the demilitarization of public security in panama

This article was downloaded by: [University of Reading]On: 19 December 2014, At: 19:20Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Small Wars & InsurgenciesPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20

The demilitarization ofpublic security in PanamaRicardo Arias CalderonPublished online: 26 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Ricardo Arias Calderon (2000) The demilitarization ofpublic security in Panama, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 11:1, 97-111, DOI:10.1080/09592310008423263

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310008423263

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions andviews of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor& Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information.Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly inconnection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/09592310008423263

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310008423263

form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

The Demilitarization of Public Securityin Panama

RICARDO ARIAS CALDERON

The Author, a former Vice-President and Minister of Government and Justice inPanama, describes the demilitarization process in his country since 1989. A historicalsummary traces militarization up to the fall of General Noriega and his PanamanianDefense Forces. The factors and stages in demilitarizing the latter back to a civilianpolice force are described together with the personnel, financial and educationalpolicies implemented. A conclusion argues that better pay and greaterprofessionalization will improve the police's self-image even more.

The democratization of Panama culminated in three years of intenseconfrontation between the movement in favor of civilian rule and themilitary dictatorship. Democratization became a reality through the traumaof US invasion on 20 December 1989. The dictatorship which the US hadfostered thus provoked its own end.

As a consequence the Panamanian process of democratization wascharacterized by the complete demilitarization of public security. Nothinglike it had taken place in Latin America since the experience which CostaRica lived through in 1948 as a result of its civil war.

In both cases, however different their national and international factors,two basic components were necessary for the complete demilitarization ofpublic security: a traumatic defeat of the existing military organization,which destroyed its utility and its prestige in the eyes of the nation and ofthe international community, and the seizing of this opportunity by those ingovernment who had the political vision and will to eliminate the militaryorganization and to substitute it with a civilian police organization.

These two components seem indispensable for completedemilitarization. Yet less dramatic circumstances can lead to varyingdegrees of demilitarization. In El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala therelative stalemate between the military organization and guerrilla groups,which proved that the military organization was unable by itself and of itselfto defeat the guerrilla insurrection, led to peace agreements which involvedthe following indicators of demilitarization: a substantial reduction innumbers of the military organization, the assignment to it of reduced andmore proper functions; the freeing of the police organization from military

Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.11, No.l (Spring 2000), pp.97-111PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14

98 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES

control, its transformation into a civilian police, the reassertion of civilianauthority over both military and police organizations and the furtherance ofthe appropriate political culture, all of which represents a significantbeginning of demilitarization, although not complete demilitarization as inCosta Rica and Panama.

In order to understand such profound institutional change, the role of thenational and international factors and the results up to now of the change,we must first understand in a summary fashion how public security hadevolved institutionally in Panama during the twentieth century and to whatpoint it had arrived just previous to the change.

Historical Summary of the Militarization of Public Security

The Independent Republic, 1903-31

During the first stage of our republican life, from 1903 till 1931, Panamaconcentrated on the task of turning institutionally a Department ofColombia into an independent Republic. The period was marked by diversearmed interventions on the part of the United States, on the grounds of thesecurity of the Canal under its control.

In December 1904, barely a year after our Declaration of Independence,the first army of the Republic was dissolved by President Manuel AmadorGerrero, with the support of the US Minister, due to an attempt againstcivilian rule. The only public security organization left was the NationalPolice.

The organization remained weak and ineffective. In 1916 theGovernment of Panama was even obliged to accept the US demand that thePolice in both terminal cities of Panama and Colon be disarmed of highcaliber rifles and remain equipped only with revolvers and shotguns.

In 1921 during the so-called Coto War with Costa Rica, an army wasestablished as well as military service under the command and instructionof the officers of the National Police, but it was an improvised andtemporary measure.

The National State, 1931-68

A civilian coup d'etat marked the transition to the second stage of ourrepublican life, from 1931 till 1968. This period was characterized by thestrengthening of the State apparatus and by the emergence of a clearnationalist consciousness. The success of this first coup d'etat was due totwo factors: the institutional weakness of the National Police at maintainingconstitutional order, in the context of the lack of sufficient legitimacy of theprevailing political system, and a new US policy of not intervening

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14

DEMILITARIZATION OF PANAMANIAN PUBLIC SECURITY 99

militarily and directly in the Republic of Panama in pursuing its Canalrelated interests.

During this period there was a gradual professional upgrading of theNational Police as well as the beginning of its militarization, with thetechnical assistance of the US and of the Chilean Cuerpo de Carabineros.Officers graduated from Latin American military schools were integrated inNational Police, among them Jose Antonio Remon Cantera. The newcondition was expressed in Law No. 79 of 25 June 1941, passed during thefirst administration of Dr Amulfo Arias Madrid.

That same year President Arnulfo Arias was overthrown in the first jointcivilian-military coup d'etat with the support of the US, which sawPresident Arias as favorable to the national socialist regime in Germany.Remon became Second Chief of the National Police, was appointed FirstChief in 1947 and had himself elected as President of the Republic in 1952.During his administration Law No. 44 of 23 December 1953, was passed,which turned the National Police into a National Guard, in the image andlikeness of the National Guard of Nicaragua. The militarization increased.Approximately, a year later, on 2 January 1955, President Remon wasassassinated, for unknown motives (rumors of relationship to drug traffichave never been substantiated).

The belligerence of the National Guard, both political and economic,increased, as well as incidents of excessive repression. The result was anunceasing enmity between the heads of the National Guard and theleadership of three-times overthrown President Amulfo Arias. Diversegroups of liberal, leftist and Christian democratic thought developed acivilian reaction to the beginnings of militarism. As a consequence of theconfrontation between these agents, social and political disturbancesoccurred.

The very reinforcement of the state apparatus, without the correspondingreinforcement of democratic legitimacy, led the militarized police to play anew role as arbiter of public power, even at the behest of the civilianpoliticians. On the other hand, the emergence of a nationalist consciousness,in its populist expression or in its leftist expression under the influence of'Castroism', led the United States to complement its policy of no directarmed intervention with a policy of unrestrictive support of the militarizedpolice, both in its training and in its resources for security purposes. TheNational Guard assumed an additional role as a surrogate agent of the USsecurity interests, especially in the Cold War.

When on 9 January 1964, the cause of Panamanian nationalismmanifested itself vehemently over the issue of the display of thePanamanian flag in the Canal Zone and had to face the aggression of the USArmy, the National Guard remained in its barracks, putting its surrogate

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


function above everything else.The lack of legislative approval of the three projects which constituted

the new Canal treaties, negotiated by President Marcos A. Robles with theUS, coincided in 1968 with a very agitated election of Dr Arnulfo Ariasagainst a candidate openly supported by the National Guard. The conditionswere thus propitious for the younger officers of the Guard to stage the coupd'etat of 11 October 1968.

The Military Dictatorship, 1968-89

With this event started the third stage in our national history, from 1968 till1989, as a result of the interaction between the relative illegitimacy of ourdemocratic politics and the questioned hegemony of the US over Panama.

This was the period of the military dictatorship, dependent on thepreeminence of a 'caudillo' but which attempted to institutionalize itself.The regime tried to bring together the factors which had entered intoconflict in the previous stage but also intensifying them: on the one hand, astate apparatus which grew to the point of becoming authoritarian and, onthe other hand, a nationalist populism exacerbated to the point of pretendingto be revolutionary. It tried to bring these factors together on the basis ofmilitarism, that is to say of the exercise by the military of supreme powerover the state and of a general supervisory role over civil society.

Under a leftist version or at least an ambivalent version of the nationalsecurity ideology, the main axis of this stage was the effort to convert amilitary police into an army. During this period five military strongmenused one junta government, seven presidents and a minister in charge of thepresidency, two heads of government and three constitutional changes asinstruments of their supreme power.

Regardless of the differences in the phases, the continuity of the periodconsisted in the effort to establish an army that could serve as the basis fordictatorial control of the country. Its foremost formal expression was foundin Law 20 of 29 September 1983, which converted the National Guard intothe Panama Defense Forces. The name was adopted supposedly under theinspiration of the Defense Forces of Israel and was supposedly meant toreflect the growing importance of the protection of the Canal as a functionof the Panamanian Public Force.

This complete militaristic experience gained the acceptance of sectors ofsociety which were both favored and manipulated, but never proven to be amajority of the country. Nevertheless, the regime ended up generatingthrough generalized corruption and repression of human rights, the worsecrisis of legitimacy of public power in the history of the Republic ofPanama.

It counted at the same time on the connivance of successive

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


governments of the United States, to which the dictatorship rendered bothpublic and clandestine services particularly in the Central American andCarribean scenarios of the Cold War.

The principal achievement of the regime was the signature of theTorrijos-Carter Canal treaties, thanks to which the relationship between thetwo countries was modernized in the context of international approval.However, the growing complicity with the narcotics traffic, particularly inthe Noriega phase of the regime, led to the beginning of non-fulfilment ofthe said treaties and provoked the traumatic invasion of Panama by the US.

By contradicting dramatically popular sovereignty and compromisingtraumatically national sovereignty, the army which the dictatorshipestablished condemned itself to disappear.

This occurred through two successive internal uprisings within theDefense Forces, on 16 March 1987 and on 3 October 1989, through itsdefeat and flight on 20 December 1989, when the US forces invadedPanama, and through the decision of the democratic government whichassumed power as of the latter date.

The complete demilitarization of the public security revealed itself to bethe indispensable condition of the democratic legitimacy of the Panamaniannational state and for this reason the safeguard of the commitment to renderthe Canal fully Panamanian.

Panama Defense Forces, the Culmination of Militarization

Under General Noriega, the Panama Defense Forces culminated in theirgrowth as the security organization of Panama, with four basic traits:militarization, centralization, supremacy and politicization.

In 1968 the National Guard had approximately 4,000 members and abudget of some 9 million dollars in 1970. In 1980 it had 8,000 members anda budget of 42 million dollars. In 1989 the Defense Forces had reached16,000 members and a formal budget of 100 million dollars, but had theeffective use of nearly 150 million dollars from public funds, without takinginto account the funds from illicit activities of all sorts, including drugtrafficking and money laundering.

The total number of officers was at the end 1,121: 1 general, 5 colonels,16 lieutenant colonels, 66 majors, 141 captains, 261 lieutenants and 631sub-lieutenants. Of the 16,000 members, nearly 4,000 belonged to militarytype units, of which nearly 1,000 were in the air and sea branches. The restserved in police, administrative or other functions, including the so-called'assimilated' individuals with rank and sometimes uniform, who served asagents of the military in sectors of civilian life.

The military style of life, separate from civilian life, imposed itself

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


gradually. Living in barracks became the foundation of this style of life. Itincluded a separate health service, as well as separate banking, supermarketand social club facilities. The system included prerogatives and privileges,both arbitrary and illicit, covering houses, summer homes, cars,participation in businesses and the delivery of paper bags with money incash in accordance with rank and the special favor of superiors.

Under a unified command, the Commander-in-Chief was assisted by a'Major Staff'. An intelligence service constituted a network of diverse centersof espionage within the security organization itself, towards society and eventowards certain foreign countries. Its financial office handled millions ofdollars from the budget, from unbudgeted public funds and from illicit sources.

The unified military and police command controlled diverse civilianagencies considered important for national security, both internal andexternal, included the agency responsible for the administration of the CanalTreaties, thus militarizing the relationship between Panama and the US.

Under the regime's Constitution - Article 277 - General Torrijos wasconsidered Leader of the Revolution and had direct power over the threebranches of government. His successors, without the title, kept the overallpower. The politieization of the Defense Forces led to a reduction of politicsto a radical all-encompassing alternative: militarism or civilian rule. Themilitary established and deposed seven presidents and a minister in chargeof the presidency. They committed electoral fraud in 1984 and attempted toannul the elections of 1989. They violated human rights massively andbrutally, and were guilty of generalized corruption to a degree never beforeexperienced in our history.

After two internal uprisings, coming to distrust the personnel of theDefense Forces, General Noriega established the so-called DignityBattalions and the Committees for Patriotic Defense and Dignity. He alsointroduced large quantities of arms from Cuba and Nicaragua anddistributed them or kept them hidden, purportedly meaning to prepareguerrilla warfare in case of an invasion.

By December 1989, General Noriega assumed the title of 'Head ofGovernment', declared Panama in a state of war and provoked the invasionby causing the death of an American soldier. As a result 321 Panamaniansdied, 57 of which were rank and file of the military; 26 US soldiers alsodied. When the US military invaded Panama, they failed to provide formaintenance of public order and the metropolitan area of the cities ofPanama and Colon experienced generalized looting.

Demilitarization of Public Security from 1989-90

In August and September 1989, during the attempted negotiation between

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


the presidential ticket which had won the 1989 elections and therepresentatives of General Noriega, under the auspices of the Organizationof American States, what seemed indispensable to demand was the exit ofGeneral. Noriega and at the most a dozen high officers. On 21 December,the presidential ticket took the initial decision that would lead to thecomplete demilitarisation of public security.

The Factors of Demilitarization

Four factors were decisive in demilitarizing public security.First, the trauma of the invasion against the Defense Forces made it

possible to eliminate the military.Second, the looting and ensuing anarchy dramatized the urgent need for

a organization whose task would be to ensure public security.Third, the awareness of the indispensable character of a national

organization to assume this task, for otherwise the absence of such anorganization would delegitimize the democratic government.

Fourth, the recognition that the indiscriminate firing of the members ofthe Defense Forces would lead to the continuation of pockets of armedresistance or to the formation of bands of delinquents, particularly given thelarge quantity of high caliber arms distributed throughout the country.

The choice was made to call former members of the Defense Forces torender renewed service, without any guarantee of impunity. Those whoresponded to the call were administered the following oath: 'I swear to Godand Country that I will comply, loyally, under the authority of the Presidentof the Republic, with the Constitution and the Laws of the land, in defenseof democracy.'

The Decrees of Demilitarization

Through Cabinet Decrees No. 38 of 19 February and No. 42 of 17 February1990 demilitarization was formalized in its double aspect: eliminating thePanama Defense Forces and establishing the new civilian policeinstitutions, under the generic name of 'Public Force', until the LegislativeAssembly would approve its Organic Law. Such a law would be dependenton the previous reform of the Constitution.

These Cabinet Decrees contained the four policies of state applied topublic security: complete demilitarization, institutional decentralization,subordination to civilian authority and apolitical professionalism.

All military type units of the Defense Forces were dismantled. In theirplace, four police services were created, with the President as SupremeChief, but with separate officer corps and command structures, as well aswith their distinct police and not military functions. These services were:the National Police, the National Air Service, the National Sea Service, the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


three under the Ministry of Government and Justice (equivalent to anInterior Ministry) and, for the security of the President and of high officialsof state, the Institutional Protection Service, under the Ministry of thePresidency. The Technical Judicial Police were to carry out theinvestigations of crimes committed, for the purpose of the AttorneyGeneral's office and the courts. They were taken out of the executive branchof government and put under the joint supervision of the Attorney Generaland the Supreme Court of Justice. It was established that the legislativeassembly would determine the size of each service in approving the yearlybudget.

To advise the President a Council of Public Security and NationalDefense was created, whose Executive Secretary, normally a civilian,assumed the functions of intelligence gathering on public security anddefense matters.

The civilian agencies which had been under the control of the DefenseForces were returned to normal civilian control. And the office for theadministration of the Canal Treaties was also demilitarized. The effectivesupervision over all financial matters by the office of the ComptrollerGeneral of the Republic was reestablished, and the budgetary process of thedifferent police services was integrated into the budgetary process of therespective supervisory ministries.

Civilian Supervision

To exercise general civilian supervision and to assume the specific functionsof an inspector general and of operational coordination of the services underthe Ministry of Government and Justice, a team of civilian functionarieswas established. The team was headed by a civilian institutional director,who had to review all personnel matters of the services, and a civilianfinancial director, who had to review all budgetary matters.

The Minister personally assumed the task of explaining and justifyingthe state policies regarding public security before numerous organizationsof civilian society and through the means of mass communication.

As part of the demilitarization, the National Penitentiary System was putunder civilian supervision in the Ministry of Government and Justice;civilians were named as directors of the different penitentiary centers andthe first steps were taken to create a corps of civilian guardians. Thus aneffort was started to deal with the very grave scandal of the systematicviolation of human rights in the jails of Panama.

Personnel Policy

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


The personnel policy encompassed several components. Of the 16,000members of the Defense Force, 12,000 positions were assigned to theNational Police, 400 positions to each of the Air and Sea National Services,300 other positions to the Institutional Protection Service, and 750 to theTechnical Judicial Police. The number of persons effectively in service wasalways inferior to the assigned number of positions.

The system of living in barracks was ended, and eight-hour periods ofservice were established. As a result in any given moment onlyapproximately 3,500 police were in service. Month-long vacations werereestablished. The separate health, banking, supermarket and social clubfacilities were abolished. And the system of institutionalized prerogativesand illicit privileges was terminated. The purpose of these measures was todismantle the separate style of military life and to integrate the policemeninto the common style of civilian life. Nothing was psychologically moreimportant in carrying out demilitarization.

A new uniform was adopted. The equipment and arms corresponding topolice functions were given, such as 9mm pistols, revolvers caliber .38,shotguns caliber 12, leaving in reserve a restricted number of T65, M16rifles and Uzi submachine-guns.

The language was modified: from 'Commander-in-Chief to 'DirectorGeneral', from 'Major Staff to 'Directory', from 'Base' to 'Station'. Morerecently, in 1994, all military titles for ranks above Major were changed forthose of 'Subcommissioner' and 'Commissioner'. The use of the possessive'my' before the title and the clicking of heels were abolished.

From 1,121 officers from the rank of sublieutenants to that of generalwhich existed in the Defense Forces in 1989, one year later were left inservice 608 or 54 per cent: 525 in the National Police, 62 in the National AirService and 61 in the National Sea Service. No general, colonel orlieutenant colonel was left. The excluded officers had either fled to a foreigncountry, let through diplomatic asylum, had been separated or imprisonedthrough judicial process, had been dismissed by administrative decision,mostly for conduct unbecoming a policeman, or had been granted regular orearly retirement. Wherever possible the latter solution was preferred inorder not to create unnecessary resentment and potential pretext forviolence. There was no formal reintegration program.

The highest position in the National Police was held successively byfour persons during the first year, the first three were military officers. Thechanges reveal the obstacles to demilitarization. The first Director Generalwas terminated when a deposit in his name for over a million dollarssurfaced. The second Director General was terminated when he came undersuspicion of being involved in the explosion of bombs to create apsychological atmosphere where the demilitarization process would have to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


be limited. He was later imprisoned and took part in an attemptedinsurrection against the democratic authorities. The third Director Generalin charge was terminated when he entered a public controversy andproffered unwarranted accusations against the chief executive officer in anational newspaper.

As a result of these changes a civilian was named Director General in themiddle of 1990 and since then a civilian has always been Director Generalof the National Police.

A team of civilians was named to key positions in the National Police.Besides the Director General, the Director Supplies, the ExecutiveSecretary, the Head of the Department of Transportation and the Head of thenewly created office of Professional Responsibility (to receive andinvestigate charges of illicit activity against members of the NationalPolice) were all civilians. The Directory was integrated in such a way thatat least a third of its members were civilians.

The Department of Legal Counsel was restructured and a program wasestablished to name a legal counsel for each major police station, to makesure that police action was carried out according to the law.

Financial Policy

Attention was paid to demilitarizing financial policy. The budget of each ofthe services was separated and integrated within that of the correspondingministry. In the case of the three services under supervision of the Ministryof Government and Justice, all the budgetary process was put under thesupervision of the Director of Finances for Public Security.

According to figures of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy,nearly 150 million dollars were spent from public funds in the PanamaDefense Forces towards the end of the dictatorship, of which two thirdswere budgeted. They were spent without any effective supervision on thepart of the Comptroller General's office.

In 1990 the combined budget of the National Police, the National AirService and the National Sea Service amounted to $76 million and in 1991to $82 million, including $2.4 million in investment. What was saved wasreflected in the increase of the budget of the Ministry of Health, from $121million in 1989 to $201 million in 1991.

An obstacle placed by the Comptroller General's office to the paymentof salaries at the end of October 1990 served as an excuse for the attemptedinsurrection in early December, which was meant to stop the process ofdemilitarization. The regular payment of salaries became all the moreimportant because demilitarization canceled two of the three sources ofincome, the free segregated services and the illicit activities. It was forseenthat salaries should be progressively upgraded. This was begun from 1992,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


so that the base salary went up from $280 per month to $355. Until 1993,nevertheless, the average salary for services in the Public Force was $404,while in government as a whole it was $437 per month.

Numerous properties accumulated by the Defense Forces weretransferred through an Inter-ministerial Committee. From 1990 to 1991, 17bases, 8 residences of the Chiefs of Military Zones and of the Associationof Wives of the Defense Forces were handed over to diverse civilianagencies. All equipment of the Military Engineering Battalion wastransferred to the Ministry of Public Works. Twelve military planes,including a Super Puma, with a market value of about $10 million, wereplaced at the disposition of the new government. The BeneficiaryAssociation, to which all members paid dues and which handled millions,was placed under an administration chosen by themselves.

Educational Policy

An educational policy was developed as the central component ofdemilitarization. It had a double objective: to promote through training there-adaptation of the former members of the Defense Forces which had beenoriginally trained as military or in a military fashion and to ensure therecruitment and training of new members as civilian professional police.The second objective was considered decisive for the future of the NationalPolice, given the high number of members of the former Defense Forceswho were to retire in the following five years.

A transition course of 120 hours duration was given in order to introducethe members of the National Police to the values and procedures of civilianpolice. During the first year 3,000 members took the course. It was givenwith the technical assistance of ICITAP, a civilian agency of the USDepartment of Justice.

A Police Academy was founded with responsibility for basic policetraining, as well as for continued police training, with 99 persons including22 instructors on the staff. Recruits were required to be high schoolgraduates and were given a battery of psychological tests before admission.The Panamanian Human Rights Committee, as well as personnel from theAttorney General's office, were asked to offer courses in the Academy. By1995, 2,714 members of the National Police or 22.6 per cent of the totalnumber of its members were new members trained in the Academy.

As a result especially of the looting which took place after the invasionand the ensuing increase in common delinquency, the population becamequite aware of the problem of public security. Informal groups of vigilanteshad been formed. An attempt was made to channel this awareness and thesegroups as support for the National Police. Because of lack of resources andtime, the effort was not successful, but it pointed to the need to garner

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


community support for the National Police to be effective.Private security agencies appeared everywhere. It became necessary to

regulate their establishment and functioning. While they presented thedanger of security in the hands of poorly trained and badly paid individuals,they represented an indispensable contribution of the private sector to theoverall security of the community and made private enterprises cognizant ofthe costs of public security.

An educational factor of primary importance was public opinion asexpressed through the mass media and through the attitudes of peoplevis-a-vis the performance of the police as measured by public opinion polls.This opinion was at first one of rejection, a combination of revenge and ofcontempt due to the previous militaristic behaviour. Gradually this turned intoa demand for more effectively public security by police agents. This relativechange helped mould the self-image of the members of the National Police,showing them the way by which they could gain recognition professionallyand socially and helping them overcome the militaristic nostalgia.

In April 1993 a well-known opinion poll revealed that 31.5 per cent ofPanamanians felt 'sure' to ask help from the police, 4.9 per cent more thanin 1992. Another poll revealed in March 1994 that 40 per cent felt 'sure' inasking help from the police and 48 per cent considered the police to somedegree or very 'honest' and 53 per cent considered the police to somedegree 'efficient'.

The fact is that the civil police alternative for public security became anaccepted fact on the part of public opinions. Even adversaries of the reformsleading to demilitarization, which represented both those accustomed to themilitaristic past and those set on a more radical course of change startingfrom zero, came to accept the reforms as the only available course to follow.Three different Ministers of Government and Justice have occupied theposition under two Presidents from opposing parties since 1990-91, andnone have introduced significant changes in the model. This is clear enoughindication that the model responded to Panamanian realities and needs.

This is not to say that the reforms of demilitarization were carried outwithout foreign cooperation. The Costa Rican experience served as aconstant reminder that demilitarization was indeed possible. And formerPresident Oscar Arias was very helpful in garnering support for the changes.In the early stage, the role of the US Army was significant at the operationalfield level. Also the role of ICITAP, the civilian agency of the US JusticeDepartment, was important particularly in the educational dimension ofdemilitarization. Venezuela helped with advice on the elaboration of theLaw creating the Judicial Technical Police. Spain helped with advice on theelaboration of the first draft of the Organic Law of the National Police.Taiwan helped in granting some early opportunities for foreign training.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


What must be said, however, is that these foreign contributions wereincluded in a national vision of the desired changes and a political will toimplement them, however high the political costs.

As a result of the general acceptance of the model it became possible tocomplete the demilitarization of public security, by the approval of aconstitutional reform eliminating the military and the approval of theOrganic Law of the National Police. The reform was attempted through aconstitutional referendum in late 1992, but the attempt failed because thevoters used the opportunity to express their disappointment with the Endaragovernment. A second attempt was made through the vote of two differentlegislative assemblies. The result was positive. Two legislative assembliesvoted the reform positively, before and after the general elections of 1994,despite the fact that the majority was radically different in each of them. Aconsensus had been reached.

After the consideration of three drafts of the Organic Law of theNational Police, a Presidential Commission integrated in a pluralisticmanner presented a fourth and final draft, which fully respected the choiceof demilitarization and which was voted for both by the government and theopposition legislators in 1997.

Some Early Results of Demilitarisation of Public Security in Panama

Four years after the 1990-91 demilitarization experience began, some earlyresults can be pointed out.

Probably the most indisputable result of demilitarization of publicsecurity has been the end of intervention in politics on the part of publicsecurity organizations. Since 1989 two electoral processes have taken placein Panama, a partial one in 1991 and a general one in 1994. Both have beencharacterized by the recognized fact that the police services have notintervened in them. The Electoral Law now foresees that days before theelections the police services are put under the orders of the Electoral Court.The habit of police and or military intervention in electoral processes hasbeen broken.

While the civilian Directors General of the National Police have comemostly from the parties of the Ministers of Government and Justice, theyhave by and large acted professionally in a non-partisan manner, except fora short incident on the part of the second civilian Director General, whichcost him the position.

This apolitical behaviour has gone hand in hand with a clearsubordination to civilian authority, especially to the President of theRepublic and to a diminishing extent to the Minister of Government andJustice. The only major exception was the attempted insurrection in

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


December 1990, when a group of officers tried to stop the demilitarization.The experience shows that maximum care must be taken with thedevelopment of elite special units.

A problem remains posed: how to coordinate the national organizationof the police services, on the one hand, and the functions and prerogativesof local civilian authorities, governors, mayors and county authorities, onthe other hand.

When militarization reached its culmination under the Noriega phase ofthe dictatorship, the violation of human rights and generalized corruptionalso reached their culmination. Once demilitarization was introduced, theviolation of human rights and the corruption, while not absent by far,nevertheless lost their systematic and intense character.

The Penitentiary System remains the area of most repeated and seriousviolations of human rights. The National Police and the Judicial TechnicalPolice have been accused of sporadic use of excessive force. Yet thetendency of authorities has been to investigate and sanction these excesses.Nevertheless, a certain tough and pragmatic approach to fighting commondelinquency tends to lead presently to lesser respect for the human rights ofsuspected criminals.

Respect for human rights has reached its highest level in over ageneration since demilitarization was implemented. However, the task is notfinished and there are some tendencies to backslide.

Corruption in the public security organizations is no longer an almostinstitutionalized system. Accusations continue to surface of bribes and ofcomplicity between police agents, including officers, and criminals. But onecannot say that police corruption is the main source of corruption in thestate, as one could say of corruption in the Defense Forces.

The results in terms of respect for human rights and the elimination ofcorruption are substantial, though less dramatic than the results in terms ofnon-intervention in politics and subordination to civilian authority. Probablythe least substantial results, though not non-existent, are those in terms ofeffectiveness and professionalism as civil police.

The increase in delinquency is both a fact and a perception. The verytransition from a repressed society to a society under the democratic rule oflaw, plus the conditions of poverty and high unemployment, plus thepresence of drug trafficking and money laundering, has brought about anobjective increase in crime.

Moreover, the fuller freedom of expression has made it possible formedia to report, without limits, and even to dramatize the frequent cases ofcriminal activity.

To respond to this challenge a strategy is required which wouldencompass better pay for policemen, better training for them, better

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14


equipment, more coordination between police services and other securityagencies, and society-wide concern and support for public security.Professionalization of the police is a key to the greater effectiveness of thesecurity services. And this professionalization requires a self-image andidentity in terms of civil police. Nostalgia for the past has been an obstacle.Yet due to traumatic experiences, to opportunism, to the failure of resistanceand to an honest to goodness change of mentality, this nostalgia hasdiminished gradually. What is needed now is a more positive expression ofthe self-image and identity as a civil police.

Finally, a global result of demilitarization should be mentioned: thegreater conjunction of a positive national will with favorable internationalconditions. The legitimacy of the democratic system has been strengthenedand so also has the institutional stability required for the full and successfultransfer of the Canal to Panamanian responsibility. Demilitarization hashelped surpass the traditional conflict in Panama between the national andinternational dimensions of our reality. It has been a way for the nation toconsolidate itself as a democracy in full sovereign responsibility for itsfuture.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Presented at the Conference on Leadership Challenges of Demilitarization in Africa, sponsoredby the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania in collaboration with the Oscar AriasFoundation for Peace and Human Progress, at Arusha International Conference Centre, Tanzania,on 22-24 July 1998.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f R

eadi

ng]

at 1

9:20

19

Dec

embe

r 20

14

the demilitarization of public security in panama

Documents