1

THE CARIBBEAN NEGOTIATION PROCESS: A COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT MODELS OF NEGOTIATIONS USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT

AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARICOM SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY

Liesl M. Harewood

A dissertation presented in the Department of History, International Relations and Politics, Coventry University, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy, Law and Global Change

September 2005

2

ABSTRACT

Today the member states of the Caribbean Community are confronted with

situations both regionally and internationally which threaten to frustrate the economic

development and which calls for a special type of collective resolve to chart the way

through a changing and turbulent world economy. The Caribbean region has recognised

that it cannot be excluded from the global economic and trading system even though it is

in a tremendously disadvantageous position compared to some of its dominant and

strongest players.

Several academics have begun to explore, identify and develop the initial format

for what is being termed a ‘beyond CARICOM’ agenda for the region. This would

incorporate cooperation and integration with the non-CARICOM Caribbean-that is

Central and Latin America, and even the state of Florida in the United States of America-

on matters that range from joint trade and investment policies to common negotiation

positions vis-à-vis the North American Free Trade Area, and trade liberalisation

throughout the hemisphere by means of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.

To be considered as a serious international actor, the Caribbean Community must

be placed within the wider hemispheric and global community. This dissertation will

attempt to trace the key negotiating developments that led to the establishment of the

Caribbean Free Trade Area, later the Caribbean Community, and beyond that the

significant initiatives being taken to strengthen the region, most notably by the

CARICOM Single Market and Economy.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………….…….i

ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………..…..ii

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………..…...6

CHAPTER ONE………………………………………………………………………..10 Negotiation theory in practice: Background of the Caribbean Negotiation Process • From Crisis to Caribbean Integration…………………………………………….....11

• The Significance of the Grand Anse Declaration of 1989…..……..……………….13

• The Impact of Traditional and Alternative Models of Negotiation on Integration and Regionalisation……………..………………16 CHAPTER TWO……………………………………………………………………….22 The Dominance of Bilateral Negotiations during the CARICOM era

• The Bilateral Negotiations of CARIFTA and CARICOM………..………………..23

• Investigative Reports Pave the way for CARICOM…………………………….... 28

• The Role and Importance of the Main Actors in the Bilateral Negotiations…………………………………………………...30

CHAPTER THREE ……………………………………………………………………33 Multilateralism: The Way Forward from CARICOM to CSME?

• The Multilateral Negotiations of the Protocols……………………………………..35

• The Importance of the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery……………….38

• Multiple Actors in the Emerging System…………………………………………...42

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………........49

APPENDIX…...................................................................................................................57

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………61

4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many thanks to my supervisor Brian Hocking for invaluable advice and support

throughout this challenging yet ultimately rewarding experience. I would also like to

thank the entire academic staff, particularly my personal tutor Steven Curtis, for your

advice and encouraging words throughout the year. To all the students related to this

course over the past year- especially Miss Pretty Cyprus, Richard-the Godfather, Herr

Vockel, the Mexican, Patsa-and Flat 14 Lynden House-you made Coventry my home and

I will always remember and appreciate that. Now let us go take over the world!

To my colleagues and staff linked to the George Eliot, William Morris and Languages

Centre Reception-thanks for the distractions.

To the Caribbean region, fulfill your mandate. If failure has often been in the headlines,

progress continues to be made in the fine print. Become one people, one nation, one

destiny.

To God-for always being there, even when I choose to ignore.

And finally, to mom, dad, my brother (I love you all more than I say), the Hynams, and

my family and friends, thank you for everything. It’s over, I’m coming home, it’s really

now beginning.

5

ABBREVIATIONS

CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market

CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Area

CCJ Caribbean Court of Justice

COTED Council on Trade and Development

CRNM Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery

CSME CARICOM Single Market and Economy

EU European Union

FTA Free Trade Area

FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas

GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services

IMF International Monetary Fund

JLP Jamaica Labour Party

LDCs Less Developed Countries

MDCs More Developed Countries

NAFTA North American Free Trade Area

NGOs Non Governmental Organisations

ODA Overseas Development Assistance

REPA Regional Economic Partnerships Agreement

SME Single Market and Economy

USA United States of America

WIC West Indian Commission

6

INTRODUCTION

‘The art of negotiation…is so important that the fate of the greatest states often depends upon the good or bad conduct of negotiations and upon the degree of capacity in the negotiators employed.’1

Historically, the dynamics of the negotiating process affecting regional

cooperation and economic integration in the Caribbean have been the subject of great

interest and study on the part of academia, business and public policymakers.2

Furthermore, the role of negotiations as a powerful vehicle for promoting the stability of

the international system has continued to increase exponentially in recent times, and

within the Caribbean region, the Heads of Government face myriad international and

regional challenges. It is undeniable that the regional negotiation experience has resulted

in a respectable institutional record: the Caribbean Community and Common Market

(CARICOM) Secretariat in Guyana; the University of the West Indies (UWI) in Jamaica,

Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago; and the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) in

Barbados, among others, and it will be the objective of this dissertation to examine the

negotiation and decision-making processes involved in the development of the Caribbean

Single Market and Economy (CSME).

The creation of the CSME is the most complex, the most ambitious and the most

difficult enterprise ever contemplated by the Caribbean region. In a region which, as

Philip Sherlock has observed, ‘division is the heritage, contrast is the keynote, and

1 F. De. Callières quoted in William F.G. Mastenbroek ‘Development of Negotiating Skills’ in Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, (Oxford: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991), p. 380. 2 David E. Lewis, ‘Intra-Caribbean Relations: A Review and Projections’ in Anthony T. Bryan (ed.), The Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy, (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1995), p. 75.

7

competition is the dominant theme’,3 the scale and depth of negotiations required have

certainly evolved. This dissertation will attempt to shed light on the Caribbean

negotiation process by comparing different models of negotiation used in the

development and implementation of the CSME. An examination of the impact of

bilateral and multilateral negotiations will be undertaken. It will be acknowledged that,

on the one hand, the context and forms of negotiation may have changed to adapt to the

world environment as influenced by the multiple actors now legitimately involved in the

negotiation process. However, on the other hand, while acknowledging that the context

and forms of negotiation may have changed to adapt to the current world environment as

created by various social, political and economic situations, the negotiating process

remains an important function of diplomacy in both the traditional and more modern

contexts of Caribbean regional integration.

While academics and practitioners are still trying to determine the ‘common

elements in the analysis of negotiations’,4 the negotiating environment is subject to many

influences and it is important to understand the nature and the context in which these

influences can make an impact on the processes of regional negotiation. Purely domestic

factors may, and indeed do, have crucial impact on the relevance of CARICOM and the

CSME. Some of these domestic factors include directives from governments who regard

regional negotiation as an extension of their foreign policy and who tend to adjust it to

the interests of that policy, and to the concern of the interested political groups and their

domestic constituencies. It is impossible to completely eliminate external international

influences on the process of regional negotiations, particularly in a contemporary world

3 Retrieved June 15, 2005 from http://www.caricom.org. 4 I.W. Zartman cited in Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation, p. 40.

8

arena where every regional negotiation is, either explicitly of implicitly, part of a much

broader network of international negotiations. This is especially true of the Caribbean,

which, historically, has existed under the not always benign political, economic and

cultural influence of the United States of America (USA). The plethora of negotiations

and regional integration agreements, each varying in their complexity, depth, and pace of

implementation has been aptly described by Bhagwati as a ‘spaghetti bowl’ and has

prompted Majluf to portray the developing countries as presently ‘swimming in a

spaghetti bowl of regional agreements’.5 Furthermore, it is in fact widely agreed that

when negotiated policies are more in line with actual needs, they are more readily

accepted by the people concerned and are therefore easier to implement and enforce.6

Chapter One will outline the historical background of the Caribbean negotiation

process. There will be a brief examination of negotiation theory in practice, and the

dichotomy existing between the traditional and alternative models of negotiation and the

impact they both have on the theories and reality of integration and regionalisation, will

be highlighted. Chapter Two will describe the dominance of bilateral negotiations from

the creation and subsequent dissolution of the West Indies Federation, the Caribbean Free

Trade Area (CARIFTA), and to the heralded Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973. There will

be an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the government-to-government

negotiating practices that were dominant during this phase of regional integration,

including a discussion regarding the negotiating and diplomatic strengths and weaknesses

of the created entity of CARICOM. By way of comparison and contrast with the

dominant bilateral negotiations of Chapter Two, Chapter Three will present the emerging

5 Ibid., p. 7. 6 Carlo Carraro et al., ‘Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues’, Coalition Theory Network, May 2005. Retrieved July 24, 2005 from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=722362.

9

prominence of the multilateral negotiations used during the implementation of the CSME.

Some reasons for the proliferation of multilateral negotiations in the contemporary world

arena, and particularly the Caribbean region will be posited. Furthermore, it will be

discussed whether bilateral or multilateral negotiations, with regards to the creation of

CARIFTA, CARICOM and subsequently the CSME, have been more effective within the

Caribbean region. The conclusion will reflect on the arguments that have arisen

throughout the dissertation and seek to identify the advantages and disadvantages of the

varying negotiating processes used to implement CARICOM and subsequently the

CSME. The question that will remain to be answered is whether the negotiations used for

the implementation of the CSME will be more effective in creating a regional institution

that is relevant in the twenty-first century. While there will be a consolidation of the

arguments presented, there will also be a suggestion of potential challenges which will

continue to face the Caribbean region as it pursues its goals.

10

CHAPTER ONE

NEGOTIATION THEORY IN PRACTICE: BACKGROUND OF THE CARIBBEAN NEGOTIATION PROCESS

The fifteen Caribbean economies7 involved in the exercise to reconstitute

themselves as the CSME have, over an extended period of over four hundred years,

incorporated into their structure and functioning certain systematic features which bear

directly on their capacity to achieve a CSME. The first is that they have evolved as

economic systems distinctly separated from each other, but closely and effectively

integrated into the economies of the metropolitan, advanced economies with which they

have been associated.8 In such a context, they have evolved inheriting few natural

indigenous economic impulses for the maximisation of resource use. Secondly, over an

extended period, the respective Caribbean economies have implemented a formidable

array of barriers to the easy and free movement of goods, services, skills and capital.

Indeed, it might well be said that foreign enterprise and entities have, in general, been

traditionally afforded a more accommodating and potentially profitable environment

within which to do business than the typical Caribbean enterprise.9 Thirdly, and perhaps

of overwhelming significance, has been the extent to which the structure of most

Caribbean economies has been shaped until recently by two reinforcing set of policies

and circumstances. The first has been the deployment across the region of a wide array

of tariff and non-tariff devices to afford high levels of protection against external

7 These fifteen Caribbean states involved in the CSME negotiations are: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Suriname, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago. 8 Retrieved July 20, 2005 from http://www.blp.org.bb/speeches/newyorkcsme.pdf. 9 Ibid.

11

competition to domestic and especially infant enterprises. The second has been the

widespread reliance of the respective Caribbean economies on preferential one-way duty

free access to the markets of their main trading partners under the auspices of trade

agreements such as the Lomé Agreements. While these trade arrangements have

provided some elements of stability and assuredness of market for traditional industries in

manufacturing and agriculture, they have always locked the region’s economies into

patterns of resource use that militate against dexterity in resource deployment in the

rapidly changing costs and demand conditions that exist in today’s world.

As a consequence of the deep-seated dependence on these two peculiar

instruments of economic development-high levels of domestic protection internally, and a

high level of dependence on trade preference externally-the Caribbean has come to this

particular juncture in the evolution of the global economy, which is itself exemplified by

an almost total commitment to the precepts and practice of economic, financial and trade

liberalisation, facing a new profound and unique development dilemma. Not only is the

Caribbean region the world’s smallest and most vulnerable economic bloc, but it also

contains a set of societies which have to undertake a more drastic and comprehensive

restructuring of their economic systems than any other set of economies if they wish to

survive in the global market.

I. FROM CRISIS TO CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION

The contemporary enterprise to integrate the economies of the Caribbean is linked

to the establishment of CARIFTA in 1968 to CARICOM in 1973, and now the CSME in

2005. This process owes a great deal to the body of ideas that was developed in the

12

1960s about development and integration in the region.10 The principal feature of

CARIFTA was the removal of tariffs and other barriers to the intra-regional trade in

goods that were produced within the region.11 Five years after the establishment of

CARIFTA, came the birth of CARICOM via the implementation of the 1973 Treaty of

Chaguaramas (the 1973 Treaty).12 One of the principal differences between CARIFTA

of 1968 and CARICOM of 1973 was the concession made for the quest of a common

policy to protect industries in the Caribbean from extra regional imports by means of a

common external tariff. This tariff was intended to be fully implemented by 1981 but

this never occurred due to the fact that there was not a single meeting of the Heads of

Government in Annual Conference between 1975 and 1982.

With the rapid emergence of globalisation in the 1980s, the 1973 Treaty proved

an inadequate mechanism for facilitating responses to a new world economy which

involved larger markets, intense competition and the free movement of capital. The

emergence of mega trading blocs in different parts of the world and the development of

the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA), meant a Single Market and Economy

(SME) became an urgent necessity for the Caribbean region. Therefore, it was clear that

a new framework for growth was needed and it was at the CARICOM Summit in Grand

Anse, Grenada, in 1989, that the Heads of Government decided to take regional

10 The work of Lloyd Best and William Demas on the political economy of transformation, and the monumental study of the Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration by Havelock Brewster and Clive Thomas, stand out as intellectual landmarks that paved the way for later governmental action. 11 Not surprisingly, any economic integration process in the Caribbean that limits itself to the liberalisation of the trade in goods only will yield very modest results and CARIFTA led to a small boost in intra-regional trade which came to represent approximately 10% of all the trade carried out by the economies of the region. 12 The 1973 Treaty was signed by Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago and came into effect on 1 August 1973. Subsequently eleven other territories would join CARICOM.

13

integration, as originally conceived in 1973, several steps further.13 This decision was

motivated by the need ‘to deepen the integration process and strengthen Caribbean

Community in all of its dimensions to respond to the challenges and opportunities

presented by changes in the global economy’.14 The Heads of Government recognised

the importance and special roles of the private sector, the trade union movement, regional

universities, religious organisations, women and youth organisations, the professions,

non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and ‘people of all walks and condition of life’,15

and they agreed on a number of actions to advance the goals of the 1973 Treaty.16

II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GRAND ANSE DECLARATION OF 1989

The Grand Anse Declaration of 1989 represented a renewed impetus to ensure the

implementation of the agreements reached by CARICOM since its inception. This was a

direct response to the progress Western Europe had made in its own integration attempt,

and it confirmed the need to establish a SME in the shortest possible time. The

Declaration was achieved through the versatile interaction between bilateral and

multilateral negotiations, which consisted of discussions between ‘officially designated

representatives designed to achieve the formal agreement of their governments…on

issues…in shared concern or in dispute between them’.17 It encompassed a series of

measures in both the economic integration and functional cooperation spheres and

13 The Grand Anse Declaration of 1989 is often regarded as the treaty which conceived the CSME. 14 Cited from ‘Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) Single Market and Economy’, Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. Retrieved June 30, 2005 from http://www.mfaft.gov.jm/Intl_Communit/Caricom.htm. 15 Kenneth O. Hall (ed.), The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001), p. li. 16 Some of these actions included the establishment of an Assembly of Community Caribbean Parliamentarians and the independent West Indian Commission under Sir Shridath Ramphal. 17 G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 2nd edition, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 27.

14

therefore indicated a renewal of confidence by the Heads of Government in the

CARICOM system as a viable mechanism for Caribbean cooperation.18 Essentially, the

CSME currently exists as a legal entity, embodied in the relevant provisions of the

Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 2001 (the 2001 Revised Treaty). The challenge remains

in successfully transforming this theoretical legality into a practical reality. While single

forms of integration, such as the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA), can be

implemented by very simple actions, such as one piece of legislation to change the

Customs Act, it is a rather more difficult task transforming a number of economies,

which had previously existed as separate economies with a wide diversity in levels of

performance, into a SME.

As construed by the 2001 Revised Treaty, the SME can best be described by

reference to its two broad components: the single market and the single economy. The

single market would constitute an arrangement allowing CARICOM goods, services,

people and capital to move throughout the region without restrictions so as to achieve a

single large economic space, and to provide for a harmonious economic and trade policy

for the region. The idea of a single economy would facilitate the coordination and

harmonisation of inter alia foreign exchange and interest rate policies, tax regimes, laws

and common currency, so as to achieve a more homogenous economic performance

across the region. The thinking behind the establishment of the CSME is that the

Caribbean states would have more economic and political strength and better prospects,

within such a framework, than they would have if they faced the global economy

individually. The CSME would therefore provide a sound basis on which the region

could interface with the rest of the world, given the changing global environment in 18 Vaughan Lewis ‘Compulsions of Integration’ in Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. 176.

15

which countries are now required to operate. Additionally, it was envisioned that both

these arrangements of a single market and single economy would lead to greater

efficiency for the benefit of the region. Opportunities for employment, investment,

production and trade for over six million inhabitants of the Caribbean region would be

greatly enhanced.

At the political level, the creation of the CSME is occurring in the shadow of the

failure of the previous attempt at political federation and it would be almost impossible

for the region to achieve the highest form of economic union, similar to the economic

integration employed by the European Union (EU), without any major political

adjustments. Not surprisingly, one of the lingering consequences of the failure of the

West Indies Federation is the conviction that any venture to forge deep political

integration in the region is both inappropriate and impractical.19 In fact, it could be

expressed that ‘the goals of a general West Indian unity at the political level remains for

the people…a sort of Holy Grail shining on the edge of a distance too far away to matter

for the time being’.20 Unfortunately, it is in this political context that there exists a false

pragmatism which emphasises the desire of some of the people of the region to

compartmentalise the economic and political affairs of the region.

19 This is the widespread opinion of the Caribbean population, who perhaps hold this view due to ignorance of the unknown rather than anything else. 20 Retrieved July 29, 2005 from http://www.caricom.org.

16

III. THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF

NEGOTIATION ON INTEGRATION AND REGIONALISATION

It is necessary to examine the concepts of integration and regionalisation within

the context of the negotiations leading to the establishment of the CSME. The term

integration has become ubiquitous in the contemporary world arena and as is often the

case, this has somewhat diluted the effect of the concept of integration, while

simultaneously shrouding it in a mist of ambiguity. It could be argued that the

negotiation process leading to the creation of CARIFTA, CARICOM, and more recently

the CSME movement, has nothing to do with integration theory if the term integration is

considered to be related to the emergence of a new and separate community into which

previous identities are submerged. Therefore, another perspective that perhaps more

appropriately describes this process is the concept of ‘regionalisation’ which Anthony

Payne defines as ‘a method of international cooperation which enables the advantages of

decision-making at a regional level to be reconciled with the preservation of the

institutions of the nation-state’.21

Although both the theory and practice of regional integration has become an

increasingly prominent feature of the politics of emerging states in the contemporary

world arena, it would perhaps be an exaggeration to say that this phenomenon of regional

integration has been completely understood by academics, practitioners and the region’s

general population. It is the case unfortunately, that most of the academic work that has

been done on the politics of regional integration has been concentrated on the EU, and the

prevailing tendency has simply been to assume that the principles that apply to the EU

21 Anthony Payne The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79: Regional Integration Amongst New States, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), p. 286.

17

are universal and applicable in respect of the integration of all new states.22 The

theoretical literature on integration has been dominated by the neo-functionalist school of

thought, which derives its origins from the growth of supranational institutions in

Western Europe in the late 1950s and early 1960s.23 Neo-functionalism was used as a

comparative model for the entire global system, and exaggerated claims were made in

respect of its universal validity as a tool for understanding regional integration. The

reality was that as an explanatory theory, neo-functionalism was bound by its roots and

was appropriate only to the pluralist politics of industrialised states. Unsurprisingly,

critics were swift to highlight its irrelevance to the emerging Caribbean states and they

preferred the utilisation of the case-study approach in trying to understand the politics of

integration amongst new states.24

William G. Demas,25 one of the most invaluable contributors in promoting

CARICOM regional integration, and one of the major architects of the CSME, believed

that regional integration offered the best prospect for the economic development of the

Caribbean countries. Ultimately for Demas, the regional movement went beyond mere

economics and embraced the questions of identity, community and human rights.26

Undoubtedly, Demas would see the advent of the CSME as the promotion of a broader

22 Ibid., p. vii. Although Payne is commenting on a political arena over two decades ago, it is unfortunate, but necessary to state that this scenario of the dominances of Western ideologies and academic thought, is still in existence in the twenty-first century global arena. 23 Although the neo-functionalist approach has been applied to integration among underdeveloped countries, the theory itself is based upon traditional customs union theory with its well-known distinction between free trade areas, customs unions, common markets and economic unions, and the political implications of ever-increasing elimination of barriers to economic exchange and adoption of common policies. 24 Payne, Politics, p. vii. 25 Demas was the quintessential Caribbean public servant, policy advisor and programme administrator, who over the years he was responsible for much of the economic development achieved by the region. His vision for the Caribbean Community revolved around one broad and overarching objective-the maintenance and protection of Caribbean sovereignty. 26 Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. lv.

18

global multilateralism and would strongly endorse the two concepts dominating today’s

global economic environment: liberalisation and globalisation. Although there are acute

differences between these two,27 they are still sufficiently intertwined to represent the

essentials of the global economic environment in which the challenges and options of

negotiations will have to be faced and exercised. It must be highlighted that the reality of

globalisation does not ipso facto endow the phenomenon with virtue as it is undeniable

that developing countries have certainly profited less than the richest industrialised

nations. Furthermore, this strong underlying trend of globalisation that is fuelling the

process of economic liberalisation suggests that both processes are not likely to be

temporary or reversible.28 Perhaps it is the economic background of the Prime Minister

of Barbados, Owen Arthur, which has made a significant imprint on the processes of the

regional negotiation by being aware to the effects of liberalisation and globalisation in the

region. Arthur’s staunch pro-CSME attitude has brought much more openness and

confidence to the negotiation practices and gives strong hope that at least some of the

existing negotiations will be successfully completed.29

Throughout the centuries, the negotiation model has responded effectively both to

external and internal changes, thereby maintaining its position of relevance in the

contemporary world arena. The negotiation practice of the twenty-first century is

spanning both sides of the river. On the one hand, it cannot remain solely a ‘matter for

27 Liberalisation is a policy prescription, which has morphed into a global prescription, whereas globalisation is a phenomenon that stems partly from the application of that prescription but from other causes as well, like the information revolution. 28 Arnold McIntyre ‘The Caribbean Community and External Negotiations’, Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. 682. 29 One clear example of Owen Arthur favouring the implementation of the CSME was evident in his speech ‘The Caribbean Single Market and Economy: The Way Forward’ at the Thirtieth Anniversary Distinguished Lecture of the Caribbean Community in Bridgetown, Barbados on April 23, 2004. Retrieved May 23, 2005 from www.caricom.org/speeches/ 30anniversarylecture8-arthur.pdf.

19

governments’.30 In fact, the traditional view of negotiations has usually been an array of

loosely tied autonomous situations in which sovereign partners meet to find a joint and

mutually acceptable solution.31 This practice undoubtedly helped to maintain the

traditional way of managing negotiations: government-to-government communications

through special representatives at the negotiation table. On the other hand however, the

increased interdependence within the Caribbean region has necessitated a shift from

traditional models of negotiation to alternative approaches characterised by greater

informality and a longer time perspective, with no evidence that they have

simultaneously become more effective.32 Based on the formulations of A.G. Arbatov, it

would appear as though the CSME is using the traditional approach of negotiations, of

which some of the negative aspects are too long a period of bargaining, a complexity of

bargaining negotiations and the resulting rigidity of the positions at the negotiating table,

and the unavoidable process of bureaucratisation of the talks, which sometimes leads

even to the abandonment of the initial goal of the negotiations.33 The alternative model

which Arbatov favours, and which appears to be more applicable to the needs of the

CSME involves a plethora of actors, not only the Heads of Government, and although

this model would allow relatively lengthy periods of consultations at the level of experts,

including the responsible diplomats and representatives of other agencies, it would be

followed by an agreement in principle at a very high level, therefore promoting the

implementation of the legality of the documents within a short period of time.34

30 Brian Hocking and Dominic Kelly, ‘Doing the business? The International Chamber of Commerce, the United Nations, and the Global Compact’ in Andrew Cooper (ed.), Enhancing Global Governance, (Japan: United Nations University Press, 2002), p. 203. 31 Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation, p. 9. 32 Ibid., p. 23. 33 “Glasnost, negotiations, disarmament’, Pravda, October 17, 1988 cited Ibid. p. 31. 34 Ibid.

20

Perhaps it is more appropriate to accept that the negotiation process leading up to

the creation of the CSME embraced values inherent in both the traditional and alternative

models of negotiations.35 Negotiations in the traditional model structure would take

place in highly formal, official negotiating sessions with Heads of Government and

suitable diplomats of government officials. The respective member state governments

would provide their representatives with very specific instructions prior to the official

negotiation sessions, and the process which would ensue would be generally one of

bargaining of exchange of concessions, focusing on immediate short-term results. It

would be anticipated that at the end of these sessions the participants would have left

with a binding agreement. On the other hand, negotiations in the alternative model

format occur in informal, working sessions. Each government would provide its

representatives with recommendations and the process of negotiation would involve joint

problem solving and brainstorming among the participants. A successful end to these

sessions would usually result in recommendations and guidelines for the member states to

follow to assist the implementation of the CSME.

Having briefly outlined the historical background of the Caribbean negotiation

process, discussed the significance of the Grand Anse Declaration of 1989 and examined

the impact of the traditional and alternative models of negotiation on integration and

regionalisation within the Caribbean region, Chapter One has established the context in

which the discussion regarding bilateral and multilateral negotiations can now be

pursued. Therefore, Chapter Two will now begin with a discussion regarding the

dominance of bilateral negotiations during the CARICOM era. While acknowledging

some of the investigative reports that paved the way for the bilateral negotiations to be 35 Ibid., p. 25.

21

conducted, the role and importance of the main actors involved in these negotiations will

be discussed.

22

CHAPTER TWO

THE DOMINANCE OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE CARICOM ERA Over the past four decades, CARICOM countries have, both individually and

collectively, accumulated considerable experience in regional and international

negotiations. It was at the Montego Bay Conference in 1947 that there was the decision

to embark upon detailed planning and preparation of a regional federation The official

view was that it was ‘clearly impossible in the modern world for the present separate

communities, small and isolated as most of them are, to achieve and maintain full self-

government on their own’.36 Federation was, from this point of view, a means of

increasing the effective size of the West Indian territories to a point where they became

eligible for self-government as one unit. The consequence of this broad consensus of

purpose was that the West Indian leaders found themselves engaged in intergovernmental

negotiations over the details of the structure of the proposed federation. This was a task

which proved to be much more problematic than anyone had anticipated, and it gradually

took its toll on the participants. When the planning stage was completed in January 1958,

H. W. Springer observed that the West Indian spirit ‘was at a very low ebb and only

momentum carried forward the unifying process’.37

Despite its misleading nomenclature, CARICOM remains, and was always

intended to be, an association of sovereign states. The principle of sovereign equality of

states finds cogent legal expression in the unanimity rule prescribed for determinations on

substantive issues on the highest decision-making organ of the Community-the

36 Payne, Politics, p. 13. 37 Ibid., p. 15.

23

Conference of Heads of Government. The legal status of CARICOM has important

consequences for the functioning of its organs and the benefits intended to inure to

nationals of member states. As CARICOM trade negotiations responsibilities became

increasingly complex, both in scope and technical sophistication, it was unlikely that this

institutional structure could be sustained. This was partly because differences of

orientation among countries, based on the differing urgencies of their integration into

wider networks required a more cohesive consensus on the required paths of negotiation.

These sentiments were expressed when the progress in regional arrangements at the wider

regional level seemed to have ground to a halt with the Heads of Government of

CARICOM not having met for many years; there was political instability and ideological

pluralism in attendance given the events in Grenada;38 and there was a major world

recession following the oil crisis of 1979.

I. THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OF CARIFTA AND CARICOM

The establishment of CARIFTA, and subsequently CARICOM, could be seen as

the product of political and social conditions resulting from the failures of the previous

bilateral negotiations associated with the creation and swift demise of the West Indies

Federation. The development of CARICOM and other related institutions and

arrangements has taken up a considerable amount of time of the Heads of Government.

38 In 1979, rebels led by Marxist Maurice Bishop overthrew the government. A number of Caribbean nations feared that Grenada would be used as a base b Cuba and the Soviet Union and in 1983 there was a USA-led intervention on the island in order to regain democratic control.

24

According to R. D Putnam:

The politics of…negotiations can be conceived as a two-level game combining aspects of both domestic and foreign policy. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies…at the international level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments.39

This interplay between these two levels of policymaking is complex and often

unpredictable. The traditional view of international negotiations has usually been an

array of loosely tied autonomous situations in which sovereign partners meet to find a

joint and mutually acceptable solution to a dispute.40 This practice undoubtedly helped

maintain the traditional bilateral way of managing negotiations: government-to-

government communication through special representatives at the negotiation table. The

increased interdependence within the Caribbean region has necessitated a shift from

traditional models of negotiation to alternative approaches characterised by greater

informality, a longer time perspective, and joint problem solving.41

How has CARICOM prepared for international negotiations? The typical pattern

has been for the Heads of Government to agree on a broad strategy, leaving it to a

Committee of Ministers, drawn from the CARICOM Council, to work out the detailed

approach to the negotiations, supported by officials from member Governments and the

CARICOM Secretariat. This structure has so far worked reasonably well, although

experience shows that it needs improvement in a number of aspects. On some occasions,

39 ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’, International Organisation, Vol. 42, Issue 3, 1988, 436. 40 Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation, p. 22. 41 Ibid., p. 2.

25

one area of weakness has been the limited interface between the regional negotiating

teams and the CARICOM Secretariat on the one hand, and persons involved in the

negotiations at the international level on the other. Quite often, important information

received on major issues has not been transmitted to the regional level, or at least not in a

timely manner, and these unintended lapses in sharing information can be a source of

misunderstanding among governments.

In the pre-negotiating phase where ‘soundings are being taken and kites are being

flown’, 42 there is occasionally a tendency to involve Heads of Government and ministers

too early in the process. On occasion they have become involved talking to relatively

junior officials about details which should properly be left to officials on their side. In

principle, the political leadership should be left to resolve major sticking points where

they can engage persons at comparable levels on the other side. Another aspect of the

preparatory process is the quality of the substantive preparation. The analytical work

which goes into negotiating briefs does not often disaggregate issues in terms of the

interests groups involved, their particular characteristics, and the possible areas of

conflict and consensus. The practice has been to treat issues almost exclusively in

economic terms with inadequate consideration of their political and social dimensions.

This has led to a certain narrowness of perspective and inappropriate timing of

negotiation initiatives because insufficient attention was paid to the political calendar in

the prospective partner countries. These deficiencies in preparatory work have often

been the result of limited resources available to the CARICOM Secretariat and national

ministries. During the negotiations developing CARICOM, the region’s approach has

42 Alister McIntyre ‘The Importance of Negotiation Preparedness: Reflections on the Caribbean Experience’ in Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. 675.

26

tended to be reactive rather than proactive, with external influences defining the agenda,

which limited the room for manoeuvre available to the Heads of Government. One

consequence of this is that negotiators tend to approach the negotiation with a very short

term perspective, giving only secondary consideration to longer-term issues.

The task of forging an intergovernmental coalition which would make economic

integration politically viable began at the Fourth Heads of Government Conference.43

This was the largest and most prestigious gathering of West Indian leaders since the days

of the West Indies Federation, and was approached with great seriousness by all the

participating governments. Their deliberations centred on three main themes, the first of

which was naturally the question of free trade. Barbados, according to reports, still

favoured the initial implementation of CARIFTA on a three-territory basis, with other

territories being left to join as they pleased and having therefore to suffer the indignity of

making a formal application for membership. The expected objections to this plan were

eventually overcome by a neat formula whereby Antigua, Barbados and Guyana signed a

supplementary agreement which set out the economic integration programme to be

followed by the region as a whole.

From the negotiations surrounding the proposal and adoption of CARIFTA one of

the most general patterns that was visible was the dichotomy which emerged between the

more developed countries (MDCs) and less developed countries (LDCs) of the region.

Among the four MDCs in CARIFTA: Guyana, Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and

Tobago, there were two major deviations from the expected pattern of negotiation

positions. Jamaica, the most industrialised island, was the most reluctant participant and

43 This was held in Bridgetown, Barbados in October 1967, and it was the first in the series to be attended by the leaders of all the Commonwealth Caribbean territories.

27

the least willing to go beyond a free trade area, whereas Guyana, the least industrialised,

was a major initiator of CARIFTA, and supported a more advanced type of integration

scheme. These two examples highlight the limitations of arriving at an explanation of

negotiation strategies based on a theory centred on the perceived opportunity costs of

economic integration without taking into consideration other factors.44 For Jamaica,

insecurity over its competitive position in a region-wide free trade area, as well as viable

extra-regional alternatives significantly influenced its position in the CARIFTA

negotiations. Domestic politics, particularly the effect of the West Indies Federation

experience on Jamaica was especially important in reducing enthusiasm over joining.

For Guyana, political factors were the most important determining influence, combined

with the potential long-term economic gain. A domestic political strategy of

development based on reducing dependent ties with metropolitan countries, a desire for

greater influence in the Third World movement, a border dispute with Venezuela, and a

government based on a racial minority provided the major forces in Guyana’s negotiation

position of promoting CARIFTA.

There was a general feeling that significant progress had been made towards the

ratification of an agreement that would allow the CARIFTA member countries to move

towards CARICOM. Due to the intergovernmental nature of the formal institutions of

CARIFTA and CARICOM, the nature of the negotiations involved a core coalition of a

few actors involved in predominantly bilateral negotiations. This situation highlighted

the limits imposed by bilateral negotiations since, for example, discussions of foreign

investment policy were conducted only at the highest governmental level with other

officials and non-governmental personnel excluded from participation, or even 44 McIntyre, ‘Negotiation Preparedness’, p. 675.

28

knowledge of the discussion.45 Furthermore, the failure to adopt the Draft Agreement on

Foreign Investment and Development of Technology in 1974 did not mark the end of

Caribbean integration, although it did highlight the deficiencies in the negotiation

process. In fact, it has been pointed out that unfortunately these bilateral negotiations

have been conducted largely above the heads of the ordinary citizen of the region and the

reality is that very few people beyond the officials directly involved in the negotiations

were even aware that a decision on this question had been taken.46

II. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS PAVE THE WAY FOR CARICOM

The Bourne Commission of 1986 was specifically mandated to undertake ‘a

general perspective study on the development prospects of the CARICOM Region in the

context of the fundamental and permanent structural changes taking place in the global

environment’.47 However, it was the independent West Indian Commission (WIC),

comparable only to the Moyne Commission48 in terms of its importance in West Indian

history, the significantly contributed to the development of CARICOM. The

Commission developed a WIC Report which shared a similar urgency of tone and

purpose of the Grand Anse Declaration while highlighting the inadequacies in the

integration process and warned that ‘the West Indies cannot afford the luxury of marking

45 W. Andrew Axline, Caribbean Integration: The Politics of Regionalism, (London: Frances Printer Ltd., 1979), p. 157. The degree to which the public was uninformed on this issue is reflected in the fact that the establishment of the Working Party of Officials on National, Regional and Foreign Investment, which took place as a result of a resolution of the Heads of Government Conference in April 1973, was not reported by the Trinidad Guardian until August 19, 1974, after the refusal to adopt the Draft Agreement, of which the paper was apparently not aware. 46 Ibid., p. 158. 47 Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. lxiv. 48 Throughout the 1930s there were disturbances in the British territories in the Caribbean. As a result, the British Government appointed the West Indian Royal Commission in 1938 to mount an investigation into the social and economic conditions in the various territories and also make recommendations. The Commission was led by Lord Moyne and is therefore referred to as the Moyne Commission.

29

time, mistaking it for progress’.49 The Report sought to prepare the Community

structurally and otherwise for the challenges of the twenty-first century and there was an

immediate proposal of a CARICOM Commission to ensure the urgent implementation of

decisions taken by the Community, and to address the issue of a SME. Furthermore, the

Report advocated greater involvement of the people of the region by supporting the

Assembly of Caribbean Parliamentarians which was designed to include representatives

of young people, farmers, religious groups, women, labour groups and business groups in

the integration process.50 There was also the recommendation of the creation of the

Association of Caribbean States because the Report felt that the peoples and

Governments of the region needed to expand their thinking beyond the narrow terms of

‘the Commonwealth Caribbean’.51

Following the investigations and reports of the WIC, the Heads of Government

made a number of decisions concerned with providing a new institutional framework for

the functioning of CARICOM and eventually the CSME, for ensuring the timely

implementation of its decisions, and for providing the Community with the appropriate

machinery for undertaking economic negotiations with the rest of the world and

particularly with the EU. A decision of such immeasurable magnitude could not evolve

in a vacuum, or in an environment created solely by the Heads of Government. Not

surprisingly, the Community’s efforts to deal with the problems of the integration

movement by means of commissions, special studies and declarations attracted equal

amounts of commendation as it did criticism and Havelock Ross-Brewster was scathing

49 Shridath Ramphal ‘Progress Report of the Independent West Indian Commission’, Hall (ed.) Beyond Survival, p. 229. 50 Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. lii. 51 Ibid.

30

in his comments when after examining several aspects of the Report with regard to

methodology, governance, the Community’s future, a common currency and a SME, he

concluded that it was a ‘one-shot preparation of a magnum opus.’52

III. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE MAIN ACTORS IN THE

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

From the beginning of the development of CARIFTA and subsequently

CARICOM, it was fairly easy to distinguish the actors who played a major role in the

negotiation process. Those most centrally involved were the Heads of Government and

the CARICOM Secretariat. The CARICOM Secretariat acts on the authority of the

member states and the intergovernmental institutions and the Secretary-General himself

has played an important role in negotiating compromises among member governments,

often through personal contact and face-to-face discussions with the Heads of

Government.53 CARIFTA and CARICOM were established as intergovernmental

organisations where the principle of sovereign equality prevailed and policies required

intergovernmental negotiations at the highest level.54

Furthermore, the domestic political systems of the Caribbean countries did not

fulfil the criteria of pluralistic regimes of neo-functionalist theory, with leadership being

personalised and often operating on a system of non-constructive ‘oppositionism’.55

Therefore, although at the time the opposition People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in

52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., p. 78. 54 Ibid., p. 187. 55 The oppositionist nature of Caribbean politics as a heritage of mal-adapted Westminster style of government is analysed by Rosina Wiltshire, Regional Integration and Conflict in the Commonwealth Caribbean, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1974, cited Ibid.

31

Guyana and the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in Trinidad and Tobago opposed the

negotiation processes, only in Jamaica, where a more traditional dual party system

existed, did the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) impose constraints on the negotiating policy

towards CARICOM. As a result of the non-pluralist nature of domestic politics, again

with Jamaica being an exception, the Heads of Government were relatively free to pursue

negotiation positions based on their personal preferences and agendas. Therefore,

CARICOM was a regional project that developed with very little popular participation

and remained an elite operation.56

The bargaining and ultimate decision-making on integrative measures took place

among the Heads of Government, the negotiation situation was structured by the

CARICOM Secretariat, and therefore the Secretariat was able to influence the outcome of

negotiations. Although formally responding to requests of the member governments

through the Council of Ministers and the Heads of Government Conference, the

CARICOM Secretariat played a major role in determining the path of negotiations. The

Secretariat has had its most significant impact on the development of CARIFTA and

CARICOM as an intermediary actively involved in the bargaining and negotiations

among the member governments. It was in this capacity that William Demas, Secretary-

General from shortly after the creation of CARIFTA until 1974, has himself constituted a

major factor in the negotiation process. During the time that he was Secretary-General

much of his effort was dedicated to bringing about compromise and agreement among the

different positions of the various governments, often working on a personal, bilateral

level with the Heads of Government and individual leaders of various political parties.

Where necessary, he would personally travel to a country to follow though with some

32

bilateral negotiations and bring about a compromise. Demas was able to successfully

play this role by maintaining the trust and confidence of even the most suspicious

politicians, and by maintaining open communication with all the actors in the negotiation

process. Therefore, what was popular in this phase of development was coalition

building and bilateral agreements between territories, and special bilateral relationships

developed between Guyana and Barbados, and Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago.

Unfortunately one of the drawbacks of this limited negotiation environment can be

described as a state of paralysis by analysis: where there is talk about some issues until,

eventually, they simply fall from the agenda.57

The objective of Chapter Two was to provide a clearer understanding of

the role and importance of bilateral negotiations during the development of CARIFTA

and CARICOM. While this chapter highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of this type

of government-to-government negotiations, some of the main actors involved were also

identified. Chapter Three will now provide a comparison and contrast to Chapter Two

but investigating the multilateral negotiations linked to the implementation of the CSME.

Furthermore, there will be a discussion as to whether multilateral negotiations are the

way forward from CARICOM to the CSME. There will also be some examples of the

multilateral negotiations that were undertaken by the growing number of actors involved

in the process.

57 Kenneth O. Hall and Denis Benn (eds.), Governance in the Age of Globalisation: Caribbean Perspectives, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), p. 571.

33

CHAPTER THREE

MULTILATERALISM: THE WAY FORWARD FROM CARICOM TO THE CSME? Multilateral negotiations were encouraged in the early years of the twentieth

century by the form of liberal thought which emphasised the importance of popular

consent in sustaining governmental authority.58 The technical complexity of the current

phase of multilateral negotiations leading to the implementation of the CSME has

revealed the lack of depth of technical expertise in negotiation issues. A concern also

exists over the level of succession planning in the region that will enable the CSME to

maintain an effective negotiation presence in the future. Although states remain the key

players in international relations and multilateral diplomacy, the changing nature of

international relations over the last few decades has affected the role of these states in

multilateral negotiations. States have gradually transferred some of their concerns and

corresponding activities to various multilateral institutes and initiatives.

Simultaneously, internal actors are taking an increasingly active interest in

international, regional and local affairs while attempting to influence the actions of their

countries in this domain. This diffusion of actors and powers has had a direct effect on

the negotiations leading to the development and implementation of the CSME. The forces

of globalisation and trade liberalisation have altered the determinants of the prosperity of

the Caribbean nations. For small countries and islands such as those in the Caribbean

region, a presence at the formative stages of international trade agreements enhances the

ability to have national interests reflected or protected in such agreements, which is

58 Berridge, Diplomacy, p. 150.

34

essential to future survival and growth.59 Furthermore, for the multilateral trading system

to bring tangible benefits there is a need to ensure that adequate policy space is

maintained to enable the small economies of some states, such as Guyana, to face the

enormous adjustment and implementation costs that are required of them.

The CSME currently shares a vision of locating itself in a world arena whose

future rests on the promotion of multilateralism. As conceptualised today,

multilateralism embraces three essential elements of indivisibility or allegiance to a

system as a whole, generalised rules of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity.60 The forces

transforming the global environment are moving the international system in two

seemingly contradictory directions. On the one hand, the world is moving towards

multilateralism and global integration with a strong commitment to open markets and

international institutions. On the other hand, the world is entering a new era of

regionalism, as nations seek to generate their economic markets. However, it has been

recently noted that ‘regionalism need not necessarily be a stumbling block towards a

multilateral trading system’.61 The contradiction of promoting multilateralism in the

context of widening inequalities between and within countries is a problem that not only

the global community faces, but by extension all regional integration movements.

59 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery: Phase II, Draft Five-Year Strategic Plan (2003/04-2007/08). Retrieved May 15, 2005 from http://www.crnm.org. 60 Thomas, ‘The Development Glass’, p. 8. 61 Jhagdish Bhagwati at Columbia University, New York cited in McIntyre, ‘External Negotiations’ in Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. 683. In fact it is believed that the new concept of open regionalism seeks to derive the economic benefits of international competition while simultaneously creating a wider economic space for member countries.

35

I. THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE PROTOCOLS62

The 1973 Treaty is being revised by way of nine protocols, which have to be

painstakingly negotiated individually in each of the member states, and it is here that the

delays to implementation are found. The first exercise involved the negotiations of a

protocol to change the organs of CARICOM, the voting arrangements and the system of

regional governance prescribed in the original Treaty, since they did not fulfil the

requirements of a SME. However, the CSME does not have to wait until all the protocols

are completed and there have been recent calls for the acceleration of negotiations on

these protocols which will immediately benefit the region’s industries. The most exciting

change the CSME is intended to introduce is to, for the first time, make it lawfully

possible for capital, skills and people to move freely in the region, the trade-in services to

be facilitated, and Caribbean citizens to be enabled to establish enterprises wherever they

wish in their region. Rules had to be developed and agreed in each of these spheres,

taking into account new international trade laws as embodied in the General Agreement

on Trade in Services (GATS), and the vastly differing regimes and conditions that exist

in respective Caribbean economies in these fields. The principle that was accepted as the

basis for defining the rules was that no new restrictions would be introduced and the

existing restrictions on the movement of capital, skills, the provision of services, and

rights of establishment would be phased out in accordance with an agreed negotiated

programme.

The most immediate and pressing schedule that is to be met is that of

implementing the arrangements to complete the Single Market by 2005. In specific

terms, this will entail the removal of the four hundred and fifty existing restrictions on 62 See Appendix C on page 54 for a summary of the nine protocols revising the 1973 Treaty.

36

capital mobility, the rights of establishment of enterprises by CARICOM nationals, the

movement of skills, hassle free travel and the provision of services, as required by

Chapter 3 of the 2001 Revised Treaty. Member countries will be expected to complete

these arrangements, fully respecting the spirit and letter of Article 7 of the Treaty which

prohibits them from applying discriminating measures on grounds of nationality only,

and Article 8 which prevents them from giving any entity outside the region more

favourable treatment than they accord their Caribbean neighbours.

The progressive multilateral negotiations determining the protocols to bring the

specific elements of the CSME into effect has meant that some part of the road towards

the establishment of a single market, if not a single economy, has indeed been achieved.

For example, the protocols relating to free movement of capital, rights of establishment

and free movement of skills, have created an impulse in the region that is facilitating the

growth of the open market space. To some extent it can be argued that it has been a

fortuitous circumstance that has facilitated this since the decision to establish the CSME

was taken when many of the leading Caribbean states and economies were in recession,

or just beginning to emerge from recession. These countries’ governments desire to

accept the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank resources in that context-

in the late 1980’s into the 1990’s-meant accepting the new programmes of structural

adjustment that have become the basis of the relatively open, tariff-free national market

system which now exists. In a sense therefore, the Caribbean governments were

somewhat forced into moving from the protected common market system to the open

market system.

37

The negotiation of the legal framework for a single economy has meant that new

legal ground has to be broken in prescribing new rules to facilitate cooperation and

coordination in the development of economic sectors and common economic policies in

the Caribbean. These rules relate to the manner in which the external trade relations

would be managed, new measures to ensure that competition in the new single market is

both free and fair, a new regime of special and differential treatment for the most

vulnerable Caribbean economies and new rules and mechanisms for settling disputes.63

An Inter-Governmental Task Force drawing upon the best expertise in the public and

private sector of the region, and taking account of the recommendations of two special

consultations on the CSME, performed an extraordinary service in negotiating the new

rules of economic engagement and liberalisation over these many areas in a manner that

attracted the support and signature of all the participating governments. In the process,

quite a considerable effort was made not only to give the legal provisions of the CSME a

‘distinctly Caribbean flavour’,64 but also to allow the entity, once created, to co-exist with

other economic arrangements of which the Caribbean is to be a part.

It is important to highlight that the CSME will never appear in any one place or

time as a finished or finite entity with a grand finale, complete with fireworks. At Article

239 of the 2001 Revised Treaty, there is a built-in agenda to support the elaboration of

future protocols in areas where the region is conducting external negotiations but has no

equivalent regional regime, for example in the area of electronic commerce and

government procurement.65 The built-in agenda also requires that future regional regimes

63 Arthur, ‘The Way Forward’, p. 24. 64 Ibid. 65 This was further explored in the postgraduate project by Marcus Thompson, ‘The Principles, Methodology and Implementation of a Small Business Ecommerce Website’, Student in Information

38

be formulated to deal with the treatment of goods in free trade zones and similar

jurisdictions, the free circulation of goods, and rights contingent on the provision of the

movement of capital and the establishment of enterprises, all with a view to give certainty

and completeness to the regional liberalisation provisions.

There are also major omissions in the design of the CSME which previous

experience suggests require immediate and urgent response. For example, unlike the

situation which pervades in the EU, the current provisions in the CSME make no

allowance for a Regional Fisheries Policy and Regime yet, the Caribbean Sea is arguably

the most vital component of the single economic space that the CSME is intended to

create. There is therefore a crucial need for rules to be devised and implemented

governing access to its resources, and the management of those resources as the

incorporation of a Regional Fisheries Policy and Regime, together with provisions

relating to Labour Law, Property Law and a regime for Community Trans-national

Enterprises can only help bring fullness to the design of the CSME.

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN REGIONAL

NEGOTIATING MACHINERY

Recognising that effectiveness is enhanced through a combination of strengths,

the Heads of Government of CARICOM established the Caribbean Regional Negotiating

Machinery (CRNM) to provide a coordinated voice for the region in developing and

executing an overall negotiating strategy for the various internal and external negotiations

in which the region is involved. Since formation in 1997, the agenda of the CRNM has

Technology in Ecommerce (ITEC) MSc., School of Engineering Design and Technology, University of Bradford, August 2005.

39

widened in scope and complexity. In the initial stages of the organisation, a focus was

placed on participation in the process of establishing the rules for future negotiations in

three main arenas.66 With the operating rules now in place, the agenda of the

negotiations has turned to the actual content of trade agreements. An essential

requirement of the concept of the CRNM is that, in negotiations, wherever there are

Caribbean voices speaking, they must be speaking from an agreed regional brief, to an

agreed regional position.67 The CRNM is headed by a Chief Negotiator supported by a

small team of advisers in collaboration with the CARICOM Secretariat. The machinery

includes negotiation working groups for each set of negotiations and also interfaces with

key elements in the Community structure, such as the Council on Trade and Development

(COTED). Ultimately, the Chief Negotiator reports to the Prime Ministerial sub-

committees on external negotiations which set policy objectives and provide overall

guidance on negotiating strategy. In addition, the Chief Negotiator is assisted by a

Technical Advisory Group that analyses and evaluates all technical studies prepared by

the CRNM prior to submission to officials, ministers and Heads of Government.

In addition to these aspects, there was a wider global context which Heads of

Government came to realise would form a framework for the tasks that had to be

completed to establish the CSME. This was the process of adjustment they would be

required to undertake as the two main pillars of the North Atlantic economy-the EU and

the countries of North America led by the USA, launched major programmes for the

basic reorganisation of that economy, and world trade and production in general.

66 These were the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and African Caribbean and Pacific-European Union (ACP-EU) negotiations. 67 Shridath Ramphal ‘The Caribbean Challenge in the Negotiating Process’ in Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. 667.

40

Specifically, the concluding years of the Uruguay Round of negotiations68 indicated that

new principles being adopted would have fundamental effects on the nature of production

in all countries and the way in which trade would subsequently be conducted between all

countries. This was due to the fact that the major economic powers insisted on the

necessity for the unfettered movement of all factors of production and of all products, as

the basis of economic interaction in the era of globalisation. This now meant that all

regions of the global economy-small and large, developed and developing-now had to

match the emerging global economic framework with its liberalised economic spaces.

There is now an increasing complexity in the nature of negotiations and the lack

of transparency and limited communication in the preparation of individual Caribbean

countries are accentuated by the unevenness of preparation capacity among them.

International, and by extension regional negotiations, have entered into a new intensive

phase characterised by frequent, overlapping and urgent meetings. This has introduced

complexities related to the range of subjects, the depth of treatment of subject matter, and

the inter-relatedness among negotiating areas and subjects. The reality facing the CRNM

is the lack of timeliness in the meeting of commitments due from member states.69

Member states are at varying stages of economic development and have different

economic structures in terms of size, sophistication and primary sectors. As a

consequence of these conflicting interests, achieving consensus on a single regional

position requires a delicate balancing of interests and a great deal of concessions. This

may cause a lack of consistency that affects the coherence of strategies and options that

68 This round of negotiations was held between 1985 and 1995 and culminated with the creation of the WTO. 69 The poor performance of the member states in terms of their meeting of commitments compromises the ability to raise funding from other sources, as it may indicate a lack of interest in the success of the organisation.

41

can be exercised in both domestic and external negotiations. Furthermore, countries

within the Caribbean have historically been reluctant to cede control over their national

policies and agendas to regional institutions. The CRNM has therefore had to focus less

on appearing at the forefront of negotiations, and instead act as a unifying force in

guiding the region strategically, preparing it effectively, bringing about coherence among

the positions of sovereign states, and actively assisting in and with the negotiations.70

The desire for efficiency and effectiveness within the CRNM requires that it

interact closely with any external support network available. It must therefore have the

capacity, in the form of responsible officials, to exploit the opportunities presented by the

existence of such a network. Special mention must be made of the relationship between

the CRNM and the CSME Secretariat as both are very much a part of the CARICOM

family of specialised agencies, and it is expected that there will be coordination between

them so that ‘cognisance is had for the peculiar needs of the region’.71 However, while

the CRNM is an agency of CARICOM, the CSME Secretariat is actually an integral part

of the CARICOM Secretariat located outside the capital city Georgetown, Guyana. The

CRNM concentrates mainly on external trade negotiations, while the CSME Secretariat is

concerned with the implementation of the internal single market. As such, while the

former remains global in outlook, the latter has a regional focus. Nevertheless, the work

of the CSME Secretariat impacts on the CRNM, and for the success of the negotiations to

be felt, there must be a mechanism that will identify where adjustments in the internal

economies of CARICOM member states are needed, and work towards their

implementation.

70 ‘Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery: Phase II, Draft Five-Year Strategic Plan (2003/04-2007/08)’. Retrieved May 15, 2005 from http://www.crnm.org. 71 Ibid.

42

The importance of the CRNM to the region is undisputed. While the final

decision in determining national trade issues should come from national governments, it

has long been recognised that effective support to the process can come through a

focused, specialised organisation such as the CRNM. As the international environment

changes and becomes more diffuse, this organisation must concentrate on new strategies

in facilitating the overall aim of obtaining the most favourable terms for the region in the

various bilateral and multilateral negotiations undertaken.

III. MULTIPLE ACTORS IN THE EMERGING SYSTEM

In the domain of international relations, it can be argued that in order to

understand the factors that contribute to an effective negotiation, one must take into

account both the actors involved and the context in which the negotiations are set.

According to the realist perspective the essential actor in the international arena is the

nation-state and therefore within the regional context of the establishment of the CSME,

the principal actors are the member states of CARICOM. In order to achieve an

agreement as a result of negotiations, each member state must agree to limit its

sovereignty and to follow the course prescribed by the articles of the 2001 Revised

Treaty. However, alongside the Heads of Government of the states involved, new parties

have emerged that have also contributed to the negotiation process within the region,

therefore embracing the pluralist perspective of world politics. From a pluralistic

perspective, although the importance of the Caribbean states as important actors is not

denied, there has been an increasing influence on the negotiations by international

organisations, influential regional businesses, political parties and movements, social and

43

religious communities and even external states with an interest in the trading activities

and relationship within the region, for example the USA, particularly the southern state of

Florida.

Florida’s call for the development of a strategic consensus with the Caribbean

basin is an advanced initiative for the securing of trade and investment stability in the

region.72 The state government and the private sector73 have begun to act as the ‘benign

hegemon’ necessary for effective cooperation to take place.74 As Florida continues to

undertake a leadership role in terms of regional and hemispheric strategic planning and

proactive initiatives, mostly via the government-private sector collaboration, its

Caribbean partners will have the burden of determining how to collaborate, respond and

complement the Florida effort. While Florida is clearly safeguarding its self-interest,75 it

is almost impossible to discern where its own interest ends and where the Caribbean

interest begins. Therefore, it would be advantageous for the region not to raise this issue

as a potential point of contention but rather to establish the institutional linkages which

can serve to strengthen the relationship. As stated by Rosenberg and Hiskey:

Florida is as much a part of the Caribbean as it is of the south eastern United States. As the special bonds between Florida and the Caribbean proliferate and deepen, the economies of the two areas are showing greater complementarity. Any complete economic development strategy crafted by either misses a critical component if the geographic and commercial contiguity of the other is ignored. However, given the rapid emergence of trade blocs and the historic trade and

72 Florida’s intentions have been enshrined in the US Congress by the legislative proposals: H.R. 1403, S. 1155, and the Caribbean Basin Free Trade Agreements Act 2000. 73 The Florida International Affairs Commission (FIAC) agenda is by far the most advanced and progressive initiative on the Caribbean by any government so far. For example, the Florida-Caribbean institute is but one of a dozen international programs coordinated by the FIAC. 74 Bryan, New Dynamics, p. 91. 75 In 1992 this interest was a $4 billion export trade to the Caribbean region, which represented 30 percent of its total exports and created 80 000 jobs in the state of Florida.

44

integration-oriented efforts of Mexico, Canada, and the United States, the development of a greater pan-Caribbean cooperation is not just far-sighted, but a strategic necessity as a means to maintain and expand the Caribbean basin standard of living.76

Curiously enough, however, neither the WIC Report nor any of the other region-based

studies, reports or CARICOM meetings has even raised the issue of the role of Florida in

regional negotiation and cooperation schemes. Moreover, as in the case of the lack of an

official CARICOM position on the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), there is

similarly no official CARICOM response regarding Florida’s interest in safeguarding the

Caribbean region’s economic interests.

The Caribbean region must understand that in the hemispheric political economy

of the twenty-first century the route to integration and cooperation cannot help but pass

through Florida. If CARICOM or any other grouping within the Caribbean region cannot

yet see this as a virtual reality then the concept of a ‘wider Caribbean’ is an illusion. Just

as various Caribbean-based strategies and initiatives regarding cooperation and

integration schemes have been formulated, there must be a systematic and detailed

analysis of the manner in which Florida is linked to the rest of the hemispheric

competitive position. Furthermore, in the eventual case of economic and political

liberalisation in Cuba, the geographic, financial, commercial, human and demographic

linkage with Florida will ensure that Caribbean islands are not economically marginalised

as a result of the new attraction offered by the larger, unpenetrated Cuban market. Due to

these factors, the strategic alliance between the region and Florida must be developed

sooner rather than later.

76 Bryan, New Dynamics, p. 92.

45

There is a significance attached to the creation of the CSME as the institutional

vehicle that will be called upon to promote equitable regional development. Furthermore,

there is a desirability and willingness of the USA, particularly Florida to be a part of the

endeavour of engendering strong and equitable development in the Caribbean, not only in

search of a secure third border, but in the interest of making the immediate hemisphere a

successful neighbourhood. It must be recognised that the USA relations with the

Caribbean have been traditionally grounded, less in the diplomacy related to economic

development, but by reference to a set of interests and power relations that at times have

elevated matters such as security, the fight against narcotics trade and immigration, to

places of relative prominence.

It would also be useful to point out, by way of context that Florida, in its relation

to the Caribbean region, is often willing to acknowledge that it is a Caribbean State. As

such, the changing roles, forced by shifts in the design of the world order from the

conflicting dual powers of the Soviet Union and the USA, to the current hegemony of the

USA, will continue to entangle the respective destinies of all involved. The measures as

set out in Chapter Five of the 2001 Revised Treaty, which present the elements of a

coordinated external trade policy for the CSME, in essence introduce new rules of

engagements for the region’s external economic relations, including those with the USA.

This suggests that in the future, more of these relations, even if negotiated multilaterally,

will have to take their reference point from the regional regimes. They certainly will

have to conform to the spirit of Article 8 of the Revised Treaty which requires that each

member state of the CSME should accord to another member state treatment that is no

less favourable than that accorded to an extra-regional third state.

46

The implementation of the CSME has also raised issues relating to the relevance

of the governance of the economic integration movement.77 The CSME constitutes by far

the single most ambitious economic endeavour ever contemplated by the region and it is

exceeded in its scope and depth only by the EU. Yet it is intended to be implemented by

recourse to mechanisms of governance, which draw their designs and power from the

concept of CARICOM as a family of sovereign states. In such a context, the nation state

is effectively the locus of decision-making and implementation on regional matters and

sovereignty is not intended to be transferred to supranational regional institutions.

Furthermore, there is the issue as to whether the CSME will be subsumed in or made

irrelevant by other integration processes in which CARICOM is engaged, such as the

FTAA. The facts are that the main provisions for the CSME are intended to be in place

by December 2005, while those relating to the FTAA, if agreement can be reached, will

be phased in over a decade or more beginning in 2005. As long as the CSME provides its

participating territories with faster, broader and deeper liberalisation in every sphere and

discipline than that which is afforded to them by the FTAA, it is conceivable that the

CSME should not only co-exist with the FTAA, but continue to be a major driving force

behind Caribbean economic transformation well into the twenty-first century.

The process of implementation of the CSME has been more prolonged than

anticipated partly due to the necessity, in the context of limited resources, to ‘bat on all

fronts’.78 However, it is also fair to say that the extent of the work implied in the

establishment of the CSME was not anticipated. The legislative arrangements that have

to be implemented have proved overwhelming. The Caribbean negotiation process

77 Retrieved July 20, 2005 from http://www.blp.org.bb/speeches/newyorkcsme.pdf. 78 Ibid.

47

movement has never been willing to embrace the EU formula of having a portmanteau

piece of legislation that all countries accept, which would make legal agreements and

regulations automatically applicable in all countries, bypassing the need for a round of

legislating in each state.79 This was emphasised by the Prime Minister of Barbados,

Owen Arthur when he stated the following:

‘Our Caribbean Community has been conceived to be a community of Sovereign States. Each sovereign state in such an arrangement retains exclusive powers in relation to the implementation of community decisions. There is also no provision for the transfer of sovereignty to any supranational regional institutions and there is no body of community law that takes precedence over domestic legislation, nor is automatically applied in domestic jurisdictions. The Caribbean has therefore chosen the most difficult political form of integration by which to implement something that is as complex as a single market and economy.’80

Therefore, it appears as though the Caribbean has chosen the most difficult political form

of integration by which to implement something that is as complex as a single market and

economy.

Chapter Three has outlined the increasing importance of multilateral negotiations

in the contemporary world arena. An analysis of the multilateral negotiations of the nine

protocols revising the 1973 Treaty was undertaken. The proliferation of actors involved

in these negotiations was contrasted to the limited intergovernmental negotiations

discussed in Chapter Two. The role and importance of this diffusion of actors was

discussed, as well as undertaking a closer examination of the CRNM and the influence of

Florida on the regional negotiation process. Having observed the differing positions of

negotiations that have been utilised within the Caribbean region, there will now be a

79 In fact, the Caribbean leadership has not yet accepted the possibility of the need for a CARICOM-wide legal system-in spite of their establishment of a Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). 80 Prime Minister of Barbados, Owen Arthur, cited by Thomas in ‘The Development Glass’, p. 18.

48

consolidation of the arguments presented, while acknowledging some of the potential

challenges facing the Caribbean region in the twenty-first century.

49

CONCLUSION

The observations of this dissertation relate to both bilateral and multilateral

negotiations of CARICOM and the CSME respectively, with multilateral negotiations

being regarded as a type of superstructure over bilateral negotiations. However, it would

be best to consider these two tracks of negotiations as two sides of the same coin with

neither one excluding the other. In fact, interaction between bilateral and multilateral

negotiations can create a new pattern of political behaviour. To use a modern technical

analogy, it could be said that the bilateral negotiations that dominated the implementation

of CARICOM are similar to using a mobile telephone, whilst the multilateral negotiations

more prevalent for the establishment of the CSME, resemble using the Internet.

Therefore, although two separate identities, they can naturally complement each other.

Furthermore, although multilateral negotiations were employed in order to gain a

consensus to establish the changes required for the protocols for the 2001 Revised Treaty,

there was often a need for bilateral preparation and follow up, to consolidate the efficacy

of the multilateral negotiations. Therefore, multilateral negotiations, despite being time-

consuming, are a very effective safeguard against hegemonistic intentions and can

drastically limit the egotistical aspirations of the individual states.

The first decade of the twenty-first century finds the Caribbean somewhat trapped

between two economic worlds; one that is swiftly vanishing, the other that is struggling

to be properly conceived. The new economic dispensation that the Heads of Government

are seeking to conceive and create is one that integrates the Caribbean successfully into

the new global economy as a competitive, prosperous economy which, through that

nexus, and through its own indigenous efforts, creates a stronger capacity to enable it to

50

meet the needs and expectations of its citizens for a better quality of life. It was at the

2003 World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations in Cancún that for the first time the

Caribbean was recognised as a group with its own identity. In view of their situation of

‘inbetweenity’81 it may well be that the CSME states will have to develop a diplomacy

and negotiation process in the international arena which is based mainly on its own

identity. So far, all that has been achieved is a reflection of years of immense

negotiations. While some measure of success has been attained, the architects of the

CSME cannot afford to rest on their laurels. Immense challenges remain and these need

to be addressed or the achievements will be reversed and the region’s intrinsic

vulnerability exposed.

There is a general agreement between economists and trade negotiators that the

multilateral approach to reducing trade barriers-one that is as inclusive as possible-is the

best approach. This is somewhat intuitive, in that solutions to problems should be more

effective the more broadly they are applied. Therefore, the negotiators involved in the

process of implementation of the CMSE have chosen to embrace the wider approach,

with regional business and local NGOs all playing a part and influencing the process.

The only way forward will be to rely on negotiations based on what Lloyd Best refers to

as the ‘effective projection of the CSME reality and separate identity’.82 This is not a

suggestion by any means that group diplomacy should be set aside, only that the

81 The notion of ‘inbetweenity’ was first referred to in the Lloyd Best edited Trinidad and Tobago Review and has subsequently been the focus of many discussions in regional journals and newspapers. For example, ‘The Diplomacy of Inbetweenity’, Stabroek News, 24 June 2005, discusses the notion suggesting that the Caribbean is itself an ‘inbetween’ region. CARICOM is grouped with Latin America, but CARICOM is not Latin. Its language is that of North America, and so are its institutions, but CARICOM is not American. It is a region not rich enough to be consulted or poor enough to be included in the categories identified for special assistance. 82 ‘The Diplomacy of Inbetweenity’, Stabroek News, June 24, 2005. Retrieved June 30, 2005 from http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article_editorialid=22551487.

51

Caribbean region must put greater reliance on ensuring that its own peculiar

vulnerabilities are recognised.

All this has taken place in a situation where it has been suggested that

multilateralism, as a process, is in crisis. This crisis originates in sources which are

intrinsic to the very notion of multilateralism. One of these is that in a world based on

the ethic of competition among nations and cooperation based on promoting national self-

interest, multilateralism can only work ‘smoothly’ if the world is effectively comprised of

nations of roughly similar economic size; technical, institutional and scientific capacities;

and, diplomatic and military clout.83 In a contemporary world of striking disparities,

multilateralism, both as a practice and as a goal of the international community, will

remain under continuous threat, as it has since the very inception of the global system.84

While the role of the CRNM is commendable, one of the issues facing the Heads

of Government is the need to involve the private sector and, in some instances,

representatives of NGOs in the negotiations. Although this is an established practice

among many countries to have these groups involved in negotiations, so far CARICOM

has done this only on a selective basis with regards to the implementation of the CSME.

Private sector participation has worked well in negotiations on sugar, rum and bananas,

where industry representatives are substantially involved at all stages, but otherwise there

remains a tendency to limit these representatives to a consultative role or an ‘on call’

basis.85 There can be no merit in limiting their involvement where in fact they can be

effective interlocutors with their counterparts. A similar point can be made about

participation by other sources of expertise, such as members of the academic community,

83 Thomas, ‘Development Glass’, p. 9. 84 Ibid. 85 Alister McIntyre, ‘Negotiation Preparedness’ in Hall (ed.), Beyond Survival, p. 676.

52

both in the preparatory process and in the negotiations themselves. Some of this is

already being done, but much more needs to be done, given the highly technical and

complex nature of the negotiations in which the CSME will have to engage over the

period ahead. A further weakness in the negotiation process is the habit of making only

limited use of officials who were involved in previous negotiations. This needs to be

addressed so that continuity can be maintained, and the institutional memory utilised to

good advantage. This applies particularly to retired officials who are not really used for

this purpose in most CARICOM countries. Therefore, a pattern has developed where

countries have little international memory on which to draw, and tend to start from

scratch every time a negotiation arises.

The Caribbean region is caught up in dramatic change, much of which has to do

with the supplanting of long standing social and economic systems and the erosion and

redefinition of past relationships. This could either become the best of times, or the worst

of times for the region, and the result will depend on whether the purposes and the impact

of change concerning the conception and implementation of the CSME can be

communicated effectively to the entire civil society. Indeed, it is still very much a fair

charge that despite the efforts of a consistent and valiant few, matters concerning the

CSME continue to be regarded by a wide cross section of the society as closely guarded

secrets, best left to public officials, or to the handful of businesses which ply their trade in

the region or to an even smaller and select group of academics who delight in dabbling in

things that are incomprehensible to the ordinary mind.86

86 Retrieved July 20, 2005 from http://www.blp.org.bb/speeches/newyorkcsme.pdf.

53

The creation of the CMSE is a historic necessity which must be brought to full

fruition, no matter how arduous the task may appear at times, no matter how negligible

the immediate returns may appear, or how vast the pitfalls and obstacles that threaten to

ensnare it. The CSME offers the societies of the region, individually and collectively, the

only realistic and viable option by which to achieve sustainable development. In the

process it also offers the prospect of erasing the two great economic deficits which

confront the region during the early years of the twenty-first century. The first economic

deficit is the wide gap between the material progress which the region can, with effective

resource use, attain as compared to what has so far been achieved; the second is the gap

between the material expectations and needs of the people and the capacity thus far to

fulfil them. The CSME also represents the most effective means by which the individual

economies of the region can be successfully integrated into the proposed new

hemispheric economy on terms that will enable them to minimise the costs and

dislocations that ensue from that integration, while maximising the potential benefits.87 It

offers a wider field of opportunity than is made available by any individual economy for

growth and expansion of businesses of all description, across all sectors, and the ideal

setting in which they can come to terms with and overcome the long standing problems

of uncompetitiveness, deriving from small scale aspirations, with which they have always

been plagued. Furthermore, it portends a new relationship between the ordinary

Caribbean citizen and enterprises to the regional economic system, in the form of new

rights of establishment of enterprise, greater economic mobility and choice, and the

exposure of new systems of competition amongst themselves through which, hopefully,

they can lift themselves to world class standards. 87 Ibid.

54

If the Caribbean region cannot compete successfully in any of the wide areas of

the CSME, how will the region survive in relationships with the FTAA and the EU?

Therefore, unless the region can successfully implement its own SME, encompassing free

movement of goods, capital and persons, without further delay it will be unprepared to

face the challenges of wider economic integration represented by the FTAA, and the

proposed Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPA) with Europe, which must

themselves conform to multilateral rules and regulations sponsored by the WTO. The

people of the region must also be made aware that the Heads of Government are not

engaged in deepening trade in the various fora because it is fashionable, but because it is

critical to the region’s ability to access the global economy. According to Prime Minister

Owen Arthur, the Heads of Government are motivated by the mutual vision that there are

benefits to be derived from free trade, and from the growing interdependence among the

region’s economies. Simultaneously, it must be emphasised that for this vision to be

realised the rules of engagement must be fair and responsive to the circumstances and

constraints of the most vulnerable states.88

The post-Cold War multilateralism is characterised by more complex agendas of

conferences and negotiations with larger numbers of issues and the growing involvement

of experts, citizens groups and NGOs. The Caribbean negotiation process is trying to

adapt to these new conditions. However, this process is painfully slow and many aspects

of the negotiation process still need to be revised, starting with procedural and

methodological issues. First of all there should be a clear line of distinction between

negotiations and treaty-making. The process of multilateral negotiations consists of two

stages: exploratory, as the initial stage, and treaty-making as the highest stage. The latter 88 Ibid.

55

could be subdivided into the definition of parameters of a future agreement and the

working out of it. Of course, the division is conditional. Bearing in mind this simple

structure, it is not difficult to build the negotiations process in such a way that the result is

achieved quickly and minimal resources are used. Unfortunately in some negotiation

fora, the participants confuse the different stages and throw the whole process into

disorder. Such negotiations may last for years and consist of endless positional

statements.

In the field of structured multilateral negotiations there is surprising resistance to

innovation. The lack of flexibility on the part of the member states is a major problem.

The United States Deputy Secretary of State, S. Talbott, was absolutely right when he

stated that ‘regional co-operation is a positive force if and only if it enhances the positive

aspect of global interdependence and combats the negative ones’.89 Flexibility, which

was always the trademark of diplomacy and negotiations, provides the hope that the

Caribbean region will not only adapt to new challenges, but will also be helpful both for

the states and other new actors on the international scene, in their efforts to create a better

world for the twenty-first century.

Jean Monet, one of the fathers of European integration said in his insightful and

informative memoirs that, ‘I have always believed that Europe would be built through

crises, and that it would be the sum of their solutions.’90 Similarly, this could be applied

to the Caribbean region, as well as C.L.R. James’ verdict that, ‘Nobody knows what the

Caribbean population is capable of. Nobody has even attempted to find out.’91

Therefore, the outcome of the negotiations leading to the implementation of the CSME 89 Retrieved July 20, 2005 from http://www.blp.org.bb/speeches/newyorkcsme.pdf. 90 Jean Monet, Memoirs, (London: Collins, 1978), p. 417. 91 Retrieved May 29, 2005 from http://www.caricom.org.

56

will test to the extreme the validity of James’ judgment. Failing this, the CSME will be

‘no more than the fifth wheel of a coach; not much of hindrance to progress, nor not

much of an aid’.92 Although the multilateral negotiations associated with the process of

implementation of the CSME differ from the bilateral negotiations which dominated the

CARICOM era, there have been some positive and negative aspects in both processes.

While the negotiators relentlessly pursue the multilateral negotiation format, which is

currently more readily accepted by academics and practitioners alike, the journey is far

from over for the Caribbean region trying to adapt to its changing environment.

92 Arthur, ‘The Way Forward’.

57

Appendix A: Chronological time line of some important dates in the Caribbean negotiation process

1947 The decision to embark upon a regional federation was discussed at the

Montego Bay Conference

1958 The establishment of the West Indies Federation

1962 The collapse of the West Indies Federation

1965 Antigua, Barbados and Guyana signed an agreement creating a three-

country CARIFTA

1968 The establishment of a region-wide CARIFTA to serve the limited

purpose of removing the tariff and other barriers to intra-regional trade in

goods only

1973 The implementation of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, of which the

provisions created a form of Common Market (CARICOM) in the region

1989 In Grand Anse, Grenada, the Heads of Government decided to transform

the limited Common Market, as originally conceived in 1973, into a full

fledged Single Market and Single Economy in the shortest possible time.

2001 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas was implemented to facilitate the

establishment of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME).

2005 The deadline for the completion of the process for establishment of the

CSME

58

Appendix B: A summary of the protocols revising the 1973 Treaty

Protocol I-Restructuring of the Organs and Institutions of the Community

By restructuring its various organs and institutions the Community will be able to

function more efficiently. A main feature of Protocol I is that it modifies that

unanimity rule for decision making which has impeded prompt decision-making by

member states. Decisions will now be reached by qualified majority vote, unless an

issue is determined to be of critical importance to the national well-being of a

member state.

Protocol II-Rights of Establishment, Services and Capital

Protocol II amends the Treaty to create a regime for trade in services. The main

objective of this protocol is to facilitate trade and investment in the services sector of

member states through the establishment of economic enterprises. The Protocol does

not apply to a CARICOM national seeking permanent employment in the territory of

another member state. Protocol II may be seen as the most important new instrument

in establishing the CSME as a single economic space.

Protocol III-Industrial Policy

Protocol III is designed to cover industrial policy, which seeks to promote industrial

production through a process of production integration, involving the establishment

of single enterprises with branches, subsidiaries or joint venture arrangements in more

than one member state. This protocol will enhance the region’s international

competitiveness in sustainable production of both manufactured goods and services.

Protocol IV-Trade Policy

Protocol IV is mainly concerned with consolidating various amendments to the trade

provisions of the Treaty that were introduced over the years.

59

Protocol V-Agricultural Policy

Protocol V aims to bring about enhanced and fuller cooperation among member states

in pursing the diversification and transformation of their agricultural sectors, leading

to greater efficiency in the production and marketing of agriculture products both

within and outside of the region.

Protocol VI-Transportation Policy

Protocol VI deals with the provision of adequate, safe and internationally competitive

transport services for the Single Market and Economy. It also deals with transport

policies and the measures which member states can take together to develop land,

maritime, and air transport which are essential components in the drive towards

greater competitiveness and sustained growth in trade and development.

Protocol VII-Disadvantaged Countries, Regions and Sectors

Protocol VII contains a special regime for disadvantaged countries, regions and

sectors, which builds on the arrangements already in place to give special treatment to

the so-called less-developed countries of the OECS, Belize and Guyana. The general

objective is to assist disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors towards becoming

economically viable and competitive within the Single Market and Economy through

support programmes and mechanisms.

60

Protocol VIII- Competition Policy, Consumer Protection and Dumping and Subsidies Protocol VIII addresses issues relating to competition policy and the promotion of

consumer welfare in the CSME. Under this protocol, a harmonised policy will be

established and administered. The protocol seeks to promote and preserve conditions

for competition to facilitate the participation of Community nationals in all markets

and to promote and protect the interests of consumers.

Protocol IX-Dispute Settlement

The settlement of disputes is an important and vital mechanism n a single market

regime. Protocol IX seeks to address this by conferring on the Caribbean Court of

Justice compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating

to the interpretation and application of the Treaty.

61

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES AND BOOKS

Arthur, Owen ‘The Caribbean Single Market and Economy: The Way Forward’, Thirtieth

Anniversary Distinguished Lecture of the Caribbean Community, Barbados, April 23,

2004. Retrieved May 23, 2005 from www.caricom.org/speeches/ 30anniversarylecture8-

arthur.pdf

Axline, Andrew W. Caribbean Integration: The Politics of Regionalism, (London:

Frances Printer Ltd., 1979)

Barrow-Giles, Cynthia Introduction to Caribbean Politics: Texts and Readings, (Jamaica:

Ian Randle Publishers, 2002)

Barston, R.P. Modern Diplomacy, 2nd edition, (London: Longman, 1997)

Baylis, John and Steve Smith The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to

International Relations, 3rd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)

Benn, Dennis Multilateral Diplomacy and the Economics of Change: The Third World

and the New Economic Order, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2002)

Berridge, G.R. Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 2nd edition, (New York: Palgrave, 2002)

Brereton, Bridget (ed.) General history of the Caribbean: The Caribbean in the twentieth

century Volume 5, (London: Macmillan, 2004)

Caldéron, Álvaro (ed.) Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2003,

(Santiago: UN/ECLAC, 2004)

62

‘Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) Single Market and

Economy’, Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, (2004). Retrieved

June 30, 2005 from http://www.mfaft.gov.jm/Intl_Communit/Caricom.htm

‘Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery: Phase II, Draft Five-Year Strategic Plan

(2003/04-2007/08)’. Retrieved May 15, 2005 from http://www.crnm.org

Collins, J. ‘U.S. signs agreement with CARICOM’, Caribbean Business, November 18,

2004, p. 43.

Retrieved May 24, 2005 from http://www.caribbeanbusinesscommunity.com

Elu, Juliet ‘The Journey So Far: The Effect of Structural Adjustment Programme,

Sustainable Growth, and Development in the Caribbean Region’, Western Journal of

Black Studies, Vol. 24, Issue 4, Winter 2002, p. 202

Erisman, Michael H. Pursuing Post Dependency Politics: South-South Relations in the

Caribbean, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992)

Fauriol, Georges A. Foreign Policy Behaviour of Caribbean States: Guyana, Haiti and

Jamaica, (New York: University Press of America, 1982)

Gemad, William D. West Indian Development and the Deepening and Widening of the

Caribbean Community, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997)

Genna, Gaspare M. and Taeko Hiroi, ‘Power Preponderance and Domestic Politics:

Explaining Regional Economic Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1960-

1997’, International Interactions, Vol. 30, Issue 2, April-June 2004, pp. 143-164.

Retrieved May 13, 2005 from http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles

Griffith, Winston H. ‘A Tale of Four CARICOM Countries’, Journal of Economic Issues,

Vol. 36, Issue 1, March 2002, p. 79

63

Hall, Kenneth O. Integrate or Perish: Perspectives of Heads of Government of the

Caribbean Community and Commonwealth Caribbean Countries 1963-2002, (Jamaica:

Ian Randle Publishers, 2002)

Hall, Kenneth O. The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival, (Jamaica: Ian Randle

Publishers, 2001)

Hall, Kenneth O. and Denis Benn (eds.) Caribbean Imperatives, Regional Governance

and Integrated Development, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005)

Hall, Kenneth O. and Denis Benn (eds.) Contending with destiny: the Caribbean in the

21st century, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2000)

Hall, Kenneth O. and Denis Benn (eds.) Governance in the Age of Globalisation:

Caribbean Perspectives, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003)

Hillman, Richard S. and Thomas J. D’Agostino (eds.) Understanding the contemporary

Caribbean, (London: Eurospan, 2003)

Hocking, Brian ‘Changing the terms of trade policy making: from the ‘club’ to the

‘multistakeholder’ model’, World Trade Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2004, pp. 3-26

Hocking, Brian and Dominic Kelly, ‘Doing the business? The International Chamber of

Commerce, the United Nations, and the Global Compact’, in Andrew Cooper (ed.),

Enhancing Global Governance, (Japan: United Nations University Press, 2002)

Jackson, Jason ‘Assessing the Distribution of Costs and Benefits in the CARICOM

Single Market and Economy’, XXXV Annual Conference of Monetary Studies, St. Kitts,

November 24-28, 2003. Retrieved July 10, 2005 from

http://www.ccmsuwi.org/ConferencesandSeminars/MonetaryStudiesConferences/2003.ht

ml

64

Jackson, Rashleigh Guyana’s Diplomacy: Reflections of a Former Foreign Minister,

(Guyana: Free Press, 2003)

Jagdeo, Bharat ‘Realising the CSME: Prospects for National Development’,

National One Day Summit on the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, Guyana,

December 01, 2003. Retrieved June 14, 2005 from www.moftic.gov.gy

Karagiannis, Nikolaos and Michael Witter (eds.) The Caribbean economies in an era of

free trade, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004)

Kramer, Roderick M. and David M. Messick (eds.) Negotiation as a Social Process,

(London: SAGE Publications, 1995)

Kremenyuk, Victor A. (ed.) International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues,

(Oxford: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991)

Lalta, Stanley and Marie Freckleton Caribbean Economic Development: The First

Generation, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003)

Lavin, Franklin L. ‘Half a Loaf is Better than None: The Case for Regional Free Trade

Agreements’, Economic Freedom Project Report, June 2, 2000. Retrieved July 13, 2005

from http://www.heritage.org

Lewis, David E. ‘Intra-Caribbean Relations: A Review and Projections’, in Anthony T.

Bryan (ed.), The Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy, (Miami:

North-South Center Press, 1995)

Lewis, Vaughan ‘Compulsions of Integration’, in Kenneth O. Hall (ed.), The Caribbean

Community: Beyond Survival, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001)

65

Lewis, Vaughan ‘The CSME, the International Environment and Options for CARICOM

and the OECS Countries’, Caribbean Investor, July 13, 2005. Retrieved August 14, 2005

from http://caribbeaninvestor.com

Luxner, Larry ‘CARICOM 25 Years of a United Caribbean Voice’, Americas, Vol. 51,

Issue 1, January/February 1999, p. 56

Mastenbroek, William F. G. ‘Development of Negotiating Skills’, in Victor A.

Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, (Oxford:

Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991)

McIntyre, Alister ‘The Importance of Negotiation Preparedness: Reflections on the

Caribbean Experience’, in Kenneth O. Hall (ed.), The Caribbean Community: Beyond

Survival, (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001)

McIntyre, Arnold ‘The Caribbean Community and External Negotiations’, in Kenneth O.

Hall (ed.), The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival, (Jamaica: Ian Randle

Publishers, 2001)

Melissen, Jan (ed.) Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.,

1999)

Monet, Jean Memoirs, (London: Collins, 1978)

Mullerleile, Christophe CARICOM Integration: Progress and Hurdles-A European View,

(Jamaica: Kingston Publishers Ltd.)

Myers, Gordon Banana wars: the price of free trade-a Caribbean perspective, (London:

Zed Books, 2004)

66

Payne, Anthony The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79: Regional Integration

Amongst New States, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980)

Pollard, Duke The CARICOM System: Basic Instruments, (Jamaica: Caribbean Law

Publishing Company, 2003)

Potter, Robert B. The Contemporary Caribbean, (London: Prentice Hall, 2004)

Putnam, R.D. ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’,

International Organisation, Vol. 42, Issue 3, 1988, p. 436

Raiffa, Howard The Art & Science of Negotiation, (Massachusetts: Harvard University

Press, 1982)

Ramphal, Shridath ‘The Caribbean Challenge in the Negotiating Process’, in Kenneth O.

Hall (ed.), The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival, (Jamaica: Ian Randle

Publishers, 2001)

Ramsaran, Ramesh Caribbean Survival and the Global Challenge, (Jamaica: Ian Randle

Publishers, 2002)

Springer, Bevan ‘Challenges, opportunities await the Caribbean in 2004’, New York

Amsterdam News, Vol. 95, Issue 1, January 1, 2004, p. 12

Springer, Bevan ‘One Caribbean Becoming a Reality’, New York Amsterdam News,

Vol. 94, Issue 28, October 7, 2003, p. 34

Starkey, Brigid et al. Negotiating a Complex World: An Introduction to International

Negotiation, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999)

67

‘The Diplomacy of Inbetweenity’, Stabroek News, June 24, 2005. Retrieved June 30,

2005 from http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article_editorialid=22551487

Thomas, Clive Y. ‘The Development Glass: Half Empty or Half Full-Perspectives on

Caribbean Development’, Text of the Sixth William G. Demas Memorial Lecture,

Caribbean Development Bank, May 17, 2005, Guyana. Retrieved June 4, 2005 from

http://www.caribank.org

Thompson, Marcus ‘The Principles, Methodology and Implementation of a Small

Business Ecommerce Website’, Postgraduate Project, Student in Information Technology

in Ecommerce (ITEC) MSc., School of Engineering Design and Technology, University

of Bradford, August 2005

Wickham, Peter et al. Elements of Regional Integration: The Way Forward, (Jamaica: Ian

Randle Publishers, 1998)

Wilkinson, Bert ‘Three Caribbean countries take the lead in single market’, New York

Amsterdam News, Vol. 95, Issue 49, February 2, 2004, pp. 14-17

Winham, G.R. ‘Negotiation as a management process’, World Politics, Vol. 30, Issue 1,

October 1977

WEBSITES

http://www.blp.org.bb/speeches/newyorkcsme.pdf

http://www.caricom.org