the causal theory of reference

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The Causal Theory of The Causal Theory of Reference Reference

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The Causal Theory of Reference. Explaining Reference. Kripke: a name refers to a thing if there is the right sort of causal link between the thing and the use of the name This causal link is equivalent to Frege’s sense It is explicable in purely physicalist terms. Baptism. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: The Causal Theory of Reference

The Causal Theory of The Causal Theory of ReferenceReference

Page 2: The Causal Theory of Reference

Explaining ReferenceExplaining Reference

Kripke: a name refers to a thing if Kripke: a name refers to a thing if there is the right sort of causal link there is the right sort of causal link between the thing and the use of the between the thing and the use of the namename This causal link is equivalent to Frege’s This causal link is equivalent to Frege’s

sensesense It is explicable in purely physicalist It is explicable in purely physicalist

termsterms

Page 3: The Causal Theory of Reference

BaptismBaptism

The event that fixes the reference of The event that fixes the reference of a term is a a term is a baptismbaptism or or dubbingdubbing Point at dog and say ‘this is Fido’Point at dog and say ‘this is Fido’ Establishes a causal link between term Establishes a causal link between term

and thingand thing Causal link exists for all witnesses of Causal link exists for all witnesses of

this actthis act

Page 4: The Causal Theory of Reference

BorrowingBorrowing

Those who don’t witness baptism have Those who don’t witness baptism have to ‘borrow’ referenceto ‘borrow’ reference They are causally linked to other users They are causally linked to other users

who have the referencing abilitywho have the referencing ability Ultimately all referencing depends on Ultimately all referencing depends on

causal connections to witnesses of the causal connections to witnesses of the baptismbaptism

We can talk about Napoleon because we are We can talk about Napoleon because we are causally connected in the right way to someone causally connected in the right way to someone who saw Napoleon, and to the one who named who saw Napoleon, and to the one who named him.him.

Page 5: The Causal Theory of Reference

AdvantagesAdvantages

It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ The sense of ‘Venus’ is different from The sense of ‘Venus’ is different from

the sense of ‘Phosphorus’ because the the sense of ‘Phosphorus’ because the causal chain that links Venus to ‘Venus’ causal chain that links Venus to ‘Venus’ is different from that which links Venus is different from that which links Venus to ‘Phosphorus’to ‘Phosphorus’

Page 6: The Causal Theory of Reference

AdvantagesAdvantages

It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ Sense determines reference, and the Sense determines reference, and the

causal chain determines reference by causal chain determines reference by being linked to the relevant thingbeing linked to the relevant thing

Page 7: The Causal Theory of Reference

AdvantagesAdvantages

It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’It explains Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ To understand the meaning of a word is to To understand the meaning of a word is to

grasp the sensegrasp the sense The causal chain from use of a term to the The causal chain from use of a term to the

thing itself must pass through the brainthing itself must pass through the brain It depends on some causal features in the brainIt depends on some causal features in the brain Which is why not all brains can have the right Which is why not all brains can have the right

causal links causal links Animals, for exampleAnimals, for example

Those causal features Those causal features are are the grasping of the the grasping of the sensesense

Page 8: The Causal Theory of Reference

AdvantagesAdvantages

Solves the ‘puzzles’ of referenceSolves the ‘puzzles’ of reference How do How do

Venus is the evening starVenus is the evening starVenus is VenusVenus is Venus

have different meanings though their have different meanings though their referents are identical?referents are identical?

Because the meanings are constructed Because the meanings are constructed out of senses and the senses/causal out of senses and the senses/causal links are different for ‘Venus’ and the links are different for ‘Venus’ and the ‘evening star’‘evening star’

Page 9: The Causal Theory of Reference

AdvantagesAdvantages

Solves the ‘puzzles’ of referenceSolves the ‘puzzles’ of reference How can we talk about things that don’t How can we talk about things that don’t

exist?exist? There can’t be causal links to non-existent There can’t be causal links to non-existent

thingsthings Consider how the name ‘Pegasus’ is Consider how the name ‘Pegasus’ is

introducedintroduced Described as a horse with wingsDescribed as a horse with wings The terms ‘horse’ and ‘wing’ both referThe terms ‘horse’ and ‘wing’ both refer Those terms have causal chains Those terms have causal chains Therefore ‘Pegasus’ has a causal chainTherefore ‘Pegasus’ has a causal chain

Page 10: The Causal Theory of Reference

AdvantagesAdvantages

Solves the ‘puzzles’ of referenceSolves the ‘puzzles’ of reference How can we say that things don’t exist?How can we say that things don’t exist?

There can’t be causal links to non-existent There can’t be causal links to non-existent thingsthings

The ‘Pegasus’ solution works here tooThe ‘Pegasus’ solution works here too

Page 11: The Causal Theory of Reference

ProblemsProblems

Change of referenceChange of reference

Two babies are born, and their mothers bestow names upon them. A nurse inadvertently switches them and the error is never discovered. It will henceforth undeniably be the case that the man universally known as ‘Jack’ is so called because a woman dubbed some other baby with the name.

Page 12: The Causal Theory of Reference

ProblemsProblems

Change of referenceChange of reference There are multiple chains between terms and There are multiple chains between terms and

referentsreferents Every introduction forms another chain from Bob to Every introduction forms another chain from Bob to

‘Bob’‘Bob’ Some may link the referent and different Some may link the referent and different

terms,terms,Others may link the same term to different Others may link the same term to different referentsreferents

If too many link a referent and a different term If too many link a referent and a different term then that term becomes the name of the objectthen that term becomes the name of the object

Page 13: The Causal Theory of Reference

ProblemsProblems

Quâ-problem-problem I point at a dog and say ‘Fido’I point at a dog and say ‘Fido’

Why have I named the particular dog and Why have I named the particular dog and not the species, or the dog’s nose, or an air not the species, or the dog’s nose, or an air molecule at the end of my finger, or the idea molecule at the end of my finger, or the idea of the dog, or …of the dog, or …

It’s the intention of the grounder to It’s the intention of the grounder to name the dogname the dog The intention must be a describable oneThe intention must be a describable one So descriptions are again requiredSo descriptions are again required

Page 14: The Causal Theory of Reference

ProblemsProblems

Natural kind termsNatural kind terms The solution to the The solution to the quâquâ-problem requires -problem requires

descriptions of natural kind termsdescriptions of natural kind terms They have all the same problems as in pure They have all the same problems as in pure

description theoriesdescription theories Modal ProblemModal Problem

““Tigers are wild striped felines”Tigers are wild striped felines” There’s a possible world where they don’t have There’s a possible world where they don’t have

stripesstripes Because there are no FreemasonsBecause there are no Freemasons

They are still tigersThey are still tigers

Page 15: The Causal Theory of Reference

ProblemsProblems

Natural kind termsNatural kind terms The solution to the The solution to the quâquâ-problem -problem

requires descriptions of natural kind requires descriptions of natural kind termsterms They have all the same problems as in pure They have all the same problems as in pure

description theoriesdescription theories Necessity ProblemNecessity Problem

You don’t need to be able to describe an You don’t need to be able to describe an elm in order to be able to refer to itelm in order to be able to refer to it

Page 16: The Causal Theory of Reference

ProblemsProblems

Natural kind termsNatural kind terms The solution to the The solution to the quâquâ-problem requires -problem requires

descriptions of natural kind termsdescriptions of natural kind terms They have all the same problems as in pure They have all the same problems as in pure

description theoriesdescription theories Sufficiency ProblemSufficiency Problem

Pegasus is the winged horsePegasus is the winged horse But if we find a winged horse created by But if we find a winged horse created by

Freemasons in Tibet by gene-splicing, that Freemasons in Tibet by gene-splicing, that wouldn’t be Pegasuswouldn’t be Pegasus

Page 17: The Causal Theory of Reference

ProblemsProblems

Twin-Earth is a planet just like Earth Twin-Earth is a planet just like Earth except water there is not Hexcept water there is not H22O, but XYZO, but XYZ

‘‘Water’ as said by a twin-Earthling Water’ as said by a twin-Earthling does not mean the same as ‘water’ does not mean the same as ‘water’ said by an Earthlingsaid by an Earthling

Yet everything is the same.Yet everything is the same. Descriptions can’t give the meanings of Descriptions can’t give the meanings of

termsterms Meanings just ‘ain’t in the head’Meanings just ‘ain’t in the head’