the deepwater horizon oil spill: the politics of crisis ... ·...

26
HKS740 Case Number 1982.0 This case was written by David W. Giles, Assistant Director, Program on Crisis Leadership, for Dr Arnold M. Howitt, Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy and Executive Director of the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, and Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, George F. Baker, Jr. Professor of Public Management, Harvard Kennedy School, and Eliot I. Snider and Family Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School. Funds for case development were provided by the Massachusetts National Guard in support of the Harvard Kennedy School’s General and Flag Officer Homeland Security Executive Seminar. HKS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright © 2013 President and Fellows of Harvard College. No part of this publication may be reproduced, revised, translated, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the express written consent of the Case Program. For orders and copyright permission information, please visit our website at http://www.ksgcase.harvard.edu/ or send a written request to Case Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: The Politics of Crisis Response (B) Introduction As they worked to bring greater cohesion to the Deepwater Horizon response, National Incident Commander Thad Allen and his two top advisors – Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger and Juliette Kayyem, Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – expended considerable energy trying to coordinate the vast federal interagency. But improving collaboration within the Obama administration was just one piece of the puzzle. In addition, they had to contend with a host of elected officials from across the Gulf Coast who stood, as one local leader put it, at the very “epicenter” of the crisis. With April turning into May and oil con‐ tinuing to leak unabated into the Gulf, Allen’s team would need to figure out how to coordinate response strate‐ gies with these governors, parish presidents, mayors, and city and county council members. 1 Speaking to the grim mood that would complicate federal authorities’ outreach to their state and local counterparts over the next sev‐ eral months, Rear Admiral Neffenger observed, “All the happy talk at the early stages [of a response] goes away pretty fast when real, long‐term effects start to hit …. There is this general sense of despair that sets in.” 2 (See Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively, for a chronology of events and a list of key actors in this case. See Exhibit 3 for a list of acronyms.) Competing Legal Regimes: OPA vs. Stafford Following the discovery of oil leaking from the Macondo Well on Saturday, April 24, Assistant Secretary Kayyem traveled to the Gulf Coast to meet with the region’s governors. Within days of her arrival, an additional leak at the well site was identified; and on Thursday, April 29, the federal government elevated the incident to a Spill of National Significance (SONS) and established a National Incident Command (NIC) to coordinate response efforts. A day later, President Obama sent senior members of his administration – including Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lisa Jackson, and the Director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change, Carol Browner – to join 1 Louisiana is politically sub‐divided into parishes, the rough equivalent of counties in other states. 2 Telephone interview with Peter Neffenger, August 24, 2011. Unless noted, subsequent quotations from and attributions to Neffenger are from this interview.

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Page 1: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: The Politics of Crisis ... · assessing‐the‐effects‐of‐the‐deepwater‐horizon‐oil‐spill‐on‐states‐localities‐and‐the‐private‐sector,

HKS740CaseNumber1982.0

ThiscasewaswrittenbyDavidW.Giles,AssistantDirector,ProgramonCrisisLeadership,forDrArnoldM.Howitt,AdjunctLecturerinPublicPolicyandExecutiveDirectoroftheAshCenterforDemocraticGovernanceandInnovation,HarvardKennedySchool,andHermanB.“Dutch”Leonard,GeorgeF.Baker,Jr.ProfessorofPublicManagement,HarvardKennedySchool,andEliotI.SniderandFamilyProfessorofBusinessAdministration,HarvardBusinessSchool.FundsforcasedevelopmentwereprovidedbytheMassachusettsNationalGuardinsupportoftheHarvardKennedySchool’sGeneralandFlagOfficerHomelandSecurityExecutiveSeminar.HKScasesaredevelopedsolelyasthebasisforclassdiscussion.Casesarenotintendedtoserveasendorsements,sourcesofprimarydata,orillustrationsofeffectiveorineffectivemanagement.

Copyright©2013PresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollege.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,revised,translated,storedinaretrievalsystem,usedinaspreadsheet,ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeanswithouttheexpresswrittenconsentoftheCaseProgram.Forordersandcopyrightpermissioninformation,pleasevisitourwebsiteathttp://www.ksgcase.harvard.edu/orsendawrittenrequesttoCaseProgram,JohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity,79JohnF.KennedyStreet,Cambridge,MA02138.

TheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill:ThePoliticsofCrisisResponse(B)

Introduction

AstheyworkedtobringgreatercohesiontotheDeepwaterHorizonresponse,NationalIncidentCommander

ThadAllenandhistwotopadvisors–RearAdmiralPeterNeffengerandJulietteKayyem,AssistantSecretaryfor

IntergovernmentalAffairsattheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)–expendedconsiderableenergytrying

tocoordinatethevastfederalinteragency.ButimprovingcollaborationwithintheObamaadministrationwasjust

onepieceofthepuzzle.Inaddition,theyhadtocontendwithahostofelectedofficialsfromacrosstheGulfCoast

whostood,asonelocalleaderputit,atthevery“epicenter”ofthecrisis.WithAprilturningintoMayandoilcon‐

tinuingtoleakunabatedintotheGulf,Allen’steamwouldneedtofigureouthowtocoordinateresponsestrate‐

gieswiththesegovernors,parishpresidents,mayors,andcityandcountycouncilmembers.1Speakingtothegrim

moodthatwouldcomplicatefederalauthorities’outreachtotheirstateandlocalcounterpartsoverthenextsev‐

eralmonths,RearAdmiralNeffengerobserved,“Allthehappytalkattheearlystages[ofaresponse]goesaway

prettyfastwhenreal,long‐termeffectsstarttohit….Thereisthisgeneralsenseofdespairthatsetsin.”2(See

Exhibits1and2,respectively,forachronologyofeventsandalistofkeyactorsinthiscase.SeeExhibit3foralist

ofacronyms.)

CompetingLegalRegimes:OPAvs.Stafford

FollowingthediscoveryofoilleakingfromtheMacondoWellonSaturday,April24,AssistantSecretary

KayyemtraveledtotheGulfCoasttomeetwiththeregion’sgovernors.Withindaysofherarrival,anadditional

leakatthewellsitewasidentified;andonThursday,April29,thefederalgovernmentelevatedtheincidenttoa

SpillofNationalSignificance(SONS)andestablishedaNationalIncidentCommand(NIC)tocoordinateresponse

efforts.Adaylater,PresidentObamasentseniormembersofhisadministration–includingHomelandSecurity

SecretaryJanetNapolitano,InteriorSecretaryKenSalazar,EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)Administrator

LisaJackson,andtheDirectoroftheWhiteHouseOfficeofEnergyandClimateChange,CarolBrowner–tojoin

1Louisianaispoliticallysub‐dividedintoparishes,theroughequivalentofcountiesinotherstates.

2TelephoneinterviewwithPeterNeffenger,August24,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattributionstoNeffengerarefromthisinterview.

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KayyemandotherfederalofficialsintheGulf.Theretheymetface‐to‐facewithanincreasinglyanxioussetofstate

andlocalleaders.3

Bythen,theGulfStateshadstartedtotakeemergencyresponsemeasuresoftheirown.OnApril29,withoil

slicksadvancingtowithinjustthreemilesofthecoast,GovernorBobbyJindalhaddeclaredaStateofEmergency

forLouisiana.Hehadalsobegunsubmittingrequeststofederalagenciesforvarioustypesofresourcesandaid,

includingsupportforthefishermenandcoastalbusinessmenwhofacedsubstantiallossesduetothespill.Follow‐

ingJindal’slead,GovernorsBobRileyofAlabama,CharlieCristofFlorida,andHaleyBarbourofMississippihad

declaredtheirownStatesofEmergencyadaylater.4

Forthestatestohavereceivedextensivefederalassistance,theObamaadministrationwouldhavehadtoin‐

voketheRobertT.StaffordDisasterReliefandEmergencyAssistanceAct(StaffordAct).5Butitinsteadproceeded

toorganizetheDeepwaterHorizonresponsepursuanttoanotherfederallaw:theOilPollutionActof1990(OPA),

which–alongwiththecorrespondingNationalOilandHazardousSubstancesPollutionContingencyPlan(NCP)–

providedthelegalauthorityandgeneralframeworkformanagingresponsestomajoroilspills.6

Fromtheverystartofthecrisis,however,localandstateleadershadadifficulttimeacceptingOPAoverStaf‐

ford.Partoftheirpreferenceforthelatterstemmedfromsimplefamiliarity:hurricanespummeltheGulfCoaston

aregularbasis,andofficialsintheregiongenerallyadheretotheStaffordActwhenrespondingtotheseandother

majoremergencies.Importantly,thelawallowsstatestoretaincontroloftheresponse,evenastheybenefitfrom

considerablefederalaid.

3HeidiAvery,“TheOngoingAdministration‐WideResponsetotheDeepwaterBPOilSpill,”TheWhiteHouseBlog,updatedMay25,2010,availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/05/ongoing‐administration‐wide‐response‐deepwater‐bp‐oil‐spill,[accessedJanuary16,2013];andJulietteKayyem,TestimonytotheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonHomelandSecu‐rityandGovernmentalAffairsSubcommitteeonState,LocalandPrivateSectorPreparednessandIntegration,DeepImpact:AssessingtheEffectsoftheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillonStates,LocalitiesandthePrivateSector,June10,2010,availableathttp://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/disaster‐recovery‐and‐intergovernmental‐affairs/hearings/deep‐impact‐assessing‐the‐effects‐of‐the‐deepwater‐horizon‐oil‐spill‐on‐states‐localities‐and‐the‐private‐sector,[accessedJanuary15,2013].4NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater:TheGulfOilDisasterandtheFutureofOffshoreDrilling;ReporttothePresident,January2011;andCampbellRobertson,“WhiteHouseTakesaBiggerRoleintheOilSpillCleanup,”NewYorkTimes,April29,2010.ForadetailedlistingofrequestsGovernorJindalsubmittedtofederalagencies,see:MarkCooper,TestimonytotheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairsSubcommitteeonState,Local,andPrivateSectorPreparednessandIntegration,DeepImpact:AssessingtheEffectsoftheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillonStates,LocalitiesandthePrivateSector,June10,2010,availableathttp://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/disaster‐recovery‐and‐intergovernmental‐affairs/hearings/deep‐impact‐assessing‐the‐effects‐of‐the‐deepwater‐horizon‐oil‐spill‐on‐states‐localities‐and‐the‐private‐sector,[accessedJanuary17,2013].5ForanoverviewoftheStaffordActdeclarationprocess,see:FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA),TheDeclara‐tionProcess,updatedJune13,2012,availableathttp://www.fema.gov/declaration‐process,[accessedJanuary16,2013].6FormoreonOPAandtheNCP,see:U.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,NationalOilandHazardousSubstancesPollutionContingencyPlanOverview,2011,availableathttp://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm,[accessedJanu‐ary19,2012].

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MarkCooper,DirectoroftheLouisianaGovernor’sOfficeofHomelandSecurityandEmergencyPreparedness

atthetimeofthespill(andsubsequentlySeniorDirectorforEmergencyManagementatWalmartStores,Inc.),7

explainedthebottom‐upnatureofatypicalStaffordresponse:

Theresponseisatthelocallevel.Andthenwhenthelocalscan’thandleit,itgoestothe

state.Thestateprovidessupport,andwhenitexceeds[thestate’s]capacity,theygoto

thefederalgovernment….[But]thecenteroftheearthwouldn’tbetheunifiedarea

command;itwouldbeatthelocallevel.8

YetwiththefederalgovernmentdecliningtoissueaStafforddeclaration,stateandlocalauthoritiesfacedan

entirelyunfamiliarscenario–onethatleftthemfeelingalienatedfromthefederally‐directedresponsebeginning

totakeshapeintheGulf.AsCoopersaid,“Thelocalsfeltliketheyhadnorole,really.Anditwastheircoastlines

andparishesthatwerebeingimpacted!”

Louisiana’sLafourcheParish,locatedalongthestate’ssoutheasterncoast,wasoneofthemanylocaljurisdic‐

tionsthatfounditswaterways,beaches,andmarshesunderdirectthreatfromtheencroachingoil.(SeeExhibit4

foramapofLouisiana,indicatingthelocationofLafourche.)Theparish,likemuchoftherestoftheGulfCoast,

washeavilyreliantontheoilandfishingindustries,andtheDeepwaterHorizonspillthreateneditsresidents’very

wayoflife.AsBrennanMatherne,PublicInformationOfficerforLafourche,vividlyputitintheearlydaysofthe

crisis,“IfyoudriveupHighway1uptoLockport,you’llseefishermenliningthebayouthewholeway….There’re

[sic]thousandsofpeopleherewhomaketheirlivingoffoysters,shrimp,andfish.Oilgoingupthebayouwouldn’t

begoodforanyofus.”9

Movingtodefendtheirshoreline,parishleadersinitiallyorganizedtheirresponsearoundthebottom‐upprin‐

ciplesofStafford,justastheyhaddonecountlesstimesinthepast.EspeciallyconcernedthatbreachesalongLa‐

fourche’scoastlinewouldallowoiltowashintoenvironmentallyfragilemarshes,theybroughtintheirown

equipmenttofillinbreaksalongtheshore.Whenthateffortfailed,LafourcheParishPresidentCharlotteRandolph

recounted,“Wedidaswenormallydoduringanemergencyandcalledinstateandnationalresourcesinorderto

assistus.”10ItwasthenthattheywerefullyconfrontedbytherealitiesofOPA,discoveringthatthefederalgov‐

ernmentwasforallintentsandpurposesincontroloftheentireresponse–includingresourcesandmoney.

“That,”Randolphdeclared,“wasforeigntous.”

7CooperlefthispostwiththeStateofLouisianaforWalmartStores,Inc.inthesummerof2011.

8TelephoneinterviewwithMarkCooper,August10,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattributionstoCoo‐perarefromthisinterview.9QuotedinBillSasser,“LouisianaLawmakers:BPCan’tHandleGulfOilSpillCleanupAnymore,”ChristianScienceMonitor,May11,2010.10TelephoneinterviewwithCharlotteRandolph,November17,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattribu‐

tionstoRandolpharefromthisinterview.

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Addingtotheirfrustrations,localandstateofficialsalsodeterminedthatOPAentailedexcruciatinglyslowbu‐

reaucraticprocedures.Louisiana’sMarkCoopernotedthatthis,too,stoodinsharpcontrasttohisstate’sexperi‐

encewithStafford‐declaredemergencies.HepointedoutthatduringHurricanesGustavandIkein2008,theFed‐

eralEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)hadworkedcloselywiththestatetoexpediteapprovalsandquickly

answerquestions(amarkedimprovementinrelationssincethemuchmalignedresponsetoHurricaneKatrinajust

threeyearsearlier).ButduringDeepwaterHorizon,Coopercontinued,stateandlocalemergencymanagement

officialshadtoworkwithnumerousfederalentitieswithwhichtheypreviouslyhadlittleinteraction.Amongother

things,thismeantthattheysuddenlyhadtofigureouthowtoadjusttoandnavigateeachagency’sadministrative

proceduresandculture.AsCharlotteRandolphofLafourcheParishobserved,

Itwasaprolongedprocesshavingtogothroughalltherulesandregulations[ofOPA

andtheNCP].Youknow,inanemergencysituation,[sometimes]youreactandfixthe

problemafterthefact.Inthissituation,wehadtofollowallofEPA’sguidelines,the

CleanWaterAct;wehadtofollowalltheCoastGuardregulations…Itwasjustone

regulationafteranother!11

ObamaAdministrationofficials,however,remainedconvincedthatinvokingOPAmadeenormoussense.Al‐

thoughmindfulofthelocalandstateofficials’frustrations,NationalIncidentCommanderThadAllendeclaredthat

“unequivocally”OPAandtheNCPprovideda“soundframeworkandallowedforneededdiscretionandfreedomof

actiontoaddresscontingenciesthatarose.”12Forherpart,AssistantSecretaryJulietteKayyemsummedupthe

advantagesofOPAinthreewords:“Thepolluterpays.”13OPA,sheclarified,requiresthespill’sresponsibleparty

(BPinthecaseoftheDeepwaterHorizonleaks)tocoverallclean‐upcosts–andpayforupto$75millioninre‐

lateddamages.Andonthatpoint,representativesofstateandlocalgovernmentagreedwiththeirfederalcoun‐

terparts.“TherewerecertainpartsofOPAthatIthinkwerebeneficial,”Cooperadmitted,“[suchas]thefactthat

theresponsiblepartywasgoingtobe100%liableforthecostoftheresponse.”

YeteventheNIC’sownleadersacknowledgedthatOPA,whichCongresshadpassedin1990inthewakeofthe

ExxonValdezoilspill,wasbynomeansaperfectfitfortheDeepwaterHorizonresponse.“Justtotellyouhowlim‐

iteditwas,[OPA]dealtwithsurfaceoil,notwithwhatweweredealingwithat5,000feetundertheocean,”

Kayyemexplained.Moreover,thelawwasbasedonthepremisethatthespillwouldinvolveavesselreleasinga

11RandolphreferredspecificallytoaninitiativeimplementedbyBPandfederalauthorities–theVesselsofOpportunitypro‐

gram–whichpaidlocalresidents,particularlyfishermenwhohadlostworkasaresultofthespill,tohelpskimoilfromthewaterandassistinotherwayswiththeclean‐up.ButaccordingtoRandolph,“InorderfortheCoastGuardtoassignthemtotheseprojects,theyhadtogothrougharigorousprocessofequippingtheirboatswiththeproperlifesavingdevices,andtheyhadtosecuretheproperlicensesandthingslikethat–whenwecouldhavejustsentthemoutandsaid‘we’resorry’later.”12ThadW.Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport:MC252DeepwaterHorizon,2010,availableat

http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/SA‐1065NICReport/$File/Binder1.pdf?OpenElement,[accessedJanuary19,2012].13PresentationbyJulietteKayyem,March23,2011,HarvardBusinessSchool,Boston,MA.Unlessnoted,subsequentquota‐

tionsfromandattributionstoKayyemareeitherfromthispresentation;anotherpresentationMs.KayyemmadeonApril14atHarvardKennedySchool,Cambridge,MA;oraninterviewbytheauthorwithMs.KayyemonMay18,2011.

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fixedamountofoilintothewater,asopposedtothecontinuousleakingthatoccurredfollowingthesinkingofthe

DeepwaterHorizon.Andfromapoliticalperspective,Kayyemadded,“Wehadalwaysthoughtthatitwouldbea

one‐statespill”–therebyinvolvingalimitedsetofelectedofficialsandjurisdictions.

KayyemandAllenstressedoneotherlimitationtoorganizingtheresponseunderOPA:the9/11terroristat‐

tacksandHurricaneKatrina,theysaid,hadradicallyreshapedthepublic’sexpectationsregardingthelevelofgov‐

ernmentinvolvementindisasterresponseandtheformsofaiditshouldprovide;butOPA,writtenyearsbefore

eitherevent,camenowhereclosetomeetingthoseexpectations.AsAllenputit,

Thereisanevolution,devolution,reinventing,whateveryouwant,ofthesocialcontract

inthiscountry[ofwhatcitizens]expectwhenoneofthesethingsoccur….Thepublic

expectsawholeofgovernmentresponse.[Buttheseresponses]cannotbeexecutedto

thesamedegreethatmilitaryoperationsaredone….I’mtellingyou,there’sadiscon‐

nectthere!”14

Kayyemadded:“[OPA’s]notaboutdiversifyingLouisiana’seconomy…It’snotaboutthelong‐termrehabilita‐

tionoftheGulf.It’snotaboutthementalhealthofthepeopleintheGulf.Thelawdidnoteventhinkofanyof

that.”Instead,shesaid,itdealtstrictlywiththemechanisms,protocols,andfundingneededtobringtheimmedi‐

atecrisis(thespill)toanend.

Staffordprovisions,meanwhile,weremuchmoreinlinewiththegrowingexpectationsoftheAmericanpub‐

lic;andthus,LafourcheParishPresidentCharlotteRandolphrecalled,localofficialsurgedtheObamaadministra‐

tiontoinvokethelaw.AccordingtoJosephAldy,SpecialAssistanttothePresidentforEnergyandEnvironment,

theirrequestsdidnot,infact,fallondeafears.TheObamaadministration,hesaid,pursuedacompromiseofsorts,

proposingthatCongressprovideStafford‐likeaid,suchasunemploymentassistance,whileallowingfederal

authoritiestocontinueorganizingtheirresponseunderOPA–therebykeepingBPaccountableforcompensation

andclean‐upcosts.15AsAldyputit,“WewantedStafford‐likeauthorities,withouttheStaffordAct,becauseaStaf‐

fordActdeclarationcouldletBPoffthehookforcompensationofdamagesfromthespill.”16

14InterviewwithThadAllen,September15,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattributionstoAllenarefrom

thisinterview.15FordetailsonthelegislativepackagesubmittedbytheObamaadministration,see:OfficeofthePressSecretary,TheWhite

House,FactSheet:DeepwaterHorizonOilSpillLegislativePackage,May12,2010,availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/fact‐sheet‐deepwater‐horizon‐oil‐spill‐legislative‐package,[accessedApril16,2012].16InterviewwithJosephAldy,August9,2011.Unlessnoted,subsequentquotationsfromandattributionstoAldyarefromthis

interview.

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Congresseventuallyapprovedsomeadditionalassistance.Allthesame,itwouldcomenowhereclosetofulfill‐

ingthehopesofelectedofficialsfromacrosstheGulf,whoweregrowingincreasinglyanxiousaboutthespill’sef‐

fectontheirconstituents’waysoflife.17

TheGovernors

OnSunday,May2,SecretariesNapolitanoandSalazarhostedwhatwastobecomeacornerstoneofthere‐

sponse–aconferencecallinvolvingseniorfederalofficials,thegovernorsoftheGulfStates,andtheirchiefadvi‐

sors.Withindays,theseso‐called“Governors’Calls”hadbecomeadailyevent,takingplaceeverymorningat

9:15.18

NationalIncidentCommanderThadAllenparticipatedinthefirstseveralcalls.Butdeterminingthattheywere

not“thebestuse”ofhistime,giventhattheyentailedlisteningtoalitanyofcomplaintsfromthegovernors,he

quicklyceasedparticipating.“Youwouldsittherefor30or40minutesandhavepeoplejustscreamingonthe

phone,”heremembered.

Still,thecallshadimportantvaluefortheadministration,particularlyinapoliticalsense.Withthe2010mid‐

termcongressionalelectionsjustaroundthecorner,andgiventhewidespreadbeliefthatseveralGulfgovernors

(allRepublicans)plannedtorunforpresidentin2012,theWhiteHousehopedtoavoidmajorconflictsoverthe

managementoftheDeepwaterHorizonresponse.Consequently,itaskedtheNICtocontinueengagingthegover‐

norsthroughthecalls.“Theydidn’twanttobecomebestfriendswiththesefolks,”Allenobserved,“butthey

wantedtomakesuretheywereminimizinganypotentialproblemsandunderstoodifsomethingwasgoingtobe‐

comeapoliticalfirestorm.”

AllenassignedhistoptwodeputiesattheNIC,RearAdmiralPeterNeffengerandAssistantSecretaryJuliette

Kayyem(whomAllenhaddesignatedashischiefpoliticaladvisorduringtheresponse),tohelpmoderatethecalls.

ParticipatingineveryoneofthealmostonehundredGovernors’Callsthattookplacethroughouttheremainderof

thecrisis,NeffengerandKayyemwouldwalkthroughtheagendaatthestartofeachmorning’sdiscussionbefore

askingvarioussubjectmatterexpertstoprovideupdates.(NOAAofficials,forinstance,regularlyreportedon

weatherconditionsintheGulf;EPArepresentativesaddressedseveralenvironmentalissues,suchastheuseof

chemicaldispersantstocombattheoilslicks;andCoastGuardofficersreviewedahostofoperationalconcerns.)

Kayyemcapturedtheimportanceofthedailycall:“[It]wasaspaceinwhichrealconcernswerediscussed….

[Andhaving]thesubjectmatterexpertsparticipatingsortofhelpedcalmsomeofthegovernors’concerns.”Forhis

part,Neffengersaidthatthecallservedasakeymechanismforbothsidestomaintainawarenessandkeep

abreastofdevelopments.“Ithinkthattherewassortofthismutualdesiretobeintheloop,”hereflected,“both

fromtheadministration’ssideandthegovernors.’”

17JosephE.Aldy,“Real‐TimeEconomicAnalysisandPolicyDevelopmentduringtheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill,”Vanderbilt

LawReview64(6),pp.1795‐1817,2011.18Avery,“TheOngoingAdministration‐WideResponsetotheDeepwaterBPOilSpill;”andKayyem,DeepImpact.

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TheNIC’stopofficialssoondeterminedthatthecallalsohadadownside,however.AccordingtoNeffenger,

eachmorning’sdiscussiongeneratedawholenewsetofdemands,whichinturncreatedsome“distortion”and

“dysfunction”intheresponsethroughouttheremainderoftheday.Heexplained,

Therewereanumberoftacticaldemandsthatjustcouldn’tbemetinthattimeframe.

Bythetimeyougotoffthephone,organizedthetasking,andfiguredoutwhointhis

massiveresponsewasgoingtoberesponsibleforwhat,awholedayhadgoneby….And

theverynextdayyouwouldhavenothingmoretoreport,except,‘Well,atleastwegot

theissuesprioritized!’19

This,hesaid,ledtosomeveryrealfrustrationsonthepartofthegovernors,whooftenfeltlikenothinghad

beenaccomplished–orthatfederalauthoritieswereignoringtheirconcerns.But,Neffengeremphasized,“You

can’tjustsnapyourfingersandhaveitallworkwhenyou’vegot47,000peopleontheground….Thisisamassive

undertaking,andittakesalotoftimetomovethingsandgetthemgoing.”20

Meanwhile,thecallstookonanaddeddynamicwhentheWhiteHousedecidedtoassignhostingdutiesto

SeniorAdvisortothePresidentValerieJarrett.AssistantSecretaryKayyemrememberedreceivingwordofthear‐

rangement.“Look,thereareprosandconstothatset‐up,”shesaid.“ButtheonerealityisthattheWhiteHouse

wasinvolvedandneededtobeinvolved.ValerieJarrett’sinvolvementisn’tsomethingyouquestion,eventhough

itraisedthelevelofattentiontothecalls.”

Neffengertookaslightlydifferentview.AlthoughagreeingthathavingJarretthostthecallslentthemsignifi‐

cantprestige,heharboredconcernsthatiterasedanyremainingboundariesbetweenthegovernorsandthe

President’sinnercircle.“Onceyou’vecreatedaccessatthesenior‐mostlevels,thenhowdoyouturnitbackoff?”

Neffengerwondered,addingthatdecisionsmadebythepoliticalleadersduringthecallsattimesunderminedthe

incidentcommandstructurethathadbeenestablishedpursuanttoOPAandtheNCP.AsNeffengerputit,“[We]

effectivelycreatedashadowcommandstructurethathadinjectsfromtheveryhighestlevelsbackintothedaily

operationalevents.”

19TheGovernors’Callwas,infact,justoneofthemanyteleconferencestheNIC’sseniorleadershiptookpartinoverthecourse

ofaday.At7:30everymorning,AdmiralAllen,RearAdmiralNeffenger,andAssistantSecretaryKayyemparticipatedinaNa‐tionalIncidentCommandconferencecalltoreviewnewdevelopments.At9:00AM,officialsfromtheNationalIncidentCom‐mandandtheWhiteHousegotonthephonetoprepareforthatday’sGovernors’Call,whichtypicallylastedaboutanhour.Afterthat,seniorfederalofficialsstayedonthelinetodebriefandbegintaskingthemanyissuesraisedbythegovernors.Then,eachafternoon,theNationalIncidentCommandledconferencecallsforlocalofficials,senatorsfromtheaffectedstates,andCoastGuardofficersservingasliaisonstoparishpresidentsandcitymayors.20Indeed,thefederally‐ledresponsetotheDeepwaterHorizoncrisiswasanunprecedentedundertakingintermsofscope,

complexity,andsize.Todealwiththeestimated4.9millionbarrelsofoilthatleakedintotheGulf,theresponseencompassedawidearrayofoperationstakingplaceintheair(anAviationCoordinationCentermanagedtheactionsofapproximately120aircraftprovidingsituationalawarenessonthespreadofthespillandlocationofresources);onthesea(the6,400vesselsin‐volvedintheresponsewere,inthewordsofAdmiralAllen,more“thanwereusedintheD‐DayinvasionofNormandy”);andontheground(Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport).Foradetailedaccountofthemassiveamountofresourcesandper‐sonneldedicatedtoresponseeffortsintheGulf,seeExhibit5.

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Butfromthegovernors’perspective,thedailycallwasextremelyvaluable.AccordingtoMarkCooper,then

theDirectoroftheLouisianaGovernor’sOfficeofHomelandSecurityandEmergencyPreparedness,“Itwasadirect

pointofcontactwiththePresident.SoIthinkthatitgavethosegovernorsanopportunitytoexpresstheirhighest

priorities.”Anddespitehisownreservations,Neffengerconceded,“IfIwereagovernor,Iwouldhavelikedit.I

wouldhavebeenonit.”Heidentifiedabroaderbenefitofthecallsaswell:

Theywereexceptionallyhelpfulinunderstandingthepressuresthat[thegovernors]

werefacingfromtheirconstituencies,thepeopleintheirstates.Andthatgavemeareal

appreciationforwhythegeneralapproachofputtingpoliticiansorelectedofficialsina

cornerandpullingthemoutasyouneedthemforpressconferencesandthelike

doesn’treallyhelp….Itcompletelymisunderstandstheroleofelectedofficials.[They

are]asmuchinchargeasyouare,butinaverydifferentway.

DemandingandDeployingBoom

Yetdespitetheadministration’shopesthattheGovernors’Callswouldminimizepoliticalconflict,disagree‐

mentsbetweenfederalandstateauthoritiesonlyescalatedasMayworeon.Oneparticularlyintensepointofcon‐

tentionrevolvedaroundtheuseofoffshoreoil“boom”forprotectingthecoastline.21AlthoughtheCoastGuard

hadbegundeployingthematerialintheearliestdaysofthespill,ithaddonesojudiciously,placingitinareas

wheretheGuardbelieveditwouldhavethegreatesteffect.(AccordingtoCoastGuardofficials,boomisgenerally

usedtodeflectoiltoplaceswhereitcanbemosteasilycollectedandremoved–notforsafeguardinganentire

coastline.)Butdeterminedtoprotecttheirshoresbyanymeanspossible,thegovernorsappliedanenormous

amountofpressuretoincreasetheamountofboomusedintheresponse.

Soon,anintensebackandforthconcerningitseffectivenesswastakingplaceovertheairwavesandonthe

frontpagesofnewspapers.AsearlyasMay1,GovernorJindalwaspubliclystatingthathehadgrowntiredofwait‐

ingforfederalofficialstoagreetoplansinvolvingvastamountsofboom.“Wearepastthepointofwaitingforany

cleanupplansfromBPortheIncidentCommander.Wehavealreadybegundevelopingcontingencyplansforpar‐

ishes,”hedeclared.“Weareaskingforthesecontingencyplanstobeapprovedso[that]wearenolongerinthe

positionofrequestingboombythefootforoneplaceoranother.”22TheGovernordidnotletup,andoverthe

ensuingweekshemadehispointtimeandtimeagain.InlateMay,heremindedthepressthathisearlierrequest

formillionsoffeetofboomremainedunfilled.AnobviouslyfrustratedJindalstated,“Itisclearthattheresources

neededtoprotectourcoastarestillnothere.”Hethennotedwithprecision,“643,148feetofhardboomoutof

21Madeoutofplasticandotherbuoyantmaterial,boomfloatsinwaterandisusedtocollect,redirect,orabsorboil.Itisbest

usedincalmwaters,aswavescaneasilypassoverorbreakitapart,aproblemthatrepeatedlycomplicatedresponseeffortsthroughoutthecourseoftheDeepwaterHorizoncrisis(PeterGrier,“ContainmentBoomEffortComesupShortinBPOilSpill,”ChristianScienceMonitor,June11,2010;JulietteKayyem,“TheGameChanger,”BostonGlobe,April24,2011;andCampbellRobertson,“EffortstoRepelOilSpillareDescribedasChaotic,”NewYorkTimes,June14,2010).22QuotedinOfficeoftheGovernor,StateofLouisiana,“GovernorJindal:OilSpillisThreateningOurWayofLife&WeAre

FightingtoProtectOurCoast,”May1,2010,availableathttp://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=2146,[accessedJuly27,2011].

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[thetotaldelivered]hasbeendeployedand[a]remaining143,037feetofhardboomissittinginstagingareas,

whileoftencontractorssitandwaitforordersfromBPonwheretodeployit.”23

AlthoughMississippiGovernorHaleyBarbourtookadifferenttack,adopting,astheNewYorkTimesputit,a

“keep‐clam‐and‐carry‐on”approach,Jindalwasbynomeansaloneinpressingtheissue.24GovernorBobRileyof

Alabamawasalsodeterminedtoprocurewhatheconsideredhisstate’sfairshare–andhecomplainedbitterly

whenNICofficialsdecidedtoredirectsomeoftheboomoriginallyallottedforAlabamatoLouisiana,asoilslicks

beganmovinginthelatter’sdirection.25InearlyJune,aftertheObamaadministrationresolvedtheissuetohis

satisfaction,RileypubliclythankedthePresidentforhispersonalinvolvementinthematter.But,theGovernor

reiterated,“BoomthatwasdeployedhereinAlabamashouldneverhavebeentakenfromusinthefirstplace.”26

Infact,despitetheirreservations,federalauthoritiesmovedtoprocureanddistributeasmuchboomasthey

couldfind,realizingthattheissuehadtakenonpoliticalovertones.27DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderPeter

Neffengerlaterreflected,

Therewerecertaintimeswhenyouknewyouweredoingsomethingjusttodealwith

theveryrealpoliticalproblemsomebodyhad.Wefoughtthatasmuchaspossible[but]

agoodexampleisputtingboominplaceswhereboomwasn’tmeanttobeput,forpur‐

posesthatboomwasnevermeanttoaddress.

Neffengeraddedthatdeployingboomjusttoplacatethegovernorsalsohadnegativeconsequencesforthe

moraleofprofessionalresponders.“Well,”hesaid,“therewerealotofplaceswhereislandswerewrappedin

boomanditwasnotatalleffective.Respondersknewthat.Sotherealconcernisyouhavecreatedawholebunch

ofcynicalresponders.”(SeeExhibit6foranimageofislandsencircledbyboom.)

LouisianaandtheSandBerms

Disputesoverthedeploymentofboomwere,however,“relativelycivil,”astheNationalCommissionthatex‐

aminedtheDeepwaterHorizonresponseputit,incomparisontothedebateoveranotherstrategyadvancedby

23QuotedinOfficeoftheGovernor,StateofLouisiana,“GovernorJindalMeetswithCoastalParishLeaders,AnnouncesNew

StrategiestoProtectCoasttoFillVoid,”May23,2010,availableathttp://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=2191,[accessedApril18,2012].24CampbellRobertson,JamesC.McKinley,Jr.,ShailaDewan,andDamienCave,“ADauntingStartofSummerfor5GulfState

Governors,”NewYorkTimes,May29,2010,A12.25HolbrookMohrandJohnFlesher,“GulfOilSpill’sThreattoWildlifeTurnsReal,”AssociatedPressOnline,June6,2010;and

JustinPritchard,TamaraLush,andHolbrookMohr,“BPSpillResponsePlansSeverelyFlawed,”AssociatedPressState&LocalWire,June9,2010.26QuotedinBenEvans,“Adm.AlleninHotSeatOverSpill,”AssociatedPressOnline,June11,2010.

27AsnotedbyNationalIncidentCommanderThadAllen,federalauthoritieswenttogreatlengthstofindenoughboomtokeep

upwiththedemandintheGulf.Hereported,“Weidentifiedeveryfootofboomintheworld….[and]engagedeverydomesticboomsuppliertoboostmanufacturefromafewthousandfeetperweekbeforethespilltooveraquarter‐millionfeetofboomperweekattheheightoftheresponse”(Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport).

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GovernorJindal–theconstructionofsandbermsofftheLouisianacoast.28InearlyMay,thestatehadrequested

thattheU.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersgrantitanemergencypermittobuildmorethan100‐milesworthofberm,

arguingthatitwouldserveasaneffectivebarrieragainsttheoilthreateningLouisiana’scoastline.Afterreviewing

theproposal,however,theCorpsofEngineers,theNIC,andseveralotherfederalbodiesraisedsomeseriouscon‐

cerns.Expressingworriesaboutitspotentialenvironmentalconsequencesandthecostandtimeinvolved,aswell

asdoubtsastowhetherbermwasasuitabletoolforcombatingthespreadofoil,federalofficialswerereluctantto

approvethemassiveproject.29

Withthereviewprocessdraggingon,GovernorJindalagainpubliclyventedhisfrustrationswithhisfederal

counterparts,notingonMay23,“Wehave[been]waitingonadecisiononourdredging/sand‐boomplanfromthe

U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersfornearlytwoweeks.WemademodificationssuggestedbytheCorpsandanswered

everyquestiontheysubmittedinthesameday.”Hecontinued,“Everydaywearenotgiventheauthorizationto

moveforwardandcreatemoreofthesesandboomsisanotherdaywherethatchoiceismadeforusandmoreand

moremilesofourshorearehitbyoil.”30

FacingmountingpressurefromJindalandlocalofficialsinLouisiana–andwithPresidentObamainjecting

himselfintothedebate–federalauthoritieseventuallyallowedpartoftheprojecttomoveforward.31Butbuild‐

ingthebermsindeedprovedtobeatimeconsumingandextremelycostlyprocess,withjustasmallportionofthe

bermscompletedbythetimetheleakswerebroughtundercontrol.32

MarkCooper,however,defendedtheaggressivenesswithwhichJindalpushedforresourcesthathefeltmight

proveeffective.“CertainlyIthinkitwasintheGovernor’srightandhisresponsibilityofprotectingtheStateofLou‐

isiana’scitizenstotryanykindofprotectivemeasurehepossiblycould,”heasserted.“Becausewewerenotseeing

thatspillbeingplugged….Imeanourentirecoastwasatjeopardy!”Cooperpointedtooneotherimportantfactor

thatdroveJindal’sbehavior.“You’vegottokeepinmind,too,thateverybodywellremembers–whetherit’sper‐

ceptionorreality–Louisiana’sresponsetoKatrina,”heexplained.“AndIthinkhecertainlywantedtoletthepeo‐

28NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.

29MimiHall,RickJervis,andAlanLevin,“IsOilSpillBecomingObama’sKatrina?”USAToday,May27,2010;NationalCommis‐

sionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,TheStoryoftheLouisianaBermsProject:StaffWorkingPaperNo.8,updatedJanuary11,2011,availableathttp://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Berms%20Working%20Paper.pdf,[accessedAugust9,2012];andCampbellRobertson,“LouisiananBecomesFaceofAngeronSpill,”NewYorkTimes,May31,2010.30QuotedinOfficeoftheGovernor,StateofLouisiana,“GovernorJindalMeetswithCoastalParishLeaders.”

31ThePresidentbecamedirectlyinvolvedduringaMay28meetingwithlocal,state,andfederalofficialsinGrandIsle,Louisi‐

ana.Afterheinvitedattendeestovoicetheirconcerns,PlaqueminesParishPresidentBillyNungesserandLouisianaGovernorBobbyJindalimmediatelyspokeup,stressingtheimportanceofthebermsproject.ThePresidentthenturnedtoNationalInci‐dentCommanderThadAllenandaskedhimtoconveneapanelofexpertstoconsidertheidea–despitethefactthattheNICandotherfederalbodieshadspentaconsiderableamountoftimedoingjustthat.Whetheritwasmeanttoornot,thePresi‐dent’srequestwasinterpretedasforcingtheNIC’shandandsettingoffachainofeventsthatculminatedintheapprovalofbermconstruction(NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,TheStoryoftheLouisianaBermsProject).32NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.

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pleofLouisianaknowthathewasfullyengagedinwhatwasgoingonandincommandofasmuchashecouldbe

incommandof.”

Nullification

IntheeyesofNICofficials,however,differencesoverthetechnicalitiesofresponsestrategiesrevealedafar

deeperproblem:thebroader“politicalandsocialnullification,”asAdmiralAllenputit,oftheplansandrelation‐

shipsthatfederalandstateauthoritieshaddevelopedtodealwithoilspills.33AstheNationalCommissionthat

reviewedtheresponsetoDeepwaterHorizonlaterconcluded,“theGovernorsandotherstatepoliticalofficials

participatedintheresponseinunprecedentedways,takingdecisionsoutofthehandsofcareeroil‐spillrespond‐

ers.”34AssistantSecretaryJulietteKayyemelaborated,“Under[OPA],stateswererequiredtoworkwiththeCoast

GuardandtheindustrytoplananAreaContingencyPlan,amutualagreementbyallpartiesaboutwhatresponse

techniqueswouldbeusedintheeventofamajorspill.”But,shecontinued,duringtheDeepwaterHorizoncrisis,

“notoneoftheGulfgovernors….wouldacceptthathisownexpertshadsignedoffonplansthat,essentially,they

nolongerlikedintheharshlightofday.”35

FederalofficialsbelievedthatthiswasespeciallysoinLouisiana.There,theysaid,eventhoughthegovernor

publiclycomplainedabouttheirresponseplansandactions,hisownrepresentativeshadactuallyagreedtosome

oftheseverysamemeasuresandstrategies.Inthemidstoftheresponse,CoastGuardCaptainRogerLaferriere,

whodirectedfederalcleanupeffortsorganizedoutoftheIncidentCommandPostinHouma,Louisiana,ventedto

theNewYorkTimes,“Itoldhim,whenhesignstheplanhe’sendorsingourprojects.”Laferriereconcluded,“Lou‐

isianaisstilllearningtheprocess.”36Fortheirpart,however,Jindaladministrationofficialsarguedthattheyhad

littlerealinfluenceoverfederally‐drivenresponseefforts.37

Meanwhile,theNIC’srelationshipwiththestatebecameparticularlystrainedwhenfederalofficialsdeter‐

minedthatGovernorJindalhadmarginalizedLouisiana’spre‐designatedStateOn‐SceneCoordinator(SOSC)–

someonewithwhomtheCoastGuardhadpreviouslyworkedcloselyindeveloping,exercising,andcarryingout

contingencyplans.AttheverystartoftheDeepwaterHorizoncrisis,aspertheNationalContingencyPlan,the

SOSC–alongwithhiscounterpartsfromAlabamaandMississippi–hadreportedtotheUnifiedAreaCommand

(UAC)inRobert,Louisiana.Eventually,however,theJindaladministrationhadrelocatedthecoordinatortothe

IncidentCommandPostinHouma,Louisiana,amovethatfederalofficialssawaseffectivelysidelininghim.They

33Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport.

34NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.

35JulietteKayyem,“TheGameChanger.”

36QuotedinRobertson,“EffortstoRepelOilSpillareDescribedasChaotic.”

37NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,Decision‐MakingwithintheUnifiedCom‐

mand:StaffWorkingPaperNo.2,updatedJanuary2011;Seealso:StatementbyMichaelD.Edmondson,TheDeepwaterHori‐zonOilSpillChainofCommand:AnExaminationofInformationSharingPracticesDuringaSpillofNationalSignificance,FieldHearingBeforetheSubcommitteeonManagement,Investigations,andOversightoftheCommitteeonHomelandSecurity,U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,July12,2010,SerialNo.111‐74(U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2011).

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werefurtherfrustratedbywhattheyconsideredtheincreasinglydirectinvolvementofthegovernor’sofficeinhis

place.This,theysaid,injectedasetofunfamiliaractorsintotheresponseandsloweddownthedecision‐making

process.38

Stateofficialssawthingsverydifferently.Emphaticallydenyingthattheyhadsidelinedanyone,theyinstead

arguedthattheSOSC’srelocationwasduetothefactthatHoumawas“wherethemainemphasis[ofthere‐

sponse]wastakingplace.”39AddressingallegationsthatJindalhadthenassumedthedutiesoftheSOSC,hisadvi‐

sorsinsisted,“TheGovernorwasnevernamedStateonSceneCoordinator.”40

TheLocals

BytheendofMay,theDeepwaterHorizonoilleakshadevolvedintoafull‐blowncrisis.Inadditiontoahostof

disputesbetweenstateandfederalauthorities,aseriesofattemptsbyBPtosealofftheMacondoWellhad

failed;41thegovernmenthaddramaticallyraiseditsofficialflowrateestimatetoupto19,000barrelsaday;

42and

oilhadbegunwashingashore.StateandfederalofficialshadalsotakenstepstorestrictfishinginGulfwaters,dis‐

ruptingawayoflifefortheregion’sinhabitants(seeExhibit7foramapdepictingpeakfisheryclosures,asofJune

2,2010).And,inaparticularlycontroversialdecision,theObamaadministrationhadimposedasix‐monthmorato‐

riumonoildrillingtakingplaceatmorethan500feetunderwater.Themoratoriumcreatedsubstantialuncertainty

withintheoilindustry,theregion’smaineconomicengine.43

Fromapoliticalperspective,thesituationhadbecomedire.AUSAToday/GalluppollreleasedinlateMay

foundthat60%ofrespondentsbelievedthatthefederalgovernmentwasdoinga“poor”or“verypoor”jobof

managingtheresponse,whilemorethanhalfdisapprovedofPresidentObama’shandlingofthecrisis.Criticism

38NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,Decision‐MakingwithintheUnifiedCom‐

mand;NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater;andTestimonybyMi‐chaelD.EdmondsonandRolandGuidry,TheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillChainofCommand.39QuotedinTheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillChainofCommand.

40QuotedinMarkSeibel,“StudySlamsConfusion,WasteinBPOilSpillResponse,”McClatchyNewspapers,October6,2010.

41ThroughoutMay,BPattemptedtostoptheleaksusingavarietyofmethods.Thetacticsincludedtryingtoreactivatethe

blowoutpreventer;placingacontainmentdomeovertheleaks;pluggingthewellwith“junkshots”ofsmallobjectsanddebris;andpursuinga“topkill”strategythatentailedfillingthewellwithheavymud(NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHori‐zonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.)42Althoughfederalofficialscited19,000barrelsperday(bpd)asthehigh‐endofthegovernment’sMay27flowrateestimate,

somecalculationswereashighas25,000bpdormore(NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOff‐shoreDrilling,DeepWater;andU.S.CoastGuard,BPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill:IncidentSpecificPreparednessReview[ISPR],January,2011).43Formoreonthemoratorium,see:U.S.DepartmentoftheInterior,NoticetoLesseesandOperatorsofFederalOilandGas

LeasesintheOuterContinentalShelfRegionsoftheGulfofMexicoandthePacifictoImplementtheDirectivetoImposeaMora‐toriumonAllDrillingofDeepwaterWells,May30,2010,availableathttp://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/MORATORIUM_NTL.pdf,[accessedAugust1,2012].

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waspouringinfromallcorners,andthemediahadbeguntoopenlyaskifDeepwaterHorizonwasnow“Obama’s

Katrina.”44

AsleadersoftheNationalIncidentCommandsoughttoregroup,theyidentifiedseveralissuesthattheybe‐

lievedhadcomplicatedtheresponseandcontributedtothecorrespondingpoliticalfallout.First,theyrecognized

thattheyhadfailedtomanageexpectationsandpreparethepublicfortheveryworst.AssistantSecretaryKayyem

elaborated,

TheblowoutpreventerfailedinApril.Whenwasthefirstoilfoundonshore?Itwasthe

lastweekofMay.Soweessentiallyhadfourweeksofanticipationwaitingforthisstuff.

ThatmeanswehadfourweekstoexplaintotheAmericanpublicwhatwasaboutto

happentothem,whatwasabouttohappentotheGulf.Wedidn’tdoit….Iwishwejust

saideveryday:‘look,oilwillhitshore.’Maybethen,whentheyactuallysawit,it

wouldn’thavebeensoshockingtothepublic.”

Inaddition,theyrealizedthattheyhadsomeveryrealproblemsrelatingtoandcoordinatingwithlocaljuris‐

dictions.Tostartwith,anumberoflocalitieshadopenlychafedathavingtooperateunderthedirectionoffederal

authorities,wholedtheresponsepursuanttoOPAandtheNCP.LafourcheParishPresidentCharlotteRandolph

explainedtheirpointofview:

Takingusoutofthepicture,outofthedecision‐making,justfrustratedustonoend,be‐

causewefeltweknewwhattheyshouldhavebeendoing.Yetthiswasafederalscene

andtheywereincharge.Theywerereluctanttoseekourinputinthis.Andthatperhaps

istheoverridingissueofitall:notrespectingthefactthatthelocalshadahandleonthe

situationbetterthantrainedprofessionalscominginfromoutside.

Feelingmarginalized,anumberoflocalitiesestablishedincidentcommandpoststomanagetheirownre‐

sponseefforts(whichtheyundertookindependentoftheNIC,usingfundsthatBPhadprovideddirectlytostates

andparishes).45ButaccordingtoRearAdmiralNeffenger,these“shadow”commandscreatedanadditionalhead‐

achefortheNIC,astheywereoften“directlyatoddswiththeworkofthe[federal]responders.”

Atthesametime,somelocalofficialshadtakentotheairwavestopointedlycriticizetheObamaadministra‐

tion’sleadershipoftheresponse.BillyNungesser,PresidentofPlaqueminesParish,Louisiana,wasparticularlyout‐

spokenandpubliclyquestionedthefederalgovernment’seffortsonaregularbasis.46InlateMay,withoilnow

comingashoreinLouisiana,Nungesserdeemedthefederalresponse“dysfunctional.”Allegingthat“there’sno

44Hall,Jervis,andLevin,“IsOilSpillBecomingObama’sKatrina?”

45NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.

46OverthecourseoftheDeepwaterHorizoncrisis,NungesserbecameafamiliarpresenceonCNN,appearingontheevening

newscastAndersonCooper360atleasttentimesinthemonthofJunealone(MattDavis,“CNN’sAndersonCooperisBackinNewOrleanstoCoverYetAnotherDisaster:TheOilSpill,”TheTimes‐Picayune,July1,2010,availableathttp://www.nola.com/news/gulf‐oil‐spill/index.ssf/2010/07/cnns_anderson_cooper_is_back_i.html,[accessedApril18,2012]).

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chainofcommand,noone’sincharge,”heconcluded,“theresponsetothis….hasbeenworsethanKatrina.”47

SpeakingonCNNonMay26,Nungesserhadevenharsherwordsforfederalauthorities–andfortheNationalInci‐

dentCommanderinparticular.“ThadAllenshouldresign,"heasserted."He'sdoneabsolutelynothing.He'san

embarrassmenttothiscountry….It'slike[theresponseis]beingrunwithabunchofseventh‐graders.Thisisabso‐

lutelyridiculous."48

Otherlocalleadersemployedslightlydifferenttactics.Althoughbynomeansadefenderoftheadministra‐

tion’smanagementoftheresponse,CharlotteRandolphmadeapointofexpressingherfrustrationsawayfrom

publicview.“Mystyleistoworkbehindthescenes,”sheexplained.“I’vefoundthatthemediamessageisnotal‐

wayssuccinctlydelivered–andit’smoresensational.”InsteadofmakinghercasethroughTVappearancesorin

thepapers,shepreferredtomeetin‐personwithfederalofficialsatunifiedareacommand.“Wefeltthathaving

theseone‐on‐onediscussionswasmoreeffective,”Randolphrecalled.“Youknow,you’vegottoacceptthefact

thatithappened,andthenyoustopblamingpeopleandstartworkingwiththepeoplewhocanfixit,”shesaid.

”Youhavetodothingsthatareproactive,andnotjustyellandscreamaboutthem.”

Yet,nomatterhowmanyoftheGulf’spoliticalleaderstookRandolph’sapproach,thepubliccomplaintscon‐

tinuedtodominatethenews.AndastheNIC’sleadersconsideredhowtogetabetterholdonthesituationpoliti‐

cally,theyrealizedthatwhiletheyhadoriginallyassumed–basedonthegoverningdoctrine–thatthestateswere

coordinatingwiththeirrespectivelocalleaders,thiswasnotalwaysthecase.49AssistantSecretaryKayyemex‐

plained,

WefellintothetrapoftheOilPollutionAct,whichwasverystatecentric.Anditmeant

thatifIamworkingwiththegovernor,theneverything’sOK.Andthenwerealizedthat

thereweremayors,countycommissioners,andparishpresidentswhohadtheirown

hostilitytowardsthestate….Wedidnotdoenoughearlyontogetthemtothetable,to

understandwhattheywereseeing,tounderstandwhattheyneeded.

Similarly,DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderPeterNeffengeremphasizedthattheNIC’searlyfocusonthe

statesattheexpenseoflocalitieswaslargelyduetobiasesbuiltintoOPAandtheNCP.Heexplainedthatduring

routineoilspillresponses,“We[theCoastGuard]workintandemwiththestates,butwetypicallydon’tpluginto

localcommunities.”TheDeepwaterHorizonresponsewasofsuchanextremescale,however,thatstandard

modesofoperationnolongerapplied.“Youcan’tsimplyassumethatthestateisgoingtoreachdownandconnect

47QuotedinHall,Jervis,andLevin,“IsOilSpillBecomingObama’sKatrina?”

48Quotedin“PlaqueminesParishPresidentBlastsFederalResponsetoOilSpill,”CNN,May26,2010,availableat

http://articles.cnn.com/2010‐05‐26/us/gulf.oil.spill.plaquemines_1_nungesser‐oil‐spill‐plaquemines‐parish?_s=PM:US,[ac‐cessedApril18,2012].49AsdetailedintheCoastGuard’sIncidentSpecificPreparednessReviewonDeepwaterHorizon,“Underthe[UnifiedCom‐

mand]constructlaidoutintheNCPandtheCoastGuard’sIMH,itisexpectedthatlocalissuesarisingwithinaStatewillbead‐dressedbytheStateOn‐SceneCoordinator(SOSC)andtheirstaffinthe[IncidentCommandPost]”(U.S.CoastGuard,ISPR).

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foryou,”Neffengersaid.“Ithinkthattherewasageneralexpectationthatifyouwereworkingwiththestate,you

wereworkingwiththelocals.Andthat’snotalwaysthecase.”

AdmiralAllenassertedthatthiswasparticularlytrueinLouisiana,wherethereassignmentofthestate’slong‐

timeoilspillcoordinator,coupledwithdisputesandconfusionoverpreviouslyagreeduponclean‐upplans,com‐

plicatedtheengagementoflocalitiesinclean‐upefforts.Thepoliticalorganizationofthestateonlyaddedtothe

challenge.Unlikeitsneighbors,Louisianaisastrong“HomeRule”state,whichmeansthatparishleadersenjoy

considerableautonomy–somethingthatthestate‐centricOPAwasnotwellsuitedfor.50

Seekingtoaddresstheproblem,NICleadersrolledoutinMayanewlydeveloped“liaisons’program,”through

whichtheydeployeddozensofCoastGuardofficerstostandalongsidelocalofficialsfromacrosstheGulf.51Ex‐

plainingthebenefitsoftheprogramforlocalleaders,Kayyemsaid,“Inacrisis,youjustwantsomeonewhohas

authority,whocanansweryourquestions,soasapoliticalperson,youdon’tlooklikeyoudon’tknowanything.”

AdmiralAllenadded,“Therehadtobeunityofeffort[betweenalllevelsofgovernment].Andtheonlywaytocre‐

ateaunityofeffortistomakesureyouunderstoodwhateverybodywasdoing.Andwehadtoadaptourstructure

todo[so].”

Fortheremainderofthecrisis,localleaderscouldturntotheirliaisonstoobtaincriticalinformation,channel

theircomplaints,andmaketheirneedsknowntoseniorresponseleaders.Atthesametime,theNICleadership

wouldbenefitfromfargreatertransparencyonissuesandconditionsatthelocallevel.Takingpainstoemphasize

theimportanceoftheprogram,DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderNeffengerandAssistantSecretaryKayyem

traveledtogetherthroughouttheregion,personallyintroducingparishpresidents,countyofficials,andmayorsto

theirnewlyappointedliaisons.

AccordingtoLafourche’sCharlotteRandolph,theprogramprovedworthwhile–eventually.“Webalkedatit

initiallybecauseofthefactthatthey[theliaisons]seemedverybureaucraticandnotreallyparticularlyresponsive

toeventsthatoccurred,”sheexplained.Ultimately,however,Randolphacknowledgedthatdeployingtheliaisons

wasbeneficialtobothlocalleadersandfederalauthorities.“Theintroductionofaliaisonwasveryhelpfulinthat

wewereabletospendquiteabitoftimewiththatparticularpersonexplainingthesituationandeducatingthem

ontheterritory,”sheobserved.MarkCooper,headoftheLouisianaGovernor’sOfficeofHomelandSecurityand

EmergencyPreparednessatthetimeofDeepwaterHorizonconcurred.“[Theprogram]certainlyassistedwiththe

frustrationatthelocallevel,”hesaid.“TheyhadsomebodyrighttherewiththemfromtheCoastGuardthatthey

couldcommunicatewith.”Headded,however,thattheprogramshouldhavebeenputinplacefromtheget‐go.“I

thinkthatthatwouldhavehelped[alleviate]someoftheangstthatwascreatedwiththeinformationthatwas

beingreported.”

50NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,Decision‐MakingwithintheUnifiedCom‐

mand.51Formoreontheliaisonprogram,see:Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport;U.S.CoastGuard,ISPR;andU.S.Coast

Guard,OnSceneCoordinatorReport,DeepwaterHorizonOilSpill,September2011,availableathttp://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf,[accessedAugust1,2012].

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Kayyemconcededthatittooksometimeforherandhercolleaguestoworkouttheprogram’skinks.Inpar‐

ticular,shenoted,itsoonbecameapparentthatsomeoftherelativelyjuniorCoastGuardofficersservingasliai‐

sonslackedtherequisiteexperience,skills,andrank.Overtime,theNICcorrectedtheproblembyintegrating

moreseniorofficersintotheprogram.Thiswasanimportantshift,asthehigherrankingofficershadfargreater

authoritytomoveresourcesandprovideanswerstothelocalofficialswithwhomtheyhadbeenpaired.“Youhave

tochooseverycarefullywhoyouputinthosepositions,”RearAdmiralPeterNeffengeremphasized.“Youneedthe

abilitytotakealotofheat,withoutcrumbling.Butbythesametoken,youhavetobeadiplomat,becauseifyou

justfightback,thenyou’velost….You’reworkingforsomebodyelse,andyourjobistofigureoutwhytheyhavea

problemandwhattheirissueis–howeverit’sdelivered.”Thiswasbynomeansaneasytask,butNeffengersaidof

theliaisonprogram:

Ithinkitwasprobablythemostimportantworkthatwedid.Becauseultimatelyitreally

didturn,Ithink,thegeneralcommentsofthelocalofficialsfrom‘theseguysareincom‐

petent’to‘alright,theyusedtobeincompetent,butnowthey’redoingtheirjobs.’AndI

thinkthe‘doingtheirjobpart’was‘nowthey’relisteningtome.’

TheCrisisDiminishes

EvenasNICofficialsfine‐tunedtheirresponse,vastamountsofoilcontinuedtoleakfromtheMacondoWell;

andbymid‐June,federalofficialswereestimatingthattheflow‐ratewassomewherebetween35,000and60,000

barrelsperday.52Allthesame,severalkeydevelopmentsbegantohelpturnthetide,slowlyraisingconfidencein

theresponseanddiminishingthepoliticalfallout.

ThepresenceofCoastGuardliaisonsintheofficesofparishpresidentsandcitymayorswentalongwayin

minimizingthedysfunctionthathadcharacterizedintergovernmentalrelationsthroughoutMay.Inaddition,a

dramaticannouncementbyPresidentObamaattheendofthemonthmarkedamorepubliclyaggressivestance

onthepartofthefederalgovernment.WhilevisitingtheGulfonMay28,thePresidentemphasizedthathetook

fullresponsibilityforresolvingthecrisis.Underscoringhiscommitment,herevealedthathewastriplingthenum‐

beroffederalpersonnelandresourcesdedicatedtotheresponseintheGulf.53

NICleadersperceivedthePresident’smoveasamixedblessing.Ononehand,itseriouslycomplicatedlogisti‐

caloperations;ontheother,theyrealizedthatithadsignificantpoliticalbenefits.AsAssistantSecretaryKayyem

observed,

Soweweregoingtotripletheresources,andtheCoastGuardandtheNICneededto

figureouthowtodothat.Itwasn’teasyanditwasblunt.Butcrisisresponseisnotsim‐

52U.S.CoastGuard,ISPR.

53NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,Deepwater;andOfficeofthePressSecre‐

tary,TheWhiteHouse,RemarksbythePresidentafterBriefingonBPOilSpill,May28,2010,availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/remarks‐president‐after‐briefing‐bp‐oil‐spill,[accessedJuly21,2011].

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plytherealityofoperationalelements;itisalsotheperceptionofgrip.Andthatwas

whatthepresidentwassmartlydoing.

Despitethefactthatitwasfarfromclearhownecessarytheaddedpersonnelandresourceswere,theNIC’s

leadershipconsideredthePresident’sannouncementanimportantstepinseizingbackthenarrative.

Justtwoweekslater,anothermoveorchestratedbytheWhiteHousehelpedtoreorientthepoliticsofthecri‐

sisevenmore:onJune16,PresidentObamainformedtheAmericanpublicthatunderpressurefromhisadmini‐

stration,BPhadagreedtopay$20billionintoanescrowaccount.Thefunds,whichthecompanywasnotlegally

obligatedtoprovide,wouldbeusedtocompensatepeopleandbusinessesaffectedbythespill.(Asmandatedby

OPA,BPwouldalsocontinuetocoverclean‐upcosts.)54“Tome,”Kayyemnoted,“thatwasthepivotalmoment.It

gavetheCoastGuardsomebreathingspace,anditwasthefirstmomentwhereBPlookedlikeitwaslickingits

wounds….TheWhiteHouseshowedtremendousleadershipandbrilliantlawyering.”

Meanwhile,evenbetternewswastocome.Inmid‐July,forthefirsttimesincethecrisisbegan,BPmanaged

tofullycontaintheleaksemanatingfromtheMacondoWell.AlthoughNationalIncidentCommanderAllenwould

notdeclarethewellcompletelydeaduntilSeptember19,respondershadforallintentsandpurposesmettheir

immediategoalofbringingtheleaksundercontrol.55

OnOctober1,theNICofficiallydisbanded.56AshesteppeddownasNationalIncidentCommander,Admiral

Allenemphasizedthegreatlengthsofficialshadgonetoinordertoresolvethecrisis.“Throughtheunifiedefforts

ofover47,000people,weorganizedanddirectedamonumentalresponsetoremoveandmitigatethedamages

fromtheestimated4.9millionbarrelsofoildischargedintotheGulf,”Allenobserved.57Atthesametime,he–

alongwithmanyotherofficialsintimatelyinvolvedintheresponse–readilyacknowledgedthatimprovements

neededtobemadeinhowthecountrydealtwithcrisesofthismagnitude.Perhapsmostsignificantly,theexperi‐

encerevealedmajorinadequaciesinhowtherelevantdoctrinesandplansdealtwiththeinvolvementofpolitical

leaders.AsSpecialAssistanttothePresidentJosephAldyputit,aresponsecan’tsimplybeshapedaround“what‐

54OfficeofthePressSecretary,TheWhiteHouse,StatementbythePresidentafterMeetingwithBPExecutives,June16,2010,

availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/statement‐president‐after‐meeting‐with‐bp‐executives,[accessedJuly21,2011].55ButtemperingthisvictorywasthealltooobviousfactthattheDeepwaterHorizoncrisishadanumberoffar‐reachingand

long‐lastingnegativeeffects.Inadditiontosignificantlyaffectingthereputationsofnationalandregionalpoliticalleaders,thespill’seconomicandenvironmentalconsequencesweresevere.Althoughscientistsgenerallybelievedthatmostofthenearly5millionbarrelsofoilreleasedintotheGulfwaseithergoneordisperseddeepunderwaterwithintwoyearsofthespill,thefullextentofenvironmentaldamageswouldremainunclearforsometime;andattheveryleast,theoilthatdidwashashorehadinflictedseriousdamageonmarshesandwetlands(“TheBigSpill,TwoYearsLater,”NewYorkTimes,April17,2012).Mean‐while,economicactivityacrossseveralsectors–includingenergy,fishing,andtourism–hadexperiencedsignificantdisruptionsasaresultofthespill.(FormoreontheDeepwaterHorizon’seconomiceffects,see:Aldy,“Real‐TimeEconomicAnalysisandPolicyDevelopment.”)56NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshoreDrilling,DeepWater.

57Allen,NationalIncidentCommander’sReport.

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everplanorsetofruleshadbeenestablishedinthepast”ifthoseplansandrulesaresilentontheroleofthesen‐

ior‐mostpoliticalleaders,whoinevitabilityplayakeyroleduringacrisis.

Allenfullyagreed.BasedonhisexperienceasNationalIncidentCommander,heconcluded,“Ifyoudon’thave

astructured,relevantroleforpoliticalleaders,theywillcreateone….Thedoctrinehastoincludethepoliticalen‐

vironment,becauseitisthesociologicalecologyoftheresponse.Andyoucannotdoalargeresponsewithoutit.

That’sthebottomline.”

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Exhibit1

ChronologyofEventsinthe

Responsetothe2010DeepwaterHorizonOilSpill

Tuesday,April20

AnexplosionrockedtheDeepwaterHorizonoildrillingrig,locatedintheGulfofMexicoofftheLouisianacoast,

sparkinganintensefireandkilling11workers.

Thursday,April22

TheDeepwaterHorizonsanktotheseafloor.

Saturday,April24

LeaksemanatingfromtheDeepwaterHorizon’sriserpipewerediscovered.

Thursday,April29

HomelandSecuritySecretaryJanetNapolitanodesignatedtheeventa“SpillofNationalSignificance”(thefirstsuch

designationinU.S.history).

LouisianaGovernorBobbyJindaldeclaredaStateofEmergency.Hesubsequentlysubmittedaseriesoflettersto

variousfederalagenciesrequestingarangeofresourcesandotherformsofaidandassistance.

Friday,April30

Seniorfederalofficials,includingSecretaryNapolitano,InteriorSecretaryKenSalazar,EPAAdministratorLisaJack‐

son,andCarolBrowner,DirectoroftheWhiteHouseOfficeofEnergyandClimateChange,metwithstateandlocal

leadersatUnifiedAreaCommand,locatedinRobert,Louisiana.

GovernorsBobRileyofAlabama,CharlieCristofFlorida,andHaleyBarbourofMississippideclaredStatesofEmer‐

gencyfortheirrespectivestates.

Saturday,May1

TheObamaadministrationappointedAdmiralThadAllenNationalIncidentCommanderfortheDeepwaterHori‐

zonresponse.

AllensubsequentlynamedRearAdmiralPeterNeffengerasDeputyNationalIncidentCommanderandDHSAssis‐

tantSecretaryforIntergovernmentalAffairsJulietteKayyemashischiefpoliticalliaison.

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Sunday,May2

SecretariesNapolitanoandSalazarhostedaconferencecallwiththegovernorsoftheGulfStates.Thesecallssub‐

sequentlytookplaceonadailybasis,hostedbytheWhiteHouseandfacilitatedbyAssistantSecretaryKayyemand

DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderNeffengner.

Thursday,May27

USATodayandGallupreleasedapollinwhich60%ofadultrespondentsindicatedthatthegovernmentwasdoing

apoorjobmanagingtheresponsetothespill.

Friday,May28

Declaringthathetookfullresponsibilityforbringingthecrisistoanend,PresidentObamaannouncedthetripling

ofresourcesandmanpowerforthefederalresponseintheGulf.

Mid‐June

Federalofficialsestimatedthattheflow‐ratewassomewherebetween35,000and60,000barrelsperday.

Wednesday,June16

PresidentObamainformedtheAmericanpublicthatBPhadagreedtopay$20billionintoanescrowaccountin

ordertocoverdamagesfromthespill.

Sunday,September19

AdmiralAllendeclaredtheMacondoWellcompletelydead.

Friday,October1

TheNationalIncidentCommanddisbanded.

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Exhibit2

KeyActorsinthe

Responsetothe2010DeepwaterHorizonOilSpill

FederalOfficials

• JosephAldy,SpecialAssistanttothePresidentforEnergyandEnvironment,theNationalEconomicCoun‐

cilandtheWhiteHouseOfficeofEnergyandClimateChange

• AdmiralThadAllen,NationalIncidentCommanderfortheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillResponseandfor‐

merCommandant,U.S.CoastGuard

• JulietteKayyem,AssistantSecretaryforIntergovernmentalAffairs,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity

• JanetNapolitano,Secretary,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity

• RearAdmiralPeterNeffenger,DeputyNationalIncidentCommanderfortheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill

Response,andformerCommander,NinthDistrict,U.S.CoastGuard

• BarackObama,President,UnitedStatesofAmerica

StateandLocalOfficials

• HaleyBarbour,Governor,StateofMississippi

• MarkCooper,Director,Governor’sOfficeofHomelandSecurityandEmergencyPreparedness,Stateof

Louisiana(andsubsequentlySeniorDirectorforEmergencyManagementatWalmartStores,Inc.)

• CharlieCrist,Governor,StateofFlorida

• BobbyJindal,Governor,StateofLouisiana

• BillyNungesser,President,PlaqueminesParish,StateofLouisiana

• CharlotteRandolph,President,LafourcheParish,StateofLouisiana

• BobRiley,Governor,StateofAlabama

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Exhibit3

ListofAcronyms

DHS U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity

EPA EnvironmentalProtectionAgency

FEMA FederalEmergencyManagementAgency

NCP NationalOilandHazardousSubstancesPollutionContingencyPlan(NationalContingencyPlan)

NIC NationalIncidentCommand

NOAA NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration

OPA OilPollutionAct

SONS SpillofNationalSignificance

SOSC StateOn‐SceneCoordinator

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Exhibit4

MapoftheStateofLouisianawithParishes

SOURCE:U.S.CensusBureau,State&CountyQuickFacts,2013,availableat

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/maps/stout22.gif,[accessedJanuary22,2013].NOTE:ArrowindicateslocationofLafourcheParish,Louisiana.PlaqueminesParishislocatedtotherightofthe

arrow.

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Exhibit5

DeepwaterHorizonOilSpillResponseStatistics

Totalestimatedamountofoilspilled 4,928,100barrels

Totalamountofoilrecovereddirectlyfromwellhead 689,934barrelsor17%

Totalamountofoilburned 246,405barrelsor5%

Totalamountofoilskimmed 147,843barrelsor3%

Totalamountofoilchemicallydispersed 394,248barrelsor8%

Totalamountofoilnaturallydispersed 788,496barrelsor16%

Totalamountofoilevaporatedordissolved 1,232,025barrelsor25%

Totalamountofoilresidual 1,281,306barrelsor26%

Totalnumberofresponsevessels 345vessels

Totalnumberofresponders 48,200personnel

TotalnumberofCoastGuardpersonnel 7,000activedutyandreserve

TotalnumberofCoastGuardassets 60vesselsand22aircraft

Totalnumberofvesselsofopportunity 3,200vessels

Totalamountofhardboomdeployed 3.8millionfeet

Totalamountofsoftboomdeployed 9.7millionfeet

Totalamountofdispersantsused 1.8milliongallons

Totalnumberofin‐situburnsconducted 411burns

Totalnumberofsurveillanceaircraftused 127aircraft

Totalnumberofincidentcommandposts 4commandposts(TX,LA,AL,andFL)

Totalnumberofsubordinatebranches 17branches

Totalnumberofequipmentstagingareas 32stagingareas

Totalnumberofaviationcoordinationcenters 1aviationcoordinationcenter(TyndallAFB)

Totalamountofliquidwastecollected 1.4millionbarrelsofliquidwaste

Totalamountofsolidwastecollected 92tonsofsolidwaste

Totalnumberofinternationaloffersofassistance 47offersofassistance

SOURCE:U.S.CoastGuard,BPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill:IncidentSpecificPreparednessReview(ISPR),January,

2011,availableathttp://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/bpdwh.pdf,[accessedJanuary22,2013].

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Exhibit6

OilBoomaroundNewHarborIsland,Louisiana

SOURCE:U.S.Navy,May16,2010,photono.100519‐N‐6141B‐001,availableat

http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=85711,[accessedJanuary19,2013].NOTE:ThisphotodepictsoilcontainmentboompositionedaroundNewHarborIsland,Louisiana,duringthe

DeepwaterHorizoncrisis.

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Exhibit7

GulfofMexicoFisheryClosures,asofJune2,2010

SOURCE:SoutheastRegionalOffice,NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration,MapofFisheryClosure

BoundaryEffectiveJune2,2010,availableat

http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/deepwater_horizon/closure_info/documents/pdfs/bp_oilspill_fisheryclosuremap_0602

10.pdf,[accessedJanuary12,2013].