the deepwater horizon oil spill: the politics of crisis ... ·...
TRANSCRIPT
HKS740CaseNumber1982.0
ThiscasewaswrittenbyDavidW.Giles,AssistantDirector,ProgramonCrisisLeadership,forDrArnoldM.Howitt,AdjunctLecturerinPublicPolicyandExecutiveDirectoroftheAshCenterforDemocraticGovernanceandInnovation,HarvardKennedySchool,andHermanB.“Dutch”Leonard,GeorgeF.Baker,Jr.ProfessorofPublicManagement,HarvardKennedySchool,andEliotI.SniderandFamilyProfessorofBusinessAdministration,HarvardBusinessSchool.FundsforcasedevelopmentwereprovidedbytheMassachusettsNationalGuardinsupportoftheHarvardKennedySchool’sGeneralandFlagOfficerHomelandSecurityExecutiveSeminar.HKScasesaredevelopedsolelyasthebasisforclassdiscussion.Casesarenotintendedtoserveasendorsements,sourcesofprimarydata,orillustrationsofeffectiveorineffectivemanagement.
Copyright©2013PresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollege.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,revised,translated,storedinaretrievalsystem,usedinaspreadsheet,ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeanswithouttheexpresswrittenconsentoftheCaseProgram.Forordersandcopyrightpermissioninformation,pleasevisitourwebsiteathttp://www.ksgcase.harvard.edu/orsendawrittenrequesttoCaseProgram,JohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity,79JohnF.KennedyStreet,Cambridge,MA02138.
TheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill:ThePoliticsofCrisisResponse(B)
Introduction
AstheyworkedtobringgreatercohesiontotheDeepwaterHorizonresponse,NationalIncidentCommander
ThadAllenandhistwotopadvisors–RearAdmiralPeterNeffengerandJulietteKayyem,AssistantSecretaryfor
IntergovernmentalAffairsattheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)–expendedconsiderableenergytrying
tocoordinatethevastfederalinteragency.ButimprovingcollaborationwithintheObamaadministrationwasjust
onepieceofthepuzzle.Inaddition,theyhadtocontendwithahostofelectedofficialsfromacrosstheGulfCoast
whostood,asonelocalleaderputit,atthevery“epicenter”ofthecrisis.WithAprilturningintoMayandoilcon‐
tinuingtoleakunabatedintotheGulf,Allen’steamwouldneedtofigureouthowtocoordinateresponsestrate‐
gieswiththesegovernors,parishpresidents,mayors,andcityandcountycouncilmembers.1Speakingtothegrim
moodthatwouldcomplicatefederalauthorities’outreachtotheirstateandlocalcounterpartsoverthenextsev‐
eralmonths,RearAdmiralNeffengerobserved,“Allthehappytalkattheearlystages[ofaresponse]goesaway
prettyfastwhenreal,long‐termeffectsstarttohit….Thereisthisgeneralsenseofdespairthatsetsin.”2(See
Exhibits1and2,respectively,forachronologyofeventsandalistofkeyactorsinthiscase.SeeExhibit3foralist
ofacronyms.)
CompetingLegalRegimes:OPAvs.Stafford
FollowingthediscoveryofoilleakingfromtheMacondoWellonSaturday,April24,AssistantSecretary
KayyemtraveledtotheGulfCoasttomeetwiththeregion’sgovernors.Withindaysofherarrival,anadditional
leakatthewellsitewasidentified;andonThursday,April29,thefederalgovernmentelevatedtheincidenttoa
SpillofNationalSignificance(SONS)andestablishedaNationalIncidentCommand(NIC)tocoordinateresponse
efforts.Adaylater,PresidentObamasentseniormembersofhisadministration–includingHomelandSecurity
SecretaryJanetNapolitano,InteriorSecretaryKenSalazar,EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)Administrator
LisaJackson,andtheDirectoroftheWhiteHouseOfficeofEnergyandClimateChange,CarolBrowner–tojoin
1Louisianaispoliticallysub‐dividedintoparishes,theroughequivalentofcountiesinotherstates.
2TelephoneinterviewwithPeterNeffenger,August24,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattributionstoNeffengerarefromthisinterview.
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KayyemandotherfederalofficialsintheGulf.Theretheymetface‐to‐facewithanincreasinglyanxioussetofstate
andlocalleaders.3
Bythen,theGulfStateshadstartedtotakeemergencyresponsemeasuresoftheirown.OnApril29,withoil
slicksadvancingtowithinjustthreemilesofthecoast,GovernorBobbyJindalhaddeclaredaStateofEmergency
forLouisiana.Hehadalsobegunsubmittingrequeststofederalagenciesforvarioustypesofresourcesandaid,
includingsupportforthefishermenandcoastalbusinessmenwhofacedsubstantiallossesduetothespill.Follow‐
ingJindal’slead,GovernorsBobRileyofAlabama,CharlieCristofFlorida,andHaleyBarbourofMississippihad
declaredtheirownStatesofEmergencyadaylater.4
Forthestatestohavereceivedextensivefederalassistance,theObamaadministrationwouldhavehadtoin‐
voketheRobertT.StaffordDisasterReliefandEmergencyAssistanceAct(StaffordAct).5Butitinsteadproceeded
toorganizetheDeepwaterHorizonresponsepursuanttoanotherfederallaw:theOilPollutionActof1990(OPA),
which–alongwiththecorrespondingNationalOilandHazardousSubstancesPollutionContingencyPlan(NCP)–
providedthelegalauthorityandgeneralframeworkformanagingresponsestomajoroilspills.6
Fromtheverystartofthecrisis,however,localandstateleadershadadifficulttimeacceptingOPAoverStaf‐
ford.Partoftheirpreferenceforthelatterstemmedfromsimplefamiliarity:hurricanespummeltheGulfCoaston
aregularbasis,andofficialsintheregiongenerallyadheretotheStaffordActwhenrespondingtotheseandother
majoremergencies.Importantly,thelawallowsstatestoretaincontroloftheresponse,evenastheybenefitfrom
considerablefederalaid.
3HeidiAvery,“TheOngoingAdministration‐WideResponsetotheDeepwaterBPOilSpill,”TheWhiteHouseBlog,updatedMay25,2010,availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/05/ongoing‐administration‐wide‐response‐deepwater‐bp‐oil‐spill,[accessedJanuary16,2013];andJulietteKayyem,TestimonytotheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonHomelandSecu‐rityandGovernmentalAffairsSubcommitteeonState,LocalandPrivateSectorPreparednessandIntegration,DeepImpact:AssessingtheEffectsoftheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillonStates,LocalitiesandthePrivateSector,June10,2010,availableathttp://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/disaster‐recovery‐and‐intergovernmental‐affairs/hearings/deep‐impact‐assessing‐the‐effects‐of‐the‐deepwater‐horizon‐oil‐spill‐on‐states‐localities‐and‐the‐private‐sector,[accessedJanuary15,2013].4NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater:TheGulfOilDisasterandtheFutureofOffshoreDrilling;ReporttothePresident,January2011;andCampbellRobertson,“WhiteHouseTakesaBiggerRoleintheOilSpillCleanup,”NewYorkTimes,April29,2010.ForadetailedlistingofrequestsGovernorJindalsubmittedtofederalagencies,see:MarkCooper,TestimonytotheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairsSubcommitteeonState,Local,andPrivateSectorPreparednessandIntegration,DeepImpact:AssessingtheEffectsoftheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillonStates,LocalitiesandthePrivateSector,June10,2010,availableathttp://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/disaster‐recovery‐and‐intergovernmental‐affairs/hearings/deep‐impact‐assessing‐the‐effects‐of‐the‐deepwater‐horizon‐oil‐spill‐on‐states‐localities‐and‐the‐private‐sector,[accessedJanuary17,2013].5ForanoverviewoftheStaffordActdeclarationprocess,see:FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA),TheDeclara‐tionProcess,updatedJune13,2012,availableathttp://www.fema.gov/declaration‐process,[accessedJanuary16,2013].6FormoreonOPAandtheNCP,see:U.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,NationalOilandHazardousSubstancesPollutionContingencyPlanOverview,2011,availableathttp://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm,[accessedJanu‐ary19,2012].
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MarkCooper,DirectoroftheLouisianaGovernor’sOfficeofHomelandSecurityandEmergencyPreparedness
atthetimeofthespill(andsubsequentlySeniorDirectorforEmergencyManagementatWalmartStores,Inc.),7
explainedthebottom‐upnatureofatypicalStaffordresponse:
Theresponseisatthelocallevel.Andthenwhenthelocalscan’thandleit,itgoestothe
state.Thestateprovidessupport,andwhenitexceeds[thestate’s]capacity,theygoto
thefederalgovernment….[But]thecenteroftheearthwouldn’tbetheunifiedarea
command;itwouldbeatthelocallevel.8
YetwiththefederalgovernmentdecliningtoissueaStafforddeclaration,stateandlocalauthoritiesfacedan
entirelyunfamiliarscenario–onethatleftthemfeelingalienatedfromthefederally‐directedresponsebeginning
totakeshapeintheGulf.AsCoopersaid,“Thelocalsfeltliketheyhadnorole,really.Anditwastheircoastlines
andparishesthatwerebeingimpacted!”
Louisiana’sLafourcheParish,locatedalongthestate’ssoutheasterncoast,wasoneofthemanylocaljurisdic‐
tionsthatfounditswaterways,beaches,andmarshesunderdirectthreatfromtheencroachingoil.(SeeExhibit4
foramapofLouisiana,indicatingthelocationofLafourche.)Theparish,likemuchoftherestoftheGulfCoast,
washeavilyreliantontheoilandfishingindustries,andtheDeepwaterHorizonspillthreateneditsresidents’very
wayoflife.AsBrennanMatherne,PublicInformationOfficerforLafourche,vividlyputitintheearlydaysofthe
crisis,“IfyoudriveupHighway1uptoLockport,you’llseefishermenliningthebayouthewholeway….There’re
[sic]thousandsofpeopleherewhomaketheirlivingoffoysters,shrimp,andfish.Oilgoingupthebayouwouldn’t
begoodforanyofus.”9
Movingtodefendtheirshoreline,parishleadersinitiallyorganizedtheirresponsearoundthebottom‐upprin‐
ciplesofStafford,justastheyhaddonecountlesstimesinthepast.EspeciallyconcernedthatbreachesalongLa‐
fourche’scoastlinewouldallowoiltowashintoenvironmentallyfragilemarshes,theybroughtintheirown
equipmenttofillinbreaksalongtheshore.Whenthateffortfailed,LafourcheParishPresidentCharlotteRandolph
recounted,“Wedidaswenormallydoduringanemergencyandcalledinstateandnationalresourcesinorderto
assistus.”10ItwasthenthattheywerefullyconfrontedbytherealitiesofOPA,discoveringthatthefederalgov‐
ernmentwasforallintentsandpurposesincontroloftheentireresponse–includingresourcesandmoney.
“That,”Randolphdeclared,“wasforeigntous.”
7CooperlefthispostwiththeStateofLouisianaforWalmartStores,Inc.inthesummerof2011.
8TelephoneinterviewwithMarkCooper,August10,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattributionstoCoo‐perarefromthisinterview.9QuotedinBillSasser,“LouisianaLawmakers:BPCan’tHandleGulfOilSpillCleanupAnymore,”ChristianScienceMonitor,May11,2010.10TelephoneinterviewwithCharlotteRandolph,November17,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattribu‐
tionstoRandolpharefromthisinterview.
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Addingtotheirfrustrations,localandstateofficialsalsodeterminedthatOPAentailedexcruciatinglyslowbu‐
reaucraticprocedures.Louisiana’sMarkCoopernotedthatthis,too,stoodinsharpcontrasttohisstate’sexperi‐
encewithStafford‐declaredemergencies.HepointedoutthatduringHurricanesGustavandIkein2008,theFed‐
eralEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)hadworkedcloselywiththestatetoexpediteapprovalsandquickly
answerquestions(amarkedimprovementinrelationssincethemuchmalignedresponsetoHurricaneKatrinajust
threeyearsearlier).ButduringDeepwaterHorizon,Coopercontinued,stateandlocalemergencymanagement
officialshadtoworkwithnumerousfederalentitieswithwhichtheypreviouslyhadlittleinteraction.Amongother
things,thismeantthattheysuddenlyhadtofigureouthowtoadjusttoandnavigateeachagency’sadministrative
proceduresandculture.AsCharlotteRandolphofLafourcheParishobserved,
Itwasaprolongedprocesshavingtogothroughalltherulesandregulations[ofOPA
andtheNCP].Youknow,inanemergencysituation,[sometimes]youreactandfixthe
problemafterthefact.Inthissituation,wehadtofollowallofEPA’sguidelines,the
CleanWaterAct;wehadtofollowalltheCoastGuardregulations…Itwasjustone
regulationafteranother!11
ObamaAdministrationofficials,however,remainedconvincedthatinvokingOPAmadeenormoussense.Al‐
thoughmindfulofthelocalandstateofficials’frustrations,NationalIncidentCommanderThadAllendeclaredthat
“unequivocally”OPAandtheNCPprovideda“soundframeworkandallowedforneededdiscretionandfreedomof
actiontoaddresscontingenciesthatarose.”12Forherpart,AssistantSecretaryJulietteKayyemsummedupthe
advantagesofOPAinthreewords:“Thepolluterpays.”13OPA,sheclarified,requiresthespill’sresponsibleparty
(BPinthecaseoftheDeepwaterHorizonleaks)tocoverallclean‐upcosts–andpayforupto$75millioninre‐
lateddamages.Andonthatpoint,representativesofstateandlocalgovernmentagreedwiththeirfederalcoun‐
terparts.“TherewerecertainpartsofOPAthatIthinkwerebeneficial,”Cooperadmitted,“[suchas]thefactthat
theresponsiblepartywasgoingtobe100%liableforthecostoftheresponse.”
YeteventheNIC’sownleadersacknowledgedthatOPA,whichCongresshadpassedin1990inthewakeofthe
ExxonValdezoilspill,wasbynomeansaperfectfitfortheDeepwaterHorizonresponse.“Justtotellyouhowlim‐
iteditwas,[OPA]dealtwithsurfaceoil,notwithwhatweweredealingwithat5,000feetundertheocean,”
Kayyemexplained.Moreover,thelawwasbasedonthepremisethatthespillwouldinvolveavesselreleasinga
11RandolphreferredspecificallytoaninitiativeimplementedbyBPandfederalauthorities–theVesselsofOpportunitypro‐
gram–whichpaidlocalresidents,particularlyfishermenwhohadlostworkasaresultofthespill,tohelpskimoilfromthewaterandassistinotherwayswiththeclean‐up.ButaccordingtoRandolph,“InorderfortheCoastGuardtoassignthemtotheseprojects,theyhadtogothrougharigorousprocessofequippingtheirboatswiththeproperlifesavingdevices,andtheyhadtosecuretheproperlicensesandthingslikethat–whenwecouldhavejustsentthemoutandsaid‘we’resorry’later.”12ThadW.Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport:MC252DeepwaterHorizon,2010,availableat
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/SA‐1065NICReport/$File/Binder1.pdf?OpenElement,[accessedJanuary19,2012].13PresentationbyJulietteKayyem,March23,2011,HarvardBusinessSchool,Boston,MA.Unlessnoted,subsequentquota‐
tionsfromandattributionstoKayyemareeitherfromthispresentation;anotherpresentationMs.KayyemmadeonApril14atHarvardKennedySchool,Cambridge,MA;oraninterviewbytheauthorwithMs.KayyemonMay18,2011.
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fixedamountofoilintothewater,asopposedtothecontinuousleakingthatoccurredfollowingthesinkingofthe
DeepwaterHorizon.Andfromapoliticalperspective,Kayyemadded,“Wehadalwaysthoughtthatitwouldbea
one‐statespill”–therebyinvolvingalimitedsetofelectedofficialsandjurisdictions.
KayyemandAllenstressedoneotherlimitationtoorganizingtheresponseunderOPA:the9/11terroristat‐
tacksandHurricaneKatrina,theysaid,hadradicallyreshapedthepublic’sexpectationsregardingthelevelofgov‐
ernmentinvolvementindisasterresponseandtheformsofaiditshouldprovide;butOPA,writtenyearsbefore
eitherevent,camenowhereclosetomeetingthoseexpectations.AsAllenputit,
Thereisanevolution,devolution,reinventing,whateveryouwant,ofthesocialcontract
inthiscountry[ofwhatcitizens]expectwhenoneofthesethingsoccur….Thepublic
expectsawholeofgovernmentresponse.[Buttheseresponses]cannotbeexecutedto
thesamedegreethatmilitaryoperationsaredone….I’mtellingyou,there’sadiscon‐
nectthere!”14
Kayyemadded:“[OPA’s]notaboutdiversifyingLouisiana’seconomy…It’snotaboutthelong‐termrehabilita‐
tionoftheGulf.It’snotaboutthementalhealthofthepeopleintheGulf.Thelawdidnoteventhinkofanyof
that.”Instead,shesaid,itdealtstrictlywiththemechanisms,protocols,andfundingneededtobringtheimmedi‐
atecrisis(thespill)toanend.
Staffordprovisions,meanwhile,weremuchmoreinlinewiththegrowingexpectationsoftheAmericanpub‐
lic;andthus,LafourcheParishPresidentCharlotteRandolphrecalled,localofficialsurgedtheObamaadministra‐
tiontoinvokethelaw.AccordingtoJosephAldy,SpecialAssistanttothePresidentforEnergyandEnvironment,
theirrequestsdidnot,infact,fallondeafears.TheObamaadministration,hesaid,pursuedacompromiseofsorts,
proposingthatCongressprovideStafford‐likeaid,suchasunemploymentassistance,whileallowingfederal
authoritiestocontinueorganizingtheirresponseunderOPA–therebykeepingBPaccountableforcompensation
andclean‐upcosts.15AsAldyputit,“WewantedStafford‐likeauthorities,withouttheStaffordAct,becauseaStaf‐
fordActdeclarationcouldletBPoffthehookforcompensationofdamagesfromthespill.”16
14InterviewwithThadAllen,September15,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattributionstoAllenarefrom
thisinterview.15FordetailsonthelegislativepackagesubmittedbytheObamaadministration,see:OfficeofthePressSecretary,TheWhite
House,FactSheet:DeepwaterHorizonOilSpillLegislativePackage,May12,2010,availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/fact‐sheet‐deepwater‐horizon‐oil‐spill‐legislative‐package,[accessedApril16,2012].16InterviewwithJosephAldy,August9,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattributionstoAldyarefromthis
interview.
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Congresseventuallyapprovedsomeadditionalassistance.Allthesame,itwouldcomenowhereclosetofulfill‐
ingthehopesofelectedofficialsfromacrosstheGulf,whoweregrowingincreasinglyanxiousaboutthespill’sef‐
fectontheirconstituents’waysoflife.17
TheGovernors
OnSunday,May2,SecretariesNapolitanoandSalazarhostedwhatwastobecomeacornerstoneofthere‐
sponse–aconferencecallinvolvingseniorfederalofficials,thegovernorsoftheGulfStates,andtheirchiefadvi‐
sors.Withindays,theseso‐called“Governors’Calls”hadbecomeadailyevent,takingplaceeverymorningat
9:15.18
NationalIncidentCommanderThadAllenparticipatedinthefirstseveralcalls.Butdeterminingthattheywere
not“thebestuse”ofhistime,giventhattheyentailedlisteningtoalitanyofcomplaintsfromthegovernors,he
quicklyceasedparticipating.“Youwouldsittherefor30or40minutesandhavepeoplejustscreamingonthe
phone,”heremembered.
Still,thecallshadimportantvaluefortheadministration,particularlyinapoliticalsense.Withthe2010mid‐
termcongressionalelectionsjustaroundthecorner,andgiventhewidespreadbeliefthatseveralGulfgovernors
(allRepublicans)plannedtorunforpresidentin2012,theWhiteHousehopedtoavoidmajorconflictsoverthe
managementoftheDeepwaterHorizonresponse.Consequently,itaskedtheNICtocontinueengagingthegover‐
norsthroughthecalls.“Theydidn’twanttobecomebestfriendswiththesefolks,”Allenobserved,“butthey
wantedtomakesuretheywereminimizinganypotentialproblemsandunderstoodifsomethingwasgoingtobe‐
comeapoliticalfirestorm.”
AllenassignedhistoptwodeputiesattheNIC,RearAdmiralPeterNeffengerandAssistantSecretaryJuliette
Kayyem(whomAllenhaddesignatedashischiefpoliticaladvisorduringtheresponse),tohelpmoderatethecalls.
ParticipatingineveryoneofthealmostonehundredGovernors’Callsthattookplacethroughouttheremainderof
thecrisis,NeffengerandKayyemwouldwalkthroughtheagendaatthestartofeachmorning’sdiscussionbefore
askingvarioussubjectmatterexpertstoprovideupdates.(NOAAofficials,forinstance,regularlyreportedon
weatherconditionsintheGulf;EPArepresentativesaddressedseveralenvironmentalissues,suchastheuseof
chemicaldispersantstocombattheoilslicks;andCoastGuardofficersreviewedahostofoperationalconcerns.)
Kayyemcapturedtheimportanceofthedailycall:“[It]wasaspaceinwhichrealconcernswerediscussed….
[Andhaving]thesubjectmatterexpertsparticipatingsortofhelpedcalmsomeofthegovernors’concerns.”Forhis
part,Neffengersaidthatthecallservedasakeymechanismforbothsidestomaintainawarenessandkeep
abreastofdevelopments.“Ithinkthattherewassortofthismutualdesiretobeintheloop,”hereflected,“both
fromtheadministration’ssideandthegovernors.’”
17JosephE.Aldy,“Real‐TimeEconomicAnalysisandPolicyDevelopmentduringtheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill,”Vanderbilt
LawReview64(6),pp.1795‐1817,2011.18Avery,“TheOngoingAdministration‐WideResponsetotheDeepwaterBPOilSpill;”andKayyem,DeepImpact.
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TheNIC’stopofficialssoondeterminedthatthecallalsohadadownside,however.AccordingtoNeffenger,
eachmorning’sdiscussiongeneratedawholenewsetofdemands,whichinturncreatedsome“distortion”and
“dysfunction”intheresponsethroughouttheremainderoftheday.Heexplained,
Therewereanumberoftacticaldemandsthatjustcouldn’tbemetinthattimeframe.
Bythetimeyougotoffthephone,organizedthetasking,andfiguredoutwhointhis
massiveresponsewasgoingtoberesponsibleforwhat,awholedayhadgoneby….And
theverynextdayyouwouldhavenothingmoretoreport,except,‘Well,atleastwegot
theissuesprioritized!’19
This,hesaid,ledtosomeveryrealfrustrationsonthepartofthegovernors,whooftenfeltlikenothinghad
beenaccomplished–orthatfederalauthoritieswereignoringtheirconcerns.But,Neffengeremphasized,“You
can’tjustsnapyourfingersandhaveitallworkwhenyou’vegot47,000peopleontheground….Thisisamassive
undertaking,andittakesalotoftimetomovethingsandgetthemgoing.”20
Meanwhile,thecallstookonanaddeddynamicwhentheWhiteHousedecidedtoassignhostingdutiesto
SeniorAdvisortothePresidentValerieJarrett.AssistantSecretaryKayyemrememberedreceivingwordofthear‐
rangement.“Look,thereareprosandconstothatset‐up,”shesaid.“ButtheonerealityisthattheWhiteHouse
wasinvolvedandneededtobeinvolved.ValerieJarrett’sinvolvementisn’tsomethingyouquestion,eventhough
itraisedthelevelofattentiontothecalls.”
Neffengertookaslightlydifferentview.AlthoughagreeingthathavingJarretthostthecallslentthemsignifi‐
cantprestige,heharboredconcernsthatiterasedanyremainingboundariesbetweenthegovernorsandthe
President’sinnercircle.“Onceyou’vecreatedaccessatthesenior‐mostlevels,thenhowdoyouturnitbackoff?”
Neffengerwondered,addingthatdecisionsmadebythepoliticalleadersduringthecallsattimesunderminedthe
incidentcommandstructurethathadbeenestablishedpursuanttoOPAandtheNCP.AsNeffengerputit,“[We]
effectivelycreatedashadowcommandstructurethathadinjectsfromtheveryhighestlevelsbackintothedaily
operationalevents.”
19TheGovernors’Callwas,infact,justoneofthemanyteleconferencestheNIC’sseniorleadershiptookpartinoverthecourse
ofaday.At7:30everymorning,AdmiralAllen,RearAdmiralNeffenger,andAssistantSecretaryKayyemparticipatedinaNa‐tionalIncidentCommandconferencecalltoreviewnewdevelopments.At9:00AM,officialsfromtheNationalIncidentCom‐mandandtheWhiteHousegotonthephonetoprepareforthatday’sGovernors’Call,whichtypicallylastedaboutanhour.Afterthat,seniorfederalofficialsstayedonthelinetodebriefandbegintaskingthemanyissuesraisedbythegovernors.Then,eachafternoon,theNationalIncidentCommandledconferencecallsforlocalofficials,senatorsfromtheaffectedstates,andCoastGuardofficersservingasliaisonstoparishpresidentsandcitymayors.20Indeed,thefederally‐ledresponsetotheDeepwaterHorizoncrisiswasanunprecedentedundertakingintermsofscope,
complexity,andsize.Todealwiththeestimated4.9millionbarrelsofoilthatleakedintotheGulf,theresponseencompassedawidearrayofoperationstakingplaceintheair(anAviationCoordinationCentermanagedtheactionsofapproximately120aircraftprovidingsituationalawarenessonthespreadofthespillandlocationofresources);onthesea(the6,400vesselsin‐volvedintheresponsewere,inthewordsofAdmiralAllen,more“thanwereusedintheD‐DayinvasionofNormandy”);andontheground(Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport).Foradetailedaccountofthemassiveamountofresourcesandper‐sonneldedicatedtoresponseeffortsintheGulf,seeExhibit5.
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Butfromthegovernors’perspective,thedailycallwasextremelyvaluable.AccordingtoMarkCooper,then
theDirectoroftheLouisianaGovernor’sOfficeofHomelandSecurityandEmergencyPreparedness,“Itwasadirect
pointofcontactwiththePresident.SoIthinkthatitgavethosegovernorsanopportunitytoexpresstheirhighest
priorities.”Anddespitehisownreservations,Neffengerconceded,“IfIwereagovernor,Iwouldhavelikedit.I
wouldhavebeenonit.”Heidentifiedabroaderbenefitofthecallsaswell:
Theywereexceptionallyhelpfulinunderstandingthepressuresthat[thegovernors]
werefacingfromtheirconstituencies,thepeopleintheirstates.Andthatgavemeareal
appreciationforwhythegeneralapproachofputtingpoliticiansorelectedofficialsina
cornerandpullingthemoutasyouneedthemforpressconferencesandthelike
doesn’treallyhelp….Itcompletelymisunderstandstheroleofelectedofficials.[They
are]asmuchinchargeasyouare,butinaverydifferentway.
DemandingandDeployingBoom
Yetdespitetheadministration’shopesthattheGovernors’Callswouldminimizepoliticalconflict,disagree‐
mentsbetweenfederalandstateauthoritiesonlyescalatedasMayworeon.Oneparticularlyintensepointofcon‐
tentionrevolvedaroundtheuseofoffshoreoil“boom”forprotectingthecoastline.21AlthoughtheCoastGuard
hadbegundeployingthematerialintheearliestdaysofthespill,ithaddonesojudiciously,placingitinareas
wheretheGuardbelieveditwouldhavethegreatesteffect.(AccordingtoCoastGuardofficials,boomisgenerally
usedtodeflectoiltoplaceswhereitcanbemosteasilycollectedandremoved–notforsafeguardinganentire
coastline.)Butdeterminedtoprotecttheirshoresbyanymeanspossible,thegovernorsappliedanenormous
amountofpressuretoincreasetheamountofboomusedintheresponse.
Soon,anintensebackandforthconcerningitseffectivenesswastakingplaceovertheairwavesandonthe
frontpagesofnewspapers.AsearlyasMay1,GovernorJindalwaspubliclystatingthathehadgrowntiredofwait‐
ingforfederalofficialstoagreetoplansinvolvingvastamountsofboom.“Wearepastthepointofwaitingforany
cleanupplansfromBPortheIncidentCommander.Wehavealreadybegundevelopingcontingencyplansforpar‐
ishes,”hedeclared.“Weareaskingforthesecontingencyplanstobeapprovedso[that]wearenolongerinthe
positionofrequestingboombythefootforoneplaceoranother.”22TheGovernordidnotletup,andoverthe
ensuingweekshemadehispointtimeandtimeagain.InlateMay,heremindedthepressthathisearlierrequest
formillionsoffeetofboomremainedunfilled.AnobviouslyfrustratedJindalstated,“Itisclearthattheresources
neededtoprotectourcoastarestillnothere.”Hethennotedwithprecision,“643,148feetofhardboomoutof
21Madeoutofplasticandotherbuoyantmaterial,boomfloatsinwaterandisusedtocollect,redirect,orabsorboil.Itisbest
usedincalmwaters,aswavescaneasilypassoverorbreakitapart,aproblemthatrepeatedlycomplicatedresponseeffortsthroughoutthecourseoftheDeepwaterHorizoncrisis(PeterGrier,“ContainmentBoomEffortComesupShortinBPOilSpill,”ChristianScienceMonitor,June11,2010;JulietteKayyem,“TheGameChanger,”BostonGlobe,April24,2011;andCampbellRobertson,“EffortstoRepelOilSpillareDescribedasChaotic,”NewYorkTimes,June14,2010).22QuotedinOfficeoftheGovernor,StateofLouisiana,“GovernorJindal:OilSpillisThreateningOurWayofLife&WeAre
FightingtoProtectOurCoast,”May1,2010,availableathttp://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=2146,[accessedJuly27,2011].
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[thetotaldelivered]hasbeendeployedand[a]remaining143,037feetofhardboomissittinginstagingareas,
whileoftencontractorssitandwaitforordersfromBPonwheretodeployit.”23
AlthoughMississippiGovernorHaleyBarbourtookadifferenttack,adopting,astheNewYorkTimesputit,a
“keep‐clam‐and‐carry‐on”approach,Jindalwasbynomeansaloneinpressingtheissue.24GovernorBobRileyof
Alabamawasalsodeterminedtoprocurewhatheconsideredhisstate’sfairshare–andhecomplainedbitterly
whenNICofficialsdecidedtoredirectsomeoftheboomoriginallyallottedforAlabamatoLouisiana,asoilslicks
beganmovinginthelatter’sdirection.25InearlyJune,aftertheObamaadministrationresolvedtheissuetohis
satisfaction,RileypubliclythankedthePresidentforhispersonalinvolvementinthematter.But,theGovernor
reiterated,“BoomthatwasdeployedhereinAlabamashouldneverhavebeentakenfromusinthefirstplace.”26
Infact,despitetheirreservations,federalauthoritiesmovedtoprocureanddistributeasmuchboomasthey
couldfind,realizingthattheissuehadtakenonpoliticalovertones.27DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderPeter
Neffengerlaterreflected,
Therewerecertaintimeswhenyouknewyouweredoingsomethingjusttodealwith
theveryrealpoliticalproblemsomebodyhad.Wefoughtthatasmuchaspossible[but]
agoodexampleisputtingboominplaceswhereboomwasn’tmeanttobeput,forpur‐
posesthatboomwasnevermeanttoaddress.
Neffengeraddedthatdeployingboomjusttoplacatethegovernorsalsohadnegativeconsequencesforthe
moraleofprofessionalresponders.“Well,”hesaid,“therewerealotofplaceswhereislandswerewrappedin
boomanditwasnotatalleffective.Respondersknewthat.Sotherealconcernisyouhavecreatedawholebunch
ofcynicalresponders.”(SeeExhibit6foranimageofislandsencircledbyboom.)
LouisianaandtheSandBerms
Disputesoverthedeploymentofboomwere,however,“relativelycivil,”astheNationalCommissionthatex‐
aminedtheDeepwaterHorizonresponseputit,incomparisontothedebateoveranotherstrategyadvancedby
23QuotedinOfficeoftheGovernor,StateofLouisiana,“GovernorJindalMeetswithCoastalParishLeaders,AnnouncesNew
StrategiestoProtectCoasttoFillVoid,”May23,2010,availableathttp://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=2191,[accessedApril18,2012].24CampbellRobertson,JamesC.McKinley,Jr.,ShailaDewan,andDamienCave,“ADauntingStartofSummerfor5GulfState
Governors,”NewYorkTimes,May29,2010,A12.25HolbrookMohrandJohnFlesher,“GulfOilSpill’sThreattoWildlifeTurnsReal,”AssociatedPressOnline,June6,2010;and
JustinPritchard,TamaraLush,andHolbrookMohr,“BPSpillResponsePlansSeverelyFlawed,”AssociatedPressState&LocalWire,June9,2010.26QuotedinBenEvans,“Adm.AlleninHotSeatOverSpill,”AssociatedPressOnline,June11,2010.
27AsnotedbyNationalIncidentCommanderThadAllen,federalauthoritieswenttogreatlengthstofindenoughboomtokeep
upwiththedemandintheGulf.Hereported,“Weidentifiedeveryfootofboomintheworld….[and]engagedeverydomesticboomsuppliertoboostmanufacturefromafewthousandfeetperweekbeforethespilltooveraquarter‐millionfeetofboomperweekattheheightoftheresponse”(Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport).
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GovernorJindal–theconstructionofsandbermsofftheLouisianacoast.28InearlyMay,thestatehadrequested
thattheU.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersgrantitanemergencypermittobuildmorethan100‐milesworthofberm,
arguingthatitwouldserveasaneffectivebarrieragainsttheoilthreateningLouisiana’scoastline.Afterreviewing
theproposal,however,theCorpsofEngineers,theNIC,andseveralotherfederalbodiesraisedsomeseriouscon‐
cerns.Expressingworriesaboutitspotentialenvironmentalconsequencesandthecostandtimeinvolved,aswell
asdoubtsastowhetherbermwasasuitabletoolforcombatingthespreadofoil,federalofficialswerereluctantto
approvethemassiveproject.29
Withthereviewprocessdraggingon,GovernorJindalagainpubliclyventedhisfrustrationswithhisfederal
counterparts,notingonMay23,“Wehave[been]waitingonadecisiononourdredging/sand‐boomplanfromthe
U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersfornearlytwoweeks.WemademodificationssuggestedbytheCorpsandanswered
everyquestiontheysubmittedinthesameday.”Hecontinued,“Everydaywearenotgiventheauthorizationto
moveforwardandcreatemoreofthesesandboomsisanotherdaywherethatchoiceismadeforusandmoreand
moremilesofourshorearehitbyoil.”30
FacingmountingpressurefromJindalandlocalofficialsinLouisiana–andwithPresidentObamainjecting
himselfintothedebate–federalauthoritieseventuallyallowedpartoftheprojecttomoveforward.31Butbuild‐
ingthebermsindeedprovedtobeatimeconsumingandextremelycostlyprocess,withjustasmallportionofthe
bermscompletedbythetimetheleakswerebroughtundercontrol.32
MarkCooper,however,defendedtheaggressivenesswithwhichJindalpushedforresourcesthathefeltmight
proveeffective.“CertainlyIthinkitwasintheGovernor’srightandhisresponsibilityofprotectingtheStateofLou‐
isiana’scitizenstotryanykindofprotectivemeasurehepossiblycould,”heasserted.“Becausewewerenotseeing
thatspillbeingplugged….Imeanourentirecoastwasatjeopardy!”Cooperpointedtooneotherimportantfactor
thatdroveJindal’sbehavior.“You’vegottokeepinmind,too,thateverybodywellremembers–whetherit’sper‐
ceptionorreality–Louisiana’sresponsetoKatrina,”heexplained.“AndIthinkhecertainlywantedtoletthepeo‐
28NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.
29MimiHall,RickJervis,andAlanLevin,“IsOilSpillBecomingObama’sKatrina?”USAToday,May27,2010;NationalCommis‐
sionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,TheStoryoftheLouisianaBermsProject:StaffWorkingPaperNo.8,updatedJanuary11,2011,availableathttp://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Berms%20Working%20Paper.pdf,[accessedAugust9,2012];andCampbellRobertson,“LouisiananBecomesFaceofAngeronSpill,”NewYorkTimes,May31,2010.30QuotedinOfficeoftheGovernor,StateofLouisiana,“GovernorJindalMeetswithCoastalParishLeaders.”
31ThePresidentbecamedirectlyinvolvedduringaMay28meetingwithlocal,state,andfederalofficialsinGrandIsle,Louisi‐
ana.Afterheinvitedattendeestovoicetheirconcerns,PlaqueminesParishPresidentBillyNungesserandLouisianaGovernorBobbyJindalimmediatelyspokeup,stressingtheimportanceofthebermsproject.ThePresidentthenturnedtoNationalInci‐dentCommanderThadAllenandaskedhimtoconveneapanelofexpertstoconsidertheidea–despitethefactthattheNICandotherfederalbodieshadspentaconsiderableamountoftimedoingjustthat.Whetheritwasmeanttoornot,thePresi‐dent’srequestwasinterpretedasforcingtheNIC’shandandsettingoffachainofeventsthatculminatedintheapprovalofbermconstruction(NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,TheStoryoftheLouisianaBermsProject).32NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.
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pleofLouisianaknowthathewasfullyengagedinwhatwasgoingonandincommandofasmuchashecouldbe
incommandof.”
Nullification
IntheeyesofNICofficials,however,differencesoverthetechnicalitiesofresponsestrategiesrevealedafar
deeperproblem:thebroader“politicalandsocialnullification,”asAdmiralAllenputit,oftheplansandrelation‐
shipsthatfederalandstateauthoritieshaddevelopedtodealwithoilspills.33AstheNationalCommissionthat
reviewedtheresponsetoDeepwaterHorizonlaterconcluded,“theGovernorsandotherstatepoliticalofficials
participatedintheresponseinunprecedentedways,takingdecisionsoutofthehandsofcareeroil‐spillrespond‐
ers.”34AssistantSecretaryJulietteKayyemelaborated,“Under[OPA],stateswererequiredtoworkwiththeCoast
GuardandtheindustrytoplananAreaContingencyPlan,amutualagreementbyallpartiesaboutwhatresponse
techniqueswouldbeusedintheeventofamajorspill.”But,shecontinued,duringtheDeepwaterHorizoncrisis,
“notoneoftheGulfgovernors….wouldacceptthathisownexpertshadsignedoffonplansthat,essentially,they
nolongerlikedintheharshlightofday.”35
FederalofficialsbelievedthatthiswasespeciallysoinLouisiana.There,theysaid,eventhoughthegovernor
publiclycomplainedabouttheirresponseplansandactions,hisownrepresentativeshadactuallyagreedtosome
oftheseverysamemeasuresandstrategies.Inthemidstoftheresponse,CoastGuardCaptainRogerLaferriere,
whodirectedfederalcleanupeffortsorganizedoutoftheIncidentCommandPostinHouma,Louisiana,ventedto
theNewYorkTimes,“Itoldhim,whenhesignstheplanhe’sendorsingourprojects.”Laferriereconcluded,“Lou‐
isianaisstilllearningtheprocess.”36Fortheirpart,however,Jindaladministrationofficialsarguedthattheyhad
littlerealinfluenceoverfederally‐drivenresponseefforts.37
Meanwhile,theNIC’srelationshipwiththestatebecameparticularlystrainedwhenfederalofficialsdeter‐
minedthatGovernorJindalhadmarginalizedLouisiana’spre‐designatedStateOn‐SceneCoordinator(SOSC)–
someonewithwhomtheCoastGuardhadpreviouslyworkedcloselyindeveloping,exercising,andcarryingout
contingencyplans.AttheverystartoftheDeepwaterHorizoncrisis,aspertheNationalContingencyPlan,the
SOSC–alongwithhiscounterpartsfromAlabamaandMississippi–hadreportedtotheUnifiedAreaCommand
(UAC)inRobert,Louisiana.Eventually,however,theJindaladministrationhadrelocatedthecoordinatortothe
IncidentCommandPostinHouma,Louisiana,amovethatfederalofficialssawaseffectivelysidelininghim.They
33Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport.
34NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.
35JulietteKayyem,“TheGameChanger.”
36QuotedinRobertson,“EffortstoRepelOilSpillareDescribedasChaotic.”
37NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,Decision‐MakingwithintheUnifiedCom‐
mand:StaffWorkingPaperNo.2,updatedJanuary2011;Seealso:StatementbyMichaelD.Edmondson,TheDeepwaterHori‐zonOilSpillChainofCommand:AnExaminationofInformationSharingPracticesDuringaSpillofNationalSignificance,FieldHearingBeforetheSubcommitteeonManagement,Investigations,andOversightoftheCommitteeonHomelandSecurity,U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,July12,2010,SerialNo.111‐74(U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2011).
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werefurtherfrustratedbywhattheyconsideredtheincreasinglydirectinvolvementofthegovernor’sofficeinhis
place.This,theysaid,injectedasetofunfamiliaractorsintotheresponseandsloweddownthedecision‐making
process.38
Stateofficialssawthingsverydifferently.Emphaticallydenyingthattheyhadsidelinedanyone,theyinstead
arguedthattheSOSC’srelocationwasduetothefactthatHoumawas“wherethemainemphasis[ofthere‐
sponse]wastakingplace.”39AddressingallegationsthatJindalhadthenassumedthedutiesoftheSOSC,hisadvi‐
sorsinsisted,“TheGovernorwasnevernamedStateonSceneCoordinator.”40
TheLocals
BytheendofMay,theDeepwaterHorizonoilleakshadevolvedintoafull‐blowncrisis.Inadditiontoahostof
disputesbetweenstateandfederalauthorities,aseriesofattemptsbyBPtosealofftheMacondoWellhad
failed;41thegovernmenthaddramaticallyraiseditsofficialflowrateestimatetoupto19,000barrelsaday;
42and
oilhadbegunwashingashore.StateandfederalofficialshadalsotakenstepstorestrictfishinginGulfwaters,dis‐
ruptingawayoflifefortheregion’sinhabitants(seeExhibit7foramapdepictingpeakfisheryclosures,asofJune
2,2010).And,inaparticularlycontroversialdecision,theObamaadministrationhadimposedasix‐monthmorato‐
riumonoildrillingtakingplaceatmorethan500feetunderwater.Themoratoriumcreatedsubstantialuncertainty
withintheoilindustry,theregion’smaineconomicengine.43
Fromapoliticalperspective,thesituationhadbecomedire.AUSAToday/GalluppollreleasedinlateMay
foundthat60%ofrespondentsbelievedthatthefederalgovernmentwasdoinga“poor”or“verypoor”jobof
managingtheresponse,whilemorethanhalfdisapprovedofPresidentObama’shandlingofthecrisis.Criticism
38NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,Decision‐MakingwithintheUnifiedCom‐
mand;NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater;andTestimonybyMi‐chaelD.EdmondsonandRolandGuidry,TheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillChainofCommand.39QuotedinTheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillChainofCommand.
40QuotedinMarkSeibel,“StudySlamsConfusion,WasteinBPOilSpillResponse,”McClatchyNewspapers,October6,2010.
41ThroughoutMay,BPattemptedtostoptheleaksusingavarietyofmethods.Thetacticsincludedtryingtoreactivatethe
blowoutpreventer;placingacontainmentdomeovertheleaks;pluggingthewellwith“junkshots”ofsmallobjectsanddebris;andpursuinga“topkill”strategythatentailedfillingthewellwithheavymud(NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHori‐zonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.)42Althoughfederalofficialscited19,000barrelsperday(bpd)asthehigh‐endofthegovernment’sMay27flowrateestimate,
somecalculationswereashighas25,000bpdormore(NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOff‐shoreDrilling,DeepWater;andU.S.CoastGuard,BPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill:IncidentSpecificPreparednessReview[ISPR],January,2011).43Formoreonthemoratorium,see:U.S.DepartmentoftheInterior,NoticetoLesseesandOperatorsofFederalOilandGas
LeasesintheOuterContinentalShelfRegionsoftheGulfofMexicoandthePacifictoImplementtheDirectivetoImposeaMora‐toriumonAllDrillingofDeepwaterWells,May30,2010,availableathttp://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/MORATORIUM_NTL.pdf,[accessedAugust1,2012].
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waspouringinfromallcorners,andthemediahadbeguntoopenlyaskifDeepwaterHorizonwasnow“Obama’s
Katrina.”44
AsleadersoftheNationalIncidentCommandsoughttoregroup,theyidentifiedseveralissuesthattheybe‐
lievedhadcomplicatedtheresponseandcontributedtothecorrespondingpoliticalfallout.First,theyrecognized
thattheyhadfailedtomanageexpectationsandpreparethepublicfortheveryworst.AssistantSecretaryKayyem
elaborated,
TheblowoutpreventerfailedinApril.Whenwasthefirstoilfoundonshore?Itwasthe
lastweekofMay.Soweessentiallyhadfourweeksofanticipationwaitingforthisstuff.
ThatmeanswehadfourweekstoexplaintotheAmericanpublicwhatwasaboutto
happentothem,whatwasabouttohappentotheGulf.Wedidn’tdoit….Iwishwejust
saideveryday:‘look,oilwillhitshore.’Maybethen,whentheyactuallysawit,it
wouldn’thavebeensoshockingtothepublic.”
Inaddition,theyrealizedthattheyhadsomeveryrealproblemsrelatingtoandcoordinatingwithlocaljuris‐
dictions.Tostartwith,anumberoflocalitieshadopenlychafedathavingtooperateunderthedirectionoffederal
authorities,wholedtheresponsepursuanttoOPAandtheNCP.LafourcheParishPresidentCharlotteRandolph
explainedtheirpointofview:
Takingusoutofthepicture,outofthedecision‐making,justfrustratedustonoend,be‐
causewefeltweknewwhattheyshouldhavebeendoing.Yetthiswasafederalscene
andtheywereincharge.Theywerereluctanttoseekourinputinthis.Andthatperhaps
istheoverridingissueofitall:notrespectingthefactthatthelocalshadahandleonthe
situationbetterthantrainedprofessionalscominginfromoutside.
Feelingmarginalized,anumberoflocalitiesestablishedincidentcommandpoststomanagetheirownre‐
sponseefforts(whichtheyundertookindependentoftheNIC,usingfundsthatBPhadprovideddirectlytostates
andparishes).45ButaccordingtoRearAdmiralNeffenger,these“shadow”commandscreatedanadditionalhead‐
achefortheNIC,astheywereoften“directlyatoddswiththeworkofthe[federal]responders.”
Atthesametime,somelocalofficialshadtakentotheairwavestopointedlycriticizetheObamaadministra‐
tion’sleadershipoftheresponse.BillyNungesser,PresidentofPlaqueminesParish,Louisiana,wasparticularlyout‐
spokenandpubliclyquestionedthefederalgovernment’seffortsonaregularbasis.46InlateMay,withoilnow
comingashoreinLouisiana,Nungesserdeemedthefederalresponse“dysfunctional.”Allegingthat“there’sno
44Hall,Jervis,andLevin,“IsOilSpillBecomingObama’sKatrina?”
45NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.
46OverthecourseoftheDeepwaterHorizoncrisis,NungesserbecameafamiliarpresenceonCNN,appearingontheevening
newscastAndersonCooper360atleasttentimesinthemonthofJunealone(MattDavis,“CNN’sAndersonCooperisBackinNewOrleanstoCoverYetAnotherDisaster:TheOilSpill,”TheTimes‐Picayune,July1,2010,availableathttp://www.nola.com/news/gulf‐oil‐spill/index.ssf/2010/07/cnns_anderson_cooper_is_back_i.html,[accessedApril18,2012]).
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chainofcommand,noone’sincharge,”heconcluded,“theresponsetothis….hasbeenworsethanKatrina.”47
SpeakingonCNNonMay26,Nungesserhadevenharsherwordsforfederalauthorities–andfortheNationalInci‐
dentCommanderinparticular.“ThadAllenshouldresign,"heasserted."He'sdoneabsolutelynothing.He'san
embarrassmenttothiscountry….It'slike[theresponseis]beingrunwithabunchofseventh‐graders.Thisisabso‐
lutelyridiculous."48
Otherlocalleadersemployedslightlydifferenttactics.Althoughbynomeansadefenderoftheadministra‐
tion’smanagementoftheresponse,CharlotteRandolphmadeapointofexpressingherfrustrationsawayfrom
publicview.“Mystyleistoworkbehindthescenes,”sheexplained.“I’vefoundthatthemediamessageisnotal‐
wayssuccinctlydelivered–andit’smoresensational.”InsteadofmakinghercasethroughTVappearancesorin
thepapers,shepreferredtomeetin‐personwithfederalofficialsatunifiedareacommand.“Wefeltthathaving
theseone‐on‐onediscussionswasmoreeffective,”Randolphrecalled.“Youknow,you’vegottoacceptthefact
thatithappened,andthenyoustopblamingpeopleandstartworkingwiththepeoplewhocanfixit,”shesaid.
”Youhavetodothingsthatareproactive,andnotjustyellandscreamaboutthem.”
Yet,nomatterhowmanyoftheGulf’spoliticalleaderstookRandolph’sapproach,thepubliccomplaintscon‐
tinuedtodominatethenews.AndastheNIC’sleadersconsideredhowtogetabetterholdonthesituationpoliti‐
cally,theyrealizedthatwhiletheyhadoriginallyassumed–basedonthegoverningdoctrine–thatthestateswere
coordinatingwiththeirrespectivelocalleaders,thiswasnotalwaysthecase.49AssistantSecretaryKayyemex‐
plained,
WefellintothetrapoftheOilPollutionAct,whichwasverystatecentric.Anditmeant
thatifIamworkingwiththegovernor,theneverything’sOK.Andthenwerealizedthat
thereweremayors,countycommissioners,andparishpresidentswhohadtheirown
hostilitytowardsthestate….Wedidnotdoenoughearlyontogetthemtothetable,to
understandwhattheywereseeing,tounderstandwhattheyneeded.
Similarly,DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderPeterNeffengeremphasizedthattheNIC’searlyfocusonthe
statesattheexpenseoflocalitieswaslargelyduetobiasesbuiltintoOPAandtheNCP.Heexplainedthatduring
routineoilspillresponses,“We[theCoastGuard]workintandemwiththestates,butwetypicallydon’tpluginto
localcommunities.”TheDeepwaterHorizonresponsewasofsuchanextremescale,however,thatstandard
modesofoperationnolongerapplied.“Youcan’tsimplyassumethatthestateisgoingtoreachdownandconnect
47QuotedinHall,Jervis,andLevin,“IsOilSpillBecomingObama’sKatrina?”
48Quotedin“PlaqueminesParishPresidentBlastsFederalResponsetoOilSpill,”CNN,May26,2010,availableat
http://articles.cnn.com/2010‐05‐26/us/gulf.oil.spill.plaquemines_1_nungesser‐oil‐spill‐plaquemines‐parish?_s=PM:US,[ac‐cessedApril18,2012].49AsdetailedintheCoastGuard’sIncidentSpecificPreparednessReviewonDeepwaterHorizon,“Underthe[UnifiedCom‐
mand]constructlaidoutintheNCPandtheCoastGuard’sIMH,itisexpectedthatlocalissuesarisingwithinaStatewillbead‐dressedbytheStateOn‐SceneCoordinator(SOSC)andtheirstaffinthe[IncidentCommandPost]”(U.S.CoastGuard,ISPR).
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foryou,”Neffengersaid.“Ithinkthattherewasageneralexpectationthatifyouwereworkingwiththestate,you
wereworkingwiththelocals.Andthat’snotalwaysthecase.”
AdmiralAllenassertedthatthiswasparticularlytrueinLouisiana,wherethereassignmentofthestate’slong‐
timeoilspillcoordinator,coupledwithdisputesandconfusionoverpreviouslyagreeduponclean‐upplans,com‐
plicatedtheengagementoflocalitiesinclean‐upefforts.Thepoliticalorganizationofthestateonlyaddedtothe
challenge.Unlikeitsneighbors,Louisianaisastrong“HomeRule”state,whichmeansthatparishleadersenjoy
considerableautonomy–somethingthatthestate‐centricOPAwasnotwellsuitedfor.50
Seekingtoaddresstheproblem,NICleadersrolledoutinMayanewlydeveloped“liaisons’program,”through
whichtheydeployeddozensofCoastGuardofficerstostandalongsidelocalofficialsfromacrosstheGulf.51Ex‐
plainingthebenefitsoftheprogramforlocalleaders,Kayyemsaid,“Inacrisis,youjustwantsomeonewhohas
authority,whocanansweryourquestions,soasapoliticalperson,youdon’tlooklikeyoudon’tknowanything.”
AdmiralAllenadded,“Therehadtobeunityofeffort[betweenalllevelsofgovernment].Andtheonlywaytocre‐
ateaunityofeffortistomakesureyouunderstoodwhateverybodywasdoing.Andwehadtoadaptourstructure
todo[so].”
Fortheremainderofthecrisis,localleaderscouldturntotheirliaisonstoobtaincriticalinformation,channel
theircomplaints,andmaketheirneedsknowntoseniorresponseleaders.Atthesametime,theNICleadership
wouldbenefitfromfargreatertransparencyonissuesandconditionsatthelocallevel.Takingpainstoemphasize
theimportanceoftheprogram,DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderNeffengerandAssistantSecretaryKayyem
traveledtogetherthroughouttheregion,personallyintroducingparishpresidents,countyofficials,andmayorsto
theirnewlyappointedliaisons.
AccordingtoLafourche’sCharlotteRandolph,theprogramprovedworthwhile–eventually.“Webalkedatit
initiallybecauseofthefactthatthey[theliaisons]seemedverybureaucraticandnotreallyparticularlyresponsive
toeventsthatoccurred,”sheexplained.Ultimately,however,Randolphacknowledgedthatdeployingtheliaisons
wasbeneficialtobothlocalleadersandfederalauthorities.“Theintroductionofaliaisonwasveryhelpfulinthat
wewereabletospendquiteabitoftimewiththatparticularpersonexplainingthesituationandeducatingthem
ontheterritory,”sheobserved.MarkCooper,headoftheLouisianaGovernor’sOfficeofHomelandSecurityand
EmergencyPreparednessatthetimeofDeepwaterHorizonconcurred.“[Theprogram]certainlyassistedwiththe
frustrationatthelocallevel,”hesaid.“TheyhadsomebodyrighttherewiththemfromtheCoastGuardthatthey
couldcommunicatewith.”Headded,however,thattheprogramshouldhavebeenputinplacefromtheget‐go.“I
thinkthatthatwouldhavehelped[alleviate]someoftheangstthatwascreatedwiththeinformationthatwas
beingreported.”
50NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,Decision‐MakingwithintheUnifiedCom‐
mand.51Formoreontheliaisonprogram,see:Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport;U.S.CoastGuard,ISPR;andU.S.Coast
Guard,OnSceneCoordinatorReport,DeepwaterHorizonOilSpill,September2011,availableathttp://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf,[accessedAugust1,2012].
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Kayyemconcededthatittooksometimeforherandhercolleaguestoworkouttheprogram’skinks.Inpar‐
ticular,shenoted,itsoonbecameapparentthatsomeoftherelativelyjuniorCoastGuardofficersservingasliai‐
sonslackedtherequisiteexperience,skills,andrank.Overtime,theNICcorrectedtheproblembyintegrating
moreseniorofficersintotheprogram.Thiswasanimportantshift,asthehigherrankingofficershadfargreater
authoritytomoveresourcesandprovideanswerstothelocalofficialswithwhomtheyhadbeenpaired.“Youhave
tochooseverycarefullywhoyouputinthosepositions,”RearAdmiralPeterNeffengeremphasized.“Youneedthe
abilitytotakealotofheat,withoutcrumbling.Butbythesametoken,youhavetobeadiplomat,becauseifyou
justfightback,thenyou’velost….You’reworkingforsomebodyelse,andyourjobistofigureoutwhytheyhavea
problemandwhattheirissueis–howeverit’sdelivered.”Thiswasbynomeansaneasytask,butNeffengersaidof
theliaisonprogram:
Ithinkitwasprobablythemostimportantworkthatwedid.Becauseultimatelyitreally
didturn,Ithink,thegeneralcommentsofthelocalofficialsfrom‘theseguysareincom‐
petent’to‘alright,theyusedtobeincompetent,butnowthey’redoingtheirjobs.’AndI
thinkthe‘doingtheirjobpart’was‘nowthey’relisteningtome.’
TheCrisisDiminishes
EvenasNICofficialsfine‐tunedtheirresponse,vastamountsofoilcontinuedtoleakfromtheMacondoWell;
andbymid‐June,federalofficialswereestimatingthattheflow‐ratewassomewherebetween35,000and60,000
barrelsperday.52Allthesame,severalkeydevelopmentsbegantohelpturnthetide,slowlyraisingconfidencein
theresponseanddiminishingthepoliticalfallout.
ThepresenceofCoastGuardliaisonsintheofficesofparishpresidentsandcitymayorswentalongwayin
minimizingthedysfunctionthathadcharacterizedintergovernmentalrelationsthroughoutMay.Inaddition,a
dramaticannouncementbyPresidentObamaattheendofthemonthmarkedamorepubliclyaggressivestance
onthepartofthefederalgovernment.WhilevisitingtheGulfonMay28,thePresidentemphasizedthathetook
fullresponsibilityforresolvingthecrisis.Underscoringhiscommitment,herevealedthathewastriplingthenum‐
beroffederalpersonnelandresourcesdedicatedtotheresponseintheGulf.53
NICleadersperceivedthePresident’smoveasamixedblessing.Ononehand,itseriouslycomplicatedlogisti‐
caloperations;ontheother,theyrealizedthatithadsignificantpoliticalbenefits.AsAssistantSecretaryKayyem
observed,
Soweweregoingtotripletheresources,andtheCoastGuardandtheNICneededto
figureouthowtodothat.Itwasn’teasyanditwasblunt.Butcrisisresponseisnotsim‐
52U.S.CoastGuard,ISPR.
53NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,Deepwater;andOfficeofthePressSecre‐
tary,TheWhiteHouse,RemarksbythePresidentafterBriefingonBPOilSpill,May28,2010,availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/remarks‐president‐after‐briefing‐bp‐oil‐spill,[accessedJuly21,2011].
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plytherealityofoperationalelements;itisalsotheperceptionofgrip.Andthatwas
whatthepresidentwassmartlydoing.
Despitethefactthatitwasfarfromclearhownecessarytheaddedpersonnelandresourceswere,theNIC’s
leadershipconsideredthePresident’sannouncementanimportantstepinseizingbackthenarrative.
Justtwoweekslater,anothermoveorchestratedbytheWhiteHousehelpedtoreorientthepoliticsofthecri‐
sisevenmore:onJune16,PresidentObamainformedtheAmericanpublicthatunderpressurefromhisadmini‐
stration,BPhadagreedtopay$20billionintoanescrowaccount.Thefunds,whichthecompanywasnotlegally
obligatedtoprovide,wouldbeusedtocompensatepeopleandbusinessesaffectedbythespill.(Asmandatedby
OPA,BPwouldalsocontinuetocoverclean‐upcosts.)54“Tome,”Kayyemnoted,“thatwasthepivotalmoment.It
gavetheCoastGuardsomebreathingspace,anditwasthefirstmomentwhereBPlookedlikeitwaslickingits
wounds….TheWhiteHouseshowedtremendousleadershipandbrilliantlawyering.”
Meanwhile,evenbetternewswastocome.Inmid‐July,forthefirsttimesincethecrisisbegan,BPmanaged
tofullycontaintheleaksemanatingfromtheMacondoWell.AlthoughNationalIncidentCommanderAllenwould
notdeclarethewellcompletelydeaduntilSeptember19,respondershadforallintentsandpurposesmettheir
immediategoalofbringingtheleaksundercontrol.55
OnOctober1,theNICofficiallydisbanded.56AshesteppeddownasNationalIncidentCommander,Admiral
Allenemphasizedthegreatlengthsofficialshadgonetoinordertoresolvethecrisis.“Throughtheunifiedefforts
ofover47,000people,weorganizedanddirectedamonumentalresponsetoremoveandmitigatethedamages
fromtheestimated4.9millionbarrelsofoildischargedintotheGulf,”Allenobserved.57Atthesametime,he–
alongwithmanyotherofficialsintimatelyinvolvedintheresponse–readilyacknowledgedthatimprovements
neededtobemadeinhowthecountrydealtwithcrisesofthismagnitude.Perhapsmostsignificantly,theexperi‐
encerevealedmajorinadequaciesinhowtherelevantdoctrinesandplansdealtwiththeinvolvementofpolitical
leaders.AsSpecialAssistanttothePresidentJosephAldyputit,aresponsecan’tsimplybeshapedaround“what‐
54OfficeofthePressSecretary,TheWhiteHouse,StatementbythePresidentafterMeetingwithBPExecutives,June16,2010,
availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/statement‐president‐after‐meeting‐with‐bp‐executives,[accessedJuly21,2011].55ButtemperingthisvictorywasthealltooobviousfactthattheDeepwaterHorizoncrisishadanumberoffar‐reachingand
long‐lastingnegativeeffects.Inadditiontosignificantlyaffectingthereputationsofnationalandregionalpoliticalleaders,thespill’seconomicandenvironmentalconsequencesweresevere.Althoughscientistsgenerallybelievedthatmostofthenearly5millionbarrelsofoilreleasedintotheGulfwaseithergoneordisperseddeepunderwaterwithintwoyearsofthespill,thefullextentofenvironmentaldamageswouldremainunclearforsometime;andattheveryleast,theoilthatdidwashashorehadinflictedseriousdamageonmarshesandwetlands(“TheBigSpill,TwoYearsLater,”NewYorkTimes,April17,2012).Mean‐while,economicactivityacrossseveralsectors–includingenergy,fishing,andtourism–hadexperiencedsignificantdisruptionsasaresultofthespill.(FormoreontheDeepwaterHorizon’seconomiceffects,see:Aldy,“Real‐TimeEconomicAnalysisandPolicyDevelopment.”)56NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.
57Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport.
HKSCaseProgram 18of26 CaseNumber1982.0
everplanorsetofruleshadbeenestablishedinthepast”ifthoseplansandrulesaresilentontheroleofthesen‐
ior‐mostpoliticalleaders,whoinevitabilityplayakeyroleduringacrisis.
Allenfullyagreed.BasedonhisexperienceasNationalIncidentCommander,heconcluded,“Ifyoudon’thave
astructured,relevantroleforpoliticalleaders,theywillcreateone….Thedoctrinehastoincludethepoliticalen‐
vironment,becauseitisthesociologicalecologyoftheresponse.Andyoucannotdoalargeresponsewithoutit.
That’sthebottomline.”
HKSCaseProgram 19of26 CaseNumber1982.0
Exhibit1
ChronologyofEventsinthe
Responsetothe2010DeepwaterHorizonOilSpill
Tuesday,April20
AnexplosionrockedtheDeepwaterHorizonoildrillingrig,locatedintheGulfofMexicoofftheLouisianacoast,
sparkinganintensefireandkilling11workers.
Thursday,April22
TheDeepwaterHorizonsanktotheseafloor.
Saturday,April24
LeaksemanatingfromtheDeepwaterHorizon’sriserpipewerediscovered.
Thursday,April29
HomelandSecuritySecretaryJanetNapolitanodesignatedtheeventa“SpillofNationalSignificance”(thefirstsuch
designationinU.S.history).
LouisianaGovernorBobbyJindaldeclaredaStateofEmergency.Hesubsequentlysubmittedaseriesoflettersto
variousfederalagenciesrequestingarangeofresourcesandotherformsofaidandassistance.
Friday,April30
Seniorfederalofficials,includingSecretaryNapolitano,InteriorSecretaryKenSalazar,EPAAdministratorLisaJack‐
son,andCarolBrowner,DirectoroftheWhiteHouseOfficeofEnergyandClimateChange,metwithstateandlocal
leadersatUnifiedAreaCommand,locatedinRobert,Louisiana.
GovernorsBobRileyofAlabama,CharlieCristofFlorida,andHaleyBarbourofMississippideclaredStatesofEmer‐
gencyfortheirrespectivestates.
Saturday,May1
TheObamaadministrationappointedAdmiralThadAllenNationalIncidentCommanderfortheDeepwaterHori‐
zonresponse.
AllensubsequentlynamedRearAdmiralPeterNeffengerasDeputyNationalIncidentCommanderandDHSAssis‐
tantSecretaryforIntergovernmentalAffairsJulietteKayyemashischiefpoliticalliaison.
HKSCaseProgram 20of26 CaseNumber1982.0
Sunday,May2
SecretariesNapolitanoandSalazarhostedaconferencecallwiththegovernorsoftheGulfStates.Thesecallssub‐
sequentlytookplaceonadailybasis,hostedbytheWhiteHouseandfacilitatedbyAssistantSecretaryKayyemand
DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderNeffengner.
Thursday,May27
USATodayandGallupreleasedapollinwhich60%ofadultrespondentsindicatedthatthegovernmentwasdoing
apoorjobmanagingtheresponsetothespill.
Friday,May28
Declaringthathetookfullresponsibilityforbringingthecrisistoanend,PresidentObamaannouncedthetripling
ofresourcesandmanpowerforthefederalresponseintheGulf.
Mid‐June
Federalofficialsestimatedthattheflow‐ratewassomewherebetween35,000and60,000barrelsperday.
Wednesday,June16
PresidentObamainformedtheAmericanpublicthatBPhadagreedtopay$20billionintoanescrowaccountin
ordertocoverdamagesfromthespill.
Sunday,September19
AdmiralAllendeclaredtheMacondoWellcompletelydead.
Friday,October1
TheNationalIncidentCommanddisbanded.
HKSCaseProgram 21of26 CaseNumber1982.0
Exhibit2
KeyActorsinthe
Responsetothe2010DeepwaterHorizonOilSpill
FederalOfficials
• JosephAldy,SpecialAssistanttothePresidentforEnergyandEnvironment,theNationalEconomicCoun‐
cilandtheWhiteHouseOfficeofEnergyandClimateChange
• AdmiralThadAllen,NationalIncidentCommanderfortheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillResponseandfor‐
merCommandant,U.S.CoastGuard
• JulietteKayyem,AssistantSecretaryforIntergovernmentalAffairs,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
• JanetNapolitano,Secretary,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
• RearAdmiralPeterNeffenger,DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderfortheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill
Response,andformerCommander,NinthDistrict,U.S.CoastGuard
• BarackObama,President,UnitedStatesofAmerica
StateandLocalOfficials
• HaleyBarbour,Governor,StateofMississippi
• MarkCooper,Director,Governor’sOfficeofHomelandSecurityandEmergencyPreparedness,Stateof
Louisiana(andsubsequentlySeniorDirectorforEmergencyManagementatWalmartStores,Inc.)
• CharlieCrist,Governor,StateofFlorida
• BobbyJindal,Governor,StateofLouisiana
• BillyNungesser,President,PlaqueminesParish,StateofLouisiana
• CharlotteRandolph,President,LafourcheParish,StateofLouisiana
• BobRiley,Governor,StateofAlabama
HKSCaseProgram 22of26 CaseNumber1982.0
Exhibit3
ListofAcronyms
DHS U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
EPA EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
FEMA FederalEmergencyManagementAgency
NCP NationalOilandHazardousSubstancesPollutionContingencyPlan(NationalContingencyPlan)
NIC NationalIncidentCommand
NOAA NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration
OPA OilPollutionAct
SONS SpillofNationalSignificance
SOSC StateOn‐SceneCoordinator
HKSCaseProgram 23of26 CaseNumber1982.0
Exhibit4
MapoftheStateofLouisianawithParishes
SOURCE:U.S.CensusBureau,State&CountyQuickFacts,2013,availableat
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/maps/stout22.gif,[accessedJanuary22,2013].NOTE:ArrowindicateslocationofLafourcheParish,Louisiana.PlaqueminesParishislocatedtotherightofthe
arrow.
HKSCaseProgram 24of26 CaseNumber1982.0
Exhibit5
DeepwaterHorizonOilSpillResponseStatistics
Totalestimatedamountofoilspilled 4,928,100barrels
Totalamountofoilrecovereddirectlyfromwellhead 689,934barrelsor17%
Totalamountofoilburned 246,405barrelsor5%
Totalamountofoilskimmed 147,843barrelsor3%
Totalamountofoilchemicallydispersed 394,248barrelsor8%
Totalamountofoilnaturallydispersed 788,496barrelsor16%
Totalamountofoilevaporatedordissolved 1,232,025barrelsor25%
Totalamountofoilresidual 1,281,306barrelsor26%
Totalnumberofresponsevessels 345vessels
Totalnumberofresponders 48,200personnel
TotalnumberofCoastGuardpersonnel 7,000activedutyandreserve
TotalnumberofCoastGuardassets 60vesselsand22aircraft
Totalnumberofvesselsofopportunity 3,200vessels
Totalamountofhardboomdeployed 3.8millionfeet
Totalamountofsoftboomdeployed 9.7millionfeet
Totalamountofdispersantsused 1.8milliongallons
Totalnumberofin‐situburnsconducted 411burns
Totalnumberofsurveillanceaircraftused 127aircraft
Totalnumberofincidentcommandposts 4commandposts(TX,LA,AL,andFL)
Totalnumberofsubordinatebranches 17branches
Totalnumberofequipmentstagingareas 32stagingareas
Totalnumberofaviationcoordinationcenters 1aviationcoordinationcenter(TyndallAFB)
Totalamountofliquidwastecollected 1.4millionbarrelsofliquidwaste
Totalamountofsolidwastecollected 92tonsofsolidwaste
Totalnumberofinternationaloffersofassistance 47offersofassistance
SOURCE:U.S.CoastGuard,BPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill:IncidentSpecificPreparednessReview(ISPR),January,
2011,availableathttp://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/bpdwh.pdf,[accessedJanuary22,2013].
HKSCaseProgram 25of26 CaseNumber1982.0
Exhibit6
OilBoomaroundNewHarborIsland,Louisiana
SOURCE:U.S.Navy,May16,2010,photono.100519‐N‐6141B‐001,availableat
http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=85711,[accessedJanuary19,2013].NOTE:ThisphotodepictsoilcontainmentboompositionedaroundNewHarborIsland,Louisiana,duringthe
DeepwaterHorizoncrisis.
HKSCaseProgram 26of26 CaseNumber1982.0
Exhibit7
GulfofMexicoFisheryClosures,asofJune2,2010
SOURCE:SoutheastRegionalOffice,NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration,MapofFisheryClosure
BoundaryEffectiveJune2,2010,availableat
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/deepwater_horizon/closure_info/documents/pdfs/bp_oilspill_fisheryclosuremap_0602
10.pdf,[accessedJanuary12,2013].