THE EGYPTIAN DILEMMA: APPLYING INTEREST-BASED

NEGOTIATION THEORY

A Project Presented to the Faculty

of

California State University, Stanislaus

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

of Master of Business Administration

By

Mohamed Elemeiry

May 2015

© 2015

Mohamed Elemeiry

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

iv

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this research to my family and my lovely wife who

helped me to start my MBA studies and to complete this final research project. My

dear mother instilled in me the value of never missing an opportunity to learn. To my

son Ryan, I hope this dedication to learning is an example for him that education is a

precious gift to never be taken for granted. I also dedicate my research to my Nana, a

lady that is so simple and yet so wise. She has never stopped teaching me since I was

a baby in her arms. .

Finally, I dedicate my research to the people of Egypt. This project was an

opportunity to not only enhance my skills in negotiations, but also to help the

Egyptian people by bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government

to a place in which they could start negotiations, with the ultimate goal of introducing

a detailed plan for how to achieve peace in Egypt. Hopefully, one day, Egyptians can

use the problem-solving process in the study to end their disputes and begin

negotiations from a place of strong communication and mutual understanding to

ultimately build a strong and peaceful Egypt for all.

My favorite part of the study was also the hardest part. I traveled to Egypt for

four months, interviewed hundreds of people, and established a network of contacts to

insure that the when the project was complete, decision makers from both sides would

consider implementing the findings to begin the road to peace. While I loved

interviewing and meeting so many people and hearing their stories, it was also

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heartbreaking to hear about so many lives ruined because of the dispute. In addition

to interviewing people that claimed membership or support of either the Egyptian

government or the Muslim Brotherhood, I also interviewed people that had no

affiliation with either group, but were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. I

interviewed these people because, while they were not directly involved in the

conflict, they had been affected by it – some were disabled by stray bullets, and

others lost their property due to destructive rioting.

The most heartbreaking situation involved a very poor mother who sells

vegetables in one of the small markets in Cairo. She lost her oldest son during the

clashes in 2012. He was a soldier in the Egyptian military doing his compulsory

national service after graduating from the Faculty of Commerce. Her husband is

disabled, and they have four children. She worked her whole life to give her children

a better life. The proudest moment of her life was when her oldest son graduated from

college. To lose him to a foreign enemy would be a great loss to suffer, but the

possibility of losing him to a war between Egyptians would be unbearable and

senseless. I dedicate this paper to people like this mother. May she find peace in her

country one day.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Ed Miller for his continuous support and

encouragement from the moment I met him. He encouraged me to follow my dream

of applying my knowledge to the country I love, Egypt. From the time this project

was only an idea until the ink dried on the paper, he has full-heartedly supported me. I

would like to thank Professor Randall Brown for believing in this project and quite

frankly making it all possible. Finally I would like to thank Professor Hinrichs for

being so kind and accepting to be my research supervisor and main reader of my

project. Your comments, feedback, and support made this paper possible.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Dedication ............................................................................................................... iv

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. vi

List of Figures ......................................................................................................... ix

Abstract ................................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER

I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 1

The Purpose of the Research..................................................... 1

Planning Interview Questions ................................................... 4

Interview Highlights ................................................................. 6

II. Separate the People from the Problem .................................................. 11

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood .................................. 11

Present Problems ....................................................................... 16

History of the Ruling Egyptian Government ............................ 19

` The Present................................................................................ 25

Analysis..................................................................................... 27

III. Focus on the Interests, Not the Positions .............................................. 31

Issues from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Point of View ............. 31

Issues from the Egyptian Government’s Point of View ........... 34

Issues after Focusing on Interests Rather Than Positions ......... 35

IV. Invent Options for Mutual Gain ............................................................ 38

V. Insist on Objective Criteria ................................................................... 42

VI. Recommendation and Conclusion ........................................................ 47

References ............................................................................................................... 50

viii

Appendices

A. The Research Plan....................................................................................... 58

B. Interview Questions .................................................................................... 59

C. Informed Consent........................................................................................ 60

D. The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement’s Declaration Of Support ........... 63

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

1. Dr Kamal Al-Helbawy During Interview with Researcher .............................. 7

2. Dr. Saad Eldeen Ibrahim During Interview with Researcher ........................... 8

3. Imam Hassan al-Banna, Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood ......................... 12

4. Egyptian, Palestinian and Algerian Political and Religious Figures at a Reception

in Cairo, 1947.................................................................................................... 13

5. Arab, U.S., and Israeli Leaders. ........................................................................ 15

6. The Assassination of President Sadat on October, 6, 1973 .............................. 15

7. Family picture of the "Free Officers" in Cairo in 1952 .................................... 20

8. Copies of the Front Pages of the English Newspapers Covering the 1956

Invasion ............................................................................................................. 21

9. Front Page Headline of Al-Ahram Newspaper ................................................. 22

10. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Funeral Procession in Cairo, October

1970................................................................................................................... 23

11. Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat, US President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime

Minister Menachem Begin Shake Hands at the Signing of the Camp David

Accords, a Peace Treaty Signed by Sadat and Begin ....................................... 24

12. President Morsi was named by Time Magazine as the most important man in the

Middle East ....................................................................................................... 26

13. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ........................................................... 27

14. Supporters of President Morsi protesting in the streets of Egypt. .................... 32

15. President Morsi’s opponents protesting in Tahrir Square................................. 33

x

16. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Irish Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald Shaking

Hands After Signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement. ............................................ 44

xi

ABSTRACT

The goal of this project is to bring two perceived enemies, the Muslim Brotherhood

and the Egyptian Government, to the negotiation table, and to help the people of

Egypt realize that there may be a nonviolent way to address the disputes between the

Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government. This may be achieved by

introducing a negotiation model that uses available data and applying interest-based

negotiation theory to find common ground and mutual gains between the two parties.

The problems surrounding the issues are addressed twice: once through the lens of the

Egyptian government, and a second time through the lens of the Muslim Brotherhood.

This approach reveals a great disparity in each party’s interpretation of the problems.

At the same time, many mutual gains are discovered, and those gains are the

foundation for this study (The University of Texas, 2011). For this project, this

researcher traveled to Egypt for four months, interviewed hundreds of people, and

established a network of contacts to insure that the when the project was complete,

decision makers from both sides would consider implementing the findings to begin

the road to peace. In addition to interviewing people that claimed membership or

support of either the Egyptian government or the Muslim Brotherhood, the researcher

also interviewed people with no affiliation with either group. After the interviews

were complete, the data were analyzed and patterns sought. The research

methodology focused on separating the people from the problems, targeting the

various sides’ positions, and inventing options for mutual gain (Kohlrieser, 2006).

xii

The researcher hopes that the four principles of interest-based negotiation will be the

road map Egypt needs in order to bring the parties together for open and honest

negotiations.

1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Research

The following research will use the interest-based negotiation theory to

examine the current political problems in Egypt. The current political issues began

with the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 and two very different

views for the future of Egypt. One view was held by the Islamic conservatives and

militants – primarily the Muslim Brotherhood – who wanted to see Sharia law

instated and for Egypt to become an Islamic republic. The other view was held by a

collection of secularists, liberals, and Christians who, having the support of the

military, hoped for a democratic government.

The research will use the four principles of the interest-based negotiation

theory to develop a proposal for bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian

government to a place where they see options for mutual gain and a way to proceed in

negotiations using objective criteria. According to the theory, the people must be

separated from the problem in order to objectively work on the actual issues. The

focus should be on interests, not the positions of each party. Successful negotiations

must invent options for mutual gain. Both parties must be able to see that they will

achieve from participating in the negotiations. Lastly, it is imperative that only

objective criteria are used. Chapters II, III, IV, and V will apply each principle to the

issues at hand, based on the results of the first-hand research conducted in Egypt in

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2014. Over 300 people were interviewed from the Muslim Brotherhood and the

Egyptian government, as well as influential people with different political, social, and

educational backgrounds. The interviewees were asked to answer seven questions

about their views of the current situation (see Appendix B for interview questions).

The main purpose of the research is to look for a solution to the almost the

daily deadly clashes in Egypt by bringing these two parties to the negotiation table.

These clashes have resulted in thousands of Egyptians being killed and or injured. In

addition to the loss of life, the Egyptian economy has been all but crippled. Tourism,

the first national income for Egypt, has all but ceased. Countless people are

unemployed because tourists will not come to an unstable country. Moreover, the

economy is experiencing a shortage in petroleum products and electricity as well as a

skyrocketing rise in the cost of living. In order to stop these clashes and restore

Egypt, I propose that both parties, the Egyptian government and the Muslim

Brotherhood, apply interest-based negotiation to find options that provide mutual

gains for both sides, without getting trapped in the past issues and historical

problems. The options should help the Egyptian government and the Muslim

Brotherhood agree to stop the clashes and focus on improving the economy.

Both the Egyptian Government and the Muslim Brotherhood have announced

several times that they are not opposed to negotiations. However, there has never

been a common basis from which to start these negotiations. Providing both sides

with a set of options will help open a dialog and create a common basis.

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According to Friedman (1994), there are two parties involved in any

negotiation process: front stage and back stage. Front stage is where the drama exists.

On this side, everyone is involved in the issue or problem: the negotiating parties;

direct members of the problems (e.g. political figures, family, friends); and indirect

participants, such as the media or foreign politicians. Thus, the front stage is always

demanding and loud, and it has very high expectations for the outcome of the

negotiation. The front stage is emotionally charged. Back stage is where the drama

should be ignored. Inviting mutual gains from all sides, or teams within the

negotiations, should be encouraged. All sides have to be dedicated to reasonable

expectations for the outcome of the negotiations. The back-stage negotiators should

meet in private, away from the public conflict. They should use their roles not only to

negotiate with other parties, but with their own group as well. They need their group

to have reasonable demands and to accept that there will be compromise in order to

achieve progress for all.

Dating back to Egypt’s independence in 1922 and the establishment of the

Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the negotiations between Egypt’s ruling party (both

monarchy and military/democratic) and the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrate the

dominance of back stage negotiations. From the start, negotiations have failed

because of the inflexible positions and threats of both sides (Abou-Elfetouh, 2011).

Over the past 90 years, the division has only increased the disputes. With each party

trying to achieve a total victory, the outcome of every round of negotiations was

4

always a total failure. As a result of that failure, Egypt is suffering from almost daily

clashes of violence, lack of basic utilities, and high inflation.

This study proposes to take a different route by applying interest-based

negotiation theory and its four principles of negotiations to the current problems

between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Government. A reasonable and

rational starting point for negotiations that will ultimately benefit both sides is

needed. Recommendations will be based on data collected from interviews.

Planning Interview Questions

According to Oliver (2002), one of the six steps to an effective negotiation is

to discover the negotiable variables. Negotiable variables are tradable concessions.

Determining what topics or subjects each side is willing to trade is key to starting any

negotiation. One issue that is key to one side may be tradable (or not key) to the other

side. Before starting negotiations, each side needs to know what it is willing to trade

and what its core principles are. Core principles are not easily traded. Parties will

never give anything away, but they may trade something that is not as valuable to

them for a concession that is more valuable to them. This will give the parties more to

negotiate with, which will help to break the cycle of mistrust (Oliver, 2002).

In order to maximize mutual gains, four steps must be taken to reach agreed-

upon variables. First, find areas for a negotiable variable. The negotiators need to

look at all of the demands, needs, and interests for each side in the negotiation

process. Indicating all of the issues for each side should help in identifying the

negotiable variables. Then, the key variables need to be identified and their place in

5

the negotiations agreed to. After identifying the negotiable variables, the negotiators

should identify more accurately the variables that are very important to either side, or

what each side is able to give or receive in order to get that variable. The negotiators

should be able to invent more tradable concessions based on the information they

have about the problem. The more information the negotiators have, the more

accurate the concessions will be. Finally, identify all negotiations as long-term

negotiations and consider the outcome as a long-term deal, which can enhance any

needed future negotiations (Oliver, 2002).

Applying the four above steps to the issues between the Egyptian government

and the Muslim Brotherhood is quite revealing. The daily protests that occur across

Egypt are a powerful negotiable variable. If the Muslim Brotherhood stops the

protests, both parties will benefit. The Muslim Brotherhood will benefit from

stopping the daily clashes immediately. A cease to violent protests will save the lives

of their members and keep them from injury or going to jail. The Egyptian

government will benefit as well. The police force and army will no longer be injured

or killed during the clashes, and they will have time to dedicate to the improvement of

daily life and the economy. The way to achieve the previous four steps is to collect as

much information as possible about the parties. For example, the Muslim

Brotherhood wants to be recognized as a legitimate political party, and the Egyptian

government wants peaceful streets. Any information that gives clues to what is truly

important will help facilitate these two groups to the negotiation table (Sloane &

Witney, 1991). That is the reason the personal interviews were critical to this

6

research. The seven interview questions were used to open a larger conversation

about the deep roots of the real issues, and the real interests of the negotiating sides,

in order to identify and clarify the following points:

1. Identification of all involved parties.

2. Identification of the total negotiable variables and the key negotiable

variables.

3. Identification and definition of the real issues and problems between the

different parties.

4. Determination of each party’s real interest.

5. Determination of each party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement

(BATNA).

6. A plan for a resolution of conflicts between the different parties.

7. An outline of an optimal agreement and settlement, based on the information

provided by the study.

Interview Highlights

I was honored to interview so many intelligent people from all the different

ranks in Egyptian society. Many of these interviews were officialy documented, while

many others I could not document, either because of the sensitivity of the official’s

job, or because the interviewee did not want to give his name for security reasons.

Meeting so many people with different backgrounds, education levels, and

political views helped me to answer many of the questions I had about the history and

7

the nature of the dispute between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian

government.

Figure 1. Dr Kamal Al-Helbawy during interview with the researcher, Mohamed Elemeiry

Dr. Kamal Al-Helbawy, former speaker of the Muslim Brotherhood in

Europe, member of the Egyptian National Center for Human Rights, and a famous

writer, resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012. He opposed the Muslim

Brotherhood’s decision of nominating one of its members as a candidate for the

Egyptian presidential election in 2012. Helbawy was a great help for this study in

many ways, as he is a supporter of liberal Islamism and one of a few people who still

has a good relationship with both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian

government. More importantly, he is one of even fewer people that have tried to

facilitate between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government. His efforts

have faced many obstacles since the violence started. Helbawy appreciated the topic

of the research and he offered his help. Helbawy thinks the reason no settlement has

yet been reached is because “the Muslim Brotherhood does not have leaders that can

improvise new reasonable proposals. They always ask for unachievable terms, such

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as the return of President Morsi. On the other hand, members of the Egyptian

government say they are interested in negotiating with the Muslim Brotherhood but

never actually take any steps to begin the process” (personal communication, May 26,

2014). This was one of the most important statements made by Helbawy. He

suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood is looking for what they want, not what they

need. What the Muslim Brotherhood needs is to focus on their interests (a voice in the

Egyptian political arena), not their problems (that President Morsi was overthrown).

On the other hand, the Egyptian government offers negotiators (facilitators), but

never agrees to an agenda to begin negotiations from.

Figure 2. Dr. Saad Eldeen Ibrahim during interview with the researcher, Mohamed Elemeiry

Another interviewee who added great value and insight this study is Dr. Saad

Eddin Ibrahim. Ibrahim is a sociologist who taught at the American University in

Cairo. He is the founder of both the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in

Cairo and the Arab Organization for Human Rights. Ibrahim is playing a large role in

Egypt, as he is the leading activist in the areas of human rights and democracy.

Ibrahim said, “We should learn from Nelson Mandela. He was the longest-

9

incarcerated political prisoner in the world with twenty-seven years in jail. His first

words after becoming president were about forgiveness and living together. The

dilemma is that everyone involved in the problem has very specific expectations and

are unwilling to compromise. They do not see a common ground with the other

parties, and no one is ready for compromise, let alone forgiveness” (personal

communication, May 13, 2014). This made me understand that any settlement should

address the fact that no one will win what they expect, but everyone will win basic

needs in the short run, and as more trust is built between all parties, more mutual gain

can be found and everyone will get more. It could be a win-win situation for the

people of Egypt.

This researcher also interviewed Abu al-Izz al-Hariri, one of the presidential

candidates in the 2012 election who is also a former member of the Egyptian

Parliament. Hariri filed a lawsuit against the 2012 Egyptian Parliament to have it

dissolved, and the Supreme Court of Egypt approved; therefore, his insight here was

valuable. The Muslim Brotherhood’s members were furious about the decision, as

that was the first Parliament in which they ever held the majority of the seats. Since

then, Hariri has had several bitter experiences with the Muslim Brotherhood, a few of

which have required medical attention for himself as well as his wife.

Hariri noted, “The Muslim Brotherhood has committed many crimes during

President Morsi’s term, but no one can deny the right that everyone should be able to

live peacefully in the country of Egypt. I do not think there is any possibility to have

negotiations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government. We will

10

be lucky if we can find common ground among the Muslim Brotherhood members to

live peacefully in this country with all its citizens” (A. I. Hariri, personal

communication, 2014). Hariri pointed out that the safety of the all Egyptians,

including their right to live peacefully next to one another, is the main key for any

solution (A. I. Hariri, personal communication, 2014).

.

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CHAPTER II

SEPARATE THE PEOPLE FROM THE PROBLEM

Interest-based negotiation theory’s first principle is to separate the people

from the problem in order to identify the real issues. Tracking problems from the

beginning of the dispute to the current situation was the best possible tool to help

untie all the complications that connect the people involved in the study to problems

that happened almost a century ago. In order to track problems from the 1920s to the

present day, I had to use many available resources to be able to understand what each

side believes. In this chapter, I describe the history of both the Muslim Brotherhood

and the Egyptian government in order to separate their personal beliefs and historical

bitterness toward each other from what they really need and not what they want

(Goodman, 2001). By doing this, I am able to identify the real issues and move

forward with negotiations.

History of the Muslim Brotherhood

In 1928, The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna

as a religious Islamic organization that helped the poor and looked after the people’s

daily social problems. By building mosques, hospitals, schools, and selling food at

reduced market prices, the Muslim Brotherhood quickly gained support throughout

Egypt and the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood also became a role model for

other Islamist groups around the world (Wager, 2013).

12

Figure 3. Imam Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. From

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_al-Banna

While the Muslim Brotherhood gained its widespread popularity by helping

the poor with social projects, it soon became politically active (Al-Banna, 1998). The

ruling Egyptian monarchy was very suspicious of the Muslim Brotherhood. It did not

like it using religion to claim political gains. It was not long before the two parties

began to have open conflict with each other (Ozyagly, 2013). The Muslim

Brotherhood and the Egyptian monarchy had accused each other of violent killings of

their members. The problems between the two parties reached the breaking point

when the Muslim Brotherhood was accused of the assassination of the Egyptian

Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nukrashi (Yousef, 2012). The Egyptian government

reacted quickly and harshly to the assassination. The governmental authorities banned

the Muslim Brotherhood and arrested most of its members.

13

Hassan Al-Banna himself was assassinated in 1949. The Muslim Brotherhood

blamed King Farouk (Zenobia, 2008). The government’s official investigation into

the murder found no link to the King (Elkharabawy 1, 2013)

Figure 4. Egyptian, Palestinian and Algerian political and religious figures at a reception in Cairo,

1947. Al-Banna (third from left) with Aziz Ali al-Misri (fourth from right).From

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_al-Banna

In 1952, a group of young officers in the Egyptian army started a coup against

the King. The coup was successful and overthrew the king. On June 18, 1953, the

monarchy was abolished and the Republic of Egypt declared (Hekal, 1990). The

leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood supported the coup and worked with the new

government (Abou-Elfetouh, 2011). This relationship was short-lived, and soon the

Brotherhood was accused of an attempted assassination of the Egyptian President

Nasser. Again, the Brotherhood was banned and most of its members were arrested

(Hekal, 1990).

The Muslim Brotherhood was banned from operating in Egypt. Many of its

members had to leave, looking for a safe shelter. The immigrant members traveled to

many different destinations around the world, spreading the ideas of the Muslim

14

Brotherhood. Furthermore, the many small groups collaborated to reform the

organizational structure and hierarchy and to recruit new members in many countries.

The Muslim Brotherhood leaders used the exact same expanding strategy they

had used before in Egypt. They targeted mosques, colleges, and universities in these

countries. Muslims in every corner of the world became the main target for the

Muslim Brotherhood (Abou-Elfetouh, 2011).

Soon, the Muslim Brotherhood announced that they had a presence in over 70

countries around the world. The strongest representation of the Brotherhood still

remains in the Middle East, specifically in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Libya, Tunisia,

Jordan, and Iraq. They also maintain branches, businesses, and offices in many

European countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and Austria. In addition,

they have a strong presence and influence among Muslim communities in the United

States. In 1970, President Nasser died. The successor was President Anwar Sadat,

who decided to try a different route with the Muslim Brotherhood. Anwar Sadat

released thousands of the Brotherhood’s members from prisons and asked for their

help against two groups: the fast-spreading leftist groups that opposed Sadat’s

capitalistic policies that replaced President Nasser’s socialistic policies, and the

Jihadist groups who started attracting young Muslims to more extreme beliefs and

ideas.

The Muslim Brotherhood was supported by the government and by donations

from their members around the world. As a result, the Brotherhood was able to

reorganize. In few years, the Muslim Brotherhood gained thousands of new members.

15

The relationship between President Sadat and the Muslim Brotherhood became

extremely tense after Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1978. Sadat was

assassinated in 1981, and once more the Muslim Brotherhood was strongly linked to

the assassination (Hekal, 1990).

Figure 5. Arab, U.S., and Israeli leaders. Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic

of Egypt (left); Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America (center); Menachem Begin,

Prime Minister of Israel (right). From http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/world/meast/camp-david-

accords-fast-facts/

Figure 6. The assassination of President Sadat on October, 6, 1973. From

http://ponderingprinciples.com/tag/sadat/

In 1981, President Sadat was followed by President Hosni Mubarak, who was

an eyewitness to Sadat’s assassination. Mubarak did not trust the Muslim

16

Brotherhood at all. In order to fight the Brotherhood, Mubarak supported several

national security organizations by giving them unlimited power and very generous

resources.

The Muslim Brotherhood was abolished by the Egyptian government and was

forced to go underground to avoid being harassed or arrested by the authorities. For

almost 30 years, the Muslim Brotherhood was secretly recruiting more members and

helping the poor while remaining off of the Egyptian Military’s radar. They went to

villages in the rural areas to help people that the government neglected. The active

and effective social work has gained the Muslim Brotherhood great publicity,

popularity, and thousands of new members and supporters. The first sign of the huge

influence of the Brotherhood on the common people in Egypt was in 2010, when the

Muslim Brotherhood gained 82 seats in the Egyptian Parliament from President

Mubarak’s ruling political party, al-Watani, the National Party (Ibrahim, 2013).

Present Problems

In 2011, the streets of Egypt were full of large crowds of protestors that

wanted to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak. The leaders of the Muslim

Brotherhood announced that they were not interested in participating in the

revolution. Only when it became clear that President Mubarak would be overthrown

did the Muslim Brotherhood join the rest of the political parties in the revolution.

Once the Mubarak regime was gone, the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be

the strongest and the most organized political and social party in Egypt. For the first

time in the Muslim Brotherhood’s history, they were treated with respect by the

17

authorities. Represented by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) the in

the first election after the January 25 Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood gained the

majority of the seats. On June 30, 2012, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood

became Egypt’s first democratically elected president (Spark, 2013).

The first year of President Morsi’s leadership was seen as disastrous by many

Egyptians. A media campaign from several networks attacked President Morsi and

the Muslim Brotherhood’s performance in a savage and persistent way. The negative

campaign worked, and the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood plummeted. Many

of the Arab leaders perceived the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a

threat to their own authority. The wealthy Gulf governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,

and United Arab Emirates significantly decreased their donations to and investment

in Egypt during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi. The only country that supported

the Muslim Brotherhood was Qatar. Ironically, the Muslim Brotherhood could not

even deliver the very basics to the people that their very organization was founded to

do. There were shortages of food, gas, and electricity (Spark, 2013).

The Muslim Brotherhood unleashed its most violent and conservative

members to threaten the Egyptian people against Morsi being removed from

presidency. They also announced their future plan to return to Sharia law for all

Egyptians, including the Coptic Christians. President Morsi’s regime was not

inclusive to all Egyptians. He seemed to address only the Muslim Brotherhood and

used old Islamic language, rather than the modern Egyptian dialect. The Muslim

Brotherhood under Morsi was responsible for “Egypt's economic disaster as result of

18

Morsi's preoccupation with establishing political control rather than fixing the poor

economy,” said Marina Ottaway, a Middle East analyst at the Woodrow Wilson

International Center for Scholars (Dorell, 2013). Moreover, "the politics of no

compromise are at fault for a good part of the economic disaster,” according to Paul

Sullivan, an expert on security and economics in the Middle East who teaches at

Georgetown University in Washington (Dorell, 2013).

On October 6, 2012, Morsi celebrated National Victory Day. The celebration

included a military show, as usual, but the guests of honor were very unusual. Morsi

hosted some of the Islamist leaders that were convicted of assassinating President

Sadat. Army officers and civilians across the board were offended, particularly

because National Victory Day is to celebrate Sadat’s orders to start the war to return

Egyptian’s occupied land. This may have been the moment when the Egyptian Army

decided to move against the Muslim Brotherhood.

In June of 2013, millions of Egyptians marched the streets demanding the

ouster of President Mohamed Morsi. The Muslim Brotherhood’s official response to

the protests was terrifying. They threatened to burn Egypt to ashes if the president

were touched. The Army Leaders ignored the threats and overthrew President Morsi,

causing a street war with the Muslim Brotherhood (Spark, 2013). The bloodiest

clashes happened in July and August, 2013, when hundreds of thousands of Morsi’s

supporters formed a sit-in in Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square for over three weeks. They

were demanding the immediate return of Morsi to the presidency. The clashes started

after police fired tear gas to disperse hundreds of Morsi supporters who tried to

19

extend the sit-in (Kingsley, 2013). Many different stories were told about the killed

and the wounded in the clashes (Shakir & Whitson, 2014). In August of 2014, The

Human Rights Watch Report was released. In 192 pages, it described what happened

as a premeditated massacre. The report accused the Egyptian Police and Army forces,

saying that they "systematically and deliberately killed largely unarmed protesters on

political grounds" in actions that likely amounted to crimes against humanity (Farag,

2011).

History of the Ruling Egyptian Government

The current ruling regime in Egypt began on July 23, 1952, with a military

coup by a group of young army officers calling themselves the Free Officers

Movement, led by General Muhammad Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The goal of the revolution was to overthrow the king’s regime and replace it with a

more patriotic and less corrupted regime.

Figure 7. Family picture of the "Free Officers" in Cairo in 1952. From R to L : Commandant Ahmed

Chawki, General Mohammed Neguib, Major Abdel Hakim Amer, Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel

Nasser (sitting), Major Mohamed Kamal el Dine Hussein, Commandant Abdel Latif B. From

http://uprootedpalestinians.blogspot.com/2012/07/egypt-brothers-erasing-history.html

20

The Free Officers established the Revolutionary Command Council as a type

of government to rule the country. The Free Officers gained immense popularity after

announcing Egypt as a republic. (They also ended the British occupation of the

country.) However, they shortly began to adopt a more communist agenda that

favored the poor people of Egypt over business people and the Egyptian upper class

in general. They established a group of policies that nationalized most of the large

private houses, palaces, business, factories, and farmland. The policies were met by

concerns and doubts from the Capitalist western world, led by the United States of

America, and with a lot of admiration from the Communist eastern world, led by the

Soviet Union (Hekal, 1990).

The Revolutionary Command Council elected General Mohamed Naguib to

become the first president for the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1953. But in 1954, he

was removed by the same Revolutionary Command Council and placed under house

arrest until 1970. He was banned from playing any role in Egyptian politics (Fowler,

1984).

After the overthrow of Naguib, Nasser stepped in to become the second

president of Egypt. He gained exceptional popularity when he nationalized the Suez

Canal in 1956, and as a result, challenged France and England, who were the owners

of the Suez Canal Company with legal rights to run it since 1951, according to the

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (Werling, 1997). France and England sent their fleets to

occupy the canal, and Israel’s army joined the invasion by attacking the Egyptian

forces in the Sinai Peninsula (Brown, 2001).

21

Figure 8. Copies of the front pages of the English newspapers covering the 1956 invasion. From

http://collegeahistory.tumblr.com/post/51926732301/photo-selection-of-newspaper-headlines

Even though the Egyptian army was defeated, and as a result, pulled back from the

entire canal area, Nasser kept fighting his political war. He promised the Soviet

Union a great influence in Egypt and in the Middle East if they provided the needed

help (Saundry & Lowitz, 2008). With the United States opposing the invasion, the

United Nations declared that the invading countries should leave the Egyptian soil

immediately (Hasting, 2013). As a result, the invading troops were withdrawn from

the Suez Canal and from the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt claimed its canal back, and

President Nasser became not only the most popular person among the 200 million

Arabs in the world (Abd El-Nasser, 2013), but also an international icon as a freedom

fighter and an enemy of imperialism. Nasser started a full-development plan for

Egypt by building the high dam of Aswan, a huge national project that secured the

Egyptian needs for water. Thousands of factories, schools, and hospitals were also

built during his presidency (Hekal, 1990).

22

Figure 9. Front page headline of Al-Ahram newspaper. The headline reads: Nationalization of Suez

Canal, 26 July 1956. The President announces, “On the name of the nation I declare the return of our

properties and our rights in the Suez Canal.” From http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/107191.aspx

In June 1967, the Egyptian army was harshly defeated by the Israelis in what

was known as the Six Days War. The Peninsula of Sinai, almost 1/6 the total area of

Egypt, was occupied by Israeli troops (Younes, 2012). Hence, the defeat was hard on

the Egyptians, who had higher expectations for their army forces (Urquhart, 2007).

Even with a shameful defeat, millions of Egyptians marched the streets asking

President Nasser not to give up the presidency and to get ready for another round of

wars with the Israelis. Nasser accepted their request to stay in power and started

negotiations with the Soviet Union to replace the heavy losses in military equipment,

and also to help with the training of the Egyptian troops (Hekal, 1990). In order to

rebuild the army and free the occupied peninsula, Nasser had to stop most of the

development projects, and he dedicated most of Egypt’s men between 18 and 40

years old to the military efforts (Hekal, 1990).

23

Figure 10. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s funeral procession in Cairo, October 1970. It was

attended by millions of mourners. From https://alldictators.wordpress.com/2012/11/02/the-dictator-of-

egypt-the-death-of-gamal-abdel-nasser-iv/

In 1970, Nasser passed away and was succeeded by President Sadat, another

member of the Free Officer Movement. In 1973, Sadat declared a freedom war to

return the Egyptian land from Israeli occupation. Sadat was able to achieve a partial

victory, but that was enough to bring the Israelis to the negotiation table. In 1978,

Sadat was able to accomplish his biggest achievement by reaching a satisfying peace

treaty with the Israelis (Fahmy, 2011).

24

Figure 11. Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat, US President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister

Menachem Begin shake hands at the signing of the Camp David accords, a peace treaty signed by

Sadat and Begin. Washington, D.C., USA. From http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-photo/rights-

managed/IH154219/sadat-carter-and-begin-shaking-hands

Sadat was a genius at international relations, but he was not very successful

with domestic management and running the Egyptian economy. In relation to the

many wars that exhausted the Egyptian economy, Sadat was a visionary man. He

predicted that Communism was falling apart and Capitalism would rule the world. He

wanted to shift the Egyptian economy to Capitalism, but he did this without accurate

preparations. Sadat opened the Egyptian markets to international companies. The

changes were overwhelming and disastrous for the Egyptian economy (Hekal, 1990)

Local companies that were once protected by very strict importation laws

were now vulnerable to competition and the power of the multinational companies.

Many private- and public-owned organizations experienced huge losses. Inflation was

out of control, and that caused the 1978 revolt when one hundred thousand protested

it in the streets, complaining about the unbearable living conditions. Sadat calmed

down the people.

25

While the people were settling down, the Islamist groups declared war on

Sadat for signing the peace treaty with Israel. Sadat reacted harshly to the threats and

ordered the police forces to arrest thousands of activists not only from the Islamist

groups, but also from several political groups (Randor, 2011). On October 6, 1980,

Sadat was shot and killed during a military show (scorpionsea55, 2009).

Mubarak became the new president in 1980. Mubarak was able to boost the

economy, fix the country’s infrastructure, and create millions of jobs during the first

two periods of his presidency. Later in his presidency, Mubarak seemed to be

surrounded by a group of businessmen. Many exceptions were made in law

enforcement and in government contracts, and hundreds of thousands of acres of very

limited inhabitable land of Egypt were given to businessmen for free (Lyon, 2013).

The Present

In 2005, Mubarak’s son Gamal came back to Egypt and to the political arena.

Once he appeared, he dominated the whole scene, as his father was 75 years old then.

As Mubarak got older, and Gamal got greedier, the country struggled with corruption

that raced through all the veins of the country. Videos of police brutality against the

poor became a daily repeated news story. In addition to the greed of the Mubarak

family, the population was growing at unprecedented rates over the last 20 years.

In 2011, the people of Egypt decided that the country needed a change. They

wanted democracy and went to the street to protest and demand that Mubarak step

down. Mubarak was eventually overthrown in 2011 and replaced with martial law

under the Egyptian army (Hammer, 2011). Mohamed Hussein Tantawy led the

26

country in the transaction period. During this time, the country witnessed a significant

rise in the crime rate, several bloody clashes between protestors and police forces,

and noted confusion and uncertainly in almost all the departments of the government

(Al-Deep, 2011).

Figure 12. President Morsi was named by Time Magazine as the most important man in the

Middle East. From http://content.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601121210,00.html

After a short term as president, Morsi was overthrown by the Egyptian

military, led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, in a coup that followed heavy pressure from

millions of protestors. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ran in the first presidential elections that

27

followed the coup and won an extreme victory. It should be noted that the election

was ignored by millions of members of Islamic groups.

Figure 13. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. From

http://drrichswier.com/2015/02/11/egyptian-president-al-sisi-muslim-brotherhood-origin/

Analysis

After going through the history of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the

Egyptian government, I was able to identify the problems each party had with the

other. By separating the problems from the people, I have moved one step closer to

bringing successful negotiations to Egypt. The problems identified are:

1. Both sides do not trust each other, based on previous disputes and many

bitter rounds of negotiations.

2. Both sides used their BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement)

in almost every major dispute. The Muslim Brotherhood always used

demonstrations and protests; on the other hand, the Egyptian government

used excessive power. Then they accused each other of terrorist acts.

28

3. The relationship between the police force and the protesters of the Muslim

Brotherhood is a circle of revenge; whenever the two sides meet, there are

always causalities on both sides.

4. The leaders of the Egyptian government believe that the leaders of the

Muslim Brotherhood have power madness and that they will do anything

to ensure that not only Egypt, but the entire Muslim world is controlled by

Sharia law and a conservative Islamic lifestyle (Ismail, 2011).

5. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood believe that the government uses

all its national security organizations, such as the police force, the military,

intelligence department, and international relations to banish the Muslim

Brotherhood not only from Egypt, but also from all the other shelters the

Brotherhood members have found in other countries (El Kharbawy 2,

2013).

29

Overcoming the Obstacle of Mistrust

According to Professor Deepak Malhotra of the Negotiations, Organizations,

and Markets Department at Harvard Business School, there are six steps to gaining

trust during negotiations: speak their language, manage your reputation, make

dependence a factor, make unilateral concessions, explain your demands, and

maximize joint gains (Malhorta, 2004). Applying the six steps to the mistrust

between the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood revealed very few

options to strengthen trust between the two groups. The main point was to focus on

the safety of all Egyptians’ family members and the future of Egyptian children.

Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders (2010) mention three ways to overcome

negative experiences: share information and encourage reciprocity, negotiate

multiplied issues simultaneously, and make multiple offers at the same time. These

three steps need to be followed in order to help develop a reasonable set of options to

overcome the deep-seated mistrust between the Muslim Brotherhood and the

Egyptian government.

Identifying the problems above will remove obstacles when applying the

second principle of interest-based negotiation, “focus on the interests not the

positions.” Knowing and recognizing the perception of one party toward the other

(and vice versa) will help overcome the obstacles of mistrust (Steinberg & D’Orso,

1999). Taking the time to break down the problems and taking steps to gain trust will

help focus on the interests of both parties involved in the negotiation for a peaceful

and prosperous Egypt.

30

An example of reciprocity, the practice of exchanging things with others for

mutual benefit, was made by the Egyptian Salafist preacher Yasser Al-Borhamy. Mr.

Al-Borhamy is the vice president of the Salafist political party (Nour Party) that won

the second most seats in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. During an interview

on an Egyptian news channel, he said, “Before the presidential election, I suggested

to Field Marshal el-Sisi that the Egyptian government pay a death benefit

(bereavement pay) to the families of the martyrs. Field Marshal el-Sisi accepted the

idea, but the Muslim Brotherhood refused” (Al-Sherouk, 2014). According to him,

many of the Muslim Brotherhood members have expressed their disappointment with

the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, particularly in not accepting payment from the

Egyptian government for the loss of life during the protests. If the Egyptian

government were to make this offer again, and the Muslim Brotherhood were to

accept it, it would lay the foundation for overcoming the obstacles of mistrust. This

would be considered an olive branch from the Egyptian government to the members

of the Muslim Brotherhood, and it would give the Muslim Brotherhood a partial

victory in the eyes of their members.

31

CHAPTER III

FOCUS ON THE INTERESTS, NOT THE POSITIONS

In order to get to the real interests of both the Egyptian government and the

Muslim Brotherhood, I had to analyze the interview data to search for patterns in

order to identify real issues in general for each side. After separating the problem

from the people, I developed a short list of the highest-priority and the most urgent

issues for both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government.

Data analysis was based on the seven interview questions asked. I used the

questions to open a full conversation about the history and the present political issues

in Egypt between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government. Some of

the interviews lasted for several hours. I was able to discuss the situation with people

from different political, religious, economic, and social backgrounds. I was able to

put a spotlight on the real issues in general, and also on the more interest-focused

issues for both sides.

Issues from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Point of View

First and foremost, President Morsi was an elected president that had the right

to finish his term. The Muslim Brotherhood believes that the popularity of President

Morsi had dropped because of a biased and organized media campaign targeting the

president’s performance. The campaign was funded by some of the remaining

officials from Mubarak’s regime, including businessmen that opposed Muslim

Brotherhood policies. Moreover, other Arab countries that owned satellite television

32

channels used the media of these television channels, which could be seen for free all

over the Middle East, to unfairly make President Morsi out to be incompetent and

religiously fundamental.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s members and supporters who were interviewed all

agreed that President Morsi did make mistakes, but it was to be expected. After 30

years under the dictatorship of Mubarak, who had banned all political parties except

for his own (the National Party, which was subsequently banned after the January 25

Revolution), how could anyone expect any president to not make mistakes due to

inexperience (Lyon, 2013)? While it is true that on June 30, 2013, millions of

protestors marched the streets against President Morsi, it should not be forgotten or

ignored that millions of protestors also went to the streets is support of him (Spark,

2013). The military coup that happened on July 3, 2013 following the June protests

clearly declared war against all Islamic political groups in Egypt and favored the non-

Islamic political groups. These are the same non-Islamic political groups that failed to

win any of the five elections against the Muslim Brotherhood since 2011.

Figure 14. Supporters of President Morsi protesting in the streets of Egypt. From

http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/07/mohamed-morsi-egypt-2/

33

Figure 15. President Morsi’s opponents protesting in Tahrir Square. From

https://www.pinterest.com/pin/398146423278102897/

Both the army and the police force used excessive and unnecessary violence

against the Muslim Brotherhood’s members during the peaceful protests that followed

the coup. The Muslim Brotherhood’s members accused the Egyptian government of

committing hate crimes against conservative Muslims. Additionally, the government

arrested thousands of the Muslim Brotherhood’s members, most of which are still in

prison without being officially charged with a crime (Shakir & Whitson, 2014). They

claim that any violence committed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s members was

simply a reaction to the Egyptian government’s cruelty toward them. The members of

the Muslim Brotherhood that are in jail are being tortured, they are banned from legal

visitations with their family members or friends, and in several cases, they are even

banned from consulting with their lawyers.

Under the current Egyptian government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the

Constitution that had been revised under President Morsi is being revised again to

move Islamic tradition and law. In addition to the rewriting of the Constitution,

34

another issue the Muslim Brotherhood has against the Egyptian government is that

while the government claims the Brotherhood is receiving financial help from foreign

governments, the Egyptian government is not able to prove it. With all the technology

the Egyptian government controls, if it were true that the Muslim Brotherhood were

supported by foreigners, they would be able to prove it. Lastly and most

significantly, the country’s current president, President el-Sisi, is enemy number one

to the Muslim Brotherhood. El-Sisi was the leader of the military coup that overthrew

the democratically elected President Morsi. No Islamic political group will ever be

able to trust him.

Issues from the Egyptian Government’s Point of View

The Egyptian Government will not tolerate the use of any violence or terrorist

acts against the army or the police force. It is completely unacceptable under any

circumstances. Any act of violence from the Muslim Brotherhood will be met with a

powerful response to crush the perpetrators. The Muslim Brotherhood uses some of

its members as militia to terrorize their opposition. Not only is this illegal, it has

highly disturbed national security. The Muslim Brotherhood’s alliance with other

conservative Islamic groups in order to infuse violence and terror into the political

dispute is totally unacceptable.

The Muslim Brotherhood considers Christian Egyptians as second-class

citizens that should have minimal civil rights. The Christian community in Egypt

comprises between 10–20% of the population, depending on the source. Regardless

of the actual number, they are a large portion of the country, with Egyptian roots just

35

as deep, if not deeper, than their Muslim counterparts. They are equal citizens and

should be treated as such (Chasmar, 2013).

Lastly, according to the Egyptian government, accepting financial help from

any foreign country or foreign organization for the funding of the Muslim

Brotherhood’s protesting activities under any circumstances is considered an act of

treason and betrayal. Many of the interviewees named Qatar, Turkey, and Iran as the

largest donors to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is an

international organization that requires all of its members to be loyal only to the

Muslim Brotherhood and not to the member’s country of citizenship or residence.

Issues after Focusing on Interests Rather Than Positions

Applying the second principle of interest-based negotiation to facilitate the

problems has revealed the real issues that lead to the core problems (Volkema, 1999).

Inventing mutual-gain options should overcome the disputes, disagreements, and

clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government that have

caused misperceptions, negative emotions, and communication problems. Identifying

the real issues will allow for the real interests of each party to be uncovered and

explored in hopes of leading to mutual gain options. According to Rahwan and

Sonenberg (2003) of the University of Melbourne, in order to focus on interests, one

must understand the difference between objective and subjective resolution. When

mediators attempt to negotiate one party’s goal, they need to understand if it is a

subjective goal because it is possible that they will be unwilling to drop that goal even

36

when faced with rational arguments. In order to set the foundation for strong

negotiations, be sure that the interests are objective.

Real Issues

The Muslim Brotherhood’s real issues are many. Firstly, they were unjustly

overthrown from power. Their leaders, members, and supporters are being jailed for

expressing their political views. Many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s members and

supporters were injured or killed during the clashes and are still considered criminals.

The Egyptian government has seized the Muslim Brotherhood’s members’ property

and businesses, with the excuse that these resources are used to fund terrorist acts.

The Egyptian government’s real issues are no less numerous than the Muslim

Brotherhood’s. They want the violent protests and terrorism to stop. They want to

obtain economy stability for Egypt. Lastly, they want the Muslim Brotherhood to stop

accusing them of illegally removing Morsi from the presidency.

In order to discover the possible mutual gains, I analyzed the real issues to

identify the real interests (Hutson & Lucas, 2010). One of the Muslim Brotherhood’s

real interests is gaining the freedom of their leaders, members, and supporters from

exile and jail. They also want satisfactory compensation and support for the families

of the martyrs who fell during the clashes in the elimination of Rabaa Square and Al-

Nahda Square. Additionally, they want compensation for losing the power to satisfy

the Muslim Brotherhood members.

The Egyptian government’s real interest is to ensure security over all Egyptian

lands. Once the security is reestablished, they believe the economy will begin to

37

recover. The shortage of resources will be reduced, and international investment will

return to the nation. The stable security will also attract both tourism and international

investors.

38

CHAPTER IV

INVENT OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL GAIN

The first two principles of interest-based negotiation (separate the people from

the problem, and focus on interests, not positions) have been applied. It is now time to

turn to the third principle: invent options for mutual gain. By revealing the mistrust

between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government, we can now move

closer to setting the stage for successful negotiations. Before we can move to the

fourth principle (insist on objective criteria), we must acknowledge the express needs

of interests of each party (Friedman, 1994).

The Egyptian government is very sensitive about the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Egyptian government considers them enemies because of the immense damage

they have caused the country. Moreover, they are done listening to the Muslim

Brotherhood accuse them of using their position of power to inflict excess force

against members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian government believes it is

the Muslim Brotherhood who uses unneeded violence and torture (BBC News, 2013).

Lastly, the Egyptian government feels it is being falsely accused of not pardoning

members of the Muslim Brotherhood in prison, when in fact the Egyptian

Constitution states that the president of Egypt does not have the power to give a

presidential pardon to anyone before the court has given its conviction and sentence.

On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood is very sensitive to any statement

that denies that it is the party with the officially elected president of Egypt. Any

39

statement that describes removing President Mohamed Morsi from power and placing

him under arrest in July of 2013 as a criminal, and not due to the military coup, is

false. Any implication that Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters are

terrorists or criminals is totally and completely unacceptable. “Those people are

freedom fighters that have defended the country against the military officers that

claimed all the power in Egypt by force since 1952,” announced a member of the

Muslim Brotherhood on Al-Jazeera News Television (Al-Jazeera News, 2015). To

reach a point that options for mutual gain can be reached, I had to rephrase and

reword many of the problems and interests to the needs of the parties and move away

from the interests. How one communicates is critical to setting the foundation for

negotiation and laying the groundwork to develop common interests. To do this, I

have spent countless hours working with both sides to be able to reach a satisfying set

of mutual gains that both sides could trust, respect, and work with (Steinberg &

D’Orso, 1999). This study has developed a set of options to begin dialogue between

the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood. Based on the interviews and

applying interest-based negotiation theory to the issue, the options for mutual gain

have been identified as:

1. The Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood should have a

respite for six months to help ease the buildup of tension.

2. The Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood should begin

direct or indirect negotiations to reach sustainable solutions for current

problems.

40

3. The Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood should

announce their total rejection of any form of violence or sabotage from any

side.

4. The Muslim Brotherhood should influence people to stop protesting

during the respite.

5. The Egyptian government should announce the casualty statistics from

both the police force and the protestors during the Rabaa al-Adawiya Square

and the Al-Nahda Square sit-ins. The martyrs from both sides should be

included in the January 25 Revolution Martyrs Program.

6. The Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters that are in prison should be

allowed visitation from family members. The Egyptian authorities will have

the right to all the necessary surveillance to ensure the safety and security of

the visits. If any of the visit requests are denied, the government should

provide an official letter explaining the reasons for the denial and the expected

time for the possible elimination of these reasons.

The article “Barriers to Resolution in Ideological Based Negotiations: The

Role of Values and Institutions” explains that people involved in a conflict are

concerned with fairness (Wade-Benzoni, Hoffman, Thompson, Moore, Gillepsie, &

Bazerman, 2002). However, how they define fairness has, more often than not, come

from their own values and beliefs. For example, in many of my interview sessions,

supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood feel that it was not fair that Egypt’s first

41

democratically elected president was removed by the military. On the other hand,

supporters of the Egyptian government feel that it is not fair that Morsi wanted them

to live under Sharia law and believe that the military did the right thing for the

country as a whole (The Guardian, 2013). By accepting the abovementioned areas

for mutual gain, both sides will be able to move on from the “Morsi issue” and look

toward the future and the future of Egypt as one country (Wade-Benzoni, Hoffman,

Thompson, Moore, Gillepsie, & Bazerman, 2002).

42

CHAPTER V

INSIST ON OBJECTIVE CRITERIA

Interest-based negotiation’s fourth and last principle is to insist on objective

criteria. A sign of a successful mediator is that he or she was able to help all parties

involved focus on their interests. Once this point has been reached, it is now time for

the mediator to get the parties to agree upon a set of objective criteria for the

negotiations.

As I researched the history of domestic conflicts, I discovered there are four

ways to sort the conflict:

1. The stronger ethnic group deports the weaker ethnic group out of the

country. This solution has happened several times. One of the most

famous was the pharaoh deporting the Jewish people out of Egypt.

2. Genocide of the weaker ethnic group. This has happened many times in

history, and unfortunately it is still happening in modern times. Examples

are the Holocaust in the 1930–1940s and Rwanda in the 1990s.

3. Dividing the country, which is something that is happening in Africa and

Asia as I write this paper. Just a few years ago, Sudan was split into two

countries and may even be partitioned into a third. The partition between

India and Pakistan in 1947 is yet another example.

4. Reach an agreement. This is by far the best solution. In many cases, the

agreements have strengthened the internal relations of the parties. The

43

most famous example of reaching an agreement is the Camp David treaty

in 1978 that ended thirty years of bitter wars (Sousa, 2014). I would like to

add that the treaty that saved thousands of lives was achieved by using the

interest-based negotiation.

A useful comparison to make is with the Irish Good Friday Agreement (GFA) or

Belfast Agreement, whose successes can be applied to the Muslim Brotherhood’s and

the Egyptian government’s situation. Both situations go back many decades. The

Egyptian conflict goes back to 1922, and the Irish conflict goes back to 1960. Both

conflicts started as a political conflict, not a religious one. The Irish conflict was to

determine the political status of Northern Ireland by either staying with the United

Kingdom or to leave and unite with all of Ireland. The Egyptian conflict is over the

2012 presidential elections. Should he be allowed to finish his term or not? Both

conflicts did have a religious dimension: in the Irish example, it was between

Catholics and Protestants. In Egypt, the conflict is between the conservative Muslims

and the rest of the nation, which includes moderate Muslims and Christians. In both

conflicts, the government and police favored one party over the other: Catholics over

the Protestants, and moderate Muslims and Christians over the conservative Muslims.

Sadly, in both instances, the political disputes turned bloody. Streets clashes were–or

in the case of Egypt, are–common. Each government labeled the dissident party as

rebels or terrorists. There are many similarities between the two conflicts.

44

Figure 16. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Irish Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald shaking hands

after signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement. From http://home.bt.com/news/world-news/november-15-

1985-anglo-irish-agreement-sparks-angry-response-from-loyalists-11363943812698

Comparing the Irish case to the current Egyptian situation will shed some light on

possible objective criteria from which to start negotiations. Below, I will compare the

outcome of my study to the Declaration of Support established by the GFA.

Based on the original research and exploration of numerous theories of

negotiation, Egypt has a chance to find lasting peace for all of its citizens if it will

take similar steps to those outlined in the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement’s

Declaration of Support (see Appendix A).

Proposed Draft of the Egyptian People’s Declaration of Support

Based on the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement’s Declaration of Support,

below is the proposed draft of the Egyptian People’s Declaration of Support.

Alongside each statement are conclusions based on research and interview.

1. We, the participants in the multiparty negotiations, believe that the agreement

we have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning.

45

a. Based on the interviews, I believe it is very important to start the

negotiations by affirming the outcome of the peace and the benefits

that the entire nation will enjoy.

2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of

suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured and their

families.

a. This study recommends that all people that lost their lives during the

clashes should be known as martyrs and that a 25th of January

program should be developed to provide compensation and medical

care for the injured and financial and emotional support to the families

of the deceased.

3. We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of

relationships within all of Egypt.

a. I recommend that the Egyptian government and the Muslim

Brotherhood cooperate on a basis of mutuality and start to build trust

through respecting all commitments made during the negotiations.

Furthermore, both sides need to put their subjective goals aside and

make compromises to reach agreements. There is no chance to sustain

peace and live as Egyptian citizens with equal rights unless we can

reach an agreement through trust and respect.

4. We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and

peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues. We oppose any

46

use or threat of force by others for any political purpose, whether in regard to

this agreement or otherwise.

a. This research has affirmed that the Egyptian government and the

Muslim Brotherhood should announce their total rejection of any form

of violence. Stopping the violence will give the negotiations a much

better chance to reach an agreement.

5. We will endeavor to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and

rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements.

We pledge that we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and

every one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement.

a. This statement is to ensure that all involved parties and individuals

will respect the outcome of negotiations. In this study we have

recommended the following: that the Egyptian government and the

Muslim Brotherhood should begin direct or indirect negotiations to

reach sustainable solutions for current problems and to build a bridge

to trust and respect the final agreement.

CHAPTER VI

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Applying interest-based negotiation principles to the interview data collected

allowed this researcher to explore the options to keep open communications and

establish a network of people in direct connection with both parties. The objective of

this original research is to establish a base from which to begin negotiations and to

then open a dialogue with both parties in order to develop a final set of options with

acceptable mutual gains for all of Egypt. Ury (2007) argues that the way to reach a

positive outcome from the negotiation is to build a bridge. As the Chinese strategist

Sun Tzu once counseled his leaders to “build a golden bridge for your opponent to

retreat across,” Ury (2007) argues that there are three different cases in which you

will have to build a bridge for the negotiating sides in order to get a positive yes: if

one of the sides has an unmet need or concerns; if one of the sides is willing to agree

but worries about the opinion of whom he represents; or if one of the sides said yes

but it may not be a long-lasting agreement because the relationship may be badly

damaged. A negotiator should offer options to help strength the relationship. He also

argues that the above obstacles can be overcome in three steps:

1. Don’t compromise essentials. Say no to any agreement that may compromise

a core belief. Such an agreement will be short-lived.

48

2. Address unmet interest. A creative negotiator should be able to indicate the

other side’s interests that he is willing to give toward, and his own interest that

the other sides is willing to give toward.

3. Help the other win approval. The negotiator should discover the essential

needs of the negotiating teams and make sure that it is all met in the

agreement (Ury, 2007).

These three steps will be used with the information collected from the interviews and

the references in order to reach the goal of the research, which is give the options to

both the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood to come to the

negotiation table. At the end of the day, it all comes down to communication, trust,

and commitment to peace.

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50

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.

APPENDICES

58

APPENDIX A

THE RESEARCH PLAN

This project was developed and conducted based on the following stages:

1. Collect existing theories, data, and history on negotiations and the Egyptian

conflict

2. Develop interview questions based on interest-based negotiation theory and

other supporting theories

3. Interview members of the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood

4. Analyze data and identify patterns

5. Apply interest-based negotiation principles

6. Make recommendations to both The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian

government

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APPENDIX B

THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Please name and explain any amendments or changes you suggest to the

current constitution that are critical to meet your minimum standards.

2. Please name and explain the actions and the steps the Egyptian government

needs to take in order to conduct a justified investigation about the events that

happened during the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporter protests.

3. What do you think the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who are not

involved in any criminal act could do to ease the tensions with Egyptian

society?

4. Please name and explain any obstacles that could prevent easing the tense

relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government?

5. Please name three of the members or supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood

that you would be willing to negotiate and accept mutual gains with in order

to reach an agreement?

6. Please name three of the members or supporters of the Egyptian government

that you would be willing to negotiate and accept mutual gains with to reach

an agreement?

7. How would you imagine Egypt’s future four years from now if we were able

to reach an agreement?

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APPENDIX C

INFORMED CONSENT

موافقة معلومة

:السيد المحترم المشارك فى الدراسة

نستأذن سيادتكم للمشاركه فى مشروع دراسة تتم لاستيفاء شروط الحصول على

حول الوضع السياسى الحالى ىمحمد العميربالدراسه القائم ماجستير إداره الاعمال, فى جمهورية مصر العربيه عن طريق تطبيق نظرية مفاوضات المصلحه المشتركه.

أسئله حول الوضع 7طلب منكم الإجابه على إذا قررتم المشاركه فى الدراسه سن السياسى الحالى فى مصر.

المعلومات التى ستدلون بها خلال لا توجد ادنى مخاطره من المشاركه فى الدراسه,

الدراسه ستكون محفوظه فى مكان آمن وسيتم حجب المعلومات فورا عن اى استخدام الا بغرض البحث والدراسه كما تنص القوانين.

باستثتاء وقتكم الثمين لا توجد اى تكلفه اخرى للمشاركه فى الدراسه ,ومن الممكن

دتكم من المشاركه .ان لا يكون هناك فوائد مباشره لسيا

مشاركتكم اختياريه لا يوجد اى عقوبات عن الامتناع عن المشاركه فى الدراسه او الانسحاب منها فى اى وقت

إذا وافقتم سيادتكم على المشاركه فنرجوا ان تتكرموا بالتوقيع على هذه الإستماره.

ل إذا كان لديكم اى اسئله او استفسارات عن الدراسه برجاء الإتصا

بصاحب الدراسة محمد العميري melemeiry@csustan.edu

61

Dr. Randall Brown أستاذ إدارة الاعمال ورئيس قسم

ماجستير إدارة الاعمال

)rbrown@csustan.edu(email:

Dr. Ed Miller دكتور إدارة الاعمال والمفاوضات ) tamiller97@aol.com(email:

إذا كان لديكم أي أسئلة بخصوص حقوق سيادتكم كمشارك في موضع دراسة برجاء

او عن طريق الايميل 2096673784بالتليفون IRBAرة الاتصال بمكتب إدا irbaadmin@csustan.edu

Informed Consent

Dear Participant:

You are being asked to participate in a research project that is being done to fulfill

requirements for a Master’s degree in Business Admiration at CSU Stanislaus.

Mohamed Elemeiry is conducting a study about the current political situation in

Egypt using Interest Based Negotiation Theory. If you decide to volunteer, you will

be asked to answer 7 questions about your view of the current situation in Egypt.

There are no known risks to you for your participation in this study. The information

collected will be protected from all inappropriate disclosure under the law. All data

will be kept in a secure location.

There is no cost to you beyond the time and effort required to complete the procedure

described above. It is possible that you will not benefit directly by participating in this

study.

Your participation is voluntary. Refusal to participate in this study will involve no

penalty. You may withdraw at any time without any penalty.

If you agree to participate, please indicate this decision by signing below. If you have

any questions about this research project please do not hesitate to contact me

Mohamed Elemeiry, by Phone: 010 153 475 44, or by Email:

melemeiry@csustan.edu,

62

or you may contact my faculties sponsors:

Dr. Randall Brown, Director MBA Program and Professor of Management,

California State University Stanislaus (email: rbrown@csustan.edu)

Dr. Ed Miller, Professor of Management and Negotiations, California State

University Stanislaus (email: tamiller97@aol.com) .

If you have any questions regarding your rights and participation as a research subject, please

contact the UIRB Administrator by phone (209)667-3784 or email IRBAdmin@csustan.edu.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Elemeiry

Participant signature and the توقيع المشارك في الدراسهdate:

التاريخ: Date:

:الأسمName:

التوقيع: Signature:

63

APPENDIX D

THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE AGREEMENT’S DECLARATION OF

SUPPORT

1. We, the participants in the multi-party negotiations, believe that the agreement we

have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning.

2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of

suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured and their

families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly

dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust,

and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.

3. We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of

relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these

islands.

4. We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and

peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues, and our opposition to any

use or threat of force by others for any political purpose, whether in regard to this

agreement or otherwise.

5. We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally

legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavour to strive in every

practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of

democratic and agreed arrangements. We pledge that we will, in good faith, work to

64

ensure the success of each and every one of the arrangements to be established under

this agreement. It is accepted that all of the institutional and constitutional

arrangements – an Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council,

implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British Irish Intergovernmental

Conference and any amendments to British Acts of Parliament and the Constitution of

Ireland – are interlocking and interdependent, and that in particular the functioning of

the Assembly and the North/South Council are so closely inter-related that the

success of each depends on that of the other.

6. Accordingly, in a spirit of concord, we strongly commend this agreement to the

people, North and South, for their approval. (United Nations Peacemaker, 1998)