The Commandants: The Leadership of the Natal Native Contingent

in the Anglo-Zulu War

By

Keith I. Smith, B.A. Hons (Macq.)

This thesis is presented for the degree of Master of Arts

of the University of Western Australia.

School of Humanities

October, 2005

Abstract

The senior Imperial officers who took part in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 are

comparatively well known and their service in that brief period has been well

documented, as indeed has that of many of their junior colleagues. Much less, however,

is known about the officers who served as commandants of the Natal Native Contingent,

although more than half of them were Imperial officers on special service duties. Most

of the rest were British ex-officers who lived in South Africa, while one of the

remaining two was an adventurer and mercenary. Many of them had already found

service with the South African force during the Ninth Cape Border War against the

Ngqika and Gcaleka which had only ended in mid-1878.

According to official documents, the Natal Native Contingent initially numbered

more than 8,000 native troops, in three regiments, under the command of European

officers and non-commissioned officers.1 At the time of the invasion of Zululand in

January, 1879, the contingent therefore made up about 62% of the invading force. This

bald statistic, as so often, hides the true story.

The thesis examines each of the commandants, and the extent to which their

abilities and personalities were reflected in the performance of the native troops under

their command, while at the same time revealing the evolution of the Contingent itself

as an arm of the invading force under Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford. One or two

of the commandants served quietly and unspectacularly, but others were remarkably

controversial and their stories remain largely untold. Some of them were seemingly

discarded after the abortive First Invasion, covering only the period from the crossing of

1 We shall see that these numbers were somewhat optimistic.

i

the Zulu border on 11th January until shortly after the battle of Isandlwana on 22nd

January, 1879, while others were re-assigned. The subsequent re-organisation of the

Contingent led to the introduction of some new commandants, who are also included

within the purview of the thesis. The quality of the new officers is compared to that of

those whose services were terminated.

The reputation which the NNC earned during the war was generally perceived as

entirely discreditable. The perception was, however, largely based on the performance

of the native forces during only the few days of the First Invasion as recounted by their

officers. That sullied reputation was not merited by all units, but it was to overshadow

the service of the re-constituted NNC in the later stages of the war. The haste with

which the regiments were assembled, their often inhuman treatment by their officers,

the minimal or non-existent training they received and the way they were armed and

dressed all combined to qualify their subsequent performance in the field. A comparison

of the NNC is drawn with the performances of the Native Mounted Contingent, and the

men of Colonel, later Brigadier General, Evelyn Wood’s Irregulars.

The conclusion of the thesis is that the commandants did indeed have a profound

effect on the quality and performance of the Africans who served under them. In

general, the units under serving British officers performed best, while the colonial

officers did less well. The mercenary officer was almost certainly the worst, but by only

a slim margin.

ii

Contents

Abstract i

Abbreviations iv

Acknowledgements v

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 The Background to the War 7

Chapter 2 Genesis of the NNC 23

Chapter 3 Invasion and Defeat 53

Chapter 4 Withdrawal and Re-organisation 78

Chapter 5 Demonstrations and Relief 100

Chapter 6 Victory and the Aftermath 126

Conclusion 150

Appendix I Post War Careers of the Commandants 160

Appendix II Instructions for the Management of Natives 164

Bibliography 167

Maps

The First Invasion 52

The Second Invasion 125

iii

Abbreviations

AGO Records of the Attorney-General’s Office, Natal.

BPP British Parliamentary Papers, Command series, in the Library of

New South Wales, Sydney.

CP Chelmsford Papers, National Army Museum, UK.

CSO Records of the Colonial Secretary’s Office, Natal.

GH Records of Government House, Natal.

JSA Webb, C. de B. and Wright, J.B. (eds.), The James Stuart Archive

of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu

and Neighbouring Peoples, in five volumes.

MSCE Records of the Master of the Supreme Court, Estates, Natal.

NGG Natal Government Gazette.

PP Pearson Papers, National Army Museum, UK.

RSC Records of the Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg.

SNA Records of the Secretary of Native Affairs, Natal.

SP Shepstone Papers.

TNA (PRO) The National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, UK.

VLM Resident Magistrate records, Verulam.

iv

Acknowledgements

The composition and actions of the Natal Native Contingent (NNC), and associated

units, from its inception to the capture of King Cetshwayo, are related comprehensively

in the only substantial work on the subject by a modern author, Dr Paul Thompson.1

The detail provided by Dr Thompson on the sources for his work is remarkably

extensive and is obviously the fruit of many years of research. His scholarship has not

perhaps reached the wide audience that it should, when one considers the proportion of

African to European troops in the conflict.

In his very detailed account of the force, Dr Thompson has touched only lightly

upon the men who led the regiments and their component battalions and yet these men

must have had some impact, positive or otherwise, upon the way each unit behaved.

Why, for example, did the NNC perform so poorly? To what extent was the imposition

of a British military leadership responsible for that performance? These are questions,

among others, to be resolved in this present work, and the great debt owed by the writer

to Dr Thompson in unwittingly providing the stimulus for this research is hereby readily

acknowledged. That debt was substantially enhanced when Dr Thompson gave me

permission to examine his personal notes, now donated to the Pietermaritzburg Archives

Repository.

I am also indebted to those curators and staff of museums and libraries who have

been so sympathetic to my frequent visits and enquiries. In particular, I must mention

the staff of the following: Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban; the library of the

University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg; the Pietermaritzburg Archive Repository; the

National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew; the National Army Museum, Chelsea;

1 P.S. Thompson, The Natal Native Contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War 1879, (Pietermaritzburg, 1997).

v

the State Library of New South Wales, for access to their British Parliamentary Papers

in a very deep basement.

The photographs used to illustrate the work are from the following sources:

Commandant R. la T. Lonsdale, from R. Lock and P. Quantrill, Zulu Victory, p. 111;

Major Bengough, frontispiece, H.M. Bengough, Memories of a Solder’s Life;

Commandant Hamilton-Browne, frontispiece, G. Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary

in South Africa; Commandant Montgomery, Natal Who’s Who, 1906, p. 140.

Photographs of the other commandants, other than Lieutenant Colonel Durnford, were

not able to be traced. The photographs of the men of the 2nd Regiment NNC and of

Sikhotha are reproduced by courtesy of the Killie Campbell Africana Library. The

photographs of the 2nd and 4th Battalions NNC are reproduced from Christopher

Wilkinson-Latham’s Uniforms and Weapons of the Zulu War.2 The two maps are taken

from Ian Knight’s, The National Army Museum Book of the Zulu War.3

Finally, particular gratitude is extended to Professor Norman Etherington, whose

supervision of my work in the preparation of this thesis, while rigorous, has always been

constructive, with large measures of encouragement. The work would be of much less

worth without his most valuable contribution and any blemishes which remain are

entirely those of the writer.

2 Christopher Wilkinson-Latham, Uniforms and Weapons of the Zulu War, (London, 1978). 3 Ian Knight, The National Army Museum Book of the Zulu War, (London, 2003).

vi

How dull it is to pause, to make an end,

To rust unburnish’d, not to shine in use!

Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Ulysses, 1842.

vii

Introduction

The subject to be examined in this work is that of the relative quality of the

leadership of the Natal Native Contingent (NNC) during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879.

Due to the limitations imposed upon the length of the work, its scope is limited to that

of the infantry arm of the African troops so employed, and thus excludes the men of the

Native Mounted Contingent, and the Native Pioneers.

The Contingent proper was a force which remained essentially discrete throughout

the war, while the mounted units changed over time, and were complemented by later

additions. The Pioneers were too small a group to have played any more than a

peripheral role in the war. Similarly, the African troops employed in Colonel (later

Brigadier-General) Evelyn Wood’s force, known as ‘Wood’s Irregulars’, have also been

disregarded since they were not a part of the Contingent.

The principal reason for subjecting this matter to scrutiny is the very large

proportion represented by the Contingent in the early stages of the war, and the way in

which they were disposed. The footmen of the NNC originally numbered more than

8,000 African troops, in three regiments, under the command of European officers and

non-commissioned officers. At the time of the first invasion of Zululand, the force thus

constituted no less than 62% of the invading army.1 With only a minimum of training,

they were then thrust into military engagements for which they were totally unfitted.

Finally, the quality of the leadership of the Contingent had an important bearing upon

the performance of the NNC in the field, but this matter has not yet been considered as a

1 According to the Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879, (Captain J.S. Rothwell,

compiler), War Office, Intelligence Branch, (London, 1881) p. 145, the three NNC regiments consisted of 2256, 3488 and 2566 African infantry respectively on 11th January 1879.

1

function of the doubtful reputation which it earned for itself, especially during the first

phase of the war.

How does one define ‘leadership’? In his work on the psychology of military

incompetence, Norman Dixon has enumerated the required characteristics as being

… ‘heroic’ leader, military manager and technocrat. To these we would add politician, public relations man, father-figure and psychotherapist.2

In 1879, these might have been simplified somewhat and confined perhaps to the

following generalisations:

• The ability to communicate effectively with both his superior officers

and his junior officers and men.

• Sufficiently confident as to be decisive, both in action and in his

management of his men.

• To care sufficiently for his men as to ensure their safety so far as

circumstances could be influenced by him, but to be one remove from

them so as to maintain his authority. He should be, one might say, a

‘benevolent autocrat’.

The most senior British officer, and the ultimate commandant of the Natal Native

Contingent, was the general commanding Her Majesty’s troops in South Africa,

Lieutenant-General (local rank) the Honourable Frederic Augustus Thesiger, later Lord

Chelmsford.3 His role in the selection of its commanders, and that of managing the

force during the several phases of the war, will come under close inspection.

Half of the NNC’s leaders were drawn from serving officers of the British Army

who had volunteered to come to the South African theatre in a special service role. With 2 Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London, 1976), p. 28. 3 Frederic Augustus Thesiger (1827-1905) began his military career in 1844 when he obtained a commission by

purchase in the Rifle Brigade. He bought a transfer into the more acceptable Grenadier Guards in 1845 and found regular promotion thereafter. By 1868 he was a Major General, having served in the Crimea, Sardinia, Turkey and India. It is fair to note that much of his service life was spent in administration, acting as Deputy Adjutant General and Quartermaster General in most of his postings. On the death of his father on 5th October 1878 Thesiger succeeded to his title as the second Baron Chelmsford. This latter name has been used throughout to avoid confusion.

2

the exception of Hamilton-Browne, who was a soldier of fortune with no formal

military training, the remainder were British ex-officer expatriates living in South

Africa. Most of them had found previous service with the South African force during

the Ninth Border War against the Ngqika and Gcaleka in 1878.

There is a plethora of works on the war, of which an early contribution was that of

the late Donald Morris, still in print and still introducing, and sometimes misleading,

new generations to this fascinating war. The difficulty with his work is that it lacks

references, a deliberate shortcoming since he claimed he ‘did not wish to claim for this

work an academic status to which it is not entitled’.4 Morris held the NNC responsible

for the tragic defeat of the British column at Isandlwana in January 1879 because of

their flight from the field at a crucial moment.5 The circumstances of this alleged event

are among the many matters to be examined in depth in this work. Morris’ view of the

NNC failure at Isandlwana has only recently been corrected for the general readership

of the war, although a contemporary of Morris, David Jackson, had almost

simultaneously written a more accurate synthesis of the battle.6 The works of Jackson

are replete with references, but his writing is limited to that of the battle of Isandlwana.

A wider coverage of the whole war is to be found in the works of John Laband and Ian

Knight. The work of the former, of which his Rope of Sand is the most comprehensive

treatment, is more academic in nature and again gives full references.7 Knight has

written extensively on various aspects of the war, and for a more general readership, but

only one of his works deals with the war as a whole.8 The references there, however, are

4 Donald R. Morris, The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation, (Jonathan Cape: London,

1965), p. 617. 5 Ibid., p. 374. 6 F.W.D. Jackson, Isandlwana 1879: The Sources Re-Examined, first published in the Journal for Army Historical

Research Vol. 43, Nos. 173, 175 and 176, 1965, re-published in pamphlet form by the South Wales Borderers Museum: Brecon, 1999. Jackson has recently reworked his articles, with minor changes and some additions, as Hill of the Sphinx: The Battle of Isandlwana, (London, 2002).

7 John Laband, The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation, (London, 1997), first published as Rope of Sand, (Jeppestown, 1995).

8 Ian Knight, The National Army Museum Book of the Zulu War, (London, 2003).

3

for the most part to those documents in the possession of the sponsor of the work, the

National Army Museum in London.

Each of these works, and many others dealing with specific incidents and

engagements in the war, make mention of the NNC only in passing. The single work

which has dealt with the Contingent specifically, and in any depth, is that by Dr Paul

Thompson.9 Perhaps the sobering experience of Thompson in endeavouring to find a

publisher for his work explains why there is no other material available:

When The Natal Native Contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War 1879 appeared in 1997, it was printed privately in a limited edition. The author had supposed that a book on an important aspect of the war which had not been examined before would be taken up by a commercial or institutional press, and was surprised when a publisher told him that, yes, the war indeed was popular, but this aspect would not be: white readers were not interested in blacks outside the simplistic British-Zulu confrontation, and black readership such as it was, was an inefficient market.10

This is an excellent work for those interested in the subject, with a detailed account

of the foot, pioneer and mounted units, their development over the course of the war and

the roles they played. Thompson too chose to differentiate between the footmen of the

NNC and the Mounted Contingent and Pioneers:

A sharp distinction was made between the foot soldiers on the one hand and the mounted men and the pioneers on the other. The infantry man remained as naked as he came, except that he was to be issued a blanket ...11

If there is a shortcoming, however, it is that the work does not examine the

commandants of the Contingent in more than a perfunctory way, nor relate their

leadership to its performance in the field.

Thompson follows the Contingent, and its allied African units, in a chronological

manner, from inception to discharge, a course which this writer has chosen to emulate.

Almost every paragraph is packed with detail and he deals with the various topics as

they arise in a brisk, almost clipped, manner. He relegates some important matters to

footnotes, some of which have led to the discovery of considerable material for this

9 P.S. Thompson, The Natal Native Contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War 1879, (Pietermaritzburg, 1997). 10 Ibid., p. iv. 11 Ibid, p. xx..

4

thesis. The work thus raises almost as many questions as the answers which it provides

about the NNC. There are also a very few inaccuracies to be found in the work, which

have been rectified here.

One or two of the men who acted as commandants served quietly and

unspectacularly, but others were remarkably controversial and their stories remain

largely untold. There are no studies of these officers covering the period of the Zulu

War, other than material included in the autobiographies written by two of them, H.M.

Bengough and George Hamilton-Browne. The first was less than comprehensive in this

respect while Hamilton-Browne’s work serves to illustrate his extreme views of his

men, both black and white.12 The latter particularly requires to be approached with

caution, however, since it was written, probably without the aid of a journal, more than

thirty years after the events described, and much of what was written is in the nature of

self-aggrandizement and only the thread of his story bears close examination.

It is the objective of this thesis to attempt to remedy the insufficiency of

information about the commandants of the NNC. There are many gaps in our

knowledge of these men but wide-ranging research has allowed the writer to fill some of

these gaps and informed speculation may still further fill the breach. The material

presented in the thesis, while making use of some secondary writings, is based firmly

upon original contemporary sources. This has been drawn from personal research in

both the United Kingdom and, more importantly, in South Africa, the specifics of which

are to be found in the Acknowledgements. It has been gained over a longer time span

than this work might otherwise indicate, since the writer has made a number of previous

forays to the institutions mentioned, which information has been complemented by that

12 H.M. Bengough, Memories of a Soldiers Life, (London, 1913) and Colonel G. Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary

in South Africa, (London, 1912).

5

of two further visits during the term of this candidature to research specific matters

which had not previously been identified.

As has been previously mentioned, the thesis takes a generally chronological

approach. The first chapter covers several matters briefly, broad at first and gradually

and successively focusing more closely on the NNC. The next two chapters cover the

period up to the conclusion of the first invasion of Zululand which ended, for the

purpose of this work, at the end of January 1879, following the disaster at Isandlwana.

The final three chapters cover the remainder of the war and afterwards, the end of the

war being treated as the successful battle of Ulundi on 4th July, and concludes with

further material up to October 1879. The work is brought to a close with findings as to

the competence of the various commandants, bringing together the conclusions reached

in each of the chapters, allowing a picture to emerge of the relative superiority of those

who were serving officers of the British army on special service assignments over the

British expatriates with much earlier military experience or none at all.

There are also two Appendices containing material which could not be included in

the body of the work, but which add to our further knowledge. The first of these

provides a brief synopsis of the later careers of the commandants while the second sets

out the regulations established for the treatment of the African troops of the Contingent.

6

Chapter 1 The Background to the War

This first chapter provides a wide introduction to the war and is set out in five

parts, each of which successively closes in upon the subject of this work. The first sets

the scene by offering a brief explanation of how the war came about, and introduces the

major actors in the drama which was to unfold. The second increases the focus on the

subject matter by examining the history of the use of African levies in nineteenth

century South Africa. The third part moves still closer to the Native Contingent by

showing how the military levies in Natal, as opposed to those of the Cape Colony, were

an extension of the earlier concept of labour provided to African chiefs, a concept which

came to be known as isibhalo.1 There follows a discussion of the career of the

originator of the NNC, Anthony William Durnford, Colonel of the Royal Engineers,

who was to become the senior commandant. The chapter ends with a review of the

perceived Zulu threat to Natal and how it was met by the military and civil

administrators, taking them to the brink of the war.

The Causes of the War

The causes of the Anglo-Zulu War are complex, with roots stretching back to the

reign of the Zulu king Mpande kaSenzangakhona, and which have been well-explored

in other works.2 The new Governor and High Commissioner to South Africa, Sir Bartle

1 1. Gang of labourers, road party; 2. Forced labour system of indenture; 3. Gang of forced labourers: Isibalo in C.M.

Doke, and B.W. Vilikazi (compilers), Zulu-English Dictionary, (Johannesburg, 1958), p. 22. 2 The most comprehensive is probably Richard Cope, Ploughshare of War: The Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War of

1879, (Pietermaritzburg, 1999). Cf. John Laband, The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation, (London, 1997) and Jeff Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879 – 1884, (Pietermaritzburg, 1994), who both give a Zulu perspective.

7

Frere, arrived at his post in April 1877.3 Frere has been described as having ‘a certain

recklessness, strange perhaps in so experienced an administrator, and yet the natural

defect of his strongest qualities’.4 It was a characteristic which was to impel him to

draw both the British and Natal governments into a violent conflict with the Zulu king

and his people.

The High Commissioner had been given a remit to create a confederation from the

several colonies and Boer republics in South Africa, following the model which had

earlier proved successful in Canada. One of the obstacles to his achieving his goal was

the seeming recalcitrance of the Zulu king, Cetshwayo kaMpande with regard to Boer

encroachments on Zulu lands.5 Land claims on the western border lands of the Zulu

people had been pursued by the Boers since the accession to the throne of Mpande

kaSenzangakhona in 1842, claims which they justified by the assistance they had

rendered to that monarch in winning his throne.6 The British had opposed these land

claims, siding first with Mpande and then his son, King Cetshwayo. The matter was

resolved soon after Frere’s arrival: the Crown annexed the South African Republic of

Transvaal only days later. But this brought with it further difficulty: having assumed

3 Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere (1815-1884), Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner for South Africa. He

had enjoyed a long and distinguished administrative career in India, where he served from 1834 to 1866, the latter years as Governor of Bombay.

4 Cornelius W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa: A Study in Politics and Economics, (London, 1965), p. 129.

5 Cetshwayo kaMpande kaSenzagakhona (c. 1832-1884) was named heir to his father in 1839, at the time that Mpande sought refuge with the Boers after crossing the Thukela to escape his brother King Dingane. Mpande later tried to substitute another son, Mbuyazi (sometimes Mbulazi) as heir, which led to the battle of Ndondakusuka in 1856, when the two sons, supported by their individual factions, fought the matter of the succession to a conclusion: Mbuyazi was killed and Cetshwayo succeeded his father in 1872. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, then Secretary of Native Affairs for Natal, attended a ‘coronation’ of the new King, when he extracted from him certain promises as to how his people were to be governed.

6 The issue of Boer land claims and the temporizing by the British and colonial governments in resolving the issue following many Zulu complaints, is dealt with at length in Frances E. Colenso, History of the Zulu War and Its Origin, (London, 1880), chapter IX.

8

control of the Transvaal, its Administrator, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, was compelled to

reverse British policy and support the Boer cause, as was Sir Bartle himself.7

Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieutenant Governor of Natal, established a Boundary

Commission which was to finally resolve the land claim issue, and which assembled for

the first time on 7th March 1878 at Rorke’s Drift.8 When the commission made its report

on 20th June, it proved a bombshell to Frere, finding entirely for the Zulu and dismissing

the Boer claims as spurious, stating that they were either based on forgery or fraud.9

Frere had expected that, had the Boer claims been upheld, the Zulu king would react

violently, allowing the British troops to intercede in any resulting conflict and thus

provide an excuse for an invasion of Zululand and the deposition of Cetshwayo from his

throne. Frere therefore had to cast about for other casus belli, and seized upon a number

of issues, most of doubtful validity, which were to be presented to the king in the form

of an ultimatum.

In July 1878, the British Army in South Africa had completed its operations on the

north-east coast of the Cape Colony, having finally defeated the Ngqika and Gcaleka

people. The force was commanded by Lord Chelmsford. By the 1st July, Chelmsford

was back in Cape Town but already his thoughts were being turned by Sir Bartle Frere

towards Zululand and King Cetshwayo. In anticipation of hostilities, British troops

began to filter into Natal, some marching 800 kilometres from King William’s Town to

Pietermaritzburg while others took ship to Durban.

7 Theophilus Shepstone (1817-1893) served as an interpreter during the Xhosa war in 1835 and became British

Resident in Kaffraria in 1839. His skill in dealing with African people and his facility with their languages led to his appointment in Natal, first as Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes and eventually as Secretary for Native Affairs. He remained in this post until appointed Administrator of the Transvaal, which territory he annexed to the Crown in 1877. He was regarded as the most experienced administrator of African affairs on the continent of Africa, and as such was widely consulted by government.

8 Sir Henry Ernest Gascoyne Bulwer (1836-1914) was appointed Lieutenant Governor of the colony of Natal in 1875, following the brief administration of Sir Garnet Wolseley. He had enjoyed a diplomatic career, beginning as secretary to the Lieutenant Governor of Prince Edward Island, Canada in 1859 after graduating from Cambridge University. From there, he was appointed Resident to Paxo, in the Ionian Islands, in 1860, and Cerigo in 1862. From 1865 to 1870 he was Receiver-General in Trinidad and administered Dominica concurrently in 1867-8. He was appointed Governor of Lebuan in 1870.

9 BPP, C. 2220, Appendix II, Enclosure 1 in No. 1: Report of the Boundary Commissioners.

9

The Earlier Use of Native Levies

The Natal Native Contingent was formed to fill a void left by the refusal of the

British home government to send sufficient additional troops to supplement those

already serving in the theatre. It was to consist of men drawn from the many chiefdoms

in the colony of Natal in the late 1870s. The use of African troops was not an innovation

at that time. Indeed, the practice of using such levies in South Africa went back as far as

the Fourth Cape or Border War of 1811, when Colonel John Graham ‘took over the

Hottentot Corps, an experiment begun some time before in giving military training to

coloured men of good character, and moulded it into a corps variously known as the

Cape Corps, the Cape Regiment, the Hottentot Regiment and the Hottentot Light

Infantry.’10

Such levies were used sporadically from that time until the Ninth Border War, in

which Lord Chelmsford assumed the command from General Sir Arthur Cunynghame

in March 1878.11 In that last campaign, no less than 3,700 Mfengu (Fingo) levies were

employed. They were led by men such as Frank Streatfeild, who said of his own

Streatfeild Fingoes, ‘at one time we must have been over a thousand strong’.12 He was

very critical of the many so-called ‘commandants’ during the Border War, saying of

them:

There was an appointment at that time called “Field Commandant,” and they drew pay of 25s. a day and allowances. There were dozens of them. As Sir Evelyn Wood once said to me, you had only to shake any mimosa bush and a bunch of Commandants would come tumbling out of it. They commanded nothing but themselves, and that very badly.13

Still another was Rupert Lonsdale,14 a name with which we will shortly become more

familiar.

10 Johannes Meintjes, Sandile: The Fall of the Xhosa Nation, (Cape Town, 1971), p. 42f. 11 Some useful details relating to the 7th Border War are to be found in Major J.J. Hulme, “Irregular Units of the 7th

Kaffir War 1846-7”, Journal of the South African Military History Society, Vol. 1 No. 3, December 1968. 12 Frank Streatfeild, Reminiscences of an Old ‘Un, London, 1911, p. 146. 13 Ibid., pp. 148f. 14 Meintjes, Sandile, p. 296.

10

Captain Hallam Parr described how the Mfengu levies had performed, and what

their function had been:

They fought with more decision and self-dependence at every skirmish, and made exceedingly good light troops. During a march, they scoured the country to the front and on the flanks, thus saving the white troops much work.15

In Natal, as opposed to the Cape, military levies were raised on a number of occasions

from 1847 onwards, even being led by Theophilus Shepstone himself. In 1848,

Shepstone was appointed ‘Captain in Chief’ of all African military forces in Natal,16

and set out the formal organisation of the levies on a permanent basis, so that every

chief knew what his obligations were.17 It is interesting to note that Shepstone arranged

for his levies to be divided into seven divisions ‘or movable columns’, and ‘proposed

the appointment of commandants’,18 since this was the same number of NNC battalions

which were to be formed during the coming war. His commandants, however, were

African chiefs and not European officers.

The concept of isibhalo

It is now necessary to digress briefly in order to examine the means by which Natal

Africans were able to be impressed into periodic government service, and how this civil

obligation was transformed over time to include military service.

Perhaps the most famous feature of the Zulu people of East Africa was their so-

called military ‘regiments’. The correct name for them was ibutho, (pl. amabutho).

Further, these men did not simply constitute the king’s army but also acted as his

personal labour force and attended to tasks such as the erection and maintenance of his

royal cantonments or amakhanda (sing. ikhanda), his gardens and his cattle. Nor were

they a standing force. They were called up, but rarely all together, at different times

15 Captain Henry Hallam Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars: Guadana to Isandhlwana, (London, 1880) p. 43. 16 Ingrid Machin, Antbears and Targets for Assegais, (Howick, 2002), p. 146, citing Pietermaritzburg Archives

Repository, SNA I/1/1. 17 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 44(2), No. 64: Shepstone to Government Secretary, September 1848. 18 Machin, Antbears, p. 147.

11

during the year to perform a specific duty and then were released back to their homes

upon completion of the work.

What is perhaps less well-known is that each ibutho consisted of men who were all

of a similar age. The creation of age-group units, however, was not a uniquely Zulu

phenomenon, it was common to most Nguni people in East Africa. Male amabutho

were called upon to perform similar duties for their chief; the Zulu simply took the

measure to its logical military conclusion.19 Such age-groups were also commonly

formed in colonial Natal, again to provide a source of labour for their chiefs.20 There

were, however, fundamental differences. Many of the chiefs in Natal were not

hereditary but had been appointed by the colonial administration to bring together

disparate groups of refugees, both from Zululand and elsewhere. As ‘Diplomatic Agent

for the Native Tribes’, the management of the Natal Africans lay under the general

superintendence of Theophilus Shepstone, whose ‘system’ of administration was to

become the model for British African colonies generally. It was he who conceived the

notion of using the labour component of the Nguni custom to obtain their services for

the Natal government.

There was a substantial labour shortage in Natal as the result of the competing

interests of the farming and domestic communities, and the exploitation of the diamond

fields which were discovered in Kimberley in 1869. There was also a strong demand for

labour from the government of the colony itself for such projects as the construction and

maintenance of roads, docks and other public works. It was to provide for this shortage

that Shepstone devised the calling up of African labour gangs.

Probably the most unpopular innovation was the introduction, in 1848, of the system of isibhalo or forced labour. The chiefs’ control of labour resources enabled the government to each year. The men served for six months, beginning at 7s. 6d. per month with rations and rising by

19 Shaka was not even the originator of the military use of amabutho. There is ample evidence to suggest that such

use was made by his father, Senzangakhona kaJama and Shaka’s mentor Dingiswayo kaJomo. 20 The well-known chief Langalibalele was reported as having an ibutho; see JSA vol. 5, p. 13,

12

1875 to 15s. The system was justified on the grounds that it was based on the amabutho system and on the right of the Lieutenant-Governor, as Supreme Chief, to call up men.21

In 1849, the African population was made subject to its own ‘native law’ rather than the

British law which governed the behaviour of white colonists, in an Ordinance in which

the title ‘Supreme or paramount Chief’ as applied to the Lieutenant Governor first

appears:

The first Legislative recognition of his title as Supreme Chief, of which I can find a record, is in the Ordinance No. 3 of 1849, which Ordinance explains the circumstances leading to the assumption of the title. That Ordinance embodies the Proclamation of the 21st June, 1849, publishing the 28th Clause of the Royal Instructions of the 8th March, 1848, providing for the placing of the Native Population under special control, and reserving to them their own Laws.22

The pertinent paragraph of the proclamation to which reference is made above is as

follows:

And be it enacted, that the Lieutenant Governor of this District, shall hold and enjoy over all the Chiefs and Natives in this District, all the power and authority which, according to the Laws, Customs, and Usages of the Natives, are held and enjoyed by any Supreme or paramount Native Chief, with full power to appoint and remove the subordinate Chiefs, or other authorities among them.23

By the ingenious assumption of the powers of a chief, the Lieutenant Governor was

entitled to demand labour from his subordinate chiefs for the work of the government.

This system of impressment of men for government work came to be known as

isibhalo,24 and was subsequently enshrined in legislation as the Natal Code of Native

Law.

Under the Natal Code, chiefs were appointed by the Supreme Chief and held office

during his pleasure, ‘contingent upon good behaviour and general fitness’. As ‘minor

deputies’ of the Supreme Chief

21 John Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal, (Pietermaritzburg, 1995), p. 30. 22 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, NCP, 4/1/2/21, Proceedings of the Natal Legislative Council, 17th February

1892: Reply to a question to the Secretary of Native Affairs concerning the first assumption of the title by the Lieutenant Governor.

23 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, NCP 6/1/1/1, Natal Government Gazette Extraordinary: Extract from the Proclamation issued by Lieutenant Governor Martin West, 21st June 1849.

24 C.M. Doke and B.W. Vilikazi, Zulu-English Dictionary, (Johannesburg, 1958), p. 22: isibalo: 2. forced labour system of indenture

13

… they were responsible for the good conduct of their tribes, the prompt supply of men for the purposes of defence or to suppress disorder or rebellion or as labourers for public works or for the general needs of the Colony’.25

The obligation for chiefs to ensure ‘the prompt supply of men for the purposes of

defence or to suppress disorder or rebellion’ was also pressed into use. Again following

the Zulu model, it was only a short step to provide for conscription into any African

military force which was required from time to time.

In November 1873, chief Langalibalele of the amaHlubi, was charged with refusing

to register his people’s firearms with the government. Such firearms had generally been

obtained in lieu of payment for work on the Diamond Fields. The Secretary for Native

Affairs had addressed this issue in the previous year:

It has been reported to the Lieutenant-Governor, that natives belonging to the Colony, who enter into engagements of service at the Diamond Fields, are in the habit of receiving fire-arms in lieu of money for their wages; his Excellency desires you will be so good as to take advantage of every opportunity of informing such natives and the tribes generally under your supervision, that all fire-arms, however obtained, are liable to be seized and confiscated, unless the natives obtaining them first receive the Lieutenant-Governor’s permission in writing, to possess them;26

When Langalibalele was summoned to appear at Pietermaritzburg for questioning

about the matter, his response was to move his people and cattle out of Natal over the

Drakensberg mountain range.27 An armed force was put together to prevent the

evacuation and compel Langalibalele to comply with the summons. The force consisted

of two companies of 75th Regiment (about 200 men), detachments of several colonial

mounted volunteer units, including the Natal Carbineers, an artillery unit and some

6,000 African levies. Major A.W. Durnford was appointed Chief of Staff to Lieutenant-

Colonel T. Milles, the commanding officer.28

25 Shula Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal, (Oxford, 1970), p. 42-3. For the Code itself,

see “Natal Code of Native Law”, from African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1943, a copy of which can be found in the Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository.

26 BPP, C. 1141, Inclosure 6 in No. 5: circular from T. Shepstone to Resident Magistrates, 14th February 1872. 27 This matter is treated extensively in N.A. Etherington, “Why Langalibalele Ran Away”, Journal of Natal and Zulu

History, Vol. 1, 1978. 28 Norman Herd, The Bent Pine: The Trial of Chief Langalibalele, (Johannesburg, 1976), p. 16. Cf. Machin,

Antbears, pp. 173-176.

14

The Father of the NNC

Anthony William Durnford was born in Ireland on 24th May 1830. He was the son

of Lieutenant Edward William Durnford, Royal Engineers, and followed his father into

the same corps in June 1848, thus maintaining a tradition in the family stretching back

to 1759.29 He was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in June 1848 and after some home

postings, served in Ceylon (modern Sri Lanka) from October 1851. He was promoted

Lieutenant in February 1854, and married Frances Catherine Tranchell in September of

that year. This proved to be a serious mistake which he later had cause to regret. He

twice tried to find active service, in 1855 in the Crimea and in 1864 in China, but was

denied on both occasions by illness. His domestic affairs also deteriorated: he lost an

infant son in 1856 and only four years later he suffered the loss of a daughter. These

events added to the strains on his relationship with his wife, from whom he then

separated. Divorce was, for an officer at that time, unacceptable, and he left for a four-

year posting in Gibraltar at the end of the 1860, during the last year of which he was

promoted to captain. Following his return in 1864, the next seven years saw him in both

the United Kingdom and Ireland but his restless nature demanded action. He

volunteered for service in South Africa and reached the Cape in January 1872. He found

some sort of fulfilment here and travelled around the country a great deal, being

promoted to major in July 1872.

His arrival in Pietermaritzburg in May 1873 proved to be something of a watershed

in his life because it was here that he met, and was befriended by, John William

Colenso, Anglican Bishop of Natal and his family. It was as a result of his friendship

with the Bishop that Durnford began to feel for the plight of the indigenous African

29 Details of Durnford’s early life are drawn from the first chapter in R.W.F. Drooglever, A Figure of Controversy:

Colonel Anthony Durnford in Natal and Zululand, (D. Litt. et Phil. thesis, University of South Africa, 1982), pp. 9ff. This was subsequently published as The Road to Isandlwana: Colonel Anthony Durnford in Natal and Zululand, (London, 1992).

15

people. He did not allow his sympathies to infringe upon his sense of duty as a soldier

but they were very strong for all that.

Major Durnford, as senior officer, was given the task of moving up to the top of the

Bushman’s river pass in order to cut off Langalibalele’s escape. He lost his way in bad

weather and eventually reached the top of a pass by a more difficult route, then found

himself at some distance from his objective. When he finally reached the Bushman’s

River Pass, he discovered that he was too late and many of the amaHlubi had already

slipped by. There was a confrontation with those still coming up the pass which quickly

turned ugly. Durnford had been ordered not to fire first but when fired upon his men

were in a poor position to defend themselves. In the flight which followed, four of his

men, of whom his baSotho interpreter Elijah Kambule was one, were killed and he

himself was severely wounded in the left elbow by an assegai thrust; the subsequent

retirement down the mountains was a nightmare of pain for him. His arm was crippled

for the rest of his life. Durnford’s most loyal African leader during the campaign was

the chief Hlubi with his mounted baTlokwa baSotho. (The name of this chief being the

same as that of the amaHlubi people might be cause for confusion: in fact, there is a

very distant family relationship between them.)

The skirmish at the pass brought considerable opprobrium on Durnford in colonial

Natal, most of it unwarranted, as the subsequent court of enquiry established.30 His

colonial troops had behaved very badly and it was alleged that he had lost his head but,

in truth, he had been a very courageous, if indecisive, leader.31 One of his critics was a

30 The formal records of the enquiry were destroyed ‘by statute’ but the proceedings were related in the local press:

see. For example, the Natal Witness, November-December 1874, passim. For a treatment of this enquiry, see Drooglever, A Figure of Controversy, pp. 88ff.

31 Sergeant Clarke said afterwards that he would never serve under him again unless “compelled by law” but it was Clarke who was found wanting at the enquiry. See Drooglever, op. cit., p. 65.

16

Captain A.N. Montgomery, late 7th Fusiliers, a gentleman whom we shall also meet

again.32

Durnford received his promotion to Lieutenant Colonel in December 1873 and, as

acting Colonial Engineer, spent much of the year of 1874 blocking the Drankensberg

passes to prevent any further flight. The punishment of the amaHlubi people, and their

neighbours the amaNgwe, (also known as the amaPhutini, from their old chief’s name,)

who were thought to have given aid to Langalibalele, was now elevated by Bishop

Colenso to become an issue of great importance. Durnford arrived at an arrangement

with the Lieutenant Governor that if the amaNgwe worked satisfactorily for him in

blocking the passes, they would be pardoned and their cattle and property returned to

them.33 (This use of the amaNgwe for this work is a perfect example of the principle of

isibhalo in action.) Bishop Colenso then went off to London to represent the Africans’

case.34 The result of the Bishop’s intervention was that the Lieutenant-Governor of the

day, Sir Benjamin Pine, was recalled.

In early 1875 Major General Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in South Africa to take up

his post as Colonial Administrator of Natal to replace Pine. Wolseley soon came into

conflict with the Bishop, and tried to remove Durnford from his influence. He confided

to his private journal:

I had a long conversation with Lt. Colonel Durnford R. E. who was wounded in the unfortunate business at the Bushman’s Pass ... Durnford has most injudiciously identified himself with the Colenso side here and as that arithmetical dignitary has taken up a line in opposition to the opinion of all Colonists, Durnford has become so unpopular that his usefulness as a public servant - he is colonial as well as military engineer - has been very seriously impaired. I gave him to understand this which I don’t think he relished … I wish I could get rid of him, for I look upon him rather as a firebrand here and I think that he is not only injudicious but that he is eccentric almost to a degree that might fairly be termed madness.35

32 R.W.F. Drooglever, The Road to Isandlwana, p. 73. 33 Durnford’s efforts, and partial success, are described, if in overly-sentimental terms, in Atherton Wylde, (nom de

plume of Frances E. Colenso), My Chief and I, (London, 1880). 34 BPP, C. 1121, Further Papers Relating to the Kafir Outbreak in Natal, deals exclusively with the Langalibalele

‘rebellion’ and its consequences. C. 1141, Langalibalele and the amaHlubi Tribe …, contains the whole case presented by Bishop Colenso to the British government.

35 Adrian Preston, Sir Garnet Wolseley’s South African Diaries (Natal) 1875, (Cape Town, 1971), p. 159: entry dated 3rd April 1875.

17

From that point, relations between Wolseley and Durnford assumed a downward spiral:

Had a little turn up with Durnford who is a busy body engaged in Colenso’s aims instead of sticking to his last, i.e. his public works duties. He brought some Basootoo Chiefs & men to see me without having first taken or sent them to the Secretary for Native Affairs. I told him before that his meddling in such matters whilst the feeling of the Colony was as it is now was prejudicial to his usefulness as a public servant.36

Wolseley finally decided to replace his Colonial Engineer:

I had a long and rather dreary visit from Durnford, to whom Brackenbury37 by my orders had communicated the fact that I had applied to England for the services of an efficient Colonial Engineer. I told him plainly that the way he had mixed himself up with Native affairs here had weakened his usefulness as a public servant in the Colony.38

The unkindest cut was that he was to be replaced by a junior officer, Captain A.H.

Hime, RE, a slight to Durnford by which even Wolseley himself was embarrassed.

… it is very unjust to Lt. Col. Durnford R.E. who has been for over a year or two acting as Colonial Engineer: that officer is in fact superceded [sic] by a junior of his own Corps as if he had committed some great fault or had shown great incapacity. I have had to find fault with him more than once for mixing himself up in political affairs in connection with the Native question regarding which he had no concern, but I have always found him to be a most hard working man.39

Despite his own personal feelings, Wolseley did not offer Durnford the explanation that

Hime was, in fact, a very experienced marine engineer whose services were required for

work on the Durban harbour and docks, and thus Durnford unfairly held Wolseley

personally responsible for his humiliation.40

In October 1875 Durnford was relieved as Colonial Engineer and, after some minor

duties, left Natal in May 1876, arriving in England in July. Only one month later,

Wolseley himself departed for greener pastures, to be succeeded by Sir Henry Bulwer as

Lieutenant-Governor of Natal. Durnford did not remain at home long. His injured arm

gave him considerable pain and after medical consultations it was recommended that he

seek a kinder climate than that to be found in Cork, Ireland, where he had been posted.

By March of 1877 he was back in Pietermaritzburg in command of Royal Engineers in

the colony. 36 Ibid., p. 162: entry dated 13th April 1875. 37 Major Henry Brackenbury was Wolseley’s Military Secretary. 38 Preston, Wolseley, p. 193: entry dated 3rd June 1875. 39 Ibid., p. 214: entry dated 11 July 1875. 40 Drooglever, Figure of Controversy, p. 141.

18

The Zulu threat to Natal

Lord Chelmsford believed that an African levy was an essential feature of the

defence of Natal. In a memorandum to Frere dated 10th June 1878, he referred to ‘native

levies that may be reckoned upon as available in Natal;’.41 It was to become a

continuing theme in subsequent correspondence. On the 21st June, he wrote:

My reports from Natal breathe nothing but peace, and I cannot discover that they have as yet organised, even on paper, any native contingent. Their principal idea seems to be passive defence in the event of a Zulu inroad, and they have arranged for the building of a large number of defensible laagers in different parts of the country.42

Another in July said:

Were I certain that the Zulus were going to attack or to be attacked, I would ask that the Cavalry regiment from Malta and at least one Native Infantry regiment should be sent to reinforce me. I cannot, however, make any such statement. Sir H. Bulwer on the contrary seems to lean to the opinion that the Zulus are not anxious to provoke a quarrel and appears to deprecate any military preparations.43

Lord Chelmsford arrived in Pietermaritzburg on 9th August, and lived as a guest at

the Governor’s residence. Two days later, and after lengthy discussions with Sir Henry,

he again wrote to Frere on this subject, afterwards writing ‘justice and Injustice are

words for ever on Sir Henry’s lips and the fear of not doing the first and of committing

the second has I think become with him almost a monomania …’44 In this same letter,

he begged Frere to come to Natal himself to give him support in his arguments with

Bulwer.

There was, seemingly, no rancour in the discussions, Chelmsford saying ‘Sir Henry

has been exceedingly kind and we have discussed the several points at issue in the most

friendly spirit and without any reservation.’45 Nevertheless, the debate must have been

robust and the Lieutenant Governor obdurate.

For his part, Sir Henry Bulwer was sincere in his beliefs concerning the pacific

nature of the Zulu people, if not necessarily their king. Public opinion was initially with

41 Quoted in Major The Hon. Gerald French, Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War, (London, 1939), p. 40. 42 Ibid., p. 40-41: Chelmsford to Frere, 21st June 1878 43 Ibid., p. 41: Chelmsford to Frere, dated only to July. 44 Ibid., pp. 42-43: Chelmsford to Frere, 11th August 1878 45 Ibid.

19

the Lieutenant Governor, to the point of apathy. In October 1878, a correspondent to the

Times of Natal wrote:

We object to be compelled to fight in a cause which has in no way been brought about by any action of ours. We were submitted to disgrace in the Langalibalele affair, and do not wish a repetition of that disaster upon a larger scale. It is right that those who make wars necessary should do the fighting.46

This general opposition is reflected by Worsfold, who wrote:

The existence of a large and selfish section of colonists, who preferred that the defence of the Colony should be paid for by the English Treasury, with a resultant low Customs tariff and other advantages, was responsible, in part, for the local reluctance to support Chelmsford in his defence measures.47

Opposition, however, was limited largely to the capital, Pietermaritzburg, and the

conurbation of Durban. Rural communities, especially those near the Thukela and

Mzinyathi rivers, felt rather differently because they were exposed on a river border

with Zululand more than three hundred kilometres long. The Biggarsberg community,

for example, went so far as to send a petition for their defence to the Legislative

Council.48 Sir Bartle Frere had his own view of opposition to his policy:

… everything I read and hear confirms my belief that the Natal believers in Cetywayo’s peaceful intentions are dreaming, and that those who, believing that our making preparations might lead to a collision, forbear to prepare, entirely mistake the way of inducing gentlemen like Cetywayo to keep the peace.49

The arrival of Sir Bartle Frere in Pietermaritzburg at the end of September heralded a

gradual shift in public opinion. At the end of October, the editor of the Mercury wrote:

The Zulu nation must be deprived of its power to injure all its neighbours, and the standing menace which has so long kept us on the qui vive must cease to trouble us. This end cannot, we fear, be achieved in any other way than by complete subjugation of the whole people to British rule.50

Similar sentiments were expressed only days later in the same organ, and in the

Witness.51 The religious community was not immune to the war fever which now began

to infect Natal:

46 Times of Natal, 4th October 1878: ‘Watchman’. 47 W. Basil Worsfold, Sir Bartle Frere: A Footnote to the History of the British Empire, (London, 1923), p. 100. 48 Natal Mercury, 17th August 1878. 49 Quoted in Worsfold, Sir Bartle Frere, p. 89: letter to Hick Beach, 10th September 1878. 50 Natal Mercury, 30th October 1878. 51 Natal Mercury, 4th November 1878, Natal Witness, 2nd November 1878.

20

A short experience of life on this border, has confirmed my conviction that war with the Zulus, sooner or later, was inevitable; and if this conviction be right, upon no principal of fairness can this outbreak be attributed merely to Sir Bartle Frere’s policy. Again and again, as I have talked with residents in or near Utrecht and Wakkerstroom, I have heard the same thing. “We do not venture upon this or that improvement, for a summer never passes without the threat of a Zulu invasion, and we might at any moment lose all, and each year of late the danger has appeared more imminent.”52

The Natal Native Contingent was formed as the result of a memorandum

advocating such a force, and sent to Lord Chelmsford on 17th August 1878 by

Lieutenant Colonel Durnford.53 It is uncertain who motivated the production of this

report, whether it was at the behest of Chelmsford after hearing of the latter’s

experience at Bushman’s River pass, or Durnford wrote it unbidden.

An indaba was arranged on the Natal bank of the Lower Thukela Drift for 11th

December 1878 to which representatives of the Zulu king were called. In the morning,

the award of the Boundary Commission was announced, modified substantially so as to

allow those Boers who were already in possession of land in the disputed territory to

remain, although ownership was to pass to the Zulu people. The Zulu listeners were

seemingly pleased with the announcement and the parties retired to take lunch.

The post-prandial agenda was very different. The izinduna were harangued by John

Shepstone, Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, and were presented with a series of

demands, including reparations for breaches of the border in two unrelated incidents.54

The King was chided for his broken coronation promises, although no promises had

actually ever been made.55 He was also required to accept missionaries back into his

country, and a British Resident. More serious still, however, were the stipulations

52 Rev. J.W. Alington, Uppingham School Magazine, vol. xvii, Feb. – Dec., 1879: letter of 6th May 1879, copy

provided courtesy of the Curator, South Wales Borderers and Monmouthshire Regimental Museum of the Royal Regiment of Wales, Brecon, UK.

53 The original organisation of the Contingent as submitted to Lord Chelmsford is set out in Appendix A of Edward Durnford, A Soldier’s Life and Work in South Africa, (London, 1882), p. 333ff. Edward Congreve Langley Durnford was Anthony’s younger brother, who served in the Royal Marine Artillery and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1877. He wrote the work as a panegyric to his deceased brother.

54 These were the crossing of the Mzinyathi river by Mehlokazulu kaSihayo in pursuit of two of his father’s wives who were subsequently murdered, and the harassment of two men, Smith and Deighton, who were surveying the banks of the Thukela river.

55 See, for example, Frances E. Colenso, The Zulu War, pp. 239f.

21

requiring two fundamental changes in the cultural life of the Zulu nation: the

abandonment of the ‘regimental’ system and ability of the men to marry when, and

whom, they pleased without the permission of the king.56 These two pillars of the

ruler’s power over the Zulu were an integral part of their life.

The ultimatum specified two periods of time: twenty days for some and thirty days

for others. In the event, the shorter period was extended to thirty days, and compliance

was required by 11th January 1879.

From the foregoing, it has been shown that while the use of African levies in South

Africa had a long history, those in Natal were of a different character and their use was

firmly based in the tradition of more than a generation of impressment of civilian labour

for the use of the civil administration. The militarization of such levies was also a

characteristic of the indigenous use of African men by their chiefs, as amply

demonstrated by the extended family of chiefdoms which came to be known as the

Zulu.

It has also been shown that the personal use by Colonel Durnford of African levies

in 1873 and afterwards, both in a military and civil role, would clearly mark him out as

the ideal candidate for selection as the originator of the Natal Native Contingent, and

subsequently as a senior commander of the force.

Finally, the perception of the Zulu threat, slim as it might have been, especially

with the hindsight of history, has been shown as the catalyst for an unfortunate war in

which the NNC was to play a significant, if subsidiary, part.

56 For a summary of the ultimatum see the “Memorandum on the Zulu Question”, TNA (PRO), CO 879/14 No. 164,

Colonial Office Confidential Print, 19th March 1879, pp. 23-25.

22

Chapter 2 Genesis of the NNC

This chapter deals with the formation of the Natal Native Contingent: the

appointment of its officers, the conscription of the African troops, its uniform, arming

and training. As might be expected, the creation of such a large force, in a particularly

short space of time, was difficult at best and, at worst, chaotic. Such an introduction to

the basic realities of the Contingent is essential for an understanding of what followed

during the progress of the war. As we review this process, the first impressions of the

commandants will begin to emerge.

The considerable detail included in Lieutenant Colonel Durnford’s report on the

proposed Native Contingent induced Chelmsford to make provision for such a corps in

a memorandum of 24th August to the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Henry Bulwer, in which

he set out details of his invasion forces.1 Bulwer had grave misgivings about the

conscription of the proposed Native Contingent, not the least of which concerned the

passing of command of the levies from local to imperial military hands. There were also

objections to the issuing of firearms to Africans, which were forbidden to them by law

without permission, an issue which had brought about the Langalibalele incident.

Concerns were also expressed regarding the ‘regimental’ system to be imposed on the

levies, as opposed to the more traditional ‘tribal’ organisation. Sir Henry sensed the

potential for armed rebellion if Africans were given such arms and military training. A

combination of the Zulu and Natal Africans, many of whom were themselves Zulu in

1 National Army Museum, CP 6807/386-10-5 and quoted in John Laband, Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign

1878-1879, (Stroud, 1994), p. 6ff.

23

origin, was too awful to contemplate. The debate which ensued was largely responsible

for the delay in the conscription of both officers and men of the Contingent.2

On 28th September, the Lieutenant General wrote to the Secretary of State for War

outlining the structure of the proposed contingent in some detail.3 It was to consist of

three regiments, the first of three battalions and the remaining two of two battalions

each. Each battalion was to consist of ten companies of 100 men, officered by

Europeans: a captain, two lieutenants and six non-commissioned officers. In addition,

there was provision for one African officer and ten African NCOs in each company. It is

interesting to note that the organisation of the companies bears a striking similarity to

the levies recruited during the Seventh Cape Border War of 1846-7. In a General Order

of that time, companies are described as consisting of 1 Captain, 2 Subalterns, 4

Sergeants, 4 Corporals and 100 Privates.4

The first formal announcement of the formation of the NNC was in an undated

General Order published on the 11th November 1878:

1. Captain Brunker, 26th Regiment, on special service, having returned from Griqualand West, his services are placed temporarily at the disposal of the Deputy Adjutant General, in order to his supervising – in consultation with Lieutenant Colonel Durnford, commanding Royal Engineers, who will be in command of the Native column – the arrangements connected with the raising and organisation of a Natal Native Contingent.5

It was an unusual way of promulgating both the creation of the Contingent and an

appointment, to say the least. The affront was corrected three days later:

2. The following will be substituted for Local General Order No. 195 of 1878, paragraph 1: Captain Brunker, 26th Regiment, on special service, having returned from Griqualand West, his services are placed temporarily at the disposal of the Deputy Adjutant General, in view to his carrying out, under the superintendence of Lieutenant Colonel Durnford, commanding Royal Engineers (who will be in command of a native column) the arrangements connected with the raising and organisation of the Natal Native Contingent.6

Public opinion in Natal, as expressed in the newspapers, was as opposed to the

drafting of the Contingent as was Sir Henry Bulwer himself, and he was probably

2 GH 1411, pp. 81-105; for the results of the delay, see Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, p. 153. 3 Laband, Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign, p. 12ff; BPP, C.2234, Enclosure 1 in No. 9, p. 16f. 4 The General Order, dated 6th May 1847, is quoted in full in Hulme, “Irregular Units of the 7th Kaffir War”. 5 General Order No. 195, Times of Natal, 15th November, 1878. 6 General Order No. 197, dated 15th November, 1878, Times of Natal, 18th November 1878

24

reflecting this opinion in his own statements. While the concept was seemingly

acceptable to those at the Cape, far from any potential danger, local feeling was quite

the reverse:

The Cape Argus takes a different view of the plan of raising native levies to that which is being generally entertained in this colony, and holds that the plan is proved to be of a very advantageous character. It says:–

“General Thesiger does not sympathise with the objection that is entertained in Natal to the employment of native levies. It cannot be denied that, well fed, well armed and well led, they are the most effective and inexpensive force that can be employed in warfare with hostile tribes…”7

An apparently informed opinion was given by J. Eustace Fannin in a letter to his wife:8

They seem to be slow in getting the Native Levies together; I hear there is a chance of their bringing up a lot of Fingoes. I hope they may instead of Natal Kafirs – I never believed much in employing the latter.9

Chelmsford’s response to all opposition was to proceed with his plans, while

assuming that the infrastructure of the Contingent would satisfy the Lieutenant

Governor’s objections.

14. The question of raising a native contingent has been regarded as a doubtful measure by the Colonial Government, and with apprehension by many of the Colonists. I have, therefore, kept in view two things in their organisation. 1st. By the introduction of a strong white element, to show the natives that though we called upon them to share with ourselves duties as Her Majesty’s subjects, yet, at the same time, we were ready to bear our share in the dangers they might be called upon to face. 2ndly. That the necessities for their services having ceased, they should be unable to retain, or reproduce, the organisation under which they had gained successes; this could not have been the case had the view of the Colonial Government been followed, viz., to call them out for service under their tribal organisation.10

In early November Lord Chelmsford finally reached a compromise with Sir Henry

on the structure of the NNC and confided to his masters in London his wish to acquire

good quality officers for the Contingent, and his difficulty in finding the right men:

The Lieutenant-Governor I am happy to say has acceded to the request made some little time ago for the services of 6,000 Natal natives. I hope to be in a position to equip and officer them very shortly. As the details of their organisation maybe of interest I shall have the honour of reporting them as soon as completed. I had hoped to place these battalions under gentlemen who had served in command of native levies under me on the Eastern Frontier, but I have unfortunately been disappointed in securing the services of two out of the six commanders I had counted on. I still hope, however, to officer them in such a manner as to ensure their proving very useful auxiliaries.11

7 Times of Natal, 23rd October 1878. 8 John Eustace Fannin was the Special Border Agent for the Umvoti district, based at Kranskop, near the Middle Drift

of the Thukela river. 9 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J: Fannin Letters, letter dated 12th December 1878. 10 BPP, C. 2234, No. 26: Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 2nd December 1878. 11 BPP, C. 2234, No. 16: Lord Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 3rd November 1878.

25

The Lieutenant General was quite clear about the quality of men he was seeking as

officers for his new corps, but both he and the Natal government recognised that their

numbers might be difficult to achieve.12

As one might surmise, men who had served with African levies in the late Border

War would have been first choice to command regiments or battalions of the NNC,

since some of them had been highly commended.13 Among them, W. Von Linsingen

declined the offer of a post, claiming he was ‘still suffering from a weakness in my left

leg in consequence of a fall with my horse’.14 He was but one of several officers who

had served in this capacity in the Border War, and Lord Chelmsford named them in a

note to Sir Henry Bulwer as suitable for recall.15 Also among those names were those of

Rupert Lonsdale, Friedrich Schermbrucker and Frank Streatfeild, all of whom who had

served in the Border War. The latter observed:

Why did I not go on to Zululand? For many reasons, the first being that I had been offered a satisfactory—as I thought—and permanent appointment under the Cape Government as a Magistrate in the Transkeian territory … Lord Chelmsford had been so complimentary and kind as to offer me the command of three thousand Swazis in the Zulu Campaign which was looming very near on the horizon. So I left the matter entirely in his hands and expressed myself as willing to do whatever he wished. He wrote to me most kindly from Pietermaritzburg, strongly advising me not to give up my Cape Colony appointment in order to take on another which could not possibly last long and might prove to be of only a very brief character.16

On 21st November 1878 another General Order was issued which announced the

initial appointments of E.R. Cooper, R. Lonsdale, A.N. Montgomery and W.J. Nettleton

to the new Contingent but without specific assignments.17

The regulations for the organisation of the corps, which were almost precisely as

suggested by Durnford, were announced in a Local General Order only two days later.18

12 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 1411, p. 230: draft memorandum by Sir Henry Bulwer, 9th November

1878 and GH 500, No. 3700, passim. 13 BPP, C. 2220, No. 10: Frere to Hicks Beach, 23rd July 1878. 14 National Army Museum, CP, 6807-386-18-10: Von Linsingen to Lord Chelmsford, 8th November 1878. 15 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 500, No. 3700. 16 Streatfeild, Reminiscences, pp. 167f. 17 General Order No. 203 dated 21st November, 1878, Times of Natal, 25th November 1878. Montgomery’s initials

were given incorrectly as ‘R.P.’: his forenames were Alexander Nixon. 18 General Order No. 205 dated 23rd November 1878, Times of Natal, 25th November 1878.

26

On 28th November, another General Order was published promulgating the names of the

commanding officers of the three NNC regiments, with their base of operations.

1st Regiment, Lieut. Colonel Durnford, station, between Greytown and Krans Kop. 2nd Regiment, Major Graves, 2-3rd Regiment; station, Lower Tugela, … with Colonel

Pearson’s Column. 3rd Regiment, Commandant Lonsdale, late 74th Highlanders; station, … with Colonel

Glyn’s Column.19

In the same General Order, Montgomery was appointed to the command of the 1st

Battalion, 1st Regiment.20

On 7th December, another General Order announced the specific assignments for

Commandants Lonsdale and Cooper: Lonsdale, in addition to commanding the 3rd

Regiment, was also to command the 1st Battalion. Cooper was given command of the

2nd Battalion of the same regiment.21

On the 9th December, Major H.M. Bengough was appointed to command the 2nd

Battalion of the 1st Regiment,22 while in the same Order, a special service officer,

Captain Geoffry Barton, recently arrived from England, was appointed Staff Officer to

Durnford. On the following day a General Order announced the appointment of Captain

C. E. le M. Cherry to command the 3rd Battalion.23 The complement of the 1st Regiment

was now complete.

The General Order which appointed Durnford as commander of the 2nd Column at

Kranskop, also gave him command, in addition to the 1st Regiment, of ‘2½ squadrons

Native Mounted Contingent. A rocket battery.’ This left Major Graves in command of

the 2nd Regiment and also its 1st Battalion, while Commandant Nettleton took over the

2nd Battalion.24

19 General Order No. 209 dated 28th November 1878, Times of Natal, 2nd December 1878. 20 The order again gives Montgomery’s initials as ‘R.P.’. 21 General Order No. 217 dated 7th December 1878, Times of Natal, 11th December 1878 22 General Order No. 218 dated 9th December, 1878, Times of Natal, 11th December, 1878 23 General Order No. 219 dated 10th December 1878, Times of Natal, 13th December 1878 24 These appointments were promulgated in General Order No. 228 dated 18th December, 1878, Times of Natal, 20th

December, 1878

27

The 1st Regiment was unusual because it had three battalions while the other two

regiments had only two. It was unusual in another respect: because it was the first

regiment to be formed, Durnford had the pick of the officers, many of whom were

already known to him. In seeking men to command the three battalions of his regiment,

Durnford was not entirely successful: he had tried to recruit William Douglas

Wheelwright but the Natal government refused to release him for service.25

Wheelwright was too good a man to be let go, having been appointed as the commander

of Colonial Defensive District No. VII, the area around Greytown and the Middle Drift,

when the Defensive Districts were formed on 26th November 1878.26

As to the Africans, he was not at all satisfied with those from whom his men were

to be drawn:

As the force under my orders to enter Zululand will have no support from H.M. troops, and but a small backbone of white men, it is submitted that I be permitted to have a Contingent of Natives who are somewhat known to me, and to whom I am known. In the attached list (“Line 2”) I recognise none, except Manyosi and Teteleku’s people, who, in 1873, when under my orders showed themselves arrant cowards, in the presence of imaginary danger.27

He then went on to list, by ‘Tribe, Chief and Magistracy’, the men whom he

preferred be assigned to him, including baSotho, amaNgwane and amaNgwe.28 It will

be seen shortly how successful his endeavours proved to be.

It is now time to look at the careers of the commandants themselves. Colonel

Durnford has already been dealt with, and the remaining senior officers of the 1st

Regiment are next considered in detail.

There is some slight confusion over the birth month of Alexander Nixon

Montgomery, appointed commandant of Durnford’s 1st Battalion, which can be

25 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1972 p. 67. 26 J. Laband and P. Thompson with Sheila Henderson, The Buffalo Border 1879, (Durban, 1983), p. 33. 27 Edward Durnford, A Soldier’s Life, p. 339: Durnford to Lord Chelmsford, “Confidential Report on a Proposed List

of Clans to form Line 2 under my Orders for Middle Drift.” 28 Ibid., p. 340.

28

determined as either March or May 1839.29 In any case, at the time of joining his

command in the NNC, he was 39 years of age. Montgomery was the son of Hancock

Montgomery, of Bessmont Park, County Monaghan, Ireland. He was appointed ensign

by purchase in the 7th Regiment of Foot at the age of 16 years on 1st June 1855.30

His career with the regiment was unremarkable other than his rapid first promotion:

he was made lieutenant in November 1855, still aged 16 years, and then to captain in

July 1863 aged 24, his captaincy being also by purchase.31 He was a contemporary of,

and almost certainly previously knew, Lieutenant Geoffry Barton, appointed Adjutant of

the 7th Regiment in 1869, the man now appointed as Durnford’s Staff Officer,32 about

whom more will later be said.

Montgomery married his cousin, Istere Alicia Verner of Gibraltar, in 1861, with

whom he had nine children.33 He was a Military Captain grantee, presumably of land, in

Natal in 1872. He had a farm near Mid-Illovo, not far from Pietermaritzburg, which he

named ‘Ismont’. He was a Justice of the Peace and to some extent involved himself in

local politics. He was, in short, a member of the local gentry.

We have already noted that he had been critical of Durnford’s performance at

Bushman’s River five years earlier. His was a fiery temperament and he had a restless

nature, always anxious to be doing something. It was impatience which was to drive

him from the NNC, but there may have been other, less well-known motives. He might

also be described, using the modern vernacular, as ‘pushy’. Not a man to hide his light

under a bushel, he had formally applied to the Natal government for a post as a

magistrate in 1875.34 A year later he stood as a candidate for the Legislative Assembly

29 His age as shown in his Record of Service in TNA (PRO), WO 31/1084, and that in his Death Notice, in MSCE

40/166, give different results when his birth date is calculated from these two events. 30 TNA (PRO), WO 31/1084: Record of commission dated 9th June 1855. 31 H.G. Hart, The New Annual Army List and Militia List 1870, (London, 1871): 7th Regiment. 32 General Order No. 218 dated 9th December 1878, Times of Natal, 11th December 1878 33 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, MSCE 40/166: death notice and will. 34 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 524 No. 2393.

29

and, remaining unelected, then wrote complaining about the ‘present voting system’.35

Shortly thereafter, he again put himself forward for a position as a magistrate.36 He was

finally appointed Administrator of Native Law, Upper Umkomanzi Division in 1878.37

He also came to attention at that time as the result of an attempted suicide at

Ismont. One of his young house guests, Robert Huskisson Marr, found himself in

impecunious circumstances and, beset by creditors,38 attempted to take his life by

cutting his throat.39 Another young man named Robert D’Ombrain, also a house guest,

was a witness in the subsequent magisterial enquiry. Marr was not prosecuted for his

offence and managed to outlive his host,40 while D’Ombrain will re-appear later in

Montgomery’s war.

Major Harcourt Mortimer Bengough, appointed to command of the 2nd Battalion,

was born 25th November 1837. He was added to the Commander-in-Chief’s list of

potential officers in February 1853, aged barely 16.41 He was commissioned second-

lieutenant by purchase in the 77th Regiment on 22nd March 1855 and lieutenant on 3rd

October of the same year, achieving his captaincy by purchase on 30th December 1864.

He was granted a brevet majority on 1st October 1877 which was made substantive on

2nd February 1878.42

Bengough had served in the Crimea towards the end of that war, and had also seen

service in Australia and India. He had a facility with languages which proved useful

when he produced a booklet on the Zulu language on his way out from England. The

booklet was printed and offered for sale in the Colony, with a useful mention in General

35 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 560, No. 2120 and CSO 564 No. 2571. 36 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 574, No. 3596. 37 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/1/30, No. 340. 38 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, RSC 1/5/91:Thomas Meikle v Robert Hankison [sic] Marr, 1878. 39 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, AGO 1/4/21, pp. 93-114. 40 He was a beneficiary in Montgomery’s will; see MSCE 40/166: death notice and will. 41 TNA (PRO), WO 31/1076. 42 H.G. Hart, The New Annual Army List and Militia List 1879, (London, 1878): 77th Regiment.

30

Major H.M. Bengough

Commandant R. La T. Lonsdale.

Commandant G. Hamilton-Browne

Commandant A.N. Montgomery

Four of the Commandants

31

Orders and in the local press,43 but it was not officially required. Its production showed

a thoughtful side to his nature.

Commanding the 3rd Battalion was Charles E. le Mesurier Cherry,44 who was born

near Reading on 21st July 1839. He began his service with the Army, as ensign without

purchase, with the 32nd Regiment on 23rd March 1858. His military career proceeded

without incident: he purchased his lieutenancy on 25th September 1869, and was

appointed adjutant on 16th January 1866. He again purchased his next step to captain, on

16th October 1866.45 He seems never to have married.46

He saw service in Gibraltar, from January 1867 to May of the same year, when he

went to Mauritius, serving there until April 1868. He was first stationed in South Africa

South Africa from November 1868 to October 1871.47 It was this service which

probably attracted him to go out again to Natal when special service officers were

required in 1878; he was then 39 years old. Special Border Agent Fannin spent a great

deal of time with him during the war and in one of the almost daily letters to his wife

Ethie, he had this to say:

I have not told you much about Capt. Cherry. I like him exceedingly – a thorough soldier and gentleman. We get on splendidly – he what you call “jumps” with me always, does anything I recommend.48

A month later, he added:

The more I see of Capt. C., the more I like him, a perfect Gentleman, a thorough Soldier, has seen a lot of the world – he is not very clever but is capital company.49

Cherry was thus a genial individual and a reasonable soldier, if not particularly

intelligent; as we shall see, the fact that his health was also failing did not help in the

leadership of his battalion. 43 General Order No. 4 dated 6th January, 1879, Times of Natal, 8th January, 1879. See also Bengough, Memories, p.

104. 44 Although ‘le Moyne’ is often given as his forename, (see Thompson, Native Contingent, p. 23) his Statement of

Service actually records it as ‘le Mesurier’. 45 TNA (PRO), WO 76/481: Record of Service. 46 A second undated Record of Services in TNA (PRO) WO 76/41 identifies him as single. 47 Ibid. 48 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J, Fannin Letters, dated 3rd March 1879. 49 Ibid., letter dated 9th April 1879.

32

Biographical information about the commandant of the 2nd Regiment NNC is

limited to that which can be gleaned from Hart’s Annual Army Lists.50 Major Shapland

Graves was born on 5th December 1833. His military career began as ensign in the 3rd

(East Kent) Regiment (the ‘Buffs’) in February 1856. He was promoted to lieutenant in

July 1859, captain in May 1866 and achieved his majority in October 1876. At the

commencement of the Zulu War, Graves was already 45 years old.

In early 1878, he was still a serving officer with the ‘Buffs’ and was in Natal

serving as Protector of Immigrants in Durban. In March of that year, his leave of

absence from his regiment was almost at an end when Sir Henry Bulwer wrote to Lord

Chelmsford stating ‘as there will be difficulty in supplying his place immediately, I am

induced to request Your Excellency to consider whether his services can be permitted to

continue at the disposal of this Government …’.51

According to the Natal Mercury, Graves was not the first choice for command of

the 2nd Regiment, Von Linsingen being originally wanted for the position:

The second regiment will be under Major Graves, 3rd buffs, Commandant of the Coast district. Commandant Von Linsingen, from the Cape Frontier, was to have charge of the European cadre but unfortunately he cannot come.52

The commandant of the 2nd Battalion was William John Nettleton.53 The eldest of

six children, he was born in Bradford, England in about 1833.54 His wife was Mary Ann

Duffy of Grahamstown, and they married there. There were seven children from the

marriage, John Charles, Caroline Elizabeth, Fanny, Clement Ridgeway, George

Augustus, William and Hamilton Hope. He was appointed to the rank of captain in the

Queenstown Volunteers in 1870.55 Unlike most of the other commandants, Nettleton

50 Hart’s New Annual Army List 1879: 3rd Regiment. 51 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 1326, No. 63: Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Chelmsford, 18th March, 1878. 52 Natal Mercury, 27th November 1878. Linsingen was one of those commended in Frere’s memorandum cited

earlier. 53 His father’s death notice gives the spelling of the family name as “Nettelton”. We have already noticed the variety

of spellings of names during this period. 54 His father’s death notice also states that he was 35 in May 1867, but his own states he was 63 in January 1897. 55 Graham’s Town Journal, 21st September 1870.

33

had had no formal army service but had apparently served with some distinction in

command of African levies during the Ninth Border War.

Rupert la Trobe Lonsdale was appointed to the command of the 3rd Regiment, and

its 1st Battalion. He was born in Melbourne, Australia on 23rd August 1849,56 and in late

1878 was thus the youngest of the commandants, being not yet thirty years of age. He

was a former lieutenant in the 74th (‘Highland’) Regiment having been commissioned

ensign in September 1868 and lieutenant in November 1871.57 He had disposed of his

commission by sale, according to the Army List of June 1874.58 Lonsdale had been the

leader of Mfengu levies in the late Cape Border war and a special magistrate in the

Keiskamma Hoek district.59

In common with other commandants, there is some confusion about the name and

original regiment of the commandant of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment. He was named

as ‘A.W. Cooper’ and wrongly assigned to the 95th Regiment by Norris-Newman, and

in this he has been followed by Thompson.60 He is cited in General Orders, however, as

‘E.R. Cooper, late 96th Regt.’.61 For once, General Orders gave the correct details.

Edward Russell Cooper was appointed ensign by purchase in the 35th Regiment on 23rd

March 1866 as a ‘gentleman cadet, from Royal Military College’ 62 and transferred as

ensign to the 96th Regiment on 24th November 1869. He was promoted to lieutenant on

1st November 1871.63 He subsequently resigned, selling his commission in December

56 TNA (PRO) WO 42/70(I): his certificate of baptism shows a birth date of 28th August, with a note that it ‘should be

23’. Lonsdale’s unusual forename has been a source of error to compilers and writers for many years. J.P. Mackinnon and S.H. Shadbolt, The South African Campaign of 1879, (London, 1880), p. 388, gives his initials as ‘R. de La T.’. Donald Morris, Washing of the Spears, p. 264, calls him ‘Rupert de la Tour’, an error duplicated by John Laband in Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign, p. 278.

57 H.G. Hart New Army List, (London, 1872): 74th Regiment. 58 See also Charles L. Norris-Newman, In Zululand with the British Throughout the War of 1879, (London, 1880), p.

21. 59 BPP, C. 2220, No. 10. 60 Norris-Newman, In Zululand, p. 21.Thompson, Natal Native Contingent, p. 33. 61 General Order No. 203 dated 21st November, 1878, Times of Natal, 25th November 1878. 62 War Office, Army List, April 1866. 63 H.G. Hart New Army List, 1872: 96th Regiment.

34

1874,64 and migrated to South Africa, where he lived in Grahamstown. Norris-Newman

identified Cooper as having served in the Ninth Border War and it was here that he

came to the notice of Lord Chelmsford.65

The majority of the remaining appointments of the junior European officers for the

three regiments were promulgated in a series of General Orders issued from the 28th

November to 3rd December.66

The uniform of the new African infantry was originally to be quite elaborate,67 but

when recruitment took place the only ‘uniform’ consisted of a red rag tied around the

forehead, and this merely served to distinguish them from both the unconscripted Natal

African and their Zulu opponents. The scale of equipment to be issued was given in a

General Order:

Each native officer and non-commissioned officer will receive:– 1 rifle and belt; 1 scarlet puggaree68 and muzzle-loading rifles with belt, bullet pouches, and cap pocket will be issued to the proportion of ten per company for the best marksmen.

A blanket will be issued to every native officer, non-commissioned officer and private:– blue for 1st battalion, grey for second battalion, green for third battalion.69

Henry Harford, Staff Officer to the 3rd Regiment, described their uniform and arms:

All natives on the strength were served out with a blanket, and a red cloth headband as a distinguishing mark. A hundred in each battalion were armed with rifles and the remainder with billhooks, but undoubtedly they put much more faith in their own assegais and shields.70

Thus only one man in ten was armed, and generally with muzzle-loading rifles at

that. Commandant Hamilton-Browne also says that some modern Martini-Henry rifles

64 War Office, Army List, December 1874, p. 893. 65 Norris-Newman, loc. cit. 66 General Orders No. 209 dated 28th November, 1878, Times of Natal, 2nd December, 1878, No. 212 dated 2nd

December, 1878, Times of Natal, 4th December, 1878 and No. 213 dated 3rd December, 1878, Times of Natal, 6th December, 1878.

67 Durnford’s original memorandum (August 17, 1878) is in National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-26-20. See also Edward Durnford, A Soldier’s Life, pp. 333 - 339.

68 Puggaree: an Indian turban; a thin scarf of light material normally wrapped around a hat. 69 General Order No. 204 dated 22nd November, 1878, National Army Museum, 6807/386-26-13. 70 Colonel Henry Harford, The Zulu War Journal of Col. Henry Harford, Daphne Child (ed.), (Pietermaritzburg,

1978), p. 12. Harford was incorrect about the billhooks;50 of them formed a part of the camp equipment: see General Order No. 205, dated 23rd November 1878, Times of Natal, 17th November 1878.

35

were issued, suggesting that his own men were in greater danger from the weapons than

the enemy.71

African officers, of whom there was to be one in each of the ten companies of each

battalion, were to be paid £3 per month, non-commissioned officers 25 shillings per

month and privates 20 shillings a month.72 (The reader may compare this latter with the

isibhalo payment of fifteen shillings a month mentioned in the first chapter.)

On the other hand, the mounted Africans fared rather better. They wore smart

corduroy trousers, half-boots, a good-quality jacket and a hat with a red puggaree. They

were required to provide their own horse, saddle and bridle. Their officers were paid at

the rate of £4-10 shillings a month, non-commissioned officers £3 a month and the

troopers 30 shillings a month.73

The British infantry, by contrast, were fully clothed at government expense and

were paid at the general rate of one shilling and one penny a day. This might be

supplemented by additional emoluments such as good conduct pay and special

allowances. From his pay, however, substantial stoppages were deducted for such items

as food, replacement of clothing and equipment, washing, hair cutting, and barracks

damages.74 Such deductions brought their actual pay to something closer to that of the

African infantry.

On the 9th December 1878, a pamphlet of instructions regarding the treatment of

African troops was issued, and also published in the newspapers of the day.75 It

suggested that the African soldier was to be regarded as ‘an intelligent, precocious boy,

with the physical strength of a man’ but then goes on to state ‘When drilling Zulus

71 Colonel G. Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, pp. 103. 72 General Order No. 184 dated 1st November, 1878, Times of Natal, 4th November, 1878. 73 Ibid. 74 Alan Ramsay Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home: The Recruitment and Terms and Conditions of the British

Regular, 1859 – 1899, (London, 1977), pp. 182-184. 75 Natal Mercury, 10th December 1878. See also Times of Natal, 9th December 1878.

36

avoid all nagging – many of them are often stupid and inattentive, and much practice is

required to teach them.’76

Agreement having been reached as to the organisation and composition of the NNC

regiments, it fell to the Natal government to initiate the process of assembling the men.

The Resident Magistrates were required to call out the men from the various chiefdoms

in their districts. To be certain of the coastal people, in early November John Shepstone,

Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, made a tour of the various chiefs which is

described in his report.77 He took a hard line with those who were reluctant to meet their

obligations:

Umqawe first spoke and said that I had told him that he might be called upon for “five hundred men; he did not see how he could do so.” He might, he said, find ten or even twenty – a young Chief named Delewayo followed in the same strain. I then considered it necessary to speak sharply and very decidedly to them and explained to them the position under the Gov’t that they were not independent Chiefs from whom the Gov’t was begging support or assistance, that they were to understand that I was there to give them the word of the Supreme Chief, and that they well knew what that meant.78

This statement is particularly revealing in that it makes clear the attitudes towards

the isibhalo system by both parties: Mqawe tried to negotiate a lower number of

impressments, commencing at his lowest offer, while Shepstone insisted that the chief

understand the relationship in which he, Mqawe, stood with the Lieutenant Governor as

Supreme Chief and that he therefore had no alternative but to comply fully. It thus

appears that by this time, military service had been accepted as a part of the duty of

isibhalo.

Durnford had a good start with his 1st Regiment. He had enjoyed a close

relationship with the amaHlubi and amaNgwane people since earlier in the decade, the

latter providing a group of men who were used as labourers in the blocking of the

Drakensberg passes,79 and Lord Chelmsford had acceded to his request for men he

76 The full text of the document is given in Appendix I. 77 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA I/1/32, No. 118. 78 Ibid. 79 Described, if in adulatory terms, in Atherton Wylde, My Chief and I, passim.

37

knew. A return by Durnford dated 6th December shows that the amaNgwane, amaNgwe

(amaPhutini) and amaHlubi were to contribute most of the men for the 1st Battalion.

(The Roman numerals in the second column indicate the battalion in which the men

were to serve.)80

Chief or Tribe No. Sikali Amangwane I 300 Amangwe I 300 Amahlubi I 200 Homoi AmaBomvu] II 50081

Mycangca [amaKabela] I 100 Nondonise [amaThuli] II 100 Sobuza [amaBomvu] III 600 Bulungeni [abaThembu] II 200 Umzwandedwa [amaChele] II 100 Somolo II 100 Sobuza [amaBomvu] III 200 Abambo I 100 Horsemen Sikali 2nd Squadron 100 Hlubi 1st Squadron 50 Edendale 1st Squadron 50 Umqundane (Jantje) Head Q’s Troop 50 Total 3050

Durnford himself included some of this information in one of his frequent letters to

his mother:

My men are drawn partly from clans well known to me. The Putini clan sent 300, Sikali’s clan 300 foot and 150 horse, Langalibalele’s old clan 100 foot, all fine fighting men, as indeed I believe are all the others; but I know the first lot well, and what they can do. My horse are my old friends the Basutos, under their chief Hlubi (you have photos of some), he sends fifty; Sikali 150; Christians from Edendale send fifty, led by a brother of Langalibalele (John Zulu), Jantje (an old friend), fifty, all full of ardour.82

We should particularly note the presence once again of the baSotho chief Hlubi

with his mounted baTlokwa. He was once more demonstrating his loyalty to both

Durnford personally and the British cause and would eventually be rewarded

handsomely for his fidelity.

80 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1925, No. 4370. Cf. General Order No. 228 dated 18th December,

1878, Times of Natal, 20th December, 1878. The author has added omitted names to the second column based on corresponding data in Schedule 3A to Appendix G, Report of the Native Commission 1882, pp. 41-45.

81 See Bengough, Memories, p. 109. 82 Edward Durnford, A Soldier’s Life, pp. 206-207: Letter of 5th January 1879.

38

Zikhali himself had died shortly before Christmas 1863,83 his son Ncwadi taking

over the chieftainship. Ncwadi, however, particularly excelled himself: as well as the

full complement of foot men, he also provided an additional fifty mounted men to make

up three of the six troops of the Mounted Contingent which were also with Durnford,

and they were thus given the appellation ‘Zikhali’s Horse’.84 Zikhali himself had led a

somewhat peripatetic life, his amaNgwane people having been driven out of Zululand in

Shaka’s day, and settling near modern Dundee.85 He, and thus his son, had every

reason, therefore, to wish to pursue the Zulu king and his army.

When Montgomery was appointed to the command of the 1st Battalion, he also had

requested that one hundred men well known to him be exchanged for some of those

already gazetted.86 This request was granted and accordingly the Secretary for Native

Affairs issued the appropriate instructions:

I see no objection and would suggest that the name of Ntshibongo be struck off the Middle Line List, and the 100 from the Abambo tribe take the place of same number to be supplied by Ntshibongo.87

Thus it was that one hundred of the abaMbo appeared as part of the 1st Battalion.

The abaMbo was in fact a very large group which included the eLangeni, uNdwandwe,

amaDlamini and amaHlubi people. The abaMbo experience was much like that of many

other people in the early part of the nineteenth century. Sambela was a brother to

Zihlandlo, paramount chief of the abaMbo people. They had prospered during the reign

of Shaka, sufficient to generate great jealousy in his brother Dingane. Having been king

for two years, Dingane could contain himself no longer and fell on them, killing

Sambela but allowing Zihlondlo to escape, only to fall to Dingane some years later.

Thus Siyingele kaZihlondlo became chief of the abaMbo, having escaped to establish 83 N.J. Van Warmelo, (ed.), History of Matiwane and the Amangwane Tribe, as told by Msebenzi to his kinsman

Albert Hlongwane. (Pretoria, 1938), p. 171, note. 84 The mounted force was initially called the ‘Native Mounted Contingent’, and did not receive the name ‘Natal

Native Horse’ until the re-organisation later in 1879. 85 JSA, vol. 2, pp. 17f.: Mabonsa kaSidhlayi. 86 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 668, No. 4334/1878. 87 Ibid.

39

his people near the Mgeni river, and at Mkomanzi.88 It was at the latter place that

Montgomery came to know them.

For the 2nd Battalion, Durnford’s list includes the largest group of 500 from the

amaBomvu under Homoyi kaZombane, and others from the amaThuli, and

abaThembu.89 The 3rd Battalion was supposed to draw its entire 1000 men from the

amaBomvu of Sobuza kaMyoli, who, from the table above, was to provide them from

two locations. This is probably because he had a substantial population which was split

between two magisterial districts, Umgeni and Umvoti, a not uncommon distribution.90

Sobuza was unable to supply the men for the 3rd Battalion and it was always under

strength, never exceeding 300 men at any time.91 As late as 20th March 1879, its

strength was only 186 men.92

The amaBomvu support for Dingane (Sobuza’s father was killed in the battle of

Blood river in December 1838,93) caused them to be driven from Zululand by

Mpande,94 after which they settled in the Umvoti and New Hanover divisions of

Natal.95 They were also distantly related to the amaNgwane.96

The arrangements of the Resident Magistrates were subsequently translated into

published instructions from the military command, in the form of General Orders

requiring the men to assemble.97

5. The Natives belonging to the 2nd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent, selected as follows, will assemble at the Nonoti River, between the Road and the Sea, on the 21st instant, by order of His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor of Natal, and will be organised into Companies and Battalions by Major Graves, Commandant, as laid down in Local General Order 205 of 1878.

88 JSA, iii., pp 1-20, passim; Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, ( London, 1929), pp. 414f. 89 Bengough referred to Homoi as “a fine old Zulu warrior, seventy years old …” Bengough, Memories, p. 109. 90 Schedule 3A to Appendix G, Report of the Native Commission 1882, pp. 42 and 44. 91 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 1424, No. 453. 92 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/14. 93 JSA, v. 351. 94 JSA, i, 94, v, 346. 95 JSA, v. 355, n. 4. 96 JSA, v. 352. 97 General Order No. 228 dated 18th December, 1878, Times of Natal, 20th December, 1878.

40

Name of Chief Where Located No. of Men Umqawe Inanda 500 Deliwayo “ 200 Dikwayo “ 100 Macebo “ 200 Musi “ 500 Sotondose Private Lands 400 Zipuku Noodsberg 100 Total 2,000

The above list reveals that the men came from a number of different chiefdoms:

Nxumalo (Sotondose kaMayusi or Malusi), amaNyuswa (Deliwayo kaDubuyana,

Dikwayo kaMkalelwa and Zipuku), amaTshangase (Macebo), amaQadi (Mqawe

kaDabeka) and amaQwabe (Musi kaGodolozi).98 The more prominent of these men are

discussed below.

The Nxumalo was a segment of the Ndwandwe people who fled the wrath of

Mbhopa to Natal in 1846.99 They established themselves in the Lower Thukela, Msinga

and Newcastle divisions at that time.100 In 1879 their chief, Sothondose, was already a

fairly old man; he died in 1895.

The amaNyuswa chiefdom was, together with the amaQadi and amaTshangase,

derived from the very large Ngcobo people.101 Deliwayo’s father Dubuyana was also

turned out of Zululand by Dingane, then entering Natal.102 Deliwayo and Dikwayo’s

grandfathers (Mavela and Sihayo) were brothers, so they were fairly closely related.103

The amaQadi were an off-shoot of the Nyuswa and thus the Ngcobo people.104

Mqawe was born about the same time as Cetshwayo and became chief in 1839,105 and

was still alive in 1903.106 His family came from the left hand house of Dubuyana,

98 Schedule 3A to Appendix G, Report of the Native Commission 1882, pp. 41-45. 99 Bryant, Olden Times, pp. 215f, JSA, v, p. 68. 100 JSA v, p. 108, n. 268 101 JSA, iii. 41f. 102 Bryant, Olden Times, p. 481f., JSA, iv, p. 49. 103 JSA, iv, p. 50. 104 Bryant, Olden Times, p. 49, JSA, ii, p. 52. 105 JSA, ii, 62, n. 1. 106 JSA, ii, 47.

41

Deliwayo’s father,107 although this is not reflected in Bryant’s genealogy,108 and he was

thus distantly related to both Deliwayo and Dikwayo.109 When the Ngcobo were driven

into Natal by Dingane, he also killed Dube, Mqawe’s grandfather.110 Mqawe

subsequently allowed many of his people to become Christians and encouraged children

to attend the missionary school, although it seems that he did not adopt Christianity

himself ‘because it was said that becoming a Christian made people throw away their

wives’.111

Musi of the amaQwabe was born c. 1820.112 His father is uncertain, being given as

both Phakathwayo and his brother Godolozi.113 His people fled across the Thukela river

into Natal in 1839 with Mpande in what was called the ‘breaking of the rope’114 settling

in the Mvoti district of Natal.

The conscription for the 3rd Regiment occurred concurrently with that of the 2nd.115

4. The Natives belonging to the 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent, are selected as follows, will assemble at Sand Spruit116 on the 18th inst., by order of His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor of Natal, and will be organized into Companies and Battalions, by Commandant Lonsdale, as laid down in Local General Order 205, of 1878:–

Name of Chief Where Located No. of men Umkungo Weenen County near Weenen 300 Pakade Mooi River 600 Umganu Sunday’s River and Tugela 600 Udomba Weenen 500

2000

107 JSA, iii, p. 32 108 Bryant, Olden Times, genealogy chart facing p. 482. 109 See also JSA, iii, p. 32. 110 JSA, iv, p. 66. see also Bryant, Olden Times, p. 494 and Magema M. Fuze, The Black People and Whence They

Came, tr. H.C. Lugg, ed. A.T. Cope, (Durban, 1979), p. 84. 111 Norman Etherington, Preachers Peasants and Politics in Southeast Africa, 1835 – 1880, (London, 1978), p, 69. 112 JSA iii, p. 238: Mmemi kaNguluzane. 113 JSA iii, pp. 238, 242, 276, n. 3. See also Bryant, Olden Times, p. 200. 114 Bryant, loc. cit. 115 General Order No. 227 dated 17th December, 1878, Times of Natal, 20th December, 1878. See also

Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 666 No. 4566 and CSO 670 No. 4536. 116 Modern Pomeroy.

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The 3rd Regiment was less of a mixed bag than the 2nd. In its 1st Battalion, seven of the

ten companies consisted of Ndomba’s amaBhele from the Weenen district:117

We Beles are blood relations of the Basuto. Our place of origin is eLenge (Job’s Kop), Natal. It was there that our ancestor Mahlapahlapa lived. … His chief son was Qunta, whose chief son was Mabandhla, and his chief son of the Left-hand house was Ndomba. … Ndomba lived in Estcourt (?) Division …118

Sikotha kaMpande

Unlike most of the other African people to be

conscripted, the amaBhele were not Zulu stock,

having lived in Natal for generations and had thus

been on the periphery of Shaka’s sphere of influence.

The other three companies of the battalion were

amaZulu under Cetshwayo’s half brothers Mkhungo

kaMpande and Sikhotha kaMpande, both of whom

had become alienated from Cetshwayo and migrated

to Natal:

The Kumalo, under Mtezuka, were attacked and killed by Cetshwayo just after Ndondakusuka, on the ground that they were the people who had taken Mkungo (as a boy) across the Tugela into Natal, Mkungo being the brother of Mbuyazi. This section lives in Natal.119

Sikhotha was a younger brother to Mkhungo and also lived in the Weenen district:

Sikota kaMpande … bought land at the Bushman’s river (Emtshezi), and asked for money from my father, Nodhlela ka Siguda … It was at Weenen (KwaNobamba), down the Bushman’s river.120

These men were known as iziGqoza or ‘rebels’, the name given to those of Mbuyazi’s

faction at the battle of Ndondakusuka in December 1856.121

Cooper’s 2nd Battalion was made up of seven companies of Phakade’s amaChunu

and three companies of abaThembu.122 Phakade kaMacingwane also crossed into Natal 117 F.W.D. Jackson, Isandlwana 1879: The Sources Re-Examined, Appendix C, p. 60. 118 JSA, vol. 2, p. 202: Mangati kaGodide. 119 JSA vol. 4, p. 284: Ndukwana kaMbengwana. Note 106, p. 388, says: “Mkhungo had been chief of the Zulu in the

Inanda and Weenen divisions in the later nineteenth century.” 120 Ibid., p. 381. 121 The battle was the culmination of the struggle between Cetshwayo and his brother Mbuyazi over the succession to

the Zulu throne, in which Mbuyazi was killed and Cetshwayo emerged victorious. See JSA vol. 2, p. 243: Maxibana kaZeni. Mbuyazi’s name is sometimes rendered as ‘Mbulazi’.

43

from Zululand in 1839 at the ‘breaking of the rope’ and established himself in the Klip

river area.123 Born about 1788, he was too old to take part in the NNC adventure

personally and was represented by his son Gabangaye. Also present was a younger son,

Mbonjana.124 The abaThembu were led by Mganu kaNodada, whose father had also

crossed into Natal about the same time as Mpande. They had originally settled in the

Bushman’s river area but had been dispossessed by the Boers and had moved to the

Klip river district, settling near Ladysmith.125

Thus it can be seen that with one single exception, the amaBhele, all of these men,

or their families, were refugees from the anger of the Zulu kings and had left Zululand

to settle in various parts of Natal, which at that time was almost denuded of its own

inhabitants as a result of the mfecane.

Despite what seems to have been reasonable, if late, planning for the assembly of

the men, inevitably there were delays. The principal cause of these was the difficulty in

ensuring that the drafts from the various chiefs were met in full. Many were late arriving

at the assembly points and, indeed, some never fulfilled their obligations at all. The 1st

Regiment was quite typical of the tardy nature of the men to report:

We arrived at Greytown on Friday about midday, and expected to stay there for a week, but were ordered away again at 5 o’clock on Tuesday morning. Five hundred of our kafirs arrived on Saturday. They are a good lot of men, and will soon pick up the drill. The other 500 are to join us here. The 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment are here with us, and have about 500 kafirs with them; so that between the two, we form a very large camp.126

An example of how such delays occurred in the 2nd Regiment is provided by the

following report to the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs:

Next came the Notice to these Headmen to hold their men in readiness for an early Muster. Every man who could, or at least a great many, got out of the way on this order being

122 From a re-construction in F.W.D. Jackson, Hill of the Sphinx: Appendix III, p. 63. 123 JSA, ii, p. 85, i, p. 200. 124 Ibid., and ii, p. 86. 125 Bryant, Olden Times, pp. 258f. 126 Natal Mercury, 6th January 1879: Report by an officer dated 2nd January.

44

communicated. There came the order for the Natives to assemble at Nonoti at a day or two’s notice. As a matter of fact it took nearly three weeks to get the number together.127

The 3rd Regiment must have endured similar problems: there is a substantial

correspondence regarding the number of men provided, and still to come, for

Commandant Lonsdale. The following is typical:

I and 3rd Reg’t are very anxious to reach Rorke’s Drift as soon as possible but this want of men detains us, cannot somebody the hurried? The Battalion Interpreters are very much wanted. Wish you a Merry Xmas.128

The letter also perhaps reveals some of Lonsdale’s vanity, or at least his susceptibility to

flattery: in a postscript, he notes: ‘H. E. Lord Chelmsford did me the honour to ask for

my photo. Please give him one of the enclosed & accept the other.’

Another example of the problems which occurred is provided by the series of

memoranda between Lonsdale, Colonel Mitchell and the Resident Magistrate for Klip

River, based at Ladysmith, Mr. W.J.M Moodie. The first is a letter to the Deputy

Adjutant General, Colonel William Bellairs on 25th December:

1. I arrived here on the 18th, having been very much delayed by the Major. 2. 1450 natives arrived the same day & I understand others are coming on. 3. I have organised all natives now present into companies. 4. There has been some misunderstanding in reference to the complement of men from Mr Mooney’s [sic = Moodie’s] district. None have yet turned up. 5. I shall be ready to move 4 days after the full number is made up.129

The response was written by Resident Magistrate Moodie to the Colonial Secretary on

28th December.

I have written two Minutes on this subject, dated yesterday, and sent them to the Secretary for Native Affairs. In his absence yesterday morning, you were good enough to write to Mr Patterson. I hope that his answer will show us what has been done in respect of the 500 or 600 men who had not arrived at Sand Spruit at the date of Captain Lonsdale’s letter which appears to have been on about the 23rd instant.130

The last was written by the Colonial Secretary to the Assistant Military Secretary to

Lord Chelmsford, Lieutenant Colonel J.N. Crealock:

127 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA I/1/33 No. 65: report by Resident Magistrate, Lower Tugela Division,

10th February 1879. 128 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 674, No. 4945: Lonsdale to Colonial Secretary, 23rd December 1878. 129 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 675, No. 4945. 130 Ibid.

45

The Sec. N. Affairs reports that no men were ordered out for Rorke’s Drift contingent from Mr Moodie’s Magistracy (Ladismith). All men directed to be sent by the Weenen Magistracy (Mr Paterson), & it is believed men were so sent.131

Further, the numbers bandied about were wildly confusing, even to Bulwer

himself.

For the Helpmakaar Column a contingent of 2000 natives was ordered out. By the last official Statement seen by me, which I think was dated the 10th Instant, the number of natives received by the military authorities was something over 1800. I believe 1815 was the exact number named: I have not the paper. We know, however, that R.M.s Paterson and Moodie were sending down more men; and I have since heard that the number of men received has been over 2300 – making 300, and more, in excess of the number promised. But I have no official statement of this.132

The same file contains returns from the 2nd and 3rd Regiments giving the following

statistics:

2nd Regiment at 6th January: 1st Battalion, 946 men, 2nd Battalion, 853 men.

3rd Regiment at 12th January, a total of 1933 men for both battalions.

On the 16th January, five days after the 3rd Column had crossed the Mzinyathi at

Rorke’s Drift, ‘Colonial Secretary states that Commandant Lonsdale reports that his

Regiment still requires 300 men to make up its complement & directs RM [Resident

Magistrate] to report what steps he has taken to produce more men.’133 Astonishingly,

however, only two days earlier, Lieutenant Henry Harford, Staff Officer to Lonsdale,

had sent the following note to the Resident Magistrate at Ladysmith:

In case Com’t Lonsdale has forgotten to send a line about the Natives, could you kindly prevent any more joining. They are dropping in, in half-dozens, & we are now some 300 & so over our strength. If you would kindly see to this I should be obliged.

I know Lonsdale said he was going to send a line but now it may have slipped his memory & I am his S.O. for the present I just send a line.134

It should be noted that the assemblies were ordered for the 18th and 21st December.

Since the ultimatum was to expire on the 10th January, it will readily be seen that very

little time remained for training the men before they were due to advance into Zululand.

Indeed, some people had very odd ideas about the extent of training which would be 131 Ibid. 132 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/11 No. 369: Bulwer to Sir Bartle Frere, 10th January 1879. 133 Ibid. 134 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1925, No. 494: Staff Officer, 3rd Regiment to Mr Moodie, Ladysmith,

14th January 1879.

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required: ‘Drill – there is none, each man knows to which section he belongs and falls in

with it. There is no line properly so called. A native regiment when formed stands in a

form of a crescent.’135

The military had rather more serious notions about training and when, or perhaps

as, the men appeared they were put through their paces at both drill and, for those with

firearms, musketry practice.

The Native Contingent is at present in a very peculiar state, viz., that of having more officers than men. Only about 250 Kafirs have arrived. They are, however, rapidly being organised … Commandant Montgomery, 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, held his first parade of the officers under his command yesterday morning a 10.30, and orderly officers for the day duly appointed … As soon as the non-commissioned officers are drafted off into each regiment, the whole will be drilled in battalions.136

The little drill that we taught them was some simple column movements, and to march past, which they very quickly picked up; to present arms, and to move to a flank by “Fives right,” which they understood more readily than by “Fours.”

The words of command were given in English.137

A report from Kranskop suggested that drill did not come naturally to the African

soldier:

Tried to drill a company of natives today in English, and after a little trouble did succeed in teaching them “fives right” and “fives left”. Of course some were stupid. I am certain that no white man could form fives as they do. It is done with a sort of hop or skip into their proper places.138

Captain Walter Stafford, one of the company commanders in Montgomery’s 1st

Battalion, said ‘Drilling was indulged in daily, which was to me always an amusing

performance.’139 Henry Harford of the 3rd Regiment was more charitable in his

description:

Drilling went on throughout the day, and kept everyone hard at work. By the time Lonsdale returned everything was in working order and discipline and drill were the main points to be attended to.140

135 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 1423, p. 155: Mr. J. Shepstone, Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, 8th

March 1879. 136 Times of Natal, 6th December 1878: Military and Volunteer Notes. See also GH, No. 1423, passim. 137 Bengough, Memories, p. 106. 138 Natal Colonist, 11th January 1879: With Colonel Durnford’s Column. The correspondent was obviously Bengough

himself, who cites the same entry in his Memories, p. 111. Cf. Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p. 97. 139 Statement dictated by Captain Walter H. Stafford, January, 1938. Talana Museum, Dundee. 140 Harford, Zulu War Journal, p. 12.

47

As might be expected, Hamilton-Browne’s views were scathing, noting that ‘a

South African native cannot walk in a line, draw a line, or form a line, and if placed in a

line will soon mob himself into a ring’.141

Those with firearms were also given musketry practice, which another

correspondent described thus:

We took the kafirs out for target practice yesterday, and the shooting was very good, especially that of the Edendalites.142

This specific report refers to the mounted men, but the ten percent of armed

infantry were also given musketry practice, as reported by Bengough.143 Hamilton-

Browne once again had something colourful to say:

[In addition to fifty Martini-Henry rifles] Fifty more old muzzle-loading rifles were provided but I did not fear these so much, as the natives usually forgot to tear off the end of thepaper cartridge or placed it in ball part first, so that the rifle refused to go off. We certainly had no time to instruct them in musketry but as only five rounds, per man, was issued, I trusted, with luck, to get through the job without being shot by my own niggers.144

The same procedure was undertaken by the men of the 2nd Regiment at Nonoti, not far

from Stanger.145 Training, then, was perfunctory at best and those men who arrived late

received virtually none at all.

By December, Lord Chelmsford had decided that he had only sufficient transport to

carry three of his five columns into Zululand. The 5th Column under Colonel Rowlands,

whom Chelmsford believed had performed poorly in the assault on Sekhukhune, was to

be left at Derby and Luneburg, and some of his troops were taken to bolster the numbers

of Wood’s No. 4 Column.146

Durnford’s 2nd Column too was originally to be left at the Middle Drift but

Chelmsford thought that the six troops of Mounted Contingent were too useful to be left

idle, particularly as he was so deficient in mounted men. Furthermore, there was not 141 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, pp. 104f. 142 Natal Mercury, 13th January, 1879: With the Native Contingent. 143 Bengough, Memories, p. 111. 144 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, pp. 103-104. 145 Natal Colonist, 16th January: ‘The news from the Native Contingent’. See also H.F. Norbury, The Naval Brigade

in South Africa, (London, 1880), p. 218. 146 BPP, C.2234, No. 26: Lord Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 22nd December 1878.

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much opportunity for an advance across the Middle Drift because the country on the

Zulu side was far too rough for any transport to carry their supplies. As a result, some

movement of elements of this column from Kranskop would be made prior to 11th

January.

In early January, the commandant of the 3rd Regiment was incapacitated by either

sunstroke or a fall from his horse:

There was in the second 24th a major (Wilson [sic] Black by name), and Commandant Lonsdale having been knocked over by sunstroke during the previous day [11th], Major Black had been placed, for the time being, in full command of the 3rd N.N.C.147

Hamilton-Browne probably has the wrong date for this. Compare his version with

that of Lieutenant Harford, Staff Officer to Lonsdale. He does not mention sunstroke,

but during preparations for a General’s inspection on the 9th January, forgotten by

Lonsdale, he reported:

We had scarcely parted when Lonsdale’s pony shied at something and threw him off. I saw the fall. … I got off at once and ran to his assistance, only to find that he was unconscious and rigidly stiff …

… It was found afterwards that he had received concussion of the brain. … 148

As a result of Lonsdale’s incapacity, Major Wilsone Black, 2/24th Regiment, was

given temporary command of the 3rd Regiment.149

It would be remiss to omit a brief mention of the other African levies which were

assembled for the invasion, neither of which were a part of the Natal Native Contingent.

At Luneburg and Derby, Colonel Rowlands had a small levy, probably Swazis and

numbering 338 men at 11th January, under the command of Captain Eckersley.150 There

is little more to be found about this group, but it is very likely that they were brought

down to join Wood’s column when Rowlands departed for Pretoria in late February.

147 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p 109. There is some support for the sunstroke incident – it was reported in

the Natal Witness, 16th January 1879, which had a dollar each way by reporting both the fall and the sunstroke. 148 Harford, Zulu War Journal, p. 14. 149 General Order No. 13 dated 16th January, 1879, Times of Natal, 22nd January 1879. 150 Narrative, pp. 144f.

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Wood himself raised what he called ‘Wood’s Irregulars’ which, also on the 11th

January, numbered 387 men under the command of Commandant Henderson.151 Wood

also points out that his men came voluntarily, as opposed to being drafted, presumably,

and were paid one shilling a day, rather more than the twenty shillings a month paid to

the NNC.152

Wood was later to say of his levy before the invasion began:

When I could obtain ten minutes without interruption, I was considering how to equip 1000 natives without any means at hand. To this number I later added another 1000, and as officers speaking Zulu had to be found, as well as blankets, guns, and something to carry powder and bullets, or ammunition, it will be understood the work was of an engrossing nature.153

It was wishful thinking and could only have been a target – his number of men grew

from one battalion of 387 men to two battalions of only 240 and 277 men.154 Henderson

was joined by Commandant Loraine White, to command the 2nd Battalion, in early

February.155 Major Knox Leet became commandant of all the Irregulars in mid-

February, Henderson becoming ‘2nd Commandant’ and White retaining his battalion.156

As the date of expiry of the ultimatum drew nearer, the NNC, together with the

Imperial troops, moved to the border of Zululand. The 1st Regiment moved from its

Nonoti assembly area to the Lower Thukela Drift. A sprawling camp appeared on the

lower shoulders of the hill on which Fort Pearson was built, straggling along the banks

of the river towards the older Fort Williamson, and enclosing the site of the presentation

of the ultimatum. The 3rd Regiment moved from Sandspruit, via Helpmekaar on the

Biggarsberg, extending the camp already developing at Rorke’s Drift on the bank of the

Thukela (Buffalo) river. When the ultimatum expired on the 11th January 1879, the

invading columns, including the three regiments of the Natal Native Contingent, were in

151 Ibid. 152 Evelyn Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, (London, 1906), Vol. II, p. 26. 153 Ibid., p. 25. 154 Major G. Tylden, The Armed Forces of South Africa, Johannesburg, 1954, pp. 212f. 155 General Order No. 27, dated 7th January 1879, Times of Natal, 10th February 1879 156 General Order No. 37, dated 19th February 1879, Times of Natal, 21st February 1879.

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place on the river borders of Zululand, even if the numbers of the latter were not yet

complete.

We have now seen how the NNC came into being, observing the delays which

occurred in its formation due to the obstruction of the Natal government and its

Lieutenant Governor, Sir Henry Bulwer. The delays inevitably abbreviated the period of

assembly and training which were a prerequisite to the useful employment of the

Contingent in the service which was to follow. It has been shown that the grandiose

plans for dressing the troops in uniform were abandoned in favour of a simple

identifying red puggaree round the head, as opposed to the uniforms provided for the

admittedly much fewer numbers of the Native Pioneer Corps. The arming of only a

fraction of each battalion, largely because of the fear expressed by the Natal

government, was to do little to bolster the confidence of the men, especially since their

role initially was to be treated almost as front line troops, a role for which they were

utterly unfit. Finally, the organisation of the three regiments, based so closely upon the

British army model, with white officers and NCOs, had surely to founder, if only

because of the lack of suitable white men in the colony to undertake the roles, and the

consequent employment of the dregs of South Africa to fill the void.

51

The First Invasion

52

Chapter 3 Invasion and Defeat

This chapter covers only the month of January 1879, during which the Contingent

was to face its baptism of fire on two fronts. The manner in which the African troops

dealt with this entry into active service was less than satisfactory and was to lead to the

reputation for cowardice with which the force was tainted. The interaction of the

commandants with their units, together with the failure of the NCOs and even some of

the junior officers, is clearly demonstrated during these early days.

The 1st Regiment

By comparison with those of the other two NNC regiments, the evolutions of the 1st

Regiment in early January were complex, reflecting the changes of mind to which Lord

Chelmsford was subject. It had originally been planned that the regiment would support

the left flank of Colonel Pearson’s advance from the Lower Drift towards Eshowe. It

became clear, however, that a forward movement from the Middle Drift was not

feasible and so on the 8th January, Chelmsford directed Durnford to

… remove your two strongest regiments [sic] to Sand Spruit Valley, and take up such position as will best ensure the protection of the Natal border from raids made across the Buffalo River between Sand Spruit and the junction of the Buffalo and Tugela rivers.1

He was also instructed to take with him all but fifty of his mounted force. On the

afternoon of the 11th January, Durnford met the Lieutenant General at Rorke’s Drift and

was given fresh orders:

I directed this officer to move one of his three battalions to watch, and eventually cross at the gates of Natal between Rorke’s Drift and the Umsinga Mountain, while he and the mounted men and rocket battery were to join me with No. 3 Column. I directed the remaining two battalions to cross at Middledrift, as soon as Colonel Pearson with No. 1 Column had reached Ekowe.2

1 BPP, C. 2242, Enclosure 3 in No. 9: Lord Chelmsford to Durnford, 8th January 1879. 2 BPP, C. 2242, Enclosure 8 in No. 20: Chelmsford to the Secretary of State for War, 14th January 1879.

53

On the 13th January Durnford took an impetuous decision. He was still at

Kranskop, despite his orders to move to Rorke’s Drift. He received information through

Bishop Schreuder that the Zulu were planning a raid into Natal. The Bishop was based

at Ntunjambili, near Kranskop, which overlooked the Middle Drift. It seemed to

Durnford that this intelligence exactly fitted the circumstances for a foray mentioned in

Lord Chelmsford’s orders of the 8th January, the second paragraph of which stated:

Should you consider that a counter-move across the Buffalo River will be efficacious in preventing an inroad of Zulus into Natal, you are at perfect liberty to make it, but with the understanding that it is made with a purely defensive purpose, and that the force making it returns to its former position on completion of the duty entrusted to it.3

What happened next is related by Captain Dymes, an officer with the 1st Battalion.

On the 14th January, we received orders at two o’clock in the morning to march at 4 a.m. down to the middle drift. I was then a captain, but, as a contingent of Sikali’s men had not yet joined us, I had no men, and was attached as aide-de-camp, or galloper to Commdt. Montgomery. When we reached the summit of Kranz-kop, preparatory to descending the valley to the drift, an orderly came up with a despatch to Colonel Durnford. I was sitting on my horse close by him when it was delivered, and I saw a change in his face at once. Suddenly he gave the word to retrace our way to camp, and I well remember the look of disgust that crossed his countenance as he read the order, which told him not to move until he received further instructions from the General.4

The message was couched in unambiguous terms and was a severe reprimand to

Durnford:

Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for the command of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy’s country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder, which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style which is distasteful to me.5

On the 17th January, Durnford finally marched to Sandspruit, arriving there on the

following day, with three companies of the 1st Battalion and all of Bengough’s 2nd, the

rocket battery and five troops of the Mounted Contingent. The three foot companies had

3 BPP, C. 2242, Enclosure 3 in No. 9: Lord Chelmsford to Durnford, 8th January 1879. 4 Edward Durnford, A Soldier’s Life, p. 212. 5 National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-27-39: Memorandum to Lt.-Colonel Durnford, dated 14th January 1879. See

also French, Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War, p. 77. The emphasis is in the original.

54

been combined into two, under Captains Nourse and Stafford, because the captain of the

third company, Hay, was senior officer and had to remain behind to act as paymaster.6

In accordance with his orders, Durnford left Bengough and the 2nd Battalion at

Sandspruit to enable him to cross the river when required,7 while Durnford went on

with the rest of his force to Rorke’s Drift. The remainder of the 1st Regiment, with

Jantze’s troop of the NMC, remained at Kranskop under the command of Captain

Geoffry Barton, Durnford’s Staff Officer.8

The 2nd Regiment

On the coast, the First Column under the command of Colonel Pearson crossed the

Lower Thukela Drift on the 12th January. Before advancing, Pearson wanted to establish

a fortified post on the left bank and by 17th January Fort Tenedos had been completed

and stores had been brought over to it. On the 18th January the first division of his

column moved north towards his first objective, the mission station at Eshowe, some

fifty kilometres away. The second division left on the following day.

Their progress was slow but uneventful and by the morning of the 22nd the first

division of the column had crossed the Nyezane, a small stream swollen by the recent

heavy rains. The second division was only slightly behind by this time and as it crossed

the flooded stream, the first division stopped for breakfast near the foot of the hills on

which Eshowe stands.

It was then just eight o’clock, and I was in the act of giving directions about the pickets and scouts required for our protection, and the wagons had already begun to park, when the leading company of the Native Contingent, who were scouting in front – personally directed by Captain Hart staff officer to the officer commanding that regiment – discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges in our front, and making for the clumps of bush around us.9

The subsequent battle of Nyezane lasted no more that ninety minutes, and was a

substantial victory for the officers and men of the 1st Column. They had defeated a force

6 Edward Durnford, A Soldier’s Life, p. 213, 7 Bengough, Memories, p. 112. 8 National Army Museum, PP, 2004-05-73-5-16: Barton to Colonel Pearson, 17th January 1879. 9 TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, Inclosure 1 in No. 61: Colonel Pearson’s report dated 23rd January 1879.

55

of some 8,000 Zulus which had set a trap for them, an ambush which had been tripped

minutes too early when they were discovered by a company of NNC led by Captain

Fitzroy Hart. The behaviour of the Contingent on first meeting the advancing left horn

of the Zulu army was disappointing. On being fired upon, they fled, leaving their

officers and NCOs behind.

In organising an advance up the central ridge against the Zulu main force, the

Narrative describes how ‘a party of officers and non-commissioned officers of the

Native Contingent’ took the knoll with the elements of the Naval Brigade. A rather sour

footnote observes ‘The men of the contingent seem on this occasion to have shown little

inclination to advance.’10 In his report, Pearson was rather charitable about the

misunderstandings which appear to have prevented the African troops from becoming

more actively engaged:

Unfortunately, owing to scarcely any of the officers or non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent being able to speak Kafir, and some not even English (there are several foreigners among them), it has been found most difficult to communicate orders, and it is to be feared that these men who lost their lives by gallantly holding their ground, did so under the impression that it was the duty of the Contingent to fight in the first line, instead of scouting only, and, after an engagement, to pursue.11

It was an acute observation, but ‘the duty of the Contingent to fight in the first line’

seems to have been a commonly held view of their function, not limited simply to the

officers and non-commissioned officers. Total British losses were given as 12 men

killed and 16 wounded. In the NNC, 2 officers, 4 NCOs and 4 African privates were

killed, as well as one officer and one NCO being wounded.12 Thus ten of the twelve

men killed were those of the NNC in the first Zulu assault.

After a short break, the column pushed on to Eshowe, arriving early the following

morning, where they began to arrange themselves at the deserted mission station.

10 Narrative, p. 24. 11 BPP C. 2260, Enclosure A, Enclosure in No. 3: Pearson to Frere 23rd January 1879. 12 Ibid., attachment to Pearson’s report.

56

Pearson’s charitable view did not last long: in a letter from a besieged Eshowe

dated 6th February, 1879, based presumably on his experience during the fight at

Nyezane, he observed:

The Native Contingent, too, are of little or no use, unless all the men have firearms; when, perhaps, they would be as dangerous to friends as foes; and the officers and non-commissioned officers can speak Kafir.13

The 3rd Regiment

The 3rd Column at Rorke’s Drift began to cross the Mzinyathi river unopposed at

six a.m. on the 11th January and established a sprawling camp on the left, or Zululand,

bank, the crossing being completed on the following morning. There were now two

matters which occupied Lord Chelmsford’s mind: the homesteads of Zulu chief Sihayo

kaXonga, which lay to the immediate left of his planned route of advance, and the poor

quality of the road between Rorke’s Drift and Isandlwana, which the General had

determined was to be the site of his next marching camp. On the 12th January, therefore,

he set out to deal with Sihayo first by attacking the homesteads.

The ‘stronghold’ of Sihayo was located in the Batshe river valley about eight

kilometres from the Drift, under the brows of a massive hill now known as Ngedla. The

operation would serve two purposes: it would secure the column’s left flank for the

advance towards Ulundi and would also serve as a lesson to Sihayo himself, whose

brother and sons were ostensibly one of the justifications for the ultimatum. Lord

Chelmsford, who observed the action from the opposite side of the valley, gave a brief

summary of the engagements to Sir Bartle Frere:

In passing by the Ngudu Hill we noticed that some herds of cattle had been driven up close under the Kraantz where one of Sirayo’s strongholds were said to be – I ordered Colonel Glyn with 4 Companies 1/24th & 1/3d Native Contingent to work up under the Kraantz [and seize the cattle].

Colonel Degacher who had been sent for from the Camp when we found that the Kraantz was occupied by the enemy came up towards the end of the affair with ½ battn. 2/24th and about 400 2/3rd Native Contingent. This force went forward to Sirayo’s own Kraal which is situated

13 BPP, C. 2260, p. 107: letter to Lord Chelmsford, 2nd February, 1879.

57

under a very steep Kraantz which is filled with caves. I ordered Sirayo’s Kraal to be burnt but none of the other huts were touched.14

The engagement lasted most of the day and the force was back in camp on the

Mzinyathi by four in the afternoon.

In the absence of Commandant Lonsdale, the ubiquitous Major Wilsone Black, 24th

Regiment, was in temporary command of the 3rd Regiment NNC, and Captain George

Hamilton-Browne seems to have commanded the 1st Battalion.15 The engagement was

the baptism of fire for the 3rd Regiment NNC. How well did it perform? If one accepts

the words of George Hamilton-Browne, not very well:

My men advanced leaping and jumping, singing war-songs, sharpening their assagais, and looking so bloodthirsty that I feared they would kill every woman and child we came across.16 But as we drew nearer the scene of action, their zeal for fighting – like Bob Acre’s courage – oozed out of them. Their war-songs dwindled away and they seemed indisposed to come on. In fact some of them suddenly remembering they had important business to transact towards the rear had to be encouraged with the butt of the rifle or the ready boot of my non-coms. As the native must be led, myself and all the officers were in front. This being the case, and we being far more in funk of our playful savages armed with M.H. rifles than of the enemy, I gave orders that there was to be no firing but that we must trust to the steel.17

Ye Gods of war, what a sight for a commandant! … I saw their backs in a mad stampede while among them raged their furious officers and non-coms.

Above the rifle shots rang out their wild imprecations while with butt, fist and boot they tried to instil courage into that awful mob of cowardly Kafirs.18

On the other hand, he did recognise the superior fighting qualities of some of his

men, paying tribute to the iziGqoza companies:

Now I must say a word about No. 8 Company. Among my 1200 men I had 300 real Zulus. They were the remains of a young Zulu regiment that had been destroyed by Cetewayo’s orders the year before. … some of them had escaped to Natal with Esikota, the king’s youngest brother, and these 300 men were quite game to return and play another match, backed up by white men, with their destroyers. Their contempt for the Natal Kafir was unbounded, and they were splendid fighting men. They formed three of my companies, Nos. 8, 9 and 10. No. 9 was in camp. No. 8 was with me and No. 10 was one of the companies I had sent to work round the enemy’s flank.19

14 Laband, Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign, p. 60: Chelmsford to Frere, 12 January, 1879. 15 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p. 99. If his statement is correct, it was entirely unofficial because his

appointment was not made until a few days after the engagement. 16 Specific instructions had been given that they were not to be harmed. 17 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p. 105. 18 Ibid., p. 106. 19 Ibid., pp. 106f.

58

Hamilton-Browne had little positive to say about the majority of his African troops

and this is reflected in his contempt for them at every turn. He was not, therefore, a very

objective commentator as far as his own men were concerned.

Cooper’s 2nd Battalion was not given an opportunity to make a better show: they

were part of the second line and details of their actions are not known. Lieutenant Henry

Harford, Staff Officer to the Regiment, accompanied Cooper but seems rather to have

moved ahead to be closer to the action.20 Harford, who himself behaved very well, has

nothing to say of the regiment, good or bad. The General himself was not displeased

and gave a balanced view:

I have the pleasure of reporting that the behaviour of the Natal Native Contingent was on the occasion all that could be desired, and by their list of casualties, it will be seen that they did not shrink from closing in on the enemy.21

Another opinion, albeit brief, was given in a newspaper:

The N.N.C., as a rule, behaved well, the whole column marching back to camp about 4 p.m., returning through a violent thunderstorm.22

Probably as a result of this action, Hamilton-Browne, who had initially been

appointed captain of a company in the 1st Battalion, was formally promoted to battalion

commandant, thus easing the burden on the recovering Lonsdale.23

George Hamilton Browne was supposedly born in Ulster in 1847,24 but more

recent information gives his birthplace as Cheltenham in the United Kingdom on 22nd

December 1844.25 He had a great admiration for military officers and long-service

soldiers and desperately wanted an army career. He failed to enter either Sandhurst or

Woolwich, a failure he greatly regretted.

20 Harford, Zulu War Journal, p. 18. 21 BPP, C. 2242., Enclosure 8 in No. 20: Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 14th January 1879. The 1st

Battalion lost two African privates killed and twelve wounded. Lieutenant Purvis and Corporal Meyer were also wounded. (Ibid. p. 42.)

22 Natal Witness, 21st January 1879. 23 General Order No. 9 dated 12th January, Times of Natal 15th January 1879. 24 Much of this brief biography is drawn from Major G. Tylden, “Commandant George Hamilton-Browne of the

Colonial Forces”, Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research, Vol. 37, 1959, pp. 153-160. 25 Family information conveyed to the writer by Mr Vernon Wilson, whose wife is Hamilton-Browne’s great

grandfather.

59

In 1866, at the age of 19 years, he went to New Zealand and enlisted in an auxiliary

unit in which served a thorough apprenticeship against the Maoris. In 1867, he received

a commission in the New Zealand Mounted Defence Force, and subsequently

transferred to the Armed Constabulary, where he was eventually promoted to captain.26

After the fighting finished, in 1870, he went to Australia where he suffered a bad chest

wound fighting bushrangers. He then travelled to the United States and fought against

the Sioux, later visiting his family in Ireland.

His health had by this time deteriorated and on his doctor’s advice he sailed to

South Africa in 1877. He made his way to King William’s Town to see officers of 24th

Regiment, whom he knew, and there met Major Henry Burmester Pulleine. He accepted

Pulleine’s invitation to take command of a company of Pulleine’s Rangers, a unit

formed by General Cunynghame to fight in the Ninth Cape Border War.27 When the

Border War ended, Browne, as he was then known, was out of work and drifted up to

Durban. It was there that his fighting reputation stood him in good stead and he was

appointed a captain in the NNC.28 He was then just 34 years of age.

Between the 13th and 19th January, the 3rd Column was busy making good the track

between Rorke’s Drift and Isandlwana to allow the passage of the many wagons and the

Contingent was actively involved in these road works. Commandant Lonsdale returned

to duty just ‘before the move to Isandlwana, quite recovered from his accident’, perhaps

on the 18th or 19th January.29 On the 20th January the column moved up to the new camp

site at Isandlwana, the last company of the 24th Regiment arriving the next morning.

Also on the 20th, Colonel Durnford arrived with his force at Rorke’s Drift and occupied

26 It was here that he gained the sobriquet ‘Maori’. 27 Major G. Tylden, The Armed Forces of South Africa 1659 - 1954, (Johannesburg, 1954), p. 145. 28 General Order No. 213 dated 3rd December 1878, Times of Natal 6th December 1878 29 Harford, Zulu War Journal, p. 22.

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the area slightly to the north of the recently vacated camp on the left bank of the

Mzinyathi river, perhaps about a kilometre from the Drift.30

On the morning of 21st January, two groups left the Isandlwana camp to undertake

a comprehensive reconnaissance of the Malakatha range of hills to the south-east of the

Isandlwana camp. The first to leave was the greater part of the 3rd Regiment, NNC:

eight companies of the 1st Battalion under Hamilton-Brown and eight companies of the

2nd Battalion under Cooper, the whole under the command of Commandant Lonsdale.

Hamilton-Browne led his men around the edge of the mountain, and along the lip of the

steep Mangeni river valley on the northern side. Cooper’s battalion descended into the

valley itself and marched, with some difficulty along the lower part of the hills,

shadowing the route of Hamilton-Browne along the top.31

Shortly afterwards, it was followed by a large party of mounted Volunteers under

Major J.G. Dartnell, en route to the south-eastern area of the same range, the highest

point of which is known as Hlazakazi.32

About noon it was decided that one company of the 2nd Battalion, under its

commander Captain O.E. Murray, be sent back to the camp at Isandlwana driving some

cattle captured during the morning.33

In the late afternoon, the two battalions of the NNC finally came together on the

flanks of Hlazakhazi hill.34 Mounted messengers brought news that a number of Zulus

had been seen in the vicinity and Dartnell ordered the Contingent to move further east to

join them. It was a decision which was not well received.

30 Durnford had been promoted in General Order No. 30 dated 9th February, 1879, Times of Natal, 12th February,

1879, effective from 11th December, 1878. 31 Norris-Newman, In Zululand with the British, pp. 49f. Norris-Newman accompanied the 2nd Battalion. See also

John Maxwell, Reminiscences of the Zulu War, Leonie Twentyman Jones, (ed.), (Cape Town, 1979), p. 1, also of the 2nd Battalion and who concurs with Norris-Newman, and Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p.p. 118f, who seems confused as to whether his 1st Battalion went into the valley or round the perimeter on the rim.

32 Narrative, p. 29. 33 Maxwell, Reminiscences of the Zulu War, loc. cit. Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p. 119f , mistakenly says

that two companies were sent back. 34 Murray was appointed to his captaincy in the same General Order as Hamilton-Browne.

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I requested Lonsdale not to think of doing such a thing, pointing out at the same time that we had no food or reserve ammunition, also that we were seven miles from camp, our white men worn out and that it would be night before we could reach Dartnell, who was over three miles from us and at least that distance further away from camp than we were.35

Lonsdale, ‘who had not got over his sunstroke, was simply spoiling for a fight’,

was not to be dissuaded. There seems to have been a considerable debate at this point,

according to Hamilton-Browne’s account, who also avers that four officers left the force

‘without leave’ at this point and returned to camp.36 Staff Officer Henry Harford more

reliably observes that the officers were simply ‘grumbling’ and places the return of two

officers, whom he names, at the point when the decision was made to stay out for the

night:

There was some grumbling among the officers of the Native Contingent, who were tired out, at having to bivouac without food, forage or blankets (the Natives all carried their blankets on their persons), and two young officers, Lieutenants Avery and Holcroft, went off without leave, evidently to ride back to camp, but were never seen or heard of again.37

Both of these officers belonged to Hamilton-Browne’s 1st Battalion.38 This fact,

together with Hamilton-Browne’s assertion that four officers departed, perhaps

emphasises the poor recall which he had of his command: he did not even remember his

own officers, even though he had served with Avery since early December, the latter

having been appointed a lieutenant in the same General Order which had appointed

Hamilton-Browne as a captain.39 The regiment finally moved across the mountain to

join Dartnell. The whole reconnaissance force then moved still further east to the edge

of the Hlazakazi range, from where they could see a large force of Zulus on the opposite

side of the intervening valley. A brief sortie in the fading light by the Mounted Police

was brought up short by the appearance of some 1,500 Zulus who gave every intention

of attacking the small force, which then withdrew.40

35 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p. 120. 36 Ibid., pp. 120f. This must exclude Captain Murray and his lieutenant, Pritchard, who left under orders. 37 Harford, Zulu War Journal, p. 25f. 38 Maxwell, Reminiscences, p. 11. 39 Hamilton-Browne’s book was published circa 1912. 40 Killie Campbell Africana Library, Wood Papers, file 32, KCM 89/9/32/10: Letter from Insp. George Mansel, Natal

Mounted Police, to Edward Durnford, 23rd November 1879.

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Since it was now after nightfall, Dartnell decided to keep his force on the hills,

despite the instruction from Lord Chelmsford that the whole reconnaissance was to

return to the camp. The night on the hills which followed was punctuated by two false

alarms, during the first of which the majority of the NNC panicked and bolted.41

About midnight – fires having been seen all night on the opposite hill, where the Zulus were – a few shots were fired by the outlying piquet, and (for what reason will never be known) one of our corners, No. 1 Company 1-3rd NNC, gave way and fled across the centre of the square, trampling over their officers and causing a general stampede of the horses;42

Neither Norris-Newman nor Commandant Lonsdale were spared during the brief mêlée:

… on looking round I caught a glimpse of both Lonsdale and “Noggs” [Norris-Newman] turning a somersault as a lot of Natives bounded over them. Poor “Noggs”, who highly resented such treatment, spent the rest of the night with the Mounted Police, having, as he afterwards told me, “had enough of the Contingent”.43

There is a brief reference to Cooper’s leadership style, given by Lieutenant John

Maxwell, during the same incident:

… almost the first man I met was our Commandant (of the 2nd Battalion to which I belonged) … He had a knobkerrie in his hand and with this article was endeavouring to bring [the men] to some order. He called upon me to procure another persuader and assist him, which I did.44

Once again, the only steady Africans were the two companies of iziGqoza, who,

after the first alarm, were instructed by Hamilton-Browne to fire on any African who

moved.45 Even so, there was another alarm later that same night.

During the previous afternoon and evening, Major Dartnell had sent three messages

back to the Lieutenant General at Isandlwana conveying news of the Zulu opposing

him, each more urgent than the last. The last one arrived at 1.30 a.m. on the 22nd

January, which convinced Lord Chelmsford that the reconnaissance force was

confronted by the anticipated Zulu impi. Accordingly, at 2.00 a.m. he issued orders to

Colonel Glyn and Lieutenant-Colonel Harness that six of the seven companies of the

2/24th Regiment would march out to Dartnell’s support at dawn with four of the six guns

41 Harford, Zulu War Journal, pp. 26ff. 42 Norris-Newman, In Zululand, pp. 52f. 43 Harford, Zulu War Journal, pp. 27. 44 Maxwell, Reminiscences, p. 2. 45 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p. 124.

63

and the majority of the remaining mounted men. They departed about 4.30 a.m. and met

up with Dartnell and the NNC some two hours later.

When Lonsdale had departed for the Malakatha reconnaissance, he had left behind

two companies of each of the NNC battalions:

1st Battalion, No. 6 Company, Captain R. Krohn (amaBhele);

No. 9 Company, Captain James Lonsdale (iziGqoza);

2nd Battalion, No. 4 Company, Captain C.A. Erskine (amaChunu);46

No. 5 Company, Captain A.J. Barry (amaChunu).

In total, these four companies numbered 391 men, white and black, excluding

officers.47

At the start of the new working day in the camp, the NNC companies which had

been left behind were assigned as follows: Barry’s company was sent to the plateau to

take up picquet duty on the Magaga knoll to the north of the camp, relieving that of

Erskine which returned to join Krohn’s company in the NNC lines in the camp. James

Lonsdale’s iziGqoza company was also on picquet duty but to the front between the

camp and amaTutshane (the Conical Koppie). He had already been there for 36 hours

and was due for relief by Krohn but this was deferred due to the alarms of the

morning.48

Prior to his own departure, Chelmsford had sent an urgent order to Durnford to

bring up his force from Rorke’s Drift to reinforce the camp. He and his five troops of

horse arrived about 10.30 a.m., the rocket battery and Nourse’s company of foot men

reached the camp about 11.15 and the baggage train with Stafford’s company shortly

after noon.

46 Not to be confused with Lieutenant W. Erskine, who was with Durnford at Rorke’s Drift. 47 BPP, C. 2252, p. 75. 48 TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, p. 276: Lieutenant Higginson. Higginson was in Krohn’s No. 6 Company.

64

This is not the forum in which the ensuing battle of Isandlwana should be

described.49 We must, however, examine the performance of the NNC companies

during the battle. Much has been said about the cowardice of the rump of the 3rd

Regiment that day and how the Africans in the centre of the British line ran away,

allowing the Zulu to exploit the gap and thus overrun the camp.50 Such examination is

perhaps best undertaken by a review of the Isandlwana casualty list, which includes the

following from the districts of Umsinga, Weenen County and Upper Tugela:51

District Chief or Tribe Killed, missing or deceased

Umsinga Mganu [abaThembu] 5 Pakade [amaChunu] 4 Weenen Amacuna [amaChunu] 240 Amatemba [abaThembu] 4 Amabela [amaBhele] 20 Isixosa [iziGqoza] 54 Upper Tugela Amangwana [amaNgwane] 103

The most notable feature of the table is that the amaChunu lost very heavily. We

might speculate, however, that there were three companies of amaChunu to be included

here rather than just the two left behind: Captain Murray’s company had possibly

reached the camp and some of his men may thus also be included in the count of those

killed, as was Murray himself and his lieutenant, Pritchard. Of the remainder, Barry’s

company on the plateau had been ordered to accompany a troop of Durnford’s mounted

men and, after the discovery of the Zulu army, it was isolated there and may have been

overrun before it could retire on the camp. Erskine’s company was in reserve in the

camp but it too went forward into the line, where it also suffered heavily. The iziGqoza

could only have been the men in Captain Lonsdale’s company and if this was the case,

then their casualty rate was also very high. Their part in the battle is discussed below.

49 For an excellent synthesis, see Jackson, Isandlwana 1879: The Sources Re-Examined and Hill of the Sphinx: The

Battle of Isandlwana. 50 See, for example, Donald R. Morris, Washing of the Spears, p. 374. 51 BPP, C. 2367, p. 173.

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The amaBhele casualties were quite low. These men were from Captain Krohn’s

company and since they were in reserve, they almost certainly were among the first to

leave the field. This must be so, since Lieutenant Adendorff must have done so in order

to arrive at Rorke’s Drift at 3.15 p.m.52 The abaThembu lost least and since they were

out with Cooper in the Malakatha hills, these must be included in the number of

‘missing’ as a result of desertion.

In addition to Zikhali’s mounted men, the amaNgwane also formed a part of

Durnford’s 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment NNC. Their total losses were also given in a note

from Albert Allison, Resident Magistrate of Upper Thukela District, in which he

apportions the casualties between foot and mounted men:53

Killed or missing, horsemen 27 footmen 73

Total 100 Wounded (returned), horsemen 6

footmen 7 Total 13

Most of the losses of footmen were probably those of Nourse’s inflated company

who went out of the camp with Durnford’s rocket battery, were left far behind by the

horsemen and were caught by leading elements of the Zulu attack. The remainder were

those of Stafford, whose company joined the British line on their arrival at the camp

after midday.

The other imponderable about the NNC losses is that many of them, and we will

never know how many, were killed in the pursuit down the Fugitive’s trail rather than

on the battlefield.

It was not hard to distinguish the kafirs who were with the white men from our men, because they were all dressed in uniform, and we did not take long in killing them off, for they were just scum.54

52 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Inclosure in No. 70: report of Lieutenant Chard. 53 BPP, C. 2318, No. 12: R.M. Upper Tugela to Colonial Secretary, 7th February 1879. 54 Statement of Nzuzi, Natal Mercury, 22nd January 1929. Cf. Statement of Umtegolalo, BPP, C. 2260, included in

Enclosure 2 in No. 12, p. 102.

66

Of the NNC officers, only Lieutenants Adendorff (No. 6 Company), Higginson

(also No. 6 Company) and Vaines (No. 9 Company) survived. Five captains and eight

lieutenants were killed, including Captain Murray. There is no evidence to indicate

where Murray and his lieutenant, Pritchard, were lost.

The only NNC company which might have comprised the ‘knuckle’ of the British

line is that of Captain Lonsdale’s iziGqoza, which remained for most of the battle

posted near the ‘conical koppie’ to the front of the camp.55 The evidence of one of its

men maintains that its retreat was orderly:

We were then ordered to retire, as we were also threatened on our rear by the advancing left of the Zulus, and fell back on camp, which we did, crossing the water-course opposite the camp of the Lt.-General. The company of soldiers was with us and on nearing the tents knelt down and commenced firing at the enemy. Below them, some distance to the left, was another company of more soldiers, also kneeling down and firing. Our Captain now got off his horse and gave it to me, telling me to take it to the ammunition wagons, and turning back, (the NNC had at this point evidently run away tho’ the narrator would not say so,) he joined the red soldiers who were firing and I never saw him again. After this I know nothing; the Zulus surrounded us on all sides, and I thought of nothing, save my own escape.56

This evidence makes it plain that Lonsdale’s company, which had been exposed for

much of the battle to the Zulu advance, only retreated when ordered and then was

accompanied by at least one British regular company. It also seems clear that the men

dispersed only after Captain Lonsdale had given up his horse and gone back into the

fray. Leaderless, poorly armed and confronted by the mass of advancing Zulu, it is

hardly surprising that they then chose to leave the field, emulating the behaviour of the

surviving British troops. This evidence must relieve the NNC of the responsibility for

the Zulu breakthrough attributed to them by Morris.57

The other matter which deserves our close attention is the actions of Colonel

Durnford. Little more than an hour after his arrival, he had taken a number of decisions,

some of which had a substantial effect on the action which followed. First, he sent back

55 Narrative, p. 35. 56 National Army Museum, CP, 6807-386-8-58: statement of Malindi. The emphasis is in the original and the

interpolation by the translator is entirely gratuitous and not based upon any evidence. 57 The view that Barry’s company re-grouped at the ‘knuckle’ with Lonsdale’s company is not supported by any

evidence. The remainder of the NNC was either on the left of the British line or in reserve.

67

Lieutenant Wyatt Vause with his troop of Zikhali’s Horse to cover the slow progress of

his wagon train, still making its way from Rorke’s Drift. It was also by now

accompanied by Lieutenant Walter Stafford’s amaNgwane foot men. Second, he sent

out the two remaining troops of Zikhali’s Horse, under their commanding officer,

Captain William Barton, to reconnoitre the plateau to the north-east of the camp, a task

which Chelmsford had promised himself that he would do, but had omitted in the haste

of his departure that morning. Barton was accompanied by Captain George Shepstone,

Political Assistant to Durnford and a close friend.

Durnford’s last, and most controversial, action was to leave the camp. A flurry of

conflicting messages led him to suppose that the Zulu were moving to attack Lord

Chelmsford’s party and he determined to head them off. After sending Lieutenant

Walter Higginson off to order Shepstone and Barton to move east along the plateau to

support him, Durnford moved out with the two remaining troops of the Mounted

Contingent, the Edendale men under Lieutenant Harry Davies and Hlubi’s baSotho

under Lieutenant Alfred Henderson. The rocket battery was also to accompany him,

attended by Captain Nourse’s amaNgwane company of the 1/1st Regiment.

Durnford’s decision to leave the camp was to cause him to be blamed for the fall of

the camp.58 One must leave aside the matter of his command of the camp, which

Chelmsford believed he had ordered. (This was proved to be false when the actual order

to Durnford was published, and which made plain that he had not been so ordered.59)

58 See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Durnford, Lord Chelmsford’s Statements compared with the

Evidence, London, 1880, passim. 59 Royal Engineers Museum, Chatham, Durnford Papers, 4901.44.15: printed circular issued by Lieut.-Colonel

Edward Durnford, 1884.

68

His behaviour under fire was a different proposition. While his African troops regarded

his actions as courageous and encouraging,60 one of the officers with him, Lieutenant

Henderson, was less complimentary:

I wrote you the other day to say that I had got out of the fight the other day. I have not as yet heard anything about George [Shepstone]. If I had known what sort of a man Durnford was (when he got into action) I don’t think I would have gone with him. He was close to me during most of the fight and he lost his head altogether, in fact he did not know what to do.61

This critical statement by one of Durnford’s officers, who may well have been

reflecting a personal grudge for some earlier slight, cannot help but remind one that the

same sentiment was expressed after the Bushman’s River Pass affair in 1873.

Nonetheless, his considered action in endeavouring to hold back the Zulu to allow the

remaining fugitives to escape the carnage in the camp rather belies Henderson’s

unpleasant words.62 Whatever the case, his personal courage is undeniable.

On the other side of the plain almost twenty kilometres away, about 9.30 a.m. that

day Lord Chelmsford received a message from Lieutenant Colonel Pulleine ‘that the

Zulus are advancing in force from left front of Camp’.63 He sent one of his aides de

camp, Lieutenant Milne R.N., to the top of a nearby hill with his powerful telescope,

where he remained for ninety minutes, finally coming down to report that nothing

untoward could be seen.64 In the meantime, the Lieutenant General despatched

Hamilton-Browne and his 1st Battalion back to the camp to assist with the movement of

the baggage for those units out with him, with the intention of establishing a new camp

site near the Mangeni falls.65 Cooper’s 2nd Battalion remained close to the General for

the remainder of the day.

60 Account of Jabez Molife, Natal Mounted Contingent, Royal Engineers Museum, Durnford Papers reference

4901.44.2,. 61 Peter Hathorn and Amy Young, Henderson Heritage, (Pietermaritzburg, 1972), p. 231. 62 It is clear that Durnford had the opportunity to escape the field but chose to stay in an attempt to keep the escape

route open for even a short time longer. 63 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Inclosure 6 in No. 96: Colonel Glyn to Deputy Adjutant General, 26th February 1879. 64 BPP, C. 2454, p. 182: undated report of Lieutenant Milne. 65 TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, Inclosure 1 in No. 96: official report of Hamilton-Browne. Cf. his account in A Lost

Legionary, pp. 126f. Captain Gardner had been sent back to the camp with the order for the move.

69

As Hamilton-Browne drew closer to Isandlwana he observed the attack and

subsequent fall of the camp, sending back four or five messages as he proceeded. (The

messages sent by Hamilton-Browne vary: in his official report dated 2nd February 1879

he mentions five;66 his memoir also gives five but they do not all coincide with those in

his report.67)

The penultimate of these messages was the only one which the General claimed he

received, the remainder being given to various officers who did virtually nothing with

them. It said ‘Come in every man for God’s sake; the camp is surrounded, and will be

taken unless helped at once.’ It was received by Captain Church about 1.15 p.m. and

delivered to the General by Major Gossett shortly thereafter.68 Lord Chelmsford

remained unconvinced that an attack had taken place. Hamilton-Browne even suggests

that when the General subsequently met him, the latter accused him of lying.69

Final proof for the attack came from a bizarre intervention: Commandant Lonsdale

appeared about 3.30 p.m., alone, and confirmed that the camp had indeed been taken; he

knew this positively because he had been there himself. There are several versions of

Lonsdale’s account of this episode, but they bear the common features that he was tired

and hungry, and his reason for returning was to order up rations for his men.70 Although

he had returned alone, however, he had advised Major Gosset, Lord Chelmsford’s

senior ADC, of his intended action.71 Whatever Lonsdale’s reasons for a return to the

camp, it was an extraordinary incident, probably the result of his earlier indisposition,

and exacerbated by the hardships of the previous thirty hours.

66 TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, Inclosure 1 in No. 96. 67 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, pp. 128-134. 68 Narrative, p. 41. 69 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p. 134. 70 See, for example, the account by H.G. Mainwaring written 22nd January, 1895 in Cairo and quoted in N. Holme,

The Noble 24th, pp. 199f; Norris-Newman, In Zululand with the British, p. 59; Natal Witness, 30 January 1879; Frank Streatfeild, Reminiscences, pp. 155f.

71 National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-8-61.

70

At this late hour, the General gathered up his scattered troops and began the

miserable march back to the camp, arriving about 8.00 p.m. They spent a sleepless night

amidst the corpses on the nek above the ruined camp, and marched back to Rorke’s

Drift the following morning at daybreak. The first invasion of Zululand was finished.

Once again, it is not necessary to restate the actions at Rorke’s Drift, but there was

an incident there which involved the NNC and which demands our attention. There was

a small element of the Contingent at Rorke’s Drift and their official role was to guard

the ponts over the nearby Mzinyathi (Buffalo) river, orders having been given to

Lieutenant Chard by the commanding officer, Major Spalding, on the morning of the

22nd January:

1. The force under Lt Col Durnford, RE, having departed, a Guard of 6 Privates and 1 NCO will be furnished by the detachment 2/24th Regiment on the Ponts. A Guard of 50 armed natives will likewise be furnished by Captain Stephenson’s detachment at the same spot - the Ponts will be invariably drawn over to the Natal side at night.72

This small group poses a problem because seemingly the whole of the 3rd Regiment

NNC was at Isandlwana on the 22nd January: as we have seen, eight companies of each

battalion under Commandant Lonsdale were employed on the extended reconnaissance

while the remaining four companies, two from each battalion, were in the camp itself.

Since the complement of each battalion was but ten companies, there seems, at first

sight, to be an error in assigning the force at Rorke’s Drift to the 2/3rd Regiment.73

As far as it is possible to ascertain, the unit at Rorke’s Drift had only a captain, and

at least one NCO, seemingly lacking lieutenants or other NCOs despite the large

number of men to be commanded. An officer named ‘W. Stephenson’ is mentioned as

being appointed as Captain to the 2/3rd Regiment NNC and, lacking any evidence to the

contrary, we must assume that this is our man.74

72 Quoted in the account of the Rorke’s Drift defence by Lieutenant J.R.M. Chard, R.E., written for H.M. Queen

Victoria and quoted in Holme, The Noble 24th, pp. 270ff. 73 Ian Knight, Nothing Remains But To Fight: The Defence of Rorke’s Drift, 1879, (London, 1993), p. 44. 74 General Order No. 213 dated 3rd December 1878: Times of Natal, 6th December, 1878

71

The next problem is the size of the unit, variously reported as 100,75 350,76 and

even 2,000.77 It is most likely that the Reverend Smith was closest to the mark because

100 men would not have made a lot of difference to the size of the barricade which was

built, whereas 350 would certainly have done so.78 The figure of 2,000 is nonsense, of

course.

Who were these men? The most likely answer is that that they were indeed a part of

the 3rd Regiment, and may even have been a part of the 2nd Battalion, as Knight says.

Their being left behind at Rorke’s Drift may be explained by the fact that the

complement of the regiment had already been greatly exceeded, despite the fact that it

took time for the levies to arrive.79 Allow me to quote from what may be regarded as

the definitive work on the Contingent:

294 men from [the Resident Magistrates] were turned over to the military on January 10th, and more continued to flow in from various quarters until the number reached 450. Ultimately the 3rd Regiment was over strength by some 300 men, whom the Lieutenant General proposed to leave at Rorke’s Drift for road work and other duties while the column advanced into Zululand.80

Thomson’s evidence was the same letter written by Lieutenant Henry Harford to

W.J.D. Moodie, the Resident Magistrate of the Klip River district on 14th January 1879,

also quoted in the first chapter:

In case Com’t Lonsdale has forgotten to send a line about the Natives, could you kindly prevent any more joining. They are dropping in, in half-dozens, & we are now some 300 over our strength. If you would kindly see to this I should be obliged.81

From this, it can be seen that Rev. Smith was indeed quite close to the mark and the

native force at Rorke’s Drift did number a little more than 300. The confusion and late

arrival of these men may account for the lack of officers and NCOs, as did a general

75 Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Bourne, transcript of a BBC broadcast, The Listener, 30 December, 1936 and quoted in

Holme, The Noble 24th, pp. 279ff. 76 Rev. George Smith, quoted in G. Paton, F. Glennie and W. Penn Symons, Historical Records of the 24th Regiment

From its Formation in 1689, (London, 1892), pp. 251ff. 77 H.C. Lugg, A Natal Family Looks Back, (Durban, 1970), p. 20. 78 After the NNC’s departure, Chard ordered that another wall be built, excluding the hospital building, so forming a

smaller perimeter. 79 Harford, Zulu War Journal, p. 12. 80 Thompson, Natal Native Contingent, p. 32. 81 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1925, No. 494: Harford to Moodie.

72

shortage of men for such positions at this date. Stephenson was probably appointed to

command this group at the last moment, although why he had not accompanied the rest

of his battalion is not known. One might speculate that he was specifically selected to

stay behind to care for the levies still appearing, since Lord Chelmsford was well aware

of them, as is shown in the quotation above.

The role of the unit, whatever its composition, is fairly clear. A part, if not the

whole, of their function at Rorke’s Drift, it seems, was guarding the ponts across the

Mzinyathi (Buffalo) river, as ordered by Major Spalding.

While preparing the barricades for the defence of the post, the native unit worked

well:

The Native Contingent, under their Officer, Captain Stephenson, were working hard at this with our own men and the walls were rapidly progressing.82

The arrival, and subsequent sudden departure, of the men of the Natal Mounted

Contingent, probably elements of several troops under the command of Lieutenant A.F.

Henderson, prompted an immediate response from the terrified NNC:

About the same time [as the mounted men left] Captain Stephenson’s detachment of Natal Native Contingent left us, as did that officer himself.83

There were, of course, valid reasons why the mounted men left: they had already

endured the horrors of Isandlwana and the taking of the British camp, followed by their

narrow escape from the closing horns of the Zulu army. As one of them later said, their

leader Colonel Durnford was cut off from them and there was nothing further they could

do.84

The men of the NNC had different reasons for departure. They had only recently

been drafted into the NNC and since the unit was poorly provided with officers and

NCOs, their training would have been virtually nil. We cannot be certain if they were

82 Ibid. 83 TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, Inclosure in No. 70: Chard report. 84 Molife account. See also Chard’s account for Queen Victoria for Henderson’s reasons for leaving.

73

even armed but given that the rest of the NNC had only ten men in every hundred armed

with rifles, most of them old muzzle-loaders, at best they would have had only 30 rifles

between them. More probably, they had nothing but their traditional weapons. In these

circumstances, then, it is hardly surprising that they chose to leave when they saw the

mounted natives under Lieutenant Henderson also depart, who were fully armed and

mounted. What is to be deplored was the departure of Stephenson himself, which was

hardly the action of an officer and a gentleman. We have already seen that every other

company commander of the Contingent had chosen to stay with their British Army

comrades and shared their fate, even after their own men had also fled as the Zulu army

began to surround and enter the camp. Clearly, Stephenson was not of the same stamp

as his NNC fellow officers.85

The circumstances of Stephenson’s treatment afterwards is lost to us, other than a

bald announcement in a Local General Order:

6. The services of Captain Stevenson, 2-3rd Natal Native Contingent, are dispensed with, being no longer required.86

On 24th January, just two days after the defeat at Isandlwana, Colonel Glyn sent the

following message to Lord Chelmsford from Rorke’s Drift:

The whole of the Native Contingent walked off this morning. Their rifles were taken from them; all the hospital bearers then went, and now the native pioneers are going. I am now left without any natives. What is to be done with Lonsdale and his Europeans? I shall of course keep them until I hear from you.87

This sorry letter marks the sudden demise of the 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent,

as a functioning unit:88

Acting on the instructions (verbal) of H.E. the Lieutenant-General, I have this day disbanded the natives forming the 3rd NNC under my command.89

85 In mitigation, it should be added that in Lieutenant Higginson’s report (TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Inclosure 3 in No.

96) he notes that he found that Stephenson had brought up the wounded Lieutenant Purvis to Helpmekaar. This might indicate that Stephenson’s departure was not as precipitate as that of his men.

86 General Order No. 37, dated 10th February, 1879: Times of Natal, 21st February, 1879. 87 BPP, C. 2318, No. 1: Colonel Glyn to Lord Chelmsford, 24th January 1879. 88 But see infra. pp. 93 f. for further information on the disbandment. 89 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 686, No. 818: Lonsdale to Major Clery, January 24th, 1879.

74

The question must be asked why this was so. The NNC had acquired a poor

reputation on the strength of its poor performance in the field thus far and this is echoed

in the words of correspondents shortly after Isandlwana:

Yesterday I rode over to Wheelwright’s camp 16 miles away with Captain Cherry. We took two mounted Natives with us and on the road stopped and disarmed two parties–six each–of Kafir deserters from the Native Contingent. I hear they are moving away wholesale since the disaster, as was to be expected. I expect the whole lot will be disbanded soon; as you know, I never believed in this Native force.90

I am glad to say the Natal Native Contingent has been disbanded, as they were found to be an intolerable nuisance;91

Our natives would have been no use in a fight as they would certainly have bolted at once leaving their officers to their fate but they would probably have given an early alarm in case of any enemy advancing.92

Even the reliable and caring Bengough, about whose battalion Lieutenant

Commeline was writing, had difficulty. He had crossed the Mzinyathi river on the 22nd

January in accordance with his instructions but hearing rumours of the British defeat

from his interpreter, and becoming acutely aware of his own indefensible position, he

re-crossed to the Natal side and made his way towards Helpmekaar.93 On the way, the

quality of the training that he had given to his men was quickly revealed:

I rode forward with Kinsman, my interpreter, and found that the report was unfounded, the Zulus seen being friendly; but it served to show the little reliance placed by our men on the drill formations in which they had been so carefully instructed, for on rejoining the battalion I found that the company formation had been entirely given up, and the men, having laid aside their rifles, had gathered round their several native chiefs, assegais in hand, apparently determined to make a stand after their own fashion.94

Bengough arrived at Helpmekaar, where his men refused to go any further.

I have brought my Battalion to this [place], but in starting to march this morning to join the General the men, chiefs & all, declined to advance unless supported by white men. I am sure that if I attempted to compel them, they would simply disband themselves & then I should lose all my ammunition, guns, blankets etc.

They have behaved very well until today but they are thoroughly cowed by the reports of our disaster on 22nd.95

90 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, Fannin Letters, letter dated 9th February 1879. 91 Lieutenant Q. McK. Logan, quoted in Frank Emery, The Red Soldier, (London, 1977), p. 105, letter dated 1st

February, 1879. 92 Gloucestershire Records Office, D1233/45/6, Commeline Letters: Commeline to his father, 16th February 1879. 93 Bengough, Memories, p. 113. 94 Ibid., p. 114. 95 National Army Museum, 6807-386-8-19: Bengough to Colonel Bellairs, Deputy Adjutant General, 24th January

1879.

75

He was eventually able to convince them to continue and they doubtfully marched

on towards Rorke’s Drift. During this march, his men were persuaded by men of the 3rd

Regiment on their way home to do likewise. Worse, they were leaving with their

firearms. Accordingly, Bengough decided to disarm his battalion and disband them too:

The battalion was accordingly formed up, and after being instructed as to what was required of them, the command “ground arms” was given, and to my agreeable surprise, was obeyed.

I then told the men in whose possession the arms were, that they might return to their kraals until again called out.96

When he met Bengough shortly afterwards Lord Chelmsford, who was on his way

to Pietermaritzburg, was extremely upset by this unilateral action and ordered that those

of the battalion who had left be recalled at once.97

In the morning, what was left of the battalion paraded according to orders, and

Lord Chelmsford addressed the men through an interpreter, encouraging them to stand

fast to their regiment, and added that they were to go to a spot, Umsinga, some ten miles

west of Helpmakaar, to protect the magistracy and prevent the enemy from breaking

over the border into Natal.98

Thus ended the First Invasion, an adventure with very mixed success for the British

columns. The NNC had fared badly on both fronts, due largely to the leading role they

had been given by the commanding General. We have also observed how the men had

been brutally treated by Commandants Hamilton-Browne and Cooper. There was to be

worse to follow, as the reasons for this poor behaviour were investigated.

96 Bengough, Memories, p. 115. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid, p. 116.

76

Men of Bengough’s 2/1st Battalion

Men of Nettleton’s 2/2nd Battalion.

77

Chapter 4 Withdrawal and Re-organisation

In this chapter we follow the consequences of the severe reverse dealt to the 3rd

Column and to Lord Chelmsford personally. The deaths of so many Imperial soldiers at

Isandlwana was to mean a further delay in Chelmsford’s plans while replacements for

the losses were made up by the home government.

The performance of the 3rd Regiment on the 21st and 22nd January, and the retreat of

the 2nd Regiment from Eshowe, had serious repercussions for the NNC, not the least of

which was the obvious dissatisfaction of the Lieutenant General with their

commandants. One of them was dead and several others had demonstrated their

unsuitability for such a command. This chapter examines in detail the way in which his

dissatisfaction was expressed, how these problems were dealt with during the month of

February, and relates these actions to the new direction of the British force in the face of

the disaster.

The effective dissolution of the 3rd Regiment NNC at the end of January affected

only the African component of the regiment: the commandants, the European officers

and the NCOs were all under contract with the military authorities and could not be

dispensed with until that contract expired in May or later. It is for this reason that no

official announcement, such as a General Order, was made of the disbandment. The

officers had, therefore, to be found alternative employment.

Commandants Lonsdale and Hamilton-Browne, with several of their officers, were

packed off to the Cape in search of men to bolster the number of European mounted

78

volunteers in the field.1 Cooper took overall command of what remained of the

regiment and there is news of him in a newspaper report of 10th March to the effect that

he ‘and several of the officers of the 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent were

returning to Rorke’s Drift from Pietermaritzburg, where they had been refitting on ten

days leave’.2 He wrote a memorandum late in March in which he reported on the status

of the 3rd Regiment:

I have the honor to inform you that there are now (with the exception of one servant) no natives in the 3rd Regiment N.N. Contingent. The whole were disbanded on the 24th, 25th January last on our return to Rorke’s Drift.3

The NCOs, and some of their officers, were enrolled in three troops of a new

mounted force called the Natal Horse.4 The table to which reference is made shows that

there were 48, 50 and 60 men in each of the respective troops, a total of 158 men. Since

each battalion had a maximum of only 60 European NCOs, the difference in numbers

must have been made up from other NNC regiments. Other officers either resigned their

commissions5 or were drafted into the other units.6

Quite what Cooper was left to do is not known. He makes a tantalising re-

appearance in early May, in a memorandum sent to advise of his discharge of three

private soldiers from the 3rd Regiment.7 He signed the document ‘Commandant, 3rd

Regt. N.N.C.’. One must ask in what role European privates, who bore the names

Hendrick, Williams and Bundy, were engaged, for the only Europeans who had

previously served with the NNC were NCOs, and we have already observed that they

were drafted into the mounted infantry. It is very possible that these men were Imperial 1 General Order No. 29 dated 8th February 1879, Times of Natal, 10th February 1879. 2 Times of Natal, 17th March 1879: report of special war correspondent dated 10th March 1879. 3 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/13 No. 6, 24th March 1879. 4 Narrative, table in Appendix D, p. 169. See also General Order No. 73, dated 1st April 1879, Natal Mercury, 3rd

April 1879, which identifies Captain Bettington as a “late non-commissioned officer of Natal Native Contingent”, and No. 87 dated 16th April, 1879, Times of Natal, 21st April, 1879, which names Captain Nourse as doing the same. Cf. Tylden, Armed Forces of South Africa, p. 121, No. 351.

5 As did Lieutenant Barry of the 2nd Battalion: General Order No. 43, dated 26th February 1879, Times of Natal, 3rd March 1879.

6 Two of them were transferred to the Corps of Indians: General Order No. 68, dated 27th March 1879, Natal Mercury, 29th March 1879.

7 National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-18-30: Cooper to Assistant Military Secretary, 10th May 1879.

79

soldiers drafted temporarily into a small headquarters unit of the regiment for

organisational or clerical purposes. Their discharge, in apparently blameless

circumstances, presaged the final end of the regiment which would follow with the

completion by Cooper of his six months’ contract of service.

The African troops of the regiment, or at least those who were still willing to serve,

were drafted into the new Buffalo Border Guard for the ‘District which lies between

Estcourt and the border of the district where the Mooi & Tugela Rivers join’. This new

levy was described in a memorandum from Sir Henry Bulwer to Colonel Mitchell, the

Colonial Secretary, dated 1st February 1879.8 The proposal was for a force ‘1500 strong

or thereabouts’ and Bulwer described how the same chiefdoms which had sent men for

the 3rd Regiment could now be re-used:

From this District came the greater portion of the men belonging to Lonsdale’s Native Contingent attached to the Military Column No. 3. It is not proposed to resuscitate this regiment, and therefore the men belonging to it, and who reside in the Weenen County … can be called out for service with the Levy which it is now proposed to raise.9

It is interesting to note that the Lieutenant Governor was at pains to ensure that the

organisation of this new force complied with his own views, previously expressed, and

was perhaps aiming a shrewd swipe at Lord Chelmsford:

The tribal bodies are to be kept as distinct bodies, and commanded by their tribal leaders; and over each tribal body should be placed a European leader or commander.10

This was precisely the sort of defensive force which Lord Chelmsford had urged

upon the Natal government throughout much of 1878, and which led to the formation of

the NNC.

One now needs to consider why the 3rd Regiment was disbanded and its

commandants scattered. After all, Bengough had also dismissed his men and

Chelmsford had insisted that they be recalled. Why, then, had he not taken the same

8 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 688 No. 1062. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid.

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action with regard to the 3rd Regiment? The reason probably lies in the quality of the

commanders.

As commandant of the regiment, Lonsdale must bear the lion’s share of the

responsibility for the poor performance of both his officers and his men. The fighting

qualities of his regiment were quite different from those of his Mfengu levies during the

late Border War and he failed to note the differences, and then compensate for them.

Certainly he could claim that his men arrived too late for any substantial training to be

given, and he was also constrained by the quality of his officers and NCOs. His own

performance in the field, however, may have demonstrated to the Lieutenant General

that something was lacking in his leadership. His willingness to stay out on Hlazakazi

during the night of the 21st/22nd – despite the fact that his men had not eaten for many

hours, had no rations to sustain them, and was opposed by his officers, including

Hamilton-Browne and perhaps Cooper11 – must be counted as a negative response to a

situation fast running out of his control. In this respect, too, we must recall his relative

youth and inexperience compared with his subordinate commandants, while at the same

time noting that this also revealed a stubborn trait in his character which must have told

against him.

His explanations for leaving the field to return to the camp on the 22nd, of which he

gave several versions, were not entirely satisfactory and it would certainly have been

better for him to have remained on sick leave until he had fully recovered his health

rather than returning while still unwell. In mitigation, his ill-health was certainly a

contributing factor to his shortcomings and this, together with his previous good record,

must have persuaded Lord Chelmsford to give him a second chance, although in nothing

like so senior a command. It was to not to prove as satisfactory a change as was hoped.

11 Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, pp. 121-124.

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There is no disputing the personal courage of Hamilton-Browne, but he was a very

poor commander of African troops. He was brutal in his treatment of them under fire

and utterly disparaging in his references to them. We have already noted that his only

favourable words were with regard to his three companies of iziGqoza Zulu. One

redeeming feature, if we can believe it, was his response when, while breakfasting, Lord

Chelmsford asked him if he had had himself eaten: ‘No, nor have my men.’12

One is compelled to ask why Hamilton-Browne was so scornful of the majority of

his African troops in his writing? It must be remembered that the work was published

about 1912, some 30 years after the events recounted, and even after that lapse of time

the book is redolent with his contempt. During his career to this point in time, it will be

seen above that his adversaries had, with one exception, been non-Europeans: the

Maoris of New Zealand, the American Sioux and the Ngqika and Gcaleka during the

late Border War. Only once had he fought men of his own race and those were the

bushrangers of Australia, a much smaller affair than any of the other wars in which he

fought. His enemies, then, had not generated the respect that those of a European war

might have engendered. It is also very likely that his opinions reflected those of the

colonial men with whom he kept company, even those of the British officers with whom

he served. Certainly, that same contempt may be found in other contemporary

correspondence, although the Zulu War was to change not a few minds in that respect.13

We should note too that the same sentiment is repeated, if in less extreme terms, by

other writers, as will be shown shortly.

We should also briefly consider the leadership qualities of Commandant Cooper.

His battalion had served in a secondary role at Sihayo’s homesteads on 12th January and

his contribution during the Malakatha reconnaissance is notable principally for the 12 Ibid., p. 126. 13 See, for example, the letters of Lieutenant Curll, 2/24th, dated 19th February 1879: Killie Campbell Africana

Library, KCM 89/41/1/1, and Lieutenant Commeline R.E of 16th February 1879: Gloucestershire Records Office, Commeline Letters, D1233/45/6.

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silence of our sources about his role. There is a brief reference to his leadership style,

given by Lieutenant John Maxwell, who was relating his version of the panic of the

NNC men during the night of 21/22nd January:

… almost the first man I met was our Commandant (of the 2nd Battalion to which I belonged) … He had a knobkerrie in his hand and with this article was endeavouring to bring [the men] to some order. He called upon me to procure another persuader and assist him, which I did.14

From this reference it is clear that Cooper shared Hamilton-Browne’s contemptuous

view and reinforces the conclusion that such an attitude was quite common in the

service. For the rest, even Maxwell is silent about Cooper, an omission which speaks

volumes as to Cooper’s personality and ability.

These three men, therefore, were not worthy of retention in their commands and

Chelmsford arranged for their departure. Sending Lonsdale and Hamilton-Browne off to

recruit at the Cape was his Lordship’s way of treating them perhaps better than they

deserved, as he was also to do in another incident to be related shortly. We should note

that Lonsdale does not disappear entirely from view, although no longer with the NNC.

By April, he was back in Zululand in command of his own irregular unit, Lonsdale’s

Horse, or Lonsdale’s Mounted Rifles, with some of the men whom he and Hamilton-

Browne had successfully recruited at the Cape.15

Hamilton-Browne returned to Durban with some sixty recruits and there met up

with Lonsdale who was busy training his men. Hamilton-Browne was with these men

moving up towards the Lower Drift, when he was asked to take a message up to Lord

Chelmsford with the Eshowe relief column, and so was present as an observer at

Gingindlovu.16 He left an account of the battle in his book but one must reflect on the

fact that in this extended account, in which the first-person singular pronoun is that most

14 Maxwell, Reminiscences, p. 2. 15 District Order No. 5, dated 22nd April 1879, Natal Mercury, 24th April, 1879. See also Tylden, Armed Forces of

South Africa, p. 108, Hamilton-Browne, A Lost Legionary, p. 196. 16 Ibid., pp. 198f. See also Tylden, “Commandant George Hamilton-Browne of the Colonial Forces”.

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frequently used, there is not one mention of the Natal Native Contingent.17 He

commented upon the inexperience of the youthful British reinforcements and their

tendency to flee, held only by their officers, and compares them unfavourably with the

fearless performance of the Naval Brigade. There is even mention of the pursuit of the

defeated Zulu by the Imperial Mounted Infantry, but of the NNC there is nothing. One

might imagine that they were not even there.

He went back to the Cape shortly afterwards to collect a herd of mules for Natal

and during the voyage from Cape Town to Simon’s Bay he was apparently injured quite

badly by a kick from one of them.18 He subsequently returned to the Cape and ended his

contract period trying to recruit ‘Fingoes’ for service in Zululand, without success:

The natives were also told that they would be mostly wanted to do piquet duty, act as scouts, and take care of captured cattle; as there were already a large number of Natal natives who were doing much of the fighting work in the field. … Not a single man offered his services.19

We must now turn to the plight of Colonel Pearson with the 1st Column at Eshowe.

About 9 a.m. on 28th January Pearson received a telegram from Lord Chelmsford

advising him of the disaster at Isandlwana which had occurred six days earlier. He was

given the choice of holding his ground, which even then was being fortified by the

efforts of Captain Wynne, R.E., or withdrawing his column to the Lower Thukela.20

After a conference with his officers, the consensus was that they should withdraw,

and Pearson initially concurred, but then changed his mind and determined to stay on, as

a means of making a point to the Zulu king.21 The key issue which tipped the scale in

favour of remaining at Eshowe was the imminent arrival of a supply column under

17 Hamilton-Browne, Lost Legionary, pp. 205-213. 18 Ibid., p. 242. 19 Natal Witness, 10th May 1879. 20 BPP, C.2260, Enclosure A in Enclosure in No. 3, p. 11. This item states the time of receipt by Pearson as 11 a.m. In

BPP, C. 2367, Item A, Enclosure in No. 19, Pearson gives the times as 9 a.m., as does the Narrative, p. 53. 21 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 2554 C111/1879: Graves’ copy report of the NNC march to the

Thukela sent to Colonel Bellairs dated 12th March 1879. It is a rambling and sometimes almost incoherent document.

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Lieutenant Colonel H.W.F. Ely.22 In order to further conserve rations, Pearson also

decided that the mounted men and the two battalions of the 2nd Regiment NNC should

withdraw to the Thukela. The NNC units left Eshowe about noon on that same day, 28th

January, while the mounted men started somewhat later.23

The manner of the withdrawal by the NNC was less than text-book. The first

intimation came from a newspaper report as early as 1st February:

Opinions and accounts differ as regards the suddenly developed determination of these [NNC] people to go home, on reaching this side of the Tugela. Some of our volunteers, who accompanied them as far as the drift, attributed their dispersion to the apparent precipitancy of what looked like a retrograde movement ...24

This was gilding the lily. Another report of the same day, this time part of a letter

from a member of the mounted corps which returned, was more specific:

We made a forced march, leaving Etshowe at 2.15 p.m., and reaching the drift at 10.30 p.m. No enemy had appeared before Etshowe. If the Mounted Police troops and Native Contingent had left together at 5 p.m.. properly organised, and marched in proper order, the natives would have better understood the meaning of the movement.25

Still more explicit was an observation two days later:

It is … an evident essential to efficiency that the officers should know the language and have the confidence of the natives. The march back from Etshowe appears to have been anything but a creditable movement.26

Thus far, the untidy nature of the withdrawal seems to have been laid at the door of

the African troops of the Contingent. On 13th March, however, the Natal Colonist

published a ‘skit’, or what today would be called a satirical playlet, called ‘Chit Chat’,

to which some prominence was given, but no names were mentioned. The nub of the

piece was a brief conversation between two ‘citizens’ about the ‘Etshowe races’, the

gallant winner of which had returned to town. The winner was said to be unable ‘to eat

fire, so they’ve sent him back to protect the General’s last base’. The response to this

was the question ‘What! Has he gone back to his office?’ The relevance of some of

22 Norbury, The Naval Brigade in South Africa, p. 240. 23 TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, Inclosure 1 in No. 141. See also Times of Natal, 28th February, 1879. 24 Natal Mercury, 1st February, 1879, ‘Major Graves and the Native Contingent.’ 25 Ibid., ‘Return of Major Barrow’s Horse’. See also Norris-Newman, In Zululand with the British, p. 91f. 26 Natal Mercury, 3rd February, 1879, ‘The Native Contingent’.

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these barbs may not be immediately apparent. The reference to the ‘Etshowe races’ was

clearly the almost indecent haste of the withdrawal to the Thukela while the inability to

‘eat fire’ implies a lack of personal courage in the face of the enemy. The significance

of ‘going back to his office’ will become apparent shortly.

On the 18th February, the following newspaper item appeared:

I believe the whole responsibility of their [the men of the 2nd Regiment] sudden panic and consequent wish to go home, lies with the way in which the order for the retreat of the N.N.C. on the Tugela was carried out. By all the accounts which I can glean from those present at the time, a most injudicious haste, such as leaving all baggage, even to blankets and such articles as might easily have been carried on the persons of the owner, was used in packing them off, the expression “everyone for himself!” having even, it is said, more than once been used. The retreat of the Contingent consequently was conducted without order or method, the whites all herding together, and leaving their men – natives – to their own resources.27

By this time, rumours were rife in Durban about the retreat and who should bear

the responsibility for its ill-disciplined execution. Nothing further was heard until the

following month, while an exchange of correspondence took place between Colonel

William Bellairs, Deputy Adjutant-General, and the editor of the Natal Witness. Not

having achieved his object by this means, Bellairs went public and arranged for the

correspondence and other documents to be published in the Colonist and Mercury.28

Publication revealed that Colonel Bellairs had demanded, on behalf of Lord

Chelmsford, that the Natal Witness divulge the name of an officer who had accused a

second officer of cowardice. Included in Bellairs’ letter was a paragraph which now

publicly identified the officer thus vilified as Major Shapland Graves, commandant of

the 2nd Regiment NNC.

In his reply the editor of the Witness, Mr Statham, refused to divulge the name of

the officer responsible for the accusation and went on to ask some penetrating questions

of his own:

I may, however, venture to draw His Excellency’s attention to the fact that, whereas in General Order No. 38, Captain Barton, 7th Foot, is appointed to certain duties at Greytown, in General Order No. 43, issued only six days later, Captain Barton, 7th Foot, is directed to proceed

27 Natal Colonist, 18th February 1879: a correspondent quoted in the leader article. 28 Natal Colonist, 22nd March 1879; Natal Mercury, 29th March, 1879.

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to take over the command of a certain native regiment from Major Graves, who is there stated to be “appointed to another duty.” And I may further beg to be informed as to the nature of the “other duty” to which Major Graves has been appointed, and the number of the General Order in which his appointment is to be found.29

The contents of two telegrams, both dated 20th February, to which reference was

made, were also published.

(From Colonial Secretary, Maritzburg, to H.E. Lord Chelmsford, Durban.) Are Major Graves’ services any longer required by Your Excellency as Commandant of a

Natal Native Contingent Regiment?

(From Lord Chelmsford, Durban, to Colonel Law, Fort Pearson.) I have just received the following telegram from the Colonial Secretary:–’Are Major

Graves’ services any longer required by Your Excellency as Commandant of a Natal Native Contingent Regiment?’

Please communicate its contents to Major Graves, and tell him that I cannot conscientiously say his services are required, as his battalion will only be on the passive defensive. I think therefore, he ought to rejoin his proper appointment.30

The significance of the telegrams seems to suggest that a request had been made by

the colonial government for the return of Major Graves to his previous post as Protector

of Immigrants. In fact, Lord Chelmsford was being particularly disingenuous by

arranging publication of the telegrams because on the 19th February he had written a

note to Colonel Charles Mitchell, Colonial Secretary of Natal, as the latter explained to

Sir Henry Bulwer:

Following close on Gallwey’s cipher despatch of yesterday comes this note of Lord Chelmsford’s.

It is, I submit, useless to allow a man in whom the General has lost confidence to continue in Command and perhaps the course indicated is the best to leave an open exposure.

Will Your Exc’y give me instructions in time to save today’s post.31

This was the note which the General had written:

Can you help me to get Major Graves out of his present position by asking me officially whether he can be spared to go back to his proper position as Protector of Immigrants?

He is a failure as a C.O. and is impetuous. In the retreat from Etshowe, he evidently lost his head and brought the natives and their

European leaders back as a disgraceful rabble. I do not, of course, wish to dismiss him, but it is certainly in the interests of the colony that

he should be removed. I can replace him with a good officer. If you would telegraph the question, I could send it on to Graves and say that I do not feel

justified in retaining his services. This will let him down easy.32

29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 2554, No. C42. 32 Ibid.: Lord Chelmsford to Colonial Secretary, 19th February 1879.

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The correspondence ends with a further brief note:

Captain Barton, 7th Fusiliers, will receive orders today from the D.A.G. to travel to Stanger & relieve Major Graves. I had hoped this order would have been give four days ago.33

On the 18th March 1879, the following notice appeared in the Natal Government

Gazette:

His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor directs it to be notified that Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies has been pleased to confirm the following appointments, viz.:–

MAJOR SHAPLAND GRAVES,

3rd Regiment, “The Buffs” to be Protector of Immigrants in this Colony.34

The mention in the skit of someone ‘going back to his office’ is now clear – it

referred to Graves’ return to his post as Protector of Immigrants. By these rather

Machiavellian actions Graves had been deftly set aside to a position in which any

further publicity or action about the return from Eshowe could do no harm to the

military command.

This correspondence is very instructive because it exposes much more than the

usual bare statements of appointment in the Natal Government Gazette or the sterile

General Orders. It reveals the politics of military command and allows us to enter the

mind of Lord Chelmsford and the coterie of officers around him. It also serves to

confirm the generally kindly nature of Chelmsford himself towards an errant officer.

His retention of Lonsdale, albeit in a subordinate rather than commanding role, is

further evidence of his compassionate nature.

Upon arrival at the Thukela, many of the African troops of the 2nd Regiment

departed for their homes, the complement of the regiment quickly being reduced to less

than 600 out of the original 2,200 men.35 This was not desertion but rather the result of

the normal African custom of returning home after any lengthy excursion.

33 Ibid.: Lieutenant Colonel Crealock, Assistant Military Secretary to Lord Chelmsford, to Colonial Secretary, 26th

February 1879. 34 NGG, 18th March 1879: Government Notice No. 70, 1879. 35 Natal Colonist, 21st October 1879; “A Protest”.

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[From what I have heard] I have come to the conclusion that the Natives dispersed through a strong desire to visit their families and relatives, that some of them considered they might do so without offence, and that this desire to visit their homes was increased by rumours which reached them soon after arrival at Tugela, that various misfortunes had occurred during their absence.36

Unlike that of the 3rd Regiment, their dispersal was, however, for the most part

orderly, the men remaining until they were paid. Specifically, those belonging to

Mqawe, Dikwayo and Delewayo are mentioned by name, and it was noted that

‘Umqawe held his men together until properly dismissed, although beyond all dispute

they were quite as anxious and excited as the others about going home’.37 Nor were the

men, at least those of the 2nd Battalion, treated by their officers as though they were

cowards, as evidenced by the certificate awarded to them by Commandant Nettleton

averring that ‘their behaviour had been exemplary, & that he would be glad to command

them again.’38

Following the death of Durnford at Isandlwana, the command of the men at

Kranskop remained temporarily with Captain Geoffry Barton, Staff Officer to the 2nd

Column. He has been mentioned several times to this point and since he is to take a

prominent role in the leadership of the NNC, we should now look more closely at his

antecedents.39 He was born on 22nd February 1844 and purchased his commission in the

7th Fusiliers on 3rd October 1862.40 He purchased his lieutenancy on 14th February 1865

and was promoted to captain on 1st April 1874. He served in the Ashanti War in 1873-4

in the Transport service and also took part in several engagements.41 General Order No.

218 contained the following announcement:

Lieut.-Colonel Durnford R.E., is appointed to command a column now in course of formation, …

The following officers will be attached:-

36 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/1/33 No. 65: W.P. Jackson, R.M. of South Tugela, to Secretary of

Native Affairs, 10the February 1879. 37 Ibid. 38 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/1/33 No. 4: Charles Barter, R.M. Inanda, to Secretary of Native

Affairs, 7th February 1879. 39 This spelling of his forename is correct. 40 TNA (PRO) WO 31/1303. 41 Hart’s Annual Army List 1879.

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Captain Barton, 1-7th Regt., arrived from England, to act as Staff Officer to the Column.42

Barton was thus aged 34 years when he arrived in South Africa. In passing, we should

note that this officer is generally confused by modern writers with Captain William

Barton, who was serving concurrently in command of Zikhali’s Horse under Lieutenant

Colonel Durnford.43 Suffice it to say here that Captain William Barton was present at

the battle at Isandlwana while Captain Geoffry Barton very definitely was not.

With effect from 27th January, Brevet Major A.C. Twentyman was posted to

Greytown:

2. Brevet Major Twentyman. 2-4th Foot, having arrived at Greytown, will take command of that District, and act as Inspecting Field Officer in charge of Colonial District No. VII, relieving Brevet Major Blake, who will rejoin his Company.44

Within days, the NNC units at Kranskop were then placed under the overall command

of Twentyman in a general reassignment of African troops:

1. No. 2 Column [Durnford’s] having been broken up, the following arrangements will be carried into effect:–

The 2nd Battalion [Bengough’s], Natal Native Contingent will be attached to No. 3 Column.

The troops at Kranzkop, in the Greytown District, will be under the command of Brevet Major Twentyman, 2-4th Foot.

The Mounted Native Contingent (with exception of the troops at Kranzkop) will be attached to No. 3 Column, until required to join No. 4 Column.45

Barton was shortly afterwards detached from the NNC, if only briefly, to become

staff officer to Twentyman at Greytown.46

While Major Twentyman was not a formal commandant of the NNC, his career is

included in some detail here because he was to play an active role in the movements of

the 1st Regiment as a result of his command at Greytown.

Augustus Charles Twentyman was born on the 29th April 1836 and enlisted in the

4th Regiment as ensign without purchase on 21st December 1855. He was promoted

42 General Order No. 218 dated 9th December 1878, Times of Natal, 11th December 1878. 43 This matter is examined fully in the author’s article “The Several Captains Barton”, Soldiers of the Queen, No. 114,

September 2003. 44 General Order No. 19 dated 27th January, 1879 Times of Natal, 29th January 1879 45 General Order No. 32 dated 12th February 1879, Times of Natal, 14th February 1879. 46 General Order No. 38 dated 20th February 1879, Times of Natal, 24th February 1879

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lieutenant without purchase on 15th June 1858, but purchased his commission as captain

on 9th October 1863 and received his brevet majority on 1st October 1877. At the time of

the Zulu War he was, therefore, 43 years of age and had considerable experience, seeing

service in Mauritius, the East Indies and Afghanistan. On 4th February 1873, the then

Captain Twentyman married Julia Lucas with whom he had a son, William Augustus

Holme, born on 18th April 1875.47

What were the activities of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Regiment? They both

remained stationary at Kranskop and they now had time to fill. At Kranskop itself,

Cherry was senior to Montgomery by virtue of his Army commission and took local

command. It was a quiet period. As Thompson observes, ‘Scares aside, the middle

border was a quiet sector. The high flowing Thukela practically ruled out enemy

operations for the rest of the summer.’48

The restless, and energetic Montgomery arranged a ‘sport’s day’ on 12th February

in which the officers and men of the regiment competed in various events. In

accordance with the mores of the day, Africans and white men did not compete in the

same event.49 Montgomery even arranged for himself and a group a friends to climb the

previously unscaled Kranskop itself, and proved his success by lighting a fire on the

summit, to the astonishment of observers.50

Captain Cherry began the fortification of a hilltop which commanded the

immediate Thukela valley, and which was to bear his name.

Fannin also states that if the Zulus come to Kranskop in small bodies they will be driven back, but they have no force to meet a large body. Very few desertions as yet, but the Native Contingent cannot be relied on. The camp there is entrenched and called Fort Cherry; there are 130 Europeans, and about 900 natives to defend it.51

47 TNA (PRO) WO 76/115 (Record of Services) and WO 76/116 (Statement of Services). 48 Thompson, Natal Native Contingent, p. 106. 49 Natal Colonist, 18th February 1879: ‘With The Native Contingent’. 50 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J, Fannin Letters, 19th February 1879. 51 Natal Witness, 13th February, 1879: ‘With No 2 Column – Native Contingent’.

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The quoted number of 900 men represents all that was left of Durnford’s 1st and 3rd

Battalions, which had lost some 250 men after the three companies of the 1st Battalion

had marched off to Rorke’s Drift. The regiment thus also lost some men through

desertion although these were not many and certainly far fewer than those of the 3rd

Regiment. The small number remaining also serves to emphasise the relatively small

size of Cherry’s 3rd Battalion even at that late date.

We left Major Bengough and his 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment at Sandspruit,

the seat of the Umsinga magistracy.

We accordingly found the spot indicated, a bit of high ground commanding the main road to Helpmakaar, and here we remained until the middle of May, 1879, when we joined the 2nd Division under the command of General Newdigate.52

On this small hill just to the south of Sandspruit he also set to work constructing an

eponymous fort.

In my last, I have told you we have taken up our position on the top of a small kopje, round which we built of a wall breast high, but owing to a good many of our men having deserted, we have since built a redoubt with two flanking bastions in the centre; this is composed of a plump wall some six feet high, and between three or four or feet thick, where we will retire in case of need. I am sorry to say that sickness is beginning to show itself in our camp, and both officers and men are down with dysentery.53

The site was described by Lieutenant Commeline when he passed through:

[Sandspruit] is not marked on Jeppe’s map but is just 18 miles short of the Tugela. Here we found our old friends the 3rd Regt [sic] of native infantry encamped in a strong stone walled enclosure on the top of a round hill, the position that we had selected the day after we arrived there. It is a most awful place to live in as the ground is completely covered with great rough boulders and there is not an inch of shade except what they have obtained by making straw shelters. We lunched with Major Bengough and his adjutant …”54

Thus began the boring hiatus for the men of the 2nd and 3rd Columns as they sat and

waited for the next campaign to begin.

In the aftermath of Isandlwana and the Eshowe retreat, there was an inquiry into

the reasons for the dispersal of the men of the Contingent.55 As a result, several

Resident Magistrates convened meetings with the chiefs concerned with the intention of 52 Bengough, Memories, p. 116. 53 Natal Witness, 13th February, 1879: ‘With No 2 Column – Native Contingent’ and headed ‘Fort Bengough,

Umsinga Division’. 54 Gloucester Records Office, Commeline Letters, D1233/45/6, letter dated 16th February 1879. 55 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1926, No. C23.

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discovering the reasons behind their apparent desertion. Two of these officials gave the

following account of their meeting with the chiefs of the men of the 3rd Regiment:

The Chiefs assembled were— 1. Umkungo [Mkhungo], who was accompanied by his brother Isikoto [Sikhota]; the latter had been out on service with the Native Contingent, and had escaped from the camp at Isandhlawana on the 22nd ultimo. 2. Domba [Ndomba]. 3. M. Ghana [Mganu]. 4. Pagade [Phakade] was at a distant kraal, mourning the death of his sons, but a few of his

people were present.56

It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that Mkhungo’s iziGqoza Zulu and Ndomba’s

amaBhele were in Hamilton-Browne’s 1st Battalion, while Mganu’s abaThembu and

Phakade’s amaChunu were in Cooper’s 2nd Battalion.

The chiefs’ responses are quite revealing. The report is cited below, and gives the

precise nature of the chiefs’ complaints. It is worth quoting extensively because it

enumerates the many problems which had previously been brought to the attention of

the British commanders but which had remained unaddressed:

First. Of the insufficiency of food, they say that only a quarter of a beast was issued daily for 100 men, and a small pannikin of meal each, and that instead of the insides of the cattle killed for them being given to them, the butchers sold them on their own account.

Secondly. That when they captured cattle and asked for some to kill and eat, according to their custom, they were refused and had no food given them, and when they surprised the enemy’s people cooking and captured their food, they were not allowed to eat it, but it was restored to the enemy.

Thirdly. That they had no food at all for three days at the time of the General’s advance against Matyane and the capture of the head-quarters camp.

Fourthly. That very many of their men were flogged for making water within certain forbidden bounds and for washing themselves in certain streams, although they never heard any orders that they were not to do so; the floggings ranging from 6 to 20 lashes.

Fifthly. That they could not understand their officers, many of them could not speak any native language, and the others only the Amapondo dialect, and if they (the men) spoke when they received an order they did not understand, their officers said they were impertinent.

Sixthly. That they were drilled continually, and that the old men were tired and incapable of understanding the drill, and if they made mistakes their officers struck them.

Seventhly. That when out in the field their men were always divided into small companies and scattered in various directions, and could at any time have been destroyed by the enemy being thus divided and dispersed.

Eighthly. That their [traditional] system of fighting was ignored, and whatever they said regarding the Zulu movements in warfare were [sic] disregarded, and they were told to shut their mouths.

Ninthly. That the Zulus would fire at them as long their ammunition lasted and then hide, and they, the Contingent men, were ordered not to kill them, but take them alive, and when men in caves fired at them they were not allowed to go in and kill them, but were ordered to make prisoners of them.

56 BPP, C. 2318, No. 7, quoting a report of Major-General Lloyd and Mr Paterson. Lloyd was District Commander

and Paterson was Resident Magistrate, respectively, of Weenen County.

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Tenthly. That whilst the Zulus spared no one, they were not allowed to kill wounded men. The foregoing is the substance of the statements made to me by the indunas of the different

tribes.57

This report was followed by several more, from different districts and chiefs, of

almost exactly the same content.58 The first report also refers to the problem of the

departure of the mounted infantry and volunteers for Helpmekaar, which the African

auxiliaries regarded as a desertion of them. Still worse regarded was the departure of the

commanding officer, Lord Chelmsford, the day after Isandlwana. Other reasons

emerged in the report of a second magistrate:

Very many of these natives, on their return from the front, reported themselves to this office.

2. Some of them declare, and adhere to the statement, that officers of the Contingent told them to return home and await further orders, as provisions were short.

3. Others, to use their own words, said to me, “We saw that the Government was driven out of Zululand, and the wind blew us back also.” In their extreme ignorance many thought that the Commander-in-Chief’s visit to Maritzburg was a flight from the enemy.

4 Another reason for their retreat, and to them a very strong one, was the necessity of going home and performing the rites of “purifying” after shedding blood.

5. Another alleged reason was that they were placed under officers whom they could not understand, and who did not understand them, the consequence being that they were severely treated for not obeying orders of which they did not know the purport.

6. It is stated, and I conclude with some ground of truth, that some of them were led by their officers in their retreat. Others saw their officers killed, and were left without control and fled.59

The quotations above are quite substantial but the writer is anxious that the reasons

why the men of the 3rd Regiment seemingly deserted did not rest so much on a lack of

courage as upon the treatment they had received in the short time since their service

began, a general lack of confidence in their officers and upon their perception of the

behaviour of their commanders at the time. Furthermore, they were used in a role for

which they were never intended. They were sent out on a reconnaissance mission where

they were exposed to the full force of a Zulu onslaught,60 while only one in ten men

possessed a firearm and even these were inadequately trained in their use. Thus, in the

two battalions of some 1600 men which roamed the hills south-east of Isandlwana on

57 Ibid. 58 See, for example, BPP C. 2318, No. 12: report of Albert P. Allison, Resident Magistrate, Upper Tugela and the

report of W.J.D. Moodie which follows. 59 BPP C. 2318, No. 9B: report of W.J.D. Moodie, Resident Magistrate, Klip River. 60 A concern raised by Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, p. 188f.

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21st January, probably less than 200 possessed firearms, and many of these were

obsolete muzzle-loading rifles.

While Lord Chelmsford had himself retained his confidence in his African troops,

despite their seeming failure on active service, the serious problem with their breaking

under pressure had not gone unnoticed in London:

That the Zulus will close with the Breech-loader, & that the Native Contingent will break up before the impact of the Zulu charge, is now known, but it was first learnt in the hard school of adversity.61

With the withdrawal of two of the three columns from Zululand,62 and the third

isolated at Eshowe, Lord Chelmsford was compelled to await the reinforcements which

the British government felt bound to send out. It was essential that the Isandlwana

defeat be avenged and the Zulu king defeated; matters of form, such as the way the war

had been induced, were for the moment set aside. Chelmsford therefore set himself two

objectives. The first of these was the defence of the Natal border against any attack

which might be made by the Zulu. The second, which would require some of the

reinforcements to complete, was the relief of the garrison at Eshowe.

Concurrently, the debate between the Lieutenant General and the Lieutenant

Governor concerning the NNC was re-ignited. The General was extremely concerned

that the NNC had seemingly deserted and all three NNC regiments were in tatters. We

have already seen that Sir Henry Bulwer initiated an enquiry as to the reasons for the

‘desertions’ and, based upon the responses from his Resident Magistrates, he re-stated

his case for the Natal government’s opposition when the Contingent had been formed.

In a long and detailed memorandum, Sir Henry set out his reasons for the problems

61 TNA (PRO), WO 30/129: Undated memorandum from Horse Guards relating to Lord Chelmsford’s request for a

second-in-command. 62 Colonel Wood’s 4th Column had withdrawn to Khambula: TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Inclosure 3 in No. 61.

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which had been inherent in the Contingent as a result of his government’s views being

ignored.63

His first objection was to the novel concept of imposing a ‘regimental’ system

upon African troops, to whom such an arrangement was entirely foreign. By this, Sir

Henry was referring to the artificial division of the men into ten companies of exactly

100 men, in each battalion. The men drafted into the Contingent could not, of course, be

so precisely placed into companies because the levy numbers from the various

chiefdoms were never exactly divisible by 100; such adjustments as needed to be made

to accommodate this problem had already caused some initial difficulties with the chiefs

involved:

I have been kept going since I arrived here in getting the Amabula Wenkosi into companies. There is not very much trouble in doing so, except that the various tribes are not represented by hundreds. In one case, i.e. Pakade’s, he has sent more than his number, and I find them already arranged in companies of from 20 to 145 men, and they very much object to be mixed up, but I have overcome their objections & have them arranged into 6 companies for the 2nd Batt.64

Bulwer’s suggested alternative arrangement was to allow the men to be grouped

informally under what was called a ‘tribal’ system. Such groups, obviously varying in

number, would have been led by their own chiefs, all under the leadership of a few

European officers. (This almost certainly reflects the organisation previously developed

by Shepstone as described in the first chapter, and which had been used in the

Langalibalele affair; it had also been adopted by Wood for his Irregulars in the 4th

Column.) Instead, the regimental organisation had required some thirty European

officers for each battalion, a number which had been recognised as impossible to obtain

in Natal, so that recourse had to made to the Cape for sufficient men. Furthermore, each

battalion required no less than sixty white NCOs, which number had also been virtually

unobtainable without the employment of many undesirables.

63 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 1421 No. 1053: Bulwer to Chelmsford, 7th February 1879. 64 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 675 No. 4945: Lonsdale to Colonial Secretary, 23rd December 1878.

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The Lieutenant Governor then identified two matters about which, he complained,

he had not been consulted:

A considerable departure from this understanding was subsequently made by the Lieut.-General, and without reference to me. He decided (1) that the appointment of officers should rest with him, and (2) that a number of Europeans (I believe about 60) should be added to each battalion as non-commissioned officers. This, it is evident, was a very important departure from the arrangement.65

There then arose a matter which impinged upon the dignity and authority of Sir Henry

himself, and it is best, once again, if the Lieutenant Governor’s words speak for

themselves:

9. The Lieutenant-General says, indeed, that as the troops in the field would have to be commanded by himself as their “Supreme Military Chief”, he does not understand how the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor, as Supreme Chief, could have been otherwise than superseded. But I have to observe, with regard to this, that, so far as the Native population of this Colony is concerned, there is no such position recognised as that of a Military Supreme Chief independent of the Supreme Chief. That position (so far as the Native population is concerned) is nowhere, so far as I am aware, conferred upon the Lieutenant-General who may happen to command Her Majesty’s forces in South Africa. The Supreme Chieftainship is vested in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor, and into his hands alone, and no provision is made for the supersession of the Lieutenant-Governor by any military or other authority.66

The remainder of the memorandum was taken up by the presentation of the

findings of the Resident Magistrates, a matter which has already been discussed.

In a belated reply, Lord Chelmsford answered the criticisms point by point,

essentially arguing that the matters raised had been adopted virtually as the Lieutenant

Governor had required.67 For example, ‘the tribal system as sketched out by Sir Henry

Bulwer was fully carried out in Commandant Lonsdale’s Contingent …’; all officers

had been approved by Sir Henry before being appointed, although it could not be

expected that he know their qualifications personally. However, said the Lieutenant

General, the ‘tribal’ system of leadership proposed by the Lieutenant Governor ‘appears

to me tantamount to appointing a military officer to command a battalion, but giving the

65 Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Chelmsford, 7th February 1879: Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 1421 No.

1053. 66 Ibid. 67 GH 1421, unnumbered, p. 113: Chelmsford to Bulwer, 4th March 1879.

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command of the companies to civilians.’ On the matter of the title Supreme Military

Chief, Lord Chelmsford was at pains to point out that

I merely used the expression “Supreme Military Chief” as representing my position with regard to the command of the Native Contingents, and not as arrogating to myself a special position in the Natal Colony.

Perhaps as a sop to Sir Henry’s pride, Lord Chelmsford added

Altho’, as Sir Henry Bulwer justly says, the system I pressed upon him was not in accordance with His Excellency’s views, it was acquiesced in by him without meeting with his approval, at my solicitation.

On the matter of the complaints of the chiefs, the Lieutenant General dismissed

them lightly:

As regards the complaints made by Umkungo, I have only to state that they must be looked upon as second-hand, as that Chief was not in the Field.

His brother Seikoto [Sikhotha] accompanied the Contingent and, according to Commandant Lonsdale’s report to me on the 23rd January, expressed his perfect willingness to serve again with his men.

Adverting to the principal bone of contention, that of the military organisation of

the Contingent, Lord Chelmsford referred to a memorandum of the Lieutenant Governor

in which Sir Henry had substantially agreed with the sub-division of a large body of

men, and the necessity for such sub-divisions to be led by Europeans. The letter

includes a propitiatory penultimate paragraph:

I cannot but think that His Excellency the Lt.-Governor and myself have been arguing this question out without [it being] thoroughly understood that the points of difference between us are not really vital ones.

The above correspondence was, in the normal course, copied to the High

Commissioner. On 7th March, Sir Henry Bulwer wrote the following note to Sir Bartle

Frere, indicating quite clearly that he was not to be mollified.

I have no desire to continue this controversy. On this account, therefore, I abstain from entering into any notice of the various points in the Lieutenant-General’s Minute which, otherwise, I might be disposed to think require notice. I will only observe that there is much in the Lieutenant-General’s Minute with which I cannot agree, both with regard to the past and with regard to the interpretations which he puts upon what I have said.

I wish this to be fully understood, so that, by my not now recording what I might have to say with reference to the contents of the Lieutenant-General’s Minute, it may not be assumed that I accept or endorse all that is said in that Minute.68

68 Ibid., No. 20: Bulwer to Frere, 7th March 1879.

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This implacable response from the Lieutenant Governor was to be one of the

catalysts which was eventually to bring about Lord Chelmsford’s recall.

We can summarise the month of February as being one of radical change for the

Natal Native Contingent. The 3rd Regiment had been disbanded and its officers and

NCOs dispersed; the commandant of the 2nd Regiment had been found wanting and had

been subtly replaced. In place of the latter, and also to replace the dead Colonel

Durnford, two more, very different, regular Army officers emerge: Barton, much more

efficient, and Twentyman, greatly experienced, and although the latter was not the

official commandant of the 1st Regiment, he was to direct its activities for the nonce.

The ‘regimental’ nature of the Contingent would remain, but without the

impediment of the NCOs, while its structure would be further streamlined in coming

weeks. Its role had been found greatly wanting and it had to change. Its function was

also to change, adopting the traditional role of its forebears in the Ninth Border War –

scouting and following up a defeated enemy.

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Chapter 5 Demonstrations and Relief

The months of March to May provided a period of re-organisation and re-

equipment for the remnants of the NNC. During that time the relief of Colonel

Pearson’s 1st Column at Eshowe was effected, in the course of which the battle of

Gingindlovu was fought and won, in which the two NNC battalions on the coast were

both involved. The remaining units of the NNC were called upon, as were regular

British forces, to provide diversions to cover the operation. The remainder of the time to

the end of May was occupied with preparations for the second invasion of Zululand. It

is in this role that the NNC on the coast will be brought into closer focus.

On the 18th March, it was announced that the NNC was to be re-structured; the

regimental organisation was abandoned and five independent battalions were

established from the ruins of what remained after Isandlwana and the Eshowe retreat.

3. The infantry battalions of the Natal Native Contingent will in future be considered as one regiment, numbered as follows:– 1st Battalion, Captain Montgomery; 2nd ditto, Major Bengough; 3rd ditto, Captain Cherry; 4th ditto, Captain Barton; 5th ditto, Commandant Nettleton.1

Barton had been away from the NNC for little more than three weeks before being

given his new NNC command. The commandants were now responsible individually to

the brigade commanders of their division. In the previous chapter, we saw that

Bengough’s 2nd Battalion was attached to the 3rd Column under Colonel Glyn. The

others remained as previously assigned: the 1st and 3rd Battalions remained at Kranskop

near the Middle Drift, while the 4th and 5th were at the Lower Thukela. At Kranskop,

Captain Cherry, being the senior officer, took overall command.

1 General Order No. 59, dated 18th March, 1879, Natal Mercury, 20th March, 1879.

100

At the 19th March, Montgomery’s 1st Battalion stood at 713 men, while only a day

later Cherry’s 3rd Battalion stood at a mere 186.2 This latter was a cause for some alarm

and again memoranda flew between the military and civil authorities:

Can you kindly tell me if the 3rd Batt. 1st Regt. N.N. Contingent under Captain Cherry at Krans Kop, is likely to be reinforced in Natives. It numbers at present about 180, and I understand never has been stronger. If not more Natives are to join, its present surplus officers would become available for other duties.3

The Resident Magistrate was asked for an explanation and could offer only a

negative response.

I have spared no trouble to procure men for Capt. Cherry’s Contingent, and have sent Police to collect people of Umzwangedwa, Umtshibongo and Nondonisa, but beyond a few old and crippled men, there are none left at Buffalo.

There is therefore no possibility of making up Capt. Cherry’s number from men of this County.4

Such was the state of the battalions at Kranskop that they were over-burdened with

both officers and NCOs. When the NCOs of the 3rd Regiment had been drafted into

mounted infantry units,5 it is almost certain that those of the 1st Regiment were also

similarly drafted. A number of officers from both battalions were transferred to new

squadrons of ‘Native Horse’ formed at Kranskop and the Lower Thukela, or were

drafted to existing mounted units.6 Indeed one officer, specifically identified as ‘being

in excess of establishment’, was allowed to resign his commission.7 In April no less

than sixty European NCOs were sent to the Lower Drift to join the Imperial Mounted

Infantry.8 Thus by this time, there were no NCOs with the NNC and the officers were

called upon to bear the brunt of command. By May, there were few officers left at

Kranskop and those few who remained were not anxious to renew their six-month

contracts, which were due to expire in May and June.

2 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/14 Nos. 10 and 12 respectively. 3 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/12 No. 67: Bellairs to Colonial Secretary, 6th March 1879. 4 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/12 No. 70: Resident Magistrate Jackson to Secretary of Native

Affairs, 24th April 1879. 5 See Chapter 4. 6 General Order No. 53 dated 9th March 1879, Times of Natal, 12th March 1879. 7 General Order No. 58, dated 17th March, 1879, Natal Mercury, 19th March, 1879. 8 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J, Fannin Letters: 21st April 1879.

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During this period, many Africans returned to the various NNC battalions which

they had left after Isandlwana and the march from Eshowe to the Thukela. On the 19th

March, the battalions with the 1st Column on the coast comprised Barton’s 4th Battalion

with 711 men9 and Nettleton’s 5th with 822.10 On the 17th April, Bengough’s 2nd

Battalion composed 1059 men.11

Some attempt was also made to arm the men properly and to improve their

uniforms. In this way, both the image and the morale of the five battalions would be

improved. Bengough’s 2nd Battalion was issued with 200 Sniders and 300 Martini-

Henrys,12 the 3rd Battalion received Sniders and muzzle loaders,13 while the 4th was

issued with Sniders and Martini-Henrys.14 There is every reason to suppose that the

other battalions were similarly re-equipped.

In each case, the men trained with their new weapons, with varying levels of

success. Bengough opined: ‘The back-sight was never quite understood, and was, I

believe, considered by the men to possess some magic power’.15

Similarly, some attempt was made to improve the uniform for the NNC, hitherto

merely a red scarf or band around the head. By June, the battalions on the coast at least

had been equipped with red tunics, as well as being armed with Martini-Henry rifles16

and it is likely that the 2nd Battalion was similarly dressed.17

Measures were also taken to simplify the complex drill in which attempts had been

made to train the battalions in the few weeks before the war began and

9 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/14 No. 9. 10 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/14 No. 11. 11 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/6/14 No. 8. 12 Bengough, Memories, p. 127. 13 Narrative p. 170. 14 Natal Mercury, 15th March 1879: ‘With the Isipingo Mounted Rifles’. 15 Ibid.; Bengough, loc. cit. 16 Norbury, Naval Brigade, p. 287. 17 Captain W.E. Montague, Campaigning in South Africa: Reminiscences of an Officer in 1879, (London, 1880), p.

213.

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recognition was at last given to a more appropriate role which they were to fulfill: ‘…

the proper sphere for the Zulu battalions was undoubtedly that of outpost duty – spies

and scouts – thus pitting native against native’.18 By this, one must assume that it was

felt to be more fitting that Africans should take this role, rather than British troops.

The armed and uniformed men of the 4th and 5th Battalions NNC

As reinforcements began to arrive in March, Lord Chelmsford commenced active

planning for the relief of Eshowe. In order that the expedition be more successfully

accomplished, the Lieutenant-General asked for the co-operation of the column

commanders in providing demonstrations which might divert the Zulu king’s attention

from the real objective.

I have just come back from Greytown and Krantzkop - I am collecting as many natives as I can secure out of the [Natal] Government along the Tugela border and I hope to be able to send in large raiding parties with a hooroosh,19 directly you are in a position to resume the advance.20

18 Bengough, Memories, pp. 127f. 19 The word ‘hooroosh’ is not found in modern dictionaries but may be defined as ‘a cry or clamor of excitement or

confusion’. It was used by Melville in Moby Dick: “What a hooroosh aloft there!” See Herman Melville, Moby Dick or The Whale, (New York, 1851), chapter 120.

20 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, Wood Papers, II/2/2: Lord Chelmsford to Colonel Evelyn Wood, 3rd March 1879.

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It is not clear who should have been making the demonstrations but the instruction

seems to refer to the Border Guard, which was under the command of the commanders

of the various Colonial Defensive Districts, and thence the Lieutenant Governor. The

only African troops commanded by the Lieutenant General were the NNC and

associated forces such as the Natal Pioneers and the men of the Mounted Contingent. Of

these, only the two battalions of the NNC, a company of Pioneers and Jantze’s mounted

troop were at the Middle Drift.

On the 11th March, Sir Henry and Lord Chelmsford met at Pinetown to discuss a

number of matters, including the demonstrations for which the Lieutenant General had

asked.21 Bulwer left this meeting convinced that he and Lord Chelmsford had agreed

that while the Border Guard would assemble for a demonstration, they would not be

required to cross the river into Zululand. This restriction did not, of course, extend to the

NNC. Bulwer used the agreement as the basis for orders to his District Commanders

that their levies were not to cross the river border, but could be used on the Natal side

for demonstrations.22

Only days later, the Lieutenant General again wrote privately to Colonel Wood,

formally requesting his assistance with demonstrations and stating his intentions with

regard to other areas.

If you are in a position to make any forward movement about the 27th of this month, so that the news of it may reach the neighbourhood of Ekowe about the 29th I think it might have a good effect. I shall tell the border commandants to make demonstrations all along the line also, and if the river admits to raid across for cattle.23

21 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 1421, No. 21: Frere’s handwritten note on memorandum from Sir

Henry Bulwer to Sir Bartle Frere, dated 11th March 1879, establishes the date of the meeting, “As the Lt.-Gov’r & Lt.-Gen’l were to meet today at Pinetown to discuss this subject I think it will not be necessary to continue the discussion further by Minute”.

22 BPP, C. 2367, Enclosure 1 in No. 22: Major Twentyman to Deputy Adjutant General, 29th March 1879. The name of the writer is again wrongly given as “A.C. Montgomery”.

23 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, Wood Papers, II/2/2: Lord Chelmsford to Wood, 17th March 1879.

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As his contribution to this request,24 Colonel Wood made arrangements for an

attack on the abaQulusi on Hlobane mountain, a group which had concerned, and

baffled, him for some time. This assault coincided with the arrival in the vicinity of a

Zulu impi intending to attack Wood’s camp at Khambula and led to the disastrous

retreat from Hlobane on 28th March and the battle of Khambula on the 29th March.

In the meantime, Major Twentyman was also planning a similar demonstration,

using both the NNC and the Native Border Guard. Captain Cherry, the senior officer at

Kranskop, marched the bulk of the NNC battalions from Fort Cherry down to the

Middle Drift on 25th March. ‘The Native Contingent started about 5 pm and spent nearly

all night in descending to the Tugela.’25 Twentyman had also requested that Mr W.D.

Wheelwright, commanding Colonial Defensive District No. VII, (Umvoti,) assemble his

Native Border Guard for a combined raid into Zululand. Aware of his instructions that

his men were not to cross the river, Wheelwright agreed to assemble his men but said

that they would not cross the river until the Natal government had given him authority

to do so. On 29th March, Twentyman made his report to Colonel Bellairs, Deputy

Adjutant General.

It was my intention to proceed to the Umdumaduma Drift and take some of the Reserve across for a raid. Captain Cherry to conduct [sic] over also at the Middle Drift, but I regret that there seems to be an objection to take the Colonial Contingent across without special permission from his Excellency the Governor. I have consulted Mr. Wheelwright who has told me that his orders for the present are for defence only, he has written requesting leave to carry out my plan. May I ask you kindly to assist in getting this leave granted, fully 1,000 natives of the Border [Guard] could be assembled immediately at the Umdumaduma Drift for a raid; they all show an excellent spirit and are most anxious to get into Zululand.26

On the 2nd April, Major Twentyman made another reference in a report to the

Deputy Adjutant General, advising that permission had still not been received for him to

use the border levies, even though they ‘are very anxious to cross, and I would gladly

24 In his report on the Hlobane incident, Wood explicitly claims that the raid was a part of the diversion in aid of the

Eshowe relief column. For his report, see Supplement to the London Gazette, 7th May 1879. 25 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J: Fannin Letters, 26th March. 26 BPP, C. 2367, Enclosure 1 in No. 22: Major Twentyman to Deputy Adjutant General, 29th March 1879. The letter

is wrongly attributed to “A.C. Montgomery, Brigade Major, 2/4 King’s Own Royal Regiment, Commanding at Greytown”.

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conduct raids with them in conjunction with others made by Captain Cherry at the

Middle Drift.’27 The report regretted that although the state of the river had prevented a

crossing, a demonstration by more than 1,000 border levies and the NNC on the Natal

side on the 25th April had seemed to be effective:

Captain Cherry’s men have been working quickly at the earthworks at the Middle Drift and the Ferry … The Zulus all along the Border seem to fear our crossing, and everywhere the cattle have been driven over the hills towards the interior.

It seems that Major Twentyman was not in possession of all the facts: Border

Agent J. E. Fannin28 reported that on that same 2nd April, ‘a small force of the Native

Contingent crossed into Zululand by the ferry boats and burnt two large kraals about a

mile distant.’29 During this time, Captain Cherry fell ill and command of the two NNC

battalions fell to Commandant Montgomery: ‘Capt. Cherry is laid up here still but this

morning has taken a turn for the better.’30

On the 3rd April, the day Eshowe was actually relieved, Fannin officially reported

the same crossing by the NNC. His report also shows his anxiety about the continuing

raids, fearing reprisals by the Zulu.

I have the honour to report for his Excellency’s information that yesterday a small force of the Native Contingent crossed into Zululand by the ferry and burnt another unoccupied kraal. They exchanged a few shots with the Zulus, but neither side appear to have hit anyone. I am afraid there will be a disaster if any more of these raids are made, for Bishop Schreuder through his glass has seen a considerable number of Zulus about three miles from the ferry. They are evidently watching for a favourable opportunity to attack.31

On the 4th, Montgomery, although plainly willing to take the risk, was unable to

cross, much to Fannin’s relief.

The Native Contingent, under Commandant Montgomery, did not make a raid yesterday, the Natives refusing to cross. I think it is fortunate it was not attempted, as the Zulus had assembled a considerable body of men to resist.32

27 BPP, C. 2367, Enclosure 1 in No. 22: Major Twentyman to Deputy Adjutant General, 2nd April 1879, this time

attributed to “A.C. Montgomerie”. 28 Jonathon Eustace Fannin was the Special Border Agent for Umvoti and during the war was based at Fort Cherry. 29 BPP, C. 2367, Sub-enclosure 1 in Enclosure 1 in No. 37: J.E. Fannin to Colonial Secretary, 3rd April 1879. 30 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J: Fannin Letters, 3rd April 1879. 31 BPP, C. 2367, Sub-enclosure 2 in Enclosure 1 in No. 37: Fannin to Colonial Secretary, 4th April 1879. 32 BPP, C. 2367, Sub-enclosure 2 in Enclosure 1 in No. 37: Fannin to Colonial Secretary, 5th April 1879 and BPP, C.

2367, Sub-enclosure 3 in Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

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Eshowe had been relieved on the 3rd April and Pearson and his men arrived back at

the Thukela on the 7th, but both Twentyman and Lord Chelmsford seemed intent on

prolonging the demonstrations at the Middle Drift, even though its raison d’etre had

expired. In fact, such raids persisted until 9th April, and were resumed in May.33

We should now examine the effects that these various actions at the Middle Drift

had wrought at the higher echelons. The words ‘border commandants’ in the Lieutenant

General’s second letter to Colonel Wood, quoted earlier, are again insufficient to

identify the groups to which Chelmsford was referring but John Laband has argued that

the two letters, taken together with the intervening Pinetown discussion, demonstrate

quite clearly that ‘Chelmsford had early determined on proceeding behind Bulwer’s

back’ by using border levies for these raids.34

We have also earlier discussed the fact that the Border Guard and the NNC were

under the command of the Lieutenant Governor and Lord Chelmsford respectively.

Despite this distinction, the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, John Shepstone,

obstinately wrote to Major Twentyman at Greytown on the 15th March.

You will also see that the Native Contingent at Kranz Kop are told either through you, or their own officers, that none will be required to enter Zulu country against their will.35

Twentyman, then in his post for only a short time and probably ignorant of the

distinction, duly passed on the instructions to Montgomery and Cherry. As a serving

army officer, the latter ignored it but Montgomery assumed that, since he was a civilian

commandant, he must comply and announced the restriction to his assembled men, who

responded that they would follow him anywhere. Montgomery then recorded the results

of this announcement in a note to John Shepstone:

33 For details of an important raid by Twentyman on 20th May, see Thompson, Native Contingent, pp. 110f. 34 John Laband, “Bulwer, Chelmsford and the Border Levies”, in John Laband, and Paul Thompson, Kingdom and

Colony at War, (Pietermaritzburg, 1990), p. 156. 35 BPP, C. 2367, Enclosure 1 in No. 22: Natal Secretary for Native Affairs, 19th March 1879.

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With reference to your Minute of 15 Inst., I have the honour to report for information of H.E the Lieutenant Governor, Supreme Chief, that I informed the Natives under my command, both through the Native Officer and on parade, that they would not have to cross the Tugela against their will.36

Inevitably, the matter was drawn to the attention of Sir Henry, who immediately

recognised the error and wrote to Shepstone on 29th March:

I cannot remember that I ever gave instructions to the S. for N. Affairs to write to the Commanders of these Battalions of the N. N. Contingent. In fact, it would be a breach of official etiquette for this Gov’t to communicate with Captain’s Cherry or Montgomery except through the proper Military authorities, and I am quite sure I never could have authorised this being done. I am at a loss to understand the origin of this communication.37

On the 4th April, Shepstone sheepishly responded:

I was under the impression, and still am, that I had the Lieutenant Governor’s directions to write to Mr Wheelwright desiring him to ask the Fort Buckingham Native Contingent if they were willing to enter the Zulu country when required. I see, however, by His Excellency’s Minute that I must have misunderstood, and that no such order could have been given by him.

The mistake therefore must rest upon me, though I had it fully believing that I had orders to do so.38

The Lieutenant Governor then became aware of the request made by Major

Twentyman to Mr Wheelwright, commanding Colonial Defensive District VII. There

followed yet another candid exchange of views between Lord Chelmsford and Sir

Henry Bulwer. On the 9th April, the Lieutenant Governor wrote two letters. The first

was to Sir Bartle Frere, objecting strongly to the raids across the Thukela into Zululand.

The burning of empty kraals will neither inflict much damage upon the Zulus, nor be attended with much advantage to us; whilst acts of this nature are, so it seems to me, not only calculated to invite retaliation, but to alienate from us the whole of the Zulu nation, men, women, and children, including those who are well disposed to us.39

The second letter was to Lord Chelmsford, and it is replete with the anger which he

clearly felt at his betrayal over the Pinetown accord.40 Sir Henry said that he had

received information that Major Twentyman had requested the use of border levies

under Mr Wheelwright to make raids across the Thukela border as demonstrations

during the relief of Eshowe. While Wheelwright had assembled his men at the river, he

36 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1926, No. 1083/1879: Montgomery to Secretary for Native Affairs,

24th March 1879. 37 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/1/33, No. 1883/1879 38 Ibid. 39 BPP, C. 2367, Enclosure 1 in No. 37: Bulwer to Frere, 9th April 1879. 40 BPP, C. 2318, Enclosure 1 in No. 13: Bulwer to Chelmsford, 9th April 1879.

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had also properly advised Twentyman that he would not send his men across into

Zululand without the authority of the Natal government.

I have to observe, with regard to this portion of Major Twentyman’s request, that, whilst I fully agreed to your Lordship’s proposal that the native levies assembled on the border for the defence of the border should assist, if necessary, in any demonstration that may be made, I have not authorised their being employed in making raids into the Zulu country.41

Two days later, Lord Chelmsford wrote to the Secretary of State for War advising

him of the difficulties he had to endure with Bulwer, and asking him to intercede.

The interference of the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal with my plan of operations, however, opens up a very serious question, and I feel bound to point out that if my orders to the Colonial forces, which have been placed under my command by Sir Henry Bulwer himself, are to be referred to himself before being complied with, the satisfactory management of the military operations now being carried on becomes an impossibility.42

We should note here, however, that once again the Lieutenant General blurred the issue

of command by suggesting that the border levies were under his control, which they

were not.

But, however that may be, the question now at issue is far more serious, and I would beg for the speedy decision of Her Majesty’s Government, as to whether the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, having once placed the services of certain Colonial. forces at my disposal, has the power to prevent the orders issued by me to their commanders being obeyed.

I need scarcely point out that if this power be vested in the Lieutenant-Governor, it will be impossible for me to accept the responsibility of the command of the Colonial forces now in the field for the defence of Natal, or to employ the Native Contingent battalions which have been hitherto associated with the British troops.43

Not content with this letter, on that same day Lord Chelmsford also wrote in a

similar vein to the Duke of Cambridge.

Sir H. Bulwer from my first arrival in Natal has thrown every obstacle in my way whilst at the same time he has endeavoured by long memoranda, minutes & dispatches to make it appear that he has given me all the assistance I have asked for.44

On the 12th April, Lord Chelmsford addressed a brief note to Sir Henry, advising

him that the matter of their differences had been sent to London.45 On the 15th, the

Lieutenant Governor responded with a tart explanation of his actions, based upon his

41 Ibid. 42 BPP, C. 2318, Enclosure 2 in No. 13: Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 11th April 1879: 43 Ibid. 44 National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-26-28: Chelmsford to the Duke of Cambridge, 11th April 1879. 45 BPP, C. 2318, Enclosure 2 in No. 13: Chelmsford to Bulwer, 12th April 1879.

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interpretation of what had transpired at the Pinetown meeting,46 and on the 16th, sent his

own explanation, with copies of the correspondence to Sir Michael Hicks Beach.47 In

this inevitably long document, Sir Henry made two key points. The first was that the

raids now brought to his attention had been proposed for dates after the relief of Eshowe

and therefore could not have had any bearing on the success or otherwise of that

venture. The second noted the ambiguous manner in which Lord Chelmsford had

referred to the African levies.

The question, therefore, put by the Lieutenant-General, in the way that it is put, before the Secretary of State for War, by not distinguishing between the two descriptions of native forces, but, as is actually done in the last paragraph but one, by naming and associating the two together as if there were no distinction between them, fails I think to represent the real state of the case.48

In his counter-claim of 18th April,49 Lord Chelmsford pointed out to Sir Henry that

‘there appears to be an unfortunate misunderstanding with regard to the conversation

which I had the honour of holding with your Excellency at Pine Town’ and that he had

given no commitment as was now being claimed by the Lieutenant Governor.

Furthermore, he now demanded that all African troops along the border be placed

‘unreservedly’ under his command and ‘that I should be permitted to employ them,

within or without the border, in whatever manner I may consider best in the interests of

the Colony, and with due regard to its protection from invasion.’

Sir Henry acknowledged the letter and undertook to bring the matter to the

attention of the Executive Council.50 This he did, and in a letter a few days later he

reluctantly capitulated,51 enclosing a Minute of the Executive Council deploring the use

of the levies in cross-border raids, but ‘that the Lieutenant-General, who is responsible

46 BPP, C. 2318, Enclosure 3 in No. 13: Bulwer to Chelmsford, 15th April 1879. 47 BPP, C. 2318, No. 13: Bulwer to Hicks Beach, 16th April 1879. 48 Ibid. 49 BPP, C. 2318, No. 18: Chelmsford to Bulwer, 18th April 1879. 50 BPP, C. 2367, Enclosure 2 in No. 44: Bulwer to Chelmsford, 22nd April 1879. 51 BPP, C. 2367, Enclosure 4 in No. 44: Bulwer to Chelmsford, 25th April 1879.

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for the operations of the war and for the defence of the Colony, should have the power

of so employing the native levies on the border.’52

Through all of this argument and counter-argument, Sir Henry had conveniently

overlooked a statement made by the himself as early as January. In the first paragraph of

his memorandum, he considered that although the Natal colonial forces were for

defensive purposes only, ‘it may be necessary for them to cross into Zululand, if only

for a few hours.’53

In point of fact, the dispute closed at first with a whimper rather than a bang,

following a submission by Special Border Agent F.B. Fynney at the Lower Thukela,

which included the words: ‘respectfully to state my conviction that in the event of our

natives being met by a body of Zulus on their own ground, they would not stand against

them, but make the best of their way back to Natal.’54 In response to this advice,

forwarded to the Lieutenant General by Sir Henry Bulwer, Lord Chelmsford made an

astonishing volte face, replying in part:

With such men it would be absurd to attempt any military operation across the border; and I should certainly have never pressed so strongly that the border forces should be placed at my disposal for that purpose had I been informed earlier of the real feeling amongst these natives.55

The matter was finally decided in London in favour of Lord Chelmsford. On 19th May,

Sir Michael Hicks Beach sent off the following terse telegram to the Lieutenant

Governor.

The full command of any forces whether European or Native, which are called out for service, must of course be with the General, with whom the responsibility for the operations rests.56

In early April, Major Bengough’s battalion under Colonel Glyn was still under-

strength:

52 BPP, C. 2367, Enclosure 3 in No. 44. 53 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 1423, p. 51: Memorandum from Sir Henry Bulwer, 20th January 1879. 54 BPP, C. 2367, Sub-enclosure in Enclosure 1 in No. 54: F.B. Fynney to Secretary of Native Affairs, 19th April 1879. 55 BPP, C. 2374, Enclosure in No. 25: Lord Chelmsford to Sir Henry Bulwer, 7th May 1879. 56 BPP, C. 2318, No. 11: Hicks Beach to Bulwer, 19th May 1879.

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Our force here, however, particularly mounted, is very weak. We have two comp’s 2/24th & one of Bengough’s at Dundee, building a work – only two comp’s here – and six companies, now weak, at Rorke’s Drift. Dartnell can barely muster 50 men, and the Carbineers refuse to cross the border.57

Despite this, Bengough also made a contribution towards the diversions, but once

again, it was after the relief of Eshowe. On the 9th April, he led his 2nd Battalion, as part

of a force led by Major Dartnell, over the Mzinyathi river from Rorke’s Drift and made

another assault on Sihayo’s homesteads in the Batshe valley.

At about 5 a.m. all precaution to guard against surprise or being cut off having been made, the police, a few mounted natives, and Bengough’s men went through the Bashee Valley, burning Sihayo’s kraal, and a few others that were left untouched before, and destroyed the crops as well as they could.

Not a soul was seen, the whole place is deserted; some of the scouts went as far as the stream on this side [of] Isandhlwana, and I believe saw two Zulus at some distance.58

The success of this raid is evidenced by the sight of ‘large numbers of cattle &

many horses’ being driven over the Malakatha hills to the south.59

Yesterday afternoon later, numbers of Zulu kraals were seen on fire and it is supposed they were fired by our raiding parties.60

On the 29th March, the same day as the battle at Khambula, the relief column under

the personal command of Lord Chelmsford marched north after crossing the Thukela

during the preceding days. It was a formidable force of two divisions. The first division

consisted of 1770 British troops and Captain Geoffry Barton with 800 men in his 4th

Battalion NNC. The second division consisted of 1470 British troops and the 1200 men

of Commandant Nettleton’s 5th Battalion NNC. These, together with some 430 mounted

men of British, Colonial and African origins, brought the total men in the column to no

less than 5,670, of which 2,130, or 37%, were African.61

By the 1st April, the force was about a mile south of the Inyezane river and here

Lord Chelmsford chose a camp site on a low knoll which had a good field of fire around

57 National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-16-7: Major Clery to Lieutenant Colonel Crealock, 9th April 1879. 58 Natal Witness, 22nd April 1879: The Zulu War, A raid into Zululand. 59 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1926 No. 1951: Report of H.F. Fynn, Resident Magistrate of Umsinga

Division, to the Colonial Secretary, 10th April 1879. 60 Ibid. 61 Narrative, pp. 162f.

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him. Like his previous camps on this march, it was laagered, with a shallow trench some

twelve metres outside the wagons in which the British troops were placed. Mounted

men and the NNC were placed inside the laager, with the cattle. The laager was

unfinished because a heavy storm broke upon the column in the afternoon and the men

only completed their task after dark, and thence passed an uncomfortable night in the

continuing rain.

On the damp morning of the 2nd, as the morning mist began to clear, a large Zulu

force was observed by the mounted scouts, in two separate columns, approaching and

encircling the laager. The men in the laager had been at the ‘stand-to’ since before

dawn, and the trench was fully manned, with all those in the laager who were able to do

so clambering on top of, and underneath, the wagons.

The ensuing battle of Gingindlovu lasted from 6.00 to 7.30 a.m., during which time

the Zulu were not able to approach the shelter trench any closer than about 20 metres.

At this juncture the Lieutenant General sent out the mounted men, who set about

attacking the Zulu flanks, by then in disarray.

On seeing this, the Natal Native Contingent, who were formed within the entrenchment on the rear face, clearing the ditch, rushed forward with loud cheers in pursuit.62

Although the NNC behaved very differently from the corps which had fled the field

at Isandlwana, Guy Dawnay, a British adventurer who was attached to Nettleton’s 5th

Battalion NNC, could still find fault with the men:

Five bodies lay just behind us, when about 7.10 the order came for the Native Contingent to charge … Burnside and Nettelton [sic] had their horses ready and were out at once; but all the other officers had to go back inside the laager and saddle up, and so, as I made up my mind to go on foot, I had a lot of men to myself. On reaching the ridge not thirty yards in front of us, we found a great lot of Zulus in the hollow; but they only stayed to fire one volley, and then ‘balekile’d;’63 the volley dropping three men … I tried in vain to stop the assegaing [of] the wounded, but it was perfectly impossible in the heat of the pursuit, as the Zulus, however badly wounded, always turned round with their assegais when we neared them. We followed a mile or mile and a quarter down to a kloof of bush … The men stood on the near side, and blazed away at nothing into the bush or up into the air; but they would not come down into the bush with assegais as I berated them, and they nearly as possible shot me half a dozen times by accident as I

62 TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, No. 133: Lord Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 10th April 1879. 63 isiZulu balekela, to run away from, C.M. Doke. and B.W.Vilikazi, Zulu-English Dictionary, (Johannesburg, 1958),

p. 61.

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got in front. One of them had previously run up to me with an order, as he said, for the men to retire; but I wasn’t going to give the order, and I could see no white officer about anywhere near us. The natives were wasting their ammunition too ridiculously, firing at nothing, and I had to take away three of their rifles, and lick a fourth man who wouldn’t cease firing. At last I saw Burnside and later Drummond, and we got them to cease firing and retire to the camp.64

Captain Geoffry Barton, commanding the 4th Battalion, wrote an account of his part

in the battle for the benefit of his friend J. Eustace Fannin at Kranskop:

You will have read about Ginginhlovo, and a few lies to boot. On the outside we buried 480 bodies, & the Native Contingent did not find 200 bodies the next day as stated. We scoured for miles around for several days & I did not find more than 70; nor Nettleton either.

The action was not very brilliant; a great deal of firing, the men let the Zulus come up as they ought to have done, they were never near the trench except as little knobs of skirmishers. … The Zulus fought magnificently; I never saw such splendid skirmishing: it was a sight to see them come through the hail of bullets which must have been sweeping over the plain as they advanced to within 30 yards of the trench where I was; there a little post of 12 or 14 lay behind some roots of trees & peppered into the camp, being constantly blazed at by several hundred of our men, but only some few hit. The rest were assegaied by my men when I advanced to dislodge them.65

It is clear that the changed attitude of the NNC towards their enemy was largely

due to the possession of firearms.

All the natives [in the Eshowe relief force] were, however, on this occasion armed with rifles, most of them of the Martini-Henry pattern, and this put them on a footing of equality with the enemy, and certainly gave them more confidence and pluck.66

The energetic Montgomery found the inaction of life at Kranskop galling and

would have greatly preferred to be closer to the front, as Bengough seemed to have

been. His must have been a prickly nature because he was unable to get along with his

colleagues, and perhaps this had something to do with the fact that both Barton and

Cherry were regular Army officers.

Capt. Montgomery calls in sometimes – he did … yesterday and told me of a dispute with Captain Cherry. He is always getting into them and was with Barton too, when he was here.67

The poor relationship which seemed to exist between Montgomery and Barton may

have been exacerbated by the fact that they had previously served together in the 7th

Foot (Royal Fusiliers), when Barton was a lieutenant and adjutant and Montgomery had

64 Guy C. Dawnay, Campaigns: Zulu 1879, Egypt 1882, Suakim 1885: Being the Private Journal of Guy C. Dawnay,

(privately published c. 1886,) pp. 14. 65 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J, Fannin Letters: Captain Geoffry Barton to J.E. Fannin, 16th April

1879. 66 Norris-Newman, In Zululand, p. 132 67 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J, Fannin Letters, dated 5th March 1879.

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been a captain. Now, of course, Barton was himself a captain, and by virtue of his army

commission, he was senior to Montgomery, a circumstance which Montgomery might

not have found to his liking.

We have seen earlier that the two Kranskop battalions had engaged in

‘demonstrations’ along the border in support of Lord Chelmsford’s relief of Eshowe,

involving several sallies across the Thukela river, but other than this brief diversion,

boredom still prevailed at Fort Cherry. It was in this atmosphere that the only suicide of

an NNC officer occurred.

Robert D’Ombrain had emigrated from England, arriving in Natal in July 1877. He

quickly contacted a friend of his family, Captain A.N. Montgomery and with

Montgomery acting as his sponsor, D’Ombrain applied for a position with the Natal

government and awaited the result of his application.68 It was probably Montgomery’s

further influence which then enabled the young D’Ombrain to be appointed as a

lieutenant to Montgomery’s battalion of the Contingent.69 Among those also assigned to

the 1st Battalion by the same General Order was Lieutenant Arthur Hornby, a brother to

another lieutenant of the battalion, George Hornby, who was a close friend to

D’Ombrain.70 It is very likely that both of the brothers Hornby were also assisted in

their recruitment into the battalion by Commandant Montgomery. Thus the lives of

these three lieutenants were already interrelated, and all were closer to Montgomery

than might generally be thought prudent for junior officers.

On the 8th April, Lieutenant Robert D’Ombrain took his own life while in his tent

near Fort Cherry. Captain Cherry, as senior officer, convened a court of enquiry on the

68 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 646, No. 2191. 69 General Order No. 1 dated 1st January, 1879, Times of Natal, 3rd January, 1879, in which he was named

incorrectly as R. D. Ombrain. 70 John Laband and P.S. Thompson, War Comes to Umvoti, (Pietermaritzburg, 1980,) p. 125.

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same day.71 Its findings were so unacceptable that Cherry then convened a second on

16th April, at which a number of officers gave evidence.

Civil Surgeon John R. Ryley stated that he had seen D’Ombrain on the afternoon of

the 6th, when he presented with what D’Ombrain referred to as the results of ‘a glass too

much and that he felt nervous and out of sorts’.72 Ryley thought it might have been

‘incipient delirium tremens’ but there were none of its symptoms and he finally treated

it as ‘drunkard’s dyspepsia’ by prescribing a laxative. The lieutenant declined to be

admitted to the nearby tented hospital.

On Monday 7th April, George Hornby returned from leave and visited his sick

friend in his tent. Robert said that he was feeling much better and remembered little of

the previous day. Hornby gave him a book before he left. Later that same day, the

medical officer visited him, found that the aperient had not had any effect and that

Robert spent a sleepless night. He went away and returned later, requiring a Corporal

Wood to give him an injection and a sedative.

Lieutenant E.A. Grantham, 3rd Battalion,73 gave evidence that he had visited

Robert several times on both the Sunday and Monday (6th and 7th April) and reported

that he had noticed nothing untoward.74 D’Ombrain’s servant Cherabanya reported that

he had been ordered by his master not to go too far away as he might be wanted at any

time; his master had eaten nothing but a little toast and some beef tea.

On Tuesday the 8th, Grantham again visited him about 10 a.m., D’Ombrain asking

him what the African soldiers nearby were saying about him. Grantham replied that they

were not talking about him, to which Robert responded that he ‘must be a little light-

71 What follows is based upon information presented in Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 698, No.

2097/1879: Proceedings of a Board to investigate the circumstances connected with the death of Lieut. R. Dombrain.

72 Civil Surgeon Ryley was posted to Kranskop in General Order No. 48 dated 4th March, 1879, Times of Natal, 7th March, 1879.

73 General Order No. 231, dated 21st December 1878, Times of Natal 25th December 1878. 74 Grantham was appointed to the 3rd Battalion in General Order No. 231 dated 21st December, 1878, Times of Natal,

25th December, 1878.

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headed’. Shortly after Grantham had left, Civil Surgeon Ryley and Corporal Wood

visited him, and again D’Ombrain reported having slept badly and had not taken his

food or beef tea. Ryley reported that D’Ombrain had looked gloomy and ‘had a morbid

fear of his brother officers knowing the cause of his illness’. Again, Ryley urged him to

go to the hospital, but D’Ombrain declined until evening, lest he be seen by anyone.

Ryley also ordered that Wood and another assistant return to care for him during the

afternoon, and for Cherabanya to make more beef tea and not to leave him. Ryley later

send Wood back to administer a draft of chloral hydrate, a sedative.

About 11 a.m., George Hornby, Grantham and Hornby’s brother Arthur, visited

and noticed nothing unusual. Grantham and Arthur left after some thirty minutes but

George remained behind, smoking. He reported that the conversation was rather

curious, saying that D’Ombrain made some odd statements, although he had given little

thought to them at the time. On one or two occasions, Robert rose from his bed and left

the tent for brief periods, and on returning to the tent after one of these excursions, told

George that ‘they were coming’. When asked who was coming, Robert simply repeated

his statement. On another occasion, Robert said that ‘there was only one woman that

had ever threatened’, which Hornby dismissed as unimportant.75 He then left, intending

to return later in the day.

Some time later, reported as noon by Ryley and 1.30 p.m. by George Hornby, both

men were in their tents when they heard a shot. Hornby, whose tent was next to that of

D’Ombrain, immediately went to it and found that Robert had shot himself. Hornby

then went to report the incident to his superiors.

When Ryley, accompanied by Montgomery, who had been with him when the shot

was heard, arrived, they found the body on a bed opposite his litter. He had fired his 75 It has been suggested that this might be a reference to Montgomery’s daughter Alette who had visited the camp

some days earlier (Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, Fannin Letters, A863J, letter dated 1st April 1879,) but there is no evidence that the visit had anything to do with his death, nor even that there was a relationship between the two.

117

rifle into his mouth, pulling the trigger with his feet by means of a riding crop placed

inside the trigger guard. The bullet had broken his jaw, smashed his skull and then

ripped through the fabric of the tent.

At the court of enquiry, George Hornby deposed that he had ‘known the deceased

for more than a year, and from my knowledge of him consider him incapable of taking

his own life, in his proper senses’. Ryley said that D’Ombrain might have been

‘labouring under some delusion’ at the time he had fired the shot but he [Ryley] had

‘failed to detect any sign of insanity during life.’

The board did ‘not consider that any blame is attached to the Senior Medical officer

but regret that Lieutenants Hornby and Grantham did not report the result of their

interviews to him, but think that they showed no culpable negligence in not so doing.’

The incident was also duly reported by J. Eustace Fannin, Special Agent at Umvoti,

in one of his many letters to his wife Ethie:

One of the officers of Native Contingent who had D. Tremens shot himself yesterday in the hospital tent here. He was buried by Capt. Montgomery in the afternoon.76

To what extent was Montgomery himself involved in the unhappy incident? He

was not involved directly at all; indirectly, however, his own actions and attitudes may

have had some influence on events. As well as knowing D’Ombrain, Montgomery was

a neighbour to the Hornby family, his family farm ‘Ismont’ adjoining their property. He

thus probably knew George and Arthur Hornby much better than D’Ombrain himself

and may also have been instrumental in their recruitment into his battalion, as well as

that of D’Ombrain. At this particular time, Montgomery, who was married with nine

children, was finding that an extramarital sexual relationship which he had imposed on a

young female of the Hornby family was also coming to an end and he was greatly

angered by this turn of events, a fury which he may have found difficult to contain and

which may have spilled on to his junior officers, especially if two of them happened to 76 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, Fannin Letters, A863J; letter dated 9th April 1879.

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be brothers of the lady in question. This was to have serious consequences for

Montgomery which will be taken up at greater length in the next chapter.

In addition to this matter, important enough, one might think, Montgomery was

also occupied with the completion of a quite different project which he had expected to

be finished at a much earlier date. He was writing a book. He had begun the work, a

digest of Natal law for judicial officers such as magistrates and justices of the peace,

about April 1878 while Acting Resident Magistrate of Mid-Illovu, fully expecting that

he would be able to complete it in no more than two months.77 Instead, publication had

been interminably delayed by ‘press of work and scarcity of labour at my publishers’,

and then the Zulu War had intervened, and with it his military service. Publication did

not finally take place until September 1879, so that he would have also spent time

during this period trying to bring it to a conclusion. It is clear, then, that Commandant

Montgomery, perhaps due to his restless nature, was diverting his efforts from his

command to more personal, even trivial, matters.

In May, Montgomery requested that his battalion be given more active duty,

serving with the 2nd Division with Bengough’s 2nd Battalion. This was discussed at the

highest level, since it involved the replacement of the battalion for the defence of the

Middle Drift area. Chelmsford was very much in favour of the move but Sir Henry

Bulwer was less enthusiastic, perhaps being more aware of the practical difficulties

involved in replacing them.78 In the end, it was decided to leave them where they were

but Montgomery was anxious to depart, even if it meant leaving his battalion behind.

His motivation may well have been to get away from the scene of D’Ombrain’s death,

the carousing of the officers and even, perhaps, to be further away from his personal

problems at Ismont.

77 A.N. Montgomery, The Natal Magistrate: A Brief Digest of the Laws of Natal, (Pietermaritzburg, 1879,) p. iii. 78 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, GH 569, No. G378.

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The arrival of four Major Generals in late April, with the last of the reinforcements,

allowed Lord Chelmsford to re-organise of the whole British invasion force: two

divisions were formed to replace Columns 1 and 3. Major General Henry Hope

Crealock, older brother of the Lieutenant General’s Assistant Military Secretary, was

given the command of the First Division at the Lower Drift. Colonel Pearson’s column

was at the Thukela and he was given a brigade which included these men. The second

brigade, based near Gingindlovu, was led by Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Clarke.

Major General Edward Newdigate took command of the Second Division, based at

Dundee, in which Colonel Glyn also took on a brigade.79 Major General Frederick

Marshall, commanding the newly arrived Cavalry Brigade, was placed under

Newdigate, much to the former’s chagrin. The fourth Major General was Henry Hugh

Clifford, who was given command of Base and Lines of Communication.80 Evelyn

Wood, now promoted to Brigadier General, retained his independent command and his

force was renamed the Flying Column.81 It was to join the Second Division and then

march in parallel with it.

Bengough’s men of the 2nd Battalion were also active with the 2nd Division on

occasion. On the 21st May they accompanied Major General Marshall to bury the dead

at Isandlwana, the first time this was undertaken. Marshall recorded their strength as

770 men.82 Despite the already prolonged delay in performing this last duty for their

late comrades, Colonel Glyn had begged that the men of the 24th be left until they could

be interred by his own men. Immediately afterwards, on the 24th May, Bengough’s

79 General Order No. 84, dated 13th April, 1879, Times of Natal, 21st April, 1879. 80 General Order No. 77, dated 6th April 1879, Natal Mercury, 8th April 1879. 81 General Order No. 79 dated 8th April, 1879, Times of Natal, 11th April, 1879. See also Narrative, pp. 146-150,

which shows the state of the force at the end of May when all the reinforcements had arrived. 82 BPP, C. 2374, Enclosure 6 in No. 32: report of Major General Marshall, 21st May 1879.

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battalion moved up to Koppie Allein, by now selected as the starting point for the

second invasion.83

The months of April through May were busy ones for the men of the 4th and 5th

Battalions, although not much exposed to any fighting. When Eshowe had been

relieved, Lord Chelmsford had retained a foothold in Zululand by leaving a post near

the laager at Gingindlovu, which included both battalions of the NNC. This comprised,

in addition to the NNC, the relieved force from Eshowe and part of Lord Chelmsford’s

relieving column. The remainder of the force, mostly newly-arrived reinforcements,

were at the Lower Thukela.84

On the 18th April, Major General Crealock took command of the 2nd Division.85

His first priority was to re-supply the men at Gingindlovu, to be called the 2nd Brigade,

and accordingly a large convoy left Tenedos on the 21st.86 On that same day, the relative

strengths of the 4th and 5th Battalions had increased to 787 and 1107 respectively, most

of whom were at the future site of Fort Chelmsford, with a small number from each at

the Lower Thukela.87 This varies only slightly from numbers given by the Resident

Magistrate of the Lower Thukela Division for the same time.88

On the 24th April Brigadier Clarke, commanding the 2nd Brigade, moved forward

and took up a position on the Nyezane river, on a site overlooking the drift, on which

was to be established Fort Chelmsford.89 This site was chosen for its advanced position,

proximity to the future Port Durnford and offered a choice of forward routes towards

Ulundi. The fort was commenced on 29th April and was completed on 10th May. An

83 Narrative, p. 92. 84 Unless otherwise stated, the information which follows is from TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, pp.260-310: Report of

operations of 1st Division, South African Field Force on coast line from Tugela River to Umhlatoozi River Apr 18 - July 7. This is itself drawn from TNA (PRO) WO 32/7772. See also BPP C. 2505, Appendix, pp. 141-196.

85 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Inclosure 2 in No. 212, p. 264. 86 Ibid, p. 266. 87 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, table in Inclosure 2 in No. 212, p. 270. 88 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, SNA 1/1/34 No. 817: Resident Magistrate, Lower Thukela, to Secretary for

Native Affairs, 17th April 1879. 89 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Sub-Inclosure G in Inclosure 2, in No. 212. p. 299.

121

intermediate site commanding the drift at the amaThikulu river was also selected as a

site for the new Fort Crealock, also completed on the 10th May.90 On the same day, half

of Nettleton’s 5th Battalion was sent to provide part of the garrison for Fort Crealock,

while the remainder was despatched to the Lower Thukela for ‘fatigue duties’.91

As soon as sufficient transport became available regular convoys were established,

leaving Fort Tenedos every week for what was to become Fort Chelmsford, a little more

than 30 kilometres north of the Thukela. The first left on 29th April. They were heavily

escorted and the route was covered in three days with overnight stops at John Dunn’s

laager, the Nyoni and Fort Crealock. The escort then returned with the sick and the

empty wagons.92

An examination of the extensive tables which accompany General Crealock’s

report might suggest that the NNC was only used in a limited way for escorting

convoys, but a closer reading of the accompanying narrative reveals a more regular

usage. The first convoy, to Gingindlovu on 21st April included 2 officers and 50 men of

the NNC;93 their battalion is unidentified but probably consisted of most if not all of the

57 of Nettleton’s 5th Battalion recorded as being at the Lower Thukela on that same

date. The narrative of the diary records that one battalion NNC was involved with a

convoy of 5th May, having met it with a number of empty wagons at the Nyoni, and then

seemingly returned to Gingindlovu.94 On the 19th, 23rd and 28th May, half of Barton’s

4th Battalion escorted empty wagons from Fort Chelmsford to the amaThikulu river and

the supposition that it was this same battalion which was involved with the convoy of

the 5th May is confirmed later.95

90 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Sub-Inclosure D in Inclosure 2, in No. 212, p. 275. 91 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Sub-Inclosure G in Inclosure 2, in No. 212. p. 299. 92 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Inclosure 2 in No. 212, p. 266. 93 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, table on p. 282. 94 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, p. 288. 95 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, pp. 289f. See also p. 299, which states that the full battalion used on the 5th was

“subsequently reduced to half a battalion”.

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Two small actions by the 4th Battalion were also recorded:

A Coy. of the N.N.C. was sent out on the 18th [sic] by O.C. Fort Crealock to reconnoitre the valley of the Amatikulu – a party of 10 men of this Coy. who had detached themselves to forage on their own account, state that they came across a party of Zulus, who fired on them and that one of their party was missing …96

Major Barrow also undertook a reconnaissance of the ‘Amatikulu Bush’ on the 21st

May

… being supported by the Native Contingent stationed at Fort Crealock, who worked up this valley towards the drift of the direct Eshowe road. Nothing seen.97

Other elements of the battalion were used locally at Gingindlovu:

Working parties of the 4th Battalion, Natal Native Contingent, were employed in repairing damage done to the Ginginhlovu Drifts by the rain, and a large supply of timber was collected by them at these drifts for future use.98

Thus we may summarise the actions of the NNC during the three months to the end

of May as one of re-organisation and re-equipment. They assisted in the only action

during this period, at the battle of Gingindlovu, where they behaved much better in a

role more suited to them. From their accomplishments, one may also glean something

about the leadership of the NNC. It may first be noted that there was a singular

improvement in command, with the exception of the battalions at Kranskop, and even

that was mitigated by the decisive actions of Major Twentyman. Certainly Major

Bengough proved to be very competent in handling his 2nd Battalion in the often

difficult circumstances in which they found themselves.

A close examination of the diaries of the two brigades of the 1st Division on the

coast reveals a significant difference in the roles played by the men of Barton’s and

Nettleton’s battalions. Barton’s 4th Battalion was much more engaged in the expected

role of scouting during reconnaissances and, to a lesser extent, undertaking convoy

escort duties. Nettleton’s 5th Battalion, however, while also undertaking some escort

96 TNA (PRO) WO 32/7754: Diaries and journals of 2nd Division, diary for week ending 25 May 1879. 97 Ibid. 98 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, p. 290.

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duty, was more often used as working parties doing fatigues.99 Indeed, we have seen

that half of them were despatched from the ‘front’ to the Thukela for that specific

purpose,100 while others were engaged in cutting wood and grass, and unloading

wagons.101

The difference in the duties performed by these two units may simply reflect the

fact that Barton was a serving officer while Nettleton was not, nor had he ever served in

the army. It might also, one might speculate, accurately reflect the value of the two men

as leaders of their men.

99 TNA (PRO) WO 32/ 7750, passim. 100 Ibid, entry for 16th May, which states that “4 officers and 221 men of the 5th Bn. NNC marched in … for the

purpose of doing fatigues”. 101 Ibid., passim.

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The Second Invasion

125

Chapter 6 Victory and the Aftermath

This final chapter deals with the actions of the NNC in the events leading up to the

victory at Ulundi on 4th July, and then continues the fortunes of the force until its final

discharge. It concludes with an examination of two of the commandants as seen in a

public libel case involving one of them and a Natal government review of the

extramarital activities of another.

By the end of May, Lord Chelmsford had resolved his transport problems as far as

possible and his 2nd Division was finally assembled at Landman’s Drift. On 31st of May

he ordered the division, with Bengough’s 2nd Battalion, to move across the border into

Zululand for the second attempt to reach Ulundi and defeat what remained of

Cetshwayo’s army.

On 3rd June, he delivered his considered opinion on the qualities of the Native

Contingent.1 In a discussion of the cost and value of native levies in the war, he was at

pains to point out that there remained only four of the original seven thousand men who

had been assembled for Contingent service, something of an over-estimate of his actual

complement. We have already noted that the 3/1st Battalion was always very much

under-strength and so was never at its nominal complement of 1,000 men. He went on

to draw attention to this very fact, and his inaccuracy, by stating that ‘one of the

battalions ordered to be raised for No. 2 Column under Colonel Durnford [Cherry’s]

never reached a higher number than 200.’ The shortfall was also blamed on ‘the two

battalions belonging to No. 3 column, which disbanded themselves after Isandlwana’

and that the two battalions of No. 2 Column were not then up to their full strength.

1 BPP, C. 2482, Enclosure in No. 13: Lord Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 3rd June 1879.

126

At Kranskop, the officers of the 1st and 3rd Battalions lapsed still further into their

state of torpor, seeking solace in drink. This was a frequent phenomenon in the civilian

populace at that time: Captain Ludlow records that ‘Drinking goes on to a fearful extent,

in the country, and the number of men I met during my trip, who were in a state of

delirium tremens, or recovering from an attack of it, was astonishing.’2 It was, however,

unacceptable behaviour on the part of serving military officers, and should have been

actively prevented by the commanders.

During early June, Captain Cherry continued in poor health and was admitted to

the hospital at Greytown on the 12th June suffering a severe ‘Colic’. During his

absence, the officers went too far with their imbibing and ‘[Captain] Tollner, who is in

command, has been giving them a talking-to.’3 Cherry did not return to duty until 24th

June, and on the following day Captain Tollner was due to leave, as were many other

officers, their six month contract being completed.4

The Zulu retaliation which Sir Henry Bulwer had prophesied for the raids made by

Major Twentyman now eventuated. On 25th June they crossed the Thukela in several

places upstream from the Middle Drift and their pincer movement created havoc in the

valley below Kranskop.5 It was a lightening attack and the Zulu were gone before either

the NNC or the Border Guard could react. The damage they caused was much more

severe than that visited upon them and more than seventy African homesteads were

burned and a great deal of stock was taken. More than twenty people were killed and

many women and children were carried off. The cost to the Zulu was no more than ‘9 or

2 Captain W.R. Ludlow, Zululand and Cetewayo, ( London, 1882), p. 14. 3 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, A863J, Fannin Letters, 13th June 1879. 4 Op. cit., 23rd June 1879. 5 BPP C. 2454, Enclosure 10 in No. 60: report of W.D. Wheelwright, 26th June 1879.

127

10 killed and several wounded’.6 The Middle Drift area remained in a state of shock

and fear until news of the victory at Ulundi arrived in early July.

On 27th June Fannin reported, in another letter to his wife, that Commandant

Montgomery had left Fort Cherry for Helpmekaar and that ‘both the Native Battalions

here are now run into one under the command of Capt. Cherry.’7 This was confirmed in

a General Order on the 1st July, in which it was also announced that Montgomery had

been transferred to the position of Colonial Commander of District No. 1 at Umsinga,

replacing W.H. Beaumont.8

Up to the middle of June, the primary task of the 1st Division on the coast had still

been pushing forward supplies to build up the two month reserve required at Fort

Chelmsford. Barton’s 4th Battalion NNC was split between convoy duty and the

garrison at Fort Chelmsford, whilst Nettleton’s 5th Battalion was also divided, one half

as garrison at Fort Crealock and the other back at the Thukela on fatigue duties. By

Mid-June, forward supplies were sufficient as to allow the whole of the 1st Division to

move forward and by the 15th June it was at Fort Chelmsford.9 From here the final

move was taken to open up Port Durnford, a task completed by the end of the month,

and reconnaissances carried out further north. By the 21st June the division had reached

the Mlalazi river, at which Fort Napoleon was to be constructed. A reconnaissance was

then undertaken to within a little more than a kilometre from what was to become Port

Durnford. On the 24th, 200 of Barton’s men, perhaps two companies, crossed the

Mlalazi to occupy a ridge giving cover to the mounted men to finally advance to the

beach at Port Durnford. Fort Napoleon was completed on the 26th, following which the

6 BPP C. 2454, Enclosures 12, 14 and 15 in No. 60. For a final statement of casualties and damage see BPP, C. 2482,

Enclosure 2 in No. 37: Sir Henry Bulwer to Sir Garnet Wolseley, 9th July 1879. 7 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, Fannin Letters, A863J: 27th June. 8 Unnumbered General Order dated 1st July 1879; Natal Witness, 3rd July 1879. 9 Unless otherwise stated, the information which follows is from TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, pp. 260-310: Report of

operations of 1st Division, South African Field Force on coast line from Tugela River to Umhlatoozi River Apr 18 - July 7. This is itself drawn from TNA (PRO) WO 32/7772. See also BPP C. 2505, Appendix, pp. 141-196.

128

1st Brigade actually marched to Port Durnford itself. Fort Napoleon was completed on

the same day. Three days later, on the 29th, a road had been constructed down to the

beach. Finally, on the 30th, transport vessels began to arrive and established a warping

facility to bring in the lighters. The first load of supplies reached the beach at about 4

p.m.

In the previous days, a large mounted force had travelled as far to the north-west as

the Mhlathuze river. Their return via the Ntuze river was secured by a smaller force

advancing to the drift of that river, including a further 200 of the 4th Battalion NNC.

On the 2nd July, General Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in the Shah off Port Durnford,

anxious to be put ashore so that he could take personal command. The weather was

poor, the surf was high and he was not able to do so, either on that day or the next. On

the 3rd he returned in his tender to the Shah, frustrated and soaked to the skin, and later

in the day headed south back to Durban.

On the afternoon of the 5th July, a large force under Brigadier Clarke marched west

towards the Mhlathuze river and established a laager there. They were followed later

that evening by Major Barrow’s mounted men. Clarke’s footmen included 500 men of

the 4th and 5th Battalions NNC, so that by that date Nettleton’s men must have returned

from the Lower Thukela. The mounted men crossed the river and continued until they

reached the old Norwegian mission station near Mangweni. They paused briefly to rest

the horses and then pressed on to reach their final objective, the old Ondini cantonment,

at 9 a.m. on the 6th July. It was abandoned and empty, and was burned to the ground.

The column then withdrew.

The return of Nettleton’s men is confirmed in a return dated 7th July which shows

the two battalions distributed as follows:10

Mlalazi Flats: 700 of 4th Battalion and 604 of 5th Battalion;

10 TNA (PRO) WO 33/34, Sub-Inclosure A in Inclosure 2, No. 212.

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Fort Chelmsford: 20 of 4th Battalion, 184 of 5th Battalion;

Fort Crealock: 110 of 5th Battalion.

The totals of 720 for the 4th and 898 for the 5th indicate a fall in numbers from those

reported on April 21st.11 While Barton had lost a little more than 100 men, Nettleton had

lost over 300. Certainly sickness accounted for some of this,12 but desertion in the

battalion ‘is so frequent that strong measures are become necessary to stop it’,13 and the

short sojourn at the Lower Thukela had permitted many of them to decamp.

Major General Crealock has been criticized for the slow progress he made during

the period from mid-April until early July, but he was severely handicapped initially by

a serious lack of both wagons and draught animals. He was also meticulous in following

his orders to bring forward supplies, and all his early efforts were devoted to this end,

whilst at the same time pushing forward reconnaissances to better his knowledge of the

ground and opposition ahead. To this day there is still no substantial road between the

Port Durnford area and Ulundi, the only major route being via Eshowe and modern

Melmoth, (which is close to KwaMagwasa). This is a clear indication of the nature of

the country over which Crealock was expected to drag his division. It is hardly

surprising, therefore, that the column was given the perhaps unfair sobriquet of

‘Crealock’s Crawlers’.

The 2nd Division continued its march to Ulundi. On 6th June, the Division reached

the Nondweni river, from where wagons were sent back for further supplies under

Wood’s Flying Column. A substantial fort was built and named Fort Newdigate after

the Divisional commander. Some of Bengough’s men were innocently involved in a

false alarm that night which caused a massive burst of firing at shadows, including by

11 See Chapter 4. 12 Durban Archives Repository, 1/VLM, 3/2/1, No. 539I, 2nd May 1879, in which the Paymaster of the 5th Battalion

notifies the discharge of 40 men “being medically unfit for further active service”. 13 Durban Archives Repository, 1/VLM, 3/2/1, No. 607I: Nettleton to Resident Magistrates, 14th June 1879, from Fort

Tenedos.

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the artillery, as a result of which the stronghold was called ‘Fort Funk’. When the

Division moved forward again on the 7th, sixty men of the 2nd Battalion NNC was left as

part of the permanent garrison.14

On the 18th June, a second fort was built some 20 kilometres to the south and given

the name Fort Marshall, for the commanding officer of the cavalry, where a further sixty

men of Bengough’s battalion formed a part of the garrison.15 Having crossed the

Babanango mountain, a third fort, named Fort Evelyn for Brigadier-General Wood, was

constructed about 35 kilometres to the south-east, after travelling over very hilly and

difficult terrain. Here too a company of Bengough’s NNC was left to garrison the fort.16

By the 26th June, the division had reached a high ridge, from which the whole of the

emaKhosini valley could be seen, with several Zulu cantonments.17 Bengough’s men

had provided valuable scouting and reconnaissance services on the march, as well as

providing garrisons, and sentries and piquets at night,18 and two companies were

involved in burning the amakhanda in the valley on the 26th.19 Among them was

esiKlebheni, one of the oldest military cantonments in Zululand. The next day, the

force reached the Mtonjaneni ridge,20 giving them a sweeping view of the Mahlabathini

plain below, on the far side of the umFolozi river. Spread across the plain were a

number of cantonments, the largest of which was oNdini itself.

Leaving a garrison behind with most of the transport, Lord Chelmsford descended

into the umFolozi valley and on the 2nd July he was encamped on the right bank of that

river. A mounted reconnaissance across the plain was undertaken by Buller on the

14 TNA (PRO) WO 32/7767. 15 Ibid. 16 TNA (PRO) WO 32/7761. 17 Narrative, p. 110. 18 Bengough, Memories, p. 134. 19 Narrative, p. 110. 20 Often referred to as ‘Magnabonium’.

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following day, during which he and his mounted men were almost caught in a clever

ambush by the Zulu.

That night, yet another false alarm occurred, during which Bengough himself was

trampled while sleeping by a stampede of his men through the camp. A terse exchange

ensued between the Major and one of his officers, Captain Boord:

‘They are not worth a rap.’ ‘Who?’ ‘Our men, Sir!’21

Leaving a large garrison to guard the baggage and the camp, including a

disappointed Colonel Glyn with his 1/24th Battalion, the Lieutenant General crossed the

river with the balance of his Second Division and the Flying Column at dawn on the 4th

July. The battle which followed went virtually by the text book and after an hour, during

which an uneasy Zulu army surrounded and unsuccessfully attacked the British square,

the mounted men went out and hunted the beaten ranks of Cetshwayo’s army from the

field.

The complement of the depleted 2nd Battalion NNC at the battle was 19 officers

and 385 men, NCOs being no longer present.22 Bengough and his officers were

dismounted during the battle, in contrast to the Imperial officers who remained mounted

throughout. The men of his battalion, in the centre of the square, ‘lay for the most part

crouched on the ground with their skin shields over their head’.23 Another observer

described them in less flattering terms:

The attitude of the miserable Natal Kaffirs or Native Contingent was in striking contrast to [the mounted Basutos]. Down flat on the ground they lay, face downwards and their shields on their backs, in the most pitiable alarm, making the most hideous noises expressing their fright. Their officers were looking on and laughing at their fears, but nothing would reassure them.24

Tomasson was, perhaps, unduly harsh in his criticism. The Africans of the 2nd

Battalion had never before been exposed to anything like the enormous noise of a

21 Bengough, Memories, p. 136. 22 TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, Enclosure 3 in No. 204. 23 Bengough, Memories, p. 137. 24 W.H. Tomasson, With the Irregulars in the Transvaal and Zululand, (London, 1881), p. 183.

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fighting square of British infantrymen, with more than 3000 rifles crashing in

overlapping volleys, twelve fields guns booming and the chattering of the two Gatling

guns. Mixed with this was a cacophony of yells, screams and moans, not to mention

commands bawled by officers at the tops of their voices in order to be heard. It might

have been very difficult even for people of today to have remained unafraid during such

an event.

And so ended the battle, and in essence the war. Lord Chelmsford treated this as

the victory which finally overcame the will of the Zulu army to continue the struggle.

The truth is probably closer to the view expressed by Jeff Guy that ‘the battle was not

the crushing military victory it was made out to be’.25 His evidence for this is

persuasive, since the duration of the battle was very short compared, for example, with

that at Khambula, and the infantry expended only an average of 6.4 rounds each. The

majority of modern writers take the view that Khambula was the watershed and after

that the bellicose spirit of much of the Zulu army began to wane. This is certainly true

after Gingindlovu, because Crealock makes frequent mention of the many major chiefs

who surrendered to him during the month of June:

The 1st Division has not been opposed by the enemy in the field during its advance to Port Durnford. On the contrary, since the day we moved on the Umlalazi, the whole populations of the local district, including Chiefs of great importance, have submitted and given up their arms and cattle.26

King Cetshwayo had not waited to determine the result of the engagement: he had

probably already guessed the outcome and had left Ulundi two days before the battle

was fought. He made his way north to the Ngome forest with his attendants, seeking

shelter at various Zulu homesteads each night.

Lord Chelmsford, having proved that the Zulu could be beaten in the open without

benefit of entrenchment or laager, in contradistinction to Isandlwana, resigned his

25 Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, p. 58. 26 TNA (PRO), WO 32/7772, report of Major General Crealock, 21st July, 1879.

133

command and left South Africa shortly thereafter, accompanied by Wood and Buller,

the former pleading ill-health. It remained to Sir Garnet Wolseley to quell the still-

troublesome abaQulusi in the north-west, and to capture the king. The latter was

accomplished by Major Marter on the 28th August, after which the king was escorted to

a ship at Port Durnford and sent into exile at Cape Town.

Although the war was now virtually over, in October 1879 two events occurred

concerning two of the commandants of the NNC, both of which throw additional light

on their characters. One of them was quite public, being reported exhaustively in the

Natal press. The second came to the attention of the Natal government and remained

there, not being made public at all.

In a previous chapter, the retreat of the 2nd Regiment NNC from Eshowe, under the

command of Major Shapland Graves was described, together with the material in the

Natal press and military manoeuvres which eventually led to his removal from the

command of his regiment. Graves continued to fight for his good name and on 13th

September a subpoena was issued to several prominent persons, including Major

General Clifford (Inspector-General, Lines of Communications and Base), Charles

Mitchell, (Colonial Secretary of Natal), Commandant Nettleton (commanding the 2nd

Battalion, 2nd Regiment NNC), and one ‘Bovey Esquire, now or lately a Captain in the

Natal Native Contingent’, to appear personally at ten o’clock on the 9th October ‘in a

certain cause now depending in our said Court between Shapland Graves Plaintiff and

John Sanderson Defendant, wherein the said Plaintiff claims the Sum of £1000 stg. as

damages for Libel.’27 Sanderson was the proprietor and editor of the Natal Colonist.28

27 Pietermaritzburg Archive Repository, CSO 721, No. 4458. 28 Sanderson, something of a crusader, was not opposed to military officers, per se. On the contrary, his had been the

only newspaper which had defended Anthony Durnford against accusations of blame for Isandlwana. See the letters which he wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock in February/March 1879: National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-23-21, 23-22 and 23-24.

134

A belated press announcement was made in an attempt to exculpate Graves but it

served mostly to alert the general public to what promised to be an interesting affair:

Full inquiry has been made by the proper military authorities into the charges recently brought forward by certain newspapers and others against Major Graves. He has been honourably acquitted by the court of inquiry which was held. It was ascertained that the charges against the Major originated through certain statements made by a drunken member of the corps, who was dismissed. Major Graves’ Solicitor is suing the Witness, Advertiser, Colonist, and Cape Argus, for heavy damages for libel in connection with the affair.29

In fact, no such formal court of enquiry had been held, as will shortly be shown.

The case lasted for four sitting days – Thursday, Friday and Saturday, 9th, 10th and

11th October, and Monday 13th October. The first three days were taken up with the

hearing of witnesses while the last was taken up with the closing arguments of counsel,

the judge’s summing up and the jury’s verdict.30

The plaintiff’s counsel called thirteen witnesses, including Colonel Pearson

commanding the 1st Column, (whose evidence, ‘taken by commission’, was read to the

court,) Major Barrow commanding the mounted men and Major Graves. Colonel

Charles Mitchell, Natal Colonial Secretary was also briefly called. Of the NNC

witnesses, two officers came from Nettleton’s 2nd Battalion, one of whom, Captain

Shervington, was not with the column but with Colonel Ely’s supply train. Defendant’s

counsel called no less than nineteen witnesses, including the defendant, John Sanderson,

and Commandant Nettleton, as well as introducing documentary evidence. It is

noteworthy that every NNC witness for the defendant came from the 2nd Battalion.

The method to be adopted in describing the hearing will be to examine the most

serious matters which were raised in evidence, since to follow the trial chronologically

would introduce much irrelevant material. The first issue to be reviewed is that of a

court of enquiry which was said to have been held, and which exonerated Major Graves.

In his own evidence, Graves testified:

29 Natal Mercury, 10th October, 1879,’ Major Graves and the Press’. The case had begun the previous day. 30 The details of the case given in this paper are drawn from the court reports of the Natal Mercury for the 10th, 11th,

13th and 14th October 1879.

135

On the 2nd April, I asked for a Court if Enquiry into the charges which had been made against me in three of the [newspaper] columns. In the letter, I stated that a Court of Enquiry was imperatively necessary to clear away the stigma against my character. I received a reply to the effect that no official report having been sent in against me, no Court of Enquiry was necessary, but that as I intended taking legal proceedings against the columnist, I should have every opportunity of full enquiry.

Thus the statement in the Natal Mercury that ‘[Major Graves] has been honourably

acquitted by the court of enquiry which was held’, which information could only have

originated from the military authorities, was patently untrue, as was the press

announcement quoted earlier.31

A second matter of a general nature refers to the withholding of pertinent

documentary evidence by the Natal government. This emerges in two places in the

evidence. The first is an exchange between counsel for the defendant and Colonial

Secretary Mitchell in which the latter ‘declined to produce other letters that had passed

because he believed their production would be detrimental to the public service of

Natal’. The judge ruled that the Secretary ‘could not be compelled to produce the

documents.’ Mr Escombe, for the plaintiff, asked if Major Graves knew of the existence

of ‘certain other documents’, to which, after some discussion as to whether the witness

should answer the question, the Colonial Secretary replied that ‘Major Graves did not

know of the existence of certain documents in his possession relating to the matter.’32

The second occasion was the later examination of the defendant, Mr John

Sanderson, by his own counsel, in which the following exchange took place:

Q. Your sense of fairness also prompted you to publish Colonel Bellairs’ letter to you with a statement that there was something kept [back].

A. I do consider, and did consider, that there was an attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the public, because I was satisfied that something had passed contrary to the correspondence which I had published, and which has not been made public to this day.

These two references clearly related to the written request made by Lord

Chelmsford to the Colonial Secretary to ask him ‘officially whether [Graves] can be

31 Natal Mercury, 9th April, 1879: ‘Major Graves and the Press’. 32 See supra, p. 87, where the correspondence between Chelmsford and the colonial government concerning Graves’

return to his post as Protector of Immigrants is solicited.

136

spared to go back to his proper position as Protector of Immigrants’ as a means of

removing him from command of the NNC regiment.33

With regard to the march itself, the first issue related to the command of the

withdrawing column. Colonel Pearson stated that he had given no written orders to

Major Graves, but that Graves ‘was senior in command both of the horses and Native

Contingent.’ This was by virtue of the fact that Graves was still a serving army officer

whilst Barrow was a volunteer. Major Barrow later stated that his orders were also

given verbally.

When the NNC left Eshowe at noon, Barrow and his mounted men were still absent

on a reconnaissance, so that Graves could not have been aware that he was in command

of the whole withdrawal. Major Barrow and the mounted men left Eshowe about 2.00

p.m. In his own evidence, Barrow was clear that he ‘was placed under the command of

no one.’ During the march, Major Graves was reminded of his seniority with respect to

Major Barrow when the latter declined to march with the NNC. Graves stated:

When [the mounted men] halted, there was an interview between myself and Major Barrow. Up to that time I had not known that he was coming. I asked him to accompany my force to the Tugela. He did not do so. He said that he would wait for me when he had got through the Amatikulu bush as he wanted to get through it before it got dark, and would send back any intelligence that he might receive of the enemy.34

It was at this point that Commandant Nettleton is alleged to have reminded Major

Graves of his seniority:

I heard afterwards that Commandant Nettleton had asked Major Graves to order Major Barrow to form an advance and a rear guard of mounted men. The Major then said he would request Major Barrow to wait for them at the Amatikulu, and Commandant Nettleton said, ‘Don’t request, order; you are the senior officer.’ The Major requested them to wait at a certain spot.35

Major Barrow, however, saw the event differently:

33 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 2554, No. C42: Lord Chelmsford to Colonial Secretary, 19th February

1879. 34 Evidence of Major Graves. 35 Evidence of Lieutenant Hayes, 2nd Battalion, for the defendant.

137

Nothing was said to me by Major Graves about waiting at some point this side of the Amatikulu bush, nor at any point on the road. I did not indicate to Major Graves any particular point. I said I would halt as soon as I got through the bush.36

Thus the NNC and the mounted men retired as two independent commands,

although Graves did state in his evidence that ‘I was, as senior officer, to assume the

command at Lower Tugela’.

The next matter is the form taken by the march. Major Graves had ordered that all

the Europeans were to march together at the front of the column.

I decided upon this peculiar formation in consequence of the state of discipline, and [the officers’] inability to carry orders to the natives, or to get them to carry them out, at which I had had sad experience at the Inyezane. Besides, before I went into Zululand, it was my opinion that if we were successful the natives would be true to us; but that if the Zulus were successful, it was doubtful whether they would not join them.37

When the officers were withdrawn from their command, the natives all broke up, and the companies ran into one another, and the men who could walk the fastest got in front.38

As a result of these actions, the length of the column quickly extended, so that by

the time Major Barrow caught up to it

… there were some natives in front of Major Graves, and the body of non-commissioned officers were with him. I can’t say at what distance the natives were ahead. From the rear men to those in front of Major Graves, I should say there was a distance of a mile or more;39

Perhaps the most serious issue during the march, and afterwards, was the behaviour

of the NCOs. It should be noted that, while officers were mounted, the NCOs were on

foot, and were thus unable to keep up the same pace as their African charges. The result

was that, from a very early stage, the NCOs began to tire. Captain Shervington testified

that he had been with Colonel Ely’s column and that only a short distance from Eshowe,

Major Graves had told him that ‘he was to stop every man going down, and tell them

that if they did not consider themselves able to march the distance to Fort Tenedos they

were to return to Etshowe.’ Further on, and after a short break at a water-hole before the

Nyezane some NCOs refused to go on and became insubordinate.

36 Evidence of Major Barrow, given by commission. 37 Evidence of Major Graves. 38 Evidence of Lieutenant Hayes, 2nd Battalion, for the defendant. 39 Evidence of Major Barrow.

138

Witness had a company of natives with him in rear of the non-commissioned officers. The latter all fell out to drink at the waterhole. After waiting some time, he called on them to fall in again, but they refused, stating that they would not fall in for witness or for any –– officer.40

Some of the NCOs eventually continued the march while others remained behind.

Some officers gave up their horses to those unable to walk and chose instead to walk

themselves. Captain Gough, 2nd Battalion, for example, walked the whole distance to

the Thukela, while Captain Maclean, 2nd Battalion, walked most of the distance.

Corporal James walked all the way by the side of Major Graves’ horse.

Major Graves was also alleged to have made an inflammatory statement regarding

the recalcitrance of the NCOs, although the evidence was often contradictory. Colour

Sergeant Leeding gave evidence that he heard Graves say ‘every man for himself’.

Richard Hazzard, another non-commissioned officer, heard him say ‘If you can’t come

on, then here’s off; every man for himself and God for us all.’ Thomas Brown, then a

trooper in the Natal Horse and previously a non-commissioned officer with the

Contingent, also stated that Major Graves said ‘Well, I’m off; every man for himself,

and God for us all.’ Sergeant Thornton declared that he heard Captain Maclean say that

he had been told that Major Graves said, ‘Every man for himself, God for us all, and the

devil take the hindermost’ but in his own evidence, Captain Maclean said only that

Lieutenant Spiller had told him that Major Graves had said every man must look out for

himself. Captain Hart, however, said that ‘the Major’s reply ‘we must go on; every man

for himself’ was false, and he was prepared to swear that it never occurred.’

From all of the evidence, it is plain that the withdrawal was of a very untidy nature

and that some NCOs were insubordinate in their refusal to march. On the other hand

many encountered great physical difficulty on a march of more than 30 miles, much of

it in the dark. As has been seen, some men were fortunate enough to be able to ride on

40 Evidence of Captain Burnside, 2nd Battalion, for the plaintiff. This was confirmed by a number of other witnesses

including Captain Hart and Commandant Nettleton.

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the horses of others while their owners walked. Men also disposed of their uniforms,

weapons and accoutrements in order to lighten their load.

I saw a man on the road who had only a shirt on. I asked him what he had done with the other things, and he told me that his boots hurt his feet, and he could not wear them, and that the other things had got too heavy to carry. I reported this to Commandant Nettleton. This man had got a mount from the mounted men, and gave it up to someone else as it hurt more to ride than walk.41

The problems did not end when the column reached Fort Tenedos on the Lower

Drift. A ‘round-robin’ letter, signed by the officers of the 2nd Battalion, was handed to

Major Graves, indicating their dissatisfaction with his command and that they wished to

become separated from him. Discussing this document, Captain Burnside, 2nd Battalion,

declared:

He recollected a paper being signed by the officers of Nettleton’s battalion, and addressed to Major Graves. The letter was in Commandant Nettleton’s own handwriting. It was sent round to the officers to ask if the officers approved of it. Witness did not approve of it and it was altered to suit the feelings and ideas of the officers. It was then re-copied by Lieutenant James, signed, and sent to Major Graves under cover, and a footnote by Commandant Nettleton.

Mr. Escombe: Was the document the spontaneous act of the officers, or did it come from Commandant Nettleton?

Witness: As he wrote it, I suppose it came from him. Mr. Escombe: Was there anything in the letter to show Commandant Nettleton’s connection

with it? Witness: Nothing.42

Burnside subsequently signed the letter, but it seems that it was rather through

loyalty to Commandant Nettleton than any stronger motive, explaining ‘[his] reason for

signing was because Commandant Nettleton and Major Graves were not on good

terms’. This also became evident during Major Graves’ own evidence when, under

heavy questioning, he became rather incoherent, claiming ‘I don’t know that Nettleton

was in the Army. He’s not in the Army’. (This was perfectly true, but Nettleton had

served with some distinction in command of African levies under Lord Chelmsford in

the Ninth Border War in 1878.)

Two other unpleasant incidents also occurred. These took place at a parade of

NCOs of the 2nd Battalion on the 7th February, after the African troops had left.43

41 Evidence of Lieutenant Hayes, 2nd Battalion, for the defendant. 42 Evidence of Captain Burnside, 2nd Battalion, for the defendant.

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During the parade, a Sergeant Warren handed a letter to Major Graves ‘setting forth the

grievances of the non-commissioned officers generally’. Graves continued:

The salient point of the document was that they wished an enquiry into the march from Etshowe to know what orders or plan was decided upon for the return to the Tugela, and also to inquire for certain comrades of theirs who were supposed to be saved. I informed them in a body of the disposition of the forces, and of what I had done to bring them to the Tugela. I told them after explaining the various points in this document to take it back, consider over it, and if after my explanations they still wished it sent to Lord Chelmsford, I would do so with great pleasure. That document was not brought back to me.

The second incident followed hard on the heels of the first, again described by

Major Graves:

During the parade, a drunken non-commissioned officer came on, and on the dismissal of the parade, which followed immediately, the non-commissioned officer called me a coward and threatened to strike those present with his rifle. He was by my orders arrested, disarmed, and placed, I was afterwards informed, in the guard tent of the 99th regiment. I then directed Commandant Nettleton to pay that man up to date on the following morning, and dismiss him from the corps. Commandant Nettleton informed me that he had carried out my orders, and that the non-commissioned officer had expressed contrition for what he had done, and that he was drunk at that time.

On the last day, after counsel had presented their final addresses, the jury retired; a

scant eight minutes later they returned with their verdict:

We find for the plaintiff; £100 damages; and we have to record our conviction that Major Graves has done nothing to forfeit his character as a British officer and a gentleman.44

Graves left the court with the cheers of his friends ringing in his ears.

The second matter related to Commandant Montgomery. When he left the NNC in

June 1879 to take up a position as commandant of Colonial Defensive District No. 1,

the move may have continued to offer him a modicum of protection when some very

personal material became known in government circles later in the year. As a result, the

story of Captain Montgomery’s venery was then, and still is, confined to the

unpublished pages of government correspondence.

On the 9th October 1879, the following memorandum was sent to the Colonial

Secretary by Mr. Marshall, Resident Magistrate of Pietermaritzburg:45

43 Lieutenant Hayes declared that these incidents occurred at two different parades, presumably on the same day. 44 Natal Mercury, 14th October 1879. 45 Pietermaritzburg Archive Repository, CSO 2554, No. C114. The details which follow are also drawn from this

same file, unless otherwise stated.

141

I enclose these Depositions for the information of His Excellency the Lieut. Governor as Capt. Montgomery holds the appointment of a Justice of the Peace for Pietermaritzburg County and has also acted as Resident Magistrate for the Upper Umkomanzi Div. and was so acting in March 1878.

On Saturday last Capt. Montgomery entered into a Recognizance to Keep the Peace towards Miss Hornby and all Her Majesty’s liege subjects for six months, himself in £300 and two Sureties to my satisfaction in £150 each.

I may add that Capt. Montgomery informed me the contents of Miss Hornby’s Deposition were not all true. Whether he is going to take any steps in regard thereto I am unable to say at present.

The depositions were dated 9th September 1879, and had been taken before Mr.

H.C. Campbell, Acting Resident Magistrate of the City (Pietermaritzburg) Division.

The principal deponent, Miss Jessie Hornby, aged 20, stated that in March 1877

she had been seduced by Captain Montgomery, under threat of his shooting both

himself and Miss Hornby, during a visit she had made to his home. Three months

afterwards, following the accidental burning of her father’s house, she and her mother

took temporary refuge in the home of Captain Montgomery, his wife, and his daughter

Alette. While out riding with Alette on the 22nd June, she was again seduced by

Montgomery, after having sent Alette away. The result of this union was the birth of a

male child on 29th March 1878. The child was subsequently taken away from her by an

African servant of the Captain, who took it to his homestead some twenty miles away.

There the child lived for a period of four months, after which it died an apparently

natural death.

Since that time, she continued, she had returned to her father’s restored house and

Captain Montgomery had continued to have intercourse with her on a number of

occasions, frequently preceded by violent rages and threats to expose her and thus ruin

her reputation. On one such occasion:

When near New Leeds he became violent but nothing occurred until I reached my father’s house, where he again had intercourse with me. I resisted by imploring him not to, but he always overcame my resistance by holding before me the consequences of exposure. A bed was made for him in the sitting room and he forced me to come to him. I was sobbing in the morning and when my mother questioned me, he told her that he had had improper intercourse with me long before that, but upon one occasion only. My mother was greatly agitated upon hearing this, and when he left, I told her all except about the child.

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Jessie had written to Montgomery, and told him personally, that she did not wish

the relationship to continue, and after this event, she had no further physical relations

with him. He was not to be deterred, however, and persistently pursued her in front of

relatives and friends, frequently giving vent to violent bouts of anger.

In April or May of 1879, she saw him in Pietermaritzburg, where he told her that

he had come down with the full intention of destroying or disgracing her, and that he

had purposely left his pistols behind as he feared to trust himself with them.46 He even

offered marriage to her ‘when he became free from his present wife’.

… I did not see him again until Sunday the 7th of June [1879],47 when thinking I had slighted him, he was very violent in his language. He then told my sister Mrs. Robert Woolley, with whom I was walking in the street, of the circumstance of the birth of the child. He said to her in a sneering way when Mrs. Woolley objected to his seeing me alone ‘Perhaps you are not aware she has had a child by me.’ He appeared to regret having said this to Mrs. Woolley, for he immediately said to her violently and earnestly ‘You had better take your solemn oath to God never to mention a word about it.’

Shortly afterwards, he went to her house and demanded to see her, despite the

presence of her two sisters. On being refused, he broke a window with his riding crop to

enter the house and subsequently smashed the door of a bedroom in which she had

sought safety, then, seizing her in his arms, made her sit on the bed with him.

This was my last interview with him although he has made an attempt to see me. From first to last, I have yielded to him both from fear of personal violence as well as from fear of exposure. I am in daily fear of him. My fears place me completely in his power.

One must presume that it was on the evidence of his violence and harassment that he

was compelled to give his ‘Recognizance to Keep the Peace’ towards Miss Hornby.

A second deposition was by Mr. Robert Woolley, Miss Hornby’s brother-in-law,

which was also made on the 9th September 1879, and confirmed virtually all of what

Jessie had herself deposed, although much of what he said was hearsay. He had been

unable to provide any support for either his sister-in-law or his wife at the time, being

46 Montgomery was at that time stationed at Kranskop, near the Middle Drift of the Thukela river. 47 At that date, Captain Cherry was quite ill, being admitted to hospital on the 12th June, so that when Montgomery

left to attend to his personal affairs the NNC at Kranskop was without an effective commanding officer. See p. 128 above.

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militarily engaged ‘at the front’.48 He called for a ‘warrant for the arrest of Alexander

Nixon Montgomery’.

The depositions were of such a serious nature as to require them to be brought to

the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor of the colony, Sir Henry Bulwer, to which his

response on the 13th October was as follows:

This is a very sad story. I think the Attorney General should see these papers in case there should be anything

required to be done by the public authorities in the matter. The concealment of both the birth & the death of the child may perhaps under some investigation [be] necessary. As for Captain Montgomery, I do not know what position he holds towards the Government exactly as a Justice of the Peace.

If the enclosed statements are correct, he of course ought no longer to hold the Commission of the Peace. But I perceive that he should have an opportunity of being heard.

On October 20th, Attorney-General Gallwey sent the results of his enquiries in a

memorandum:

I am informed that a singcon [sic]49 and a nurse were in attendance at the birth of this child and the child lived for some time.

Neither was there any disposing or burying of the child, which is necessary to prove on trial for concealment of birth.

The Act of Registration of Births and Deaths 1867 has been contravened as neither the birth nor the death were registered.

The Registration District where the birth should have been registered was Richmond (Umkomanzi).

The child was born on the 29th March 78. The Resident Magistrate is the Registrar of Births there. Capt. Montgomery was acting Resident Magistrate for that District from 9th March to April

22, 1878. The child was illegitimate; the mother was the person bound to give the information and

she omitted to register the birth and is liable to the penalty imposed by the Law £5.0.0. The Registrar does not appear to have committed any contravention of the Law for which

he is criminally responsible. Instructions have been now issued to institute an enquiry into this alleged death of the child. In any case, no step to remove Capt. Montgomery from the Commission of the Peace

should be taken until he has had afforded to him the opportunity of offering some explanation in this sad case.

Meanwhile, investigations concerning the child proceeded apace; on 21st October,

the Attorney-General was able to forward a Minute from the Resident Magistrate of the

City Division to the effect that ‘no registration of either the birth or the death of any

child of Miss Jessie Hornby has been registered in the Register books at my office’ and

48 It is not known in what capacity he served: he is nowhere mentioned in General Orders and so may have served in

one of the many volunteer units. 49 Perhaps isangoma=witch-doctor?

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to request a similar investigation by the Resident Magistrate of the Umkomanzi District,

wherein lay Captain Montgomery’s residence:

You will be pleased again to note the contents of the above minute. There is evidence as to the birth 29/3/78 of the child referred to, but although the infant’s

said to have died about four months after birth, there is no evidence as to the fact. I have therefore to request that you will institute the necessary enquiries with a view to ascertain whether the child has actually died & if it has, to place on record the circumstances connected therewith.

You will be pleased to communicate to me the result of your investigation. The child is said to have been removed from its mother by Captain Montgomery, of Ismont in your Division.

On 22nd October, in response to Mr. Gallwey’s letter, Sir Henry Bulwer noted:

If there is any truth in this story – and from the Resident Magistrate’s minute I am led to infer that Captain Montgomery does not deny the truth, in part, of the story – I do not see how Captain Montgomery’s name can be kept on the Commission of the Peace. If any further proceedings are being taken, and if, pending those proceedings, any action taken by the Government in this matter could appear to prejudge the case, it would perhaps be better to await the result of the proceedings for that reason. But if no proceedings are being taken, then I do not think our action might be delayed.

One might be surprised to note that the principal cause for concern was

Montgomery’s occupying the position of Justice of the Peace, rather than the

circumstances of any innocent party or the concealment of a child’s birth and death.

Then as now, however, any contentious issue required the elimination of potential

embarrassment for the government of the day. Finally, on 31st October came a covering

letter from Mr. Gallwey:50

I enclose for His Excellency’s information the report of the Res. Magistrate Upper Umkomanzi, together with certain depositions made before him by some natives in reference to the death of a white child handed over to their custody and to its death while at their kraal.

The most important witness in the case, the native who it is said acquired the child from Capt. Montgomery, and his directions concerning the child, is absent, and his return is uncertain. No action can be taken in the interim.

Bobiana, the head of the homestead to which the child was taken, gave his

deposition, together with two of his wives, Manyoni and Mandowanina. The most

important witness, the African servant Uhai, who had taken the child to his homestead,

had run away and his statement was not taken until some time later.

Uhai said that he was in the service of Captain Montgomery and that some 18

months earlier, when Montgomery was at Richmond, he was in the house when the

50 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 2554 No. C127.

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child was born. About a week later, he was instructed by Montgomery to take the child

to his homestead and have it cared for.

I told him that none of the women were sucking children and that they were old; he said I was to take it and that he would see that the people of the kraal did not make a fuss about it.

Montgomery, Jessie and ‘another small girl’ (perhaps Alette Montgomery,) brought

the child in a wagon. The child had some clothes and a bottle of milk. It was

subsequently fed with cow’s milk and Uhai reported to Jessie from time to time as to the

child’s progress. It apparently caught a cold and Jessie gave Uhai some medicine for it.

The child died shortly afterwards from the cough on its chest. I took it up to Captain Montgomery at Ismont but as he was not at home and not wishing to tell any body about it, I buried it myself. Captain Montgomery was at Richmond when Miss Jessie gave me the child. He was at Richmond.

On the evidence of Uhai’s statement, the child’s death could not have been the

result of malnutrition, since he said it was fed with cow’s milk. It is more likely that the

death was the result of an infection, due to the unhygienic conditions in which the infant

found itself.

This account must end without a satisfactory conclusion. We do not know if

Commandant Montgomery made any statement in his own defence, although he had

admitted the substance of the charges. It seems that no criminal or other charges were

brought against either Montgomery or Miss Hornby, or any other person. The matter

was quietly laid to rest but Montgomery’s career in the colony’s public service was

effectively at an end for many years.

Rupert Lonsdale continued to serve with his Native Horse until the unit was

demobilised on 10th October,51 when he dropped out of sight for some little time. In a

letter in late 1880, Lonsdale acknowledged an earlier correspondence from Lord

Chelmsford which was clearly critical of his command, to which he replied: ‘I can quite

understand the kind of reports, which I have every reason to believe reached you,

51 National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-22-19: Lonsdale to Lord Chelmsford, 17th August 1880.

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leading you to conclude that “Lonsdale’s Horse” was a failure’.52 The nature of the

Lieutenant General’s criticism is not known, but clearly he felt that Lonsdale had let

him down once more. In the letter, Lonsdale gave his address as ‘St Helier, Jersey’, so

he had briefly returned to Britain.

According to a table in the Narrative, the five battalions of the Contingent were

discharged in September 1879.53 Certainly, Bengough’s battalion arrived at Greytown

on the 15th September, where they were paid up and discharged shortly afterwards.54

Cherry’s 1st and 3rd combined battalions, now called the 1st, were also discharged at the

end of the month.55 Captain Barton’s 4th Battalion was probably let go at about the same

time.56

On the 1st October, Commandant Nettleton issued what he called a ‘Battalion

Order’ to the men on their discharge.57 In it, he noted that their numbers had been as

high as 1200, gave thanks to the men of his battalion for ‘their many good qualities and

their cheerful performance of trying and arduous duties’ and told them that their

conduct had been ‘most creditable’ and had been noticed by senior officer of the brigade

and division. He noted that they had lost some thirty of their number killed or wounded,

but that those lost through disease were substantially more. He offered his sympathy to

their families.

In saying “good bye” to the men and wishing them a prosperous and peaceful future, the Command’t marks with great satisfaction the confidence and perfect understanding that has existed between the European officers and the Native Officers, N.C.O.s and men of the Battalion.

It seems, however, that this was not the end of the battalion. A newspaper article of

22nd November reported the assembly of the men and a speech given to them by Chief

52 Ibid. 53 Narrative, p. 170. 54 Natal Witness, 30th September 1879, report from Greytown dated 23rd September. 55 Natal Witness, 30th September 1879, report from Greytown dated 29th September. 56 Times of Natal, 8th October 1879. 57 Durban Archives Repository, 1/VLM, 3/2/1, No. 854I.

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Mqawe.58 The article began: ‘On the hills above Fort Tenedos lie the last of the British,

the very rear of the grand army; it is Commandant Nettleton’s N.N.C.’ Mqawe

concluded his brief address with the following words:

War came; we told the government that we were their children. We have now proved it in battle, and are going home because the war is over. Tonight we dance on the Zulu hills, and none can make us afraid. Where is Ketshwayo? He’s not here; he’s away. Go, you have done well. I have spoken.

A month earlier, however, Mqawe, who must have been something of a firebrand,

had declared that he would never fight for the British again. In a speech in which he

highlighted the conditions under which he and his men had served, he observed:

We are wholly losers in the campaign; the Zulus are wholly gainers. Nothing has been done to them to show them they are punished, conquered; not a head of cattle taken. I come out of the fight unrequited in any sense.59

It might have been the response of the whole of the Natal Native Contingent at the

end of the Zulu war.

This final chapter has described the events which occurred in the period up to the

discharge of the Contingent in the last quarter of 1879, including the final victory at

Ulundi. The men at Kranskop continued their decline, largely as a result of dissolute

officers in the absence of a sick Captain Cherry. The departure of Commandant

Montgomery made little difference to discipline and the brief flurry of activity on the

river did little to assuage their boredom. It is clear that Montgomery’s personal

problems did little to help his leadership pretensions, and much to cut short his post-war

career.

On the coast, the two battalions were much more active but a close examination of

the work undertaken shows a marked distinction.60 Barton’s 4th Battalion was used

extensively for reconnaissance work and scouting generally, with a little convoy duty.

Nettleton’s 5th, on the other hand, was used less for convoy work, did no reconnaissance

58 Natal Colonist, 22nd November, 1879: special correspondent 59 Natal Witness, 2nd October 1879: ‘Extraordinary Statement by Umqawe.’ 60 TNA (PRO), WO 32/7750, daily diaries of the brigades of the 21st Division.

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duty and spent much of its time doing fatigues and cutting grass and wood. Both were

used to form part of the garrison at the forts built on the coast.

One must pose the question as to why Barton’s men were used in the more

proactive role while the 5th was used on more menial tasks. It is difficult to determine

the answer to this question but one might hazard that it had much to do with the fact that

Barton was a regular British officer while Nettleton was not, and indeed had never

served with the British army. Probably Barton was the better leader of the two, if only

perhaps for their military backgrounds.

Major Bengough also left three of his companies in the intermediate forts on the

line of march, thus having only seven of them at Ulundi. He may have been

disappointed at their behaviour during the battle, which might explain why they were

not used during the pursuit of the defeated Zulu regiments afterwards.61

61 General Newdigate specifically states in a postscript to his report ‘The 2nd Battalion of Natal Native Contingent

acted in reserve during the action.’ (TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, Enclosure 1 in No. 205). Bengough himself does not mention their involvement in the pursuit.

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Conclusion

In this work, the writer has demonstrated that the NNC had its roots in the Natal

concept of labour service for the government, or isibhalo. Its full flowering was the

result of Colonel Anthony Durnford’s personal experiences with, and sympathy for, the

Africans among whom he worked. It has also been shown that its inception was delayed

by arguments between the military authorities and the Natal government, personified by

the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Henry Bulwer, and that as a result, the timetable for war

set in place by Sir Bartle Frere left little time for the men who were impressed to receive

more than rudimentary training.

The large number of white men required take leadership roles in the three NNC

regiments was impossible to obtain without resort to the employment of those of much

less quality than the positions demanded. At the most senior levels, that of the

commandants themselves, a number of officers who had served successfully in the

earlier Border War declined to serve in Natal, so that once again, resort was had to men

with less ability. It should also be stated that these men were leavened by the use,

perhaps as the result of the paucity of colonials with access to the Zulu language, of

special service British officers.

Captain Hallam Parr, in his memoirs, had this to say of the NNC:

By dint of strict training and discipline, with confidence in their officers, and accustomed to be led by them, the Natal natives would become, doubtless, excellent soldiers; but they, like Cetywayo’s men, require to be well-disciplined, and the Natal Native Contingent of 1878 [sic] was no more to be compared to a Zulu regiment than a hastily armed battalion of French peasants with a regiment of the Prussian line.1

Thus the NNC, when first taken into action in a role for which they were unfitted –

ill-prepared, poorly armed and led by men, many of whom they could not understand, in

1 Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, p. 155.

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whom they reposed little confidence – performed poorly. At Sihayo’s homestead, on the

second day of the invasion, they were in the front line, while the regular British troops

were behind them. Ten days later, they were roaming the hills about Isandlwana,

completely exposed to an attack from the Zulu enemy which was expected at any time.

The failure of Major Graves and his officers and NCOs of the 1st Regiment was

revealed during their march from Eshowe to the Thukela river on the 28th/29th January.

We have noted that as a result of this poor performance in the first stages of the

war, and the subsequent enquiries which were undertaken by the Natal government, the

NCOs were stripped from the regiments and re-assigned to mounted infantry duties. It

must again be stressed that unsatisfactory officers and NCOs were not able to be simply

discarded, other than for some serious offence, since they were under a six-month

contract of service which both sides were required to observe.

In the wake of the Isandlwana disaster, the senior commandants were closely

examined and found wanting: four of them were removed from their commands and the

3rd Regiment was disbanded, three of the failed commandants, Lonsdale Hamilton-

Browne and Cooper coming from that unit alone. They were assigned to other duties,

while the single serving officer, Graves, returned to his previous employment as

Protector of Immigrants. In a re-organisation of the Contingent, the regiments

themselves were dissolved and a new structure consisting of five independent battalions

was substituted. This was a quite sensible arrangement since not one of the three

regimental commandants remained. Shortly afterwards, the men of the NNC were fully

armed with modern weapons and were given uniforms, both of which improved their

confidence greatly: ‘They had done very well since they had been armed with rifles, but

before that they were as useless as anyone would be in an Irish row without a stick.’2

The replacement of Durnford and Graves by serving British officers contributed to this

2 Natal Mercury, 10th October, 1879: evidence of Captain Fitzroy Hart in Major Graves’ libel trial.

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improvement, as did the change of role to the more suitable one of scouting and

following up a defeated enemy. Their performance at Gingindlovu demonstrated this

increased confidence, although it was still less than optimum.

Of the three battalions of the 1st Regiment, a portion of the 1st Battalion saw action

while a portion of Bengough’s 2nd Battalion, although present at the final battle of

Ulundi, made little contribution to what was, perhaps, a hollow victory. The 3rd

Battalion, with the remaining elements of the 1st, were based throughout at Kranskop,

and were only briefly used during the ‘diversions’ prior to, and shortly after, the relief

of Eshowe. Gingindlovu was the last battle for the 4th and 5th Battalions.

In spite of the disbandment of the 3rd Regiment, and the less than satisfactory

performance of the other two regiments before their re-organisation, Lord Chelmsford

had maintained his confidence in his African force throughout the war:

With regard to their value as fighting units, I am free to confess that I cannot rank them very high. I do not, however attribute any blame in this matter to the individuals who, man for man, are, I believe quite as courageous, and possess quite as fine a phisique [sic] as the Zulu proper.

Steady behaviour under fire on the part of troops in the field, depends almost entirely upon drill, discipline, organisation, and good officers.

These advantages, owing to the hurried manner in which the native contingents were raised, have been hitherto enjoyed by them to a very limited extent, and they are only now beginning to feel their effects.3

This was an unspoken criticism of the men who had led the Contingent, since their

leadership had largely contributed to their failure. The second paragraph is particularly

telling because these were the very elements which were lacking.

Lord Chelmsford then turned his attention to their aptitude for service. Despite his

reservations, he noted that they were still ‘absolutely indispensable’ to his columns,

being

… excellent scouts, indefatigable, and quick witted, perform all fatigue duties most cheerfully, and can be employed with mounted men when necessary in consequence of their wonderful marching powers, many of the men are employed as spies; and all cheerfully and

3 TNA (PRO) WO 33.34, No. 181, Lord Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 8th June 1879.

152

willingly perform any duty they may be detailed for, such as bringing in wood, repairing roads, searching difficult country, building entrenched posts, &c., &c.4

It will be noted that their role had by then been subtly transformed from that for

which they had originally been impressed. W.H. Stafford, who briefly had command of

one of the 1/1st Battalion companies, was much less flattering about the Contingent in

later life:

In my opinion, which I have always held, the formation of the Natal Native Contingent, as a fighting force was farcical. They were spell-bound with terror of the Zulu impis; the Zulu army to them was invincible.5

This is, however, an example of one of a number of stereotypes which were

apparent. The Zulu themselves, whilst holding the NNC in contempt, did so because

they were thought to be pawns of the white government. They were, in fact, little

different from their Natal brothers and were as likely to break under pressure: ‘You

know what we are, when we once give way and run. There is no stopping us to fight the

pursuer.’ 6

While their discipline under Shaka and Dingane had been instilled by fear, by 1879

the Zulu had become much more independent of the king and although most were still

prepared to fight for him, some chose not to do so. Their independence is demonstrated

by the fact that most of the victors of Isandlwana chose not to return to Ulundi but to go

instead to their homes. Their initial victory was of a Pyrrhic nature, their losses had

been horrendous and it was for a while quite possible they would have broken under the

tremendous fire from the Martini Henry rifles of the 24th. Further, their confidence of

success waned substantially as the war progressed, particularly after Khambula and

Gingindlovu, and their reluctance to fight at Ulundi was clear.

Finally, we should turn to a review of the commandants themselves, bearing in

mind the standards of leadership established in the Introduction. Colonel Anthony

4 Ibid. 5 Captain W.H. Stafford, Natal Mercury, 22nd January, 1929. 6 A Zulu chief, quoted in Alan F. Hattersley, (ed.), The Later Annals of Natal, Green: London, 1958, p. 161.

153

Durnford, creator of the NNC and commander of the 1st Regiment, was the only

commandant who lost his life during the war, and under the most unfortunate of

circumstances. We have noted his tendency towards impetuosity, and one could also

impute to him, as perhaps an extension of that impetuosity, an inability to withdraw

from a worsening situation until it was too late. One might do worse than quote the

words of Robin Drooglever in his own assessment of Durnford’s command abilities:

The uncertainty of much of what happened at Isandlwana leaves one doubtful whether he had succeeded in proving to himself whether he was indeed a leader. Unfortunately, in that respect, he had left behind him a catalogue of failure.7

It is a harsh verdict on a man of whom he also said ‘His grace, his manners, his

humanitarianism, his sense of propriety and of justice, his moral courage, were all

admirable social attributes.’8 Drooglever also includes a most telling quotation which

encapsulates the dilemma in which Durnford found himself, especially after his

reprimand of only a week or so earlier:

Lack of direction from those at the apex of a hierarchical authoritarian organization provides a special dilemma for those at lower levels in the chain of command. Confronted with an absence of clear-cut orders. what are they to do? If they take the law into their own hands they run the risk of being accused of insubordination, particularly if their plans happen to miscarry, but if they do not show initiative then they are equally likely to suffer for not having done so.9

Durnford was designated at the time as the man responsible for the loss of the camp

at Isandlwana, a blemish which was the result of a propaganda campaign begun almost

while the powder smoke was still hanging in the air on that tragic field. It is clear that

Durnford cared for his African troops, just as he had done for his Ngwe charges in

1873/4. His distribution of the ‘General Instructions for the Management of Natives’ is

ample proof of that.10 He was, however, indecisive at crucial moments, and inclined

towards impetuosity, characteristics which made him unfit for such a command as was

7 Drooglever, A Figure of Controversy, p. 287. 8 Ibid. 9 Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, p. 40f. 10 See Appendix II.

154

given to him. He was a not a ‘line’ officer but an engineer, and would have served his

country better had he been retained in that role.

The remaining commandants fall into two distinct groups: special service officers

of the British army and colonial officers who may or may not have received formal

military training. Three men of latter group were in command of the 3rd Regiment and

its two battalions. The worst of them, condemned by his own words as much as

anything else, was Hamilton-Browne. We have already observed the contempt in which

he held his men and the brutal treatment offered to them. Worse, his example must

surely have been imitated by his officers and NCOs. Sadly, the sources remain largely

silent on the command abilities of Commandant Cooper. He must surely have been as

bad as Hamilton-Browne if only as a result of his taking up a knobkerrie to deal with his

frightened men. Thus both were completely uncaring about their men and entirely

lacked communication skills. Both men were retained only until the expiry of their

contract in May, Hamilton-Browne in recruiting men for what was to become

Lonsdale’s Horse, and Cooper in meaningless regimental tasks. This clearly indicates

the poor opinion in which they were held in the higher echelons of command.

Better, but by no means satisfactory, with perhaps one single example, were the

colonials. Rupert Lonsdale, who commanded the 3rd Regiment was, of course, sick for

much of the period during which the initial training of the corps was given and his place

was taken by Major Black, but he was present during the extended reconnaissance of

the Malakatha hills. It is most likely, however, that he still suffered the after-effects of

his indisposition and his subsequent action in returning alone to the camp confirms that

he was not fit to command at that time, either physically or mentally. He was also sent

to the Cape to recruit mounted volunteers and was later appointed to the command of

his own unit of horsemen, Lonsdale’s Horse, the core of which was formed by the men

155

he and Hamilton-Browne had brought up from the Cape.11 Although this unit served in

the relief of Eshowe and thus the battle of Gingindlovu, there is no evidence that

Lonsdale was himself present in its early days. Indeed, a General Order of 22nd April

1879 states that ‘until the arrival of Commandant Lonsdale, the command of Lonsdale’s

Horse will be assumed by Captain Burnett’.12 His unit did, however, serve in the later

phases of the war, as he had done in the 9th Border War, so that his failure at Isandlwana

should be mitigated by his ill health. There is, however, evidence that his new command

was also less than successful.13

Of the two remaining colonial officers, one of them served in each of the 1st and 2nd

Regiments. We have reviewed the career Captain Montgomery, commandant of the

1/1st, at length. He was diverted from his command to a considerable extent by his

anxiety for the publication of his book, and by his extramarital adventures. In a more

direct sense, he paid little attention to discipline in his own unit and permitted the

extensive inebriation of his officers which became the pattern of life at Fort Cherry.

This may well have been a contributing factor in the suicide of Lieutenant D’Ombrain,

as it had been in the attempt made by Robert Marr to end his own life in the previous

year. Montgomery’s need for the company of young men may, in today’s more open

times, suggest a bisexual orientation but there is nothing other than circumstantial

evidence to sustain such a charge.

Commandant Nettleton, commanding the 2nd Battalion on the coast, is more of an

enigma because we know little about him. It is clear that he had little time for his

commanding officer, Major Graves, and perhaps the removal of the latter, and the re-

organisation of the NNC into five independent battalions, suited his personality much

better. Certainly, his men behaved very well, although they were as prone to desertion

11 Tylden, Armed Forces of South Africa, No. 302, p. 108. 12 District Order No. 5, dated 22nd April 1879, Natal Mercury, 24th April 1879. 13 See for example, National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-22-19, discussed later.

156

as any of the other units, particularly on their brief sojourn on the Thukela. It is

extremely difficult to reconcile, at this distance, the two statements made by Nettleton

on the dismissal of his battalion at the end of the war, with that made by Mqawe only a

few weeks earlier. One might wonder if Nettleton’s treatment of his men was less than

seems at first apparent. It is also clear that his battalion was given the more tedious tasks

of fatigues and other mundane duties while Barton’s was more involved in scouting and

other front-line duties. It has already been observed that this might have been a

reflection of the differing views by senior officers of the abilities of regular army and

colonial officers but may equally have been a reflection of their differing efficiency.

Finally, there remain the serving officers, of whom there were five. Four of them

performed very well, but again were no less prone to the desertions which occurred after

the first invasion. The least competent was Major Graves, whose behaviour during the

march from Eshowe to the Thukela on the 28th/29th January was particularly suspect and

brought about his removal from command. His notion of bringing the white officers and

NCOs to the front of the column was a clear reflection of his lack of care for his African

troops, allowing them to become spread out more than a mile from front to rear. The

behaviour of the NCOs, in particular, was very poor but one must bear in mind that they

were all, unlike their officers, on foot and were required to undertake a thirty mile

march, much of it during the night hours. Their discipline was also very poor, choosing

to discard their weapons, accoutrements and even clothing in order to reduce the weight

they were carrying. It is very apparent, by his machinations behind the scenes, that Lord

Chelmsford had a poor opinion of Graves and was prepared to go to some lengths to

publicly support him, while at the same time clandestinely removing him from his

command.

There is little to choose between three of the other officers, Barton, Bengough and

Cherry. The latter’s command was marred by ill-health at a crucial period in mid-winter

157

and may explain his own dereliction in permitting the drunkenness of his officers to

continue. Major Bengough demonstrated his communication skills by producing his

small Zulu language handbook on his way to Africa, which was offered to everyone

involved with African troops. He was, however, quite prepared to allow his men to

desert after Isandlwana, not fully understanding that what drove them away was not

only a want of courage but a need to see and reassure their families. It was only Lord

Chelmsford’s insistence which brought them back, an action he chose not to repeat with

the 3rd Regiment.

Of all the British officers, Captain Barton seems to have been the most assiduous,

demonstrating his command of all the skills required in an officer. His term as adjutant

of his battalion, and then as staff officer to Durnford, honed his communication skills

and he acted decisively in action at Gingindlovu, as his letter to J. E. Fannin showed. It

is noteworthy that both he and Bengough were eventually elevated to the rank of Major

General.

How successful the NNC might have proved to be as an effective force during the

war is difficult to determine. In the latter stages of the war, when they were better armed

and attired, and better led, they probably performed at least up to contemporary

expectations. However, so ingrained were the stereotypes of the day in most of the men

who led them, and so poor were communications between officers and men, that the

Africans were given little opportunity to perform better.

It is appropriate to mention here still another reason which may assist in an

assessment of the NNC. In his work on Africans and the state, John Lambert has

identified an artificial demarcation between chiefdoms in Natal and those in Zululand,

both of which had been incorporated into the Zulu nation. The key passage states:

But, to stress their inferior status vis-a-vis the Zulu, the chiefdoms of the southern region were ideologically distinguished from those of the Zulu heartland north of the Thukela. The latter were incorporated closely into the Zulu kingdom and were encouraged to regard themselves as being amantungwa, of a common descent with the Zulu; while the former were distinguished as

158

inferior amalala (menials), firmly excluded from centres of power and prevented from organizing amabutho for military service.14

It is therefore not unreasonable to posit that after many decades of this

discrimination, the chiefs of Natal really felt that they were inferior to the ‘Zulu’.

Finally, one must take into account the sociological differences between the

African and European soldier, each of whom had an entirely different heritage. The

European was accustomed to long periods of military service, stretching in many cases

to at least two decades and more. The African, in contrast, was used to serving for only

one campaign, and then for only a very short period of time. Following a natural break

in hostilities, usually a single engagement, the warriors would return home until next

called upon. This was termed ‘desertion’ by the British, rather than viewing it as quite

normal behaviour. It was therefore unreasonable to expect that the customs of one

should be substantially changed to accommodate the needs of the other. It was the

failure of the military authorities in South Africa to appreciate these greatly differing

traditions which contributed most to the ineffectiveness of the African levies.

14 John Lambert, Betrayed Trust, p. 24.

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Appendix I Post War Careers of the Commandants

Rupert Lonsdale next appeared serving in command of one of three battalion of

Zulus in a campaign against rebel elements of the Zulu army in 1888, Lieutenant

Colonel ‘Fred’ Carrington in command.1 No further information is available on his later

life, or death.

George ‘Maori’ Hamilton-Browne left the service of the British army in May

1879, his services being no longer required. In the ten years following the Zulu War, he

continued to seek out military service in Africa: he was involved in the Basutoland

Rebellion in 1880-81, Warren’s Bechuanaland Expedition in 1884-85, and was

appointed adjutant of the Diamond Fields Horse in 1886. He returned to Natal briefly in

1888 to take over another of the battalions under Carrington, and was thus briefly

reunited with Lonsdale once more. He was involved in both Matabele Wars (1893 and

1896), the second of which was his last campaign. He is recorded as having died in

1916, approximately 69 years of age.2

Edward Russell Cooper also left the British forces in May, when his six month

contract terminated. The only further information about him is a notice in the Graham’s

Town Journal: ‘His Excellency the Governor, with the advice of the Executive Council,

has been pleased to approve of the appointment of Mr Edward Russell Cooper as

adjutant and instructor of musketry to the 2nd Yeomanry Regiment.’3 The details of the

remainder of his life are unknown; he thus remains the officer about whom we know the

least.

1 Tylden, “Commandant George Hamilton-Browne of the Colonial Forces”, pp. 153-160. 2 The account of Hamilton-Browne’s later years are also drawn from Tylden, “Commandant George Hamilton-

Browne”. 3 Graham’s Town Journal, 12th January 1880.

160

In the years from the end of the war until his death, Alexander Nixon Montgomery

continued to prove a nuisance to the Natal Government, writing a myriad of letters of

complaint to various officials, covering such matters as the government pound and its

pound-master, fencing of farms, publication of the Natal Government Gazette, locusts in

his district, and roads, particularly those around his farm of Ismont.4 In his later years,

he became obsessed with a need for official stationery, and made strenuous requests for

more.5 It was, perhaps, an indication of the substantial correspondence which he

undertook.

It seems that he was stripped of his post as a Justice of the Peace for Natal, but not

for his local area, since he continued to use those initials in his correspondence. He even

recommended himself as Justice of the Peace for the colony but this was not pursued.6

Furthermore, his dalliance might finally have been forgiven since he acted as a

temporary Resident Magistrate for Upper Umkomanzi in 1893,7 and in the same role for

in 1896.8

Montgomery died, insolvent, on 19th January 1911, aged 71 years and eight

months. He had continued to live on his property Ismont, but at the time of his death it

was owned by his son-in-law, to whom it had been mortgaged for £2500.9

After the discharge of his men in late 1879, William John Nettleton served late in

the following year with another African levy in the brief campaign against the

baSotho.10 He may then have retired to his home in King William’s Town, where he

died on 18th January 1897 aged approximately 64 years. At the time of his death he was

4 Among the many are: roads: SNA 1/1/81, 147/1885; fencing: CSO 1330, 1953/1892; animal pound: CSO 1258,

7249/1889; locusts: CSO 1445, 789/1896. 5 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1602, 831/1899. 6 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1439 , No. 4333/1895. 7 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1431, No. 2518. 8 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, CSO 1468, No. 3216. 9 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, MSCE 40/166. 10 Nettleton gives brief details of his command in a letter to Lord Chelmsford from “Basutoland”, dated 20th

November 1880, in which he tries to establish contact with friends of one of his officers, Lieutenant Nelso, killed in action. See National Army Museum, CP, 6807/386-22-23.

161

a Road Inspector. There was a brief obituary which referred to him as an ‘old and

esteemed resident of King William’s Town’ also noting that he had arrived in the town

forty years previously. The obituary noted that he saw service in the ‘Native wars & was

present at Ulundi’. He was buried with military honours, the Volunteer Medical Service

Corps ‘parading for that purpose’ and ‘the firing party being provided by the Cape

Police’.11

There was a mass of promotions for those British officers who had served in the

Zulu War, all of which were awarded on the same day, 29th November 1879. These, of

course, were to fill the vacancies caused by the many deaths which had occurred in

Zululand, and elsewhere in the world.

Captain Cherry was not one of those to be promoted on that date, however, having

to wait until 30th January 1880 for his brevet majority. This was made substantive on

29th June 1881. He went on to achieve the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on 23rd September

1885 but his career was cut short when he died, while still in the service, a year later on

5th July 1886; he was a few days short of his 47th birthday.12 Clearly, Cherry suffered

ill-health long after his Kranskop days.

In common with a number of other officers, Major Bengough was promoted to

Lieutenant Colonel on 29th November 1879 and then to Colonel on the 29th November

1883. He was on half-pay for a period commencing on 29th April 1882. He was

appointed Major General, perhaps local rank only, when he went to Jamaica in 1893.

The rank was made permanent on 13th February 1894. He retired from the service on

29th November 1898; Bengough himself says that he did so ‘a little before the Boer War

of 1899’.13 He was awarded the honour of a knighthood in the Order of the Bath.14

11 Obituary of William Nettleton, Queenstown Representative, 21st January 1897. 12 TNA (PRO), WO 76/481; Army List, 1885 and 1886. 13 Bengough, Memories, p. 203. 14 Bengough confessed that for a time he was regarded in the army as persona non grata because he was ‘a fellow

that writes to the papers’. (Bengough, Memories, pp. 199f.)

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Captain Geoffry Barton was promoted to Brevet Major on 29th November 1879. He

served in the Egyptian War of 1882 as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General commanding

the military police. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 18th November 1879,

Colonel on 18th November 1866 and to Major General on 27th October 1898. He was

made Colonel of his regiment, the 7th (Royal Fusiliers), on 1st May 1900. He returned to

Natal during the Boer War of 1899-1902, serving under Buller. He was placed on the

retired list on 13th August 1904 and died 6th July 1922. His honours included a C.B., in

1889, the C.M.G. in 1900 and finally a knighthood, Knight Commander of the Victorian

Order, in 1906.15

There is no evidence to suggest that the career of Major Shapland Graves was in

any way affected by the débâcle of the withdrawal of his regiment from Eshowe to the

Thukela and his subsequent removal. It is perfectly possible that his exoneration by the

civil court in his suit for damages explains, at least in part, why this was so. Perhaps

more important still, however, was the fact that promotion was at that time based upon

seniority and not merit; if death or ill-health could be avoided, promotion was

guaranteed. He returned to his regiment, the 3rd East Kent (the ‘Buffs’) Regiment and

was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 1st July 1881. He was promoted to Colonel on

1st July 1885, went on half-pay on 1st July 1887 and retired on 5th December 1888. It

seems that he returned to the service at some time, since he is also recorded as retiring

finally on 11th October 1905.

15 D.W. Kruger, C.J. Beyers (eds), Dictionary of South African Biography, (Cape Town, 1977), Vol. III, p. 52.

163

Appendix II Instructions for the Management of Natives

General Instructions for the Management of Natives,

for the guidance of Officers appointed to the Natal Native Contingent,

and others who may have Natives placed under them.16

1.–The Natal Zulu may be looked upon as an intelligent, precocious boy, with the

physical strength of a man.

2.–He is very sensible of justice, and equally sensitive to injustice. A firm, kind

rule is what he understands and appreciates.

3.–If you look after his personal comfort, and take an interest in his welfare, you

will certainly gain his confidence.

4.–Insist on unquestioning obedience, and be careful that your order is carried out.

Avoid, however, unreasonable, contradictory and, when possible, unnecessary harassing

orders.

5.–Set an example of perfect obedience. ‘The chief says it’ is the law to the Zulu.

6.–Avoid undue familiarity. Never argue, but converse freely with your men.

7.–Never use epithets of contempt, such as niggers, kafirs &c. Call then ‘abantu’

(people), ‘amadoda’ (men), or ‘amabuti’ (soldiers).

8.–Passionate language is always held in contempt by a Zulu. A quiet, firm tone is

the one to adopt. Any intimation that they are behaving like common kafirs

(amakafula), and not like ‘real soldiers’ (amabuto wenkosi) is certain to produce an

effect.

16 Published in the Natal Mercury, 10th December 1878 and the Times of Natal, 9th December 1878.

164

9.–Never pass over neglect of orders; and never threaten without carrying threat

into effect, if occasion requires it.

10.–When drilling Zulus avoid all nagging–many of them are often stupid and

inattentive, and much practice is required to teach them.

Teach them slowly, quietly, and good-humouredly over and over again, and they

will understand and appreciate your object–explain the why and the wherefore, and do

not weary them by too long drills.

11.–When investigating disputes, never allow more than one man to speak at the

time–permit, as far as possible, petty disputes to be settled by the native company

officers. Should an appeal be made to you, allowing no discussion after you have once

given judgement.

Should the question have to be referred to higher authority, the matter must be

dropped until that can be done.

12.–Fighting against each other must be stopped at once, as betokening gross

respect to their commander, who requires all energy to be directed against the enemy.

13.–A Zulu has no idea of punctuality. Simple signals or calls, however, would

soon be understood.

14.–A proper roster for all duties must be kept, so as to ensure a fair distribution of

work.

15.–Leave of absence, except on sick certificate of medical officer, must not be

granted. This rule will prevent hourly applications based on every kind of excuse. The

men must be told that so long as the Supreme Chief requires their services, all else must

be looked upon as secondary.

16.–Each company must be held accountable collectively for all articles issued to

it. This rule is in accord with native customs, and will reduce loss to a minimum.

165

17.–Esprit de corps is well understood by Zulus, and every use should be made of

it. Each battalion should be given a native name, which, no doubt, the men themselves

will soon select.

18.–Never punish a man for disobedience of order until you have clearly

ascertained that he understood it; nor for disrespect, unless you are certain of having

understood what he said.

166

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167

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South Africa

E. Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository

Attorney General’s Office (AG) 1/4/21. Colonial Secretary’s Office (CSO) 44(2), 524, 560, 564, 574, 646, 666, 668, 670,

674, 675, 686, 688, 698, 721, 1258, 1330, 1431, 1439, 1445, 1468, 1602, 1925, 1926, 1972, 2554.

Government House (GH) 500, 569, 1326, 1411, 1421, 1423, 1424. Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA) 1/1/30, 1/1/32, 1/1/33, 1/1/34, 1/6/11, 1/6/12,

1/6/13, 1/6/14. Master of the Supreme Court: Estates (MSCE) 40/166. Records of the Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg (RSC) 1/5/91. Letters of J.E. Fannin, A863J. Correspondence of Sir Evelyn Wood, A598, II/2/2: incoming letters 1878/9.

F. Durban Archives Repository

1/VLM 3/2/1

G. Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban.

Letters of Lt. Charles Curll, KCM 89/41/1. Stafford Account of Isandlwana, KCM 42310. Wood Papers, KCM 89/9/32/10.

II. Official Publications

A. British Parliamentary Papers (Command)

C. 1121: Further Papers relating to the Kafir Outbreak in Natal, February 1875. C. 1141: Langalibalele and the amaHlubi Tribe, being remarks upon the official

record of the trials of the Chief, his sons and induna and other members of the amaHlubi tribe, January 1875.

C. 2220: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, December, 1878.

C. 2234: Correspondence Relative to Military Affairs in Natal and the Transvaal, February 1879.

C. 2242: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, February 1879.

C. 2252: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, March 1879.

C. 2260: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, March 1879.

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C. 2318: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, May 1879.

C. 2367: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, July 1879. C. 2374: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, July 1879. C. 2454: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, August

1879. C. 2482: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, February

1880. C. 2505: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, March

1880.

B. Natal Colonial Publications, KwaZulu-Natal.

“Natal Code of Native Law, [Proclamation No. 168, 1932]”, re-printed in African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1943.

Natal Government Gazette, 1879. Natal Colonial Publications,6/1/1/1, Natal Government Gazette Extraordinary,

23rd June, 1849. Natal Colonial Publications 8/5/14, Papers Relating to the Supply, by Native

Chiefs, of Native Labour in Connection with the Public Works of the Colony, 1880.

Natal Colonial Publications 4/1/2/21, Sessional Papers, Legislative Council, L.C. No. 4, February 1892.

Report of the Native Commission, 1881-2, Pietermaritzburg, 1882.

III. Other Published Documents

Child, Daphne (ed.), Zulu War Journal of Colonel Henry Harford, Shuter and Shooter: Pietermaritzburg, 1978.

Dawnay, Guy C., Campaigns: Zulu 1879, Egypt 1882, Suakim 1885: Being the Private Journal of Guy C. Dawnay, privately published c. 1886.

Fannin, Natalie (ed.), The Fannin Papers: A Pioneer’s Story in South Africa, Durban, 1932.

Laband, John (ed.), Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign, 1878-1879, Army Records Society/Alan Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK, 1994.

Laband, John and Knight, Ian (eds), Archives of South Africa: Zululand, The Anglo-Zulu War 1879, Volumes 1 - 6, Archival Publications International: London, 2000.

Leverton, B.J.T. (ed.), Records of Natal, Volumes 1 - 4, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1984 –1982.

Marter, Major, The Capture of Cetywayo, King of the Zulus, 1880. Maxwell, John, Reminiscences of the Zulu War, L.T. Jones (ed.), Cape Town,

1979. Pearse, R.O et al. (eds.), Langalibalele and the Natal Carbineers, Ladysmith

Historical Society: Ladysmith, 1973, 1976. Preston, Adrian, Sir Garnet Wolseley’s South African Diaries (Natal) 1875, A.A.

Balkema: Cape Town, 1971. Webb, C. de B. and Wright, J.B. (eds), The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral

Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples, Volumes 1 to 5, Killie Campbell Africana Library and University of Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg, 1976 - 2001.

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Worsfold, W. Basil, Sir Bartle Frere: A Footnote to the History of the British Empire, Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London, 1923.

War Office (Intelligence Branch), Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879, (Captain J.S. Rothwell, compiler), London, 1881.

IV. Newspapers and Periodicals

Graham’s Town Journal, 1870, 1880. Natal Colonist, 1879. Natal Mercury, 1878, 1879. Natal Witness, 1879. Queenstown Representative, 1897. The Listener, 30 December, 1936. Times of Natal, 1878, 1879.

V. Books and Compilations

Bengough, H.M., Memories of a Soldiers Life, Edward Arnold: London, 1913. Blood, Sir Bindon, Four Score Years and Ten: Bindon Blood’s Reminiscences, G.

Bell & Sons: London, 1933. Brookes, E.H. and Webb C. de B., A History of Natal, University of Natal Press:

Pietermaritzburg, 1965, Third Imp. 1979. Bryant, A.T., Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, Longmans, Green: London,

1929. Castle, Ian and Knight, Ian, Fearful Hard Times: The Siege and Relief of Eshowe,

1879, Greenhill: London, 1994. Chadwick, G.A. and Hobson, E.G., (eds), The Zulu War and the Colony of Natal,

Qualitas: Mandini, 1979. Colenso, Frances E., assisted by Lt-Col. E. Durnford, History of the Zulu War and

Its Origin, Chapman and Hall Ltd: London, 1880. Cope, Richard, Ploughshare of War: The Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879,

University of Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg, 1999. Dixon, Norman F., On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Jonathan Cape,

London, 1976. Doke, C.M. and Vilikazi, B.W., Zulu-English Dictionary, Witwatersrand

University Press: Johannesburg, 1958. Drooglever, R.W.F., The Road to Isandlwana: Colonel Anthony Durnford in Natal

and Zululand, Greenhill: London, 1992. Duminy, Andrew and Ballard, Charles (eds), The Anglo-Zulu War: New

Perspectives, University of Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg, 1981. Durnford, E., A Soldier’s Life and Work in South Africa, Sampson, Low, Marston,

Searle and Rivington: London, 1882. Emery, Frank (ed.), The Red Soldier: Letters from the Zulu War, 1879, Hodder and

Stoughton: London, 1977. Emery, Frank, The 24th Regiment at Isandhlwana: The Zulu War 1879, privately

published, Oxford, 1978. Etherington, Norman, Preachers Peasants and Politics in Southeast Africa, 1835 –

1880, Royal Historical Society, London, 1978. French, Major The Hon. Gerald, Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War, Bodley Head:

London, 1939.

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Fuze, Magema M., The Black People and Whence They Came, (tr. H.C. Lugg, ed. A.T. Cope,) University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg/Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban, 1979.

Gon, Philip, The Road to Isandlwana: The Years of an Imperial Battalion, A.D. Donker: London, 1979.

Guy, Jeff, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879 – 1884, University of Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg, 1994.

Guy, Jeff, The Heretic: A Study of the Life of John William Colenso 1814-1883, University of Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg, 1983.

Hamilton-Browne, Colonel G., A Lost Legionary in South Africa, T. Werner Laurie: London, 1912(?).

Hart, Col. H.G., Hart’s Army List 1870, John Murray: London, 1870. Hart, Col. H.G., Hart’s Army List 1872, John Murray: London, 1872. Hart, Col. H.G., Hart’s Army List 1873, John Murray: London, 1873. Hart, Lt. Gen. H.G., Hart’s Army List 1879, John Murray: London, 1879. Hart, Lt. Gen. H.G., Hart’s Annual Army List 1885, John Murray: London, 1885. Hathorn, Peter and Young, Amy, Henderson Heritage, privately published,

Pietermaritzburg, 1972. Hattersley, Alan F. (ed.), Later Annals of Natal, Longmans, Green & Co., London,

1938. Herd, Norman, The Bent Pine: The Trial of Chief Langalibalele, Raven Press:

Johannesburg, 1976. Holme, Norman, The Noble 24th: Biographical Records of the 24th Regiment in the

Zulu War and the South African Campaign 1877 - 1879, Savannah: London, 1999.

Jackson, F.W.D., Hill of the Sphinx: The Battle of Isandlwana, Westerners Publications Ltd, London, 2002.

de Kiewiet, Cornelius W., The Imperial Factor in South Africa: A Study in Politics and Economics, Frank Cass: London, 1965.

Knight, Ian, The Sun Turned Black: Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift 1879, William Waterman: Rivonia, 1995.

Knight, Ian (ed.), By the Orders of the Great White Queen: Campaigning in Zululand through the Eyes of the British Soldier, 1879, Greenhill: London, 1992.

Knight, Ian, The National Army Museum Book of the Zulu War, Sidgwick & Jackson: London, 2003.

Krige, Eileen Jensen, The Social System of the Zulus, Shuter and Shooter: Pietermaritzburg, 1977.

Kruger, D.W. and Beyers, C.J., (eds), Dictionary of South African Biography, Vol. III, Tafelberg-Uitgewers: Cape Town, 1977.

Laband, John, Companion to Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879, North and South Press: Constantia, 1989.

Laband, John, Kingdom in Crisis: The Zulu Response to the British Invasion of 1879, Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1992.

Laband, John (ed.), Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign, 1878 – 1879, Army Records Society/Alan Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK, 1994.

Laband, John, The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation, first published as Rope of Sand, Jonathon Ball: Jeppestown, 1995, re-published Arms and Armour: London, 1997.

Laband, John and Thompson, P.S., War Comes to Umvoti, University of Natal: Pietermaritzburg, 1980.

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Laband, John and Thompson, P.S., with Sheila Henderson, The Buffalo Border 1879: The Anglo-Zulu War in Northern Natal, Department of History, University of Natal: Durban, 1983.

Laband, John and Thompson, P.S., Kingdom and Colony at War, North & South Press: Cape Town/University of Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg, 1990.

Lambert, John, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal, University of Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg, 1995.

Lock, Ron and Quantrill, Peter, Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-up, Greenhill, London, 2002.

Ludlow, Captain W.R., Zululand and Cetewayo, Simkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1882.

Lugg, H.C., A Natal Family Looks Back, Griggs & Co.: Durban, 1970. Machin, Ingrid, Antbears and Targets for Assegais, Brevitas: Howick, 2002. Mackinnon, J.P. and Shadbolt, S.H., The South African Campaign of 1879,

Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington: London, 1880. Marks, Shula, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal, Clarendon

Press: Oxford, 1970. Meintjes, Johannes, Sandile: The Fall of the Xhosa Nation, T.V. Bulpin, Cape

Town, 1971. Molyneux, Major-Gen. W.C.F, Campaigning in South Africa and Egypt,

MacMillan: London, 1896. Montague, Captain W.E., Campaigning in South Africa: Reminiscences of an

Officer in 1879, Blackwood & Sons, London, 1880. Montgomery, A.N., The Natal Magistrate: A Brief Digest of the Laws of Natal,

Pietermaritzburg, 1879. Morris, Donald R., The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu

Nation, (Jonathan Cape: London, 1965), revised edition Pimlico: London, 1994.

Natal Who’s Who: an illustrated biographical sketch book of Natalians, Natal Who’s Who, Durban, 1906.

Norbury, Fleet-Surgeon Henry F., The Naval Brigade in South Africa During the Years 1877-78-79, Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington: London, 1880.

Norris-Newman, Charles L., In Zululand with the British Throughout the War of 1879, first published W.H. Allen: London, 1880.

O’Connor, Damian, The Zulu and the Raj: The Life of Sir Bartle Frere, Able Publishing: Knebworth, 2002.

Parr, Captain Henry Hallam, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars: Guadana to Isandhlwana, Kegan Paul, London, 1880.

Paton, G., Glennie, F. and Penn Symons, W, Historical Records of the 24th Regiment From its Formation in 1689, London, 1892.

Skelley, Alan Ramsay, The Victorian Army at Home: The Recruitment and Terms and Conditions of the British Regular, 1859 – 1899, Croom Helm: London, 1977.

Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, John Murray: London, 1925.

Stalker, Rev. John, The Natal Carbineers, P. Davies & Sons: Pietermaritzburg, 1912.

Streatfeild, Frank N., Reminiscences of an Old ‘Un, Eveleigh Nash: London, 1911.

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Thompson, P.S., The Natal Native Contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War 1879, privately published, Pietermaritzburg, 1997, republished Brevitas: Pietermaritzburg, 2003.

Tomasson, W.H., With the Irregulars in the Transvaal and Zululand, Remington: London, 1881.

Tylden, Major G., The Armed Forces of South Africa 1659 - 1954, Frank Connock Publications, Johannesburg, 1954.

War Office, The Army List for April 1866, London, 1866. War Office, The Army List for June 1874, London, 1874. War Office, The Army List for February 1879, London, 1879. van Warmelo, N.J., ed., History of Matiwane and the Amangwane Tribe, as told by

Msebenzi to his kinsman Albert Hlongwane, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1938.

Wilkinson-Latham, Christopher, Uniforms and Weapons of the Zulu War, Batsford: London, 1978.

Wood, Evelyn, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, Methuen: London, 1906. Wylde, Atherton (nom de plume of Frances E. Colenso), My Chief and I, first

published Chapman and Hall: London, 1880, University of Natal Press, new edition M.J. Daymond (ed.), Pietermaritzburg, 1994.

VI. Pamphlets, Theses, Articles and Other Papers

Alington, Rev. J.W., Uppingham School Magazine, vol. xvii, Feb. – Dec., 1879. Beckett, Ian W, “Chelmsford’s Major Generals”, Soldiers of the Queen, No. 84,

March, 1996. Benyon, J.A., “Isandlwana and the Passing of a Pro-Consul”, Natalia, No. 8,

December, 1978. Bourquin, S.B. , “Col. A.W. Durnford”, Military History Journal, Vol. 6, No. 5. Drooglever, R.W.F, A Figure of Controversy: Colonel Anthony Durnford in Natal

and Zululand, 1875-1879, D. Litt. et Phil. Thesis, University of South Africa, October 1982.

Dominy, Graham, “Awarding a ‘Retrospective White Hat’: A Reconsideration of the Geopolitics of ‘Frere’s War’ of 1879”, a paper presented at a workshop on Natal in the Colonial Period, at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, October, 1984.

Drooglever, R.W.F, A Figure of Controversy: Colonel Anthony Durnford in Natal and Zululand, 1875-1879, D. Litt. et Phil. Thesis, University of South Africa, October 1982.

Durnford, Lt-Col. E., Isandhlwana, 22nd January, 1878: a narrative compiled from official and reliable sources, April, 1879.

Durnford, Lt-Col. E., Isandhlwana: Lord Chelmsford’s statements compared with the evidence, November, 1880.

Etherington, N.A., “Why Langalibalele Ran Away”, Journal of Natal and Zulu History, Vol. 1, 1978.

Evans, Stanley, Maps and Notes of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War 1879, privately published, Johannesburg, 1973.

Hulme, Major J.J., “Irregular Units of the 7th Kaffir War 1846-7”, Journal of the South African Military History Society, Vol. 1, No. 3, December 1968.

Jackson, F.W.D., Isandlwana 1879: The Sources Re-Examined, first published in the Journal for Army Historical Research Vol. 43, Nos 173, 175 and 176,

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1965, re-published in pamphlet form South Wales Borderers Museum: Brecon, 1999.

Mathews, Jeffrey, Lord Chelmsford and Problems of Transport and Supply During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, unpublished MA thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1979.

Robinson, P.S., Sir Henry Bulwer and the outbreak of the Zulu War, unpublished BA (Hons) thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1969.

Smith, Keith I., “The Several Captains Barton”, Soldiers of the Queen, No. 114, September 2003, p. 7.

Tylden, Major G., “Commandant George Hamilton-Browne of the Colonial Forces”, Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research, Vol. 37, 1959, pp. 153-160.

van Warmelo, N.J., ed., History of Matiwane and the Amangwane Tribe, as told by Msebenzi to his kinsman Albert Hlongwane, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1938.

Webb, C. de B., “Lines of Power: The High Commissioner, the Telegraph and the War of 1879”, Natalia, Vol. 8, December, 1993.

Wright, L.P., The response of public opinion in Natal to the Zulu War, unpublished BA (Hons) thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1964.

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