In this month’s issue of �e CIP Report, we feature the Dams Sector. �e Dams Sector includes dam projects, navigation locks, levees, hurricane barriers, mine tailings and other industrial waste impoundments, water retention and water control facilities, and hydropower plants. We take a look at these di�erent aspects of the Sector throughout this issue.

First, the Executive Director of the Association of State Dam Safety O�cials (ASDSO), a key partner inthe Dams Sector, discusses their e�orts to protect dams and their associated elements in the UnitedStates. Another key partner in the Dams Sector, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), discusses the importance of public-private partnerships in leading security and protection e�orts for dams. �en, the dams and reservoir markets in the United States are examined by a Design Manager at ASI Constructors, Inc. A representative from International Riversdescribes some of the safety and security concerns for international dams, focusing on earthquakes, food and regional security, and climate change. Next, the General Manager Infrastructure at Goulburn-Murray Water in the State of Victoria, Australia highlights the role that risk assessments play in dam safety programs. �e Executive Director of the International Hydropower Association examines sustainable hydropower, speci�cally the recently developed tool, Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol. Finally, an academic researcher Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol. Finally, an academic researcher Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocoland consultant on water law and policy expounds upon the challenges and opportunities pertaining to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a new dam being constructed in Ethiopia that will impact numerous countries in Africa.

�is month’s Legal Insights brie�y reviews the legal challenges associated with the Legal Insights brie�y reviews the legal challenges associated with the Legal Insights2011 Mississippi River �ooding and the subsequent opening of the Morganza Spillway.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank the contributors of this month’s issue. We truly appreciate your valuable insight.

We hope you enjoy this issue of �e CIP Report and �nd it useful and informative. �ank you for your support and feedback.

the cip report

101000101010110101001010101011010100101110101010010111010101010101010110101010101011011010101010100101010101010101010101101010010101010101110101101011001010101010101010101010100101010101010110101010100

CENTER FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION VOLUME 10 NUMBER 4

October 2011DAMS SECTOR

Dams Sector .................................2

Partnerships ..................................4

U.S. Dams Market .......................8

Global Challenges ......................12

Dam Safety ................................14

Hydropower ...............................17

Ethiopia .....................................21

Legal Insights .............................24

Editorial Staff

EditorsDevon HardyOlivia Pacheco

Staff WritersM. Hasan AijazShahin Saloom

JMU CoordinatorsKen Newbold

John Noftsinger

PublisherLiz Hale-Salice

Contact: dhardy1@gmu.edu703.993.8591

Click here to subscribe. Visit us online for this and other issues at

http://cip.gmu.edu

CENTER for

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTIONand

HOMELAND SECURITY

Mick KicklighterDirector, CIP/HSGeorge Mason University, School of Law

and Homeland Secur ity

The CIP Report October 2011

2

Public-Private Collaboration Brings Ongoing Success to the Dams Sector

One of the 18 critical infrastructure sectors identi�ed through Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7 is the Dams Sector. In a few short years, the Dams Sector — capitalizing on its public-private partnership model — has created a variety of Nation-wide and regional programs along with avast range of products, research, resources, training, and information sharing tools. A key partner is the Association of State Dam Safety O�cials (ASDSO). ASDSO’s rolewithin the Dams Sector is to coordinate the participation of State subject-matter experts, representing the dam regulating community; provide technical resources and data; and, support the dissemination of training materials and information for the Sector.

�e Dams Sector comprises dam projects, hydropower plants, navigation locks, levees, dikes, hurricane barriers, mine tailings and industrial waste impoundments, and other similar water retentionand water control facilities. �ese assets represent a vital and bene�cial part of the Unites States’ infrastructure and continuously provide a wide range of economic, environmental, and social bene�ts, including hydroelectric power, river navigation, water supply, wildlife habitat, waste management, �ood control, and recreation. However, the potential risks associated with

Dams Sector asset failure, regardless of causation, are considerable and could result in signi�cant destruction, including loss of life, massive property damage, and severe long-term consequences.

�e O�ce of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) serves as the Sector Speci�c Agency (SSA) for the Dams Sector. �e Dams SSA directly coordinates national protection and risk mitigation activities through ongoing collaboration with the Dams Sector Coordinating Council (DSCC) and the Dams Sector Government Coordinating Council (DGCC). �ese councils provide the primary vehicle through which representatives from the government (Federal, State, and local) and the private sector can e�ectively collaborate and share approaches focused on the improvement of critical infrastructure protection.

Resources developed by the Dams Sector provide a wealth of useful information ranging (but not limited) from: active and passive vehicle barriers, water side barriers, personnel screening procedures, security awareness for dams andlevees, protective measures, emergency preparedness, as well as

cybersecurity and the importance of control systems.

�e Sector has implemented a series of free web-based training courses, with accompanying guidance documents, which cover a multitude of issues regarding security awareness, protective measures, and crisis management. �ese courses are o�ered through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and users are provided with a corresponding certi�cate of completion. �ese courses include:

• Independent Study (IS)-872 Dams Sector: Protective Measures addresses protective measures related to physical, cyber, and human elements, and emphasizes the importance of these measures ascomponents of an overall risk management program. It also describes the basic elements of risk management, discusses the steps required to develop and implement an e�ective protective program, and helps stakeholders develop protective programs based on a systematic assessment of threats, selected levels of protection, and consideration of constraints.

• IS-871 Dams Sector: Security Awareness provides information toenhance the ability to identify

by Lori C. Spragens, Executive Director, Association of State Dam Safety O�cials

(Continued on Page 3)

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Dams Sector (Cont. from 2)

security concerns, coordinate proper response, and establish e�ective partnerships with local law enforcement and �rst responder communities.

• IS-870 Dams Sector: Crisis Management addresses crisis management activities as an important component of an overall risk management program and provides dam and levee stakeholders with recommendations to assist in the development of various plans focused on enhancing preparedness, protection, recovery, and resilience capabilities.

�e IS-871 and 872 courses are designated as “For O�cial Use Only” and are available only through the Homeland SecurityInformation Network-Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS) Dams Portal. IS-870 is available to the public on the FEMA EMI website.

In the works for future training through a collaborative e�ort between the Dams SSA and ASDSO are two new reference documents: Estimating Loss of Life for Dam Failure Scenarios and Estimating Economic Consequences for Dam Failure Scenarios. �ese companion guidelines o�er recommendations for the assessment of direct loss-of-life and fatality rates and the evaluation ofdirect and indirect economic impacts resulting from worst reasonable case scenarios. �e goal is to create classroom and eventually self-paced training on estimating consequences from dam failure with a special focus on these reference documents.

�e Dams SSA and ASDSO are also collaborating with sector partners todevelop the Dam Security and Protection Technical Seminar. �is seminar aims to provide owners, operators, State dam safety regulators, and other related stakeholders with a comprehensive “101” overview of dam security, protection, and crisis management-related issues. �e �rst presentation of this seminar will be in 2012.

As important as the training partnership is to ASDSO and theSector, information sharing is assigned equal billing. One way toe�ciently share the multitude of aforementioned sector reference materials is through presentations at national and regional conferences, like those held by ASDSO, the U.S. Society on Dams, or the National Hydropower Association. Even better is the idea of creating a national event dedicated to the Dams Sector. In support of this idea, the Dams SSA and ASDSO began conducting the Annual National Dam Security Forum in conjunction with ASDSO’s Annual Dam Safety Conference. Started in2008, this forum is the premiere national summit where public and private stakeholders can get the latest information regarding dam security, protection, and resilience.

�is year, ASDSO and DHS held the Fourth Annual National Dam Security Forum in conjunction withASDSO Dam Safety ’11 from September 25-29 at the Gaylord National Resort Hotel and Convention Center in National

Harbor, MD. �is year’s forum featured a variety of presentations, ranging from security considerations to emergency preparedness e�orts.

During this conference and throughout the year, ASDSO assists the Dams Sector in publicizing other useful tools that enhance information sharing. Here are some examples:

• The on-line Dams Sector Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) tool provides stakeholders with the ability to horizontally report and retrieve information pertaining to suspicious activities.�e SAR tool is available via the HSIN-CS Dams Portal and o�ers vetted sector partners the opportunity to better understand the implications of incidents that occur throughout the Nation. Once a report is entered via the SAR tool, automatic noti�cations are sent within 30 minutes to a predetermined list of sector stakeholders informing them that a suspicious activity has been reported. As such, vetted partners are able to examine reports from abroad range of sector stakeholdersand subsequently determine the need to implement protective measures.

�e Dams Sector Tabletop Exercise Toolbox (DSTET), developed by the Dams SSA in coordination withsector partners, directly assists stake-holders in planning and conductingsecurity-based tabletop exercises inaccordance with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation

(Continued on Page 25)

The CIP Report October 2011

4

The Importance of Public-Private Partnerships in Leading Security and Protection E�orts for Dams

Introduction

As evidenced by recent events around the world, such as the extensive wild�res in the Southeast and Southwest regions of the United States, historical �oods ofthe Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, the Eastern Japan tsunami and Fukushima nuclear disaster, and theterrorist attacks in Norway, theglobal risk environment is highlyunpredictable and unforgiving. �ese disasters have demonstrated that their impact can be oftencatastrophic, reaching vastly populated areas and potentially hindering the critical infrastructuresthat underpin their local communities. Our critical infrastructure and those who operate them face an ever growingarray of natural and manmade threats that may include earthquakes, �oods, hurricanes, tsunamis, domestic and international terrorism, pandemic in�uenza, aging, environmental degradation, industrial accidents, wild�res, and cyber intrusion, among others. Each of these threat actors is capable of producing signi�cant consequences depending on the location of the infrastructure, its inherent vulnerabilities, proximity of local population centers, number of people served, and interdependencies with

other critical systems. Critical infrastructure vulnerabilities manifest themselves both within and across other infrastructure sectors as a function of complex physical, cyber, and human challenges, and if exploited, theycan severely impact “just-in-time”operations that are tied to the global economy and international supply chains. To address these various challenges, the National Security Strategy calls for a comprehensive approach that improves the resilience of our Nation’s infrastructure through risk-informed prevention, protection, and preparedness programs that are speci�cally designed to reduce the most serious risks to the American people and our economy.

When considering the protection and resilience of our critical infrastructure, we must acknowledge the fact that the responsibility and accountability for such matters are distributed across awide spectrum of government andindustry stakeholders at all levels aswell as a multiplicity of agencies and security, emergency management, and public safety disciplines. Protection and resilience strategies must be tailored according to di�use risk environments, operating landscapes, stakeholder authorities, and capacities. Security and

resilience are better assured when they are “built in” rather than “bolted on.” A key element to the success of this approach relies on the development of sustainable public-private partnerships to enhance planning and multi-jurisdictional coordination in the context of a wide range of potential threats and hazards.

�e National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the unifying partnership structure for the integration of critical infrastructure protection and resilience as part of a coordinated national program. �is plan, itssupporting sector plans, and thepublic and private sector partnership they represent are at the core of our Nation’s all-hazards approach to homeland security preparedness and domestic incident management. Within the context of the NIPP, the Dams Sector comprises dam projects, navigation locks, levees, hurricane barriers, mine tailings impoundments, and other similar water retention and/orcontrol facilities. �ere are over 82,000 dams in the United States; approximately 65 percent are privately owned and more than 85percent are regulated by State DamSafety O�ces (see previous article

(Continued on Page 5)

by Yazmin Seda-Sanabria1 and Robert B. Stephan2

1. National Program Manager, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Program, O�ce of Homeland Security, Directorate of Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Headquarters, Washington, DC 20314.2. Managing Director, Dutko Worldwide LLC, Washington, DC 20003.

The CIP Report October 2011

5

Partnerships (Cont. from 4)

for information on ASDSO). Over the past decade, the Dams Sector has made signi�cant progress in developing a comprehensive riskassessment and management framework to enhance the protection and resilience of critical assets under its purview. �is progress comes as a direct result of a robust and dynamic public-private partnership within this sector that has driven a number of successful activities and initiatives focused on critical infrastructure identi�cation and prioritization; security risk assessment and management; information sharing mechanisms; and research and development initiatives for blast mitigation. �is article provides an overview of some of the Sector initiatives in each of these areas, and the progress made since the tragic events of 9/11.

Dams Sector Partnership Model

�e public-private partnership is the mechanism championed by theNIPP to promote and facilitate sector and cross-sector planning, coordination, collaboration, and information sharing of critical infrastructure protection and resilience activities between the public sector (Federal, State, local,and tribal governments) and theprivate sector. �e Dams Sector operates under the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) framework, which facilitates e�ective coordination between Federal infrastructure protection programs and infrastructure protection activities of State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and the

private sector. CIPAC provides a forum that allows government and private sector partners to engage ina broad spectrum of activities to support and coordinate critical infrastructure protection. �e CIPAC framework consists of a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) and Government Coordinating Council (GCC). �e goal of thisenterprise framework is to establish the context and provide speci�c support for the activities required to implement and sustain national- and sector-level critical infrastructure protection and resilience e�orts. As such, the sector has adopted a vibrant and dynamic public-private partnership approach to promote and enable risk assessment, risk management, planning, training and exercises, and other core activities. �e Dams Sector and Levee Sub-Sector GCCs and SCCs include representation from dozens of Federal, State, and local government agencies, private sector owners, and other non-governmental organizations. �ese forums enable direct collaboration, dialogue, and program development and implementation across the spectrum of Sector stakeholders.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Programs

�e U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a key leader and stakeholder in the implementation of this national approach within theDams Sector, as an owner and operator of a large portfolio of water resource facilities that provide multiple functions in support of its Civil Works mission and the

Nation. Within the Corps, the Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience (CIPR) program leads the implementation of this national strategy. Its vision is to achieve a more secure and more resilient Civil Works critical infrastructure portfolio in order toprevent, deter, or mitigate the e�ects of manmade incidents andimprove response and rapid recovery in the event of an attack,natural disaster, and other emergencies a�ecting Sector assets. �e CIPR program supports the NIPP and the National Response Framework, and it is directly aligned with the Dams Sector-Speci�c Plan. �e objectives of theCIPR program include assessing and prioritizing Corps Civil Workscritical infrastructure by implementing a portfolio-wide riskassessment framework through theintegration of both system-level and asset-speci�c activities. �is approach has enabled a more e�ective and e�cient management of security risks to USACE Civil Works critical infrastructure, and iscontributing to manage security risks and guide life-cycle investments collaboratively with other partners across the Sector.

Identi�cation and Prioritization of Critical Infrastructure

Considering the large number of assets within the Dams Sector, a clear and consistent strategy was needed to identify the subset of those high-consequence facilities whose failure or disruption couldpotentially lead to the most severeimpacts, and to conduct a

(Continued on Page 6)

The CIP Report October 2011

6

Partnerships (Cont. from 5)

systematic sector-wide prioritization. �e Consequence-Based Top Screen (CTS) methodology was jointly developed by the Dams GCC and SCC, under the auspices of the CIPAC framework. �e CTS methodology can be used to identify critical facilities within a portfolio (i.e., those high-consequence facilities whose failure or disruption could bepotentially associated with the highest possible impact among portfolio assets). By focusing onpotential consequences and decoupling the analysis from the threat and vulnerability components of the risk process, the CTS approach serves as an e�ective all-hazards preliminary prioritization scheme. In the case of human threats represented by an intelligent and adaptive adversary, it would be practically impossible to conduct in-depth vulnerability evaluations of all assets in a target-rich environment such as the Dams Sector and portfolios within it (i.e., USACE). In this case, the CTS approach can e�ectively reduce the size of the problem by identifying those assets that could potentially attract higher adversarial interest.

�e CTS is supported by a user-friendly, web-based tool which allows users to consider di�erent consequence categories: human impacts, economic impacts, and mission disruption impacts. In 2009, the CTS methodology was adopted by USACE and is being implemented by the CIPR program to screen and identify its critical facilities (dams and navigation locks) through a national cadre.�is consistent process provides

valuable information to USACE and at the same time enables comparison of high-consequence facilities across the portfolio. �e prioritization information obtained from the CTS process is used to support decisions regarding the need for additional analyses and detailed studies. For example, as anowner responsible for a large portfolio of dams, those facilities identi�ed as high-consequence assets through the CTS process are assigned a higher priority within USACE for conducting detailed risk assessments. �e results from the CTS process could also e�ectively inform decision-makers about facilities within a speci�c area that should receive particular attention from the emergency management community because of their potential for signi�cant impacts at the local and regional levels.

A Portfolio Approach for Security Risk Assessment

In 2006, USACE initiated a comparative risk assessment methodology study for civil infrastructure projects with the goalof evaluating the e�ectiveness ofexisting assessment practices inaddressing infrastructure securityrisk. Further interagency collaboration between USACE and DHS expanded upon the results provided through this initial e�ort and broadened its focus to the sector enterprise level. None of the existing models studied satis�ed theneed for a practical approach suitable for comprehensive sector-wide application nor could they provide analytically-based resultsand enable the objective

comparison of the various asset types within the Dams Sector portfolio. Nevertheless, this initial collaborative e�ort helped establish and de�ne in detail the requirement for a portfolio-wide risk assessment framework utilizing a simple, yet mathematically defensible and scalable model to support rigorous sector-level risk analysis and prioritization.

To ful�ll this requirement, the USACE CIPR program and DHSDams SSA are collaborating todevelop and implement the Common Risk Model for Dams (CRM-D), a security risk assessment methodology intended to serve as the basis for portfolio-wide risk assessment of critical dams and navigation locks. �e CRM-D methodology incorporates commonly known risk metrics thatare transparent, easy-to-use, andmathematically rigorous. CRM-D takes into account the unique features of dams and navigation locks and provides a systematic approach for evaluating and comparing risks to terrorist threats.�rough application of the methodology, risk is identi�edas a function of plausible attack scenarios, probability of a successfulattack, and predictable consequences in terms of human health and safety and economic impacts. In 2011, the CRM-D methodology is being piloted at arepresentative number of criticalprojects in the USACE Northwestern Division (Columbia River, Willamette River Tributary, and Missouri River basins), Mississippi Valley Division

(Continued on Page 7)

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Partnerships (Cont. from 6)

(Mississippi River basin), and Great Lakes and Ohio River Division (Ohio River basin).

Information Sharing

�e Dams Sector uses multiple mechanisms and systems to support all-hazards information sharing requirements as developed by Sector partners. �e Dams Sector Suspicious Activity Reporting Tool and the DHS Executive Noti�cation Service (ENS) are used, respectively, to alert vetted Dams Sector stakeholders of suspicious incidents and trends and convey urgent alerts and noti�cations pertaining to emergent threats andall-hazards incidents to Sector leadership across government andthe private sector. Other information sharing requirements are supported through periodic classi�ed brie�ngs to Sector leadership and the robust Sector information sharing enterprise platform, the HSIN‐CS Dams Portal. �e utilization of the HSIN-CS Portal continues to expand within the Sector, and a comprehensive peer vetting process has been developed to allow controlled stakeholder access to “For O�cial Use Only” materials contained in the portal.

Regional Resilience E�orts

�e Dams Sector Exercise Series(DSES) program is as a collaborative process led by USACE and DHS, with the purpose toidentify, analyze, assess, and enhance regional preparedness and disaster resilience, using multi-jurisdictional discussion-based

activities involving a wide array of public and private stakeholders. For a given region, a particular scenario serves as the triggering event to analyze impacts, disruptions, critical interdependencies, and stakeholder roles and responsibilities. �e discussion-based process is executed under the framework provided by the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), maintained by FEMA. �is framework provides a standardized methodology and terminology for activity design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning, and can be adapted to a variety of scenarios and events (from natural disasters toterrorist incidents). To date, three major regional e�orts involving multiple dams and levee systems, cascading impacts, and critical infrastructure interdependencies have been conducted as part of the DSES program: Bagnell/Truman Dams (DSES-08), Columbia River Basin (DSES-09), and Green River Valley (DSES-10).

Research and Development E�orts for Blast Mitigation of Dams

�e Dams Sector is committed todeveloping a thorough understanding of the e�ects that potential attacks could have on its assets and the far reaching impacts on other sectors of the Nation’s infrastructure, and identifying opportunities to minimize the likelihood of their occurrence or minimize their impacts. A key Sector priority includes re�ning the current understanding of the e�ects of potential attacks, vulnerabilities

and weaknesses of its critical assets, and local and regional consequences of those attacks in order to develop appropriate protective measures andrecovery technologies. One of thekey requirements for both the assessment of risks and mitigation of blast damage to dams from terrorist threats focuses on the development of blast damage estimation tools to support the assessment of critical components on dams, locks, and levees as partof the overall risk evaluation process. In 2007, USACE and DHS established an interagency agreement initiating a collaborative R&D program to address technical gaps related to risk and blast mitigation for dams. �eir ensuing e�orts have involved experimental and analytical activities designed to improve blast damage prediction capabilities for dams, navigation locks, and levees resulting from vehicle and waterborne attacks. �e outcomes of these e�orts are being incorporated into the improvement of a blast damage prediction tool that can be utilized by dam owners and operators to assess thevulnerabilities to various threat conditions and facilitate the implementation of e�ective protective measures at these critical facilities.

Conclusion

�e Dams Sector has come a long way in the last decade in better assessing and managing risk of its critical infrastructure in a very dynamic global risk environment. �ese collaborative e�orts have been e�ective in leveraging

(Continued on Page 27)

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Introduction

Dams and reservoirs have been a part of our society for hundreds of years. In the United States alone, there are approximately 85,000 dams that serve dozens of purposes — from power generation to �ood control to mine tailings containment to water supply. Yet, with these structures serving as such integral systems in every aspect of our lives, little about their �nancial in�uence is understood or openly discussed. Current discussions surrounding the dams and reservoirs, and more recently levees, market is limited to individual projects, speci�c owners such as theBureau of Reclamation and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, or included in a general discussion

surrounding the aging infrastructure in the United States.

Since 1998, the Engineering News Record (ENR) Magazine has been compiling and reporting �rm revenues for speci�c market sectors, and using this data to rank �rms bymarket sector. �is includes the dams and reservoirs market sector, where the top 10 �rms are annually ranked. As a �rst attempt to gauge the relative health of the dams and reservoirs market, the combined revenues of these 10 �rms for eachyear reported were compiled. Data was �rst reported in 1998 when thecombined revenue of the top 10 dam �rms was $97.1 million. In July 2010, the combined revenues of the top 10 dam �rms were $753.1 million. �is equals an

average annual market increase of 20 percent and is an exceptional growth rate when compared to other markets and industries. �e revenues of the top 10 dam and reservoir �rms have, as a whole, been growing at a rate 3 ½ times faster than the growth rate of the combined revenues of the top 500 design �rms, as reported by the ENR. Figure 1 provides a graph of these data.

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

Another source of information considered when evaluating the dam and reservoir market was gross domestic product (GDP) data, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) website. �e BEA compiles individual GDP data from thousands of industries and uses this to determine the combined GDP of the United States. From 1977 to 1997, this included GDP on a category titled “New Dams and Reservoirs.” Annual GDP for “New Dams and Reservoirs” from the BEA website produced Figure 2 (see Page 9).

GDP numbers for new dams and reservoirs are inclusive of construction costs. To estimate engineering revenues, it was assumed that engineering is typically 10 perecent of any heavy

(Continued on Page 9)

The Relative Health of the Dams and Reservoirs Market

1 Design Manager, ASI Constructors, Inc., 1850 E. Platteville Blvd., Pueblo West, CO 81007, dshannon@asiconstructors.com.

by Del A. Shannon, PE1

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The CIP Report October 2011

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civil construction project, a well documented and accepted percentage for civil engineering projects. �is allows a comparison and combination of the GDP data and the ENR data, which is exclusively consulting engineering related revenues. Taking 10 percent of the Figure 2 GDP data to estimate engineering revenues, and including this with the ENR data, a new graph, shown in Figure 3, is generated.

�ere is an obvious correlation with the GDP and ENR data, which gives added evidence that we are experiencing rapid growth in the dams and reservoirs market. Data from other sources, such as conference and investments, are described below.

Dam Related Conference Attendance

U.S. Society on Dams (USSD): Additional data can be found with the U.S. Society on Dams. Larry Stephens, the Executive Director of USSD, has kept excellent records on conference attendance and this can be compared with the ENR data as well. Figure 4 (see Page 10) shows USSD conference attendance combined and compared with the ENR data.

U.S. Dams Market (Cont. from 8)

�e USSD conference attendance generally matches the ENR data, especially in the last �ve years when both have increased dramatically.

Association of State Dam Safety O�cials (ASDSO): Susan Sorrel provided conference attendance data for ASDSO and similar trends can be seen. �ere is a general correlation between the ENR dam engineering revenue and ASDSO conference attendance, which both show dramatic increases occurring in the last �ve years. Figure 5 (see Page 10) shows ASDSO conference attendance combined and compared with the ENR data.

World Bank Dam Related Investment

At its peak in the 1970s, the World

Bank was involved in approximately 4 percent of all dam construction projects worldwide.By 2003, this percentage had declined and leveled at 0.6 percent. Also in 2003, the World Bank Board of Directors approved the Water Resources Sector Strategy and has re-engaged in the development and management of water resources infrastructure. �is includes the consideration of public and private �nancial and funding mechanism, project and country/region speci�c planning, and evaluating the speci�c needs — and targeted bene�ts — on a project by project basis. While the impacts of this shift in strategy are still emerging, lending for projects with hydropower elements has increased dramatically since 2003. In 2003, World Bank lending for hydropower projects was $200 million. In 2008, it was just over $100 billion. �is represents an increase of over 500 percent in just �ve years. As with the ENR data, dramatic increases in dam related investment can be seen occurring inthe middle of the last decade, providing further evidence of the current expansion of the dams and

Figure 2: New Dam and Reservoir GDP - 1977 to 1997.

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Figure 3: Estimated Dam and Reservoir Engineering Revenues - 1977 to 2010.

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U.S. Dams Market (Cont. from 9)

reservoir market.

�is data indicates that we are indeed in the middle of a rapid expansion of the dams market. While the data clearly indicates there is market expansion occurring, the reasons behind it are not well de�ned or understood.

Reasons for Recent Market Expansion

Survey Results

A 10 question survey was sent to USSD members asking for their insights into the current and future dams market. It received good response and interest with a total of 127 responses to the survey collected. One question asked respondents to identify the greatest drivers of the dams market and 108 selected Water Supply Concerns. While this category covers a large range of issues, it has been interpreted by the author to encompass all issues surrounding the development and securing of raw water used in our everyday lives. �is includes most prominently water for drinking,

irrigation, and industrial uses.Figure 6 (see Page 11) shows the responses to Question 9 by category.

American Society of Civil Engineers Infrastructure Report Card – Aging Infrastructure

�e �rst American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) report card for our Nation’s infrastructure was published in 1998: dams received a “D” letter grade. Subsequent report cards published in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2009 have also given dams a “D” grade and, according to

ASDSO, the number of high hazard de�cient dams has swelled from 488 in 2001 to 2,047 in 2008. �is report card is generating increased attention as more and more examples of the signi�cant de�ciencies with our infrastructure are reported. �e failure of the levees in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, the catastrophic collapse of the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis, the explosion of the high pressure natural gas pipeline inSan Bruno, California, and the failure of the Taum Sauk Dam in Missouri are just a few examples of catastrophic infrastructure failures in recent years.

Security Concerns

With the heightened concerns surrounding terrorism and its potentially devastating e�ects on our society, DHS established a Dams Sector in its counterterrorism division tasked with improving the security of our dams against a terrorist attack. With dams

(Continued on Page 11)

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U.S. Dams Market (Cont. from 10)

recognized in such a prominent role as a vital component and in need of vigorous protection, they are gaining much needed additional attention and associated funding.

Resurgence of Hydropower

In addition to the World Bank’s reinvestment in hydropower, a story published in the Wall Street Journal on September 13, 2010 also discussed the reemergence of hydropower as a “green” energy source if implemented in environmentally friendly ways. �ese include adding small hydro units to some of the more than 85,000 existing dams in the United States as well as new pumped storage schemes. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, a new hydropower project completed in 2016 would produce power at $120 per megawatt hour. �is compares very favorably to other “green” energy projects that would be completed at the same time, such as wind power projects, which would produce power at $150 per megawatt hour, or a photovoltaic solar array which would produce power at around $400 per megawatt hour.

From this perspective, hydropower makes excellent economic sense when compared to other renewable energy sources. �e upfront capital costs for a hydroelectric plant are typically greater than a fossil fuel plant, but the long-term economic bene�ts are often far more attractivebecause dams and hydropower schemes have such long design lives.

Regardless of the reasons or the

geographic areas where this work isoccurring, the net e�ect on the dams market appears to be undeniable. �e market isexpanding and will most likely continue to expand.

Future of the Dams Market

�ere is evidence the health of the dams market will remain strong both in the near- and long-terms, which includes its continued growth and expansion. However, predicting the actual growth of any market is a di�cult task for even the most experienced economist or �nancial advisor, especially if that market has not been previously studied in great detail. Still, this discussion should be occurring among those who work within the dams industry as it will improve our industry as a whole. Improved accuracy in forecasting will provide owners and managers with additional insight into the market and help them make capital expenditure and budgeting decisions that bene�t their organizations and ultimately their

customers and end users. Similarly, consultants and contractors will bene�t from an improved understanding of the market as they make strategic decisions surrounding sta�ng, mergers and acquisitions, expansions into new markets, commercial expenditures, and so on.

Projection of Data

Annual growth rates in revenues reported in the ENR lists will likely slow in the near-term but will also likely remain positive. According to the ENR, dam engineering related revenue grew at a rate of 17 percent in the most recent lists published this year, and it would not be surprising to see growth rates to slow to below 10 percent in subsequent years.

Figure 7 (see Page 26) projects ENRreported engineering revenue growth beyond 2010 at two di�erent rates — 3 percent and 8 percent. If growth expands at rates

(Continued on Page 26)

Figure 6: Survey Results - Greatest Drivers of the Dams Market.

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With over 54,000 large dams worldwide, dam safety is a major and growing global concern. In a changing climate, dam safety and security is no longer just an issue ofaging infrastructure but also of intensifying water con�icts, food security, and appropriate adaptation measures to climate change. Below are just some of the many examples of dam safety and security issues from around the world.

Dam Safety and Earthquakes

While individual dams built today are likely to be much safer than those built 50 years ago, the global stock of dams as a whole is aging. Around the world, 5,000 large damsare at least 50 years old; the average U.S. dam is in its 40s. �e two main reasons for dam failures aredam bursts or “overtopping” (responsible for around 40 percent of failures and often a result of �ooding) and foundation problems (around 30 percent). Over 12,000 people have been killed this centuryby dam-bursts outside of China for which data are available1 (within China, the worst dam burst disasteroccurred in 1975 in Henan

province, where o�cial estimates say at least 26,000 people died from the incident).2

While earthquakes have damaged hundreds of dams, dams can alsotrigger earthquakes in a phenomenon known as Reservoir-Induced Seismicity (RIS). Globally, there are over 100 identi�ed RIS cases.3 �e most widely accepted explanation of how dams cause earthquakes is related to the extra water pressure created in the micro-cracks and �ssures in the ground under and near a reservoir. When the pressure of the water in the rocks increases, it acts to lubricate faults that are already under tectonic strain, but are prevented from slipping by the friction of the rock surfaces.4

�e most serious case may be the 7.9-magnitude Sichuan earthquake in May 2008, which killed an estimated 80,000 people and has been linked to the construction ofthe Zipingpu Dam. After the earthquake struck, the Ministry of Water Resources reported that as many as 2,380 dams were damaged in the earthquake. Scientists in

China and the United States fear that the earthquake may have beeninduced by the weight of the Zipingpu reservoir.5 Despite these concerns, China continues to plan major dam projects in its seismically active southwest.

Dams and Food Security

�e impact that dam building could have on regional food security is no more evident than in the Mekong basin in Southeast Asia. �e Mekong River �ows through �ailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and supports the world’s largest inland �shery. Its economic worth at �rst-sale value is at least $2billion per year and up to $9.4 billion per year, taking into account secondary industries.

Food security forms the basis upon which other forms of development are built, such as good health, education, and productivity. Wild-capture �sheries are especially important to those rural families that have limited access to land andother productive resources and with

Global Dam Safety and Security Challenges

by Katy Yan, International Rivers

1. P. McCully, Silenced Rivers, Zed Books Ltd, New York, (2001), 117.2. Fu Wen, “Reservoirs Dogged,” Global Times, (August 26, 2011), http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/672685/Reservoirs-dogged.aspx.3. H.K. Gupta, “A Review of Recent Studies of Triggered Earthquakes by Arti�cial Water Reservoirs with Special Emphasis on Earthquakes in Koyna, India,” Earth-Science Reviews, 58 (3-4) (2002), 279-310, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0012825202000636.4. V.P. Jauhari, Prepared for �ematic Review IV.5, “Options Assessment – Large Dams in India Operation, Monitoring, and Decommissioning of Dams,” (1999), http://www.dams.org.5. Gautam Naik and Shai Oster, “Scientists Link China’s Dam to Earthquake, Renewing Debate,” �e Wall Street Journal, (February 6, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123391567210056475.html.

(Continued on Page 13)

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Global Challenges (Cont. from 12)

a low monetary income.6 However, the governments of Cambodia, Laos, and �ailand are considering plans to build 11 large hydropower dams on the Mekong River’s lower mainstream. If built, these dams would block the major �sh migrations that are essential to the life cycle of around 70 percent of the Mekong River’s commercial �sh catch.

For instance, a report published in 2009,7 revealed that the �rst dam planned for the lower Mekong, the Don Sahong Dam in southern Laos, would block the migration of many important �sh species that move up and down the Mekong River throughout the year. As a result, the dam could seriously impact �sheries as far upstream as northern Laos and northern �ailand, and �sh populations downstream would also be threatened, including important �sheries in the Tonle Sap in Cambodia and the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. In addition, the government of Laos is currently proposing to build the Xayaburi Dam despite opposition by its neighbors and civil society. A technical review8 in March 2011 by the Mekong River Commission could lead to the extinction of approximately 41 �sh species, including the critically endangered Mekong Giant Cat�sh. �ese

impacts in turn would a�ect the livelihoods and food security of millions of people in the region.

Regional and International Security

History is �lled with examples of international disputes over shared freshwater resources.9 For instance, in the Middle East, hydropower and agricultural developments on the Euphrates River have been the source of considerable international concern. �is river �ows from the mountains of southern Turkey through Syria to Iraq before emptying into the Persian Gulf. Both Syria and Iraq depend heavily on the Euphrates River for drinking water, irrigation, industrial uses, and hydropower, and view Turkey’s upstream dam development plans with great concern. When all of Turkey’s projects are complete, the �ow of the Euphrates River to Syria could be reduced by up to 40 percent, and to Iraq by up to 80 percent.10

Similarly, countries downstream of China are concerned that China’s dam building upstream of major transboundary rivers such as the Mekong, the Salween, and the Brahmaputra rivers could leave thousands of communities downstream in Myanmar, India, and the greater Mekong region

stranded without dependable water for their �elds and �sheries. For instance, China intends to build as many as �ve dams on the middle reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo (known as the Brahmaputra in India). �e 510 MW Zangmu hydroelectric power station is already underway,11 and talk about a massive project at the Great Bend (which would be twice the size of the �ree Gorges Hydroelectric Project) is causing serious concern and speculation in India.

Challenges in a Changing Climate

Dam designers work on the assumption that historic hydrological variables such as average annual �ow, annual variability of �ow, and seasonal distribution of �ow are a reliable guide to the future. As global temperatures increase, however, there are likely to be signi�cant changes in seasonal and annual rainfall patterns and other factors a�ecting stream�ow.12 Most of the world’s dams have not been built to allow for the erratic hydrological patterns that climate change is bringing. More extreme storms and increasingly severe �oods will have major implications for dam safety.Floods exacerbated by dam bursts

6. B. Peterson and C. Middleton, Feeding Southeast Asia: Mekong River Fisheries and Regional Food Security, International Rivers, (2010), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/5637. 7. I. Baird, �e Don Sahong Dam: Potential Impacts on Regional Fish Migrations, Livelihoods and Human Health, (2009), http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/4595.8. Mekong River Commission Secretariat, Prior Consultation Project Review Report: Proposed Xayaburi Dam Project – Mekong River, (March 24, 2011), http://www.mrcmekong.org/pnpca/2011-03-24_MRCS_PC_Review_Report.pdf.9. P.H. Gleick, “Water and Con�ict,” International Security, 18 (1), (1993), 79-112.c.10. Ibid, p88.11. Jiang Yannan and He Haining, “A New Era for Tibet’s Rivers,” chinadialogue, (January 17, 2011), http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4055.12. McCully, p.145.

(Continued on Page 27)

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Introduction

Over the past decade, risk assessment has been widely used inAustralia to support dam safety programs. It is broadly accepted that risk assessment can provide a rational framework for decision-making when the type of analysis and associated detail is appropriate for the issues to be resolved. In particular, the use of risk assessment to determine the priority, urgency, and extent of remedial works across a portfolio or at a single dam is seen as particularly valuable.

Regulation

Australia has a federal system of government, whereby powers are divided between the central government and individual states. Dam safety is a matter for the six State and two Territory Governments. Currently, four States and one Territory have speci�c dam safety regulations. Risk assessment is permitted in three States and one Territory and is also being extensively used in the other jurisdictions.

A Dam Improvement Program

Goulburn-Murray Water is a rural water corporation in the State ofVictoria. It has responsibility for operation, maintenance, renewal,

and dam safety programs for 16 dams. �e dam portfolio is diverse,ranging from relatively small earthen embankments to the highest dam in Australia. �e age pro�le is from 15 to 140 years and the dams have a current replacement cost of AUD $5billion.

Goulburn-Murray Water established a Dam Improvement Program in late 1997. �e program originally developed a strategy to reduce the risk posed by Goulburn-Murray Water’s dams using risk assessment with varying levels of assessment for the purposes of determining investigation and works priorities.1

�e strategy used an initial risk assessment process, commonly referred to as “portfolio risk assessment” to determine design review priorities and to provide anindication of potential works. Following the completion of design reviews, a detailed quantitative risk assessment has been used to:

• Assist in determining the severity of a risk by comparing the calculated risk to indicative targets for tolerable risk to life and then deciding an appropriate time frame for reducing risk;

• Assist in devising interim, or

short-term, risk reduction measures that achieve a level of tolerable risk until funds are available to undertake standards based works; and

• Assist in deciding when business risks might be addressed ahead of low risks to life.

�e process of detailed risk assessment and developing a risk reduction program had to meet the following requirements:

• Clearly present the current statusof risk and how cost e�ective measures could be implemented to reduce risk;

• Be subject to expert review andallow for inputs regarding consequence assessments by key stakeholders;

• Be to a level of detail that would provide for con�dence in decision-making and be defendable under scrutiny; and

• Provide base data for the evaluation of risk reduction and provide associated data forinsurance purposes.

For each dam, a staged approach torisk reduction has been adopted.

Risk Assessment and Dam Safety

by Shane McGrath, General Manager Infrastructure, Goulburn-Murray Water, State of Victoria, Australia*

1. D. Stewart, S. McGrath, and D. Nabbs, Prioritisation of Dam Safety Management in a Large Water Business, ICOLD International Symposium on Dam Safety Management, St Petersburg, (2007).

(Continued on Page 15)

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�e risk reduction strategy is based on progressively reducing risks across the portfolio to meet interim risk targets as follows:

First Risk Target: Reduce all risks below the ANCOLD (Australian National Committee on Large Dams) Guidelines on Risk Assessment2 limit of tolerability for risk to life safety.

Second Risk Target: Reduce risks classi�ed 1 or 2 to a Rating 3 or better under the Goulburn-Murray Water Whole of Business Risk Management Framework (dam safety risk is compared to other high business risks).

�ird Risk Target: Reduce risks classi�ed as a Rating 3 to a Rating 4 or better under the Whole of Business Risk Management Framework (further risk reductionbased on relative business priorities). Detailed assessment of ALARP criteria has not yet been undertaken.

Dam Safety (Cont. from 14)

Fourth Risk Target: If required, upgrade dams to standards-based criteria.

�is approach allows for risks to be reduced in a rational and cost e�ective way, undertaking the projects generally as ranked from highest to lowest risk.

�e �rst risk target provides for theregulatory requirement to give priority to risks to life ahead of other risks. Subsequent risk targets enable remaining risks to be assessed and prioritised alongside risks other than dam safety risks faced by the Authority.

Guidelines for determining the timeframe for upgrade works have been developed. Timing for commencement of upgrade works are based on the magnitude of risks and are determined relative to the time the de�ciency was identi�ed.

Since 1997, Goulburn-Murray Water has invested AUD $125 Million on 14 risk reduction

projects across its portfolio of dams. �e graph (see below) indicates the extent of risk reduction achieved. �is has included staging works at individual dams to ensure higher priority risks at other sites were addressed in the most e�cient way.

Reducing “Tolerable” Risks

Several dam owning agencies in Australia have now reduced risk across their portfolios to the extent that most, or all, dams have calculated risk levels below the “limit of tolerability.”3 If a pure risk-based approach is to be used, then the “As Low as Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP) test should now be applied to each dam to ascertain whether risk has been reduced su�ciently. ANCOLD suggests that the following points are relevant to the consideration of ALARP:

• Cost-to-save-a-statistical-life (CSSL) is a consideration for life safety risks;• Whether good practice is met is a consideration;• The level of existing risk is a consideration;• Societal concerns may be a consideration;• Affordability is not a consideration for life safety risks; and• Duration that the risk applies may not be a consideration for life safety risks in some circumstances.

2. Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD), Guidelines on Risk Assessment, 2003.3. Ibid.

(Continued on Page 16)

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Dam Safety (Cont. from 15)

�e evaluation of ALARP for dams does not yet have a depth and range of an accepted body of work to provide owners with a sound methodology to work through.

�is is not unexpected since theALARP principle is not a technical concept, but was established in law in Britain in 1949. ANCOLD includes the statement that “there isno ‘formula’ by which to decide that risks are ALARP” and “the owner can treat CSSL as one consideration, but must ultimately make, and take responsibility for, the judgement that the sacri�ce isgrossly disproportionate to the bene�t gained in terms of risk reduction.”4 �is is a demanding process and it is not to be expected that the determination of ALARP is a simple matter. �e determination of what constitutes “good practice” is particularly challenging.

Recently, it has been suggested5 that the dam owners in Australia may be over-investing in dam safety. �is view appears to be based principally on the measurement of CSSL for dam safety upgrade projects compared to other investments in public safety. It is a function of themathematical determination of CSSL that for any dam which has risks just lower than the “limit oftolerability,” other than minor investment in risk reduction, it will have poor justi�cation. However, a focus on the value of CSSL seems to ignore the broader tests required in the consideration of ALARP, for example, the consideration of “good

practice.”

An approach to ALARP only considering CSSL will generally result in risk at any dam not being reduced signi�cantly once a risk position just below the limit of tolerability is reached. Whilst this situation may be a reasonable outcome for some dams and satisfythe tests for ALARP, it is unlikelythat it would be considered a reasonable approach for an extreme hazard dam where nationally signi�cant consequences of loss of life, environmental, or economic damage would result from dam failure.

Safety Case

In the author’s view, once risks at adam or portfolio of dams have beenreduced to below the limit of tolerability, a “safety case” should be prepared for each dam that sets out the rationale supporting further risk reduction or for normal operations to continue for the time being. For example, the safety case would be acomprehensive document that would include the following:

• Management System Approach: Outlining all activities and methodologies in place to ensure that the dam is operated and maintained safely, including emergency plans, operations, surveillance, and maintenance manuals, �ood management plans, risk assessments, and the regular safety review;• All base data for the dam;

• Surveillance results and analysis;• Site investigation findings;• Safety review results;• Risk assessment results, including probabilities and consequences; and• A concise report setting out the defensive mechanisms in place todeal with all identi�ed failure modes and the rationale to continue normal operations or for further risk reduction at the dam.

Whilst the comparison of risk positions with respect to tolerability criteria and the calculation of CSSL may form partof the report, such constructs may not provide su�cient support forthe defence should a failure occur. It is possible that a more sophisticated “safety case” approach is necessary that can be understood as appropriate for the protection ofpublic safety by a “reasonable” person.

Conclusion

Risk assessment is an extremely valuable tool for determining the priority and urgency of works. Combined with tolerable risk criteria, a logical framework for cost-e�ective and timely risk reduction can be assembled. However, in a dam safety program, risk assessment is but one tool within a comprehensive dam safety system, covering all facets of operations and maintenance.

�e reliance on calculated risk and

4. Ibid.5. J. Marsden, L. McDonald, D. Bowles, R. Davidson, and R. Nathan, Dam Safety, Economic Regulation and Society’s Need to Prioritise Health and Safety Expenditures, NZSOLD ANCOLD Workshop, “Promoting and Ensuring the Culture of Dam Safety,” Queenstown, (2007).

(Continued on Page 29)

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Sustainable Hydropower’s Role in Global Security

�e need for a new approach to security, one which includes new paradigms such as environmental issues, food, water, and human security, above and beyond the more traditional military concepts of security, has in recent years been garnering growing recognition.

Climate change threatens to impact many of the diverse de�nitions of security and logically therefore should be considered a global security issue of the highest importance itself. Challenges inmeeting the current, let alone increasing, needs and expectations of the developing world on water, energy, and food supplies will becompounded by the impacts of climate change — needs and expectations that if not met have the potential to rapidly become signi�cant security challenges.

As the percentage of the world’s population living in cities dramatically increases (for example, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme estimates inthe State of African Cities 2010: Governance, Inequalities and UrbanLand Markets that “[a]frican citypopulations will more than tripleover the next 40 years,” from around 395 million in 2009 to around 1.23 billion in 2050), the vital importance of getting the interaction between the water/energy/food nexus and the impacts

of climate change right to ensure human wellbeing and global security, can only increase.

�e signi�cance of these points has not been lost by key decision-makers.

As far back as 2004, the United Kingdom Government’s Chief Scienti�c Advisor, Sir David King, stated “[c]limate change is a fargreater threat to the world’s stabilitythan international terrorism.” Achim Steiner, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme, in a statement in July of this year agreed that “[t]here can be little doubt today that climate change has potentially far-reaching implications for global stability and security in economic, social and environmental terms which will increasingly transcend the capacityof individual nation States to manage.”

Addressing the links between energy security, water security, and food security requires an intense focus on sustainability as a strategic imperative. Hydropower as an advanced, renewable energy source is a nexus that connects all three, and has a key role to play in addressing these challenges. �e importance of hydropower in making a signi�cant contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation therefore demonstrates

it has much to o�er in the area of global security.

Further developing hydropower potential in regions, that in some cases have enormous untapped potential, would help meet a substantial portion of growing energy demands, demands spurred by the quest for sustainable development. At the same time, developing this potential sustainably allows for improved water management. Reservoirs thatform part of hydropower infrastructure have multiple advantages, including enhancing water security, providing �ood mitigation and water for irrigation, tourism and recreational facilities, as well as new aquatic habitats. Better water management and the provision of water for irrigation in turn can help bolster food security.

In these ways, hydropower presents an opportunity to boost economies and human well‐being, but it must be developed sustainably. �e hydropower sector has lacked a comprehensive, globally applicable tool to assess and demonstrate the sustainability of hydropower projects — a point that was highlighted by the World Commission on Dams Final Report in 2000.

In 2008, the hydropower sector

(Continued on Page 18)

by Richard Taylor, Executive Director, International Hydropower Association

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Hydropower(Cont. from 17)

began working with diverse partners to de�ne a sustainability assessment tool that would meet this need. �e outcome was the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol, developed by a multi-stakeholder body known as the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum over a period of 30 months. �is Forum consisted of representatives from social and environmental NGOs (Oxfam, �e Nature Conservancy, Transparency International, and World Wildlife Fund); governments (China, Germany [observer], Iceland, Norway, and Zambia); commercial and development banks (includingbanks that are signatory to the Equator Principles and the World Bank [observer]); and the hydro-power sector, represented by International Hydropower Association (IHA). Field trials were conducted in 16 countries, across six continents, and 1,933 individual stakeholders in 28countries were engaged as part of

the development process (see Figure 1). �e Forum incorporated �eldwork in China and Zambia in working with a�ected communities, as well as consulting a�ected communities during both of the two review phases of the Protocol, and worked with them during thetrialling of the draft Protocol. �ese e�orts, and the learning developed through them, strongly in�uenced the �nal version of the Protocol, launched in June 2011 in Iguassu, Brazil.

As Dr. Joerg Hartmann, Water Security Leader at WWF International and a Forum member, stated, “[f ]or years, the environmental community has been looking for industry leadership to raise the environmental performance of hydro projects, and to avoid bad projects altogether. Industry awareness is certainly increasing, but there is still an urgent need for practical tools in the �eld. Working with IHA on theProtocol has already proven to be a

very e�ective way for WWF to reach a broad group of utilities, investors and regulators.”

Sustainability Pro�le

�e Protocol o�ers the proponent of a hydropower project a consistent, globally-applicable method of assessing performance inapproximately 20 (depending onthe stage being assessed) sustainability topics. �ese topics cover the three recognised pillars of sustainability: social, economic, and environmental, and include issues such as downstream �ow regimes, indigenous peoples, biodiversity, infrastructure safety, resettlement, water quality, and economic viability (see Table 1 on Page 19).

Independent, accredited assessors will conduct Protocol assessments after undergoing comprehensive training. Using the Protocol tools as a framework, assessors produce asustainability pro�le of a project. �is pro�le can then be used to foster better understanding among, and increased dialogue between, multiple stakeholders.

An assessment can be conducted during any stage of a project from planning to operation. Commissioning an assessment gives a project developer, and others, insights into areas that may need improvements in sustainability. However, as it is not a standard, it does not automatically enable them to claim that their project is sustainable.

Regardless, according to Dr. Donal

Figure 1: Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum Stakeholder Engagement Activities (Continued on Page 19)

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Hydropower(Cont. from 18)

O`Leary, Senior Advisor of Transparency International (TI), and a Forum member, “[f ]or the �rst time, the issues of governance, transparency, integrity and accountability were addressed in the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol. �is will signi�cantly facilitate the sustainability of the planning, design, implementation and operation of hydroelectric projects.”

�e ability to rapidly interpret andtransparently communicate the results of a project assessment, based on documented evidence andthorough objective analysis, is keyto ensuring that the Protocol is useful to a wide variety of stakeholders. �erefore, results arepresented using a standardised structure and diagram, resembling aspider diagram, showing a scoring between 1 and 5 for each of the sustainability topics (See Figure 2 on Page 20).

�is new approach to promote continuous improvement in hydropower sustainability has been designed so that the sustainability of hydropower projects can be assessed anywhere in the world, covering abroad range of possible case scenarios, making it a potentially valuable tool for investors and other �nancial institutions operating across diverse geographies.

Governance

�e Protocol is governed by a multi-stakeholder Governance Committee, currently chaired by Dr. Joerg Hartmann (WWF International). �e Committee

receives its mandate from the Hydropower Sustainability AssessmentCouncil Charter, drafted by members of the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum, the body responsible for drafting the Protocol between 2008 and 2010.

�e Governance Committee’s authority extends to:

• Approving any changes to the Protocol;• Ensuring that assessments constitute appropriate applications of the Protocol;• The development of training materials;• Accreditation of assessors; and • Any revisions to the Terms and Conditions

Governance Committee members are elected from expert groups referred to as “Chambers,” representing environment or conservation organisations; projecta�ected communities and indigenous peoples’ organisations;

�nancial institutions; developing country governments; industry; and developed country governments. In a direct e�ort to foster inclusiveness, the Governance Committee welcomes and encourages input from, and engagement with, stakeholders involved in the development of hydropower throughout the world.

Sustainability Partnerships

Sustainability Partners receive a number of bene�ts for taking the initiative in advancing sustainable hydropower. For example, they are trained on the content of the Protocol and how to apply it, ando�ered an uno�cial Protocol assessment, an o�cial Protocol assessment, or both. Sustainability Partner models remain somewhat �exible to allow for the needs of di�ering participating organisations.

Ten organisations, representing operations across the globe, have

(Continued on Page 20)

Integrative Environmental Social Technical Economic / Financial

Demonstrated Need Downstream Flow Regimes Resettlement Siting & Design Financial Viability

Policies & Plans Erosion & Sedimentation Indigenous Peoples Hydrological Resource Economic Viability

Governance Water Quality Public Health Infrastructure Safety Project Benefits

Integrated Project Management

Biodiversity & Invasive Species Cultural Heritage Asset Reliability &

EfficiencyProcurement

Table 1: Example of Range of Topics

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Hydropower(Cont. from 19)

already become IHA Sustainability Partners: Environmental Defense Fund, E.ON, Itaipu Binacional, Hydro Equipment Association, Hydro Tasmania, Landsvirkjun, Manitoba Hydro, Odebrecht, Sarawak Energy, and Statkraft.

“By partnering with IHA on implementing the Protocol, Sustainability Partners are demonstrating their commitment to sustainable, and therefore increasingly secure, hydropower development,” said Dr. Refaat Abdel-Malek, President of IHA.

�is positive response from the hydropower industry demonstrates the wide interest in applying the Protocol among companies keen to promote continuous improvement of hydropower sustainability performance.

IHA’s Hydro4LIFE project will form the basis for Sustainability Partners, whose projects for assessment using the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol are situated within the European Union. Hydro4LIFE is a European Commission-funded project to assist the implementation of the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol in the European Union. �e project is 50 percent co-funded by the European Commission’s Life+ Environment Policy and Governance Programme, and 50 perecent by IHA, with a total budget of €1.2 million. It is coordinated by IHA and runs until 2014. �e approach requires that

match funding be provided by leading hydropower organisations.More information on the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol, including downloadable copies, can be sourced by visiting: www.hydrosustainability.org.

Sustainable Hydropower’s Potential

Water and energy are vital for economic growth and stability, and directly a�ect the prices of goods and services that their presence makes possible. Although energy provision is not speci�cally a UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG), it nonetheless underwrites a number of these goals. Achieving the MDGs will be virtually impossible without addressing water and energy issues to ensure resilient, consistent, and reliable supplies of both.

�ere are major bene�ts from hydropower at the local, regional, and global level as a source of clean, renewable, and low-carbon energy. Hydropower will continue to play afundamental role in both water and

energy supply, forming the nexus where energy and water issues meet, and where challenges can be overcome, provided development is carried out responsibly.

As decision-makers, particularly inthe developing world, seek to improve their water and energy security, they are reassessing their country’s hydropower potential and the contribution it can make toclimate change mitigation and adaptation. A tool, such as theHydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol, which comprehensivelyassesses and demonstrates thesustainability of hydropower projects, will be a useful addition to their policy development toolkit.�e Protocol therefore o�ers an opportunity to enhance infrastructure security, water and energy security, and so has positive implications for global security. v

�e International Hydropower Association (IHA) was formed under the auspices of UNESCO in 1995

Figure 2: Sustainability Pro�le: An Example Presentation of Results

1

2

3

4

5P - 1 : Consultation & Communications

P - 2 : G overnance

P - 3 : Demonstrated Need & Strategic F it

P - 4 : Siting & Design

P - 5 : Environmental & Social I mp actAssessment & Management

P - 6 : I ntegrated P roj ect Management

P - 7 : H y drological Resource

P - 8 : I nfrastructure Safety

P - 9 : F inancial V iab ility

P - 1 0 : P roj ect B enefits

P - 1 1 : Economic V iab ilityP - 1 2 : P rocurementP - 1 3 : P roj ect- Affected Communities &

L ivelih oods

P - 1 4 : Resettlement

P - 1 5 : I ndigenous P eop les

P - 1 6 : L ab our & W ork ing Conditions

P - 1 7 : Cultural H eritage

P - 1 8 : P ub lic H ealth

P - 1 9 : B iodiversity & I nvasive Sp ecies

P - 2 0 : Erosion & Sedimentation

P - 2 1 : W ater Q uality

P - 2 2 : Reservoir P lanning

P - 2 3 : Dow nstream F low Regimes

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Introduction

In March 2011, the Government of Ethiopia announced to the world that it plans to start construction ofthe Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile near the borders with the Sudan. �e dam would be the largest dam in Africa, and the tenth largest in the world. �is article reviews Ethiopia’s damconstruction program, with particular attention to the

challenges posed, and opportunities provided, by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Water Resources of Ethiopia

Ethiopia is one of the countries that is classi�ed as rich in water resources. Its renewable water resources exceed 122 billion cubic meters (BCM) per annum, with a per capita of 2,000 cubic meters; making it the richest country in

Africa after the Democratic Republic of Congo. �e country is endowed with 12 river basins, 22lakes, and a large quantity of mostly untapped groundwater. �e 12 river basins can be classi�ed into four separate river systems. �e Awash River originates and �ows through the eastern plateau, andends in the wetlands shared with Djibouti, making Djibouti a riparian state. �e Wabe Shebelle, Genale, and Juba basins dominate

the central plateau, and are shared with Somalia, whileKenya shares the Dawa tributary of the Juba River. �e Omo River �ows through the southern plateau of Ethiopia and empties into LakeTurkana that falls largely within Kenya, with only its small northern edge falling into Ethiopia. �e Nile River system dominates the western plateau from the upper northern to the southern reaches, and consists of three basins: the Tekeze/Atbara in the northern part, the Abbay/Blue Nile in the central part, both �owing into the Sudan and becoming part ofthe Nile river, and the Baro/Akobo/Sobat Basin that originates in the southern western plateau and �ows into South Sudan where it joins the White Nile. �e Nile river basinis shared by 11 countries, namelyDemocratic Republic of Congo,

(Continued on Page 22)

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Challenges and Opportunities

by Salman M. A. Salman*

Map of Ethiopia and the Blue Nile with an approximate location of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. �is map was produced by Patricia Boudinot, an Instructor for the Geography and Geoinformation Science Department at George Mason University, using ArcMap software.

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Burundi, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Ethiopia is the source of about 72.5 BCM or 86 percent of the total Nile waters of 84 BCM measured at Aswan (59 percent Blue Nile, 14percent Sobat, and 13 percent Atbara). �e remaining 11.5 BCM, or 14 percent of the Nile waters �ow from the White Nile, and originate from the equatorial lakes, particularly Lake Victoria which is shared by Tanzania (49 percent), Uganda (45 percent), and Kenya (6 percent).

In addition to the fact that its 12 river basins are shared with 12 other riparians, Ethiopia faces the challenges of climate change (�oods and drought), environmental degradation, including massive soil erosion, and population growth. Indeed the population of Ethiopia has reached close to 88 million this year, surpassing that of Egypt of 84 million.

History of Dam Building in Ethiopia

Despite its richness in water resources, Ethiopia has been, untilrecently, one of the poorest countries, with one of the lowest per capita water storage and electricity production in the world. Since 1960, Ethiopia wasted massive �nancial and human resources in wars against Eritrea and Somalia, and internally against itself. It wasonly at the beginning of this century that Ethiopia has been, for the �rst time, not engaged in an active war, although opposition to the current regime remains wide, and an armed movement still roams

parts of the Ogaden region.

�e studies undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s indicated the huge potential for hydro-power inEthiopia, estimated at 45,000 megawatt, with close to two thirds of that amount from the Nile river system alone. However, with the wars and poor economic situation, not much was done to harness this massive hydro-power potential. Few small dams for generation of limited hydropower were constructed in the1960s and 1970s, including the Fincha Dam on the Blue Nile (total hydropower of 80 megawatt); Koka Dam on the Awash (total hydropower of 40 megawatt); Melka Wakena Dam on Wabe Shebelle (total hydropower of 150 megawatt); Tis Abbay (First and Second dams) at Lake Tana (with a total hydropower of 75 megawatt); and Sur Dam on the Baro (total hydropower of 40 megawatt). By the close of last century in 2000, Ethiopia’s total hydropower production was less than 400 megawatt, and the irrigated area from the 12 river basins was less than 70,000 acres.

However, with the relative peace, improvement in relations with the west, and considerable increase in the world co�ee prices, Ethiopia launched a very ambitious development program at the beginning of this century, which includes a number of large dams. �is program is facilitated by the discovery and development of natural gas in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and by the emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a dam builder and �nancier and as an economic power, hungrily searching

Ethiopia (Cont. from 21)

for natural resources across the globe.

Dams on the Omo River

Ethiopia started its ambitious large dam construction program on the Omo River. It chose the Omo River because it has a huge potential, and also has the least controversies with the other riparians. Dam projects on the Omo River would a�ect Lake Turkana which is shared with Kenya, but Kenya itself has also contributed to the decrease of the �ow of its own rivers that empty into the Lake. Moreover, Kenya is desperately in need of electricity, and the Omo river hydropower of Ethiopia is close, cheap, and large involume. �e Turkana tribe would be negatively a�ected by the Ethiopia dams program on the Omo River, and indeed this has caused a number of donors to refuse to �nance those dams. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is proceeding with its dam building program on the Omo River.

Ethiopia completed the �rst project on the Omo River, called the Gilgel Gibe project, in 2004, with the helpof the Italian company Salini, for generation of 180 megawatt of electricity. It constructed the second Gilgel Gibe project, again with the help of Salini in 2003, and completed it in 2010, for generation of 400 megawatt. �e third Gilgel Gibe project, which was started in 2006, has run into huge local and international opposition because of its expected negative environmental and social e�ects on the Lake and the Turkana

(Continued on Page 23)

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Ethiopia (Cont. from 22)

people. Ethiopia now claims that those issues have been adequately addressed, and the project would becompleted with the �nancial assistance and construction help of China in 2012, for generation of 1,900 megawatt. Two more projects on the Omo River, Gilgel Gibe four and �ve, for generation of 1,500 and 600 megawatt respectively, are currently at an advanced stage of studies, with the help of China.

Dams on the Nile River System

As indicated above, Ethiopia constructed two small dams on the Blue Nile (Fincha), and Lake Tana (Tis Abbay). However, it started the �rst large dam, the Tekeze Dam, in 2002 on the Tekeze/Atbara River. �is dam, which China assisted in construction and �nancing (costing $360 million), was completed in 2010, with a height of 188 meters and a reservoir capacity of 4 BCM. �is is a major achievement for Ethiopia, as it was able to erode the hegemony of Egypt and Sudan over the Nile River by completing this large dam. �is dam was followed by the Tana Beles dam, where water is being diverted from Lake Tana to the Beles River, and a hydropower station is built, with the help of Salini, at the junction for generation of 460 megawatt. Ethiopia plans a huge dam construction program, covering 17large dams, nine of which are planned on the Nile River system. �ose nine dams include the Border, Karadobi, Mendaya, Mabil and Dobus dams, as well as the Grand Renaissance Dam, discussed below.

�e Grand Renaissance Dam

�e announcement about the Grand Renaissance Dam, made lastMarch, indicated that the dam would be constructed on the Blue Nile about 40 kilometers from the borders with the Sudan. It is expected to generate 5,250 megawatt of electricity, create a reservoir that would hold 62 BCMof water, and cost close to $5 billion. �e generating capacity isalmost twice that of the Hoover Dam, and close to that of Robert-Bousara, Canada’s largest hydro-power plant. �e size of the reservoir would be almost double the size of Lake Tana (the origin of the Blue Nile), and close to half the size of Lake Nasser of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. Construction is expected to start this year, and be completed in 2016. Either Salini or China, or both, could be involved with the construction and �nancing, although the Ethiopian government indicated that it would raise the cost through publicly issued bonds. If this project and theother Omo River projects are completed on time, Ethiopia hydro-power production would rise in that year (2016) to about 10,000 megawatt.

�e announcement about this dam was made in March 2011, a few weeks after Egypt was engulfed inand became busy with its revolution, indicating the intricate hydro-politics of the Nile basin. Both Egypt and Sudan initially opposed the dam as harmful to their interests, and as a violation of the 1902 Agreement between Britain and Ethiopia, under which Ethiopia agreed not to construct any works

on the Nile or its tributaries which would negatively a�ect Egypt without Egypt’s consent. Ethiopia has long claimed that the English version of this agreement was di�erent from the Amharic version, and at any rate, the agreement was not rati�ed by Ethiopia. Egypt disagrees and claims that the agreement is valid and binding on Ethiopia. Ethiopia claims that the Grand Renaissance Dam would actually bebene�cial to Egypt and Sudan. It states that the Dam would regulate the �ow of the Nile and end the devastating �oods, particularly in the Sudan. It would also trap the huge amounts of sediments that are negatively a�ecting the dams in the Sudan and Egypt. Given its location in a deep valley, and the weather inthat area, Ethiopia states that evaporation losses would be minimal, compared to the huge evaporation losses of the dams in Egypt and Sudan. It also claims that the cheap electricity that would be generated by the dam could be sold to Egypt and Sudan, and that Sudan could even expand its irrigated agriculture in the border areas by taking water from the reservoir. Ethiopia indicated that it is willing to have the project jointly funded and operated with Egypt and Sudan.

Egypt and Sudan voiced their opposition to the project and demanded copies of the studies for the project to ascertain its e�ects. However, on May 2011, a large Egyptian delegation visited Ethiopia, and this was followed by a

(Continued on Page 29)

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�e Morganza Spillway and the 2011 Mississippi River Flooding

�e Morganza Spillway (the Spillway) is a �ood control structure in Louisiana operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and is designed to divert �ood waters from the Mississippi River into the Atchafalaya basin during high water events. It has only done so twice, once in 1973 and most recently during the 2011 Mississippi River �oods, to lower pressure on both upstream and downstream levees and other water control structures. �e Atchafalaya basin is sparsely populated, but contains several farms and thousands of oil and gas wells that would be �ooded in the event of anopening. A product of the severe �oods along the Mississippi in 1927, the Spillway was one of several structures mandated by the Federal government to both mitigate future �ooding and maintain the current course of the Mississippi River. �ese structures were designed to maintain the river at a navigable depth during normal conditions and shunt o� �ood water during high water conditions.

In April 2011, USACE recognized that the Mississippi �oods were

Legal Insights

Morganza Spillway and the Flowage Easement

serious and merited consideration of opening the Spillway. As a result,they considered and modeled the �ooding in four di�erent scenarios. (For example, when the �ow rate ofthe Mississippi approaches 1.5 million cubic feet per second at RedRiver Landing, Louisiana, USACE would consider opening the Spillway). On May 13, the �ow rate was measured at 1.449 million cubic feet per second. Given this information, USACE weighed the�ooding of the Atachafalaya basin against the potential for major �ooding in Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Subsequently, on May 14,USACE lifted one of the �oodgates and executed one of their planned scenarios by operating at 21 percent capacity. USACE took this action with the understanding that about 25,000 people and 11,000 permanent structures were in harm’sway in the 3,000 square mile �ood area.1 On May 18, 17 gates were opened and the resulting �ow rateswere found to be higher than expected, which, in addition to thefalling water levels, allowed USACE to reduce the number of open gates to two by June 8.

�e Spillway is merely part of a larger �ood control system for the Mississippi River that was designed

to consider the tradeo�s between control �ooding in some areas and leaving other areas un�ooded. �is system, the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, is composed of four �oodways, three of which were open at the same time during the 2011 �oods. �e tradeo� decision in the case of the Morganza Spillway involved �ooding 3,000 square miles of sparsely populated agricultural land, roughly 3 million acres,2 to save the densely populated and economically important urban areas of Baton Rouge and New Orleans.3 Referring to that tradeo�, Colonel Ed Fleming, in charge of �oodway operations for USACE, said on May 16, 2011 that “[w]e do take all the advantages and disadvantages into account. We understand the human impacts. We understand the environmental impacts. We understand the engineering impacts. And so, none of these decisions are easy.”4 �e mechanism that allows USACE to make such a momentous decision for so many landowners is their acquisition of �owage easements, or,the right to �ood land in the �oodplain without incurring liability for damages to the �ooded

1. http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/05/morganza_�oodway_opens_to_div.html.2. http://www.americanrivers.org/newsroom/blog/sudvardy-20110513-mississippi-�ood-update.html.3. John Barry, PBS Newshour, May 11, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/jan-june11/�oods_05-11.html/.4. Colonel Ed Fleming, PBS Newshour, (May 16, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/jan-june11/�ooding_05-16.html.

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Dams Sector (Cont. from 3)

Program guidelines. It provides owners and operators and their public safety partners with the capability to identify and address security gaps, threats, issues, and concerns pertaining to their respective facilities, with a focus on information sharing and coordination during incidents. In addition, DSTET allows participants the opportunity to identify and examine the issues and challenges presented via two unique exercise scenarios provided as part of the toolbox. It is designed to allow exercise planners to tailor the details of the exercise to suit the speci�c needs of their individual facilities (see the Partnerships article on Page 7 for more information).

• The Dams Sector Analysis Tool (DSAT), currently being developed by the Dams SSA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, will provide sector partners with secure access to di�erent modules and applications covering a wide range of analytical capabilities. DSAT facilitates the identi�cation and relative prioritization of critical facilities based on a consequence index that re�ects the overall potential for combined signi�cant impacts. In addition, it provides areporting mechanism that can consolidate descriptive information for each facility, including operational characteristics, regional information, and relevant incidents or events. DSAT serves as the implementation platform for a conditional risk assessment methodology based on standard security con�guration attributes and pre-selected attack modes, and includes a database of dam incidents as well as supporting geospatial tools.

Playing a major role in helping to publicize information and tools is the ASDSO/Sector webpage, which can be accessed through ASDSO’s website (www.damsafety.org) or directly (learningservices.us/asdso/). All of the aforementioned training information and tools can be reviewed and utilized at this site. Failure or disruption of the Nation’s critical infrastructure could threaten national security, result in mass casualties, weaken the economy, and damage public morale and con�dence. However, through enhanced outreach, education and awareness e�orts, such as those conducted by the Dams Sector, vast improvements can be made to the overall security, protection, and resilience of the Nation’s dams and levees. �e Dams Sector’s ongoing progress is a testimonial to the e�ectiveness of public-private partnerships and their direct contribution to ensuring the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. v

and addresses the role of hydropower in meeting the world’s growing water and energy needs as a clean, renewable and sustainable technology. With members active in more than 80 countries, IHA is a non-governmental, mutual association of organisations and individuals.

Hydropower(Cont. from 20)

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U.S. Dams Market (Cont. from 11)

between these two boundaries, total engineering revenues in the ENR dams and reservoirs list will be between $1.0 billion and $1.6 billion by 2020. By comparison, average annual growth rates from 1977 to 1997 in the dams market were 3.5 percent, and were 20 percent from 1998 to 2010.

ASCE and ASDSO Projections

ASCE and ASDSO have identi�ed the number of de�cient dams in the United States as well as estimated the cost to rehabilitate these dams. Current estimates place the total cost to rehabilitate the Nation’s de�cient dams at $50 billion. �is is an increase from 2003, when thecost to rehabilitate the Nation’s dams was estimated to be $36 billion. �ere are just over 4,400 known de�cient dams in the United States and this number continues togrow rapidly. In 1999, there were approximately 1,400 dams identi�ed as having some element ofde�ciency. By 2008, the number ofde�cient dams had increased dramatically to about 4,400. �is represents an increase of over 300% in only nine years. If this trend continues, the number of de�cient dams will pass 7,000 within the next �ve years. v

References

American Society of Civil Engineers, Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2009.

Association of State Dam Safety O�cials, 2008 Statistics on State Dam Safety Regulation, August

2009.

Association ofState Dam Safety O�cials, Overview of Dam Safety in the US, December 2008.

Engineering News Record, �e Top 500 Design Firms Sourcebook, 1998 to 2010.

Palmieri, Alessandro, Lead Dam Specialist, Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit, Operation Policy and Country Services, World Bank, Re�ections on Dam and Hydropower Development Globally, May 2, 2011, Unpublished.

Palmieri, Alessandro, Lead Dam Specialist, Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit, Operation Policy and Country Services, World Bank, Dam Project Portfolio – Past and Present in the World Bank, World Bank Water Week, December 1998.

Simon, Stephanie, “�e Wall Street Journal,” Water Surge – Hydropower, Once Shunned Because of Environmental Concerns, Is Making A Comeback, September 13, 2010.

Sorrell, Susan, Meetings and Membership Director, Association of State Dam Safety O�cials, AS-DSO Conference Attendance Records, 1997 to 2010, September 27, 2010.

Stephens, Larry, Executive Director, US Society on Dams, USSD Conference Attendance Records, 1998

to 2010, September 9, 2010.

US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis Website - http://www.bea.gov/.

US Department of Homeland Secu-rity Website - http://www.dhs.gov/.

US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Website - http://www.bls.gov/.

World Bank, Water Resources Sector Strategy: Strategic Directions for World Bank Engagement, February 2003.

World Bank, Directions in Hydropower, March 2009.

Figure 7: ENR Dam Revenue Growth Projections – 2010 to 2020.

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

$1,400

$1,600

$1,800

1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020

Engi

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ing

Reve

nues

($ M

illio

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ENR Dam & Reservoir Revenue G row th P roj ections

8% Avg. Annual G row th

3% Avg. Annual G row th

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Global Challenges (Cont. from 13)

and inadequate safeguards are already a serious problem in many regions (particularly South Asia13) and are expected to increase under the new climate scenario.14 Flood damages have soared in recent decades, despite hundreds of billions of dollars spent on �ood control structures. Improving our ability to cope with �oods requires adopting a more sophisticated set of techniques than dams and levees — the “soft path” of �ood risk management, which aims to understand, adapt to, and work with the forces of nature.

“Soft-path” �ood risk management seeks to reduce the damage from any size of �ood and to respond to the hydrological changes caused by changing land use and river morphology.15 Flood risk management assumes that �oods will happen and that we need to �nd better ways of reducing their speed, size, and duration where possible. It assumes that all �ood protection infrastructure can fail and that this failure for �ood protection infrastructure must be planned. It is also based on an understanding that all �oods are not inherently bad — and indeed that �oods are essential for the health of riverine ecosystems.

Dam Safety Concerns a Window of Opportunity

Incorporating dam removal into e�ective dam safety programs is well-established in a number of U.S. states and inEurope.16 �ough responsible dam decommissioning can have a large initial price tag, it can add up to long-term savings through the removal of insurance liability and maintenance and repair costs, enhanced ecological and property values, and even in reduced �ood damage from the restoration of wetlands and �oodplains. v

For more information on dam safety and security, please visit: www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/492.

13. “Pakistan Floods: Why the Fertile Indus River is so Prone to Flooding,” BBC World Service Interview with Dr. Daanish Mustafa, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/news/2010/08/100818_indus_wt_sl.shtml; excerpted quotes: http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/5715.14. P. McCully, “And �e Walls Came Tumbling Down,” World Rivers Review, (2005), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/1464.15. P. McCully, “Before the Deluge: Coping with Floods in a Changing Climate,” (2007), International Rivers, http://www.internationalriv-ers.org/node/517.16. Lejon, A. et al., “Con�icts Associated with Dam Removal in Sweden,” Ecology and Society 14(2): (2009), 4. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art4.

Partnerships (Cont. from 7)

resources towards developing an improved understanding of risk and blast mitigation of dams, and in ensuring the e�ective application of the best technologies available to address critical infrastructure protection requirements. Leveraging this progress, additional work remains to be done. �e key to the future reliesin the sustainment of an enduring robust public-private partnership that incorporates a balanced scheme of authorities, capacities, and resources required to get the job done. Building on the successes this partnership hasenjoyed in its formative decade, the Dams Sector looks forward to continued progress in ensuring the security and resilience of our sector infrastructure and the communities it services nationwide. v

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Legal Insights (Cont. from 24)

land.

Flowage Easements

Absent legislation to the contrary, the �fth amendment of the U.S. Constitution prevents the Federal government from depriving any citizens of the use of their property without adequate compensation, what is often referred to as the “takings clause.” In the case of theSpillway opening, USACE acquired easements to �ood the land in the Atchafalaya basin in the 1950swhen they were building the Spillway, expandeding on several easements they had bought in the 1930s and 1940s in the wake of the1927 �ood. �ose easements were made possible due to the 1928 Flood Control Act,5 which allowed USACE to acquire “�owage rights” for �ood waters that would �ow “by reason of diversions from the main channel of the Mississippi River.”6

USACE most frequently acquired these easements from the homeowners (though they maypursue condemnation actions in Federal court to obtain the rights); in this case, the right to store water on the lands in the �ood plain. According to Tulane University Professor Richard Campanella, this is “another way of saying �ooding it (the land under easement).”7 Most importantly, the �owage easement provides the government with liability protection for any damages that occur as a result of �ooding. To ensure that the right to �ood without liability persists, these

easements are essentially a propertyright held by USACE, and are therefore transferrable with the title to the property.

As the easements attach to deeds, USACE has also been sending out yearly notices, up to 1,300 homeowners per year in the Atchafalaya �ood plain with �ooding information. In the spring of 2011, information was also included about the potential damage to homes should the Spillway open.8 Just as USACE had to make the tradeo� decision to open the spillway, residents of the �oodplain had to consider the legal risk of being �ooded in their decision to remain in the �oodplain. �e argument that homeowners are compensated for their assumption of the risk of living in the �oodplain becomes problematic when one considers those indirectly a�ected by the Spillway, those who have never been compensated by an easement and who therefore do not receive the warnings issued by USACE.

�e USACE responded to concernsfrom people in this situation, such as residents of Terrebonne and Lafourche, Louisiana, by making the distinction between natural �ood areas, for which no easement was purchased and therefore no warnings received, and man-made �oodways such as the Atchafalaya basin. However, these homeowners are not completely without remedy. During the 2011 �oods, a situation

occurred upriver at the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway in Cairo,Illinois where a �ood control structure was opened pursuant to a tradeo� decision and large amounts of agricultural land were �ooded. In that case, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that, while the failure of USACE to obtain �owage easements for every property eventually a�ected does not prevent the operation of the �ood control system, landowners without easements had the right to seek compensation from the Federal government. �is recent holding directly contradicts the blanket immunity contained in the Flood Control Act, making this issue ripe for further legislative or judicial action, particularly as natural disasters continue to dominate the headlines. v

5. 33 U.S.C. ch. 15.6. Flood Control Act of 1928, Section 4.7. Richard Campanella, (May 13, 2011), http://www.fox8live.com/news/local/story/Morganza-Spillway-opening-to-destroy-property/3WYfOtbx5kO5P5Pw9EWgXg.cspx.8. http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20110521/articles/110529949?tc=ar.

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The Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security (CIP/HS) works in conjunction with James Madison Univerity and seeks to fully integrate the disciplines of law, policy, and technology for enhancing the security of cyber-networks, physical systems, and economic processes supporting the Nation’s critical infrastructure. The Center is funded by a grant from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

If you would like to be added to the distribution list for The CIP Report, please click on this link: http://listserv.gmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=cipp-report-l&A=1

CSSL to demonstrate an ALARP position may not provide a su�ciently compelling case for public safety. A more comprehensive approach is suggested whereby the owner’s damsafety system forms the foundation of the safety case for a dam that isfurther developed through the logical case, setting out the defensive mechanisms for the identi�ed failure modes at the dam and identifying whether those mechanisms are su�cient. v

Shane McGrath is the General Manager Infrastructure at Goulburn-Murray Water in the state of Victoria, Australia. He is a Fellow, Institution of Engineers, Australia; Australia’s representative on the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) Committee on Dam Safety; an Associate Member of the Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) and heads the working group for the ANCOLD Guidelines on Risk Assessment.

Dam Safety (Cont. from 16) Ethiopia (Cont. from 23)

visit to Addis Ababa by the new Prime Minister of Egypt. Both visits dealt with the overall Nile relations and the Grand Renaissance Dam, as well as cooperation over, and bene�t sharing from, the Nile River. On June 20, 2011, Sudan announced its endorsement of the project. Egypt and Sudan seem tobe in dialogue with Ethiopia about the Nile and the project, and there were reports about a planned tripartite meeting to discuss the proposed dam.

Conclusion: �e Challenges and Opportunities

�e Grand Renaissance Dam project presents a major challenge to the Nile riparians relations, but also o�ers opportunities for cooperation amongst them. �e �lling of the reservoir could harm the interests ofEgypt and Sudan if it is not done over a reasonable period of time and in close cooperation between the three countries. �e huge power to be generated could bene�t the three countries, as well as South Sudan, which has no power generation facilities, and Kenya, which is in desperate need for more hydropower. Indeed, Ethiopia isclearly emerging as a regional hydropower hub, and plans to be amajor hydropower exporter not only to Sudan, South Sudan, and

Kenya, but also to Djibouti, Egypt, and even to Yemen and Somalia, if stability were to return to those two countries. However, the Nile, like every other international basin, needs cooperation among the riparian states to realize its huge bene�ts. With poverty and population growth dominating the Nile basin countries, only full cooperation can help the riparian counties harness the enormous potential of the Nile to pull their population out of their poverty, misery, and under-development. v

* LL.B. University of Khartoum, Sudan; LL.M. and J.S.D. Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut; Academic Researcher and Consultant on water law and policy; Salmanmasalman@gmail.com.