the concept of evil

8/9/2019 The Concept of Evil

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The Concept of Evil First published Tue Nov 26, 2013

During the past thirty years, moral, political, and legal philosophers have becomeincreasingly interested in the concept of evil. This interest has been partly

motivated by ascriptions of ‘evil’ by laymen, social scientists, journalists, and

politicians as they try to understand and respond to various atrocities and horrors

of the past eighty years, e.g., the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, the !""

terrorist attac#s, and #illing sprees by serial #illers such as $effery Dahmer. %t

seems that we cannot capture the moral significance of these actions and their

perpetrators by calling them ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ or even ‘very very wrong’ or ‘very

very bad.’ &e need the concept of evil.

To avoid confusion, it is important to note that there are at least two concepts ofevil' a broad concept and a narrow concept. The broad concept pic#s out any bad

state of affairs, wrongful action, or character flaw. The suffering of a toothache is

evil in the broad sense as is a white lie. (vil in the broad sense has been divided

into two categories' natural evil and moral evil. )atural evils are bad states of

affairs which do not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents.

Hurricanes and toothaches are e*amples of natural evils. +y contrast, moral evils

do result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. urder and lying are

e*amples of moral evils.

(vil in the broad sense, which includes all natural and moral evils, tends to be thesort of evil referenced in theological conte*ts, such as in discussions of the

problem of evil. The problem of evil is the problem of accounting for evil in a

world created by an all-powerful, all-#nowing, all-good od. %t seems that if the

creator has these attributes, there would be no evil in the world. +ut there is evil

in the world. Thus, there is reason to believe that an all-powerful, all-#nowing,

all-good creator does not e*ist.

%n contrast to the broad concept of evil, the narrow concept of evil pic#s out only

the most morally despicable sorts of actions, characters, events, etc. /s arcus

0inger puts it 1‘evil’ 2in this sense3 4 is the worst possible term of opprobriumimaginable5 60inger 7889, ":;


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is evil an out-dated or empty concept which should be abandoned> &hat is the

relationship between evil and other moral concepts such as badness and

wrongdoing> &hat are the necessary and sufficient conditions for evil action>

&hat are the necessary and sufficient conditions for evil character> &hat is the

relationship between evil action and evil character> &hat types of evil actionsand characters can e*ist> &hat is the proper analysis of derivative concepts such

as evil institution>

This entry gives an overview of answers to these ?uestions found in the literature.

• ". (vil-0#epticism @ersus (vil-Revivalism

o "." (vil and the 0upernatural

o ".7 (vil and (*planatory Aower

o ".B The Dangers of ‘(vil’

".B." )ietCsches /ttac# on (vil

o ".9 /rguments in =avor of the Eoncept of (vil

• 7. The History of Theories of (vil

o 7." Dualist and Arivation Theories of (vil

o 7.7 Fants Theory of (vil

o 7.B /rendts /nalyses of (vil

• B. Eontemporary Theories of (vil /ction

o B." (vil and &rongdoing

o

B.7 (vil and Harm

o B.B (vil and otivation

o B.9 (vil and /ffect

o B.; (vil and Responsibility

B.;." Asychopaths

B.;.7 +ad Gpbringings

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviSkeVerEviRevhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviSuphttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviExpPowhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#DanEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#NieAttEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#ArgFavConEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#HisTheEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#DuaPriTheEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#KanTheEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#AreAnaEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#ConTheEviActhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviWrohttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviHarhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviMothttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviAffhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviReshttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#Psyhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#BadUpbhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviSuphttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviExpPowhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#DanEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#NieAttEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#ArgFavConEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#HisTheEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#DuaPriTheEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#KanTheEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#AreAnaEvihttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#ConTheEviActhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviWrohttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviHarhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviMothttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviAffhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviReshttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#Psyhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#BadUpbhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/#EviSkeVerEviRev


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B.;.B %gnorance

• 9. Eontemporary Theories of (vil Eharacter!Aersonhood

o 9." =re?uent (vildoer and Dispositional /ccounts

o 9.7 /ffect-+ased /ccounts

o 9.B otive-+ased /ccounts

o 9.9 Eonsistency /ccounts

o 9.; (*tremity /ccounts

•

;. (vil %nstitutions

• +ibliography

• /cademic Tools

• ther %nternet Resources

• Related (ntries

1. Evil-Skepticism Versus Evil-Revivalism(vil-s#eptics believe we should abandon the concept of evil. n this view we can

more accurately, and less perniciously, understand and describe morally

despicable actions, characters, and events using more pedestrian moral concepts

such as badness and wrongdoing. +y contrast, evil-revivalists believe that the

concept of evil has a place in our moral and political thin#ing and discourse. n

this view, the concept of evil should be revived, not abandoned 6see Russell 788I

and 788J


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the supernatural, or the devilK 67< the concept of evil is useless because it lac#s

e*planatory powerK and 6B< the concept of evil can be harmful or dangerous when

used in moral, political, and legal conte*ts, and so, it should not be used in those

conte*ts, if at all.

1.1 Evil and the SupernaturalThe concept of evil is often associated with supernatural powers or creatures,

especially in fictional and religious conte*ts. The monsters of fictions, such as

vampires, witches, and werewolves, are thought to be paradigms of evil. These

creatures possess powers and abilities that defy scientific e*planation, and

perhaps human understanding. any popular horror films also depict evil as the

result of dar# forces or 0atanic possession. &e find similar references to

supernatural forces and creatures when the term ‘evil’ is used in religious

conte*ts. 0ome evil-s#eptics believe that the concept of evil necessarily ma#esreference to supernatural spirits, dar# forces, or creatures. /ccording to these

theorists if we do not believe that these spirits, forces, or monsters e*ist, we

should only use the term ‘evil’ in fictional conte*ts, if at all 60ee Elendinnen

", JL""BK Eole 788I


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or an action, is evil is just to say that that person, or action, defies e*planation or

is incomprehensible 6see Elendinnen ", :"K see also, Aococ# ":; Eole

believes that the concept of evil is employed in these cases to provide the missing

e*planation. However, Eole argues that the concept of evil does not provide a

genuine e*planation in these cases because to say that an action is evil is just to

say either that the action resulted from supernatural forces or that the action is a

mystery. To say that an event resulted from supernatural forces is not to give agenuine e*planation of the event because these forces do not e*ist. To say that an

event is a mystery is not to give a genuine e*planation of an event, but rather, it is

to suggest that the event cannot be e*plained 6at least with the information

currently available< 6788I, IL


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and less li#ely that there would be peaceful relations between the peoples and

governments of %ra?, %ran, and )orth Forea and the peoples and government of

the Gnited 0tates.

+ut should we abandon the concept of evil because it leads to harm when it is

misapplied or abused> Elaudia Eard argues that 1%f the li#elihood of theideological abuse of a concept were sufficient reason to abandon the concept, we

should probably abandon all normative concepts, certainly ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’5

6Eard 78"8, ";< /nd yet evil-s#eptics do not believe that we should abandon all

normative concepts. 0o why do they believe that we should abandon the concept

of evil>

/n evil-s#eptic might reply that we should abandon only the concept of evil, and

not other normative concepts, because the concept of evil is particularly

dangerous or susceptible to abuse. &e can discern several reasons why

ascriptions of evil might be thought to be more harmful or dangerous thanascriptions of other normative concepts such as badness or wrongdoing. =irst,

since ascriptions of evil are the greatest form of moral condemnation, when the

term ‘evil’ is misapplied we subject someone to a particularly harsh judgement

undeservedly. =urthermore, it is reasonable to assume that evildoers not only

deserve the greatest form of moral condemnation but also the greatest form of

punishment. Thus, not only are wrongfully accused evildoers subjected to harsh

judgments undeservedly, they may be subjected to harsh punishments

undeservedly as well.

/nother reason that ascriptions of evil can be particularly harmful or dangerousis that it isnt always clear what people mean when they use the term ‘evil.’ /s

(ve arrard puts it 1the general obscurity surrounding the term ma#es some

thin#ers very reluctant to appeal to the idea of evil56arrard 7887, B77


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e*ecuted. +ut if evildoers do not have these fi*ed dispositions and they are

treated as if they do, they will li#ely be mistreated.

Thus, while most theorists agree that the concept of evil can be harmful or

dangerous there is considerable disagreement about what conclusion should be

drawn from this fact. (vil-s#eptics believe that because the concept of evil isharmful or dangerous we should abandon it in favour of less dangerous concepts

such as badness and wrongdoing. (vil-revivalists believe that because the

concept of evil is harmful or dangerous more philosophical wor# needs to be

done on it to clear up ambiguities and reduce the li#elihood of abuse or misuse.

Eard and Fe#es argue that it is more dangerous to ignore evil than to try to

understand it 6Eard "I and 78"8K Fe#es "8


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1.+ *r$uments in ,avor of the Conceptof Evil0ome people believe that we should revive the concept of evil because only the

concept of evil can capture the moral significance of acts, characters, and eventssuch as sadistic torture, serial #illers, Hitler, and the Holocaust. /s Daniel

Haybron puts it 1Arefi* your adjectives 2such as ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’3 with as many

‘very’s as you li#eK you still fall short. nly ‘evil’, it seems, will do5 6Haybron

7887b, 7I8


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enters into beings, or rather into a certain order of beings, would be ma#ing the

best beginning if they established, first of all, what precisely (vil is5

6Alotinus, %nneads, %, :, "


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positively bad and not merely lac#ing in goodness 6Ealder 788JaK Fane ":8.

0ee /nglin and oetC ":7 for a reply to these objections


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morally right, her actions have no moral worth and, according to Fant, her will

manifests the worst form of evil possible for a human being. Fant considers

someone with a perverse will an evil person 6Fant "JB, +# %, 7;


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is that it isnt done for humanly understandable motives such as self-interest, but

merely to reinforce totalitarian control and the idea that everything is possible

6/rendt ";", 9BJL9;K +ernstein 7887, 78BL779


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others believe that evil action has a multitude of essential components. This

section discusses different views about the essential components of evil action.

".1 Evil and /ron$doin$

ost philosophers, and laypeople, assume that wrongfulness is an essentialcomponent of evil action 60ee e.g., Eard 7887, arrard ", =ormosa 788:


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any theorists writing about evil believe that evil actions must be harmful 6see,

e.g., Eard 7887K Fe#es 788;


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describes the harm of evil as an intolerable harm. +y an intolerable harm, Eard

means a harm that ma#es life not worth living from the point of view of the

person whose life it is. (*amples of intolerable harms include severe physical or

mental suffering as well as the deprivation of basics such as food, clean drin#ing

water, and social contact 6Eard 7887, "I


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metaphysical silencer is a reason which is so weighty that, objectively spea#ing,

it ta#es away the reason-giving force of some other consideration. &hen this

happens we say that the less weighty consideration has been metaphysically

silenced. +y contrast, a psychological silencer is a reason which is so weighty for

an individual that, subjectively, it ta#es away the reason-giving force of someother consideration. &hen this happens we say that the consideration has been

psychologically silenced for the individual.

Eonsider Aeter 0ingers case of coming across a child drowning in a shallow

pond 60inger "J7


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Eritics of 0teiners view argue that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for evil to

ta#e pleasure in performing wrongful actions. Eritics argue that it is not

necessary to ta#e pleasure in doing wrong to perform an evil action since it is

sufficient to intentionally cause significant harm for an unworthy goal such as

self-interest 6Ealder 78"B


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give us the conditions for moral responsibility as well as the conditions for

criminal responsibility 6see, e.g., &olf ":J


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wrong values to people suffering from psychosis because li#e psychotics they are

unable to ma#e accurate judgements about the world. =or e*ample, &olf has us

consider the case of $ojo, the son of $o, a ruthless dictator of a small 0outh

/merican country. $o believes that there is nothing wrong with torturing or

e*ecuting innocent people. %n fact, he enjoys e*pressing his unlimited power byordering his guards to do just that. $ojo is given a special education which

includes spending much of his day with his father. The predictable result of this

education is that $ojo ac?uires his fathers values. &olf argues that we should not

hold $ojo responsible for torturing innocent people since his upbringing has made

him unable to judge that these actions are wrong. 0ince $ojo is unable to judge

that his actions are wrong he meets the conditions for insanity as stated in the

)aghten rules 60ee section B.;." above


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from philosophers writing about evil is ignorance that results from self-

deception. %n self-deception we evade ac#nowledging to ourselves some truth or

what we would see as the truth if our beliefs were based on an unbiased

assessment of available evidence. 10elf-deceivers are initially aware of moments

when they shift their attention away from available evidence to something else,although they may not be aware of the overall project of their self-deception.5

6$ones ", :7


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someone who is strongly and fi*edly disposed to perform evil actions when in

autonomy favouring conditions. 0omeone is strongly disposed to do evil if she is

very li#ely to do evil. 0omeone is fi*edly disposed to do evil if this disposition is

unli#ely to change over time. 0omeone is in autonomy favouring conditions

when she is not deceived, threatened, coerced, or pressed to act in one way rather than another 6Russell 78"8


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desire is a motivational state that consists in a desire for what is correctly

believed to be someone elses significant harm for an unworthy goal or for what

would correctly be believed to be someone elses significant harm for an

unworthy goal in the absence of self-deception 6see 0ection B.;.B for more on

self-deceptive evil


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view, the concept of evil character very closely resembles the concept of

psychopathy 6=or a description of psychopathy see 0ection B.;."


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However, while Eards account of evil institutions correctly identifies genocide

and other paradigmatically evil institutions as evil, her account also classifies as

evil some institutions which are less obviously evil such as capital punishment,

marriage, and motherhood 6Eard 7887, 78"8


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• /ristotle, Ni$ho#a$hean %thi$s, . stwald 6trans.


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• LLL, 788Jb, 1/gainst Eonse?uentialist Theories of @irtue and

@ice,5 tilitas, " 675 "hilosophi$al tudies, "IB 6"


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• =ran#furt, H.., "J", 1=reedom of the &ill and the Eoncept of a

Aerson,5 +ournal of "hilosophy, I: 6"


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• LLL, 788;, The 'oots of %vil , %thaca' Eornell Gniversity Aress.

• Fant, %., "J:;, The Ground-or/ of the Metaphysi$s of Morals, . regor

6Trans. and ed.


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• +rien, D., "I, 1Alotinus on matter and evil,5 in The &a#bridge

&o#panion to "lotinus, M.A. erson 6ed.5 "a$ifi$ "hilosophi$al 5uarterly, :' ;"IL;B;.

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-motivation/http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-motivation/


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• Thomas, M., ":, *iving Morally, Ahiladelphia' Temple Gniversity Aress.

• LLL, "B, essels of %vil !#eri$an lavery and the 4olo$aust ,

Ahiladelphia' Temple Gniversity Aress.

• LLL, "I, 1+ecoming an (vil 0ociety' The 0elf and 0trangers,5 "oliti$al

Theory, 79 67

the concept of evil

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