the direction of value flow in multi-service connectionless networks bob briscoe bt research 7 oct...

The Direction of Value Flow in Multi-service Connectionless Networks

Bob Briscoe

BT Research

7 Oct 1999

7 Oct 1999 Direction of Value 3

context pricing clearing scenarios summary

why think about this?

theory of the value of communications: – connection-oriented hegemony

[ITU96, Zull97, Clark96, MacKie-Var92]

confusion is abroad in the world– junk advertising, bundling content+network

why assume multicast sender pays? alternative proposal seems obvious

– but wasn't when I started

context



context

multiservice, multicast IP (real-time apps) some services usage-charged, whether

packet, flow or even longer term granularity electronic tariff announcement buyer's market designed for bundling

– will cover in a future paper...

context



what business?

link (wholesale cost) network connection? (not supplied)

applic’n

present’n

session

transport

network

link

physical

network

link

physical

end-system

router network

link

physical

applic’n

present’n

session

transport

network

link

physical

context

e-commerce



the value of place

xmt value /leg = (value of place/time) but competition cost+ margin pricing who can know the value of place?

N: providerY: end-users apportionment

clearing grows comms market

ii

value1 = f(i, place1 , time1 )

value2 = f(i, place2 , time2 )

icontext



end to end pricing

end-to-end pricing role

price

service

data flow

pricing



end-to-end pricing role

not necessarily a business; a role taken by:– one ISP– the customer– a third party (+ bundling content?)

but…...what is the best default apportionment?...

pricing



default value apportionment proposal:

– 'sender and receiver both charged'– slight discrepancy in prices possible– every leg of every flow is part charged twice– model self-similar for inter-domain boundaries

pricing



split-edge pricing - per direction price in & out

separately each price

between boundary and remote edge

price effects localised

contracts localised

extendsedge-pricing [Shenker96]

Na

Nb

Nc

Nc

NdNdNe

WbasWabr

Wabs

Wbar

pricing



split edge pricing - per class

each class of service has a market

class mismatch effects localised

pricing



split-edge pricing - per leg

VVQQuu

QQtt

QQuu

QQuu

QQvv

QQww

QQww

Na

Nb

Nc

Nc

NdNdNe

Wabr

Wbas

Wabs

Wbar

multicast & heterogeneous QoS

pricing



default value apportionment choose default to minimise clearing 'only senders' or 'only receivers' charged

halve transaction volume require industry-wide co-operation unstable - mavericks gain and increase costs of all multicast requires trusted receiver count

'sender and receiver both charged'majority of comms between consenting partiesvalue, charge and cost congruentstable against maverick policies doesn't match blame for transmission...

pricing



blame, liability and control

but…...sender always to blame for a transmission

request-reply is irrelevant to network layer other confusions clarified:

• value of moving info transitory

• value of moving GBs is often for a few bits

• cost of xmt << cost of targeting what to xmt

clearing



dilemma & solution

'sender and receiver both charged' vs. 'sender to blame'

receiver customarily pays...but...

sender liable cf. postage stamp

• sender customarily pays, but receiver liable

clearing



clearing across edge providersthird party

100

51

55

49

clearing

2

37

46

44

service

money

clearing



clearing across edge providersiterative

37

46

44

10051

44

service

money

54

clearing



end-to-end model: justification avoids Int'l Accounting Rate System flaws:

muddling wholesale with clearing per-flow metering in backbone trusted end counting for multicast apportionment needs authentication

therefore unaggregateable acd+1 prices in system 6e26

clearing

c 20,000

d 5

a = apportionment schemes per ISP 10

a = apportionment schemes per ISP 10



end-to-end model: justification II

localised contract• jurisdiction clear

• what to meter decided locally

selective openness of clearing process ac2 prices problem still exists 4e9

clearing



scenarios

see paper for...

finding an end-to-end price sender liable but local payment customary inter-domain multicast with heterogeneous

quality of service (QoS) phone to Internet gateway (PIG)

...ie. per session accounting

scenarios



PIG - phone to Internet gatewaysservice

moneyInternetend-end

PSTNiterative

13

21

24 21

100

41

55

59

2

37

3629

25clearing

PIG

scenarios



alternative now seems obvious... per-session accounting bill=anachronism split-edge pricing scales infinitely 'sender and receiver both charged' stable

– customary - but only sender liable to pay end-to-end pricing and clearing efficient

end-to-end intermediary could take 0-50% of retail ISP and telco markets– ...and their customer relationships

summary



further information

Differential charging (diffchar) projecthttp://www.labs.bt.com/projects/mware/

Bob Briscoehttp://www.labs.bt.com/people/briscorj/

more info

the direction of value flow in multi-service connectionless networks bob briscoe bt research 7 oct...

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