the elusive obama doctrine - middle east technical universityusers.metu.edu.tr/utuba/gelb.pdf ·...

The Elusive Obama Doctrine

By Leslie H. Gelb

Leaving aside political and ideological position he inherited from George W.

malcontents as well as defenders of Bush and generally bolstering America's' the faith, it seems to me that three reputation. Specifically, he managed

points can be made fairly regarding Presi- Ainerica's exit from Iraq well and developeddent Barack Obama's foreign-policy and a new, focused and effective militarynational-security record. strategy to counter terrorists. Inevitably,

First, he has captured the potent experts will quarrel over whether Obamapolitical center, a considerable feat for any could have done more of this or less ofDemocrat. He's done so mainly by staying that. But on the whole, he guided Americaout of big, costly trouble. He further capably through the kinds of problems thathelped himself by co-opting some of the often had turned sour in administrationspopular hard-nosed rhetoric and actions of past. Even where Obama took wrongtraditional realists not generally associated turns—and there were a number of these—with Democrats. Right-wing extremists he mostly sidestepped costly mistakes,did their part by practically conceding with the exception of Afghanistan. He wasthe middle ground with their unrelenting aided in avoiding such big errors—quitehawkishness. All of this permitted Obama an accomplishment—by possessing a clearto outmaneuver the Republicans and sense of the limitations of American power,hold the center. In doing so, he has given Third, while Obama saw what AniericanDemocrats their first real shot at being power could not do, he failed to appreciateAmerica's leading party on foreign policy what American power could do, especiallysince Franklin Roosevelt and the earliest when encased in good strategy. Thus,days of Harry Truman. his principal shortcoming was failing to

This has been nothing short of a political formulate strategy and understand itscoup that could reverse long-standing interplay with power. He should be faultedRepublican electoral advantages on national here, even though most who fault himsecurity. usually fail to produce their own viable

Second, Obama managed a complex strategies—those magical brews of picturingrange of tactical challenges quite well, pitfalls and opportunities, hammering outimproving significantly on the international attainable objectives and focusing the use

of power. To this day, Obama's AfghanistanLeslie H. Gelb is president emeritus of the Council Strategy seems little more than a disjointedon Foreign Relations, a former senior official in the list of tactics. More sorrowfully on theState and Defense Departments, and a former New strategic front, he has yet to put economicYork Times columnist. He is also a member of The resurgence and U.S. economic power atNational Interest's Aàwi&oiY CouncA. the core of the national-security debate.

18 The National Interest The Elusive Obama Doctrine

where they must be, for an effectivenational-security policy in the twenty-first century. To be sure, he has spoken ofthis need on occasion, but in his handsit has seemed more a rhetorical stepchildthan a key ingredient of internationalpower and successful strategy. Withoutstrategy and without economic renewalto power it, Obama neither has achievedlasting strategic breakthroughs nor laid thegroundwork for them later on.

Those who have easy solutions forforeign-policy challenges don't know verymuch about foreign policy. I've tried tobe mindful of the great difficulties and ofreasonably varied policy perspectives—andof the fact that, in the course of events, I'vechanged my own mind on matters smalland large. I am mindful, too, that strangeoccurrences often attend the monthspreceding presidential elections.

confidence in him. Holding center fieldallowed Obama to move both left and rightto block attacks or gain support. At times,though, such political gain came at thecost of contradictory actions that confusedaudiences both domestic and foreign. As forunhappy liberals, Obama often has flickedthem away almost as easily as Republicanshave.

In taking over the middle, Obama hadhelp from a centrist-oriented Bill Clinton,who certainly was an elusive target forRepublicans in the 1996 elections.However, Clinton's immunity often derivedfrom his tiptoeing around internationalissues rather than boldly seizing the center.Obama seized that center. It must be saidthat, during the Clinton and Obamayears. Republicans contributed to theirown decline with unadulterated hawkishrhetoric. The 9/11 events briefly boosted

Obama's position at the political centerin U.S. foreign policy has enabled him todeflect classic Republican charges of liberalweakness that always kept Democrats onthe defensive. He and his team also adoptedmuch of the realist language of "interests"and "power," which further enhanced public

Bush and Republican hawkishness, but thatfaded soon enough.

Obama earned the people's trust. Heand his new Democrats averted the usualhellholes because they understood thelimits of American power far better thanBush had, particularly when it came to the

The Elusive Obama Doctrine September/October 2012 19

shortcomings of military force. Yes, theUnited States had military superiority afterthe Cold War. Bush and the neocons sawthis clearly. But they went on to draw thewrong conclusion—namely, that the wayto exercise that superiority was to threatenforce and wage war. Obama and hisminions grasped the reality that Americansuperiority can prevail in conventional warsagainst nonsuperpowers (driving Iraq out ofKuwait), in operations to decapitate regimesin their capital cities (Saddam Hussein inBaghdad; the Taliban in Kabul) and incommando-like operations. But unlikethe Bush contingent, the Obamanitessaw that conventional military superioritycannot pacify countries or resolve civilwars and vast internal conflicts. With thenotable exception of Afghanistan, the newDemocrats respected this reality.

Once in office, Obama aided himselfpolitically by quickly ditching the liberalforeign-policy agenda of his campaign. Bythe end of his first year, he had quietlyabandoned promises on global warmingand Guantánamo. The former provedmuch too expensive in the short run, andthe latter had become a symbol of liberalnaïveté. He hushed conservative critics witha more skeptical tone on Palestinian-Israelitalks and a tougher stance on Iran andNorth Korea. He guarded himself furtherby stiffening his position on economicand humanitarian issues with China andstressing his pro-human-rights posture onRussia.

Obama then deflected the Republicans'remaining bullets with his amplified andwinning war against terrorists. He toppedthe antiterror charts when, in the face ofconsiderable risk, he ordered the killingof Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Hepunctuated this by eliminating Anwar al-Awlaki, another monster, in September2011. Instead of sending in the troops tofight open-ended land wars, he fought the

terrorists with special-operations teamsand drones. Whatever you think of hisadministration's tendency to leak news of itsvictories or the ethics of having a "kill list,"in his four years, Obama has taken the fightto our enemies and dealt them a staggeringblow.

Only buckshot remained in theRepublican political arsenal. The GOP wasreduced to complaining about Obama'sabandoning Bush's democracy-promotionagenda, delaying the elimination of Egypt'sand Libya's dictators, not taking "action"to remove Syrian president Bashar al-Assadand generally forsaking the Arab Spring.Obama barely had to respond, given theprevailing political sentiment. Jimmy Carterand Bill Clinton must have been jealous.

But Obama surely knows that historyis closing in and will be seeking realaccomplishments. He has to be aware thatat some point even the sleepy press will ask:"Where's the beef?"

This lack of beef brings us to the majorhole in Obama's foreign policy—the paucityof genuine strategic thinking. While thepresident's political leeway was constrictedon most domestic issues, he had a relativelyfree hand on foreign policy, especially afterhe demonstrated he could handle issuesreasonably well. To be sure, he stayedattentive and responsive to conservativeattacks on his actions abroad. For the mostpart, however, he made foreign policy histurf and ran a highly centralized one-manshow. The cost of this overconcentrationwas that he usurped even the details ofpolicy from his principal cabinet officersand thus left himself little time to conceiveand craft a long-range strategy. Fashioningstrategy takes both time and experience,neither of which Obama possessed. Further,there was a deeper impediment still—hispersonal predilections and personality.He was not built for strategizing. Strategycalls for making bets and taking risks


Obama's position at the political center in U.S. foreign policy

has enabled him to deflect classic Republican charges of liberalweakness that always kept Democrats on the defensive.

that the strategist must stick to overtime, come what may. Strategy requiresreducing flexibility, cutting off optionsto follow a certain course and not gettingoverwhelmed by details. These traits, too,ran counter to Obama's disposition to shiftnimbly and keep options open. Strategyrequires sticking to your guns, with somediscomfort, in the face of pressures to trimsails.

Strategy is also about figuring outprecisely how to use the power you have.Even with the decline in America's economyand the shifting sands of internationalaffairs, one remaining constant is thatnations the world over still recognizeWashington as the indispensable leader.America never had the power to orderothers around—not after World War II norat the Cold War's end. But now more thanat any point since America's global reignbegan, other countries have the power to gotheir own way and say no to Washington.America may be the only nation that canlead, but with less relative power, it needsgood strategy more than ever.

Such strategic considerations are at theheart of the exercise of power. Obamadoes not have an overarching strategy,nor did Bill Clinton ot George W. Bush.George H. W. Bush did: end the Cold Warwithout a hot war by helping Soviet leadersdismantle their empire. President Nixonand Henry Kissinger did as well: bury theill effects of the Vietnam War by skywritingAmerica's unique diplomatic power, makepeace between Egypt and Israel, open uprelations with Communist China, and usethat as leverage against Moscow and ties to

Moscow against Beijing. Best of them all.President Truman created two handfuls ofinternational institutions for the exerciseof America's economic power—the IMF,the World Bank, the UN, the MarshallPlan, NATO and more. In the face of Sovietmilitary superiority in Europe and Chinesesuperiority in Asia, that power was key forTruman, as it was for Dwight Eisenhower.Through these institutions, and thanksto sustained U.S. economic growth andsuperior military technology, Washingtonimplemented the brilliant policies ofcontainment and deterrence.

The difficulty with presidents whodon't have strategies is convincing themthat they actually don't have them andthat they do need them. George W.Bush seemed to believe that militaryassertiveness constituted a strategy. BillClinton subordinated international strategyto domestic politics. Obama appears tothink that common sense and flexibilityconstitute a strategy. The result is thatleaders around the world often puzzle overwhat Obama is seeking and how. It's notthat these leaders have their own strategy,but there is a much better chance thatthey'll go along with Obama if they believehe has a plausible one.

To understand this gap, it's helpful tosurvey the evolution of Obama's approachto world affairs. When he took the oathof office, Washington's relations withthe world were, to put it kindly, in astate of disrepair. Initially, Obama triedto be forthcoming and understanding toall. He offered talks with Iran and NorthKorea, and he made conciliatory gestures


toward China and Russia. He opened awelcoming hand to Arabs and Muslimsin a June 2009 speech in Cairo, whichhe underscored by not traveling a fewextra miles to Israel. Europeans expressed

pleasure at his un-Bushian willingness toconsult them, appreciate their points ofview and recommit America to an early exitfrom Iraq. But with little to build upon anda declining U.S. economy, these initiativesstalled, and high hopes abroad began todim. What follows is a rapid run-throughof my observations on some of the majorissues.

N owhere was Obama's understandingof the limitations of American power

better executed than in Iraq. Bush signed apact for the full withdrawal of U.S. forcesby the end of 2011, and it was clear to all—save the neocons—that the Iraqis wouldnot budge on that. Obama took out thetroops. Republicans tried to attack but gotnowhere. Most Americans realized that stay-ing would expose U.S. soldiers further with-out having much effect on Iraq's varioustroubles. However the public may have feltabout the toll in American lives and money,it now seemed relieved. And the negativeconsequences in the Gulf area have beenminute. The real strategic blunder came

when Bush destroyed Iraq, leaving Iran asthe only major regional power.

In Afghanistan, Obama made theopposite call, yielding to the pressure toescalate. He quickly became bogged down

due to the casualties andcosts, Afghan corruption andinefficiency, Pakistani duplicityin providing safe havens to theTaliban and so on. Only as hisreelection campaign approacheddid he commit to a limited war-fighting strategy and eventualwithdrawal. But questions lingerover how many troops willremain after combat forces arewithdrawn in 2014 and for howlong. Perhaps Obama simplyis trying to cover up retreat inan election year. Perhaps he

still believes in some of his old danger-and-victory rhetoric about Afghanistan. Orperhaps he still doesn't quite know what todo.

Obama's policies on the nuclear badguys—Iran and North Korea (and don'tforget Pakistan)—have been mixed. Afterearly days of conciliation, Obama's policyon Iran has been mostly hard-line, a clarityblessed by U.S. and Israeli politics. And it'sbeen half right. On the plus side, he's gottenmost major nations to impose a formidablelist of economic sanctions and stepped upU.S. military presence in the region. Butpressure alone, no matter how formidable,hasn't been and won't be sufficient to settlematters with Iran. Sanctions won't workunless teamed with a reasonable proposal.If the U.S. goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclearprogram altogether, the risk of war will behigh. If the goal is to restrict that programto energy and make it very difficult forTehran to develop and hide weapons-gradematerial, diplomacy has a chance.

So far, Tehran wants almost all sanctionslifted without giving clear indications of


its bottom line. The American-led sideinsists on a step-by-step approach and won'tconcede Iran's right to produce uraniumenriched to 20 percent, a short jump toweapons-grade quality. Neither side willbudge, and nothing will happen beforeNovember. The same holds for the alreadynuclear-capable North Korea. Obamatried talking, but like his predecessors,he flopped. For all Pyongyang's threats,however, its leadership seems to respectdeterrence—buttressed by Beijing's aversionto another Korean war.

To me, more worrisome than NorthKorea or Iran is our sometime allyPakistan. Pakistan already has damagedantiproliferation efforts by divulgingnuclear secrets to ignobles the worldover. With its unstable domestic politicsand possession of over a hundred nuclearweapons (and growing), it has to rankwell ahead of Iran and North Korea inlikelihood to use nuclear weapons or givethem to terrorists.

Obama's policies toward China, Russiaand India have had their inevitable

ups and downs, without crises. From hereon, presidents will be judged in large mea-sure by how well they manage affairs withChina, the other superpower. At the outset,Obama faced the improbable circumstanceof Chinese leaders liking his predecessor,who didn't arouse the usual Chinese suspi-cions about scheming Americans. Obamahas not had an easy time commanding theirrespect. To them, he's been sometimes toohard, sometimes too soft, sometimes both.They certainly didn't like the Obama team'spolicy and resource pivot from Europe andthe Middle East to Asia, China's turf. ToChina, it smacked of a new containmentpolicy and of Washington's refusal to allowBeijing its day in the sun.

Obama has a genuine desire to work outdifferences with China, provided he can

satisfy three key constituencies: 1) China'sneighbors, who want an unobtrusive U.S.bubble of protection from Beijing; 2)humanitarians, who believe that strategicconcerns should be subordinated todemocratization and human rights; and 3)conservatives, who fear growing Chinesemilitary might. All represent legitimate U.S.concerns.

Obama has tried to calm Beijingsomewhat by reframing the pivot as moreof a "rebalancing." Thus, even as Obamatransfers U.S. military resources to Asia,he correctly is attempting to shift the maintheater of competition from security toeconomics. He boldly and rightly expandedplans for the Trans-Pacific Partnership,going beyond free trade to the aggressiveprotection of intellectual-property rightsand other matters. At the same time,however, he has tried to comfort China'sneighbors over key issues such as the SouthChina Sea. These neighbors want it allways—U.S. protection but not so muchas to anger Beijing and risk Chinese tradeand investment. In other words, they wantWashington to take the heat, not them.

Relations with China are nothing likethose with the old Soviet Union. Therewas no economic dimension to Cold Warpolitics. In U.S.-Chinese relations today,economics is central. Each is a major traderand investor with the other, and Chinaholds more than a trillion dollars of U.S.debt. While common economic interestscertainly do not guarantee peace, they surehelp. The main point is this: events in Asiaand elsewhere will go China's way unlessAmerica's economy revives—a key pointthat Obama hasn't sufficiently stressed toAmericans.

From a low point under Bush, U.S.relations with Moscow had nowhere togo but up. Obama hit the "reset" buttonto start a new relationship. Sometimes,this produced good feelings; other times.


In no theater ofthe world has Obama's lack of a strategic

vision had starker consequences than in Afghanistan.

there were increased tensions. Particularlytroublesome to Moscow have been U.S.interventions, actual and potential, inother countries. Russia worries about U.S.interference in Ukraine and Georgia aswell as in places like Syria. Yet Moscowhas cooperated with Washington onAfghanistan logistics, nukes in Iran andNorth Korea, and antiterrorism issuesgenerally.

The reset button has had its offs and ons,and the relationship hasn't been elevated tothe strategic partnership Obama wanted.But it's still worth trying, especially withVladimir Putin reensconced as president.To make it work, U.S. leaders must prepareto be seen side by side atop the mountainwith Russian leaders. That's how they seethemselves, and Washington should treatthem that way. It's a small price to pay forRussia's diplomatic cooperation. Americanleaders can't ignore human-rights anddemocracy concerns, but for now they willneed to temper the rhetoric to get Moscow'spower aligned with America's on difficultworld issues.

The would-be strategic partnershipwith India has yet to bloom, and if it everdoes it's not clear what form it will take.Like many of its neighbors to the east,India wants China to be distracted withAmerica as it flexes its muscles. At thesame time. New Delhi is deciding whenand how much to embrace Washington.And it is India that will do the deciding.So far, Washington's devotion to forgingthis strategic partnership (against China,unspoken) has been mostly unrequited.Washington has given India a free ride

on inspecting military-run nuclearfacilities. In return. New Delhi has beenquite stingy. In a huge deal last year, Indiasnubbed U.S. jet fighters and chose to buyRussian and French ones instead. Indiais still figuring itself out, and both NewDelhi and Washington are calibratinghow far they can go without alienating theChinese.

Obama's policy of humanitarian inter-vention and democracy promotion

has been inconsistent. Such is the troublefor every president who must balance valuesand hard interests.

The most dramatic problems have beenLibya and Syria. Obama rushed into Libyato help America's allies crush a dictator.It was a tricky decision. Washingtoncouldn't ignore the pleas of friends whohad fought alongside Americans in thetwo big contemporary wars. Yet the eagerinterveners hadn't the foggiest idea whetherthey were helping future Islamic extremistsor potential democrats. It is a welcome signthat Libyans bucked the regional trend ofelecting Islamists in their July electionsbut nothing to warrant a proper exhale.For now, the Obama team is happy iteliminated an Arab dictator to proveAmerica's democratic wares.

Not so, so far, in Syria. Unlike in Libya,Obama is wary of the potential sinkholeand rightly so—even as the neocons, asalways, beat their war drums. And unlike inLibya, where the Arab League encouragedintervention, Obama has been spared itspressure to use force against the Assadregime. Nobody wants to take the military


lead because of the blame that may comelater. The hope is that Moscow, a supporterof Assad, may pull the plug on its ally andsave everyone else from having to go in.

There is a big strategic question markover Syria. Will it miraculously becomecalm and democratic? Will it become aradical Sunni state tied to Al Qaeda? WillIran lose the future Syria as an ally, thusdriving Tehran from its main Mideastoutpost? Those at Syria's borders are bracingfor the worst.

The day may come when Washington canhelp Arabs toward a freer life. But that daystill is not near, as the Arab Spring screamsboth hope and danger.

For Egypt, there is so much to say andso little that can be done.It embodies all America'sdreams and nightmaresabout societies progressingfrom dictatorship todemocracy, with little or nogrounding in democratictraditions and institutions.The fear, of course, is thatdictators relatively friendlyto Washington will bereplaced by new dictatorsharsher to their ownpeople and unreceptiveto Washington. HosniMubarak was a corruptdictator indeed, and it's justbabble to argue that Americacould have kept him in power and/ormoved him toward democracy. He seemeddug in forever. Yet when Tahrir's momentcame, the dictator disappeared in the blinkof an eye.

Obama now must choose between acorrupt and nondemocratic Egyptianmilitary, possibly amenable to Americaninterests, and the people's choice: a MuslimBrotherhood that might be moderate nowbut extreme once in control. If the Muslim

Brotherhood strips off its Clark Kent suitto become Islamist Superman, there willbe hell to pay for Egyptians, Israelis andAmericans.

The choice now would be no better hadObama immediately dumped Mubarak andsided with the protestors. The latter hadlittle power and no political organization,demonstrated by their poor performancein elections. Indeed, Libya aside, liberalsthroughout the Arab lands are unpreparedto compete with Islamists for power. Withno obvious and viable ally, Obama has littlechoice but to keep lines out to most parties,as is his wont. He has been mostly cautiousabout the unknown tides of the Arab Spring,and for that he deserves commendation. But

there is a future to plan for, and it is not toosoon for a U.S.-led economic-aid project tostrengthen the cadres of moderate reform inthe Arab world.

Obama does not merit high marks formanaging Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.He did virtually nothing to prod Palestinianpresident Mahmoud Abbas to prepare hispeople for compromise, and he allowedIsraeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahuto denigrate the negotiation process. At a


joint press conference, Netanyahu lecturedObama on the evils of a peace accord builtaround the 1967 borders, and the U.S.president just sat there. The modified '67borders, endorsed by several of Netanyahu'spredecessors, have been America's positionon peace for a half century. With Novemberapproaching, an American clarification ofthis issue has to wait until 2013. But atthat point, Washington must be ready forstraight talk with Israel and the Palestinians,backed up by the blessings of Arab statesand an Arab economic-development planfor Palestine.

Latin America offers an opportunitylargely ignored by Obama, and Africarepresents a growing threat about whichhe can do little. Brazil is the world'ssixth-biggest economy, and the Mexicaneconomy is booming. Even with America'sown difficulties and other internationalpriorities, the Southern Hemisphere hascommanded shockingly little time fromthe White House. The administration putmuscle into passing trade agreements withPanama and Colombia only because it hadthe GOP votes in Congress. At the Cartagenasummit in 2012, Obama was slammed forhis failure to roll up his sleeves on either theCuban embargo or drugs. The most interestAmericans showed in the region came whenSecret Service officers were found to becavorting with prostitutes.

In Africa, some countries havestrengthened their democracies, thoughmany are now gravely threatened bycorruption, internal butchers or Islamicextremists. The United States and othersfeign interest, but absent direct implicationsfor other continents, outside lights rarelywill shine on Africa for some time to come.

Even as fashion now runs to Asia, Europeremains America's principal economic,diplomatic and security partner. Asia willnever replace it—though Obama doesn'tseem to see it that way.

Our European friends have fallen onmiserable economic times, and Washingtoncan offer little help. But the degree to whichEuropeans have gone their own way isworrisome. Eastern European leaders areunhappy about Obama's apparent lack ofconsideration for their feelings about theRussian bear. And Obama did not handleissues regarding that region's missile-defensesystem in a way that inspired confidence.

When the Obama administrationannounced what sounded like a strategicshift in emphasis toward Asia, itdemonstrated a lack of sensitivity to allEuropeans in a time of great need.Explanations and qualifications flowed fromWashington, but the damage was done. Notsurprisingly, early European acclamations ofObama—fueled by hopes that he was morein tune with world affairs than Bush—havemostly dissipated.

In no theater of the world has Obama'slack of a strategic vision had starkerconsequences than in Afghanistan. TheWhite House has altered its objectivesthere so frequently, it's hard to followwhat America is fighting for now. First,it was to defeat Al Qaeda in retributionfor 9/11. Then, it became to defeat theTaliban as well because the Taliban mightlet terrorists back into the country. Later,it was somehow to prevail in Afghanistanto bolster moderates in Pakistan andsafeguard Pakistani nukes. This lastobjective was nothing short of psychedelic.It was never clear how any outcome inthe wilds of Afghanistan, no matter howpositive, could save a messed up, corrupt,multiethnic country of 190 million wherethe military and the Islamists are the onlyreal political forces. Without realisticgoals to give his actions ballast, Obamaincreased the U.S. military presence morethan threefold from the approximatelythirty thousand troops he inherited. Hegave them a counterinsurgency and nation-


Obama often speaks of the importance of Americas economicstrength. Yet he has not put this point at the core of his

national-security agenda, and that's why he has fallen short.

building mandate that stretched credulity.Einally, now, he will withdraw all combattroops by 2014 and drop his broadcounterinsurgency strategy in favor of asensible, targeted counterterrorist approach.For all that, he still hasn't decided the sizeof the residual force after 2014. It could beas high as thirty thousand and hang aroundindefinitely.

Administration officials say that theirobjective is to remove "almost" all U.S.forces in "coming years" while makingAfghanistan more secure. And they aimto achieve these goals by taking threesteps: exploring a deal with the Taliban,improving the performance of Kabuland Afghan security forces, and enticingAfghanistan's neighbors to accept greaterresponsibility. But what the administrationhas here is a list—not a strategy.

A strategy starts with the essentialjudgment that the United States simplydoes not have vital interests in any majorsustained presence in Afghanistan, butAfghanistan's neighbors do—and it is tothem, therefore, that Washington's strategymust be directed. It is they who willhave to worry about what happens afterU.S. forces depart, they who will have todeal with the drugs, the refugees and theIslamic extremists that will flow across theirborders—not the United States. As for U.S.concerns about Afghanistan as a globalheadquarters for terrorists, that time haspassed. Today, terrorists operate worldwide,certainly more in the Middle East than inAfghanistan.

Task number one, then, is to convinceAfghanistan's neighbors that the United

States is pulling almost all of its forces out,and soon, and that America no longer willbear the primary burden. These countriesmust be convinced that while Washingtoncan live with an anarchic Afghanistan—or worse—they cannot. Otherwise, theneighbors will be happy just to sit backand watch. Afghan parties, including theTaliban, must understand that they willhave to deal with these neighbors inAmerica's absence, and the neighbors mustbe made to see that they must shoulder theburdens or suffer the consequences. Noneof this is to say that Washington shouldsimply walk away and hope these countriessee the light. The United States still willhave to play a leading role in getting thisnew coalition organized.

In Afghanistan and elsewhere,Washington has to persuade key countriesthat U.S. power is being used to solvecommon problems. America's future powermust be based on mutual indispensability:the United States is the indispensable leaderbecause it alone can galvanize coalitionsto solve major international problems(most nations know this); other nationsare indispensable partners in getting thejob done. Others must see clearly thatU.S. actions serve their interests as well asAmerica's and that their interests cannot beadvanced save by American leadership.

This principle of mutual indispensabil-ity, with Washington in the lead, must

be the intellectual heart of strategy—butwhat will keep it pumping is economics.Good strategy is a necessary but insufficientcondition for success in the twenty-first


century. Money, more money, innovationin management and technology, competi-tive and skilled workers, and an economythat can trade and invest with the best arealso essential. The U.S. economy is thebasis of America's military and diplomaticpower and, of course, America's foreigneconomic power. Economics is now theprincipal currency of international affairs,the new precious coin of the realm. Ofcourse, in certain matters, only force andtraditional diplomacy are appropriate. Butin most international transactions today, it'seconomic goodies given or withheld thatturn heads.

Obama often speaks of the importance ofAmerica's economic strength. Yet he has notput this point at the core of his national-

Peace and Security Fellowshipin Washington, DC

The Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowshipinvites recent college graduates to apply for six tonine month fellowships in Washington, DC, focusingon arms control, peace, and international securityissues. Founded in 1987 to develop and train thenext generation of leaders on a range of peaceand securit/ issues, theprogram has awarded 138fellowships.

Scoville Fellows work withone of more than two dozen participating public-interest organizations. They may undertake a varietyof activities, including research, writing, and advocacy,and may attend policy briefings. Congressionalhearings, and meetings with policy experts. Manyformer Scoville Fellows have taken prominent positionsin the field of peace and security.

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or contact (202) 446-1565 or [email protected].

security agenda, and that's why he has fallenshort. It's not enough to say, "Our nationmust do this." He has to show how andinspire fear of failure—show how decliningeconomic vitality destroys American powerand undermines U.S. interests. He hasn'testablished this sense of urgency.

Eisenhower knew the magic here. Whenthe Soviets threatened, he tied it to theU.S. economy. Moscow increased militaryspending? Ike said our country needed tolaunch a massive highway-building programso U.S. forces could crisscross the nationmore readily. Moscow launched Sputnik? Heinsisted Congress vastly increase spending onmath and science education "to catch up."

The greatest danger facing America todayis economic stagnation and decline as we

lose trade and jobs to morecompetitive and innovativecountries. Obama mustfind the words to reverse thedownward slope—to restoreresearch, manufacturing skillsand physical infrastructure.He's got to make Americansunderstand that withoutsuch rejuvenation, we cannotsustain America's lead intechnological or militarysuperiority.

Obama uttered these verythoughts. At West Point inDecember 2009, he said,"The nation that I'm mostinterested in building isour own." But he has onlyjust begun to yoke togetherthe American economy andAmerican security. Thisshould be the stuff of anational crusade, with flagsflying and a political strategyto rally Americans. It's thekind of task great leaders arebuilt for. D


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