co-ercive as any reason not to engage in it, and thus do not value co-operationas such. They act co-operatively, for now, only to secure their interests.Rawls calls this a modus vivendi. In order to move beyond a modus vivendi

citizens must value civic friendship, and thus take its potential realization asa significant reason to seek policies justifiable on grounds which all canaccept as reasonable.

Secondly, one might worry that this way of characterizing the neededagreement does not answer the problem generated by conflicting reasonableworldviews. The problem was that if we appeal to worldviews which arereasonable, but not shared, we coerce our fellow citizens. But why is it anydifferent if we appeal to a political conception which all agree is reasonable,even if they do not share this conception themselves?

The answer lies in what it means to agree that a political conceptionis reasonable. This just is to agree that the considerations which it counts asreasons for political purposes can be recognized as such by any reasonableperson. This is to concede the reasonableness of policies justified by thepolitical conception in question. That is, to agree that a political conceptionis reasonable is to acknowledge that one could co-operate in policies whichit justifies. The same does not follow from agreeing that a particularworldview is reasonable. To agree to this is only to deny that disagreementsbetween oneself and others holding this view amount to failures in reasoningon someone’s part. Nothing follows about how one thinks it is reasonable tooperate with this view in the political sphere. A political conception ad-dresses precisely this latter question.

III. THE PARTIES TO AGREEMENT

So far I have discussed the fact and implications of reasonable disagreement.It is important to distinguish this from the implications of unreasonable dis-agreement. Unreasonable disagreement creates a different obstacle to idealcivic relations, and requires a different response. Among reasonable people,co-operation in the exercise of state power presents an ideal which drives thesearch for common ground. But co-operating with the unreasonable is not avalue. Opposing those who make unreasonable demands, for example, thosewho advocate routine violence against civilians in pursuit of political goals, is

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a legitimate, indeed necessary, use of state power. Even if such peoplebelieve that they are justified, we do not need to craft our policies in wayswhich respect this view. But if we should treat reasonable and unreasonabledisagreement differently, we need some way of determining which is which.This section attempts to draw the relevant distinction.

III.. Three ways of being reasonable

In fact, there are three questions: what counts as a reasonable worldview?What counts as a reasonable person? What counts as a reasonable politicalconception? Answering these questions is not always an epistemic task. Sincethe questions use the term ‘reasonable’, a term of art in epistemology, somethinkers believe that Rawls owes us a worked-out epistemology.17 But Rawls’lack of a complete epistemic position is no oversight. It results from an inten-tional circumscription of these questions. (More on this below.)

Rawls says least about the first question. He characterizes a reasonablecomprehensive doctrine as an exercise in both theoretical and practicalreason that ‘covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects ofhuman life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner’.18 Hedeliberately makes the standards for reasonableness minimal and loose here,because rather than defending a complete epistemology he aims to includeas many citizens as possible in the co-operative endeavour. In the light ofthis aim, he treats (PL, p. n. ) as potentially reasonable for politicalpurposes even doctrines which we may justifiably regard as unreasonablefor purposes of deciding which to adopt. The permissiveness is unproblem-atic because only political attitudes matter here. I can regard even peoplewith an apparently strange comprehensive doctrine as candidates forvaluable co-operative political relationships, so long as their view of whatthe state is for and what it may do is sufficiently close to mine.19 This isimportant in the light of the mutual incomprehension displayed by manyreligious and non-religious people.

Thus the best way to answer the second question, what makes peoplereasonable, is with just two criteria, both dealing with their attitudes towardspolitical relations: they acknowledge the value of justifying policies ongrounds common among all reasonable views, and they recognize the exist-ence of reasonable views in society besides their own. The first of thesecriteria is not epistemic at all. The second does demand a judgement about



17 See, e.g., Eberle, Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics, part III; Wolterstorff, in Audi andWolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square, pp. –, –.

18 PL, p. . Interestingly, he says (ibid.) that ‘it normally belongs to and draws upon atradition of thought and doctrine’.

19 On ‘reasonableness’ as a moral rather than epistemic norm, cf. Freeman, ‘Public Reasonand Political Justification’, p. .

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the epistemic status of views that are not one’s own, but it does not requireany epistemic theory. It requires only a commitment to the negative claimthat the correct epistemic norms, whatever these are, do not determine asingle worldview. That is, it requires acknowledging that there are factorswhich play the role of Rawls’ burdens of judgement.20

Reasonable people thus guide themselves by the familiar and attractiveidea of trying to see things from, and to take account of, other reasonableviewpoints. They also know that this requirement is non-trivial. They treatanyone who shares their commitment to taking up other points of view likethis as a candidate for co-operative action, and believe that such co-operation is valuable. This value gives them reason not to use the power ofthe state to serve values they know others do not share. As far as I can tell,Rawls offers no argument for this ideal of co-operation, that is, no argumentaiming to persuade someone to be, in his sense, reasonable. He simplyhopes that having seen the ideal, people who endorse various worldviewswill recognize its attraction. This hope does not seem unfounded.

Now for the third question, what counts as a reasonable political concep-tion. Given Rawls’ account, this is the most pressing of the three questions,because it is this on which we must agree. Rawls claims that three featurescharacterize all reasonable conceptions: each contains a list of basic rights,assigns these priority over the enforcement of unshared worldviews, andguarantees the fair value of liberties by ensuring that all citizens have‘adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms’ (PL,pp. –). Though he provides no detailed argument for these features, it isnot hard to see how at least the first two follow from the commitments thatcharacterize reasonable people. The rights in question will be of two kinds:rights that ensure participation in the political system, such as the right tovote, hold office, and engage freely in political speech; and rights that allowus to live as our worldview demands provided this does not prevent othersfrom doing likewise, such as rights of freedom of religion, of assembly and ofspeech generally. Reasonable people will include the former in their politicalconception in virtue of valuing co-operation. The additional recognition ofthe existence of reasonable disagreement yields a commitment to limitstrictly the power of the state to force others to live in ways whichacknowledge values they do not recognize. The limits to this are set by thestate’s obligation to make sure that all have similar freedoms. Defending

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20 Rawls, PL, pp. , . Freeman believes that Rawls rightly refuses to put this or any othercharacterization forward as a definition. I am concerned that without a definition independentof whether people abide by the requirements of strict political liberalism, the view threatens tobe circular. Compare Freeman, ‘Public Reason and Political Justification’, pp. , .Joshua Cohen, ‘A More Democratic Liberalism’, discusses the worry about circularity: seepp. , .

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the claim that commitment to the fair value of rights is a feature of allreasonable political conceptions is more difficult, and I shall not mount adefence of this here.

Rawls must intend these features to characterize any given politicalconception only partially. It is implausible to suppose that they would sufficeto settle all fundamental political issues, and Rawls clearly requires thepolitical conception to do this work. Thus any political conception willadditionally have to acknowledge and somehow rank various political valuessuch as public health, safety, and protection of natural resources. Manydifferent views about this are compatible with recognizing the priority andfair value of basic rights.

So reasonable citizens are those who accept the value of acting co-operatively and recognize the existence of reasonable disagreement, thosewho themselves aim to co-operate. We can achieve the ideal of co-operationif we can agree with these people about which political conceptions arereasonable views about the considerations on which the state should act.Rawls thinks that we should regard as primary among these considerationsthe protection of rights which ensure that we can participate in state powerand live as our own worldviews demand. All reasonable politicalconceptions will agree on at least this much.

IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT

I return now to the question deferred in the first section: to what extent isthe hope of achieving co-operative relationships with all reasonable citizensrealizable? The hope is realizable if and only if everyone who values co-operation can find enough common ground with everyone else who does soto be able to bring it about. All will be well so long as each reasonableperson can affirm a political conception robust enough to settle allfundamental political issues, and all can agree that those affirmed by othersalso count as reasonable. I part company with Rawls here, for I see noreason to suppose that we can always achieve this much agreement.

Rawls stakes his claim for the plausibility of finding the needed agreementon the notion that a political conception can be ‘presented as free-standing’(PL, p. ). A free-standing political conception is constructed from ideasin the political culture, and so is not reliant for its justification on anyparticular worldview. Whether we can construct a sufficiently robust free-standing political conception in any given society is a complicated empiricalquestion. It is unclear how to discern the likelihood that such a project could



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succeed prior to attempting to carry it out. Rawls suggests that we shouldunderstand his own view of justice as fairness as such an attempt.

But this strategy is problematic in two ways. First, it is unduly con-servative: only societies that inherit a robust liberal political culture enjoythe possibility of civic friendship. I think the theory can aim higher.Secondly and more importantly, Rawls’ strategy fails to explain whyindividuals should grant a political conception formed as he envisagesauthority. To answer this objection, one cannot avoid discussion of citizens’understanding of the justificatory relation between their worldviews andtheir political conceptions. Rawls acknowledges that there will normally besuch a relationship, and that it can contribute to citizens’ commitment to thefreestanding political conception. But the relationship is bound to do morethan this. If one’s own worldview supports the conception, then justificationfrom the political culture will be redundant. If the conception conflicts withone’s worldview, then it will be unclear how one could make sense of givingit overriding consideration. Indeed, in these circumstances it is unclear howone can make sense of weighing justifications available in the political cul-ture at all. In both cases the free-standing aspect of any political conceptionis normatively inert.

So the question how to find the needed common ground remains, and Ibelieve it cannot always be answered satisfactorily. Some thinkers, seeingthis clearly, have wanted to throw the whole view out, claiming that weshould reject political liberalism across the board. But this is too drastic.Even if we cannot always find common ground, political liberalism canprovide questions which should guide our thinking on matters of basicjustice. In particular, it asks us to interrogate our positions in the light of theproper role of the state. In this section I show how this might go in severalcontentious cases. If I am right about these, then the ideal of civic friendshiphas genuine practical value, but cannot do all that Rawls hopes. I concludewith cases in which the ideal seems unattainable.

In discussing cases, it is important to remember that commitment topublic reason is not supposed to settle issues (cf. Rawls, ‘The Idea of PublicReason Revisited’, pp. ff.). Arguments respecting the limits of public rea-son are available on both sides of many controversies. Determining one’sposition on these issues requires assessing competing arguments and makinga judgement. It is important to separate the possibility of continued dis-agreement on particular issues, which strict political liberals can perfectlywell recognize, from the possibility that there is no way to settle someissue without either appealing to or denying the truth of some worldview. Inthis situation, co-operation is impossible; we must fall back on somethingless ideal.

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Cases in which the ideal of co-operation is action-guiding have thefollowing structure: if all parties assume that all reasonable people affirmtheir worldview, they would settle the issue in one way. But, given the valueof co-operation and the existence of reasonable disagreement, it makes sensefrom each person’s own point of view to forgo the values each believes thissettlement would achieve. For instance, supporters of laws which attempt toregulate homosexual practices usually justify them by appeal to a worldviewon which the practices are impermissible. But since many who affirm thevalue of exercising state power co-operatively do not share this view, itcannot provide a basis for co-operation among all reasonable people.Moreover, someone who affirms a political conception which falls within therange of the reasonable denies that it is the state’s role to determine aparticular way of life for its citizens, and so will not take convictions aboutthe impermissibility of a practice as settling the quite different question ofhow the state should treat those who participate in it. Such a person’s inter-est in co-operative political relationships provides reason to oppose theselaws, and one can do so without revising or contradicting one’s moral views.

As for state recognition of homosexual unions as of the same kind asheterosexual marriages, it is harder to see how public reason could guidethis case, because it seems to require the state to take a stand on a valueabout which citizens disagree. No view about the relative value ofhomosexual and heterosexual relationships could by itself mark a citizen asunreasonable in the relevant sense. Any view about this is compatible withaffirming the reciprocity criterion, recognizing that other reasonable citizenswho affirm it have other views, and endorsing a political conception whichprioritizes basic rights.

Given the disagreement, recognizing heterosexual unions while excludinghomosexual ones, on the ground that there is some morally significantdifference between them, cannot provide the basis for co-operation.21 Thisdefence presumes the falsehood of the worldviews of some reasonablecitizens. Given their commitments, these citizens could not make sense ofco-operating in the policy, and could only understand it as exercising co-ercive power over them. But if state recognition of both as of the same kindrelies on the claim that there is no moral difference between them, then thejustification for this policy also appeals to a worldview not shared by allcitizens prepared to co-operate. Either way, the policy is not justifiable tosome reasonable citizens.



21 Some opponents of same-sex marriage base their arguments on its alleged undesirableeffects. These could, in principle, fall within the parameters of public reason. SeeA. Koppleman, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage’, University ofSt Thomas Law Journal, (), pp. –, for analysis.

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So public reason cannot speak to this question, understood as a refer-endum on the morality of certain sexual practices. Fortunately, it need notbe understood in this way. Rather, we should ask whether, in refusing torecognize homosexual relationships on the same terms as heterosexual ones,the state is according to some rights unfairly denied to others. Resolving thisdebate thus involves separating the state’s granting of certain rights andresponsibilities to couples from value judgements about their relationshipsarising from reasonable citizens’ worldviews. In order to mark this separa-tion, some propose making all state-enforced rights and responsibilitiesavailable to homosexual couples, but withholding the term ‘marriage’, withits moral resonances. Against this, others object that by assigning this termexclusively to heterosexual unions the state continues to affirm a morallysignificant difference. I believe the best response to this legitimate concern isto get the state out of the marriage business altogether. The state shouldsimply define a bundle of rights and responsibilities, call it somethingother than ‘marriage’, and make it possible for any two competent adultsto enter reciprocally into such a relationship, making no presumptionsabout the sexual nature, much less about the moral status, of theserelationships.

There are at least two kinds of objection to this view. Voices from theright proclaim a need to maintain a long-standing consensus on the natureand value of marriage and its role in society. Voices on the left claim thatthe demand for homosexual marriage is not only about rights, but aboutrespect for relationships which homosexual people value and with whichthey identify, respect which the term ‘marriage’ importantly expresses. I be-lieve that defenders of both positions want the same thing, viz a communitybuilt on consensus about valuable ways of life. This is worth wanting, but asI have argued above, it is not the appropriate aim of politics.

In these and many other cases, the value of co-operation may give peoplesufficient reason, from their own point of view, to support policies which donot realize all of the values they recognize. They can forgo the realization ofthese values in politics without denying their importance. But in other cases,people will have from their own point of view significant reasons not to co-operate, even as they recognize the value of doing so. In these cases, toignore the countervailing values in considering the policy in questioncould not but be to pretend that they are less important than the people inquestion take them to be. Thus people see themselves as choosing betweenusing the power of the state to compel those who do not share theirworldview to live in a way which makes sense only if that worldview is right,and denying the import of other values which they recognize. In caseslike this, public reason is silent. Public reason speaks only by endorsing

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settlements which do not deny the truth of any reasonable worldview heldby reasonable citizens. But here, by hypothesis, there is no such settlement.People who believe that co-operative relations with their fellow citizens areof great value must choose between forgoing one or another value. Some-times they may judge that civic friendship is important enough to justifyaction against their other reasons. But I see no reason to suppose that thiswill always be the verdict. When very great values are involved on the otherside, sometimes we take ourselves to be warranted in coercing fellowcitizens.

Many supporters of the American civil rights movement understood theirdemands for changes in civil rights law as supported by religious convictions.Suppose they further thought that no non-religious argument could justifythese demands. Then they would, from their own point of view, face achoice, either to coerce fellow citizens by imposing on them laws thatpresume the truth of their religion, or to forgo justice for non-whites. Ofcourse contemporary strict political liberals hold that it was an error to thinkthey had to depend on religious views. But if we seek a view about howcitizens ought to conduct themselves in politics, then the availability of someargument in public reason of which they were not aware is irrelevant. Whatmatters is how these religious supporters of the civil rights movement shouldunderstand themselves. I claim both that they must understand themselvesas choosing to coerce fellow citizens, and that nevertheless they would dothe right thing in doing so.

Nevertheless, the fact that it seems so obvious that the arguments neededwere available in public reason may be a distraction here. Other cases mayestablish the point. Suppose Anne’s religious commitments lead her tofavour a radical redistribution of wealth to the poor. She has considerednon-religious arguments for wealth redistribution and found them lacking.Perhaps she too is wrong. Perhaps one of these arguments is sound, and thusthere are reasons to be given which all reasonable people could accept with-out abandoning their own worldviews. But if she thinks not, then she mustunderstand herself as choosing between coercing others and forgoing justicefor the poor. If she places a high enough value on economic justice, shecannot reasonably co-operate in a policy she takes to contravene it. Evengranting that co-operation gives her some reason to do this, she need notjudge this reason to be sufficient. If she thinks not, she judges that her valuesrequire one kind of policy, while alternatives would be supported if and onlyif her worldview were false. Rawls’ hope for co-operative relationshipssimply appears unrealizable to someone in this position.

The issue on the contemporary scene which strikes me as least likely to beamenable to a solution endorsed by public reason is that of abortion. The



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political conception of a person, as Rawls understands it, remains silenthere. It indicates what kinds of considerations could justify a policy toeveryone, but it does not speak to the issue of who is owed justification. Butdetermining who counts as deserving state protection is crucial to settlingthe abortion issue. Those who hold that even an early foetus deserves pro-tection and those who do not can both meet the tests of being reasonablepeople. But the two sides disagree not only over the content of the laws, butalso on what counts as a reasonable political conception as it applies to thismatter, viz one that includes or excludes human rights for foetuses. Thosewho affirm this status for the foetus cannot reasonably agree to any concep-tion which supports permissive abortion policies. Those who deny it cannotreasonably agree to conceptions which support restrictive ones. I cannot seethat we can expect anyone to do anything here other than advocate theirown convictions.22 Some strict political liberals argue that the balance ofreasons which all could accept supports permissive policies on abortion.23

They argue that considerations which all reasonable people can accept asreasons, such as that women have a right to equality and liberty, count infavour of these policies. Some very strong considerations would need to bebrought against these to justify restrictive policies. But the strongest claimcounting against permissive policies, that abortion kills an innocent humanbeing, is not one that all reasonable people agree applies to the case at hand.So the balance of reasons accessible to all favours permissive policies.

But this argument fails to take seriously the insufficiency of thisjustification from some points of view. Those who hold that abortion is agrave moral wrong cannot accept the balance of reasons proposed herewithout abandoning or contradicting their own worldview. This is in partbecause it is impossible to assess whether some consideration is an accept-able reason independent of the position it purports to support. One mightaccept the liberty and equality of women as important reasons in manycontexts, but nevertheless reject these considerations as reasons for doingwhat is, as one might understand it, here proposed, namely, killing aninnocent. In comparison, that a policy increases the GNP could be a reasonto support it in some contexts, but will not count in favour of employingslave labour. Arguments like the one above rely on making assessmentsabout reasons without reference to policies. Once we reject this method, wecan see why disagreement persists as to what considerations count as reasonsin the abortion debate.

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22 Cf. Dworkin, ‘Rawls and the Law’, Fordham Legal Review, (–), p. ; A. Guttmanand D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Harvard UP, ), pp. –.

23 See, e.g., Dombrowski, Rawls and Religion, ch. ; Cohen, ‘A More Democratic Liberalism’,p. .

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On my view, since there is no settlement that all reasonable citizens canaccept without denying an important tenet of their worldviews, public rea-son remains silent here. Compare Samuel Freeman’s reading (‘PublicReason and Political Justification’, pp. –) of the role and authority ofpublic reason with respect to abortion. He interprets the debate quitedifferently, holding that public reason does speak, providing a more or lessdefinite settlement, despite the fact that not all reasonable people can agreeto this settlement. In particular, he thinks that public reason dictates thatabortion should be legal and available, at least in the first trimester, butrecognizes that some reasonable citizens cannot regard this resolution asjustified. So he distinguishes the question whether public reason can providea resolution from the question whether all reasonable people can accept itssettlement. On my view, these two questions cannot come apart.

The difference arises because Freeman interprets public reason asaddressed to free and equal citizens as such. He thus interprets thereciprocity criterion as requiring reasons which others can accept qua

citizens, not, as on my view, those they could accept without denying thetruth of their worldview. This limits us to appealing only to interestscharacteristic of free and equal citizens as such on fundamental questions.24

Freeman holds that these include an interest in developing what Rawls callscitizens’ moral powers and in the conditions needed to secure and maintaintheir freedom.

Freeman’s reading has the advantages of establishing a well definedcontent for public reason, and avoiding the worry that false worldviews willinfluence government policy. But it also has a distinct disadvantage: it doesnot guarantee that reasonable citizens can make sense of a justification inpublic reason as justifying the policy in question to themselves. Freemanaddresses this worry with respect to abortion, but only to explain why wecan reasonably hope that the remaining dissent will not destabilize thesociety. In so doing, he ignores the point of defending one’s views in publicreason, on both my account and his own.

Freeman (pp. , ) suggests that the requirement to limit ourselves topublic reason in defending fundamental political views is based on theobligation to respect our fellow citizens’ liberty of conscience. This makes hisview look similar to my own, since we cannot co-operate with people whilerequiring them to act against their consciences. But Freeman’s treatment ofdissent in the abortion issue brings out a tension. By his own lights, it isunclear how pro-life citizens who sincerely regard abortion as tantamount tomurder can understand this policy as not violating their consciences. These



24 Freeman, ‘Public Reason and Political Justification’, pp. , –, .

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citizens understand themselves as implicated in the most serious of moralwrongs when they pay taxes to support a government that permits abortion.If such outcomes are possible even when all citizens respect the limits ofpublic reason, then respecting these limits is no guarantee of protection forliberty of conscience, or, in my terms, of co-operation. But then these valuescannot provide a justification for limiting ourselves to public reason in ourown policy deliberations.

The lesson from the cases that I have discussed is that the value of co-operative relationships should often move people not to use state powersimply to force others’ compliance with their values, or to bring about moreconsensus on those values. But the value of co-operation should not bethought sufficient to move them to violate a perceived obligation to protectsome members of society from injustice. In cases where reasonable peoplehave conflicting views about what these obligations are, agreement aboutwhich policies could be justified will be difficult and perhaps impossible toachieve. On such cases, contra strict political liberals, I hold that citizens haveno better option than to support the policy they think best.

Though the ideal of co-operation is out of reach in such cases, otherRawlsian characterizations of possible relations between citizens do notdescribe them well either. They do not necessarily result in a modus vivendi,since this is characterized by merely strategic commitment to a policy,contingent on the balance of power among competing factions. In contrast,in the cases at hand citizens support a given policy precisely becausethey have a moral commitment to it, not because they think that it bestpromotes their interests or the interests of their group. Nor need thesesituations cause anyone to think that fellow citizens’ interests do not countin making policy.

So while we cannot stand in the relationship of civic friendship thatRawls hopes for without sufficient agreement among reasonable people,neither must we stand in the relation of civic enemies. The distinctionsamong possible relationships I drew in §I come into their own here. Even ifcivic friendship is the ideal for political relationships, there are better andworse ways to construct our relationships when we cannot attain it.

Standing in co-operative relationships with fellow citizens is of greatvalue, and all reasonable people recognize this. Finding considerationswhich all reasonable people can recognize as reasons bearing on the issue athand allows us to exercise state power co-operatively, an outcome all shouldwelcome. The value of co-operation thus provides reason to groundfundamental policies in this way, and so explains how one could reasonablyforgo enacting a policy that recognizes all the values of one’s worldview,without denying that these are values.

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But there is no reason to think in advance that the necessary agreement isalways available. It is not available when people committed to the ideal ofco-operation nevertheless have conflicting views about what justice requires.When forced to choose between fulfilling perceived obligations of justice andco-operating with their fellow citizens in policies that do not meet theseobligations, reasonable people may opt for coercion. Given their commit-ment to the value of co-operation, they will regret that this is the best theycan do.

I have not seen any argument which could convince people that in suchcases they must violate their perceived obligations to maintain co-operativerelationships. This is the case which must be made if the theory is to havepractical import for the citizens whose reasoning it aims to guide. But if I amright that Rawls’ hope is unrealizable in some cases, then the task for us is todiscern which these are, and what justice demands in each.25

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25 Thanks to the many people who read and commented on previous drafts. These includeEric Anderson, Arthur Applbaum, Michael Blake, Samuel Fleischacker, Jon Garthoff,Waheed Hussain, Niko Kolodny, Andrew Koppelman, Ian MacMullen, Bryan McGraw andJapa Pallikkathayil.

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the beginning of community: politics in the face of disagreement

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