the construction ofpalestinian identity: hamas and islamic...
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The Construction of Palestinian Identity: Hamas and Islamic Fundamentalism
Institute of Islamic StudiesMcgill University, Montreal
April 2002
A thesis submitted ta the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillmentof the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts
© Joyce Hamade2002
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Introduction
CHAPTERONE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
Four Stages in the Construction ofPalestinian National 4Identity
CHAPTER TWO
Ottoman rule to WWI
WWIto 1948
1948 to 1987
Post-Intifijr;la
Theories ofNationalism
5
11
20
23
25
The Construction ofPalestinian Identity: The Role ofSecular Nationalism 34
CHAPTER THREE Islamic Fundamentalism: Theoretical Approaches 43
Fundamentalism in Palestine: lfarakat al-Muqiiwamaal-Isliimiyya Clfamas) 49
The Historical Antecedents of lfamas 52
The Charter: Ideological Goals Versus Political 57Pragmatism
The Marriage ofPalestinian Nationalism and Islam 59
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
lfamas-PLO Relations
Paiestinian Identity: the RaIe ofIsiamicFundamentalism
70
82
93
101
INTRODUCTION
The rapid economic, social and scientific changes that
characterize modemity had a profound effect on the Middle East.
Industrialization led to mass urban societies that replaced localized
forms of community. Modem equality and individualism caused a
shift away from high centres of govemment such as monarchs or
caliphs. This was accompanied by a shift in allegiances away from
family, clan and religion to the impersonal state. The modem
revolution resulted in two interrelated developments-nationalism
and Islamic fundamentalism.
The demise of Nasser and Pan-Arabism paved the way for
Palestinian nationalism. Since the 1960's the Palestinian Liberation
Organization or PLO has led the Palestinian nationalist struggle.
However, the revolutionary project of the PLO and other secular
movements failed to secure a state for Palestinians. The rapid
progress ofmodemity brought upon a growing sense of alienation
and economic strife in the Middle East. This coupled with the
failures of 1967 and 1973 created a social and political vacuum that
religiously based political movements moved to fill. Although the
cultural and political origins ofIslamic fundamentalism can be traced
to the late nineteenth centUlY, it became widespread as a political
phenomenon in the Arab world in the late 1970's and in Palestine in
the 1980's.
2
My thesis focuses on modern Palestine and the role of
nationalism and fundamentalism in the construction ofPalestinian
national identity. lfamas provides a case study ofIslamic
fundamentalism in Palestine. The movement developed during the
late 198ü's as a reaction to the failures of the secular project. lfamas
is a reflection of a region-wide phenomenon. It is not solely a
reaction to modernity. Rather, lfamas is the result of specifie
condition that led to the politicization ofIslam after the Intifiùja.
Today the nationalist PLO and lfamas struggle to define Palestinian
identity and to shape the emerging Palestinian state.
Palestinian national identity like that of other modern nations has
been constructed. Nation-building or identity construction in
Palestine can be divided into four historical stages. Each stage is
characterized by overlapping and competing identities: Ottoman,
Arab, religious, local and kinship. These identities are not mutually
exclusive and often a combination of identities became prominent
historically depending on the internaI and external forces pressuring
society. Nationalism and fundamentalism developed in the later
stages ofPalestinian identity construction, 1948 to the present. Each
plays a significant role in the construction ofPalestinian identity.
Fundamentalism utilizes religion as a cultural system. Islam is
viewed as a means of creating or preserving identity. As a
fundamentalist movement, lfamas promotes narrow identities based
3
on religion and kinship, what it views as the pillars ofPalestinian
society. In contrast, the PLO (re) defines Palestinian national
identity along more secular lines. Although not devoid of religious
overtones, the PLO promotes broader more impersonal identities
linked to the Palestinian state and citizenship. Nationalist elites
endeavor to construct "authentic" identity as a means of securing a
Palestinian state, fundamentalist as a strategy for preserving a way of
life threatened by the encroachment of secularism.
4
CHAPTERONE
Four Stages in the Construction ofPalestinian National Identity
National identity is created and not an essential given. The
construction of a separate Palestinian identity occurred in four
historieal stages. In each stage the project of identity creation was
eHte driven. Notables, intellectuals and urban eHtes began a process
of identity-creation in the last decades of Ottoman rule. These elites
manipulated symbols and re-narrated the past in an effort to
construct Palestinian national identity. They fostered a shared
consciousness based on a common history, language and a common
threat, Zionism. This national consciousness emerged in the absence
of a nation-state and was disseminated to peasants and the lower
classes, through the press and education.
The first stage in the construction of a separate Palestinian
identity encompasses the last decade of Ottoman rule to World War
1. This era was characterized by overlapping and competing
identities: Ottoman, Arab, religious, local and family. The second
stage (post WWI to 1948) expanded the sense ofPalestinian identity
and united the population against a common threat, Zionism. During
the third stage (1948 to 1987) Palestinian identity is defined by the
common fate of dispossession and exile. It is during this period that
secular nationalism develops fully. Finally, during the post- Intifiiqa
5
stage (1987 to the present) identity is in flux. Established identities
are contested by developing religio-political movements such as
lfamas.
Ottoman Rule to WWI
During the first stage (late 1800's to WWI) Palestinian
identity was shared by a narrowly defined group of urban educated
elites. These elites formed a group larger than the old traditional
notables, however they were still a restricted strata of society. They
inc1uded the new middle c1asses-teachers, c1erks, government
officiaIs and businessmen who increased rapidly in the last decades
of Ottoman rule. l These elites and the rural, illiterate majority of the
population were characterized by a multi-focused set ofidentities.
Palestinian identity competed and overlapped with Ottomanism ,
Arabism, religious, local and family loyalties.2
The first stage in the construction ofPalestinian identity is a
time of great change in the Arab world. Until the First World War
the urban educated elites primarily subscribed to Ottomanism. They
were integrated into the Ottoman system of government and they
were loyal to the Caliph. During this period a ulliversal process was
unfolding in the Middle East involving an increasing identification
1 Rashid Khalidi, Palesfjnian Identity: Tbe Construcfjon ofModern national Consciousness, New York:Columbia University Press, 1997, 193.
6
with the new states created by the post-World War 1 partitions.3
Ideas of identity were shifting away from Ottomanism.
Zionism also played a role in shaping Palestinian identity. It
was the primary "other" faced by the Palestinians for much ofthis
century.4 This has led sorne to overestimate the significance of
Zionism to the development ofPalestinian identity: "Had it not been
for the pressure exerted on the Arabs ofPalestine by the Zionist
movement, the very concept of a Palestinian people would not have
developed".5 Hence, Palestine and Palestinian identity is made
illegitimate. This line of argumentation is parochial and ignores the
historical developments taking place in the Arab world during the
early twentieth century.
While Zionism helped shape the specifie form ofPalestinian
national identification, it cannot be viewed as the sole reason for the
development of Palestinian identity. The question ofPalestinian
identity must be situated within the larger context of Arab history.
Although the threat of Zionism encouraged Palestinian nationalism,
2 Ibid. Khalidi examines the lives and writings of two representatives of Jerusalem in the OttomanParliament (1876-78 and 1908-1913). These writings exemplify the shifting identities of Palestiniansbefore World War I. See 63-88.3 Ibid.4 Khalidi, 20.5 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Midgal, Palestinians: tile Making ofa People, Toronto: The Free Press,1993, xvii.
7
it was "ushered into its own independent existence mainly as a result
of the chaos and disarray ofthe larger Arab nationalist movement.6
The fragmentation ofthis movement in Amir Faysal's state
in Syria (1918-1920) led to a subsequent disillusionment with Arab
nationalism after 1920. This fracture tipped the scale in favour of
the Palestinian urban notables. The failure of Amir Faysal's Arab
nationalism ushered the way for the development of local Palestinian
autonomy. Local newspapers were central to the development of an
autonomous Palestinian nationalism.
Palestinian urban elites utilized Arabie language newspapers as a
tool for uniting Palestinian society. They worked tirelessly to
elucidate the history and objectives of Zionism. Influential
newspapers such as al-kannil and Filastin dedicated numerous
articles to the devastating consequences Palestine would face as a
result ofZionist activity.
Established in 1908 Al-Kannilwas published in Haifa by
Najib Nassar. It was by far the most outspoken newspaper in its
opposition to Zionism. Filastin was established in 1911 and
published in Jaffa by 'Isa and Yusuf al- 'Isa. Filastin soon became the
rival of al-Kannil inside and outside Palestine and was the most
important paper of the two during the mandate period. Both focused
6 Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Oâgins o[Palestùlian Nationalism, New York: Columbia University Press,1988, x.
7 Ibid., 142.g Ibid.
8
on the question ofZionism as a common threat to Palestinians and
Arabs alike.
Newspapers functioned as pioneers ofPalestinian and pan-
Arab opposition to Zionism. The Arab critique of Zionism in the
press can be distilled to a few major themes. First, was the
opposition to the laxity of Ottoman central authorities in restraining
Zionist colonialism. The Ottomans controlled the granting of visas
and the system of land purchasing. Other themes included: "the
opposition to unrestricted Zionist immigration and land-purchase,
the resentment ofthe self-imposed segregation of the immigrants and
their failure to become loyal citizens of the country they settled."7
Through an examination of the Arabic press during this
period it is conclusive that by 1914 most editors and writers were
fully aware of the ultimate ends ofZionism. They identified the
Zionist dream of establishing of a Jewish state in Palestine, and its
concomitant the dispossession of the Arab population. li
The opposition to Zionism was a source of unity for
Palestinians. Although Zionism was the subject of extensive
journalistic comment and public controversy in Palestine and the
Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire, the urban elites did not calI for
9
armed resistance against the colonizers.9 They failed to critique the
Ottoman government who ultimately controlled visas and land sales
and purchases in Palestine. Further, the Palestinian elites did not
criticize the Ottoman's new European-derived property relations that
made land sales to the Zionist possible.
In short, during this early period, there was no demand for the
social transformation needed to successfully deal with Zionism. The
literate upper classes in Palestine (with sorne exception) failed in
terms of leadership. They proved unwilling to follow the lead of the
fellahin or peasants in their resistance to Zionism. 10
Theorists ofnationalism tend to focus solely on the role of
intellectuals and often ignore the role of the subaltern. The non-elites
or subaltem elements ofPalestinian society were the first to come
into direct contact with Zionism. In the Palestinian case the
fellahin were faced directly with increased Zionist expansion. The
implementation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 in Palestine
caused communal rights of tenure to be ignored. Many peasants with
long-standing traditional rights failed to register their land for fear of
taxation and conscription by the Ottomans. 11 Instead village leaders,
and urban members of the upper classes, manipulated the legal
process and registered large areas of land as their personal property.
<) Khalidi, 93. Khalidi points out that the question ofZionism was part of the 1911 Ottomanparliamentary debates. He dispels the myth that Arab opposition to Zionism began only during theMandate period.
10
The consolidation of land ownership through Ottoman
registration led to devastating ends. Prosperous merchants from
Beirut, Haifa, Jaffa and Gaza purchased large tracts of fertile land in
Palestine. These new owners did not work the land. Rather, they
viewed land as nothing more than a commercial investment. 12 These
wealthy merchants were largely responsible for the sale and transfer
of lands to Zionist settlers. The Paiestinian peasants found
themselves dispossessed of lands they once "owned," and working as
labourers on lands now owned by Jews. 13
This dispossession and accompanying resistance to Zionism
led to a degree of politicization among the rural population of
Palestine. Palestinian opposition to Zionism in the last decades of
Ottoman rule developed along tl1fee lines, Ottoman loyalism,
Paiestinian patriotism, and Arab nationalism. 14 Ottoman loyalty was
upheld by the oider notable elites. Notable or ayan is used in the
political sense to mean intermediaries between government and
people. The aristocratie families, the Husseini's, Nashashibi's,
Khalidi's, were recruited as high-Ievel bureaucrats by the Ottomans.
The notables rejected Zionism because they did not want to be
separated from the Ottoman state.
10 Ibid., 140-42.Il Khalidi, 95.12 Khalidi argues that during the 1920's more than 60 per cent of the land purchased by Jews was boughtfrom Arab absentee landlords residing outside of Palestine, 113.13 Land sales were not made to individual Jewish settlers, rather the Jewish National Fund purchasedPalestinian land as a trust for the Jewish people until time immemorial.
14 Muslih. 216.15 Ibid.16 Ibid.
11
Palestinian patriotism rejected Zionism as a threat to
Palestinians. Until the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918,
Palestinian patriotism ran parallel with Ottoman loyalties. 15 In
contrast, Arab nationalism was espoused by younger urban elites and
was intertwined with Palestinian patriotism until1920. The
adherents of Arab nationalism rejected Zionism because it would
take Palestine out of Arab hands and thwart the goal of Arab unity.
They believed Arab unity would protect them against Zionism:
"Thus Palestinian patriotism was the common characteristic of the
two main Palestinian groups...Zionism was the context in which this
patriotism grew.,,16 Zionism provided Palestinians with the focus for
their national struggle. Through the press they engendered an Arab
reaction to Zionism. Between 1908 and 1914 newspapers in
Palestine and in the Arab world (Beirut, Cairo and Damascus)
influenced attitudes toward Zionism and shaped ideas of identity. 17
WWI to 1948
The second stage in the construction ofPalestinian national
identity includes the period from the outset ofWorld War One to
1948. During this period, the political and national identification of
most politically conscious, literate, and urban Palestinians underwent
12
a sequence of major transformations resulting in a strong and
growing national identification with Palestine. IX The first ofthese
changes was the collapse of the Ottoman state. This left a vacuum in
political consciousness that would be filled by Arabism: "Arabism
had the same central goal of Ottomanism, that is it aimed at
defending the civilization ofIslam and the Arabs from Western
threats and ambitions.,,19
The idea of Southern Syria also emerged as a post-war focus
of identity. Palestinian elites who saw their country as southern
Syria were largely committed to Arabism. The first modern Arab
state under Amir Faysal was viewed with pride as a representation of
Arab triumph over colonialism. Palestinians hoped the new state
would protect them against the emerging Zionist threat. Hence, the
fragmentation ofFaysal's government in Damascus caused major
disillusionment among Palestinians. This fracture was a major factor
in the development of a separate Palestinian nationalism.
During the early Mandate Period (1917-1923) the Balfour
Declaration and the Mandate over Palestine contributed to a
transformation ofPalestinian identity. The struggles with British
and Zionist colonialism fostered feelings of solidarity based on a
common fate/threat. Coupled with the collapse of the Ottoman state
17 Khalidi examines newspapers in this manner in order to eliminate the oversimplif1ed view prevalent inIsraeli and much western scholarship that Palestinian identity was primarily a response to Zionism.IX Khalidi, 149. By the end ofWWI Ottomanism and religion were diminished in importance.
13
this new solidarity led to a shift from Ottoman!Arab to
Palestinian!Arab identity.
Arab nationalism was an ideology influenced by the western
concept of the territorial and political nation. It emerged as a
reaction to pan-Turanianism or the Ottoman belief in Turkish
superiority. At the heart of Arab nationalism is the belief in the
cultural, ethnie and political unity of Arabs. However, advocates of
local independence viewed their struggle as compatible with Arab
t · 1° 20na lOna lsm.
For example, Palestinian notables viewed Syrian-Palestinian
unity as an expanded opportunity for political posts that would work
to their advantage. The young urban partisans of unity imagined a
sense of ideologically compatibility with Syrians and Iraqis whom
they anticipated would pre-empt the Damascene elites?1 Other
complex factors motivated leaders of the Palestinian Arab nationalist
movement: fear of Zionism, patriotic sentiment, and the ideological
strength of the Arab nationalists in Syria.22
A united Syria was viewed as an expression of self-assertive
patriotic sentiment and Amir Fay~al represented revoIt against
19 Muslih, 2.20 The ideo1ogy ofloca1 nationalism was not encouraged and terms such as a1-wataniyya al-Fi1astiniyyawere not uti1ized, see Muslih, 5.21 Yehosuah Porath, The Emergence ofthe Pa1estinian-Arab National Movement: 1918-1929, London:FrankCass, 1974,83.22 Muslih, 185.
14
colonialism on behalf of the Arabs.23 United the Arabs could guard
against Zionism and European expansion.
Palestinian Arab nationalist promoted the idea ofPan-Syrian
unity to advance the Palestinian cause. Through pamphlets they
promoted the religious significance of Palestine, to arouse
Syrian!Fay~al's support. Palestinians, like 'Isa al-'Isa the editor of
Filas.tfn, ,were influential in Faysal's government. They utilized
- -organizations such as al-Fatat, al-Nadi al-'Arabi, and the al-Istiqlal
party to influence the outcome of political debate on Palestine.
Through these organizations the Palestinian Arab Nationalist
won majority support in favor of pan-Syrian unity at the First
Palestinian Arab Congress in 1919.24 However, by the Third
Palestinian Arab Congress fragmentation ofFay~al's government
split the Arab nationalist movement along provinciallines. By the
Third Congress, there was no reference to pan-Syrian unity in the
resolutions and the Congress' objectives were distinctly
P 1 .. 25a estIman.
A narrow, territorially defined concept of an independent
Palestinian state emerged from the Third Palestinian Arab Congress.
By the 1920's the regional division between Syria and Palestine was
23 Ibid. 186-17.24 Ibid., 193-210. The Second Palestinian Arab Congress was to be held in May 1920 to protest theBritish Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. For fear of disturbances this did not occur. The ThirdPalestinian Arab Congress convened in Haifa in December 1920. It was designated third despite the factthat the second congress was never convened.25 Ibid., 209.
15
complete, and the ideal of Arab nationalism was replaced with the
reality oflocal nationalism.26 The focus shifted to Zionism's
political counterpart, " 'Palestinianism': the beliefthat the Arab
population originating in the area of the Palestine mandate is distinct
from otherArab groups, with a right to its own nation-state in that
territory."27
The 1929 Rebellion and the 1936-1939 Revoit were the most
significant events in the second stage of the construction of
Palestinian identity. Arab fears of Jewish infringement on their
territory came to climax in 1929. A dispute emerged over the
Maghrebi quarter of Jerusalem and the Western Wall. Jews view the
Western Wall as the last remuant of the outer wall of Herod's
Temple, built on the site of Solomon's Temple.2R For Muslims, the
wall is the outer perimeter of the Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest
site in Islam, the temple mount that housed the al-Aqsa Mosque and
the Dome of the Rock.29
Zionist leaders wanted to buy the wall from the Muslim waqf
that held it tear down the Maghrebi region and open the area for
Jewish worshipers?O In August of 1929, Jews and Arabs attacked
each other killing and wounding over 200 people. The Zionist
26 Ibid., 210.27 Kimmerling and Midgal, xviii.28 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martins Press, 1992,87.29 Ibid.30 After the 1967 War the demolishing of the Maghrebi region was accomplished by Israel.
16
Revisionist Party and the Mufti of Jerusalem have both been blamed
for the violence: "What seems clear is that the struggle for control of
the Western Wall evolved from a purely religious matter of long
standing into a political confrontation in which both the hopes and
the fears of the respective populations were fused. "31 The 1929
violence between the Jewish and Arab communities was only
surpassed by the 1936 Revoit.
During the 1936-1939 RevoIt Palestinians from the upper and
middle classes both urban and rural were mobilized against British
and Zionist colonialism. 32 Palestine was transformed socially from a
self sufficient and homogenous peasant society to a society
incorporated into world markets and politics.33 This transformation
created division within Palestine as pertinent links between
Palestinian notables and British rulers were severed. A new
leadership emerged divided intointernalleaders that represented the
specifie regions ofthe country, and those outside that claimed to
speak for the national movement. This division would characterize
Palestinian leaders in the subsequent stages ofPalestinian national
development. However, the national movement was unanimously
united in its opposition to Zionism.
31 Smith, 89. The al Husseini family control1ed the post ofmufti from the mid-nineteenth century. Theirprominence led the British to recognize the then Mufti ofJerusalem, Haj Amin al Husseini, as the leadingArab representative during the Mandate fol1owing World War 1. See Smith, 32.32 Although the 1936 Revoit is referred to as the Arab Revoit, this is in fact a Palestinian revoit againstthe British and to sorne extent against Zionism in Palestine. So as not to be confused with the 1917 ArabRevoit the 1936 RevoIt will hereafter be referred to as the Revoit.
17
In 1936 a series of general strikes, political demonstrations
and clashes with police marked the beginning of anti-mandate
activism. These protesters sought to rid the country of imperial rule.
British support ofZionist was no longer viewed as delusion to be
corrected: "Rather, Zionism was part and parcel of Western
imperialism in the Middle East.,,34 However, until1936 the Mufti of
Jerusalem publicly urged the Arabs to target Jews and not the
British. This coupled with internaI conflict among the notable
families shows their distance from the immediate situation of
peasant dispossession and general anti-imperial wil1.35 During the
first half of the 1930's radicalized urban political activist, reacting to
the factional fighting among the notables, led a surge of anti-A 'yan
opposition.
This period in the Palestinian nationalist movement was also
marked by religious tensions among Muslims and Christians. These
tensions were grounded in Husseini's power base in the Supreme
Muslim Council and the use of mosques as a base for popular
mobilization. The over-representation of Christian Arabs in the
bureaucracy and the presence offoreign missions in Palestine further
exacerbated tension. 36 Sorne militants promoted an exclusivist
33 Ibid., 97.34 Ibid., 99. A portion of the old ayan, the notable tàmilies of the Husseini and Nashashibi clans, initiallymoved to temper militants in the anti- imperial Istiqlal Party.35 Pretentiously the ayan continued to use "feudal" titles such as pasha, bey, and effendi. See Kimmerlingand Midgal, l02.36 Ibid.
37 Khalidi, 106.
18
Islamic component ofidentity. They sought a prominent role for
Islam in the emerging national identity and in politics. However, a
secular independent Arab state remained the goal of notables, urban
elites and most rural leaders.
The tensions of the 1930's took place against the backdrop of
increasing Jewish immigration, growing social dislocation and Arab
urbanization. Rural resistance ranging from civil disobedience
(withholding taxes) to violence (guerrilla organized peasants) played
a critical role in the 1936 RevoIt. Jewish settlements and British
installations were attacked by bands of peasants. During this period,
the image of the dispossessed Arab farmer became a poignant symbol
ofPalestinian identity.
In the name ofthese dispossessed peasants, sheikh 'Izz al-Din
al-Qassam organized armed resistance against imperial rule. His
death by British forces in 1935 gained symbolic significance during
the Revolt. In the 1960's armed movements would link al-Qassam's
"heroism" to that of the first fellahin. 37 The peasant headdress-the
kiifiya-was appropriated by these later movements. They became
symbolic of the continuity with the first armed opponents of
Zionism.
The Revolt resulted in cultural and socio-political
transformation in Palestine. In a "muted cultural revolution," Arabs
19
were asked to discard the fez or tarbush, a symbol of middle and
upper c1ass urbanization, for the kiiflya.38 Rural leaders and the
Mufti commanded the veiling ofwomen both Christian and
Muslim.39 Both the kiifiya and the veil became symbolic ofprotest
against urban assimilation and the dominance of urban elite culture.40
In reaction, the British destroyed the national institutions of the
notables. Palestinian urban elites could no longer play an effective
leadership role in the Revolt.41 Power shifted from notable
controlled Jerusalem to Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem,
towns controlled by rural rebels.
The revolt' s strikes and boycotts affected the urban economy
and initiated a process of reverse migration, from cities to villages.
This shift was marked by c1ass struggle as the uprising was directed
at the notables as weIl as the British and Jews: "popular culture
romanticized the lower c1asses, especially the peasantry, interpreting
the revolt as a struggle against the collusion of oppressive forces, the
Zionist, the British, and the ayan.,,42 The reality was a breakdown of
order. Religious c1eavages, local disputes and kinship tensions, long
3X Kimmerling and Migdal, 112.39 Ibid. This is ironie sinee traditionally the veiling ofwomen was an urban Muslim rather than villageeustom.411 Both the kaffiyya and the veil beeome part of the proeess by whieh Palestinian identity is eonsolidatedduring the Intifàda.41 Kimmerling and Migdal, 107.42 Ibid., 113.
20
characteristic ofPalestinian society, once again surfaced.43 A
growing violence between urban and rural Palestinians also emerged.
Wealthy notables and merchants were forced into "taxation" to
sustain the revoIt. When they resisted paying they were beaten or
murdered, or deemed "collaborators" or "traitors."44 The revolution
deteriorated and the urban leadership of the national movement was
deported, killed or self-exiled.45
The Revoit left the Palestinian national movement fractured
and directionless. It was however, a distinct watershed that
crystallized Palestinian national identity: "It offered new heroes and
martyrs-most prominently Sheikh Qassam-and a popular culture
to eulogize them; it constituted an unequivocal declaration that,
whatever their social status, Palestinians unaIterably opposed the
Zionist program.,,46 The Revoit had devastating results for
Palestinian society and economy. Nevertheless, it reflected the local
language ofPalestinian nationalism and helped to create a nation.47
1948 to 1987
The third stage in the development ofPalestinian national
identity encompasses the period from the formation of the state of
43 Druze and Christian communities were the targets of rural bands, the latter were also singled out aswealthy merchants and often because of the uprising's strong Islamic component. See Kimmerling andMidgdal, 116.44 Ibid.45 Nearly the same number of Arabs died as Jews. This created fear and led many wealthy Palestiniansinto exile in Beirut were they remained until the 1980's.46 Kimmerling and Migdal, 123.47 Ibid.
21
Israel in 1948 to the outbreak of the Intifieja in 1987. This period is
characterized by dispersal and dispossession. The 1948 Nakba or
catastrophe overshadowed pre-war divisions. Both urban and rural
Palestinians found themselves in refugee camps, united by the
experience of exile: "1948 proved both a great leveler, and a source
of a universally shared experience.,,48 The experience of exile created
a form of cultural umest captured in narrative, songs and poetry.
The new folk culture conveyed: the praise and memory of a
lost paradise, lamented the present hardships, and dreamed of a
triumphant return.
How can l see my land, my rights usurpedAnd remain here, a wanderer, with my shame?Shall l live here and die in a foreign land?No! l will return to my beloved land.l will return, and thereWill l close the book of my life.49
These literary themes are reminiscent of other unfulfilled national
identities-the Kurds, Armenians and Jews before 1948.50 With the
demise ofthe politicalleadership literary motifs maintained and
rebuilt Palestinian national identity. This was accomplished through
education.
The education system facilitated the spread ofnationalist
concepts in Palestine. In the towns in 1945-46, 85% ofboys and
4X Khalidi, 194.49 Fadwa Tuqan, "Visions of the Return: The Palestinian Arab Refugees in Arab Poetry and Art," MiddleEast Journal, 17 (1963): 517. Tuqan's poetry is representative of the dispersal and alienation ofPalestinian refugees.50 Khalidi, 194.
22
65% of girls were enrolled in schools. The United Nations Relief
Works Agency (UNRWA) was established in 1949 as a response to
the refugee crisis. This agency became responsible for the education
ofrefugees, and fuHliteracy was achieved within a generation.51
During the Mandate period Palestinian nationalism originated
among the notables and urban elites and spread down to the peasants
and lower classes. After 1948 this process was reversed. Former
fèllahin and workers, especially the children educated in the refugee
camps, defined a new Palestinian consciousness. Arabs in Israel as
weIl as communities within Gaza and the West Bank defined
Palestinian national identity. These refugees shaped Palestinian
national aspirations into a search for a homeland, rather than merely
a return to Palestine.52 They defined ghurba not as exile from
Palestine, but as displacement from original homes, villages and
lands.
The refugee camps became societies onto themselves and
UNRWA reinforced refugee isolation. This agency became a
paternalistic force that provided material necessities, educated
children and provided employment for refugees. UNRWA promoted
Palestinians into staff positions and its teachers became the basis of
a new Palestinian leadership. With aH its successes UNRWA
51 Ibid., 194.52 Kimmerling and Migdal, 187.
53 Khalidi, 200.
23
continued to represent the impermanence of the Palestinian refugees,
and it engendered a sense of dependence.
Post- Intifiùja
The final stage in the construction ofPalestinian national
identity was inaugurated by violent struggle. The Inti1Jiefa (1987-
1996) a grassroots popular uprising in the occupied territories
signaled a new area. Palestinian identity could no longer be
characterized by quite perseverance in the face of dispossession and
occupation: "A corrosive counter-narrative" emerged based on the
disillusionment with the PLO leadership, especially for Palestinians
. h D· 53III t e laspora.
By the late 1980's the Palestinian leadership now in Tunis
was viewed as ineffectual. The Palestinians within the territories
regained political control. The center of gravity ofPalestinian
politics shifted away from the Diaspora back inside Palestine. The
PLO continued to play a role in the construction ofPalestinian
national identity. However, the secular nationalist were faced with
opposition from newly emerging religio-political organization such
as lfamas.
During the Inti1Jiefa-stage fundamentalist movements
promoted a Palestinian religious identity to the exclusion of other
24
identities. Fundamentalist elites argued that secular nationalism
failed to deliver economically, politically and socially. They called
for a retum to Islam and to "authentic" Islamic values as the remedy.
The commitment to an Islamic state in Palestine places
fundamentalist movements in direct conflict with the PLO. The
following chapter deals with theoretical approaches to nationalism
and examines the third stage in the construction ofPalestinian
identity more closely. The focus is on Palestinian secular
nationalism and the role of the PLO in the construction of
Palestinian identity.
25
CHAPTER TWO
Theories ofNationalism
Defining concepts such as nation and nationalism is often
problematic. Ethnic as opposed to political components of the
definition ofnation are most contested.54 Nationalism is equally
elusive. Sorne equate nationalism with 'national sentiment,' others
with nationalist ideology or language. Most recent scholars
theorizing nationalism fall into one of two main categories:
modemists and "ethnicists".
Modemists argue elites and intellectuals construct the nation by
utilizing state institutions as a means to engender a national identity.
Ethnicists focus on the cultural aspects ofthe nation, the pre-modem
and perpetuaI nature of the nation especially as an expression of
"authentic" identities. In contrast, modemists focus on the political
aspects of the nation.
Modemist and Ethnicist
Both modemist (Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson) and
Ethnicist (Anthony Smith, and John Armstrong) describe
nationalism as a product of objective socioeconomic conditions.
Modemists and ethnicists adhere to the realist perspective. They
54 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith eds., Nationalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 4.
26
define nationalism as a tangible reality embedded in concrete
historical circumstances (ancient for ethnicist and recent for
modernist).
Modernist theorists such as Ernest Gellner define nationalism
as an inherently modern phenomenon. It is not the identification
with a nation that is modern rather it is the political expression of
this identification that is a distinctive feature of the modern world.
In the modern age, culture and state power are related in a new way
so as to engender nationalism.55.
Like Max Weber, Gellner defines the nation in terms of a
shared culture. Culture both persists and changes. Although cultures
are continuously transmitted over time, they are not static, and what
is presented as "continuous" and "immemorial" tradition is often
consciously invented.56 Gellner argues, "The attribution of an
immemorial antiquity to nations is an illusion.,,57 Nations are
mythic entities created and invented by nationalist intelligentsia.
Intellectuals and political elites transmit shared culture through state
institutions. In this way Gellner places nationalism in the political
sphere: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds
55Ibid.,93.56 EricHobsbawm and T. Ranger, The Invention ofTradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1983.57 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism, London: Weidenfe1d & Nico1son, 1997,93.
27
that the political and the national unit should be congruent."S8 This
approach privileges the political role of intellectuals:
Gellner divides history into an agrarian age (Agraria) and a
modem age (Industria): "homogeneity of culture is an unlikely
determinant of political boundaries in the agrarian world, and a very
probable one in the modem industriallscientific world".S9 In the
transition from Agraria to Industria, localized forms of community
(tribe, village) are replaced by mass urban society. This urban
culture is characterized by conflict over limited resources by
differently socialized ethnie groups. Nationalism is rooted in these
inevitable conflicts.60
Benedict Anderson also represents the tradition of modemist
theorist ofnationalism.61 Like Gellner, Anderson views nationalism
as modem. Nations are "imagined communities." The possibility of
imagining the nation only arose in the modem age when three
ancient, fundamental cultural conception lost prominence. The first
was the rejection of the idea that a script-language (Latin, Arabie)
offered access to ontological truth, and hence, was a part of that
truth. The second was movement away from the hierarchical
ordering of society and the decline of societal organization under
5X Ernest Gellner, Nations mJd Nationalislll, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983,1.59 Gellner, Nationalism, 95.611 Gellner, Nations and Nationalislll.61 Anderson theorizes nationalism in much the same way as Ernest Renan did in 1882. Renan identifiedthe subjective nature of the nation as a "moral consciousness." See "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" a lecture
28
high centres such as monarchs who governed by divine rule. The
third cultural conception to lose prominence in the modern age deals
with temporality and the conflation of cosmology and history.62
These ideas rooted humankind and provided certainties. In the
industrial age these three cultural conceptions fall under the impact
of rapid economic, social and scientific change.
Further, the modern equality and individualism of the
Enlightenment abolished the heterogeneity ofhierarchical
belonging.63 There is a shift away from narrow identities (local,
family and religious) to wider impersonal identities of the state. The
modern age is accompanied by the development of print-capitalism
and the use ofnew vernacular languages that "unify the fields of
exchange and communication.,,64 The new way of communicating (a
result of the development ofprint capitalism) facilitated the growth
and dissemination of a new image of the nation. This image is
rooted in a remembered past central to the subjective idea of the
nation.65
Gellner and Anderson view the 'origins' ofnations and
nationalism as a sign of the 'modernity' of society. Both recognize
delivered at the Sorbonne, Il March 1882. A translation of Ernest Renan' s "What is a nation'?" appearsin Romi K. Bhabha, Nation and NalTation ed., New York: Routledge, 1990, 8-21.62 The decline ofthese three idea1s is summarized in Benedict Anderson, hnagined Coml11unities:Reflections on tfle Origins and Spread oi'Nationalism, London: Verso, 1991,36-46.63 Ronald Beiner ed., TiJeorizing Nationalism, New York: State University of New York Press, 1999,225.64 Rutchinson and Smith, Nationalism, 94.65 The subjective idea of the nation owes much to Renan's thesis. The focus on communication anddissemination ofideas is rooted in Karl Deutsche's Nationalism and Social CommU11ication, 1953.
29
nationalism thrust for a correspondence of ethnic/cultural identity
and political identity. However, unlike Gellner, Anderson does not
view nationalism as an ideology in the sense of Liberalism or
Marxism. It is more strongly affiliated with religious imaginings:
"nationalism has to be understood, by aligning it not with self-
consciously held political ideologies, but with large cultural systems
that preceded it, out ofwhich-as well as against which-it came
into being.66 For Anderson, the nation is: "the representation of
social lifè rather than the discipline of social politj' .67
In addition to the emergence ofnationalism from a system of
cultural signification, Anderson is critical of Gellner's
characterization of nationalism as fabricated. Gellner argues that
'Nationalism is not the awakening ofnations to se1f-consciousness:
it invents nations where they do not exist. ,6R In this sense invention
becomes fabrication rather than imagining or creation.
Unlike modernist, ethnicist theorist (Anthony D. Smith and John
Armstrongt9 view nationalism as a permanent feature of humankind
and as primarily though not exclusive1y an expressions ofidentity.7o
Although not purely a thesis ofprimordially, Armstrong and Smith
both focus on the cultural component of the nation.
66 Anderson, 12.67 Bhabha, 2. Bhabha represents the semiotic or postmodernist theories of nationalism.68 Anderson,69 John Armstrong, Nations Befàre NationaJism, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1982.Anthony D. Smith, T1Je Et1Jnie Origins ofNations, London: Basil Blackwell, 1986.70 Classical examples include theorist such as Fichte and Herder.
30
Although the nation is a relatively modern phenomenon, its
origins can be traced to pre-modern ethnie communities, ethnies.
Ethnicists agree with modernists that nationalist create nations
however, they argue that this creation does not occur ex nihilo.
Nations are shaped out of pre-existing cultural resources-myths,
memories, symbols and traditions. For ethnicists nationalist elites
utilize pre-existing cultural resources to re-interpret sacred text in
order to "reconstruct" the nation. This is in contrast to modernist for
whom the nation is created/reshaped out ofnew modern processes
related to high culture, modern technology, bureaucracy, capitalism,
secular education and nationality.
For ethnicist modern nations have a sociologically dominant
ethnie community or an "ethnie core". State-formation takes place
around this community and ultimately the nation is formed. In sorne
cases two or more dominant ethnie communities are in dispute.
Often a monarch or an aristocracy builds the state on upper-class
culture with myths of common decent, a vernacular language,
territorial homeland and shared history. This ethnie community or
ethnie spreads the culture and language downwards to the middle and
lower classes. Often the monarchy or aristocracy no longer exists
and the ethnie categories are subject populations. However, the
educated upper classes preserve memories of indigenous heroes,
31
kingdoms, poets of a 'golden age', sacred territories and myths of
origin and divine election.71
By the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under the
influence of Romanticism and western scholarship there is a process
of retrieval that takes place. The search for an "authentic" past takes
the shape of territorial civicnationalism or a more ethnictype of
nationalism. For Smith, territorial, civic nations tend to develop
from aristocratic ethniesthrough a process of 'bureaucratie
incorporation.' The lower classes are absorbed into the ethnie
culture of upper classes. In contrast, ethnie nations develop from
'vertical' ethnies through a process of cultural mobilization on the
part of intellectuals.72
Like smith, Hutchinson divides nationalism into cultural and
political types. Like the classical polis, the ideal of political
nationalism is a civic politY of educated citizens united by common
laws. They reject the traditional allegiances for a rationalist
conception of the nation that transcends cultural difference.
However, they must work within a territory or homeland to secure a
state: "To mobilize a political constituency on behalf ofthis goal,
political nationalist may be driven to adopt ethnic-historical
71 Beiner, 33.72 For a differentiation of 'eivie' from 'ethnie' nations see Anthony D. Smith, "The Origins of Nations,"Ethnic and Racial Studies, 12 (July 1989): 340.
32
identities and in the process may become ethnicized and 're-
traditionalized' .73 The goal-securing a state-is modem.
Cultural nationalist view the state as accidentaI, because the
essence of the nation is distinctive civilization, the product of a
specifie history, culture and geography.74 Nations are viewed as
organic beings or personalities infused with a creative force that
endows aIl things with individuality. They are primordial
expressions ofthis spirit. 75 Hutchinson's political nationalism is
comparable with Smith's 'civic' nation. Politicallcivic nations
uproot traditional order and replace it with modem legal-rational
society. Hutchison's concept of cultural nationalism is reminiscent
ofSmith's 'ethnie' nation, both are elite driven movements of moral
regeneration. Both cultural and ethnie nations replace the state as
agent of popular mobilization and seek to reconstruct a communal
past and unite the traditional with the modem.76
According to Hutchison, political nationalism appears first in
the West. In CentrallEastem Europe and Asia, society was primarily
agrarian and a secular middle class did not exist. This society was
characterized by social and political backwardness that facilitated
the dominancy of a "reactionary aristocracy.,,77 Modemist claim
there often exists no correlation between ethnie and political
73 Hutchinson and Smith ,124.74 Ibid.75 This creative force is the spirit Herder speaks of.
33
boundaries and that cultural nationalist create them through a
visionary nation. This imaginednation is based on ancient historical
memories and unique cultural attributes.
In opposition to this modernist interpretation, Hutchinson, is
sympathetic to cultural nationalist. He views the reassertion of
traditional values by educated elites in the 'East' as a defensive
response. The return to the foundational past is not a regression but
rather a means to advance into a new stage of social development;
"Cultural nationalist should be seen, therefore, as moral innovators
who seek by 'reviving' an ethnie historicist vision of the nation to
redirect traditionalist and modernist away from conflict and instead
to unite them in the task of constructing an integrated distinctive
and autonomous community, capable of competing in the modern
world.,,7R
Methodologically modernist and ethnicist do not differ. They
can both be characterized as "realist." This perspective holds that
nationalism is produced by and anchored in objective socioeconomic
conditions and material interest.79 Nationalism is a tangible reality
embedded in concrete historical circumstances (ancient for
ethnicist and recent for modernist). These theoretical approaches
76 Smith, "The Origins of nations," 341.77 Hutchinson and Smith, 127-28.7X Hutchinson and Smith, 129.79 Jankowski and Gershoni" Retlzinking Nationalism in tfle Arab Middle East, 6.
34
are a tool for examining the historical circumstance of the
Palestinian case.
The Construction of Palestinian Identity: The Role of SecularNationalism
Although nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, nations and nationalism have
survived and penetrated into all societies. The political dimensions
of modernity provide the conditions for the rise of nations and
nationalism. Similar to Gellner, this paper contends that in the
Palestinian case nationalist elites played a role in the construction of
Palestinian identity. They shaped this identity through various
institutions such as the press, schools, religious establishments,
political groups, foreign missions,dubs, charities and organs of the
Ottoman state.
Both Anderson and Gellner draw attention to the non-
political changes ofmodernity: printing, literacy, urbanization and
changing social roles. These are significant in the Palestinian case.
Print-capitalism and the modern press were utilized by elites to
engender nationalism. In the first decade of the twentieth century
Palestinian newspapers, al-KaJmil and Filastin, reacting to British
colonialism and Zionism engendered a sense of identity among
Palestinians. This was aided by the institutions of education that
35
development in conjunction with the "industrialization" of
Palestinian society. The modem press facilitated a shift in identity
among Palestinians. Narrow identities offamily and village gave
way to broader identities ofmass urban society.
Ethnie bonds and the centrality of reinterpreted traditions
also play a significant role in the construction of the modem
Palestinian nation. Palestinian notables played a role in the
dissemination ofhigh culture and fostered the construction of
modem Palestinian consciousness. The Palestinian ethnieresiding in
cuiturally transmitted myths and symbols, especially the myth of
common descent, constructed a sense ofPalestinian identity and
nationalism. For nationalists the nation includes a population
occupying a historicalland, a common culture, economy, legal rights
and duties for members as weIl as shared myths and memories.
The Construction of identity is the vehicle by which the
nation emerges in the modem era. Palestinian nationalist elites re
narrated the past and utilized symbols such as dispossession and
exile to construct "authentic" Palestinian identity. They often
portrayed military defeat as triumph or heroic perseverance, ~'iUmud
in an effort to consolidate a sense of common struggle. This began
during the Mandate Period and reached its peak in the 1960's with
the emergence ofthe PLO.
36
The first decade after 1948 was characterized by
disorientation, an absence of meaningful politicalleadership and
petty communal feuding. Grassroots organizations, charitable,
professional and cultural in nature, continued to function quietly.RO
Organizations like the Haifa Cultural Associations and the Jaffa
Muslim Sports Club kept alive the memory of Palestine. The shared
experiences of dispossession, suffering and refugee camps preserved
and reshaped a sense of solidarity.
After the Palestinian dispossession, more than half of the pre-
war population was now in the West Bank. These refugees came
under the control of Jordan. The Hashemite regime declared itself
the only legitimate heir of Arab Palestine.RI The Jordanian state
executed a process of Jordanization ofPalestinians. Two-thirds of aU
Palestinians became Jordanian citizens. The state established a
comprehensive educational system for the East and West Banks in
order to promote a Jordanian social whole.R2 Palestinians were
encouraged to settle on the East Bank and welfare and development
agencies were created to aid refugees. The Jordanian state also acted
to suppress the voicing of a national Palestinian identity.R3
This policy of Jordanization was problematic at the outset.
The Palestinians (an educated and urbane community) out numbered
HO Ibid., 195.HI This po1icy was maintained until 1988.H2 Kimmerling and Midga1, 191.
37
the Jordanians two to one at the time of annexation. They quickly
overwhelmed the original Jordanian population in many domains.
The Bedouin core of Jordanian society was left in control of key
political ministries and the army.
The Gaza strip came under Egyptian control after 1948. This
was a much harsher c1imate for Palestinian refugees. Gaza suffered a
loss of its agricultural zones (citrus and grain lands), and was
characterized by poverty and social misery.84 The Egyptians denied
Gazans opportunities granted to Palestinians by the Jordanians.
They were denied opportunities for institution building and political
participation (including citizenship).
Gaza was poor and constituted mainly of illiterate unskilled
refugees and agricultural workers. It did not become a center of new
Palestinian institution building. Rather, Gazan society developed
and maintained memories and culture from pre-war Palestine: "Gaza
became the quintessential representation of a new culture-what we
might call camp society.,,85 Old institutions offamily and clan
remained important for Gazans during this time of strife. These
institutions helped recreate Palestinian identity. After the 1967
Gaza and the West Bank became the Occupied Territories. The
83 King Abdallah was negotiating with Israel when he was assassinated in 1951 by a Palestinian.84 Kimmerling and Migdal, 199.85 Ibid., 198-99.
38
separate and isolated Palestinian culture that developed in Gaza and
the West Bank came together in the territories.
The period after 1948 was marked by inter-Arab rivalries. In
1956-57 Egypt and Iraq clashed over the Baghdad Pact. In 1961
Syria seceded from the union with Egypt. The war in Yemen further
divided the Arabs into camps.86 In 1964 Nasser called a meeting of
Arab leaders in response to Israeli implementation of a plan to divert
the waters of the Jordan River for its own use.87 It was at this
meeting that a "Palestinian entity" was created.
A few months later, a Palestine Council of 422 Palestinians
representing various sectors of the population would proclaim a draft
constitution oftwenty-nine articles that included a resolutions for: a)
the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization or PLO, b)
election of A1].mad al-Shukayri, the Palestinian representative at the
Arab League, as chairman of the Executive Committee, c) the
transformation of the council into the First National Congress of the
PLO, d) the adoption of a national Covenant for the organization,
and e) the selection by the chairman of an executive committee of
fifteen Palestinian representatives.88
H6 For a full account ofthese rivalries see Malcom H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abdel Nasser andHis RivaIs, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.H7 Jamal R. Nassar, The Palestine Liberation Organization: From Armed Struggle t the Declaration al'Independence, New York: Praeger, 1991, 19.HH Ibid., 20.
39
After the 1967 war the PLO under the control of FateJ;. came
to dominate Palestinian politicS.89 The PLO dominated by FateJ;.
established itself as the official leadership of the Palestinians and
Palestinian nationalism. The PLO generation of leaders had access to
university education in the Arab world and sorne in North America
and Europe. The new professionals and intel1ectuals derived their
powers not from the traditional villages but from the tools of modern
education.
After the 1967 war, the newly educated constructed three
heroic images that would shape Palestinian national identity for the
next three decades: the freedom fighter, the survivor and the martyr.
The fidi'Îwas the modern holy warrior who sacrifices himself in the
battle against Zionism.9o This image idealized the peasant in spite of
the fact that the new leadership, the PLO was mainly urban. The
second was the survivor, the fèl1iJ;. or peasant who demonstrated
steadfastness, enduring humiliations and dispossession.91 The last
was "the child of the stone," the shahidor martyr who offered his life
for the national cause.92 These youth were reminiscent of the shabib
of the RevoIt. During the 1960's and 70's (the era ofworldwide
nationalliberation movements) the symbol of the fidi'j dominated.
X9 ln 1959 Yasser 'Arafat and a group of his university colleagues established Fa/ell the PalestinianNational Liberation Movement.911 The fèdaywas portrayed wearing the kiifiya, the headdress of the feflalün, and carrying a Kalishnokov.This image drew on memories of the rebels in the Palestinian RevoIt.91 Ibid., 212.92 Ibid.
40
In the 1980's and 90's the image of the martyr became more
prominent.
The PLO developed a national mythology ofheroism and
sacrifice. The 1968 battle of a1-Karamah is an example of this
national mythology. This battle is the "foundation myth" of the
modern Palestinian commando movement. 93 The mythology built
around this incident is characteristic of the myth making that enters
into the process of creating national identity. The PLO often
narrated failure (military defeat) as triumph. The battle of a1-
Karamah is an example of this mythologization.
The battle took place in the abandoned city of al-Karamah on
the East side of the Jordan River. Israeli troops attacked Palestinian
military bases and met with unexpected resistance. The Israelis
suffered much heavier casualties than expected and were forced to
leave behind sorne damaged vehicles.94 This was not an Arab
military victory but the Palestinians fought and were left in control
of the land at the end of the battle. Viewed in the immediate
aftermath of the 1967 defeat, al-Karamah became a symbol exploited
by Palestinian nationalist. A failure narrated as heroic triumph.95
93 Khalidi, 196. The name of the town aJ-KaramaiJ means dignity.94 Ibid., 197.95 The portraya1 of failure as defeat became part of PLO mythologizing. Other examp1es include thenarration of the debacle in Jordan in September of 1970. PLO defeat cu1minated in Black September andexpulsion from Jordan. The 1975-76 attacks on Pa1estinian camps in Lebanon, and the 1982 defeats botha result of PLO invo1vement in the Lebanese Civil War. These and numerous other events have been renarrated as victory rather than defeat.
41
The "narrative of failure as triumph" re-shaped events like the
martyrdom of sheikh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the Palestinian RevoIt,
and the Arab-Israeli War. The violence and losses suffered by
Palestinians during the course of the revolt as weIl as the
disorganization, confusion and leaderless chaos of the Arab-Israeli
War were turned into triumph. Defeat was shifted into the heroism
of the Palestinian peasant, urban fighters and charismatic leaders of
the war. The selective retrieval ofhistory is typical of aIl nationalist
movements. As Ernest Renan argues, nations must choose to
remember and to forget their past.
The re-narration ofhistory must be viewed along side the fact
that the PLO was not a government. They operated without the
benefit of a nation-state and hence, they did not possess the means to
propagate an official version ofhistory to the entire Palestinian
population. They lacked an education system, control over channels
of the media, museums, archaeological exhibits, national parks and
cultural manifestations to reinforce their version ofhistory.96
However, the PLO was able to reach sorne of the Palestinian
population through newspapers and periodicals, its publishing houses
and research institutes, and especially its radio station $awt Filas/in,
the Voice ofPalestine.97 The Palestinian experience of
96 Kimmerling and Midgal, 199.97 Ibid., 199-200.
42
dispossession, dispersal and exile was disseminated through these
media in a hid to construct a sense of national solidarity.
The IOle ofnationalist elites in identity-creation can he
compared to that ofIslamic fundamentalist. The following chapter
examines the theoretical approaches to Islamic fundamentalism and
the IOle of fundamentalist movements in the construction of
Palestinian identity. The central focus is the history, organizational
structure and ideology of lfamas, a movement of Islamic
fundamentalism in Palestine.
43
CHAPTER THREE
Islamic Fundamentalism
Theoretical Approaches
In the late twentieth century the resurgence of religion in the
Middle East is a reaction to the failures of modernization. More
accurate1y, the formation offundamentalist movements can be
attributed to the inability ofreligious and politicalleaders to deal
with the negative consequences ofthe modern age.9R The Islamic
Resistance Movement (lfarakat al-Muqiiwama al-Isliimiyya)99
exemplifies Islamic fundamentalism in Palestine. My thesis utilizes
fundamentalism to denote, the affirmation of religious authority as
holistic and absolute, expressed through the collective demand that
scriptural dictates be recognized and legally enforced.\OO lfamas
affirms the authority ofIslam and promotes an Islamic state in
Palestine.
Fundamentalism as a global concept is characterized by an anti-
modern reaction against secularism. Fundamentalists are modems
not modemist.\O\ They do not resist industrialization or scientific
progress rather, it is modernism they appose. Modernism is
characterized by relativism, consumerism, and the search for
individual autonomy. Its foundations were established in the
9K James Piscatori, "Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms," in Accoun{jng for FundalllentaJjsllls: TheDynalllk Character o[Movelllents, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby eds. (Chicago: The Universityof Chicago Press, 1994),361.99 HereatTer referred to as Hamas.100 Bruce Lawrence, Defènders o[God: The FundamentaJjst Revoit Agajnst tile Modern Age, (SanFrancisco: Harper & Row, Publishing, 1989),27.lOI Ibid., 1.
102 Ibid., 97.103 Ibid., 24.
44
Enlightenment, and its vision and values are driven by secular
rationalism. Modemity is used to describe the physical process of
modemization such as urbanization, industrialization, and
capitalism. In this context, fundamentalists do not deride the
consequences ofmodemism (modemization), but castigate the values
on which this process rests.
Although dogmatically opposed to the values of
individualism and relativism, fundamentalists tacitly accept greater
urbanization and modemization. This, modemization, however,
must occur within a cultural paradigm that affirms the importance of
religion. Fundamentalists see modemization coupled with
'westemization' as anathema to their cultural integrity and survival.
Committed to a religious and cultural structure, wholly different than
the one offered by the West, fundamentalists use anti-westem
rhetoric to promulgate an urbanized, sophisticated modemization
buttressed by a commitment to religious scripture. Hence,
fundamentalism is a modem ideology first and a religious disposition
second. J02
The prelude to understanding fundamentalism as an
ideological reaction to modemism lies in the examination of religion
in its pre-modem scope: " A drastic change has been transforming
the entire world during the Technical Age. Its manifestations are
physical and material, but its undercurrents are spiritual and
psychological. J03 History can be divided into the Agrarianate Age
(pre_19th century), the Technical Age (beginning in the 19th century
45
and extending to the early 20th century), and the High Tech Era
(since 1950's). 104 The relationship between ideology and religion is
different in each division ofhistory.
In the Agraianate Age religion was superior to ideology, in
the Technical Age ideology and religion were separate yet in latent
conflict. In the High Tech Era (post-1950's) ideology superseded
religion. The conflict is no longer dormant. Modemism (relativism,
consumerism, individual autonomy) emerges as the dominant
ideological strand ofmodemity in the High Tech Era. Two opposite
templates of the world are bom, modemism and the reaction against
it fundamentalism. 105
Fundamentalism is a religious ideology with five discemible
characteristics: (l) fundamentalist advocate a pure minority
viewpoint even when they gain the majority as in Iran; (2) they are
oppositional and reactionary; (3) fundamentalists are secondary-level
male elites that interpret scripture; (4) they generate their own
technical vocabulary; (5) fundamentalism is characterized by
historical antecedents, but no ideological precursors. I06 It is possible
to utilize these criteria to determine the nature of particular religious
political movements.
The revival ofIslamic ideas in the 20th century contains two
distinct components, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic revival.
104 Ibid., 97-99.lOS Accompanying the shift from the Agrarianate Age to the High Tech Era is a shift in European thought.Exponents of the Enlightenment like Emmanuel Kant enlarged the role of practical reason and detinedcategorical or moral imperatives as equivalent to belief in God. Other Enlightenment thinkers woulddemote religious authority in the Post-Kantian Period: Hegel, Feurbach, Comte and later Nietzsche andMarx.!06 Lawrence, 100-101. According to Lawrence, antecedents such as the Wahhabi revoit for SunniMuslims, do exist but as a religious ideology fundamentalism is recent.
46
Islamic fundamentalism is synonymous with political Islam and is
characterized by extremism and isolation. Resurgence is mainstream
and pervasive, a broad intellectual, cultural, social and political
movement in the modem Islamic world. 107 The resurgence is a
collected effort on the part of Muslims to modernize without
westernizing, to industrialize without adopting Western values. The
political manifestation of the Islamic resurgence is comparable to the
protestant Reformation: "both are reactions to the stagnation and
corruption of existing institution; both advocate a return to purer and
more demanding form of their religion; preach work, order and
discipline; and appeal to emerging, dynamic, middle-c1ass people. JOX
There exist no scholarly consensus on what defines
fundamentalism. A broad range oftheories can be utilized to define
the historical context, meaning and relevance of Islamic
fundamentalism. The evolutionary theory focuses on the
development offundamentalism as a reaction to Western hegemony.
This theory defines fundamentalism as a stage in Islam's
development, and a reaction to the modernization of the last two
hundred years. Scholars such as Bruce Lawrence, John Obert Voll,
Mohammed Ayoob and Fazlur Rahman view the development of
fundamentalism as a modem reaction against Western domination.
The second theoretical approach focuses on religion as a
cultural system and presents fundamentalism as a means of creating
identity. Fundamentalism is a strategy or set of strategies: "which
\07 Samuel Huntington, The Clash ofCiviJjzations and the Remaking of World Order(New York: Simonand Schuster, 1996), 110.IOX Ibid., Ill.
47
beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their cultural identity as a
people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk, fundamentalist
fortify it by selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices
from a sacred past.,,109 Hence, fundamentalism according to the
afore mentioned concepts requires: (a) an external force, power or
entity able to (b) generate a specific identity.
Both theoretical approaches are encompassed in the theory of
essentialism (negatively described as cultural determinism).
Essentialists focus on Islam as a cohesive whole with basic and
permanent values. According to essentialism, the thinking of
fundamentalist is characterized by the standard Islamic world-view
and the corresponding self-image ofIslam. 110 Scholars that adhere to
this theory (implicitly and explicitly) characterize Islam as an
unchanging monolith, with an essential "essence" that can be
observed and studied.
According to essentialist, the fundamentalist reaction to
modernity and the need for identity creation are based on traditional
Islamic values and precepts: "The fundamental reason for the
resurgence appears to be the feeling among many ordinary Muslims,
that they were in danger of losing their identity, because of its
109 Martin E Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Accounting for Fundamentalism, 1. Marty and Applebyare the editors of a massive tlve volume work know as the Fundamentalism Project based at theUniversity of Chicago.110 See Montgomery W. Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity, New York: Routedge, 1988.
52
leadership's authority was undermined and diminished. Finally, the
political circumstances of foreign military occupation and the threat
of annexation triggered the Intifada and the development of Hamas:
"Political violence has been a product of unusual circumstances and
external influences.,,120 Prior to these circumstances, political Islam
in Palestine was primarily a movement of social transformation.
Palestinian fundamentalists react to the economic and social
hardships of the Israeli Occupation and increasingly to the inability
ofthe secular nationalist PLO/PA to find lasting political solutions
for Palestinians. Thus Islam provides the vehicle for confronting
Israel and Western hegemony. The resurgence of religion and the
return to prominence oftraditional identities (rooted in blood ties,
family, clan and tribe) are not solelya reaction to modernity. In the
face ofmilitary occupation by Israelis the reaction to modernity is
exasperated.
The Historical Antecedents of lfamas
Founded by I:Iasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim
Brotherhood is the historical and ideological predecessor of Islamism
in Palestine. The Palestinian question has been central to the
movement since its inception. This centrality resulted in both
119 Israel mistakenly characterized the Mujama as a social welfare organization and unlike the PLO uninterested in politics. In 1978 Israel's civil administration encouraged Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the head ofthe Mujama and later the spiritual leader of Hamas, to register as a charitable society.
53
ideological and sorne military support and culminate in the fonnation
of a Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood organization. The new
movement was characterized by religiously motivated social welfare
activism. The religious motives of the movement are related to the
concepts ofIslamic ummiior community and the notion ofjihiid 121
The Muslim Brothers divided politicalloyalty into loyalty to
country, loyalty to Arabism and loyalty to Islam. Arab unity was a
prerequisite for the revival of the past (glorious age ofIslam) and for
Islamic unity. The unity of the Islamic ummiirequires the revival of
the caliphate. According to al-Banna, this would be achieved
graduaI, "moving from national unity, to Arab unity and then to
Islamic unity.,,122 This religious notion ofIslamic fratemity is rooted
in the Qur' an and replaces nationalism with a greater bond of unity
built on Islam.
The Muslim Brethren viewed Palestine as part of the Islamic
nation or ummiiand its significance was couched in religion.
Jerusalem was the place of the Prophet Muhammad's night joumey
and the first qiblah or direction ofprayer. For religious reasons
Palestine was the property of aU Muslims and not just
120 Ibid., 6.121 Abd al-Fattah Muhammad el-Awaisi, The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928-1947,(New York: Tauris Acedemic Studies, 1998), 2.122 Ibid., 4.
111 Ibid., 61.
48
erosion by Western intellectual attitudes". 11 1 Hence, fundamentalist
believe, a return to "true Islam," the Islam ofthe earliest period, will
insulate them from the onslaught of secularism. Islam is seen as the
solution for all social and economic problems. In short, essentialism
emphasizes specifie historical and cultural traditions presented
through the lens ofIslam (fundamentalist). My thesis accepts the
essentialist theory tempered with a qualification.
The emphasis on tradition by essentialism to the exclusion of
other factors leads to an incomplete and unsatisfactory understanding
of fundamentalism. Edward Said argues: "Islam has been
fundamentally misrepresented in the West-the real issue is whether
indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any
and all representation, because they arerepresentations, are
embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institution,
and political ambience of the representer.,,112 This is a critique of the
methodological failures of Orientalism. However, it can be
incorporated to facilitate a valuable polemical challenge to
essentialism.
What emerges, is an understanding of a changing
fundamentalism constructed by and in response to specifie political
and culture exigencies. This is not to imply that definitive
representations can't be formed and presented. It only alerts the
49
astute observer to the fact that these representations are not always
fixed in a single historical context. The case of lfamas demonstrates
that a fundamentalist movement (colored by traditional Islamic
world view) can explicitly affirm traditional values (essentialism)
while, implicitly asserting a Palestinian identity enshrined in the
modem notion of the nation state.
Fundamentalism in Palestine: lfarakat al-Muqiiwama al-Isliimiyya
(lfamas)
As a political phenomenon in the Arab world, Islamic
fundamentalism became widespread in the 1970's. The emergence of
an Islamic republic in Iran facilitated a global Islamic awakening.
The Israeli occupation delayed the development of fundamentalism
in Palestine until the late 1980's: "Islamism has now become a major
political force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the expense of the
PLO.,,113 Support for Islamism was achieved through a radical
reorientation of the main Islamic organization in Palestine, the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Resurgence theories offundamentalism suggest that
fundamentalism took root in Palestine for many of the same reasons
it has developed in the Arab world in general. According to these
112 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1994, 272.113 Jean-Francois Legrain, "Ramas: Legitimate Reir of Palestinian Nationalism?" in John Esposito, PoliticalIslam, Revolution, Radicalism or Reform, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, 159.
50
theorist fundamentalism is a reaction to modernity.114 A leading
resurgence scholar summarizes the approach ofthese theorists in his
dual characterization of fundamentalism as both political and
cultural. l15
PoliticaIly, Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction to a
structural crisis. Economic factors such as the need for jobs, housing
and education, class malaise, individual alienation state tyranny and
political alienation due to the lack of liberalization among Arab
governments are aIl significant determinants of popular support for
Islamist movements. Islamic fundamentalism is an attack on the
nation-state and an effort to provide an alternative to this failed
secular institution. 116
CulturaIly, political Islam emerged as a response to a crisis of
meaning(the result of cultural contradictions produced by
modernity). According to Bassam Tibi, "The salient feature of
political Islam is its defensive-cultural character." The defensive
culture ofIslam is a result ofIslam's clash with 'cultural modemity.'
This clash revolves around the modem concept of knowledge
114 See the work of Bruce Lawrence, James Piscatori, Robert übert Voll, John Esposito, MohammedAyoob, Fazlur Rahman and others. See especially, Martin E Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.) Aeeountingfor Fundamentalism. This part of a massive five volume research project based at the University ofChicago.115 Basam Tibi, Confliet and War in the Middle East: From lnterstate War to New Security, (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1999),227.116 Bassam, Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder,(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
51
providing the basis for modern science and technology, and the idea
ofsecular governance versus the "rule ofGod."ll7
Although modernist theories of nationalism can be applied
successfully to the Palestinian case, related theories that attempt to
explain the 'resurgence' ofIslamic fundamentalism do not fully
explain the rise Palestinian religio-political organization such as
Hamas. The decline of Arab secularism in the Nasser era did not lead
to Islamic fundamentalism in Palestine: "In the case of Palestine,
however, the opposite was true: the period after 1967 saw political
Islam eclipsed by an increasingly flourishing secular nationalism."IIK
These movements must inevitably be viewed with reference to the
unique political circumstances from which they emerged.
First, Israel supported Islamist such as the Mujama or Islamic
Congress as a way to destroy the secular nationalist struggle for
statehood.1l9 Israeli funding ofIslamists was intended as a policy of
divide-and-rule in the Occupied Territories. However, it is partly
responsible for the rise ofIslamic fundamentalism in Palestine.
Second, the Palestinian nationalist movement went into decline after
the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon that resulted in forced exile and
the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla. Dislocated in Tunis the PLO
117 Ibid" 224-230.118 Beverley Milton-Edwards, fslamic Politics in Palestine, New York: Tauris Academie Studies, 1996.5.
54
Palestinians. 123 Modem fundamentalist inherited the idea of
Palestine as an Islamic waqfor trust for aIl Muslims.
The strategy ofthe Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine is divided
into two phases. In the first phase there is a caU to transform
society, in the second the focus is on the calI for jihador holy
struggle against Israel. Al-Banna defined holy struggle as a religious
obligation of aIl Muslims and thus, it is part of the oath of aIlegiance
of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a community Muslims are to defend
themselves from aggression, secure freedom ofbelief, protect the
message of Islam and relieve the oppressed and support them against
their oppressors. 124 The doctrinaire perspectives on the religious
precepts of umniâ and jihad drive the Muslim Brotherhood's
commitment to the Palestinian cause.
To a lesser extent, the Muslim Brothers had national and political
concems that focused on the military and economic security of
Egypt. They feared a Zionist state because they viewed it as an
outpost of Western imperialism and as a barrier obstructing contact
with Asia and Africa. Zionism was also viewed as a social threat, a
potential source of apostasy and permissiveness. 125
The Muslim Brotherhood met in Haifa in 1946 and 1947 and
committed itselfto the defense of Palestine and to cooperation with
123 Ibid., IO.124 EI-Awaisi arrives at these conclusion after analyzing the writing of Hasan al-Banna and the MuslimBrothers.
55
the nationalist forces. The movement flourished as general respect
and appreciation for its support grew. In 1947, the Brotherhood
became active in public mobilization campaigns in preparation for
Jihad and in disseminating anti-Zionist propaganda. 126 The
Brotherhood disseminated its message through the mosques. In the
1948, the movement put aside ideology and joined forces with
national organizations even participating in the war.
After the 1948 war the movement was divided. The Muslim
Brotherhood in the West Bank was incorporated into the
Brotherhood in Jordan and the Brethren in Gaza carne under
Egyptian control. The movement in the West Bank adopted a
political approach that focused on education, and charity. The
Brothers in Jordan were conservative and quietist, more concerned
with social issue and the building of an Islamic society. Its
counterpart in Gaza took on revolutionary and military traits. The
Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip was involved politically and militarily
until1954 when Nasser banned the organization. This led to the
establishment of the National Liberation Movement, Fatei} in 1958-
59.
Palestinian Islamists distanced themselves from the secular
nationalism of Fate{J.. They refrained from engaging in the liberation
125 EI-Awaisi, 18.126 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Politicai Tbougbt and Practice, (Washington D.C: Institute for PalestineStudies, 1998),17.
56
struggle during the 1960's and 70's when FateiJ came to dominate
the PLO. 127 The Brotherhood continued to play a passive role
focusing on social rather than political issues. They built mosques,
and social institution, Islamic student societies, clubs and charitable
organizations.
In the late 1980's the Muslim Brotherhood underwent an
ideological transformation and became the Movement of Islamic
Resistance, lfamas. This shift coincided with the outbreak of the
Intifiiç/a and was accompanied by a marked change in the political
practice ofthe movement. Led by Shaykh A1}mad Yasin, the
Brotherhood embraced the principle of armed resistance and
combined it with the social change thesis. m Patriotism (watanlyah)
was united with religion (da 'wa). After the signing ofthe Peace
Accords in 1993 lfamas became the main opposition to the terms of
self rule. As such, lfamas views itself as the legitimate alternative to
Palestinian secular nationalism.
In the West Bank and Gaza lfamasis the most popular Islamist
movement. Polls conducted by the Center for Palestinian Research
and Studies, an independent think tank in Nablus, consistently place
lfamas as the main Islamist rival to the FateiJ controlled PA. In a
January 1999 poll of elections for the PNA President, 47% of
127 The Brotherhood justifies its non-engagement in the liberation struggle on the bases of arguments thatit was engaged in a social struggle to change society and prepare a generation for struggle.12X Hroub,35.
57
supporters chose'Arafat followed by 12% support for Al]mad Yasin
(the spiritual leader ofI1amas). FateJ;. consistently receives the
largest faction of the vote nearly 50% followed by lfamas at about
15%. lfamas may not be an epi-phenomenon or the result of short
lived frustration but it is also not the legitimate alternative to
nationalism. 129 Although the movement is the largest Islamic
opposition to the PLOIPA it has not been able to capture support
from more than a minority ofPalestinians.
The lfamas Charter: Ideological Goals Versus Political Pragmatism
In November 1988 the Palestinian National Council (PNC) of
the PLO adopted a Declaration of Independence. This Declaration
accepts UN Resolution 181 and UN Security Council Resolution
242. Resolution 181 calls for the division of Palestine into two
states, one lewish and one Arab, and 242 establishes the right of aIl
states to live in peace and security within secure boundaries. 130 In
August of 1988 lfarakat al-Muqiiwama al-Isliimiyya or the Islamic
Resistance Movement emerged as a reaction to the Palestinian
Declaration of Independence. 131
129 Legrain, 159.1311 Menachem Klein, "Competing Brothers: The Web of Hamas-PLü Relations" in Re/igious Radica/ismin tile Greater Middle East, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (eds.), (Portland: Frank Cass,1997), Ill.
131 Because the Declaration of Independence implicitly recognizes the state of Israel it is rejected bylfamas. The Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement is lfamaswhich means zeal.
58
The 1988 charter identifies the movement and establishes its
ide010gica1 and politica1 goals:
Allah is its Goal.The Messenger is its Leader.The Qur'an is its Constitution.Jihad is its methodology, andDeath for the sake of Allah is its most coveted desire. 132
Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the ultimate goal ofI1amas is the
establishment of an Islamic state. This can only be achieved through
the liberation of al1Palestine (Jordan River to the Mediterranean
Sea) from the "Zionist enemy.,tl33 Accordingly, the Charter
establishes the land of Palestine: "upon all Muslim generations till
the day ofResurrection" as an Islamic waqfor religious trust. 134 The
Palestinian cause is transformed into a religious cause, and Jihad for
the liberation of Palestine is made obligatory for every Muslim. 135
lfamas also professes a social agenda. The movement calls for
fundamental changes in the education system: "to liberate it from the
effects of the Ideological Invasion brought about at the hands of the
Orientalists and Missionaries... "136 The role ofwomen is described as
"no less than the role of the man, for she is the factory of men." 137
lfamas' anachronistic system views woman's biology as destiny. The
131 Article 8. "The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine" translated by MuhammadMaqdsi, fOl/maI olPakstine Stl/dies, 22, no. 4 (summer 1993), 122-134.133 Article Il, 125.134 Article 10, 125.135 Article 15, 126.136 Article 15, 127.137 Article 17, 127.
59
role ofMuslim women is in the home. They are to raising children of
ethical character in accordance with Islam and to prepare children for
the religious obligations ofjihad
The Charter characterizes Jews as an oppressive enemy that
robs Muslims oftheir lands and property, imprisons youth, make
orphans of children, and issue tyrannicallaws. 138 According to the
Charter, the Jews collectively own wealth and control the
international press through the support of powerful enemies of Islam.
Zionist are responsible for crimes from the Communist Revolution to
the First World War and the destruction ofthe Islamic Caliphate. As
a religio-political movement lfamas is faced with conflicting
ideological issues.
The Marriage ofPalestinian Nationalism and Islam
The movement utilizes religious language in its charter and
quotes the Qur'an and iJadith (the prophet's sayings) leaving little
room for political flexibility. It denies the possibility of any and aH
peace initiatives. As religious trust Palestine can never be divided.
Renouncing any part ofPalestine or recognizing the state of Israel is
kufi- according to lfamas. 139 However, although committed to an
undivided Palestine, lfamas does not renounce the PLO (which has
l3X Article 22, 129.139 Ibid. Kufùroften trans1ated as heresy, is a much more serious sin of non-be1ief deeming the sinner aninfidel.
1411 Article 27,131.141 Piscatori, 366.142 Piscatori, 366.
60
accepted a two state solution). Rather, the PLO is referred to in the
charter as father, brother, relative, or friend: "Our nation is one,
plight is one, destiny is one, and our enemy is the same..."140
Ideologically, the secular nationalism of the PLO is in total
contradiction to lfamas'religious ideology. However, like its
predecessor lfamas has been forced to alter its parochial beliefs.
The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was constrained to adopt an
Islamic endorsement ofviolence that is jihiïd against Israel. 141
Similarly, lfamashas also been forced to alter its ideology to suit the
political realities of Palestine. The movement recognizes the
nationalist character of the Palestinian struggle. Therefore, the
charter makes concession to the PLO making nationalism (al-
wa,taniyah) a component of the faith. 142
In addition to its tacit support of the PLO, lfamas supports
two conflicting obligations, an undivided Palestinian state and an
Islamic community or ummii. Like its predecessor, the Muslim
Brotherhood, lfamas simultaneously supports a universalist vision of
Islamic fraternity and a particularist vision ofPalestinian
nationalism. Although lfamas daims to represent "true" Islam its
ideology is not an unchanging body of doctrine. Rather, it is
something that evolves and changes based on pragmatic realities.
143 Klein, 113.144 Piscatori, 364.145 Klein, 113.
61
lfamas' written manifesto is not the only tool for
understanding the movement. Although the Charter establishes the
ideological foundations of lfamas the movement' s practice often
strays from its doctrinaire goals. As a fundamentalist movement
lfamas is influenced by an Islamic heritage, but as a national
liberation movement it is implicated in secular, western, national
ideas: "Since its inception, lfamas has 'Palestinianized' the universal
claim ofIslam and given the movement a national-religious political
profile.,,143 The national struggle of the PLO has been Islamized by
lfamas: "So effective has Barnas becorne in setting the agenda of the
Intifiùja that the PLO has been moved to invoke an Islamic discourse
in its own pronouncements." 144 In this way, lfamas has
Palestinianized Islam as opposed to Islamizing Palestine.
The Palestinianization ofIslam occurred on three ideological
levels. lfamas differentiates its political conditions from those in
other Arab countries because Palestine is ruled by an internaI
(secular) enemy. Second, Palestinian land especially Jerusalem is
portrayed as the center ofnational-religious identity. Finally, the
jihadof the Intifiiqa led by lfamas is equated with the struggle
against the enemies ofIslam. 145 However, the movements' sacred
obligations to an undivided Palestine clash with its obligation to
Palestinian unity and Islamic fraternity. These contradictions are
manifested in threc modes ofpolitical action on the part of lfamas:
competition with the PLO, prevention of civil war with the PLO, and
62
communication to reach equal status with the PLO. 146 lfamashas
adhered to these simultaneously creating antagonism.
In 1990, lfamas groups in the West Bank clashed violently
with Fatei}. the PLO's largest faction. The fighting came to an end
one year later when lfamas and the PLO signed the 'Alliance of
Honor'. The PLO offered lfamaspolitical representation and a
chance to participate in its institutions. PLO leader Yasser 'Arafat,
offered lfamas seats in the 20th session of the Palestinian National
Council. 147 lfamas agreed to participate on the condition that the
PLO rescind its recognition ofIsrael and its readiness to make peace.
The PLO rejected these conditions and the political clashes
continued. 148
In December of 1992, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade (lfamas'
military wing) launched guerrilla actions in the West Bank and Gaza
that claimed the lives of six Israeli soldiers in six days. As a result
the Israeli government expelled 415 alleged lfamas fundamentalist to
South Lebanon and, unleashed the worst period of Israeli repression
in the Territories since 1967. 149 This is the historical background of
the negotiations between the PLO and Israel. These negotiations led
to the Declaration ofPrinciples on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (DOP), signed in Washington in 1993.
146 Klein, 115.147 Ibid., 112.14X Ramas' leadership is characterized by pragmatic leaders in Palestine and "hard-Hne" leaders in Jordan.Muhammad Nazal and Ibrahim Gawshah deported by Israel in 1989 direct the Hamasbranch in Jordan.149 Graham Usher, "What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Ramas in the Occupied Territories," in PolitkalL<ilam: Essay" tram Middle East Report, Joel Beinin and Joe Stork eds. Berkeley: University ofCaliforniaPress, 1997,339.
63
According to the DOP Israel agreed to partially withdraw from
Gaza and the West Bank town of Jericho as a prelude to a
comprehensive peace. lfamas terrorist actions seemed to succeed.
They forced the Israeli government to unprecedented limits and
insured a space for lfamas in the struggle for a Palestinian state. As
a modern political movement that challenges Israel and the PLO,
lfamas is critical of the DOP as a political and ideological
surrender. 150 In 1993 as a reaction to the DOP, lfamasjoined forces
with the Popular and Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP and DFLP) and eight ex-PLO groupS.151 The new
commitment became 'The Palestinian Forces Alliance'. The
Alliance sought to build a politicaJ alternative to the PLO leadership
by Ulliting ten ideologically diverse groups. 152
This union accepted the PLO Covenant (1968) and the Program of
Stages (1974) as the basis for its ideology.153 This is another
example of lfamas'ideological compromise. The 1974 Program of
Stages contradicts the lfamas Charter and the notion of the
indivisibility of Palestine. The Program of Stages: "accepts the
adoption ofpolitical means and divides the liberation ofPalestine
into two successive stages.,,154 In order to dominate the Palestinian
Forces Alliance lfamasrelied on pragmatism rather than ideology. It
compromised its ideals for political gain.
1511 An Interview with Edward Said, "Symbols Versus Substance: A Year After The Declaration ofPrinciples," Journal olPalestine Studies, 24, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 60-72.151 Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic lùndamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza" Indianapolis: Indiana UniversityPress, 1994, 119.
152 The Alliance represents secular-Marxist views, ultra-nationalist and Muslim radicals.153 Klein, 120.154 Ibid.
155 Hroub, 50.156 Ibid., 57.
64
Since the early 1990's, lfamas leadership outside Palestine
has mobilized the movement in a less ideological direction. lfamas'
doctrinal discourse (the rigid language of the Charter) has diminished
in intensity. The struggle against Zionism has taken precedence over
questions of ideology. This moderation is refiected in lfamas'
practice. The organization has established contacts with Western
states and international bodies especially in humanitarian matters.
Further, a more nuanced understanding of Judaism, that separates the
political movement of Zionism from the Jewish religion as a whole,
has emerged. 155
As lfamas is drawn into the political sphere it behaves
according to the rational actor model: "political relations normally
are governed by shifting pragmatic interests rather than by enduring
abstract theoretical positions based on principle.,,156 By placing
interests above principles lfamas is acting out of preservation. Its
ideology will continue to evolve and change. The shift to pragmatic
politics is evident in the way lfamas has approached the interim
solution (Oslo).
lfamas views the struggle with Israel as a long-term historic
struggle. Victory requires the supremacy ofIslam in the form of an
Islamic state. However, the final victory of the Islamic ummiiover
Zionism and Western ideals is viewed in future terms. Accordingly,
the temporaJyvietories of Zionism are not final because the historie
conditions required for victory in a final sense have not yet been
realized. When the Arab and Islamic renaissance takes place and the
157 Ibid., 69.
65
will of the ummiiis united, victory (the liberation ofall Palestine)
will be attained. These views form the basis of lfamas'position on a
Palestinian state in part of historie Palestine, alongside a sovereign
Israeli state.
lfamas differentiates a historie solution from an interim
solution. The historie solution to the Palestinian problem is
described as a long-term solution. The objectives of a long-term
solution are to win baek aIl ofhistorie Palestine. The short-or
medium-term solution is called the interim solution. This inc1udes a
commitment on the part ofPalestinians to willingly accept a
Palestinian or Arab or Islamic sovereignty over only part of the
historie territory of Palestine alongside a sovereign Israeli state.
This would be achieved through war or through peaceful means and
is usually coupled with the idea of an armistice. 157
lfamas did not abandon the historie solution however, it
became less prominent in the post-Oslo period. Political realities
forced the movement to choose between dealing with the
developments of the peace-process or rejecting them outright.
Aware that the Palestinian "dream" ofliberating aIl of historie
Palestine could not be achieved immediately lfamas followed a
realistic approach. It made its acceptance of an interim solution
contingent on a number of conditions outlined in the five pillars or
guidelines of its Political Bureau.
lfamas bases its acceptance of an interim solution on the
unconditional withdrawal of Zionist occupation forces from the West
158 Ibid., 76.159 Ibid., 72.160 Ibid., 75.161 Usher, 302-06.
66
Bank and Gaza, including Jerusalem, the dismantling of settlements
and the evacuation of settlers from those areas, and the holding of
free general elections for a legislative body among the Palestinian
people inside and outside Palestine. 158 Acceptance is also based on
the condition that there is to be no recognition ofIsrael. The
eventual goal is an Islamic state in which Jews could live as citizens,
not a sovereign Jewish entity.159
lfamas also bases its support on the consistency of the
interim solution with shari 'ah. The interim solution is consistent
with the Islamic concept of hudnah or armistice. Hudnah is not a
peace treaty. According to Islamic law an armistice is an agreement
limited for up to ten years. Hudnah does not require: "acceptance of
the usurpation of our rights by the enemy."160 Hence, an interim
solution is not a permanent solution rather it is an agreement for a
short period oftime until political circumstances in Palestine change.
Acceptance of an interim solution is contingent on the acceptance
that armed resistance, the most prominent example being the
Intifiiqa, is the only way to achieve progress beyond the interim
solution. These guidelines are summarized in a statement by the
Political Bureau of lfamasdated April 1994.161
For the first time in the history of the movement an agenda in
the form of a comprehensive solution was proposed. However, the
statement by the Political Bureau like the ideology of Ifamas is rife
with ideological contradictions. It is difficult to reconcile the
67
acceptance in principle of an Interim solution with the continued
beliefin Palestine as an indivisible religious trust for aU Muslim
generations.
lfamas argues that it is willing to accept an Interim solution,
that is declare a willingness to accept a Palestinian, Arab or Islamic
sovereignty over part of the historie territory of Palestine alongside a
sovereign Israeli state. However, one of the conditions of accepting
an Interim solution is the non-recognition of Israel. lfamas is
simultaneously committed to a historie solution that caUs for an
Islamic state (to be established at a latter date) that does not include
a sovereign Jewish entity and an Interim solution that recognizes a
two state solution.
The proposaI from the Political Bureau caused sorne to
believe that lfamas had moved beyond its initial rejection of Oslo to
a more pragmatic position that recognizes the political realities of
self-rule. 162 However, the commitment to a historie solution is
unwavering: " the movement still believes that the Palestinian people
have a right to Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan; that
jihad is the path to liberation; and that negotiating with the enemy is
totaUy unacceptable.,,163 lfamas did not abandon its position on the
historie solution. Rather the movement adopted a wavering position
in favour of an Interim solution in tandem with its core position
calling for the liberation of aB Palestine. What Ffamas has gained
from these contradictory statements is political space to discuss the
details of the settlement plan. However, it consistently argues that
162 Graham Usher, "Ramas seeks a place at the Table," MMdle East International, (May, 13, 1994), 17.16.' Rroub, 70.
lM Ibid., 19.
68
engaging in discussion is not to be viewed as acceptance of the plans
themselves.
For the present, lfamas is focused on ending the occupation
rather than the liberation of aIl Palestine. The political realities of
Israeli military occupation made it necessary to focus on daily
survival. As a pragmatic exchange with the PLO lfamas demanded
cultural control in Palestine. It is concemed that school curricula and
personal status legislation be based on shari'ah. However, the
movement is not only interested in the social culture of self-rule:
"what I1amas wants is what mainstream political Islam in the
occupied territories has always wanted-less the soil of Palestine
than the souls ofits people."I64 Through the souls ofPalestinians
lfamashopes to gain the soil ofPalestine.
Socio-cultural control of Palestine is not as an end in itself.
Winning the souls ofPalestinians is a prelude to winning the soil of
Palestine. Underlying lfamas' political pragmatism is a belief in the
inevitability of an Islamic renaissance, the formation of an Islamic
brotherhood and hence, an Islamic solution for Palestine. The
acceptance (direct or indirect) of self-rule is not a deviation from
lfamas'historic position of a solution in stages. lfamasviews Oslo
as part of a preliminary stage and does not believe that any
movement can relinquish the rights ofPalestinians to aIl Palestine.
The movement's spiritual leader Shaykh A1)mad Yasin
established lfamas as a division of the Muslim Brotherhood. The
Brotherhood was originally a socio-cultural movement whose
69
primary goal was the founding of the Islamic personality 165 The
concept of territory as a component of identity was seen as foreign to
the construction of the Islamic personality. Territorial nationalism
was viewed by the Muslim Brothers as idolatry: "The land... is either
a land of atheism or of Islam; there is no such thing as Arab,
Palestinian, or Jewish land... Land cannot be considered holy,
because holiness is only characteristic of Allah, so how can we
sanctify and even worship a very small geographical area [Palestine]
rather than Allah, as the so-called nationalist dO?,,166 Ideologically,
Palestinian Islamic nationalism is at odds with prevailing Islamists
ideology.167
Initially, Israel misinterpreted the intentions of lfamas and
equated Islamist social program with political inactivity. The Israeli
army virtually ignored the movement (even after lfamas published
its political manifesto). In fact, Israel originally supported the
movement as a useful tool for combating Palestinian nationalism
(PLO). It is only after lfamastook responsibility for killing two
Israeli soldiers in 1989 that the movement was declared illegal by
Israel.
In departing from the Brotherhood's ideological stances on
territorial nationalism lfamas creates a new tradition. This invented
tradition is here after considered an integral part ofPalestinian
national identity.16x lfamas conflates religion and territory. Islam
165 Graham Usher, "What Kind of Nation'!" 340.166 Ibid., 351. Usher quotes the West Bank Muslim Brother Sabri Abu Diad early in the 1980's.167 The work of Sayyid Qutb illustrates this. In Milestones he argues thal the land of Islam is not a piece ofland by the homeland ofIslam (dar al-Islam).16K Eric Hobsbawm, The Invention of'Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Thequestion of identity is especially relevant for a generation that came of age and was politically forged bythe Intifiiçla.
70
aIlows for the creation of an identity and territory facilitates the
substantive recognition ofthis identity. Thus, like the state ofIsrael,
which garners its legitimacy through international recognition of its
territorial sovereignty, lfamas aims for a similar recognition.
The organization has Islamized the struggle for Palestinian
statehood, manipulating the interim solution into its version of
Islamic law. In the interest of gaining "a place at the negotiating
table," lfamas has avoided direct confrontation with the PLO and
moderated its tone toward the PA security forces. 169 This has not
stopped the PA from arresting and imprisoning lfamas militants.
lfamas-PLO/PA Relations
The PLO has always been dominated by Fatal;, which is led
by Yassir 'Arafat. So that PLO/ lfamasrelations are in fact lfamas'
relations with Fatel;,. Both organizations have been in constant
competition for membership especially in professional associations
and universities. In January of 1994, elections of the Gaza
Engineers' Association (929 registered), the lfamas/Islamic Jihad
bloc received 46.7% of the vote, with Fatel;, receiving 43.95%.170
Support for Islamic groups spread to aIl professional fields, doctors,
lawyers and teachers unions: "In most of the professional and
university election held between 1989 and 1994, lfamas and Fateh
169Usher, 18.170 The Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus publishes monthly opinion polis andelection results.
71
obtained almost the same results, ie around 40% each.,,171 However,
the national support remains at 40% support for Fatel; and only 12-
17% for lfamas. 172
The competition and tensions characteristic of lfamas-Fatel;
relation date back to the 1950's when Fatel; split from the Muslim
Brotherhood. Ideologically, the PLO is committed to a two state
solution and a democratic secular state in Palestine. This places it in
direct opposition to lfamas. Although the lfamas charter mentions
the PLO as brothers in the same struggle, there is no clear
recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representatives of the
Palestinian people. The Introductory Memorandum of lfamas
stresses that the organization has no objection to integration with the
PLO as long as the PLO remains committed to the liberation of
Palestine and to non recognition ofIsrael. 173
lfamaswas critical of the Madrid and Oslo peace-process and
the Cairo agreements. During the Madrid Conference lfamas
attacked the PLO delegation because it "lacked legitimacy.,,174 They
refused to recognize the resolutions of the Palestinian National
Council meeting in Aigeria that endorsed participation in Madrid. In
1993 a meeting in Sudan between the PLO and lfamas failed.
171 Legrain, 166.172 See the CPRS at [email protected] Introductory Memorandum (1993) appears in the appendix of Hamas: Political Thought and Practice byKhaled Hroub.174 Ibid., 90.
72
Between the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Agreement in
1993 lfamas grew increasingly critical of the PLO. In lfamas' view
the PLO abandoned the Palestinian people and negotiated their rights
away.175
The lfamas Charter provides two conditions for its
participation with the PLO: the abandonment of secularism and the
end of a political agenda that caUs for a peaceful settlement with
Israel. The possibility ofjoining the PLO arose in 1990. In a
Memorandum presented to the Palestinian National Councillfamas
asked the PLO to consider four conditions: the PNC's adherence to
the principle of liberating aU Palestine, the refusaI to recognize the
Zionist entity; the endorsement of the military option and the
granting of a number of seats in the PNC to lfamas. 176 The PLO
refused. Despite continued tensions lfamas did not attempt to take
over the PLO or to present itself as the legitimate alternative to the
organization.
Rather, lfamas refrained from adopting a clear position. This
provided the organization with political flexibility that would be
absent had it joined the PLO. A wavering position also translated
into freedom for lfamas. They were not constrained to establish a
clear political strategy or to strive for regional or international
175 ]famas special statement issued after the announcement of the Oslo Agreement (1993) entitled"Comprehensive national reform is the solution." Ibid" 91.176 Ibid., 95.
177 Ibid.. 102.
73
legitimacy. The fact that lfamas did not attempt to replace the PLO
meant that the two organization could cooperate on issues of
common interest such as the exile ofIslamists leaders to south
Lebanon. l77
The middle option left lfamas able to criticize the "power
usurping" leadership of the PLO while cooperating with the
nationalist. 178 Since the PLO took control ofthe self-mIe areas in
mid-1994 lfamas has refrained from criticizing them and tumed its
attention to the PLO controlled Palestinian Authority or PA. The
Oslo Agreement provided for the establishment of a Palestinian
Authority. From the beginning lfamas was critical of the PA. They
released numerous accusatory and hostile statements however these
were never translated into violence. Initially, lfamasrefrained from
confrontation with the newly burgeoning PA. They welcomed the
Palestinian police of the new authority even meeting with 'Arafat at
the Islamic University in Gaza. But the honeymoon period did not
last and the PA and lfamas clashed to the point of civil war.
I1amas' relations with the PLO were strained during the Intjfjjqa.
In 1994, the PA undertook an arrest campaign, the closure ofI1amas
institutions and the humiliation ofI1amas leaders by PA security
forces. The PLO undertook a three-prong approach in its
confrontation with I1amas. First, the PLO attempted to co-opt the
178 Ibid., 89.
74
opposition by offering them representation in PA institutions.
Second, the PLO attempted to split the movement by encouraging
sorne of its members to form an independent Islamic political party.
FinalIy, the PLO attacked I-Jamas' traditional centres of influence,
the mosques, charitable societies and institutions of civil society.
Sermons were censored and religious endowments awqiifcame under
direct PA control.
In response, lfamas did not participate in the 1996 elections
but it did not calI for a boycott of the elections either. Further, the
movement refrained from any military activity during the election
despite the fact that the head of its military arm Yahya 'Ayyash was
assassinated two weeks prior. After the elections lfamasretaliated
with a number of organized suicide bombings in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem
and 'Asqalan. The PA responded arresting lfamas members and
jailing important leaders. They also c10sed the organization's
charitable institutions restricted lfamas activities in the West Bank
and Gaza. In March of 1996, the Palestinian police raided al-Najah
University in Nablus and arrested the lfamas dominated student
union board. 179
In addition to attacks on lfamas'traditional centres of
influence, the mosques, charitable societies, the PLO attempted to
co-opt· the opposition. It offered lfamas four positions in the
179 Ibid., 106-07.180 Ibid., 107.181 Ibid., 108.
75
leadership ofthe PA which lfamas refused. 180 Further, the PLO
attempted to split the movement by encouraging sorne of its
members to form an independent Islamic political party. This did
not succeed.
lfamaswanted to avoid civil war. Consequently, the PA was
confident that lfamaswould not directly confront the PLO. This
was in fact the true. lfamas did not retaliate for the "Black Friday"
incident in which fourteen of its supporters were shot to death by the
Palestinian police. They did not retaliate for the assassinat ion of
lfamas military leaders, nor did it retaliate for the arrest and
interrogation of numerous of its other members, or the raids on its
mosques, agencies and the Islamic University. 181 lfamas'political
relations with the PLO/PA continue to be characterized by tension.
Predictions about future relations can be discemed by
examining the theoretical approaches to pluralism presented in the
lfamas charter. Section four of the charter examines the issue of
political pluralism. There is a declaration of respect for other Islamic
movements and for the PLO who is recognized as brother
organization: "We have but one homeland, one affliction, one shared
destiny, and one shared enemy.,,182 The Introductory Memorandum
includes a section on "The Positions and Policies of the Movement in
76
the Palestinian Sphere" in which lfamas preaches tolerance:
"regardless of the extent of differences in viewpoints and
perspectives (ijtihiidiit) in the national effort, it is impermissible
under any circumstances to use violence." In its relations with the
PLO and the other Palestinian resistance groups lfamas has kept its
promise.
Shaykh Yasin has expressed a preference for a multiparty
democratic state. When asked ifhe would support the election of
communists, Yasin responded: "If the Palestinian people were to
express their rejection of an Islamic state, l would respect their will
and honor their wishes.,,183 lfamas uses its participation in student
and trade union elections as evidence of its commitment to
pluralism. In the 1970's and 80's, Islamic student groups played a
integral role in the foundation of lfamas and the outbreak of the
Intifii4a. lfamas points to participation in those student elections as
a principle aspect of political practice inside the Occupied
Territories.
lfamas leadership adhered to its expressed commitment to
avoid violence and political assassinations. During the elections for
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1992 FateiJ was accused
ofvote rigging. The lfamasbloc withdrew rather than cause the
failure of the elections. In 1992 during elections for student council
182 JfamasCharter, Article 27.
77
at al-Najah University (which lfamaswas projected to win) armed
Fate1}. Black Panthers stormed the campus causing the Israeli
authorities to interfere. Fate1}. triumphed and in the process agreed
with Israel to the deportation of four Palestinians. lfamas again
avoided violence against the PLO. Despite these harassments lfamas
remained calm creating "norms for democratic practice in
Palestinian politics".\84
In theory, lfamas'leadership accepts political pluralism.
They consistently profess tolerance despite differences in belief: "No
faction has the right to encroach on, obstruct, nullify, or abrogate the
political activities of another faction ...No faction has the right to
claim that it represents the majority or that other factions are in the
minority in the absence of free, honest and unbiased elections ... "\ 85
This is a tactical position taken out of pragmatism rather than a
genuine commitment to pluralism. lfamasitselfhas emphasized the
need for unity in the face of occupation. The avoidance of violence
against the PAis a pragmatic position that temporarily recognizes
the overarching Israeli challenge and the need for unity in
confronting Zionism.
lfamashas skillfully placed pragmatism above ideology. This is
true of the alliance lfamas formed with the united opposition of ten
183 Hroub, p. 211.184 Ibid., 212.185 Ifamasdeclaration dated November 6,1991. Ibid., 214.
186 Ibid., 222.
78
organizations committed to the Palestinian resistance. The
Palestinian national resistance organizations or fà$ii'il
includes the Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of
Palestine and numerous other pro and anti-'Arafat factions.
Pragmatically, lfamaswas able to overcome the ideology of the
Leftist and secular groups in the fàsa 'il in hopes of building on a
common political position-resistance to the peace-process. When
the alliance proved unbeneficiallfamas retreated.
Similarly, lfamas acted pragmatically when it withdrew
demands for Israeli withdrawal and UN participation before national
elections could be held. A 1992 statement on self-rule and elections
demanded "No to Elections Associated with Self-Rule."186 However,
in practice lfamas viewed elections as a source of representational
legitimacy. This had to be balanced with the movements' boycott of
the Madrid-Oslo process. Participation in election was not only a
way to demonstrate the activity of Islamism in Palestine it could be
translated as de facto acceptance of the peace negotiations.
lfamas' official position was not to participate in the Madrid-Oslo
framework through elections. It based this on the nature of the
elections. lfamas argued that these elections were inseparable from a
settlement that differed little from Camp David. Further, the
elections were for an administrative and executive body tied to self-
79
rule not representatives for a legislative body representing the
Palestinian people. 187 This is an example where lfamas placed
ideology above pragmatism since it is argued that the fa$a'il could of
utilized elections to form a united list of candidates to capture the
majority and abrogate the Oslo Agreement. 188
The elections of 1996 had a voter tum out of 86 percent.
Such a high ratio can be translated as support for the Oslo peace
process and a weakened support of lfamas. This is especially true
since 'Arafat won a high ratio of the vote for president. The Center
for Palestine Research and Studies place support for lfamas between
1993 and 1997 at slightly over 18 percent and support for Fatel; at
just over 40 percent. 189 However, polIs and opinion surveys are never
recognized as impartial by all sides.
lfamas views the CPRS as biased. It accuses the pollsters of
supporting Fatel;. lfamas argues that the polIs are often conducted
on Fridays during noon prayers when its supporters are at mosque.
They allege that pollsters have avoided universities, professional
associations of lawyers, doctors and engineers, mosques, and other
places of support for lfamas. Further, they argue that the
intimidation by Israeli and Palestinian security forces make it
difficult for respondents to dec1are support of lfamas.
187 Ibid. 221-22.188 The independent Islamists won 8 out of 88 seats despite the fact that lfamas and Islamic Jihad wereuninvolved.
80
lfamas did not participate in the 1996 e1ections and hence
there are no clear numbers of support nationally for the movement.
It is difficult to ascertain whether high voter turnout was re1ated to
support for the peace-process or simp1y a thirst for freedom and
independence. 190 Based on an assessment ofprofessiona1, student
and chambers of commerce elections, lfamas estimates its support to
be at 40 and 50 percent. 191 However, these cannot be translated to
the general Palestinian population who are less educated and less
politicized than professional association members and college
students. l92 Further, the e1ectoral platforms of these associations and
unions are not pure1y political. They have administrative, financial
and ethical concerns that give advantage to Islamic blocs because of
their religious faith and Islamic discipline. 193
Another reason the claim to 40-50 percent support for lfamas
may be exaggerated is the centrality of the PA in the West Bank and
Gaza. The presence of the PA impacts Palestinian public opinion.
Israel, the neighbouring Arab states and the international community
has legitimized the PA through the peace-process and this affects
public opinion. The media in Israel and in Palestine has turned the
peace-proccss into a fact of life. Further, the PA has a virtual
IW .See the CPRS at [email protected] Ibid., 230.191 Khaled Hroub of the Institute for Palestine Studies has written the most comprehensive work on lfamasto date. He estimates support for lfamas in Palestine to hover around 30percent.192 Ibid., 231.193 Ibid.
194 Ibid., 232.
81
monopoly over television and controls aH but a few pro-lfamasradio
stations limited in broadcast range and efficacy.194 The most
influential newspapers support the PA. The threat from both the PA
and Israel insures that few publications loyal to the opposition thrive.
The PA has not abrogated its support for the interim solution.
This process requires time to work and resolve difficulties and the
Palestinian population seems to be willing to invest the time. This
translates into voting for candidates who are working within the
framework of self-rule, the PLO/PA. As of yet, lfamas has been
unsuccessful in its political goal. It has not managed to capture
support from more than a minority ofPalestinians. Yet Islamism has
had a profound effect on Palestinian identity.
lfamas embodies Islamic anti-Israeli resistance. It has
attempted to reconcile Islamism with nationalism as an indispensable
condition ofthe movements' success in assuming the heritage of the
former nationalist leader, the PLO. The foHowing section deals with
the role ofIslamic fundamentalism in the development ofPalestinian
identity. Fundamentalism is characterized by a reaction to
modemity. Fundamentalist elites perceive their identity to be
threatened by the secular identity that engenders modemity. A
complex understanding offundamentalism requires an
82
acknowledgment that both traditional values and shifting identities
constitute the fundamentalist agenda.
lfamasuses Islam to define the struggle for Palestinian
identity and statehood. In addition the emphasis on territorial
sovereignty imports into the fundamentalist ethic a commitment to
the modem concepts ofthe nation-state. Hamas operates on two
levels. Extemally, it must confront the Israeli presence. Intemally,
it struggles to capture the state from the secular nationalist PLO.
Palestinian Identity the Role of Islamic Fundamentalism
The resurgence of religion and the retum to prominence of
traditional identities (rooted in blood ties, family, clan and tribe) are
a reaction to modemity. Urbanization, industrial development and
the values that underpin modemity are a direct threat to religious
identities. lfamas developed as a reaction to the failures of
modemization. More accurately, it is a reaction to the inability of
religious and politicalleaders to deal with the negative consequences
of the modem age.
In the High Tech Era (post-195ü's) ideology superseded
religion. Modemism (relativism, consumerism, individual
autonomy) emerged as the dominant ideological strand ofmodemity.
The secular ethos of modemity is in conflict with the religious
identity engendered by lfamas. ln the face of Israeli military
occupation the failures of modemity are more pronounced.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an ethnie conflict: "Both
among lsraelis and Palestinians interpretations ofhistorical events
83
have become potent ethnie symbols. History and tradition have been
invented, interpreted and reinterpreted, purified and essentialised."195
Images of the "enemy" constitute an effort on the part of the powers
(Israel/Palestine) to produce national consensus. Like
Israel/Zionism, lfamas transforms the nationalist ideology and
imbues it with a religious tone. lfamas interprets Jewish identity as
inimical to Islamic identity. As a result, the territorial integrity of
Palestine and Islam are conflated to confront the Israeli state and the
Jewish religion. In this way, the identities ofboth Israeli and
Palestinian have developed in opposition to each other. The
individual ethnic differences and identity divides are downplayed in
an effort to forge national consensus.
In the case ofIsrael, diverse ethnic and religious identities
(Ashkenazim, Mizrahim, Sephardim, secular and religious Jews and
so on) are overlooked. The Israeli state ideologically manipulates the
historical events (Holocaust) and other pogrom-symbols to bridge
this sectarian divide. 196 Palestinian identity has also been forged in
the context of symbol manipulation. The symbol of the Palestinian
peasant has in the face of the occupation been manipulated by the
urban middle-c1ass as a national unifying symbol. 197 The peasant is
presented in essentialised form as a symbol of ancient collective
Palestinian attachment to the soil and the homeland. 19x In this
manner both Tsraeli and Palestinian identities are constructed.
195 Dag Jorund Lonning, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Inter-Ethnie Dialogue in Israel-Palestine, Bergens,Norway: Norse Publication, 1995,45.196 Ibid., 56.197 Ibid., 71.198 Gustav Thaiss, "The Conceptualization of social Change Through Metaphor," Journal ofAsian andAfriean Studies, 8, 1978, 1-2.
84
The anthropology of religion identifies the cultural dimension
of religious analysis. Ideological manifestations of religion
(fundamentalism) are explained in reference to culture. According to
Clifford Geertz, culture denotes: "an historically transmitted pattern
of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate,
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward
life.,,199 Symbolism forms the positive content of cultural activity.
As a cultural system religion utilizes symbols to facilitate the
creation of identity.
According to Geertz, religion is:
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful,pervasive and long lasting moods and motivations in men by(3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existenceand (4) c10thing these conceptions with such an aura offactuality that (5) the modes and motivations seem uniquelyrealistic.200
Palestinian fundamentalists manipulate the metaphorical
transmission ofthis system of symbols. Religious concepts such as
jihiidor waqf, dar alharh and dar al Islam are transmitted from a
religious semantic field to the secular field of politics.201
During the Intifiieja-the fourth stage in the construction of
Palestinian identity-conflict emerged based on how Palestinian
identity would be defined. lfamas transformed the nationalist
ideology and imbued it with a religious tone. National symbols such
199 Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Religion and Ideology" Robert Bocock and KennethThompson ed.(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), pp.66.200 Ibid., 67.201 Lonning, 72.
85
as the idealized peasant were less relevant in post- Intifjitfa Palestine.
The image of the fellal1 steadfastly dealing with dispossession and
humiliation gave way to the more activist image of the fida'i, or
martyr willing to die for Islam and Palestine.
However, Islamists cannot daim a monopoly on the notion of
jihador martyrdom. Secular nationalist utilized the terms although
not in the manner articulated by Sayyid Qutb and other Islamists.
The fida'i, fighters of the secular nationalist were modern
revolutionaries in a nationalliberation struggle: "they were portrayed
as educated, urban, worldly and sophisticated, not as traditional,
conservative or rural figures.,,202 The sacrifice they made as martyrs
(shahid) was as fallen fighters struggling to liberate Palestine, not as
mujahidin fighters of the jihad for God.203 These fighters were the
vanguards inspired by the guerrilla movements of Vietnam, China
and Latin America. The symbolism is in sharp contrast to the
religious martyrs of Hamas.
lfamasviews its struggle with Israel in a larger context as a
struggle with the forces of European colonialism. This is a religious
struggle that takes on civilizational terms. It is a comprehensive
jihadon social, and military fronts: "the conflict in its general
context is one between the entire Islamic ummawith its Islamic
cultural program and the forces of world imperialism with its agenda
ofWesternization.,,204 Zionism is representative of the wider agenda
ofwestern imperialism.
202 Milton-Edwards, 91.203 Ibid., 95.2114 Hroub, 46.
86
In addition to the external dynamic with Israel, there is an
internaI struggle to define Palestinian identity. The most important
dimension of this struggle concerns the theoretical complexities
challenging the Islamic movement in general. These include the
dialectic of religion, politics, and social change, and the extent to
which the behaviour of the movement should be determined by
political considerations or by religious values and principles.
lfamas has successfully blurred the religious and the political.
Its social action and its political practices are intertwined. The
movement has not followed the path of formation and development
typical ofpolitical parties. IdeologicaIly, lfamasviews itselfas "the
radical and cultural alternative" to the Israeli and Western orders.
Accordingly, lfamas elites are waiting for the PLO to exhaust aIl
means and resources and collapse, taking with it the Palestinian
secular experience.
Like its ideological predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood,
lfamas is opposed to secular Arab nationalism. In accordance with
other Islamists, lfamas'leadership believes that without Islam,
nationalism has no content: "Islam gave it [secular nationalism] its
civilizational dimension" .205 Without Islam secular nationalism is
205 Mahmud Zahar, "Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct," JoumalofPale...tineStudies, 24, no. 3 (Spring, 1995), 81-88. Converse1y, another leading Pa1estinian Islamist, claims lfamasdoes not want to destroy the PLO but reform it ti-om within. See Graham Usher, "The Is1amistMovement and the Pa1estinian Autharity," an interview with Bassam Jarrar in, Political Islam: Essaystram Middle East Report, Joel Beinin and Joe Stark (eds.), Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1997,pp. 335-338.Bassam Jarrar is 1eading Is1amist thinker in the occupied territories and teacher ofIs1amic studies atUNRWA's Teacher Training Center in Ramallah (West Bank). He was one of the 415 alleged Ramasmembers to be deported by Israel in 1992.
87
simply the dream of Christian Arabs educated in Western
universities.
In practice, the Muslim Brotherhood subordinated the
Palestinian national issue to the goal ofIslamizing society. It is only
after the Intifaeja and the establishment of lfamas that the former
takes precedence over the latter. Hamas'interest in the Palestinian
question represent a qualitative shift from the position of the
Brotherhood towards the Palestinian national problem. lfamas'
goals continue to be political rather than solely Islamist or social.
Shaykh Hamad Bitawi, a prominent pro-lfamasreligious
representative was nominated by 'Arafat as head of the religious
courts in the West Bank. These courts operate under the PA'S awqaf
ministry and as such incorporate lfamas into PA institutions. The
incorporation of lfamas into the institutions of the PAis a
recognition of Islamist political culture in the occupied territories.
The Palestinian national struggle has to contend with the Islamist
influence in legal spheres and on the socio-cultural fronts via the
schools and mosques. It is also evidence that lfamas seeks political
and not just socio-cultural power in Palestine.
There is an organic connection between lfamas' social and
political views. The involvement of lfamas in the social dimension
of the Palestine problem stems from the ideology of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The Brotherhood emphasized social development as a
necessary stage in the path of political change. lfamas is involved
extensively in the infrastructure of charitable social services
established for the poor: "Subsequently, these social services became
one of the most important sources of influence that Hamashad with
88
the broad strata ofthe public."206 The Jfamas charter sets out the
two main components ofits social action theory. The liberation of
Palestine must be waged by a "fortified society" and the fortification
of society can only be achieved through religion?07
Society according to the charter must be fortified in order to
undertake the struggle against Israeli occupation. The role ofwomen
is important to the fortification of society. As "the factory of men,"
Muslim women must work in the home raising children of ethical
character in accordance with Islam and preparing them for the
religious obligations ofjihad".20R Through social solidarity Zionism
"the enemy" can be defeated. Society must be built on solid
ideological bases before the enemy can be confronted and Palestine
liberated: "The two processes are coherent and complementary. The
first process fortifies society through education, and the second
challenges the occupation with a fortified society.,,209
The theory translates into practice for charitable institutions,
mosques, schools, alms tax cornrnittees, medical clinics, relief
societies, orphanages, nurseries and cultural and sports clubs.2IO The
focus is on these activities both before and after the Intifiù;Ia. These
organizations were in constant contact with the needs and concerns
of the working class and the poor. They helped influence political
choices and religious conduct and beliefs. In contrast to PLO
206 Hroub, 234.207 See the l~amas Charter, Articles 17, and 18.20X Ibid.209 Hroub, 235.210 Funding for these institutions and societies came from private donations inside the Occupied Territoriesand from Arab oil-producing states in the Gulf.
211 Article 15, 127.212 Hroub, 238.m Ibid., 240.
89
nepotism, incompetence and corruption these institutions produced
an Islamic ethic ofhonesty and integrity.
lfamaswas also interested in the education ofPalestinian
children who often suffered from strikes and school closures.
Theoretically, lfamaswas interested in liberating the education
system "from the effects of the Ideological Invasion brought about
at the hands of the Orientalists and Missionaries... ,,211 Practically, it
established temporary public education in mosques where school
curricula was taught in the evenings.
lfamas utilized religious education to fortify society in an
effort to create social solidarity and prepare Palestinians to resist the
occupation. Through the education system it instilled religious
values of martyrdom and sacrifice blurring the religious, social and
politica1.212 Boycotting Israeli goods was conflated with issues such
violation of the holiness of Ramaqan. Enlistment in the IntifÉùja was
made a symbol of religious commitment. In short, lfamas combined
social discourse and national resistance and made each an integral
part of the other. Mosques and Islamic institutions played a vital
role in these activities.
lfamas was able to remove mosques and Islamic societies
from under the control of the Israeli authority, the Jordanian
religious endowments and even the PA,213 This contributed to the
development of an autonomous Palestinian civil society. However,
in 1996 in response to lfamas' disruption of the peace-process
90
through suicide attacks, the PA took control of mosques controlled
by the movement. These were brought under the control ofthe PA
awqafministry.
The following year the PA closed over 20 charitable
institutions belonging to lfamas crippling the infrastructure of
Islamic social movements in the West Bank and Gaza. lfamas
developed its thought and practice regarding social issues during the
Intifiieja. After the peace agreements brought an end to the resistance
and the PA was established, the solidarity ofPalestinian society was
undermined,z14 The external threat ofIsrael was replaced with an
internaI governmental authority that was in conflict with Islamists.
According to Palestinian, Israeli and international human
rights organizations such as Amnesty International, the PA is
responsible for repressive tactics and social policies. Giacaman and
Jorund' s 1998 book After Oslo outlines the dismantling of the
institutions ofPalestinian civil society.215 Although an analysis of
PA activities is beyond the scope my paper, the dismantling of
Palestinian civil society as outlined in After Oslo has direct
repercussions for lfamas. "The Autonomous structures in civil
society have been seized, the atmosphere has been militarized, and
there is rapid movement toward a traditional kind of police state,
where the state exercises it hegemony over civil society."Z16 For
example, prior to Oslo Palestinian charitable nongovemmental
organizations paid the primary cost ofhealth care. After Oslo, the
214 Ibid., 241.215 George Giacaman and Dag Jorund, eds., After Oslo, London: Pluto Press, 1998.216 Hroub, 241.
91
PA has crippled these institutions with legal regulations, monitoring
of funds and genera1 interference in their internaI affairs.
The PA has set out to destroy opposition to the peace
process. It has involved its security forces in supervision ofIs1amists
institutions causing a tense atmosphere of fear. The international
community has virtually ignored PA violations as a way of giving
precedence to the peace process in the Middle East. As a newly
formed government, the PAis in a precarious position to prove its
legitimacy. It must prove to Israel and the international community
that it is able to suppress or destroy opposition to the peace process
and it is willing to accomplish this even at the expense ofPalestinian
civil society.
Since its inception during the Inti/iil/a, lfamas has professed a
belief in the military option. According to its charter, armed struggle
is central to the liberation ofPalestine.217 The military operations
and suicide bombings of its military wing (the 'Izz al- Din al-Qassam
Brigades) are a source ofmass appeal and politicallegitimacy.218 Its
military operations after Oslo added to the strained re1ationship with
the PA.
lfamas had confined its military actions to Palestine
attacking only military targets until the 1994 Hebron massacre.219
After the massacre, a lfamas communiqué offered Israel an armistice
in which civilians would he removed from the struggle. The
movement views settlers in the West Bank and Gaza (most ofwhom
217 liamas Charter, Article 12 and 15.218 Hroub, 242.219 In 1994, twenty Palestinians were shat by a Jewish settler during Ramadan prayers at the AbrahamMasque in Hebran.
220 Hroub, 247.
92
are armed) as legitimate military targets. Israel did not respond to
the communiqué.
lfamas continues to justify its attacks on Israeli civilians as
part of a long-term plan to liberate aH ofhistorical Palestine.
According to the movement, these attacks are to be viewed as a way
of exhausting, embarrassing and weakening the state ofIsrael:
"Hamas'goal is to transform Israel from a land that attracts world
Jews to a land that repels them by making its residents insecure.,,220
Because the Israeli foe is militarily formidable the use of
unconventional means (attacking civilians) is justified by lfamas. It
is important to note that lfamas has inherited the military strategy
and ideology of the PLO during the 1970's and 80's.
93
CONCLUSION
Palestinian national identity like that of other modem nations
has been constructed. This speaks to the evolving nature of national
identity in general and specifically in Palestine. The multiple foci of
identity (Arab, religious, kinship) are characteristic ofPalestinian
history. Shifts in the focus ofPalestinian identity can be traced to
historical developments in the Middle East. Sometimes the Ottoman
identity prevailed, at other times the Arab or Muslim identity came
to the forefront.
The construction of identity is the means by which the nation
is created. Nations have ethnie cores that invent and re-create
themselves through the use of symbolism. In the modem era, these
identities were disseminated through print-capitalism-education,
newspapers, publications and institutes. The politicization of these
ethnie cores (nationalism) creates the modem nation-state. Similar
to other national identities, Palestinian identity was constructed and
reconfigured by elites.
The Palestinian nation is an "imagined community" that
constitutes a shared consciousness. The press united a group, who
did not know one another face to face but shared a joint sense of
grievance, into a "community" ofPalestinians. This community
94
constructed its identity (Palestinian-ness) through symbols and the
interpretation ofhistoric events.
Both nationalist and fundamentalist construct identity. The
making ofPalestinian identity can be divided into four historical
stages. During each stage nationalist or fundamentalist elites
utilized different symbols in an effort to foster unity under the
banner of sameness. The symbol of the felliiJ; or peasant was
idealized and used by both fundamentalist and nationalist in their
attempts to forge a sense ofPalestinian consciousness. The
Palestinian peasant was steadfast dealing with dispossession and
humiliation. This image became less relevant in post-Intifiieja
Palestine when the more activist image of the fidii'i or freedom
fighter, and the siJaiJidor martyr willing to give his life for the nation
dominated. This shift coincides with the outbreak of activist
opposition to Israel, the Intifiieja.
During the Intifiieja, religio-political organizations gained
prominence. Fundamentalist movements such as lfamas promoted a
Palestinian religious identity to the exclusion of other identities.
This must be viewed within the context of Israeli identity creation.
The focus on Palestinian religious identity emerged in opposition to
an Israeli identity constructed around Judaism. Like Palestinians,
Israelis constructed this identity through the manipulation of
95
symbols. Although this construction pre-dates the, Intjfjù!a the
occupation served as an immediate reminder of Jewish control.
Islam provided the vehicle for confronting Israel and Western
hegemony. The resurgence of religion and the return to prominence
oftraditional identities (rooted in blood ties, family, clan and tribe)
are a reaction to modernity. Urbanization, industrial development
and the values that underpin modemity are a direct threat to religious
identities. In the face of military occupation by Israelis the reaction
to modemity is exasperated.
The Palestinian case is congruent with theoretical approaches
to nationalism. The Palestinian nation like other nations utilizes
symbols and culture to invent and re-create itself. The politicization
ofthis process (nationalism) creates the modern nation-state.
Similar to other national identities, Palestinian identity was
constructed and reconfigured by elites. In Gellner's view nations are
invented: "nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures
and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often
obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality."221 Palestinian
nationalism whether promoted by secularist or fundamentalists is
constructed.
Both secular and fundamentalist nationalism ignore the
ancient history of Palestine. There is no mention ofCanaanites,
221 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 49.
96
Philistines or early Christianity. The nationalists foeus on the
mythology of freedom fighters recently created by the PLO. The
fundamentalists utilize the past glories of Islam as way to foster
identity. Bath invent, obliterate and reereate myth and culture so as
to foster a common Palestinian identity deserving of a separate
nationination-state.
The Palestinian nation was constructed in four historical
stages characterized by overlapping and competing identities
Ottoman, Arab, religious, local and kinship. These identities were
not mutuaHy exclusive, one or the other became prominent
depending on the internaI balance of power and the nature of external
forces pressuring society.z22 As an "imagined community" the
Palestinian nation constitutes a shared consciousness. The shared
consciousness ofPalestinians is facilitated through print-capitalism
and the spread of education.
Zionism was a force that solidified the Palestinian nation.
Together Palestinians of aH classes and religions faced the same
threat, suffered the same exile and dispossession. Certain symbols
(religious and secular) captured the meaning of historie events. The
use of these images and myths help create a sense of identity-
Palestinian-ness.
222 Kimmerling and Migdal, 278.
m Milton-Edwards, 5.
97
The Palestinian case is not congruent with theoretical
approaches to fundamentalism. The decline of Arab secularism and
modernism in the post-1967 period did not lead to the rise of
fundamentalism in Palestine. In fact, "political Islam was eclipsed
by an increasingly flourshing secular nationalism."223 Contemporary
political Islam in Palestine is not solely a product of modern
acculturation. The resurgence of Islam in Palestine occurred under
specifie conditions. Fundamentalism in Palestine is shaped by
numerous specifie events and peculiarities: British colonization,
Zionist immigration, the refugee experience, the heritage of
Jordanian and Egyptian rule, the Israeli Occupation and the
nationalist experience.
Fundamentalism in Palestine developed after the PLO defeat
in Lebanon in 1982. These groups were encouraged by Israel as part
of its policy of divide and rule aimed at eradicating the secular
nationalist PLO.224 Islamic fundamentalists in Palestine were
reacting to the secularization ofPalestinian society. Often their
ideology was less political and more religio-cultural calling for a
return to Islamic dress and tradition. However, this is as much the
result of a crisis of identity and as it is a product of direct Israeli
policies of encouragement. Perhaps most importantly, the outbreak
of the Intifiiçla accounts for the change in the nature ofPalestinian
224 Ibid., 8.
98
Islamists. The Israeli Occupation is the central factor that accounts
for the shift in the nature ofIslamic organizations in Palestine from
religio-cultural movements of social transformation to politically
violent anti-occupation force. 225
Recently, fundamentalism in Palestine has played an
increasing role in identity creation. Fundamentalism as addressed in
this paper is characterized by its reaction to modernity. A complex
understanding of fundamentalism requires an acknowledgment that
both traditional values and shifting identities constitute the
fundamentalist agenda. lfamas utilizes Islam to define the struggle
for Palestinian identity and statehood. In addition the emphasis on
territorial sovereignty imports into the fundamentalist ethic a
commitment to the modem concepts of the nation-state. lfamas
operates on two levels. Externally, it must confront the Israeli
presence. Internally, it struggles to capture the state from the secular
nationalist PLO.
lfamasmade the transition from a socio-cultural organ of the
Muslim Brotherhood to the a political, armed resistance
organization. This transition is characterized by ideological
inconsistency. As an organization born during the Intifijeja the
movement was initially limited in ideological and practical scope.
99
Unlike the PLO it did not benefit from a continuity ofleadership and
institutional structures. The inconsistency is a result of the gray
areas created by a movement that is caught between principles and
self-interest.
Further, lfamas is unable to act solely for political reasons, it
is confined by a religious framework that is the source of ideological
inconsistency. Initially, lfamaswould not participate in any PLO
organization unless the PLO abandoned secularism and its political
agenda for a peaceful settlement with Israel. Its political thought has
deve10ped and it now focuses solely on the rejection of the PLO's
political agenda: "Hamas tacitly acknowledged (although it never
said as much verbally or in writing) that it had transcended its
insistence that the PLO abandon secularism in order to be consistent
with its own declared commitment to democracy and pluralism." 226
The focus now is sole1y on the political agenda.
lfamaspossesses sufficient support within the territories (15-
30%) to continue operating despite the fact that its socio-cultural
and economic activities have been greatly curtailed by the PA. The
legitimacy lfamasenjoys is a result ofits new-found attachment to
the Palestinian national cause. The movement has tapped into the
discontent sorne Palestinians fee! with the peace process. lfamas
225 Milton-Edwards outlines political Islam's strategy of social transformation in Palestine from 1920-1995.She argues that over this 75 year period Islamic groups have engaged in the peaceful transformation ofsociety. Political violence is the product of unusual circumstances and external influences.
100
support stems from grassroots ofPalestinians who arc discontent
with the PLO's abandonment of the principle ofindependent
statehood in historie Palestine and of armed struggle.
Essentially, lfamas'political program is that of the old PLO,
the liberation of Palestine from river to sea. Its success and
legitimacy is a result of its nationalist activity and not its religious
message.227 Its armed operations (a mixture of religion and
nationalism) are the most significant of the movement's activities.22X
Recent developments in Palestine have shown the inadequacy of the
Oslo agreement. If the Palestinian Authority continues to be
characterized by autocratie and inadequate leadership this may create
a political and ideological vacuum for relgio-political movements to
fill. We may be witnessing the beginnings of this in the recent
Iiamasification ofPalestinian society.
226 Ibid., 95.227 Musa K. Budeiri, "The Nationalist Dimension of Islamic Movements," Journal al Palestine Studies,24:3 (Spring 1995), 93.228 Hroub, 258.
101
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