the death of the dream for socialist chile
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An essay about how often military power ends ideological revolution.TRANSCRIPT
Nathaniel Whittemore
Latin American Revolutions
Paper 1
May 03, 2005
Prompt 2
Intro
The Chilean socialist experiment was an exciting moment of
confluence between different political and economic actors. It was also a
tragic lesson in the force that powerful minority interests can bring to bear
upon the rights of the collective. The relationship between the so-called
“revolution from above” and the “revolution from below” was never as
simple as shared or divergent goals and means. Salvador Allende’s Popular
Front provided a national context and revolutionary lexicon for the ongoing
localized frustrations of workers. The workers movements, such as that of
the Yarur mill, animated the movement at large and provided Allende’s
government with the resonant constituent base and demonstrable saliency it
needed to formally confront the existing order.
To some degree, the interplay between the two was based on
imagined relationships. The anxious workers appropriated the idea of
Allende as their own, projecting their struggled onto both the man and his
ideology. His real ideology imagined a relationship with the working class
that in some ways combined the patron system with socialism. Yet even in
the Yarur take-over crisis these two colliding imagined relationships were
able to inform real discourse and find political compromise and
maneuverability.
This paper explores the particular circumstances of those imagined
relationships and their brutal snuffing just a few years after they had
formed. The Chilean socialist experiment is the story of these relationships
and their extinction. Left to its own devices, it seems as though Allende’s
popular front socialism might have been buckled under its own political and
economic divisions and inefficiencies. Yet the truth of the situation remains
that the end of the movement came with the mobilization of incredibly
powerful minority and international actors.
The moment of new socialism
Allende’s Popular Front vision and the surging Chilean worker’s
revolution of the early 1970s were born into a set of circumstances that
reflected not only the economic, political, and industrial conditions of the
moment, but were predicated on a long history of worker activism and
changing demographics. Allende’s triumph at the polls and the Yarur
worker’s reclamation of their union were manifestations of a particular
moment in which local labor discontent finally found context in national
political momentum. The revolution from above and revolution from below
would, over the course of the coming months, shape, inform and give
strength to one another. At the same time, their sometimes-divergent
techniques, emphases and timing would threaten the socialist unity that was
the lifeblood of the movement for the overthrow of the old system of
exploitation. The interplay between the two was often rooted in the way in
which workers imagined Allende’s government and indeed, Allende himself,
in relation to themselves.
Allende’s 1970 campaign saw a very different electoral composition
than eighteen years earlier when he had first run for president. There had
been a doubling of eligible voters and increased power concentrations
within the lower class1. The composition of laborers at the Yarur mill
reflected these demographics and a particular combination of experiences
that went along with them.
The “Old Timers” were a group whose experience was that of
conditioned pessimism. Almost all had witnessed or been part of the
suppressed strike of 1962 and some had been there even earlier. For most,
the only politics that mattered were those of survival. The youngsters, on the
other hand, reflected a move in the Chilean industrial base from rural to
urban youth. These new circumstances of upbringing had implications for
the anxiousness of the young workers to improve conditions that went
beyond the fact of their youth itself.
For young Chileans, a move from countryside to city meant increased
contact with peers. The family ceased to be the singularly dominant social
unit as new communities, in the forms of class mates, neighborhood friends,
sports teams and other clubs came to occupy a significant place in the lives
1 Winn, “Weavers of Revolution,” 58
of young people. This was a world in which “loyalty” was increasingly the
most important characteristic of relationships and people’s friends came to
exert a stronger and stronger influence over decisions and actions.
At the same time as these new sorts of relationships were forming, the
Yarur factory was becoming increasingly de-personalized and de-humanized.
The patron system which relied so heavily on the personality of the leader
had not been successfully transmitted between generations of the Yarur
clan. Moreover, the system was predicated on a tangible sense that real
gains could (only) come from the individual relationship with the boss. It was
doomed to wither in the face of decades passed with work conditions the
same or worse as before. As Winn writes, the gifts of the patron system
“were double-edged, instruments of social control as well as expressions of
benevolence. Their intent was to bind workers to their boss by ties of
gratitude…and fears of losing those [benefits] already granted.”2 The last
vestiges of the system employed by Don Amador failed to resonate with a
younger group of workers not weaned with the same sense of filial piety as
the older generation.
More than that, the mechanization of the working process increased
the physical and social isolation of workers from one another. Indeed, this
mechanization was the final blow to any sustaining power of the old familial
patron system. The replacing Taylor System was an American innovation
designed to increase the productivity of the workers. While in purely
economical terms, it had the desired outcome; it also created an impersonal
situation in which labor was separated from the laborers. Indeed, the
workers became “extensions of the perpetual motion machines they
tended.”3 On page 46, Winn writes that “companerismo was another
casualty of the Taylor System – and paternalism perished with it as well.
There was no longer time to talk with other workers.”4 This was completely
at odds with the senses of community that had become increasingly
important in the social fabric of the young workers.
2 Ibid, 803 Ibid, 804 Winn, “Weavers of Revolution,” 46.
This was the situation that into which Allende came as he began to
campaign for his fourth presidential bid. For the Old Timers, he represented
the indefatigable spirit of past uprisings. He had been a part of the struggle
for so long that his perseverance gave a sense of continuity to the toil of
those who had languished in Yarur for decades. Like them he had risen up
time after time, only to be struck down by more powerful opponents. Allende
had run for president in 1952, 1958, and 1964, each time adding to his
electoral gains.5 In that way, Allende became the embodiment of the history
of Chilean labor struggle. As one man put it, “Salvador is a man formed in
this long struggle.” 6 For the older group of Yarur workers, his past
campaign defeats were not symbols of failure but rather of perseverance
and a sustained struggling against the tide. Moreover, while the youngsters
may not have been interested in the patron system, its roots still ran deep
for a large part of the Yarur body. Allende represented the best that a strong
leader could be. His candidacy was not even a question; there was no other
who could represent the Chilean people.
For the youngsters, too, the Allende Popular Front campaign of 1970
represented a very distinct ethos, as well. They had grown up in a new
urban situation in which “peers were the dominant influence of
adolescence.”7 Indeed, loyalty to companeros became the fundamental
currency of relationships. Urban class consciousness combined with new
community units such as sports clubs and social centers created new levels
of community.
Popular Front’s appeals gave a cohesive rhetorical voice to this sense
of community. Its calls for popular participation and democratic socialism
gave voice to the need for a unity and communalism in the face of an
isolating industry. In the language of the movement, friends became
comrades and loyalty became solidarity. Mirroring the social infrastructures
of their formative years, the Popular Front ideology envisioned “the creation
of organizations in workplaces and residential neighborhoods [to] ensure
that the {new power structure…built up from the grassroots} would be
5 Ibid, 566 Ibid, 557 Ibid, 85
exercised directly by the people themselves.”8 At the same time, Allende as a
man situated the role of the individual within the context of the new
emphasis on group rights.
Most of all, the new democratic socialism and the man who carried its
banner provided a national ideological, political, and economic context for
the visceral, immediate and localized pains experienced by the Yarur
obreros. His campaign reaffirmed for both groups, young and old, that their
frustrations and hopes for salvation were justified and not limited to solely to
their local community. Moreover, he helped inspire a massive shift in self-
perception, a “dramatic change in the workers’ view of themselves [and]
their capacity and power,” that was a “precondition for the revolution from
below.”9
Imagining relationships
Allende’s own vision of his movement relied on the same sorts of
imagined relationships that workers used to put context to their struggles.
For Allende, socialist politics was all about unifying the forces that could
bring about long-term sustainable change. This meant binding together the
destinies of the working class, middle class, and political elite. Allende saw
himself as the man to do this and as such, came to have a sense of the place
that each group would play in his coalition. The workers were largely
expected to cast their lot in and look to Allende for direction; indeed this
was the prerequisite for the tacit middle classes acceptance of socialist rule.
In this delicately balanced strategy of economic and political change, the role of the “masses” – workers, peasants, and pobladores – was to provide political and social support when called on, but otherwise to await patiently the advances and benefits of the revolution from above.10
Yet the truth was that throughout the country, Allende’s campaign
was driven by the lower toiling classes who had seized Allende as their own.
His rhetoric was generalized enough that it could connect with most of the
disaffected, and his movement broad enough that it could encompass a
spectrum of radicalism. While this delivered a popular victory, the unity
behind Allende was actually an obfuscation of reality. The truth was that
8 Ibid, 649 Ibid, 13610 Ibid, 140
many Allende’s had been elected, each customized to the particular
intensity, composition and discontent of his supporters. The aims of the
laborers who made up the “masses” “tended to be concrete – objectives that
responded to problems in their daily lives, but that they equated with
advacing the “revolution.””11 The conflict between these imaginations would
become clear over the course of the first year and a half of his presidency.
They were particularly on display in the crisis surrounding the Yarur mill
takeover.
As the parallel campaigns proceeded, the Yarur workers increasingly
relied on Allende’s surging campaign to demonstrate that there was hope in
popular action to the reticent members of the factory community, most often
the Old Timers. Winn writes that the message of the obreros “increasingly
joined their campaign for an independent union to Allende’s campaign for
the presidency.”12 They came to imagine Allende not simply as a politician
who would support them when he came to be elected, but as an extension of
themselves and their movement. Allende had incredible currency both as a
real figure and as a myth. This imagination was affirmed when, during his
campaign, he was permitted to speak to a crowd at the factory. With Amador
present, Allende promised that were he to be elected, he would wrest
control from his old acquaintance. The stunned crowd could hardly believe
their ears. There was no longer room for doubt; the moment had to be
seized.
Right in front of his workers, right there in his own factory, “Allende had told ‘El Chico’ that he was going to take his industry away from him.” The word soon spread through the mill to workers who had been afraid or unable to attend, shattering Amador Yarur’s image of omnipotence and triggering worker dreams.13
From that point onwards, the would-be union leaders employed the
mythology of Allende to convince the fearful that their best hope lay in
collective action and that for once, there would be a government that would
not intervene on the side of the owners. The closer union elections came, the
stronger the imagined personal relationship between the Yarur workers and
their companero president grew.
11 Ibid, 14112 Ibid, 9713 Ibid, 99
When he was finally elected president, it seemed to portent victory for
the Yarur’s own battle at the union polls set for a few months later. Indeed,
as Winn writes on page 104 “when Allende’s election was confirmed by the
Chilean Congress, they celebrated his triumph as their own.”14
“I was still celebrating…the following morning,” recalled Alma Galegos, a…former Yarur worker: “When Companero Allende was elected…it was like a carnival. It was something we had never expected…it was ajoy that couldn’t fit inside one.”15
Imaginations collide
As Allende set about consolidating his political base and allaying the
middle class fears of radical upheaval, the Yarur worker’s prepared for their
battle for the union. At the time, Allende’s slow moving leadership presented
no problems for the workers. His words of warning to Don Amador a few
months earlier still echoed throughout the halls of the factory. Moreover, his
election victory in and of itself was evidence enough of a changing tide.
Likewise, in this period of silent surging, the workers movement didn’t
appear to threaten the gradualism or hierarchy of the Allende ruling
coalition. It was not long before the apparently benign differences between
the techniques and emphasis of the parallel revolutions would be cast into
stark difference.
The imagined solidarity between the Yarur leftist leaders and the
Popular Front government began to be put to the test as the workers
revolution, which rightly felt itself the natural base of Allende, became
caught in its own momentum. The overwhelming success of the leaders in
regaining control of the union inspired the rank-and-file to desire more.
There were certain gains and changes, such as retirement annuities, that
would never be realized with Don Amador remaining at the helm.
The groundswell towards socializing the mill became rapidly more
uncontrollable, both for union leaders and government officials. Moreover,
the government found itself in the awkward position of being in total
ideological support of the workers but fearful of the rapidity with which
change was taking place and the degree to which it was orchestrated from
below, without confirmation of governing bodies. These factors caused major
ruptures within the Popular Front coalition. Still, the gradualist position of
14 Ibid, 10415 Ibid, 70
the president was more or less totally untenable with worker’s who were
responding not to political analysis but the immediacy of their own
frustration. For Yarur, the levy had broken, and the new union leaders
recognized that to try to slow the momentum of the movement would be like
asking the water to file orderly through the flood gates. As Winn writes on
page 141, “The deprived of Chile had taken Allende’s victory as their own
and were acting out its meaning in their own direct action.”16
The situation in which Allende found himself in April 1971 was one
which he was loath to deal with. Confronted with the takeover of the Yarur
mill, he had either to give up his gradualist position and risk setting a
precedent for unrestricted socialization of industry or support the ownership
classes in a clear case of monopolization and exploitation of workers. For a
week, the Yarur’s imagined relationship came crashing to reality with the
president. For most of the time it appeared as though he was going to
renege on his campaign promise to seize the mill. His initial veto of the plant
seizure was “to the union officers…a bewildering betrayal, an unanticipated
stab in the back.”17 It was, in the starkest terms, a competition between
imaginations.
Each party felt betrayed by the other as they recognized that the
relationships they had believed in could not be counted on. Allende couldn’t
fathom that the Yarur worker’s group had maneuvered outside of his own
authority to make the situation that now confronted them come to pass. At
the same time, the Yarur leaders believed that Allende’s democratic
socialism was predicated on listening to the masses and translating their
energies into political and economic realities. To some extent, they felt
themselves to be conveyers of a message from their companero president’s
constituent body, and were shocked to discover just how divergent his
sentiments were. Indeed, they believed that they were “fulfilling the Popular
Unity program and redeeming Allende’s campaign pledge.”18 As Winn
recalls, the particular constitution of the Yarur movement had been
informed by Allende himself.
16 Ibid, 14117 Ibid, 16818 Ibid, 139
Allende’s campaign speech at the mill planted the seed of socialism in [the worker’s] consciousness…and the events [that followed] brought about a dramatic transformation of consciousness and an inflation of expectations.19
Both parties tried passionately to convince the other of the expediency
and saliency of their own imagination. Allende reprimanded that there
needed to be a controlled pace of change orchestrated by state and local
actors simultaneously, while the union leaders argued that for the Yarur
workers, there were no politics but rather life on the line. The strands of
patronismo came through in the most intense moments of the debate. There
was no room in Allende’s mind for a revolution orchestrated without his
consent: “I am the president, and it is I who give the orders here!”20
In the end, the workers’ prevailed, and Allende ceded some political
control for ideological unity. The workers had been aided by the solidarity of
a number of Allende’s top ministers who threatened to resign if he handed
the Yarur mill back to its despicable owner. Allende’s final decision reflected
not only the strength of the workers arguments, but the very real fact that
he owed his presidency largely to their informal efforts. He had stated
earlier that “It was the people who chose me. My own party was against me,
the leaders of the Popular Unity were against me. But the people made me
their candidate.” It seemed that the power from below had exerted itself
again.
Dénouement
The months following the socialization of the Yarur mill provide
evidence for a number of scenarios that could have befallen the Chilean
socialist revolution. The delicate political alliance that Allende had build
began to see trouble. Workers around the country had become politicized,
and as such, individual parties within the Popular Front began to take
alternate courses. Whereas Allende had stressed unity as the technique of
revolution, groups within the alliance increasingly suggested more radical
methodologies, fracturing the coalition. Moreover, this radicalization led to
turmoil in the middle classes, who were being furiously courted by the right
nationalist parties and whose support Allende’s power hinged upon. The
more real the imagined relationship between the worker’s revolution from
19 Ibid, 13520 Ibid, 186
below became with the bureaucrats revolution from above, the more
accelerated the pace of upheaval became and the more nervous became
groups outside the proletariat. The Christian Democrat party benefited from
this tension, as more and more middle class Chileans were worried about
loosing their own property or status. The right and center parties allied and
became an increasingly forceful political unit. Allende’s presidency was
getting shaky.
At the same time, there was evidence that all was not lost. In the
Yarur mill, most agreed that “despite the failings and tensions, the balance
of that first year of comanagement was positive.”21 During the first year and
a half of worker management of the mill, production had actually been
turned around. The workers were able to “reverse the decline in output [for
the first time] since 1968.”22 Moreover, there was a sense that Ex-Yarur
demonstrated some advance towards egalitarianism and fraternity. Winn
says that the “factory became a community.” This was in spite of the sort of
political splintering occurring at the same time. Indeed, while an increased
number of political parties jeopardized the short term efficacy of Allende’s
Popular Front coalition, the greater participation in democracy had positive
long-term ramifications.
The workers of Ex-Yarur demonstrated that they were now prepared to vote, to speak their mind in public, to sign petitions, to join demonstrations, and to organize…23
It seems largely polemic, however, to speculate on would-haves. There
is plenty of evidence that Chilean socialism would have collapsed under the
weight of its economic and political problems. At the same time, there were
some indications that it might have been able to continually adapt itself.
What is undeniable is that the end of the experiment came from the
confluence of extremely powerful minority interests in the form of brutal
violent repression. In a few short months, Pinochet’s regime unmade all the
progress that Chilean socialism had achieved. Indeed, it can hardly be
characterized as “restoring” an older order; the force of methods of
repression created a controlled state unlike any Chile had seen. The actors
most notable in this drama were not the workers. To lay blame at their feet
21 Ibid, 21222 Ibid, 21223 Ibid 223
for their destruction denies the incredible force that the owner class was
able to bring to bear in co-opting the military apparatus. Moreover, it denies
the very significant involvement of wealthy international actors.
Conclusion
The death of the Chilean socialist dream was characterized, like the
movement itself, by the combination of imagination and reality. Real desires
for power as well as economic and military might colluded with the secretive
elements of an American foreign policy willing to imagine that anything was
better than even a democratic socialism. It was a modern tragedy which
demonstrated with painful authority that no amount of confluence of
political and economic dreaming is immune to the force of military might.
Yet it remains vital in understanding the Chilean and other revolutions to
examine the give and take of the “masses” and their leaders. In the Chilean
situation, the relationship was both real and imagined. While the real
Allende provided the spark of confidence needed to ignite the seething
passions of the working class, it was increasingly the emphases of that
cohort that came to define the man and his movement. It is, in some ways
fitting, that the final convergence of the revolutions from above and below
came in the simultaneous symbolic and physical martyrdom of their leaders.
In a hail of gunfire, the Pinochet regime erased the distinctions between
imagination and reality and created an entirely new mythology that would
have to sustain the Chilean workers until the next moment which found the
doors of possible change thrust open.