?b JOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES A N D CRISIS MANAGEMENT

AGENCY REPORT: The Braer Disaster: A Virtuous Crisis? - International Responsibility and Prevention of Incidents at

Simon Booth*

Introduction

Sea

he strength of the UK inquiry system is T that it is meticulous and exhaustive. Its weakness is that inquiries operate strictly within the terms of references given, which can lead to a narrowing of focus. There is also no necessary follow up of the recommenda- tions by public agencies and authorities. The information which surfaces in such inquiries can lead to public learning but little or no real change. There may be understandable reasons for this. The inquiry into the Zeebrugge disaster, for example, provided an excellent analysis of the inherent structural weaknesses of the roll-on-roll-off ferry system which has yet to lead to measures to prevent future similar situations occurring because, despite public concern, the British government found that there was difficulty in getting concerted international action. Direct action, in the form of welding bow doors, was taken by some governments only after the sinking of the Estonia in September 3994 (Carnegy and Lloyd, 1994). Similarly, the Bruer disaster led to a number of important reports which provided information on the effectiveness of the emergency planning and response to the incident and raise important questions about public learning and international regulation in the interests of safety. The heart of the problem lies not in the arena of national control, but with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN body responsible for international shipping agreements. Trans- lating understandable calls for urgent action at the national level to changes in such international bodies represents a significant challenge.

The Rraer incident could be seen as an examule of serendiuitv in two main wavs as

I I , J

far as public agencies were concerned. First, it was thought to be a major disaster which led

*Simon Booth, Department ot ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ of Reading I K to the maximum emergency response and

which, through good luck rather than through good emergency planning, did not lead to the expected devastating consequences. The reality of the incident led to an excellent spin- off effect. It forced the agencies to fully operationalize their emergency plans for coping with a major disaster. This enabled them to learn a great deal about the effectiveness of their plans and how they managed interpretability issues. This resulted in the report by the Marine Pollution Control Unit (MPCU, 1993) which evaluated the effectiveness of the emergency response Secondly, the incident caused such a public shock that an inquiry was set up to advise 017 whether further measures were appropriate and feasible to protect the UK coastline from pollution from merchant shipping. This resulted in the report by Lord Donaldson (1994) which itself led to calls for urgent action (Batchelor, 1994).

The MV Rraer was an oil tanker carrying 84,700 tons of Norwegian Gullfaks oil and 1,600 tonnes of heavy fuel oil when, due to engine failure and extreme storm conditions. it was wrecked on the rocks of Garth Ness in the Shetlands on 5 January 1993.

Almost all of its cargo of oil leaked into the sea or was blown onto land by the storm force winds. The tanker finally cracked up and sank resulting in a total loss. This was the worst leakage of oil since the Amoro Cudiz in 1979 which lost 227,000 tonnes, and the Torr?y Canyon, which lost 119,000 tonnes in 1967 I t represented a greater potential disaster than the Exxon Valdez which lost 37,000 tonnes in 1989. The extraordinary result was that, unlike these incidents, the loss of oil from the Rraer did not lead to any significant pollution nor the expected environmental catastrophe As a consequence of this there was little delay in completing the various inquiries because o f

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legal proceedings and there was an absence of defensiveness and blaming often associated with such post-hoc evaluations of crisis events. As such, the incident represented an excellent opportunity for learning for the public authorities, international agencies as well as operators and owners. Learning from this case, as well as previous ones, could help in developing contingency plans to prevent at least a number of similar incidents occurring in the future. The question is, have the authorities learnt the right lessons?

Emergency response

The report on the emergency response to the Braer crisis shows that the emergency management systems were effectively and efficiently established. The contingency plan developed by the MPCU operated success- fully. What was not tested was the effect of strain on those concerned, had the result of the spill been pollution on a scale similar to the Exxon Vuldez disaster.

Two important lessons were learnt by emergency managers from the disaster. First, the need for earlier warning to enable them to have a longer time period to build up the response effort which might need to extend over months. The MPCU recognised that the last thing an owner or master of a ship wants to do is be responsible for an incident, because this can lead to legal proceedings, compensa- tion, loss of life and pollution. Partly as a consequence of this, masters tend to put off calling for assistance. They think they are working in the interests of their employers in doing this, but in the hope of reducing the costs of temporary assistance they may be increasing the risk of much larger losses. The problem for those who may be responsible for emergency response is that they can do little until there is a significant potential for an incident. As a result there can be a delay in providing the substantive response needed, especially in remote areas. The lesson is that action should be taken earlier to alert the MPCU so they can begin the process of the response operation. What is a matter of public concern is that this lesson should have been learnt from the Exxon Valdez case, where this issue had been highlighted.

Secondly, there is the need for accurate information on the nature of the pollution. In the case of the Braer the weather was very severe for a week after the disaster and this meant that spraying dispersant from aircraft was only possible on a very limited basis. Not until five days after the spill was it possible to really begin spraying; 20 tons of dispersant

was sprayed successfully dispersing oil. In total, 120 tons of dispersant was used.

In the post-incident reviews it was suggested that spraying was unnecessary and might have caused more harm than good. The reason for this was that the type of oil was ‘Gullfaks Crude’ which, being a light oil, dispersed naturally in stormy conditions. While the emergency managers knew the type of the oil, they did not know about these properties until much later. They were doing what they thought was correct and taking risks to do the job they thought had to be done. But, with hindsight, it was established that spraying was not appropriate when the storms were doing the job of dispersing the oil naturally. An important lesson was to improve the database on information about the nature and properties of crude oil so that the MPCU in future would know when spraying would be appropriate.

Other lessons for future contingency plans included the need to identify areas of sensitivity where spraying dispersant could adversely affect fish farmers or wildlife sanctuaries and the problem of how to protect fish farms from pollution. In addition, some problems that are common in crises re- appeared. In particular the report cited the problem of dealing with the media. Whilst the control centre dealt successfully with over 500 reporters and newsmen, they found demands for individual interviews with those involved in the operational side took people away from important operational matters. The report recommended that an experienced Press Officer should be available to deal with such inquiries and to handle the many requests from VIPs for visits.

The incident, therefore, represented a valuable opportunity for organizational learning and enabled the MPCU to improve its plans for the next incident. Developing better contingency plans through evaluations of previous crises represents only one side of the coin. Prevention is at least as important. The Braer was a Liberian registered tanker and the issue of prevention of incidents raises a challenge not just for the UK government but for the community of states concerned with the management of maritime problems.

International regulation to prevent incidents at sea

Some of the most important trading states in the world; the USA, Japan and the UK rely on efficient and effective sea transport. For the UK, 77 per cent of imports and 74 per cent of exports (by value) are transported by sea.

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These states, therefore, have an interest in upholding the highest standards of quality and efficiency of sea transport. Other states, according to Donaldson (1994), have lower standards or, whilst proclaiming that they adhere to international convention, do not in practice implement the standards required. In what is, without doubt, a tightly coupled and highly complex system, a very small number of what Donaldson (1994) calls ’fly-by-night’ operators have the potential to create significant crises. They act like a burning fuse with the potential to cause incidents anywhere in the world. The intention of the Donaldson report was to force the operators of such ships to improve their standards or go out of business.

There are two main difficulties in achieving this. First, it is likely to be very difficult to be able to eradicate what Donaldson calls the ’cheats’ using legal mechanisms. International law amounts to no more than an expectation that operators will abide by its codes in enlightened self interest. Outside territorial waters there are no real penalties for failing to keep to commonly accepted norms, let alone international law. In reality, operators can do as they please on the ’high seas’. For example, only about 10 per cent of pollution comes from big spills. The rest comes from small accidental spills or from illegal discharges at sea. Discharges of oil and waste by masters may be illegal, but the lure of the ’free rider’ syndrome is stronger than the fear of getting caught. In UK waters there have been only three prosecutions for waste discharge and the maximum fine is only f1,000. With only two aircraft monitoring shipping in UK waters, the chances of being caught are remote.

Secondly, the only possibly effective control over operators is by the Flag State which has the right to impose any standards above the internationally agreed minimum. Despite this, many states find it impossible to police their fleet which, at any moment, could be scattered around the world. For example, over 85 per cent of the inspections of Indian registered ships uncovered deficiencies. Some states have not responded in the past to encourage- ment to improve standards and have found it in their immediate short-term interest (in terms of flagging revenues and employment) to maintain a low standard. Many operators have moved from high-cost flags, such as the UK, to low-cost flag states.

There are, therefore, states that have neither the ability nor will to supervise the safety of their ships. States such as Cyprus, St Vincent, Vanatu, Panama, Greece, Bahamas and Liberia have had a significant increase in their fleet since 1988 and, as shown in Table 1

Table 1: Flags of ships inziofved zn incidents in UK waters: 1993

__

Liberia Russia Bahamas Denmark Panama Spain Bermuda Britain Cuba Cyprus France Greece Italy Latvia St Vincent Vanatu

Source: Donaldson (1994)

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above, have had ships involved in incidents in UK waters. In Pauchant and Mitroff’s (1988) terms, it could be suggested that, on the face of it, these states come into a ’crisis pmnc’ category.

The basically problematic nature of t h e regulatory environment would not necessarily be significant were it not for two other important factors. First, the fact that highlv dangerous and toxic substances are frequentlv carried by ships with ‘convenience flags’. Th can lead to potentially significant problems There is supposed to be a higher standard of construction for ships carrying toxic sub- stances, but in reality this does not necessarily mean they are safer. For example, inspections by Port authorities found that on average 5.6 per cent of ships in 1992 were detained for nn infringement of regulations. More disturbing was the fact that 6 per cent of chemical tankers and 8 per cent of oil tankers were detained by Port states for not abiding by international conventions. Secondly, there are ’bottleneck passages’ in some parts of the world where collisions and accidents at sea occur with x~

relatively high frequency and which, in a worst case, could have very significant adverse environmental consequences. For example, o f the 29 incidents in UK waters in 1993, nine occurred in the English Channel. In this situation it might be expected that it would br. in the interests of all parties to learn lesson.; from previous incidents and accidents. But in the period since the Bruer disaster there have been 67 incidents in UK waters (up to earlv 1994).

Of the 28 incidents in UK waters in 1993 (see Table 2), probably the most regulated and busiest waters in the world, four resulted in

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Table 2: Categorization of causes of incidents in UK waters: 2993

1 Cause Number I Mechanical Human Natural causes (weather)

12 10

6

the total loss of the ship. In all other cases ships were towed or repaired.

In terms of the nature of the cargoes on board of ships involved in incidents, two involved LPG and a further six involved inflammable or toxic chemicals. A further six incidents dealt with oil. In 1993, therefore, almost half of the incidents in British waters involved ships with a potential for adverse environmental consequences. This fact together with the known higher than average detention rate for ships transporting chemicals led the Donaldson inquiry (1994) to recom- mend that steps be taken to further investigate and consider remedial measures.

In one incident, the master of a ship in the English Channel (which is like a motonvay for ships) was going the wrong way down one lane, without a chart or pilot and unable to communicate in English! In another incident, a ship with a highly volatile chemical cargo collided with a ferry.

Prevention of some incidents is possible. Given that mechanical failure and human error are those most common causes of incidents, there is a case to be made for looking at the role of regulations and specifically at the issue of whether to adopt a ’safety case regime’. This would entail the setting of primary safety goals for all aspects of ship operation, based on a risk assessment, cost benefit analysis and an internationally agreed level of acceptable risk. Each ship would be audited, on a regular basis and have to demonstrate that it met the relevant safety goals. In the UK, a similar approach has been adopted by the railway system which has learnt through bitter experi- ence that simply imposing rules is not enough to ensure safety.

Where it is possible to enforce and police such a system there might be merit in it. But the problem with shipping is that the Flag State has the final authority and enforcement must come from this source. It is unrealistic to expect Flag States to enforce a safety case regime if they do not even enforce the existing, more relaxed, control measures. Instead, the Donaldson report (1994) follows the UK government’s compromise approach, which is

to formulate practical proposals which emphasize the totality of a ship’s performance compared to the hazards the ship might encounter. This ’formal safety assessment’ approach aims to identify relevant hazards; assess the risk of the hazards; identify how those risks can be managed; carry out a cost- benefit analysis of the options identified; and make clear decisions on which options to select. Adopting such an approach would be a step in the right direction, but this seems as doomed to failure as the more rigorous ’safety case’ approach because of the unwillingness of Flag States to take any significant action. The British Transport Minister announced that the government intended to shame ship owners into raising standards by publishing a monthly list of substandard vessels calling at LJK ports (Batchelor, 1994). Such an approach clearly fails to deal with the heart of the problem which is in the inter- governmental arena.

Conclusion

Public opinion and many ship operators in the USA and Europe appear to be ready to support a stronger approach given that their interests could be adversely affected (Bonnieux and Rainelli, 1993). The fact that there had been on average about one incident each week re- ported in or near British waters during the sitting of the inquiry led the media to suggest that the industry was in ’near crisis’ and that low safety standards were a cause of public concern (Financial Times, 1994). The conse- quence of taking the line of least resistance is to play into the hands of the very states that the report criticises. This would do little to improve the present situation. It would be a cause for concern if Europe, like the US, had to experience an incident, like the Exxon Valdez, before taking action. The Braer, in any case, has provided the UK and Europe with all the ammunition it needs, without the pollution, to press for changes in the most important area - international regulation.

The Braer was a very lucky escape. It is clear that some important lessons have been learnt. What is unclear is whether this will be translated into effective action to prevent similar incidents in the future. For example, it is a matter of regret that the Donaldson report (1994) did not recommend that vessels should be fitted with transponders to allow them to be located in case of illegal discharges. It would be too cynical to suggest that states only act after they have experienced the worst possible crises. The problem is that no one state has the power to change the international

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regulations. The UK, like the US, can take direct action only in its own waters,

It is surprising that on the one hand the inquiry should accurately identify the problem but, then, avoid the logical solution of joining with the USA to take a more muscular approach in the international arena. The challenge that the present inadequate inter- national standards represent is a serious one. Changing the IMO regulations will not be an easy task. Nevertheless, by adopting the US approach of unlimited liability, coupled with the agreement of the three great trading blocks, ships which did not conform to the standards set would simply not be able to operate. Perhaps governments can exhibit the same syndrome that Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) identified in some crisis-prone firms, namely that nothing bad can happen to us. The Braer incident, like a benign tumour, can be seen as a virtuous crisis; it showed clearly that the dangers of a serious incident are real and similar potential dangers are occurring every week. The existing situation is not likely to be improved by incremental steps that rely only on the goodwill of the worst offender Flag States. For effective learning to take place urgent action must be taken by member states of the IMO.

References

Batchelor, c‘. (1994), ’Low Safety Standards Cause Alarm‘, rinancial Times, 18 May, p. 7.

Bonnieux, F. and Rainelli, P. (1993), ‘Learning from the Amoco Cadiz Oil Spill: Damage Valuation and Court’s Ruling’, lndirstrinl nnd Environmenful Crisis Quarferly, Volume 7 . Number 7, pp

Carnegy, H. and Lloyd, J . (1994), ‘Six Ferries in

Near Accidents’, Finaizcial Tinies, 30 September

Donaldson, Rt. Hon. The Lord Donaldson t ~ t

Lymington (1994), Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Transport, HMSO, Cm 2560, May, pp xxix + 522.

Financial Times (1994), ’Oil on the Rocks Again Editorial, 18 May, p. 21.

Mitroff, I. and Pauchant, T. (1990), We’re So Bis a i d Pozcierful That Nothing Bad &if H a p p w to Us , Carol Publishing, New York.

MPCU (1993), The Braer Irzcidenf (Report by the Marine Pollution Control Unit), Department of ‘Transport, HMSO, London, December.

Pauchant, T. and Mitroff, 1. (1988), ’Crisis Prone Versus Crisis-Avoiding Organizations: Is Your Company’s Culture Its Own Worst Enemy in Creating Crises?’, Indust r i d Crisis Quurtcrlv. Volume 2, Number 1, pp. 53-63,

169- 188.

p. 1.

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