THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MOSAIC AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY

Jeffrey Cohen Associate Professor, Boston College

Ganesh Krishnamoorthy Associate Professor, Northeastern University

Arnie Wright Professor, Boston College

Published in

Journal of Accounting Literature (2004, pp. 87-152)

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THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MOSAIC AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY

INTRODUCTION

One of the most important functions that corporate governance can play is in ensuring the

quality of the financial reporting process. Levitt (1999 2) stated in a speech to directors, “the link

between a company’s directors and its financial reporting system has never been more crucial.”

Further, the Blue Ribbon Commission (1999) called for auditors to discuss with the audit

committee the quality and not just the acceptability of the financial reporting alternatives.

Corporate governance has received increasing emphasis both in practice and in academic

research (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee Report 1999; Ramsay Report 2001; Sarbanes-Oxley 2002;

Bebchuk and Cohen 2004). This emphasis is due in part, to the prevalence of highly publicized and

egregious financial reporting frauds such as Enron, WorldCom, Aldelphia, and Parmalat, an

unprecedented number of earnings restatements (Loomis 1999; Wu 2002; Palmrose and Scholz

2002; Larcker et al. 2004) and claims of blatant earnings manipulation by corporate management

(Krugman 2002). Further, academic research has found an association between weaknesses in

governance and poor financial reporting quality, earnings manipulation, financial statement fraud,

and weaker internal controls (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996; McMullen 1996; Beasley et

al. 1999; Beasley et al. 2000; Carcello and Neal 2000; Krishnan 2001; Klein 2002b). Given these

developments, there has been an emphasis on the need to improve corporate governance over the

financial reporting process (e.g., Levitt 1998, 1999, 2000) , such as enacting reforms to improve the

effectiveness of the audit committee (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002)

and to make the board of directors and management more accountable for ensuring the integrity of

the financial reports (SEC 2002, The Business Roundtable 2002) as well as a rapid expansion of

research on corporate governance.

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The purpose of this paper is to review research on corporate governance and its impact on

financial reporting quality. This review will serve three purposes: (1) to suggest a corporate

governance “mosaic”(i.e., the interactions among the actors and institutions that affect corporate

governance) that encompasses a broader view of governance than has been considered in prior

accounting research; (2) to provide an overview of the principal findings of prior research; and (3)

to identify important gaps in the research that represent promising avenues for future study.

Accordingly, the remainder of the paper is divided into the following three sections. The next

section provides a general framework for understanding the corporate governance mosaic and its

impact on financial reporting quality. This section is followed by a discussion of prior research,

dealing respectively with the role of the following actors in the corporate governance mosaic: (1)

the board of directors and the audit committee; (2) the external auditor; and (3) the internal

auditors. The final section provides a summary of areas for future research.

THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MOSAIC

Figure 1 provides an overview of the corporate governance mosaic and its impact on

financial reporting quality. Prior accounting research and the accounting profession have focused

primarily on the board of directors and the audit committee. For instance, the Public Oversight

Board (POB 1993) defined corporate governance as “those oversight activities undertaken by the

board of directors and audit committee to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process.”

However, a narrow view of corporate governance restricting it to only monitoring activities may

potentially undervalue the role that corporate governance can play.

Further, in a recent meta analysis of corporate governance research, Larcker et al. (2004, 1)

conclude that “the typical structural indicators used in academic research and institutional rating

services have very limited ability to explain managerial behavior and organizational performance.”

Thus, as depicted in Figure 1, a more comprehensive framework should consider all major

stakeholders in the governance mosaic, including those inside and outside the firm. For instance,

the external auditor plays a significant role in monitoring financial reporting quality and hence can

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be viewed as an important participant in the governance process. We do not suggest that extant

research has not looked at the role of the auditor but rather that the role of the auditor in the

governance process is very complex as the auditor interacts with other stakeholders in the

governance mosaic such as the audit committee and the management. In turn, the interplay among

the stakeholders is affected by outside forces such as by regulators and stock exchanges as well as

pressure to meet financial analysts. Further, the corporate governance mosaic suggests we need to

look beyond much of the focus of current research in corporate governance that has concentrated

on documenting associations and not causal relationships (Larcker et al. 2004) and to complement

the current research by also investigating the substance of the interactions in the corporate

governance arena. For example, although the emphasis in corporate governance research has been

on looking at issues of independence, Cohen et al. (2002) document that unless management allows

itself to be monitored the substance of governance activities will be subverted.

Figure 1 also indicates interrelationships between the various actors and mechanisms

within the corporate governance mosaic. For example, the interactions among the audit committee,

the external auditor, the internal auditor, the board, and the management are crucial to effective

governance and to achieving high quality financial reporting (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002). An

interview study with experienced auditors (Cohen et al. 2002) revealed that management has a

significant influence over these parties. Some of the auditors in that study argue that if management

does not want to be “governed”, they can’t be (Cohen et al. 2002 582). Further, management may

place passive, compliant members on the board who may satisfy regulatory requirements but are

reluctant to challenge management. For example, QWEST had no outside directors with experience

in the company’s core business. They also had a compensation committee that consistently

awarded excessive bonuses to management in spite of the firm’s relatively subpar performance

(Business Week 2002).

Other actors and mechanisms depicted in Figure 1, largely external to the corporation, also

influence its effective governance in significant ways and are integral to safeguarding the interest

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of a company’s stakeholders. Examples of such actors include, but are not limited to, regula tors,

legislators, financial analysts, stock exchanges, courts and the legal system, and the stockholders.

These external players often shape and influence the interactions among the actors who are more

directly involved in the governance of the corporation. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

(2002) has significantly impacted all direct players in the corporate governance mosaic not only in

terms of their role and function in the governance process but also in terms of how the players

interact with one another. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit committee now has the responsibility to

hire and fire the auditor and to approve the non-audit services that the auditing firm can perform

(Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002). Further, management must state that it has the responsibility for

maintaining the internal control system and for evaluating its effectiveness (Geiger and Taylor

2003).1 In summary, Figure 1 depicts the actors in the governance process, highlights their

potential interactions, and suggests that the governance process impacts the quality of financial

reporting (e.g., transparency, objectivity) and, in the extreme, earnings manipulation and outright

fraud.

Quality of Financial Reporting

Although one should expect that “better” corporate governance leads to improved financial

reporting, there is a lack of consensus as to what constitutes “financial reporting quality.” For

example, although, the BRC (1999) and Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) require auditors to discuss the

quality of the financial reporting methods and not just their acceptability, the notion of financial

reporting quality remains a vague concept. As Jonas and Blanchet (2000, 353) state, “in light of

these new requirement, auditors, audit committee members, and management are now struggling to

define “quality of financial reporting.”

Rather than define “quality of financial reporting,” prior literature has focused on factors

such as earnings management, financial restatements, and fraud that clearly inhibit the attainment

1Although we don’t discuss the courts in this paper, we do include the courts in the governance mosaic and recognize that they play a critical role in the governance process. For instance, the courts can define and can

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of high quality financial reports and have used the presence of these factors as evidence of a

breakdown in the financial reporting process. Specifically, prior literature has examined the role of

the various players in the governance mosaic (e.g., board, audit committees, external auditor,

internal auditors) and the extent to which these players have either individually or collectively

influenced the attainment of financial reports that are free from material misstatements and

misrepresentations. The principal players identified in prior literature include the board of

directors, the audit committee, the external auditor, and the internal auditors.

Accordingly, in the rest of this paper, we discuss the role of the following players, the

interactions among them, and their collective influence in helping attain high quality financial

reporting.: (1) the board of directors and the audit committee (2) the external auditor; and (3) the

internal auditors.2 A summary of prior research is contained in Table 1.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND AUDIT COMMITTEE

Various attributes of the board and audit committee may influence their effectiveness as

corporate governance mechanisms.3 For example, the BRC’s (1999) recommendations looked at

strengthening both the independence and expertise of audit committees. In this section, we examine

the research of various characteristics of the board and audit committee including issues of (1)

composition, (2) independence, (3) knowledge and expertise, (4) effectiveness, (5) power, (6)

duties and responsibilities and (7) the association between board characteristics and earnings

manipulation and fraud.

Composition

expand the duties of directors and officers to the corporation such as the duty of care and loyalty. 2 Management potentially has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the governance process and is listed in the corporate governance mosaic. However, since there has been almost no research that explicitly and directly examines the role of management in the governance process, we discuss management primarily in relation to opportunities for future research. 3 DeZoort et al. (2003) provides a framework for the evaluation of audit committee effectiveness and synthesizes the existing literature into four components: audit committee composition, authority, resources, and diligence. However, their study does not directly address board characteristics, nor does their framework provide a basis to synthesize and interpret prior literature in terms of their impact on the financial reporting process.

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The only study to directly examine the composition of AC members in terms of board

experience and independence was conducted by Vafeas (2001). He found that members appointed

to the AC have significantly less board tenure with the firm, serve on fewer other committees, and

are less likely to serve on the important compensation committee. Surprisingly, they hold the same

level of equity interest in the firm and are as likely to be a grey4 director as other members of the

board. The overall results led Vafeas to conclude that AC appointees are less seasoned board

members, who are not chosen because of their greater experience or independence but consistent

with a “next in line” strategy. He notes that future research is needed to examine whether the

characteristics studied are linked to improved AC performance or financial reporting quality and

that the composition of the AC in terms of other characteristics such as financial literacy need

consideration.

To answer the question of what audit committees are actually doing, Carcello et al. (2002)

examined recent disclosures of audit committee charters and reports included in proxy statements.

The major finding of this study is that there is a gap between what audit committees say they are

doing and what is mandated by their charter. Although this gap may be due to several reasons

including liability concerns, it raises the general issue of transparency with respect to activities of

the audit committee despite the changes made in disclosure requirements based on BRC

recommendations. The study also found that while there is generally a high level of compliance

across firms with respect to exchange mandated disclosures, voluntary disclosures of AC activities

were more prevalent in larger companies, depository institutions, NYSE firms, and firms with

independent audit committees. An important limitation of the study is that it did not explore the

specific reasons for the gap between what is stated in the AC reports and the mandate in the AC

4 Independent directors are defined as non-employees with no tie to the firm or its management except in their role as a director. Grey directors are defined as non-employees who may have past or present relationship with the firm or its management such as relatives of management or consultants and suppliers.

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charter. Future studies should address this issue by using other research methods such as interviews

or internal documentation that will complement the archival data.

Collectively, these two studies suggest that audit committees prior to Sarbanes-Oxley may

have underutilized its potential as the committees had less experienced members on it and there are

questions about whether committees fully fulfilled its mandate. Of course, since the data in these

studies were collected prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, it is imperative to determine if these shortcomings

still hold true in a world where there is more scrutiny placed on AC activities.

Independence

The recent reforms in Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) enacted to strengthen the audit committee

(AC) has implicitly assumed that independence will improve the effectiveness of the audit

committee. An early study that investigated this issue was conducted by Vicknair, Hickman and

Carnes (1993) who examine the level of “grey” directors who are members of the audit committees

of a sample of NYSE firms. They find that about a third of the members of the audit committees

sampled were grey directors and, thus, of questionable independence. Since this data was gathered

about 15 years ago, it is unlikely that the findings are reflective of the current situation given the

movement to improve the independence of audit committees (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee 1999).

Wolnizer (1995) uses an a priori argument approach to evaluate whether independent ACs

can significantly improve financial reporting quality. He argues that this is unlikely, because

current accounting practices allow wide discretion by management in the choice of accounting

methods and estimates. With limited exceptions (e.g., count of cash or inventory) accounting

values are not subject to validation through impartial evidence (e.g., market based data). Thus,

auditors and the AC can only evaluate or review management’s potentially biased choices. The

most significant contribution of this work is to highlight the link between the nature (limitations) of

the accounting system and those who seek to monitor the system.

Another study relating to the importance of AC independence was conducted by DeZoort

and Salterio (2001). They examined the judgments of audit committee (AC) members who were

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asked to determine their level of support for the auditor vis-à-vis management in a case situation

involving a dispute over proper revenue recognition. The primary issue addressed was how AC

independence and knowledge affect audit committee members’ propensity to support the auditor’s

position. The findings indicate that independent, more knowledgeable AC members were more

likely to support the auditor in a dispute with management.

A question arises as to what causes the demand for AC independence. To explore this

issue, Klein (2002a) examined whether AC independence was affected by a number of board

factors and by substitute monitoring mechanisms. Her results indicate a positive association

between AC independence and board size and AC independence and the proportion of outside

board members. Klein also found negative associations between AC independence and a firm’s

growth opportunities, AC independence and the existence of a large blockholder on the audit

committee and finally AC independence and firm size. There was no effect for creditors, CEO on

compensation committee, and outside directors' shareholdings. The study suggests that prior to the

regulations enacted recently after the BRC, the ability of an AC to be independent was affected by

the larger outside board and a firm's financial health. This study highlights the importance of the

board in its power over assignments and authority afforded to the AC.

Collectively, these studies, especially Klein (2002a), suggest that the independence of audit

committees may be affected by the independence of the board in general. Although there is nothing

in Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) that mandates the selection of powerful AC members who are

independent in fact as well as in form, there is at least the potential that stronger boards in general

will seek out AC members who are willing to confront management to a greater degree than

previously was documented prior to the enactment of the BRC (1999) reforms.

Knowledge and Expertise

With the requirement in Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) that all AC members have financial

literacy and that at least one member be a financial expert, an understanding of the link that

knowledge and expertise has on audit committee effectiveness is quite important. DeZoort (1997)

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investigated the views of AC members regarding the formal responsibilities of the AC, other duties

performed, and the importance of potential duties from those compiled by Wolnizer (1995). The

duties from Wolnizer fall into the general categories of financial reporting (including controls);

auditing; and other corporate governance (e.g., facilitate communications between the board and

the external auditors).The results suggest that AC members were not fully aware of their formal

responsibilities when comparing their responses to those reported in the company’s proxy

statement. Noteworthy, the majority felt that all AC members should have sufficient knowledge in

accounting, auditing, and legal issues and that they perceived they did not have enough knowledge

in many of these areas. DeZoort calls for further research examining the divergence of publicly

disclosed responsibilities of the AC and those identified by participants. He also emphasizes the

need for further work regarding the types and composition of expertise needed by AC members.

DeZoort (1998) evaluated whether AC members with experience in auditing and internal

controls would make different internal control evaluations than members without this experience.

DeZoort found that as hypothesized, the AC members with experience were more likely than AC

members without such experience, to make control evaluations more in line with external auditors.

The AC members with greater experience also were more consistent and demonstrated a higher

degree of consensus. These results suggest that ACs that have members with appropriate domain

related experience may at least have a better understanding of the auditor’s side in disputes with

management and potentially may even lend support to the auditor in their dispute.

Beasley and Salterio (2001) posit that the board has a significant influence on the quality of

the AC in terms of independence and knowledge, since it is the board who selects AC members.

They argue that strong, independent boards, as evidenced by the proportion of outside members, an

independent chair who is not the CEO of the company, and larger size, will be more likely to

appoint a higher quality AC. Their findings supported expectations, although a weaker association

was found for AC knowledge. This study is noteworthy in that it is the first one to explicitly

consider the AC as part of the corporate governance rubric, highlighting that there are many other

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interrelated mechanisms such as the board, the external auditor, and holders of large blocks of

stock. Beasley and Salterio note that future research is needed to examine the causal links (beyond

the association found in their study) between AC quality and other governance mechanisms and to

examine whether and how AC characteristics impact monitoring effectiveness.

The issue of how the expertise and financial literacy of AC members potentially affect the

quality of the financial reporting process was examined by McDaniel et al. (2002). The BRC had

recommended that ACs be comprised of individuals possessing financial literacy with at least one

member being a financial expert. In their study, McDaniel et al. compared how financial experts

may differ from financial literates in the evaluation of the quality of financial reporting items and

whether the salience and the recurring nature of the items would affect the groups' evaluations.

They found that in contrast to literates, the experts' assessment of quality was related to elements of

the SFAC framework (relevance and reliability) and they identified reporting concerns that were

recurring in nature and would receive little business press. In contrast, literates raised concerns

about high salience items that were nonrecurring in nature and those that received attention from

the press. Thus, the paper suggests that each group may bring different perspectives to AC

meetings and thereby improve financial reporting quality.

Finally, DeZoort and Salterio (2001), examine the effect of AC member accounting and

auditing knowledge on the propensity to support the auditor’s position in a dispute with

management over an ambiguous accounting issue. They find that greater auditing knowledge is

positively related to support for the auditor, while, unexpectedly, no relationship is found for

accounting knowledge. The latter finding may have been due to the non-technical, generic nature

of the accounting issue at hand.

Collectively, these studies suggest that getting more knowledgeable audit committee

members may lead to greater cooperation between auditors and the audit committee members of

their clients. However, consistent with the findings of DeZoort and Salterio (2001) this knowledge

potentially may be more important if it relates to knowledge of the complex nature of the

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accounting problem on hand for a specific industry. Thus, an issue for future research might be to

extend this line of research by examining how the support for auditors from AC members may vary

as a function of the AC knowledge of complex industry specific accounting issues and of auditing.

Effectiveness

Although all factors discussed in the previous subsections can potentially influence AC

effectiveness, studies that have directly examined this issue are discussed in this section. Spangler

and Braiotta (1990) focus on the impact of the AC chair possessing transactional and

transformational leadership attributes. In essence, the transactional leadership attribute pertains to

the ability of the AC chair to help provide opportunities and rewards and thus motivate

management to act in the best interest in the shareholder while the transformational leadership

attribute refers to the ability of the AC chair to provide a vision for management to follow. They

found a positive association between AC effectiveness and transformational leadership and some

transactional leadership characteristics (contingent rewards and active management by exception).

Spangler and Braiotta suggest that further research should examine company specific situational

variables that may impact the importance of AC chair leadership characteristics in committee

effectiveness.

Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) investigate the relationship between various dimensions of

power and the effectiveness of ACs in discharging three oversight roles (financial reporting,

oversight of external auditors, and oversight of internal controls). Their results indicate that

organization types of power are mediated by personal power factors. Specifically, effective ACs

require a strong organizational charter or mandate, institutional support (information support from

management and auditors and a supportive environment by top management), and diligence.

Organization power, however, is not useful unless members exercise strong will and determination.

Knowledge (expert power) was important only for the financial reporting oversight function,

implying ACs can rely on the support of other parties such as the external and internal auditors to

effectively discharge their other functions. Future research could further explore how the complex

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nature of power dimensions such as the personal relationship between management and the audit

committee members could potentially impact AC effectiveness.

To explore the impact of symbolic activities (e.g. frequency and quality of the audit

committee meetings, the act of asking questions at the audit committee meeting) on the perceived

effectiveness of ACs and to determine what impacts the social construction of the effectiveness of

the AC, Gendron and Bédard (2004) interviewed governance actors both internal to firm and the

external auditors from two corporations. Social construction is the manner in which AC members

achieve legitimacy in the eyes of other attendees at audit committee meetings. They found that the

social construction was affected by the ability of the AC to ask questions, have private meetings

with the external auditors and through the ceremonial and substantive components of the meetings.

They conclude that AC meetings are more than mere symbolism and that the performance of

members plays a significant role in the social construction of their effectiveness. Their research

demonstrates the value of qualitative research methodology to uncover the underpinnings of the

workings of audit committees.

AC’s may be formed primarily for cosmetic reasons to make it appear to outside

stakeholders that the company desires monitoring of financial reporting and controls. Menon and

Williams (1994) examine this issue by looking at the relationship between reliance on the AC and

factors suggested in the literature that potentially drive the need for an effective AC: management

stock ownership; leverage; company size; type of auditor (Big 8 vs. Non-Big 8); board

composition; and board size. AC reliance is measured by activity (number of meetings) and

independence (presence of a member of management). The sample included OTC companies not

required to form an AC. The results indicated that AC activity and independence was positively

associated, as expected, with the proportion of outside directors on the board and that AC activity

was also greater for larger companies.

In an extension of their earlier study (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993), Fogarty and Kalbers

(1998) investigate whether AC effectiveness is more closely aligned with agency or institutional

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theory. Agency theory would predict that factors that create a need for closer monitoring of

management (e.g., higher leverage) produce the need for effective ACs. In contrast, institutional

theory posits that many organizational structures such as the AC are merely symbolic to conform to

social expectations. To test this issue, they reanalyze the data obtained in their earlier study along

with considering an additional measure of AC effectiveness (number of AC meetings).5 Although

they find support for the importance of some agency variables (e.g., company size), the results

generally do not show a strong link between AC effectiveness and agency theory factors. There is

also a weak correlation between effectiveness and some measures of organizational bases of power

for the AC (sanctionary power relating to the scope of the AC charter). Fogarty and Kalbers call for

additional consideration of the joint effects of agency and institutional factors in research

explaining AC effectiveness.

Collier and Gregory (1999) replicate and extend the study by Menon and Williams (1994)

by looking at AC activity for large companies and by examining another measure of AC

effectiveness—duration of meetings. The results failed to support the findings of Menon and

Williams regarding the impact of agency variables on the number of AC meetings, most likely

because of limited variance in this measure (usually two meetings per year). However, the type of

auditor (Big 6) was found to be associated with increased duration of AC meetings while leverage

had a marginally significant relation with the duration of AC meetings. Importantly, a dominant

CEO and AC insiders were found to lead to a significantly lower duration of meetings. These latter

results suggest the importance of having an independent chair of the board and independent AC

members to foster an active AC. Future research may work on developing a more testable construct

of audit effectiveness.

Haka and Chalos (1990) investigated the perception of an agency conflict among chief

operating officers, internal auditors, external auditors, and audit committee chairs. Examining

5 It should also be noted that Kalbers and Fogarty define AC independence more strictly than many prior studies, excluding members of management and “grey” directors.

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factors that constitute complete financial statement disclosure and factors that should influence

accounting procedure choice, they found that audit committee members wanted greater disclosure

than other groups. Further, audit committee chairs and external auditors disagreed on the influence

of a number of factors (e.g., cost of audit, government intervention) that are important in the

financial reporting process. External auditors and management tended to agree on both what should

constitute complete financial statement disclosure and what should influence accounting procedure

choice.

Krishnamoorthy et al. (2002a) surveyed both audit partners and managers to understand

their conceptualization of financial reporting quality and to evaluate factors that influence the

effectiveness of audit committees. They found that the expertise and willingness of AC members to

confront management are strong influences on the effectiveness of audit committees. They also

found that management is perceived to play a significant role in influencing the extent and the

quality of communication between the external auditors and the audit committee and that the AC

should play a greater role than they currently do in ensuring the quality of the financial reporting

process. Also, consistent with the BRC, clarity and consistency of financial disclosures and degree

of aggressiveness in accounting principles and estimates were cited as the most important

determinants of financial reporting quality. Krishnamoorthy et al. (2002a) did not examine whether

there is consensus between auditors and audit committees about what constitutes quality financial

reporting. However, they suggest that if audit committee members are in agreement with auditors,

then audit committee members will be more likely to support the auditors in disagreements with

management.

Collectively, these studies suggest that it is important to examine what actually transpires

in audit committee meetings and interactions to determine if its reported activities are effective. For

example, both Fogarty and Kalbers (1998) and Gendron and Bedard (2004) demonstrate the need

to look at the substance of the AC activities to help determine if the AC is effective. The mere

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recording of activities may be symbolic or a means of complying with regulation. This suggests

that future research may explore whether a principles-based approach may be better than a rules-

based approach in achieving the desired goals of audit committees to effectively serve as an

oversight to management in the financial reporting process.

Power

The only studies to explicitly consider the importance of AC power were conducted by

Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) and Fogarty and Kalbers (1998). In the former study, they examine the

relationship between various dimensions of power and AC effectiveness. Power could take the

form of support from the organization in terms of the AC receiving appropriate and timely

information from management or power for an AC could be manifested in the expertise of its

members. The findings indicate that effective ACs require a broad mandate, good institutional

support, and a willingness to undertake its responsibilities. Organization power was only valuable

when the AC exercised diligence. Interestingly, expert power (knowledge) was important only for

the financial reporting oversight function, suggesting the AC could draw on other sources of

expertise in addressing other functions such as overseeing the functioning of controls. Also, as

reviewed earlier, the primary focus of Fogarty and Kalbers (1998) was to examine agency and

institutional theory factors impacting AC effectiveness. They report a weak correlation between

AC effectiveness and some measures of organizational bases of power for the AC (sanctionary

power relating to the scope of the AC charter).

The research by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) and Fogarty and Kalbers (1998) suggest that

it is difficult to measure the construct of power of the audit committee. It appears that research is

needed that uses an in depth interview approach similar to the methodology used by Gendron and

Bedard (2004) to isolate the characteristics of an audit committee that determine what creates the

power for an AC to be effective in its monitoring role over management. This in depth interview

approach can also isolate when an AC’s lacks real power and exists as a mere symbolic mechanism

in place to comply with regulation.

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Duties & Responsibilities

Two studies that focus on the duties and responsibilities of the AC are by Wolnizer (1995)

and DeZoort (1997). In a comprehensive review of professional standards and the literature

Wolnizer identifies 17 functions for the AC that fall into three areas: financia l reporting (including

controls); auditing; and other corporate governance (e.g., facilitate communications between the

board and the external auditors).

DeZoort provides empirical data to validate this list of functions by asking a sample of AC

members whether they perform these functions. He also compares the duties they note as assigned

to those indicated in the company’s proxy statement. Respondents indicate that the most important

duty for the AC is to evaluate controls. Other important functions were to review financial

statements, review the effectiveness of the internal and external audits, review the management

letter of the external auditor, and evaluate auditor independence. There was a weak association

between duties listed in the proxy statement and those that AC members indicated were assigned to

the committee.

Collectively, these studies suggest that the public disclosures of AC activities do not seem

to map well with those actually exercised. Since the duties and responsibilities of AC members are

evolving, future research can investigate the level of convergence between the activities outlined in

an audit committee charter and the actual duties that AC members perceive they perform as well as

consider factors that may account for greater or lesser convergence.

Earnings Manipulation and Fraud

The research to date in this area has used an archival approach to assess the link between

corporate governance characteristics and instances of earnings manipulation and fraud as

documented in Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC. The

studies discussed below have generally been consistent in their findings that there appears to be a

link between board and/or audit committee characteristics and the incidence of earnings

manipulation and fraud.

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McMullen (1996), using data from when audit committees were voluntary, examined the

association between the presence of an audit committee and various indicators of possible lapses in

the financial reporting process or the occurrence of illegal acts. Using archival data, she found that

the existence of an audit committee was associated with a lower incidence of shareholder litigation

of alleged fraud, correction of quarterly earnings, SEC enforcement actions, illegal acts, and

auditor turnover due to a reporting dispute with management. A future study could examine the

reasons for this finding. For example, does the ability and the willingness of audit committee

members to ask tough questions of management result in a lower incidence of these lapses than

companies that have audit committees that essentially provide a “rubber stamp” for management?

Dechow et al. (1996) compared firms receiving AAERs with a non-AAER sample

matched6 on size and industry to determine motives and consequences of earnings manipulation.

They also investigated whether characteristics of the corporate governance structure are associated

with behavior consistent with earnings manipulation. They found that firms subject to enforcement

action have weaker governance structures (e.g. less independent boards and ACs) and are more

likely to engage in earnings manipulation. The existence of an audit committee as well as general

board characteristics (e. g. composition, power of CEO, stock ownership) were associated with

differentiating AAER from non-AAER firms. They found no effect for the existence of a bonus

plan but they did find support for motivation to lower the cost of external financing. Thus, this

study lends support for investigating the importance of governance structures in improving the

quality of the financial reporting process.

Beasley (1996) examined the relationship between board of directors’ composition and the

likelihood of financial statement fraud. In addition, he examined if the presence of an audit

committee reduces the likelihood of fraud. Using a matched sample of fraud and non-fraud firms,

6 Although a discussion of the methodological limitations of using a matched sample in research studies is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to recognize these limitations when interpreting the results from these studies. Readers interested in a thorough discussion of the limitations of matching in empirical research should refer to Kerlinger and Lee (2000, 489) or a similar treatise on research methods.

18

he reports that boards of no-fraud firms are more likely to have a larger proportion of outside (non-

employee) directors than fraud firms. The results were robust to a finer definition of outside

directors, separating outside directors into grey and independent directors. Surprisingly, the results

indicate that the presence of an audit committee was not associated with a reduced likelihood of

financial statement fraud. Finally, supplemental analysis suggests that the likelihood of fraud

decreases as (1) the level of stock ownership by outside directors increases; and (2) the number of

years of board service for outside directors increases. Further, the likelihood of fraud increases as

the number of directorships held by outside directors in other firms increases. Collectively, these

results highlight the importance of examining corporate board-level factors when evaluating the

impact of corporate governance on financial reporting quality. 7

Using three industries (high technology, health care and financial services), Beasley et al.

(2000) compared fraud companies (subject to SEC enforcement) with benchmarks of industry

corporate governance practices. They found that the only Board of Director measure that differed

was the proportion of outside directors, with fraud companies having a lower proportion of its

directors who are outsiders. Examining the AC variables, they found differences in all three

industries for the likelihood of independent directors with less fraud occurring when there were

more independent AC members. Further, the AC members in the high tech and health care fraud

companies met less frequently than was typical for their respective industries. Finally, they found

that the internal audit function was less likely to be evident in fraud companies. This study suggests

the need to investigate or at a minimum control unique industry effects of specific corporate

governance characteristics.

Abbott et al. (2000) posit that audit committee independence and increased activity will

result in a lower incidence of SEC enforcement actions. Using a matched control sample, they

found support for their expectations. Their results were qualitatively the same if they restricted the

7 Beasley’s (1996) results described are for univariate analysis. The results might be viewed with some caution as the results for multivariate analysis are not as strong as those found with the univariate analysis.

19

study to the firms specifically sanctioned for fraud. Since their study is a test of association, a

future study could examine the causal link between audit committees characteristics and fraud.

Abbott et al. (2001) compared fraud/financial misstatement firms with a control group.

They found a negative relationship for both independence and activity of AC. No effect was found

for AC financial statement expertise or AC size and, in contrast to Beasley (1996), no effect was

found for any of the board characteristics. Their results suggest that some of the BRC's

recommendations (e.g., independence) may be effective in mitigating fraud or earnings

management while others (e.g., expertise) may either have no effect or may need time to have an

influence on the workings of the AC. It must be noted that since the data was from a pre BRC

period, the reforms enacted post BRC may be effective in improving the quality of the financial

reporting process.

When discussing earnings management , it is also important to explore the effect of

corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management behavior that does not strictly violate

GAAP rules but may nonetheless be potentially violating the spirit of GAAP (Krishnamoorthy et

al. 2002a).An archival study in this area was conducted by Klein (2002b) who examined whether

there is a link between the independence of the board and/or audit committee and the magnitude of

abnormal accruals. She found that firms with a majority-independent board and/or audit committee

have a lower level of discretionary accruals. However, there was no additional curtailment of

earnings management when the audit committee consisted wholly of independent directors. This

result calls into question whether the regulation requiring complete independence of the audit

committee is overly stringent as Klein found having a majority of independent directors would

suffice.. She also found that when firms switched from a majority-independent to minority

independent board/audit committee they experienced a higher amount of abnormal accruals.

Klein’s study demonstrates the importance of looking at quality of earnings, and not just the

incidence of fraud or earnings manipulation. Since Klein’s paper documents an association and not

causality, future research could disentangle whether the management is influencing the selection of

20

compliant boards in order to engage in aggressive earnings management or conversely do more

independent boards curtail management from overly aggressive earnings management behavior.

Although not directly dealing with earnings manipulation, another relevant study was

conducted by Wild (1996) who investigated the association between formation of an audit

committee and the quality of accounting earnings. Using an information economics framework,

Wild predicts that earnings reports disclosed after the formation of an audit committee will elicit a

greater stock price reaction than those disclosed before, after controlling for other relevant factors.

Using abnormal stock returns, results were consistent with expectations and showed that the stock

market reaction for earnings reports was 20 percent greater for earnings announcements after audit

committee formation than before. These results suggest that audit committees provide a useful

oversight mechanism for the financial reporting process and that this increased oversight results in

improved earnings quality. This study also suggests the value of using a longitudinal approach to

investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of financial reporting

over time.

Collectively, these studies suggest that there is an association between the independence

of the audit committee and the incidence of fraud or AAERs as well as activities associated with

earnings management behavior. However, there is a need to document why this association exists.

Is it that more independent audit committees are more diligent in preventing management from

engaging in egregious behavior or is that the through the influence of management of better

companies who identify audit committee members that will ask the type of questions that will

mitigate the firm committing errors and irregularities?

Synthesis of Research on Board of Directors and Audit Committee

To synthesize, prior research suggests that audit committees are comprised of relatively

junior members of the board, whose effectiveness is largely dependent not only on their knowledge

and expertise in financial reporting, but also the extent to which the board supports and empowers

21

the AC. Further, AC independence, a key factor in the AC’s ability to confront management and

work effectively with auditors, is largely dependent on the attitude and independence of the board.

Prior studies also indicate that the role of the AC is crucial, especially in resolving auditor-

management disagreements on significant financial reporting issues, an aspect critically important

in supporting and enhancing auditor independence. Finally, there appears to be an association

between characteristics of the board and the audit committee and the incidences of earnings

manipulation and fraud. The results imply that for the AC to play an important role in the financial

reporting process, the AC must be vested by the greater board with real power and sufficient

expertise to serve as an effective monitor over management’s actions. The AC should be viewed as

an ally to auditors in being steadfast in the goal of having a high quality financial reporting process

and in the prevention of fraud.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

EXTERNAL AUDITOR

The external auditor plays a crucial role in helping to promote financial reporting quality.

As a result of Sarbanes-Oxley (2002), auditors must be prepared to discuss with the audit

committee the quality and not just the mere acceptability of financial statement issues. Through

curtailing excessive earnings management techniques such as unexpected discretionary accruals,

auditors can serve as an effective monitor on overly aggressive management. Prior research

examining the relationship between various actors in the corporate governance mosaic and the

external auditor can be summarized into the following themes: (a) auditor selection and client

acceptance; (b) audit quality and audit fees; and (c) audit opinion and the audit process. These

themes are discussed below.

22

Auditor Selection and Client Acceptance

With increased emphasis on the role of corporate boards and especially audit committees in

auditor selection and retention decisions, research in this area is of critical importance to both

auditors and other corporate stakeholders. Abbot and Parker (2000) argue that independent and

active audit committees will demand higher quality audits and are hence more likely to engage an

industry-specialist auditor. This reasoning is in line with the earlier cited research on the

relationship between governance factors and quality of earnings (e. g. Klein 2002a and 2002b) that

suggests that stronger boards may demand a higher quality audit to curtail management’s ability to

engage in rampant earnings management behavior. Abbot and Parker defined audit committees as

independent if they were comprised entirely of independent directors and as active if they met at

least twice a year. The study found support for the hypothesis. However, audit committee

independence or activity alone yielded insignificant results.

Beasley and Petroni (2001) examined the association between outside directors on the

board and the choice of external auditors for property-liability insurance companies. They argued

that boards with a higher percentage of outside directors will seek higher quality auditors in order

to provide more effective monitoring of corporate management. Using a sample of property-

liability insurers, Beasley and Petroni (2001) found that the likelihood that a specialist Big-6

auditor is selected increases with the percentage of outside directors on the board, but the outside

board membership percentage has no impact on the choice between a nonspecialist Big-6 and non

Big-6 auditor. Thus, board composition is associa ted with choice of auditors based on industry

specialization, rather than the blanket brand name (Big 6 vs. non-Big 6) differentiation found in

other settings. Together, these two studies suggest that a more independent and active governance

structure is associated with the use of higher quality auditors, assuming that industry specialization

is an indicator of quality.

Shareholders are taking a more active role in decisions relating to the hiring and retention

of external auditors (Clapman 2000). Two studies have examined shareholder ratification of

23

auditors selected by management. Raghunandan (2003) investigates whether shareholder

ratification of a management-selected auditor is affected by the relative magnitude of nonaudit fees

paid to the auditor. Based on the analysis of shareholder voting in a sample of Fortune-1000

companies, Raghunandan hypothesizes that the magnitude of nonaudit fees (relative to audit fees)

will negatively impact the percentage of shareholders voting to ratify the appointment of the

external auditor. Although the findings were consistent with expectations, the results of the study

should be interpreted with caution given that the shareholder ratification rates were very high

(about 97%) even in companies where a significantly la rge percentage of the total fees paid to

auditors consisted of nonaudit fees. Given the above finding, two questions that arise is what are

the characteristics of companies that actually have shareholders debate as well as ratify the choice

of auditors and secondly how how the composition of the audit committee influences shareholders’

decision to ratify an auditor appointment when nonaudit fees are high.

Raghunandan and Rama (2003) examined this issue and found that shareholders are less

likely to vote against auditor ratification even when the nonaudit fee is relatively high if the audit

committee consists of solely independent directors. However, audit committee expertise (i.e., the

presence of at least one member with accounting or financial expertise) was not associated with

shareholder votes on auditor ratification.

From an external auditor’s perspective, corporate governance and audit committee factors

could significantly influence the client acceptance decision. These factorswill influence the quality

of the financial reporting process, because in light of the heightened scrutiny in the post-Enron era,

auditing firms may be reluctant to associate themselves with clients where management is likely to

engage in egregious financial reporting behavior. Very little professional guidance or prior research

exists on how auditors consider governance factors when accepting new clients. Cohen and Hanno

(2000) was the first study on this issue. Specifically, they relied upon the monitoring framework of

the COSO Report (1992) and POB (1993) to develop an oversight perspective when describing

corporate governance factors. Manipulating the strength of the management control philosophy and

24

the strength of the corporate governance structure in an experimental setting, they asked audit

partners and managers to make a client acceptance recommendation. They found that both the

management control philosophy and the strength of the corporate governance structure

significantly affected client acceptance recommendations, control risk assessments and the extent

of substantive testing. However, they manipulate corporate governance in an aggregate manner,

employ a governance orientation based strictly on the COSO (1992) framework, and do not test the

effect of individual elements such as the independence of the audit committee. Their study suggests

the need to more fully capture the effect of individual components of corporate governance on

various stages of the audit process.

Collectively, the studies on auditor selection suggest that stronger governance structures

are associated with the selection of higher quality auditors. Further, the studies suggest that

although shareholder ratification is influenced by the provision of nonaudit services, stronger audit

committees may be viewed by stockholders as effective monitors to ensure that audit quality is not

compromised due to the provision of significant nonaudit services. Further, because of the paucity

of existing studies, more research needs to be conducted examining how the judgments of auditors

are affected by governance factors during the client acceptance process. For example, will auditors

view a potential client that has a board with a strong and effective monitoring focus as a client that

has a lower r likelihood of revealing overly aggressive reporting behavior by management and thus

be a client that is more desirable to actively seek? Finally, with the requirements of the Sarbanes-

Oxley Act that the audit committee select the external auditor, research is needed on factors that

impact their decision.

Audit Quality and Audit Fees

Since audit committees can play a key role in auditor selection, audit committee members’

assessment of audit quality is an important issue to consider. Knapp (1991) examined the impact of

auditor firm size (Big Eight versus local CPA firm), length of auditor tenure, and general audit

strategy (structured versus unstructured) on audit committee members’ assessment of audit quality.

25

Audit quality was operationalized as the likelihood that the auditor will (a) discover a material

error; and (b) disclose the error in the audit opinion (DeAngelo 1981). Results suggest that the

length of auditor tenure significantly affected perceptions about the discovery of material error

while Big Eight firms were perceived as more likely to disclose a discovered error. While the

degree of an audit firm’s structure had no effect, audit committee members did perceive a positive

relationship between auditor tenure and the discovery of material error for the early years of auditor

tenure while the relationship was perceived to be negative for later years. Thus, it appears that audit

committee members perceive that financial reporting quality will be positively affected by having a

large auditor, as larger firm are more likely to disclose discovered errors. These results also suggest

that audit committee members may perceive a “learning” effect in the early years of auditor tenure.

However, if the client retains the same auditor for an extended period of time then financial

reporting quality may suffer as the audit firm may become too complacent as they adopt “too

cozy” of a relationship with the client that could potentially hamper audit quality. It must be noted

that this study did not explicitly test the effect of current or future audit fees on audit committee

members’ assessments of audit quality.

Carcello et al. (2002), using an agency framework, argue that high quality boards would

demand more external monitoring and thus be willing to pay for higher quality audits. They found

a significant and positive relationship between audit fees and board independence, number of board

meetings (a surrogate for diligence) and the number of outside directorships held in other

corporations (a surrogate for expertise). However, they report that the characteristics and activities

of the audit committee adds no explanatory power above and beyond board characteristics. Their

study suggests that if we accept the assumption that higher audit fees is a surrogate for audit

quality, then stronger boards will employ better auditors who in turn presumably will be a more

effective monitor on management ensuring that appropriate financial statements and disclosures

will take place.

26

Abbott et al. (2003a) examine the association between audit committee characteristics and

audit fees. A positive association is predicted between audit fees and audit committee

independence, expertise, and meeting frequency. This prediction is based on the notion that audit

committees that are independent, have expertise, and that meet frequently will demand a higher

level of audit assurance requiring an increased level of audit coverage, resulting in higher audit

fees. Results indicate that audit committee independence (defined as consisting solely of

independent directors) and expertise (defined as committees that include at least one member who

has financial expertise as outlined in the BRC recommendations) are significantly and positively

associated with audit fees. However, audit committee meeting frequency was not significantly

associated with audit fees. Although Abbot et al’s (2003a) results (e.g., that audit committees in

general do have a significant effect) are not entirely consistent with those reported in Carcello et al.

(2002), they attribute the variation in findings primarily to the difference with respect to the data,

and changes in the nature and function of the audit committee as a result of expanded regulatory

focus by the SEC and other agencies8. An important limitation of both studies is that alternative

explanations for the positive association between board/audit committee characteristics and audit

fees that are unrelated to audit effort (e.g., increased billing rates rather than increased audit hours)

cannot be ruled out. Future studies should attempt to address this limitation.

Collier and Gregory (1999) investigated the relationship between audit committee activity

and firm specific agency factors, including auditor quality. The general expectation was that audit

committee activity will increase in firms with higher agency costs. They found that auditor quality

(Big 6) and leverage were positively related to AC activity while AC activity was lower in firms

where the role of chairman and CEO were combined and where insiders were included in the AC.

Their results suggest that ACs are more active where there is more independence on the board and

a higher quality auditor is involved. However, it is unclear whether the increased activity of the AC

8 Carcello et al. (2002) study use survey data relating to 1992-1993, while Abbott et al. (2003a) obtain more recent data (Feb through June 2001) from SEC filings.

27

will actually result in more effective performance. For example, a future study can investigate if the

increased activity results in ACs being more involved in resolving reporting disputes between

auditors and management.

Recent regulatory efforts (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley 2002) have highlighted the importance of

the relationship between fees for nonaudit services and auditor independence. Using SEC audit and

nonaudit fee data, Abbot et al. (2003b) examine the association between audit committee

characteristics and the provision of nonaudit services (NAS) by the incumbent auditor. They

hypothesize that audit committees that are independent and active are associated with lower ratios

of NAS fees to audit fees. Since audit failures in a number of high profile corporate scandals (e.g.,

Enron) have been attributed in part to the loss of auditor independence due to provision of nonaudit

services, the findings of this study provide important insight on this issue. Results indicate that the

ratio of NAS fees to audit fees is significantly lower in firms with independent and active audit

committees, lending further support to the notion that audit committees could play a positive role in

promoting auditor independence, to the extent auditor independence is negatively compromised by

the provision of nonaudit services to audit clients.

Collectively, these studies suggest that more independent audit committees will demand a

higher quality audit and thus be willing to ratify higher audit fees. It also appears that more

independent audit committees will be less willing to engage the auditor in activities that may

compromise the perceived appearance and perhaps actual level of auditor independence. However,

none of the research to date has been successful in documenting causality in the relationships.

Audit Opinion and the Audit Process

Corporate governance factors could significantly influence auditor decisions relating to the

audit process, including the nature of the audit opinion rendered. In addition, the role of the audit

committee in helping resolve disagreements between the auditor and the management is an

28

important issue that has been addressed in prior research. Studies dealing with these issues are

discussed below.

Cohen and Hanno (2000) found that both the management control philosophy and the

strength of the corporate governance structure (which as discussed earlier they patterned in a strict

fashion after the monitoring focus of the COSO Report 1992) significantly affected auditor control

risk assessments and the extent of substantive testing but had no effect on the timing of substantive

testing. Their results suggest that auditors consider the overall corporate governance structure

during the audit process. From a financial reporting quality perspective, this implies that auditors

would view clients with a board that has a strong oversight function as having less risk that

management would overstep their bounds in being aggressive in financial statement position issues.

Using a semi-structured interview approach, Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2002)

examined the impact of various corporate governance factors such as the board of directors and the

audit committee on the audit process. Auditors from all levels (seniors, managers, partners),

representing all of the then Big-5 firms indicated a range of views regarding the elements included

in the concept of what constitutes “corporate governance.” As noted previously, auditors viewed

company management as the primary driver of corporate governance, a notion inconsistent with a

prescription of the board and other mechanisms serving as a means to independently oversee

management’s actions to protect stakeholders. Further, auditors considered corporate governance

factors to be especially important in the client acceptance phase and for multinational clients.

Despite the attention placed on the audit committee, several auditors indicated that their

experiences with their clients suggest that audit committees are typically ineffective and lack

sufficient power to be a strong governance mechanism. The lack of reliance on the audit committee

potentially means that auditors would conduct more substantive testing than if there was an

effective audit committee that auditors could rely upon. However, their data was collected prior to

the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and perhaps in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era the

29

audit committee can be relied upon more to serve as an effective monitor over management’s

activities.

Carcello and Neal (2000) examined the relationship between the independence of the audit

committee and the likelihood that the client will receive a going-concern opinion. Using a sample

of nonfinancial public companies experiencing financial distress, the study found that the greater

the percentage of affiliated directors (inside or gray) in the audit committee, the lower the

probability that a going-concern report will be issued. In a follow up study, Carcello and Neal

(2003) examined if the composition and characteristics of the audit committee might influence

whether auditors were dismissed after the auditing firm issued a going concern report. They

expected that a stronger and more independent audit committee would be more likely to adopt an

effective monitoring perspective and be less likely to allow management to replace an incumbent

auditor in light of an unfavorable opinion. They found that for going concern (GC) firms, there was

a greater likelihood of auditor dismissal if the audit committee was less independent and if the

audit committee members had greater stock ownership. Additionally, there was a lower likelihood

of dismissal if there was greater governance expertise on the audit committee. Contrary to

expectations, the financial expertise of the AC members had no significant effect on dismissal.

Carcello and Neal suggest that when audit committees are less independent, management may be

more likely to pressure auditors to issue clean opinions and if they do issue a GC opinion, then

management may be more likely to dismiss the auditors. From a financial reporting quality

perspective, this implies that an effective audit committee can help the auditor be more aggressive

to curtail excessive management egregious behavior. However, since the study was archival,

Carcello and Neal were unable to identify causality. Further, in the post Sarbanes-Oxley

environment, it would be interesting to see if the threat of litigation or the increased scrutiny by

regulators over the financial reporting process may lower the relative frequency of audit firms

being dismissed for issuing a GC opinion.

30

The audit committee can potentially play a key role in facilitating the resolution of

disagreements between management and the external auditor. Knapp (1987) examined the factors

that determine audit committee’s support for auditors when there is a dispute with management.

The study found that audit committee members are more likely to support the auditor rather than

the management when audit committee members are themselves corporate managers; the issue

under dispute has objective technical standards that support the auditor’s position; and the client’s

financial condition is weak rather than strong. However, Knapp found no effect for whether the

auditor is a Big Eight as opposed to a non Big Eight firm. One implication from the corporate

governance mosaic, is that attention is needed to be placed on the complex interactions among the

players in the mosaic. For example, will heightened scrutiny by regulators or increased pressures

from activist shareholders influence audit committees to be more supportive of auditors if there are

financial reporting disputes with management?

In a study discussed previously, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) examined how AC

independence and knowledge affect audit committee members’ propensity to support the auditor’s

position. Results indicated that the number of independent directorships and greater audit reporting

knowledge were associated with greater support for the auditor, while those serving on the board

while also being as a member of management led to more support for management. Surprisingly,

financial reporting knowledge was not found to be a significant factor, perhaps due to the generic

nature of the accounting issue at hand. DeZoort and Salterio emphasize that the findings support

the need for independent, knowledgeable AC members. Thus, to strengthen the ties between the

auditor and the audit committee in ensuring financial reporting quality, care must be taken in

choosing audit committee members with the appropriate background perhaps emphasizing at least

some members possessing audit ing expertise.

Ng and Tan (2003) examined the effects of the availability of authoritative guidance and

effectiveness of the client’s audit committee on auditors’ perceptions regarding outcomes when

negotiating with a client. A central issue evaluated in the study is whether the effect on auditor-

31

client negotiation of the presence (absence) of authoritative guidance is moderated by audit

committee effectiveness (or lack thereof). Results indicate that availability of authoritative

guidance has a greater impact on auditors’ perceived negotiation outcome when the client’ audit

committee is ineffective than when it is effective. Further, audit committee effectiveness has a

greater effect on auditors’ perceptions regarding negotiation outcome in the absence of

authoritative guidance than in its presence. In effect, the study suggests that authoritative guidance

and effective audit committees can serve as potential substitutes in enhancing auditors’ ability to

negotiate with client hence increasing audit effectiveness and financial reporting quality.

DeZoort et al. (2003) examine the effects of earnings per share (EPS) proximity to analyst

forecast, financial-report timing (quarterly versus year-end), and external auditor argument

consistency on audit committee members’ support for a proposed audit adjustment. Using source

credibility theory, the study predicts that audit committee members will provide greater support for

a proposed audit adjustment when: (1) the financial report relates to the year-end rather than at

interim; (2) when unadjusted EPS is above rather than below analysts’ consensus forecast; and (3)

when the auditor consistently argues for the adjustment rather than agreeing with the management

to avoid adjustment. The study found that audit committee members are more likely to recommend

an audit adjustment for annual rather than quarterly financial statements and when the auditor

consistently argues in favor of making the audit adjustment. However, no significant effect was

found for the EPS proximity variable. The study adds to the growing literature on the conditions

under which audit committees will support external auditors in resolving contentious financial

reporting issues with the management.

Bedard and Johnstone (2004) investigate the impact of earnings manipulation risk and

corporate governance risk (e.g., the strength of governance variables) on audit planning and pricing

decisions. Using proprietary data from a public accounting firm, the study uses partners’

assessments with respect to engagement risks, together with audit effort and billing rate data

relating to those engagements. Results indicate that heightened earnings manipulation risk is

32

associated with increases in planned audit hours and planned billing rates but there is no significant

association between corporate governance risk and planned audit hours or billing rates. However,

an interactive effect between earnings manipulation and corporate governance risk is reported, i.e.,

corporate governance is associated with increased planned audit hours or billing rates only when

earnings manipulation risk is high. From this interactive effect, Bedard and Johnstone conclude that

corporate governance risk is most important to auditors when there are indicators of potential

earnings management.

Collectively, these studies suggest that there is a link between governance factors and the

ability of the auditor to resolve disputes with management. It appears that audit committees can

potentially serve as an ally to the auditor especially if the audit committee members have sufficient

expertise and sophistication. However, as documented by the interview study of Cohen et al.

(2002) the potential for audit committees to enhance the quality of the financial reporting process

has still not been fully realized.

Synthesis of Research on External Auditor

To synthesize, prior research suggests that stronger boards and audit committees are

associated with a demand for higher quality audits. Further, stronger governance structures are

associated with higher audit fees. In addition, evidence from recent research suggests that

shareholders are beginning to take a more direct and active role by affecting their voting of

ratification of the appointment of auditors where the magnitude of non-audit services is judged to

threaten auditor independence. Although there is prior research on the role of governance factors

both with respect to auditor selection and compensation, there is a paucity of research that

examines the role of a client’s or a prospective client’s governance structure on an auditor’s

decision to continue with an existing client or to accept a new client. For example, are auditors

more likely to accept clients with stronger audit committees with the hope that a stronger audit

committee is more likely to side with the auditor in case of disagreements with the management, or

that a strong audit committee is less likely to be price-sensitive with respect to audit fees?

33

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

INTERNAL AUDIT

Internal Auditors and The Audit Committee

A close relationship between internal auditors (IA) and the audit committee (AC) has the

potential to enhance the corporate governance capabilities of both parties. The independence of the

IA is strengthened when it reports directly to the AC and is not hampered by concerns of divulging

sensitive findings as compared to when IA reports to top management. Further, the breadth and

hence, perceived value, of the IA is likely to be enhanced when it is employed as an important

agent of the AC. Correspondingly, the effectiveness of the AC is strengthened when it is able to

deploy the resources of the IA staff to obtain significant information on issues within the company

of concern such as the strength of internal controls and quality of accounting policies.9

Research in this area has used a survey methodology to investigate the affect of AC

characteristics on the strength of its relationship with the AC. Scarbrough et al. (1998) survey chief

internal auditors (CIA) and find a positive association between AC independence and the frequency

of meetings with IAs as well as review of IA work. Raghunandan et al. (2001) report that CIAs

indicate companies with ACs that comply with the Blue Ribbon Report recommendations as to

independence and financial knowledge had more frequent meetings, more private meetings, and

reviewed the work of IAs more than those who did not meet the recommendations.

Goodwin and Yeo (2001) find wholly independent ACs had more frequent meetings and

more private meetings with IAs. None of the three prior studies noted above report a significant

association between AC characteristics and ACs’ power to dismiss the CIA.

9 A large body of literature has examined issues related to external auditor’s evaluation of and reliance on the internal audit function, including external auditor’s use of internal auditors as assistants (see Krishnamoorthy, 2002 for an overview). However, this stream of literature does not consider the role of other players that are traditionally included in the corporate governance mosaic (e.g., board of directors, audit committees). Further, a review and synthesis of literature on internal audit is the subject matter of a separate paper by Gramling et al. (2004). Hence, this section does not include literature that exclusively emphasizes the relationship between the external and the internal auditor.

34

Goodwin (2003) reports the results of a survey where she separately examines the effect of

AC independence and financial knowledge on the relationship with IAs. She finds that while AC

independence is most significantly associated with “process” factors (e.g., number of meetings,

length of meetings, and number of private meetings), AC financial competence is related to the

extent of the review of the work performed by IAs. That is, financial knowledge is necessary for

the AC to be in a position to evaluate and oversee the work of IAs. She also finds that AC

independence is strongly associated with the power to dismiss and appoint the CIA.

Collectively, these four studies suggest that internal audit potentially can interact with audit

committees to play a role in effectively monitoring management and improving financial reporting

quality. Of note, since all of above studies rely on a survey of internal auditors only, future research

should examine whether audit committee members have similar perceptions as IAs do and whether

auditors would rely more on the work of IA if the internal audit function has a more effective

working relationship with the AC.

Other Internal Audit Studies

Corporate governance can encompass helping management in setting a strategic direction

as well as monitoring management activities (Wright et al. 2004). Melville (2003), examines the

role of IAs in helping to establish and oversee a Balanced Scorecard system. Such functions would

suggest a role for IAs in the strategic management process of a company. To address this issue a

survey was sent to practicing IAs. The results indicate IAs are often involved in strategic

management initiatives, including a Balanced Scorecard, and also provide assurance on the quality

of financial and non-financial measures utilized in such efforts.

James (2003) examines lenders’ perceptions of the effectiveness of IAs in preventing

and/or reporting fraudulent financial reporting when they report to senior management or directly

to the board and when this function is performed in-house or outsourced. The findings indicate

lenders believe an in-house internal audit function that reports to the board is significantly more

likely to report, but not deter, fraudulent reporting. This result could be because of the greater

35

independence of IAs when reporting to the Board rather than to management. An outsourced IA

function that reports to the audit committee is seen as more likely to deter and report fraud than an

in-house IA function reporting to management. However, overall, no differences in perceptions are

found in fraud deterrence, detection, and reporting between an in-house and outsourced IA

function. This finding is attributed to the fact that while an outsourced function is seen as more

competent and objective, in-house IAs are viewed as possessing more detailed knowledge of the

company.

Collectively, these two studies suggest that there is a role for IA to play in fulfilling both

the strategic aspect of governance as well as a more traditional monitoring function. Both of these

roles could potentially lead to improving financial reporting quality. For example, if internal

auditors are effective in monitoring a balanced scorecard and the balanced scorecard is closely tied

in with an effective implementation of a far sighted business strategy, then there may be a

reduction of the potential for a going concern to arise.

Synthesis of Research on Internal Auditors

To synthesize, prior studies have documented a positive association between the

independence and expertise of the audit committee and the effectiveness of the internal audit

function. Recent governance reforms (i.e., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the resulting SEC and

stock exchange regulations) have emphasized the significance of the internal audit function as an

important part of the governance mosaic. For example, companies listed on the NYSE are now

required to maintain an internal audit function and the audit committees of such companies are

required to meet with the internal auditors without the presence of the management. Increasingly,

boards and audit committees view internal and external auditors as partners who must work

together for ensuring that the highest quality financial reports are provided to all stakeholders.

Hence, an important area for future research is to examine how governance factors, such as the

strength of the audit committee, influence the extent to which external auditors partner with

internal auditors in the process of providing assurance on financial statements. For example, are

36

external auditors’ assessments of internal audit quality and subsequent reliance on the work of

internal auditors influenced by the effectiveness of the client’s corporate governance? Do stronger

boards and audit committees promote a higher level of coordination between the external and

internal auditors? Future research may examine what are the factors that enhance the internal

auditors’ ability to improve financial reporting quality. For example, looking at the governance

mosaic, should regulators mandate experience or knowledge requirements for heads of IA

departments for publicly traded companies? Further, if this is mandated will these requirements

strengthen the power of IA departments and thus enhance their effectiveness in the IA department’s

ability to curtail unduly aggressive management behavior

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

We now discuss research opportunities that are indicative of the prior review as well as the

recent financial scandals and the resulting response from the U.S. Congress as evidenced by the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). These are discussed in the following subsections. We have also, where

appropriate, identified gaps in the governance mosaic that is outlined in Figure 1 where there exists

future research opportunities.

Future Research Relating to Board and Audit Committee Characteristics

There are a number of promising directions for future research regarding board and AC

characteristics and their impact on governance. Most of the studies primarily focus on the AC and

only a few consider the interrelationship between the AC and the board (e.g., Menon and Williams

1994; Kalbers and Fogarty 1993; and Beasley and Salterio 2001). Since the board empowers and

selects members of the AC, without strong board support the AC cannot be effective in fulfilling its

oversight functions. Thus, consideration of the AC in isolation is questionable.

The importance of the type of knowledge base audit committee members should posses is

ripe for further consideration in research. Cohen et al. (2002) found that auditors viewed audit

committee members as lacking in sophisticated financial and business knowledge. This lack of

37

knowledge could pose problems for auditors since DeZoort (1998) found that audit committee

members who did not have appropriate experience did not evaluate control environment activities

in a manner consistent with auditors. An interesting research question is whether audit committee

expertise has significantly changed in light of the reforms (e.g., the requirement that the audit

committee have at least one member who possesses expertise while all other members must have

financial literacy) enacted as a result of the BRC (1999) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002).

Additionally, research can focus on whether the increase in audit committee expertise has resulted

in an increase in the quality of financial reporting, as intended by the legislators and regulators.

Research in this area can provide guidance to legislators and regulators interested in further

enhancing the substantive effectiveness of boards and their subcommittees.

Further work is also needed in identifying and more precisely measuring the key

characteristics of effective AC members. For instance, what forms of knowledge are most

important for various types of issues confronting the AC such as a technical accounting matter

versus considering auditor independence? Although Sarbanes Oxley has a general requirement for

financial expertise and financial literacy, does the life cycle of a company necessitate different

types of skill sets from the AC members. Thus, for newer companies in volatile industries such as

exists in high tech, a broader business skill set may be necessary than what would be required from

AC members who serve in very stable companies in stable industries where a strong financial

monitoring skill set may be more appropriate. Further, in our review one notable gap in the

literature is the lack of governance related research that focuses on the issue of regulated versus

unregulated industries. For example, a fruitful area of future research is to examine if the

composition and expertise required of audit committee members in regulated industries (e.g.,

banking, utilities) is significantly different from that in unregulated industries. Research in this area

can provide useful information and guidance to regulators such as the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (FDIC) when formulating guidelines that impact its constituent firms.

38

Finally, there has only been one study to examine characteristics of AC appointments vis-

à-vis other members of the board and of other board committees (Vafeas 2001), and only a few

studies have investigated power dimensions relating to AC performance (Kalbers and Fogarty

1993, Fogarty and Kalbers 1998). Since the data in those studies was collected pre Sarbanes-Oxley,

it is essential to see if the findings still hold in a world where corporate governance issues

consistently hit the headlines of the business press. These issues are likely to have a profound

impact on the effectiveness of an AC and, thus, are promising avenues for future research.

Post Sarbanes-Oxley it is imperative for researchers to consider what is the role of the AC

and how do we appropriately define and measure AC “effectiveness.” For example, Brown (1999),

the Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission argues (p. 8) that “the committee should take

responsibility for reinforcing the independence of the auditor and ensuring accounting policies are

consistent with not only the letter of GAAP, but also the spirit.” He further recommends that the

focus of the audit committee “should be on ensuring the quality of the audit rather than becoming

preoccupied with the level of fees quoted, perhaps at the expense of quality.” An important area of

future research is to examine if the spate of legislative and regulatory reforms resulting from the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act results in unintended consequences that negatively impact the quality of

financial reporting. For example, an unintended consequence of the emphasis in the Sarbanes-

Oxley Act on financial literacy and expertise for audit committee members may result in audit

committees that overly focus on the financial statements without adequate consideration for

business and strategic risks faced by the company.. This potentially affects financial reporting

quality because of the going concern issues could arise if the firm has not adequately understood its

competitive marketplace. Further, this focus on the “form” of the audit committee may detract from

the need for the committee to have the requisite power and diligence (“substance”) needed to

effectively perform their oversight duties. Research on such issues can be instructive to both

legislators and regulators in obtaining valuable feedback that can guide future regulatory efforts.

39

Future Research Relating to Management

Management has the primary responsibility for ensuring that the company’s financial

reporting system, including the overall control environment, results in a high quality of financial

reports provided to the company’s stakeholders. The issue of how management interacts with the

other players in the corporate governance mosaic to potentially affect financial reporting quality is

ripe for further exploration. To date, there has been almost no research that has directly looked at

how management affects the corporate governance mosaic. The prior research on boards and audit

committees(e.g. Beasley 1996; Beasley et al. 2000; Abbott et al. 2000) though does suggest that

stronger boards and audit committees may potentially deter management from engaging in earnings

manipulation and/or committing financial reporting fraud as well as even curtailing earnings

management (Klein 2002a 2002b). prior studies suggest the lack of a consistent and a generally

accepted definition of “high quality financial reporting” among the players in the governance

mosaic. This issue is worthy of future research, especially in the light of the ongoing debate in the

accounting profession with respect to a “principles” versus “rules” based approach to generally

accepted accounting principles. For example, is a principles based approach more or less likely to

build greater consensus across the various stakeholders, especially the management, the auditors,

and the audit committee, with respect to what constitutes “high quality financial reporting,” as

compared to a “rules” based approach?

To date, the literature has focused on identifying an association between corporate

governance factors such as characteristics of the board of directors or the audit committee and

financial reporting quality. However, this research has not directly examined actual management

behavior and the research has largely ignored identifying a causal link between the components of

the governance mosaic. Although documentation of such an association is extremely important, an

archival approach may not be able to tease out the direct links. For example, although Klein

(2002b) found an association between independence of boards and the incidence of earnings

management she was not able to state whether this was due to good (bad) management or good

40

(bad) boards. As Klein (399) notes, “A less liberal interpretation is that firms with large accruals

inherent in their earnings structure are less inclined to have independent boards or audit

committees.” This is an area where applying a judgment and decision making framework or

utilizing experimental economics may allow researchers to more finely assess the impact of

individual components of the corporate governance mosaic. For example, a future study could

manipulate the incentives of management to engage in earnings manipulation and determine under

what conditions board member independence will matter (or not) in deterring management’s

willingness to engage in this behavior. Thus, research may examine if auditors are sophisticated in

evaluating the substantive effectiveness of the board to determine if the board can be relied upon

for a risk management strategy and adjust their audit planning decisions accordingly. Further,

looking at gaps in the research in the corporate governance mosaic, there can be more research

examining the role that the stock exchanges could play in enhancing the effectiveness of the

substance of audit committee activities. For example, research can examine if specific rules on the

different exchanges regarding the characteristics (e.g., financial expertise) needed for an audit

committee member may differentially affect the financial reporting quality for companies listed on

a particular exchange. the exchanges about what types of experts should be in place in the audit

committees for firms listed on their exchange.

Further, archival research is limited in being able to detect the difference between the form

and substance of corporate governance mechanisms. For example, management will ensure that

ACs comply with the minimum standards of having all independent members, at least one a

financial expert, and the rest being financial literates as prescribed by BRC (1999). However,

independence can be subverted if audit committee members are all connected with the CEO

through being in a similar business and/or social milieu. A future study should investigate if

auditors recognize the ability of management to influence the effectiveness of the audit committees

so auditors can discern differences in the form and substance of corporate governance mechanisms

when assessing the risks associated with the financial reporting process. For example, it is unclear

41

whether auditors can rely on ACs who management has helped shape to merely comply with

regulations. Will these ACs be supportive of auditors’ positions in disputes over financial reporting

issues? Thus, auditors need to closely examine the substance of the activities of the AC and

whether management exerts undue influence on the performance of the AC. If research finds that

firms are complying with the letter of the law on governance requirements but the governance

mechanisms remain impotent in their ability to challenge management on reporting issues, then

perhaps legislators will need to rethink the current “bright line” approach to mandating governance.

Although corporate governance has universally viewed inside directors in a negative light

(Dalton and Daily 1999), there are times that very close connections between management and the

board may enhance the effectiveness of the board’s activities. For example, the presence of some

key insiders potentially may help other board members better understand the workings of the

company and thus perhaps improve the strategic functions of the board which in turn has the

potential to limit the potential down the road for going concern problems. For instance, if the CEO

is also on the board, the CEO could provide the board with detailed information on potential new

product lines that could significantly affect the performance of the company, and thus perhaps

enhance the speed and quality of the type of access and connections that other board members may

provide. A future study could examine the trade-off between better strategic decision-making

versus the increased probability of agency costs of having management unduly influencing the

corporate governance mosaic by placing key insiders on the board. Perhaps regulators may have to

adopt a more flexible principles based approach to governance that at times would allow

companies to have a more strategic focused BOD.

Another area open to research is whether the type of accounting issue will affect the link between

corporate governance mechanisms and the ability of management to influence the quality of

financial reporting. For example, management may be more aggressive in financial reporting when

the accounting standard is less precise (Nelson et al. 2002). Further, Trompeter (1994) found that

the ambiguity of an accounting issue was negatively related to auditors' judgments in

42

recommending downward adjustments to income. A future study could examine if the effectiveness

of corporate governance mechanisms will influence audit judgments differently over a variety of

accounting issues that were more technical in nature as well as across more stable business

environments.

Prior studies also suggest the lack of a consistent and a generally accepted definition of

“high quality financial reporting” among the players in the governance mosaic (Haka and Chalos

1990; McDaniel et al. 2002) . This issue is worthy of future research, especially in the light of the

ongoing debate in the accounting profession with respect to a “principles” versus “rules” based

approach to generally accepted accounting principles. For example, is a principles based approach

more or less likely to build greater consensus across the various stakeholders, especially the

management, the auditors, and the audit committee, with respect to what constitutes “high quality

financial reporting,” as compared to a “rules” based approach?

Another fruitful area of future research relates to the requirement imposed by Section 302

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that the management (CEO and CFO) of public companies certify the

appropriateness and fairness of financial reports and related disclosures. Future research could

consider if other stakeholders in the governance mosaic (e.g., boards, audit committees, external

auditors) view certification by senior management as significantly improving corporate

accountability with respect to financial reporting, or merely symbolic with little or no meaningful

effect on the credibility of financial statements. Also, future research could examine if courts and

the legal system, including prospective jurors will hold senior management to a higher standard and

therefore impose greater penalties in case of financial reporting failures, as a result of the explicit

certification provided by management.

One final area that remains largely ignored in the research to date is the effect of cultural

variations on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms on monitoring and assisting

management in multinational settings. Hofstede (1991) has suggested that culture could play a role

in the effectiveness of various control mechanisms on a manager’s behavior. For example, he

43

suggests that some countries such as the United States have a high degree of individualism and low

power distance while other countries such as Japan would be more collectivist in orientation and

would have a higher power distance (Cohen et al. 1993, 1995). This would suggest that even more

so than in the United States, in some other cultures corporate governance mechanisms would be

merely symbolic and be ineffective in moderating managers’ earnings manipulation behavior.

Thus, future research should investigate the impact of culture on the effectiveness of the corporate

governance mosaic in monitoring management in ensuring a high quality financial reporting

process. For example, the courts and legal system may be more important in ensuring effective

governance and serving as a check on management’s behavior than governance mechanisms in

cultures that have a higher power distance (Cohen et al. 1993).

Future Research Relating to the External Auditor

There are several avenues for future research that relate to governance factors and the

external auditor. First, issues relating to auditor selection should be examined in greater breadth

and depth in future research. The general research issue can be summarized in the following

research questions: Do corporate governance factors influence auditor selection and retention

decisions? If so, how? Although prior research (Abbott and Parker 2000) has examined the role of

AC member independence and activity in auditor selection, it is important to examine the role of

the entire board as auditor selection increasingly takes center-stage in corporate boardrooms.

Beasley and Petroni (2001) examined the association between outside directors and auditor choice

but did not examine or control for other board characteristics (e.g., composition, size, knowledge,

expertise). Given the recent increased expectations regarding the accountability of the board to its

stakeholders (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002), it will be instructive to examine if board

characteristics other than independence are associated with auditor choice and selection decisions.

Further, there is paucity of research on the corporate governance factors that are important in

auditor retention decisions. AC committees are now required to be actively engaged in the auditor

retention and fee process (NYSE 2002), rather than merely rubber-stamping management decisions

44

with respect to the incumbent auditor. Hence, research relating to corporate governance factors that

influence auditor retention and auditor switching decisions are likely to be fruitful areas for future

research. It would also be useful to examine how regulators may affect this process. With the

increased scrutiny of the auditing process by the PCAOB, will auditing firms be more reluctant to

engage in lowballing in order to lure clients away from their current auditing firms?

The impact of the board and the AC on audit planning judgments is a potentially fruitful

area to investigate. If auditors only focus on the monitoring functions and ignore the potential role

that boards have in setting the strategic directions of their clients, then auditors may be sacrificing

potential efficiencies as well as possibly impeding effectiveness. The type of corporate governance

in place could affect key business processes (e.g., product innovation, supplier selection, R&D

processes) and the risks associated with the achievement of those processes. Thus, an evaluation of

a client’s corporate governance structure could help an auditor understand the process by which an

entity’s mission and business objectives are defined and developed, the business risks that can

impede the attainment of these objectives, and the risk management processes in place to control

and monitor business risks (Bell et al. 1997, 38).

The allocation of professional staff to audits may also be a function of the importance

placed on the governance structure when planning an audit. Cohen et al. (2002) revealed that an

audit senior’s role with regard to governance is primarily one of gathering information for manager

and partner consideration. It is important to examine how seniors obtain this information, given

their limited exposure to senior management and the board (mechanisms considered of greatest

importance). Since seniors are responsible for planning and executing day-to-day audit procedures,

they may be insufficiently impounding information on governance given their limited knowledge

regarding governance. Future research could investigate if the review process is sufficient to

overcome potential incorrect conclusions by seniors. Alternatively, it may be important to

recognize that if the evaluation of corporate governance is made an integral component of the audit

planning process, then research may be conducted to determine if the individuals making the

45

corporate governance evaluations should be partners who are more likely than seniors to have the

requisite amount of domain expertise (Bedard and Biggs 1991). For example, if research

determines that there is a need for more partner involvement in governance related issues, then

regulators may mandate the use of a more substantive involvement by partners in the audit process.

Prior research also suggests two perspectives with respect to the impact of corporate

governance on the extent of audit work that is performed by external auditors. One perspective,

predominately based on agency theory, argues that boards that exhibit a stronger monitoring focus

will demand a higher quality audit resulting in greater audit effort by the external auditor (e.g.,

Carcello et al. 2002). Others (e.g., Bedard and Johnstone 2002, Wright et al., 2004) argue that if

corporate governance mechanisms are weak (strong), external auditors are more likely to respond

to this increased risk with an increase (decrease) in audit effort. This risk-based approach, which at

first blush seems to contradict the demand-based approach outlined earlier, deserves further

attention since one could argue that these approaches are not mutually exclusive (i.e., audit effort

may be increased either due to a greater demand from a client with strong governance or due to

greater perceived risk by the auditor when governance mechanisms are weak). Future research,

employing a variety of research methods (analytical, empirical, behavioral) should develop a strong

theoretical basis on which we can develop a greate r understanding of the corporate governance

factors that influence auditors’ planning judgments. For example, companies in stable industries

may be more likely candidates for the demand explanation because the environment is more

predictable and a greater demand for auditing services will help the board fulfill its monitoring

role. In contrast, in volatile industries where the external environment is more in flux, the auditors

may use the perceived strength of various corporate governance factors as part of their risk

containment strategy. Future research may look at the role of the courts and legal system here. For

example, no research to date in accounting has looked at how and indeed whether potential jurors

will weight the evidence associated with governance factors when deliberating on the

appropriateness of the evidence that auditors have gathered.

46

Another factor that must be considered when examining the relationship between the

external auditors and corporate governance characteristics is the incentives of auditors. Although

Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) prohibits a number of nonaudit services, there are still a number of services

that auditors can provide subject to the approval of the audit committee. Will the existence of these

incentives mitigate the likelihood that auditors will even question management’s position where

there are more ambiguous accounting standards (Nelson et al. 2002)? Further, if auditors do not

raise the issues, will the audit committee have sufficient power and expertise to independently raise

these accounting issues with the auditors? If legislators perceive that auditors are not capable of

this, then research should examine if future legislation should extend the ban on nonaudit services

even further. In addition, future research should examine the role of stockholders, especially large

institutional shareholders such as pension funds, in decisions with respect to the appointment and

retention of auditors. Research on whether regulators should mandate that the

appointment/reappointment of auditors should be approved by the shareholders is an important and

useful area of future research.

Future Research on Internal Auditors

Little attention has been paid in prior research to the effect of governance factors on the

relationship between external and internal auditors. External auditors’ evaluation of and reliance on

the internal audit function is an important issue that impacts audit efficiency and effectiveness and

has been well researched in the auditing literature (e.g., Krishnamoorthy 2002, Maletta 1993).

Since corporate governance factors are known to impact the internal audit function (e.g.,

Raghunandan et al. 2001), examining the role of governance factors in external auditors’ evaluation

of and reliance on the internal audit function is a useful area for future research.

With the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) putting more emphasis on the control systems of companies,

it will be interesting to see if internal auditors play a more important role in the corporate

governance mosaic (Geiger and Taylor 2003). Future research may examine if management’s

increased responsibility over controls will enhance the power and in turn the effectiveness of the

47

internal audit function. Other issues that should be examined in future research include whether the

type and strength of corporate governance is related to (1) external auditors’ assessment of the

objectivity, competence, and work performance of internal auditors; (2) external auditors’ reliance

on the internal audit function, including their propensity to use internal auditors as assistants; and

(3) external auditors’ overall client risk assessment and audit program planning judgments in the

presence of a strong (weak) internal audit function. Perhaps one overall goal of the research on the

relationship between the internal audit function and corporate governance could be to provide

insight for legislators and regulators on approaches to effectively mandate closer cooperation

between internal auditors and external auditors especially if the outcome of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

is to enhance the perceived professionalism of internal auditors.

FIGURE 1: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MOSAIC AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY

Courts & Legal System Financial Analysts

Regulators Stock Exchanges Stockholders

Legislators

Management External Auditors Internal Auditors

Board of Directors Audit Committee

Financial Reporting Quality

1

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF STUDIES RELATING TO BOARD AND AUDIT COMMITTEE

Author(s) Method Sample Independent Variable(s)

Dep. Variable

Results Future Research

Vafeas (2001) Archival (proxy statements 1995-98)

262 audit committee appointments and matched sample of board non-members

Grey director; equity holdings; number of directorships; board tenure; other committee memberships

Probability of serving on audit committee

“Next in line”—audit committee appointees have less tenure on board and fewer other committee appointments. No difference in frequency of grey directors vs. other board members. Suggests audit committee a training ground or of lesser importance.

Examination of other qualifications such as financial literacy. Evidence these factors lead to improved financial reporting quality.

Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal (2002)

Archival 150 companies, randomly selected, 50 each from NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ

Size, Big5, Financial Distress, Nonaudit fees, Exchange, Industry, Number of AC meetings, AC independence

AC Disclosure

The study found gap between what audit committees say they are doing and what is mandated by their charter. Although this gap may be due to several reasons including liability concerns, it raises the general issue of transparency with respect to activities of the audit committee

Examine relationship between AC disclosures and AC effectiveness. Explore relationship between additional AC disclosures and financial reporting quality

Vicknair et al. (1993)

Archival: proxy statements

100 NYSE companies (1980-87)

No model Level of grey directors on audit committee

About 1/3 of audit committee members are grey directors, notably interlocking directors, engaged in related party transactions

Affect of grey directors on auditor switching, audit opinion, reporting quality; more recent data

2

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Wolnizer (1995)

A priori; Argument

N/A N/A N/A AC independence will not enhance financial reporting without improvements in accounting practices to allow authentication by impartial, market evidence vs. evaluation of management choices

Empirical data to validate premises identified and alternative accounting systems; validation of duties of AC compiled from the literature

DeZoort & Salterio (2001)

Experiment 68 audit committee members

Independent director experience; audit knowledge

Support for management Or auditor

Greater support for auditor in an accounting dispute situation with increased independent director experience and audit knowledge. No affect for level of accounting knowledge.

Impact of financial accounting expertise; alternative dispute situations; alternative independence measures; group interaction.

Klein (2002a) Archival 803 year end observations of S&P 500 firms that had SEC filed proxy statements between 1991-1993

Independence of BOD, size of BOD, growth in earnings or cash flows, series of consecutive losses, debt to assets ratio, whether CEO sits on the compensation committee, presence of large non-inside shareholders on AC, % of shares held by outside directors.

Independence of AC

Positive association with board size, % of outsiders on Board Negative association with growth opportunities, consecutive losses, large blockholder on AC, firm size No effect of Debt to assets, CEO on compensation committee and outside director Holdings.

Is independence of Acs for higher growth firms and firms with consecutive losses associated with higher incidence of fraud What factors affect the ability of Acs to meet expectations of expertise?

3

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

DeZoort (1997)

Survey 118 audit committee members

N/A Formal duties and additional duties of AC; knowledge needed

Did not recognize duties reported in proxy statement; identified many other duties performed or should be performed; perceived need for accounting, auditing, and legal knowledge

Examination of divergence of formal responsibilities in proxy and those identified; Need to examine types and composition of knowledge needed for AC members

DeZoort (1998)

Experiment 87 audit committee members

Experience in auditing and internal control evaluations

An internal control evaluation

AC members with experience in auditing and internal control evaluations more likely than AC members who have less domain related experience to make control evaluations in line with auditors.

Will AC members with the appropriate domain related expertise be more likely than AC members without the appropriate domain related expertise to side with auditors in disputes auditors may have with management?

Beasley and Salterio (2001)

Archival 665 large Canadian companies

Proportion of outside board members, board size, board chair

Outside AC members beyond mandated; AC knowledge

Higher quality AC (independence and knowledge) associated with stronger boards

Causal links in factors studied; Monitoring effectiveness of AC and board

4

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

McDaniel et al. (2002)

Experiment 20 Audit managers surrogating as financial experts. 18 Executive MBA Graduates surrogating as financial literates

Financial experts versus literates, Financial item salience

Evaluation of the quality of the item's reported treatment with respect to elements of reporting quality. Identification of critical reporting issues to be discussed at the AC meeting with external auditors.

Experts and literates differed in their evaluations of what was important in evaluating financial reporting quality. Experts' assessments of relevance and comparability characteristics of quality were different than literates. Literates raise more concern than experts on items that are nonrecurring or receive high salience in the press.

Whether and how different types of experts differ in their evaluation of quality How will interactive group settings affect the overall assessments by the AC on issues of financial reporting quality Will inclusion of experts lead to a greater focus on reporting quality issues than an AC comprised solely of literates.

DeZoort & Salterio (2001)

Experiment 68 audit committee members

Independent director experience; audit knowledge

Support for management Or auditor

Greater support for auditor in an accounting dispute situation with increased independent director experience and audit knowledge

5

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Spangler and Braiotta (1990)

Survey 77 respondents from 42 companies (audit partner, AC chair, CFO, AC members, chief internal auditor)

AC chair leadership: transactional (opportunities and rewards) and transformational (vision and charisma)

Perceptions of AC effectiveness

Mixed results (correlation vs. regression); positive association between AC effectiveness and transformational and some transactional (contingent rewards, and active management by exception) characteristics

Examine situational moderating variables; improved measures of AC effectiveness.

Kalbers and Fogarty (1993)

Survey 164 partners, CFOs, and chiefs of internal audit for 90 companies

Types of organizational and personal power

AC effectiveness for 3 oversight functions and overall

Using LISREL models forms of institutional power are found to mediate personal power factors (especially AC diligence). Institutional power (strong charter, good information support) is only valuable if AC has high diligence.

Further understanding of complex nature of various power dimensions; improved measures of constructs.

6

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Gendron and Bedard (2004)

Interview 15 professionals associated with two Canadian firms. (e.g., CEO's, CFO's, Internal Auditors, External Auditors, Audit Committee members)

Variables affecting social construction of AC effectiveness Member's profile(independence) Ceremonial features of the meeting (a defined agenda) Substance of meetings (AC members assess coherence of financial statements)

Social construction of perceived effectiveness of audit committee

Importance placed on private meetings between the audit committee and external auditors Questions occupy a key role in social construction AC meetings are more than mere symbolic Perceived performance of AC members play a significant role in constructing AC effectiveness.

Relationship between practices that are important in constructing effectiveness (e.g., asking questions) and indicators of AC effectiveness)

Menon and Williams (1994)

Archival 200 over-the-counter (OTC) firms

Management ownership, leverage, auditor type (Big Eight versus Non-Big Eight), board size, firm size, proportion of outside directors on board.

AC activity (number of meetings held by AC); Whether or not a manager served on the AC.

AC activity significantly related to firm size and proportion of outside directors on the board. Also, managers are more likely to be excluded from AC in firms with higher proportion of outsider directors on the board.

The mere mandate of ACs is not sufficient—need to ensure that ACs are indeed performing effectively.

7

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Fogarty and Kalbers (1998)

Survey (using data from their earlier study 1993) and archival

See above (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993)

% management ownership, leverage, company size, % outside directors, types of organizational and personal power

AC effectiveness for 3 oversight functions and overall, number of AC meetings

Weak association between Agency Theory factors and AC effectiveness, providing indirect support for Institutional Theory (AC a symbolic structure to conform to social pressures)

More refined development of Institutional Theory and operational measures; joint consideration of both Agency and Institutional Theories

Collier & Gregory (1999)

Survey & Archival

142 UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange

Agency and control variables: proportion of shares held by directors; leverage; size; Big6; proportion of non-exec directors; number of board members; chairman and managing director combined; number of shareholders; book to market value; growth in sales; qualification of audit report.

AC activity: Annual frequency of regular AC meetings and total annual time in hours that the AC met for.

Results show little support for the findings of Menon & Williams (1994). Big 6 and leverage were positively related to AC activity. AC activity was reduced in firms where the role of chairman and CEO were combined and where insiders were included in the AC.

More refined measure of AC activity.

8

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Haka and Chalos (1990)

Survey Subjects from Fortune 500 companies 53 chief operating officers within clients, 103 internal auditors, 57 external auditors and 55 audit committee chairs

Type of subject-e.g., chief operating officer

What should constitute full financial statement disclosure? What should influence accounting procedure choice?

Audit committee chairs are consistently different from other groups on what should constitute full disclosure (with ac members wanting greater disclosure). There was a relatively greater consensus with what should influence accounting procedure choice. However, there was still somewhat of a difference between AC and external auditors (e.g., audit cost perceptions, government intervention).

Empirical data to validate premises identified and alternative accounting systems; validation of duties of AC compiled from the literature. Impact of audit committee on disclosure and accounting procedure decisions Overall independence of auditors from management

9

Author(s ) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Krishnamoorthy et al. (2002)

Semi-structured survey

42 auditors (21 partners and 21 managers)

Factors affecting audit committee effectiveness (e.g., knowledge and expertise). Factors affecting financial reporting quality (e.g. type of disclosure) Factors affecting communication between the audit committee and the external auditor (e.g., influence of management)

Audit committee effectiveness, Financial reporting quality, Communication between the AC and external auditor.

Important to distinguish between the "form'" (meeting regulatory requirements) and the "substance," (the effectiveness) of Audit committees. Management exerts a significant influence over the quality of the interactions between the audit committee and the external auditor AC should play a greater role than they currently play in ensuring financial reporting quality. Major challenges in working with AC to ensure high financial reporting quality include the lack of financial sophistication of AC members and the will or substantive power of the AC members.

Does the type of corporate governance structure in place influence the expertise of the AC members? Will the adoption of the BRC recommendations be sufficient to make the AC a more effective oversight mechanism to the financial reporting process?

10

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

McMullen (1996)

Archival Five separate samples and control groups for firms that: Experienced shareholder litigation 1984-1988, corrected quarterly earnings, 1982-1988, violated SEC regulation, 1982-1988, committed illegal acts between 1984-1988, and had an auditor turnover due to an accounting dispute 1984-1988

Presence of an audit committee

Shareholder litigation, correction of quarterly earnings, violation of SEC regulations, committed illegal acts, and auditor changes due to accounting disputes

Presence of audit committee is associated with: 1. fewer shareholder

suits 2. fewer quarterly

earnings restatement 3. fewer SEC

enforcement actions 4. fewer illegal acts 5. fewer instances of

auditor turnover when there is an accounting dispute

Examine impact of organizational environment on audit committee effectiveness Examine influence of audit committee chair on audit committee effectiveness. Examine if there are systemic differences (e.g. composition, independence) between audit committees with and without financial reporting problems.

11

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable Results Future Research

Dechow et al. (1996)

Archival 92 companies subject to AAERs between 1982-1992 and a control sample matched on size and industry

Firms subject or not subject to AAERs

Agency related variables-demand for actual financing, insider trading, leverage, technical default and existence of a bonus plan. Governance variables-existence of an audit committee, composition and number of directors on the board, outside block shareholder, insider/outsider as chair of the board , big 6 auditor and whether the CEO is also the founder of the company

Firms subject to AAERs more likely to manipulate earnings to achieve lower cost of external financing No difference found in existence of bonus plans or in degree of insider trading Firms subject to AAERs have more leverage and are marginally more likely to be in violation of a debt covenant. Firms subject to AAERs more likely to have weaker governance structures and a) more insiders on

board b) insiders hold more

stock than outsiders on the board

c) more insiders, CEO more likely to be chair of the board and an original founder

d) less likely to have an audit committee

Once firms are subject to AAERs they have higher cost of capital

Examine what are the factors managers consider when deciding whether to engage in earnings management strategies when seeking external financing. Examine the factors that influence a firm’s disclosure policy that affects the tradeoff between short-term gain versus long term reputation. When firms are subject to AAERs, what actions do firms take and are the actions successful in restoring a firm’s reputation.

12

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Beasley (1996)

Archival Matched sample of 75 fraud and 75 non-fraud firms. Frauds publicly reported during 1980-91.

Percentage of outside board members, growth in assets, net losses prior to fraud, number of years as a public firm, insider ownership, CEO tenure, CEO also Chair of the Board, blockholders' ownership

Fraud or no Fraud

Larger % of outside members on board reduces fraud likelihood. Presence of AC has no effect on fraud likelihood

Research relating to levels of board composition and nature of board activities. Research on individual director traits (personality, management style, etc.) and their relationship to financial reporting quality. AC's role in enhancing financial reporting quality.

Beasley et al. (2000)

Archival 66 companies in 3 industries: High Tech-25 Health Care-19 Financial services-22 Compared to industry benchmark corporate governance measures.

Fraud vs. Industry benchmark Characteristics of Board of directors, audit committee and internal audit

Fraud companies in all 3 industries less likely to have independent audit committees, outsiders on the board and to have an internal audit function. High tech and health care fraud firms meet less frequently than their industry’s benchmark

Affect of grey directors on auditor switching, audit opinion, reporting quality; more recent data. Refine and build better models to discriminate between fraud and non-fraud companies

13

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Abbott et al. (2000)

Archival 78 firms from 1980-1996 subject to AAER's matched with 78 non-sanctioned firms

Audit committees with both a minimum level of both independence (no insiders) and audit committee activity (minimum two meetings per year) A number of control variables (e.g. Board characteristics, growth)

Incidence of SEC sanction for fraud and aggressive accounting

Independence together with activity of the AC is associated with a lower incidence of AAER For control variables, growth of company or the CEO as Chair of the Board resulted in a greater incidence of fraud. Results qualitatively similar for examining only the 43 fraud firms.

Examine effect of audit committee characteristics (e.g., experience, tenure and financial expertise of its members) on sanctions.

Klein (2002b) Archival 692 firms with audit committees listed on the S&P 500 as of 1992 and 1993 with annual shareholder meetings between 1991-1993

Board independence, Audit committee, independence, Large blockholder, CEO shareholdings. Control variables: Debt, size, past negative earnings and market to book ratios.

Magnitude of abnormal accruals

Negative relationship between board/audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. No evidence between having all independent audit committees and abnormal accruals. Changes from majority independent boards and/ or audit committees result in a significant increase in abnormal accruals. % of CEO holdings not significant Mixed results on large blockholders.

Will results hold with more refined measures of abnormal accruals. Examine the direction of causality e.g., whether the management of firms with abnormal accruals will create less independent boards or will more independent boards curtail the management of accruals by management.

14

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep.

Variable Results Future Research

Abbott et al. (2001)

Archival 83 firms from 1991-1999 having either AAER's or were mentioned in WSJ for restatement matched with 83 control firms

Independence of AC members, size of AC, accounting or related financial management expertise, discussion in proxy statements by AC of the frequency of AC meetings

Financial reporting misstatement or fraud

Misstatements affected by presence of a completely independent audit committee. Holding a minimum number of meetings while not significant are expertise and Characteristics of the Board of Directors

Wild (1996) Archival 260 companies that formed audit committees between 1966 and 1980.

Audit committee formation Abnormal stock returns

Results suggest that the audit committees provide a useful oversight mechanism for the financial reporting process and that this increased oversight results in improved earnings quality. Specifically, results showed that the stock market reaction for earnings reports was 20 percent greater for earnings announcements after audit committee formation than before.

Research rela ting to other corporate governance mechanisms and activities that are likely to impact the quality of financial reporting.

15

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF STUDIES RELATING TO EXTERNAL AUDITOR

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable

Results Future Research

Abbott & Parker (2000)

Archival 500 randomly selected firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with December 31 fiscal year ends.

Audit committee composition and meeting at least twice a year; number of outside directors as a percentage of overall board; % of shares owned by insiders; natural log of sales; leverage; new debt and equity issued; number of business segments; proportion of foreign sales; and return on assets

Three different specifications of specialist auditor based on prior literature

audit committees that are both independent and active are positively associated with selection of an industry specialist. Audit committee independence or activity alone yielded insignificant results.

Beasley & Petroni (2001)

Archival 681 Property-Liability Insurers for the 1991-92 fiscal years

The percentage of outside directors on the board. Control variables: size, financial health, business concentration (Herfindahl’s) index, the number of states the insurance company was licensed to do business, whether the insurer issued stock or surplus notes, and whether the insurer was organized as a mutual or a stock company.

Audit firm type (Specialist Big 6, Nonspecialist Big 6, Non-Big 6)

Results indicate that the likelihood that a specialist Big-6 auditor is selected increases with the percentage of outside directors on the board, but the outside board membership percentage has no impact on the choice between a nonspecialist Big-6 and non Big-6 auditor.

The study called for future behavioral research examining board members’ perceptions of the importance of industry specialization when choosing external auditors.

16

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable Results Future Research

Raghunandan (2003)

Archival Proxy statements and 10Qs of 172 of Fortune-1000 companies

Shareholder vote on auditor ratification

Ratio of nonaudit fees to audit fees; common stock returns; insider ownership of stock; CEO/Chairman duality

The proportion of shareholder votes against ratification is positive ly related to the ratio of nonaudit to audit fees.

Given the very high ratification rates (about 97%), even in companies with high ratio of nonaudit fees to audit fees, future studies should more fully explore the underlying reasons for shareholder ratification (or lack thereof) with respect to auditor appointment.

Raghunandan and Rama (2003)

Archival Proxy statements and 10Qs of 199 public companies

Percentage of votes against or abstaining from ratification of auditor

Ratio of nonaudit fees to audit fees; common stock returns; insider ownership of stock; CEO/Chairman duality; % of stockholders voting against director ratification; Big-5 or non Big-5 auditor; block (>5%) share ownership; audit committee quality

Shareholders were less likely to abstain from ratification or vote against ratification when ratio of nonaudit fees to audit fees is high, if the audit committee was comprised of solely independent directors.

Given the governance changes following Sarbanes-Oxley both with respect to the prohibition of nonaudit services as well as the composition of audit committees, future research should re-examine the issue of shareholder ratification in the context of changes resulting from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

17

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable Results Future Research

Cohen and Hanno (2000)

Experiment 96 auditors Strength of management control philosophy and strength of corporate governance

Client acceptance recommendation, Audit planning

Both management control philosophy and corporate governance significantly affected client acceptance recommendation, risk evaluations and extent of substantive testing. No effect found on the timing of testing.

What is the effect of individual corporate governance elements on the audit process? What is the effect on the audit process if a client has a different corporate governance perspective (e. g., "resource dependence") than the monitoring approach adopted for this study?

Knapp (1991) Experiment 122 responses from audit committee members of 192 Texas-based public companies.

Auditor Size (Big Eight versus local firm); length of auditor tenure (zero, five and 20 years); audit strategy (structured versus unstructured)

Audit Quality assessed as the likelihood that the auditor would (1) discover the material error; and (2) disclose the discovered error

Auditor size and Length of auditor tenure significantly impacted audit quality assessments but audit structure did not.

Potential AC members’ bias against non-Big Eight; Relationship between auditor tenure and decisions regarding timing and frequency of auditor changes; Audit committee involvement in the audit process.

18

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable Results Future Research

Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002)

Survey and archival

258 Fortune 1000 companies supplying audit fee data from April 1992-March 1993

% of outside directors, Number of board meetings, Number of outside directorships held in other corporations Control variables: number of business segments, foreign operations, profitable/not, utility industry, proportion of assets in receivables, proportion of assets in inventory, size

Audit fees All predicted relationships confirmed. Audit committee characteristics have no explanatory power over board variables.

Examine supply and demand data and examine how audit hours and mix of hours across staff levels are affected by the board characteristics

Abbot et al. (2003a)

Archival Proxy filings of 492 public companies

Audit committee independence, expertise, and frequency of meetings

Natural log of audit fees

Audit committee independence and expertise are significantly and positively associated with audit fees. No significant association found for audit committee meeting frequency.

Abbot et al. (2003b)

Archival Proxy filings of 538 public companies

Audit committee effectiveness

Ratio of total nonaudit services fee to total audit fees

Ratio of nonaudit services fee to audit fees is significantly lower in firms with independent and active audit committees

19

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable Results Future Research

Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright (2002)

Interview 36 auditors None None Contrary to agency theory, auditors view management as a primary driver of corporate governance. Auditors view audit committees as typically ineffective and lacking adequate power to be a strong governance mechanism.

Future research should include corporate governance perspectives beyond the agency perspective. The role of audit committees should be studied as an interactive relationship between the board, AC, and management

Carcello & Neal (2000)

Archival 223 nonfinancial companies experiencing financial distress during 1994.

% of affiliated AC members, % of inside directors on AC, % of gray directors on AC, debt default, going-concern modified report in prior year, total sales, Zmijewski’s financial condition index, and if the firm is a development stage company

Whether a client received a going-concern-modified report

The higher the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee, the lower the probability that the auditor will issue a going-concern report.

20

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable Results Future Research

Carcello & Neal (2003)

Archival 62 nonfinancial public firms issued a going concern report by a Big Six (Five) firm and dismissed their auditor between 1988-1999 matched with 62 firms issued a going concern that did not dismiss their auditor. 125 firms issued a clean opinion and dismissed their auditor matched with 125 firms issued a clean opinion and did not dismiss their auditor.

% of affiliated AC members, governance expertise of AC members, financial expertise of AC members, and stock ownership of AC members. Control variables: size, auditor’s industry share, tenure of the auditor, Zmijewski financial distress score and management change.

Whether a client dismissed their auditor before the client’s next annual report.

The higher % of affiliated directors and stock ownership in the AC, the more likely the auditor dismissed subsequent to a going-concern report. The greater the governance expertise the less likely a dismissal while there was no effect for financial expertise. Non-GC samples: no significant effects for AC independence, stock ownership, a marginal effect for both governance expertise (negatively related to dismissal) and financial expertise (positively related to dismissal).

Investigate causality of relationships.

21

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable Results Future Research

Knapp (1987) Experiment 179 audit committee members from California based public corporations

Subject background (corporate managers versus others) was a between-subjects variable; audit firm size, conflict issue, and financial condition was manipulated within-subject.

Likelihood that AC member will support auditor

AC members are more likely to support auditors disputes with management when: (1) audit committee members are themselves corporate managers; (2) the issue under dispute has objective technical standards that support the auditor’s position; and (4) client’s financial condition is weak rather than strong.

Ng and Tan (2003)

Experiment 101 audit managers from U.S. offices of a Big 4 firm.

Authoritative guidance availability, audit committee effectiveness.

Amount of audit adjustment to be booked, perceived negotiation outcome.

Perceived negotiation outcome is affected both by authoritative guidance availability and AC effectiveness, with authoritative guidance having a greater effect in the absence of an effective AC.

Future research should investigate if the findings generalize to richer settings. Also the effects of contextual factors should be examined.

22

Author(s) Method Sample Independent

Variable(s) Dep. Variable Results Future Research

DeZoort et al. (2003)

Experiment 131 audit committee members

Timing of report, proximity of forecast, auditor consistency.

Audit committee member support for recording the audit adjustment.

Audit committee members are more likely to recommend an audit adjustment for annual rather than quarterly financial statements and when the auditor consistently argues in favor of making the audit adjustment.

Bedard and Johnstone (2004)

Archival Engagement partner client assessments for over 1000 clients of the participating accounting firm.

Earnings manipulation risk, Corporate Governance risk.

Natural log of total planned audit hours and hourly billing rate

Heightened earnings manipulation risk associated with increased planned audit hours and billing rates. Also, an interactive effect between earnings manipulation risk and corporate governance risk reported.

23

TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF STUDIES RELATING TO INTERNAL AUDITORS

Author(s)

Method

Sample

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Results

Future research

Scarbrough et al. (1998)

Survey 118 Chief internal auditors of Canadian manufacturing companies with sales over 50 million dollars

Independence of the audit committee

Interactions with the internal audit function

Fully independent audit committees had more meetings with internal auditors and reviewed more of their work than audit committees with non-independent members

Examine audit committee interactions with internal auditors in other countries. Greater focus on the quality of the interactions. Examine varying levels of audit committee independence.

Raghunandan et al. (2001)

Survey 114 Chief Internal Auditors of U. S. companies with sales greater than $250 million.

Audit committees with all independent directors AND has at least one member with an accounting or finance background.

Interactions with the internal audit function.

Audit committees with only independent directors and have at least one member that has an accounting or finance background: 1.have marginally more meetings and have longer meetings with the chief internal auditor. 2.are more likely to meet in private with the chief internal auditor 3.are more likely to review the internal audit program and plan 1. are more likely to review the

management-internal audit interaction.

Examine how composition of audit committees varies across countries. Examine how audit committees’ interaction with internal auditors varies across countries. Examine how the personality, attitude and character of audit committee members affect the interaction with the internal audit function.

24

Author(s)

Method

Sample

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Results

Future research

Goodwin and Yeo (2001)

Survey 65 Chief Internal Auditors of Singapore companies

Audit committees with all independent members

Interactions with internal audit; use of internal audit as a training ground

Independent audit committees met more frequently with internal auditors and were more likely to use this as a training ground than those that were not independent. However, there were no differences in the level of review of internal audit work and involvement in dismissing the chief internal auditor

Consideration of the nature and depth of meetings. Examination of audit committee members’ views.

Goodwin (2003)

Survey 80 Chief Internal Auditors from Australia and New Zealand from public (48) and private (32) companies

Audit committees with all independence directors, proportion of members with an accounting or finance background

Interactions with internal audit

Audit committee independence associated with greater process measures (number of meetings, length of meetings, power to dismiss chief internal auditors) and audit committee financial knowledge related to extent of review of internal audit work

Nature and level of accounting expertise of the audit committee as it affects interactions with internal auditors.

25

Author(s)

Method

Sample

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Results

Future research

Melville (2003)

Survey 154 internal auditors from the US, Canada, and abroad

Organization awareness of Balanced Scorecard, reliance on financial and non-financial measures

Internal audit involvement in strategic management initiatives

Internal auditors recognize the value of a Balanced Scorecard and are often involved in establishing and oversee this and other strategic management initiative.

James (2003)

Survey 64 US bank lending officers for companies with revenues over $100 million

Likelihood of fraud detection, deterrence, and reporting of fraud found

Level internal audit reports to; and insourced, outsourced external audit firm, outsourced different audit firm

Internal auditor reporting to the audit committee seen as more likely to detect and report fraud than reporting to senior management; with reporting to the audit committee there are no differences in perceptions of whether internal audit is insourced or outsourced (either to the external auditor or another firm)

More complete understanding of why outsourced firm was viewed as more competence but not viewed as enhancing fraud detection, deterrence, or reporting than insourced internal audit

26

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