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THE COALITIONAL PRESIDENTIALISM PROJECTwww.area-studies.ox.ac.uk/presidentialism
April 20, 2023
The Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
Svitlana ChernykhUniversity of Oxford
Outline
Evolution of the presidential debate
What do we know about coalition management already
Research objectives
Theoretical claims
Data
April 20, 2023Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 2
First phase of debate: Linz’s classic arguments
Second phase: Mainwaring, Stepan/Skach, and others add party fragmentation to the mix: the “difficult combination” of presidentialism, multipartism, and stable democracy
Third phase: scholars assail the “difficult combination” argument by detailing coalition formation even in least-likely cases (Deheza, Amorim, Pereira, Altman, Zelaznik, Mejía-Acosta, Martínez-Gallardo, Zucco, etc.)
“Presidentialism can work like parliamentarism”
From the “perils of presidentialism”to the coalitional approach
“Presidentialism can work like parliamentarism” (Negretto/Colomer)
Coalitional politics are the key. Presidents now conceived as formateurs.
Coalition governments almost as common under presidential as under parliamentary regimes
Presidents try to foster the emergence of legislative cartels which will defend the preferences of the executive
Where is the debate now?
What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?
The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.
April 20, 2023Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 5
What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?
The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.
The size of the president’s own party matters.
April 20, 2023Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 6
What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?
The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.
The size of the president’s own party matters. Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to
portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions.
April 20, 2023Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 7
What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?
The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.
The size of the president’s own party matters. Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to
portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions. The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences
governing style.
April 20, 2023Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 8
What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?
The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.
The size of the president’s own party matters. Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to
portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions. The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences
governing style. Coalitions tend to erode toward the end of the presidential term
(lame-duck effect); electoral cycles matter.
April 20, 2023Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 9
What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?
The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents
The size of the president’s own party matters Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to
portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions. The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences
governing style Coalitions tend to erode toward the end of the presidential term
(lame-duck effect); electoral cycles matter The very existence of a dominant pro-presidential faction in the
legislature creates a new meta-cleavage in political life, which can be described very simply as “ins versus outs” or government versus opposition
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Too often institutionally univariate
Too often divorced from local context
Too often ignores the role of informal institutions in presidential governance
Too prone to stake big generalizations on the experience of a single country or region (typically Latin America)
Deficiencies of the current debate
Objectives of the Project
Uncover and analyze the tools that presidents use to create and manage coalitions in multiparty systems
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Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
Objectives of the Project
Uncover and analyze the tools that presidents use to create and manage coalitions in multiparty systems
Assess the consequences of these tools for democratic accountability: this is the tradeoff of governability versus accountability
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Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
Presidents are equipped with a “toolbox” which allows them to initiate and cultivate interparty coalitions
Presidents tend to use five key tools, but in varying admixtures
These tools are imperfectly substitutable
Tradeoffs for democratization: these tools enhance presidential power, but can also erode legislative capacity, horizontal accountability, transparency, and party systems
We make 4 related claims
Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
April 20, 2023
Agenda power: legislative powers of the president
Budgetary prerogatives: control over public spending, use of “pork”
Cabinet management: allocation of portfolios among coalition parties
Partisan powers of presidents
Informal institutions: clientelistic, paraconstitutional, and indirectly observable practices that govern executive-legislative relations
The five tools in the toolbox
Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
April 20, 2023
Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador)
Ex-USSR (Armenia, Russia, Ukraine)
Africa (Benin, Kenya, Malawi)
Cross-regional focus
Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
April 20, 2023
Data collected
Interviews
Objective indicators
Case studies• 2 successful cases• 2 failed cases• Budget case study
April 20, 2023Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
350 (total) interviews with national legislators
60% members of the coalition
40% members of the opposition
Inside each group, an approximate reflection of the size of sub-groups (constituent parties)
Appropriate mix of party leaders and backbenchers
Sample
Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
April 20, 2023
The interview sample
Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
April 20, 2023
The Questionnaire
April 20, 2023Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods
• 12 structured and 10 semi-structured questions
• 5 main categories of questions: nature of the coalitions in the country, formal and informal tools, presidential powers, personal characteristics and experiences, democracy and accountability
• Available in 7 languages (English, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian)
Preliminary Results