ForwardDear Reader,

The Emory Globe is proud to present its Spring 2016 volume of the Emory Journal of International Affairs.

The journal contains a variety of papers by some of Emory’s finest undergraduate international affairs scholars with pieces featuring a variety of different topics and areas of the globe.

The Emory Globe is Emory University’s foremost undergraduate publication on foreign affairs and issues of global importance. Our staff writers spend an entire year working through researching and analyzing global affairs and have much to offer to both the Emory community and beyond as critical thinkers and scholars. This journal is a more formal presentation of some of our best quality work, showcasing not only Globe staff writers but non-staff scholars who demonstrated a similar commitment to excellence in foreign affairs analysis.

I would like to give special thanks to those who made this volume of the Emory Journal of International Affairs possible. First, I would like to thank the writers for their great articles and persistent engagement throughout the editing process. Secondly, a very important thank you to Steven Jaber and Maggie Mang for their help with InDesign, digital editing, and design. Both of these individuals have my sincere gratitude for the incredible amount of hard work that they so selflessly put into this journal. Thanks are also due to Media Council for providing funding and Emory Document Services for printing. Additionally, I would like to thank our faculty advisor Dr. Shawn Ramirez for her enthusiasm, suggestions, and support. Lastly, the entire editorial staff of the Globe has been spectacular and both this journal, and the incredible things that this organization does, would not be possible without their leadership and diligence. A special hats off to our outgoing editor-in-chief, Ben Perlmutter, whose leadership and vision has shaped this organization to be where it stands today. It has been a real pleasure and honor.

We at the EJIA hope that you enjoy the Spring 2016 volume of our print journal, and will continue to follow us going forward.

Sincerely, Nate SawyerPublications EditorEmory Journal of International Affairs

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Port Security is a MustBy Daniela Mintz

Table of Contents

History Doesn’t Repeat Itself, But It Sure Does RhymeBy Andrew Shifren 4

6“Classic” Communists: The Cold War in Tlatelolco SquareBy Hugh McGlade 8Why Did Tunisia’s Transition to Democracy Succeed? By Jacob Potts 10The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Argument for United States RatificationBy Jessica Margolis 13

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To the casual observer, there is very little that might suggest a connection between East Asia today and East Asia in the 17th century. China and Japan are thoroughly ensconced in a global age. The region since the 17th century has been shaken by Western imperialism, transformed by the Cold War, and rocketed forward through economic booms. Japan exports microchips rather than silk and China plans to spread its influence with aircraft carriers instead of junks. But diplomacy between Japan and China is surprisingly consistent. Studying the past between these two giants may not give all the answers for the future, but the exercise is crucial in forming a better understanding of the region.

On November 10th, 2014, during the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, Chinese President Xi Xinping and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met for the first time. Their handshake, which would have been significant regardless, took on special significance because of its obvious coldness. Neither head of state mustered a smile and hours later the video of the encounter went viral on the Internet due to Xi’s and Abe’s incredible awkwardness on camera. Xi has refused to meet with high-level Japanese officials for years, due to Chinese outrage over official visits to the Yasukuni shrine and conflicting claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. A month later, on December 9th, Akio Takahara wrote an op-ed in the NY Times titled Détente for China and Japan. According to Takahara, a Tokyo University professor who attended the APEC summit, it was only with certain concessions on the part of Abe that Xi agreed to meet. Xi’s terms for meeting were that Abe had to acknowledge that Japan and China were engaged in a legitimate territorial dispute over the Senkaky/Diaoyu islands. He would also have to promise to end his visits to the Yasukuni war-dead shrine.1

Japanese-Chinese relations reached a low point at the end of WWII. Japanese armies occupied much of China, exploiting its resources and acting with impunity throughout the country. In some cases, such as in Nanking, Japanese soldiers’ brutal killing and raping left an indelible mark on the average Chinese that has lasted until the present day. This is the reason that Abe’s visits to the shrines of Japanese soldiers and commanders are so divisive. Although it is hardly surprising that many

Chinese harbor resentment towards China in light of the Japanese occupation, it is vital that the two largest economies of East Asia cooperate to solve contemporary problems.

The meeting between Xi and Abe, therefore was hailed as a great milestone. It was only achieved because of shrewd diplomacy by both heads of state. Both leaders have powerful factions in their countries that advocate a tough stance towards the other. This makes cooperation complicated because it is vital for each leader to appeal to its constituencies while simultaneously making meaningful decisions and agreements with each other. The problem with Xi’s Senkaku/Diaoyu concession was that for Abe to admit that there is a real territorial dispute would be admitting that China has a legitimate territorial claim. To do so would anger many hard-liner Japanese. Abe and Xi eventually settled with the statement, “Both sides recognized that they had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku Islands.”2 The wording of the statement is intentionally vague so that both sides can appease their citizens while also progressing with a groundbreaking, albeit cold, meeting.

The diplomatic finessing between China and Japan today has parallels stretching back to the mid 1600s. In this time period, the shogun had recently reunified Japan and was once again the most powerful figure in the country. Although Japan was closed to the West in this period, Japanese trade with China and to some degree Korea was immense. China and Korea both accepted a Confucian Sino-centric world order in which China was the knowledgeable and powerful father, and its tributary states like Korea were the children. Japan, unlike Korea, chafed at this regional political system. It was clear, however, that China was the dominant economic and military power in the region. To challenge the vast empire overtly would be foolhardy. The shogun, therefore, wanted to assert its own greatness while corresponding with Korea and China, but simultaneously maintains warm enough relations to continue trade. The emperor of China’s subjects considered him as “King under heaven,” which meant emperor of all lands including Japan. The Chinese emperor would never trade with the emperor of Japan. To even acknowledge another

History Doesn’t Repeat Itself, But It Sure Does RhymeWritten by Andrew Shifren

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emperor would be encouraging a child state to challenge the place of the father.

Understanding China’s position, the shogun created honorary titles for himself that were ambiguous enough to seem submissive to the Chinese emperor, but at the same time bullish to fellow Japanese. One common term was Kobu, which could be translated to something like “highness.”3 This title was particularly effective in proving to Japanese that the shogun was tough on China because it was a word commonly used to refer to the emperor of Japan. The term Tai Kun, later coined in English as Tycoon, was an ambiguous name for the shogun in his dealings with Korea. In the Sino-centric hierarchy, it was not obvious whether Korea was superior to, or a peer of Japan, and the title Tai Kun was unclear enough that it let diplomats and merchants dodge the question altogether.

The issue of the Ryuku Islands was another source of ambiguity between China and Japan. Since 1372 Ryuku had been an official tributary state of China. But in the early 17th century at the same time, the Satsuma daimyo, one of Japan’s feudal lords, invaded and established its own trade and tributary system, parallel to China’s. Satsuma’s colonization had to be hidden from China so that Japan would not seem to be

overtly challenging the Sino-centric tributary system. There is evidence, however, that China was aware of Japan’s tributary system, but looked the other way. Not only would it have been an expensive campaign to extricate the Japanese from Ryukyu, but Sino-Japanese trade through Ryukyu was lucrative. As long as Japan kept up its charade and hid its presence in Ryuku from China, then China would not have to intervene to protect the integrity of its international system.

The contemporary Sino-Japanese relationship is in many ways starkly different from what it was in the mid 1600s. The most obvious difference is that there is no longer a Sino-centric international order in Asia. Japan and China today are competitors and peers. The historical echoes, however, are loud. The ambiguous nomenclature of the 1600s and the tense meeting between Abe and Xi in 2015 both reveal nations attempting to forge beneficial bonds even as many of their people push for tough stances. The conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is also reminiscent of the uneasy peace between China and Japan over Ryuku. In each case, China and Japan asserted their control over a single island and their success or failure meant a slight shift in the Asian power structure, but no fundamental change in the international system.

Before September 11, 2001, a nuclear terrorist attack on American soil was not a formidable threat. Since then, the government has implemented a variety of programs to prevent nuclear terrorism in a variety of different areas, extending beyond just air transportation. Marine transportation, for example, has been acknowledged by government officials and experts as “one of our nation’s most serious vulnerabilities”1. However, current levels of government funding are unable to adequately secure American ports. Given the existing risk of a nuclear ter-rorist attack, the U.S. should spend billions of additional dollars to improve port security and reduce the risk of a nuclear terrorist attack.

It is important to note that while deterrence was successful during the Cold War, it is not a successful strategy against terrorists. Because deterrence-based risk-reduction strategies do not work with non-state actors, focus on prevention is key. 2 The fear of terrorists acquiring nuclear material is not unfounded. Terrorist organizations have demonstrated time and time again the motive and willingness to innovatively seek nuclear destructive power3. Focus on increasing the security at ports is an important safeguard against a terrorist organi-zation successfully carrying out a nuclear attack because terrorists have the will to acquire nuclear material, are innovative, and cannot be deterred.

While a comprehensive strategy to fight terrorism would ideally work to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear material and increase port security, the U.S. should prioritize the latter because it can never be certain that terrorists will be stopped from acquiring nuclear ma-terials. The importance of security-based strategies are even more important given that it only takes one instance of a terrorist acquisition slipping by to have a nuclear di-saster. Terrorists can acquire nuclear material in a variety of ways. This includes stealing unsecured nuclear weap-ons, such as weapons in Pakistan and Russia, and rogue states, such as North Korea, directly providing nuclear materials to a terrorist organization4. Alternatively, it is also possible for a terrorist organization to acquire nucle-ar materials through the black market.

In particular, focusing on port security in secu-rity-based risk reduction strategies is justified because ports are the most plausible targets for a nuclear terrorist attack5. Ports provide the perfect outlet for a nuclear terrorist attack because of improper security at foreign

ports. In recent years, the vast majority of cargo is not inspected both when it leaves foreign soil and when it arrives to the U.S. In fact, only about 4% of containers that arrive in the U.S. were scanned in 2012. In his con-gressional testimony, Kevin McAleenan, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, stated that increasing security to the “ “2100 lanes at the 700 ports globally that ship directly to the [U.S.]” could cost $16 billion dollars”6. Though expensive, this investment is vital to effectively curtail an attack. As Abt explains, “A nuclear weapon loaded on to a container in a foreign port has a very high probability of passing undetected through the foreign port of embarkation. A terrorist who can get a nuclear device into a container is virtually assured of achieving at least a dockside detonation”.7 Although scanning a higher percentage of containers at U.S. ports is absolutely important, it is vital to recog-nize that inadequate security in foreign ports is one of the main risk factors for a nuclear terrorist attack. Given the current security levels at many ports globally, it is conceivable that a terrorist could carry out an attack by placing a nuclear weapon in a container that is destined for the U.S. There is a need to change the protocols for cargo scanning both in the U.S. and abroad to increase the percentage of cargo scanned in order to achieve the greatest security possible. Additionally, equipment needs to be regularly updated and maintained in order to have an inclusive strategy. When equipment breaks down, it is imperative to fix or replace it promptly in order to avoid security gaps. More costly than regular maintenance, however, is replacing outdated equipment. The Customs and Bor-der Protection and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office currently lacks a system to finance the maintenance and replacement of this equipment.8 The ramifications of the lack of such a system must not be underestimated.

While we have existing programs meant to support port security, the primary security program – the Port Security Grant Program (PGSP) – is in severe need of funding. The overarching purpose of PSGP is to strengthen maritime infrastructure against potential terrorist attacks.9 When the appropriations and authori-zation levels for PSGP were established in the FY 2014 appropriations omnibus, it was for $400 million. Howev-er, these funds were never delivered. Only $100 mil-lion have been delivered to the PSGP. In a policy paper released March of last year, the American Association

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Port Security is a MustWritten by Daniela Mintz

of Port Authorities expressed concerns over this lack of funding, urging Congress to fully fund the program.10 It is unrealistic to expect PSGP to strengthen U.S. ports and prevent a nuclear terrorist attack if it does not receive the necessary funding. Providing one-fourth of the funds required means that only some measures will be imple-mented to provide a certain level of security, but such piecemeal measures of security leave wide swaths of vulnerability for terrorists to exploit. It is naïve to believe that the PSGP is performing at its intended levels with a fraction of the required funds.

When considering the need for port security, it is also important to make note that while any nuclear attack would be devastating, a port-based nuclear ter-rorist attack would be particularly nefarious. The most devastating attack would occur if a terrorist detonates a nuclear bomb at a major American port; the economic repercussions are unfathomable. RAND investigated the impacts of a nuclear terrorist attack at the Port of Long Beach in California. They concluded that the death toll would exceed 200,000 people. It would destroy the infra-structure of the port and the Port of Los Angeles, along with the ships and all the cargo at the ports.11 It is also highly probable that all other U.S. ports would close as a response. This would cause a complete halt of all ship-ping in the U.S., as well as the inspection of every cargo container at U.S. ports to ensure that there is no addition-al nuclear bombs or materials. All perishable cargo can also be expected to spoil during this time.12

Moreover, the economic effects of an attack would run beyond the direct effects on trade and ports. For example, if an attack were to occur in New York, major businesses and offices in the city would likely close either because they are destroyed or are severely impacted by radiation. It is plausible that a nuclear ter-rorist attack at the port of New York could destroy Wall Street, prevent the global economy from functioning for a few days, and cause unpredictable losses. Thus, the ramifications of a nuclear attack on an American port are not only limited to the inevitable loss of life, but also extend to the global economy.

When conducting cost-benefit analysis to deter-mine whether or not the U.S. should invest billions of dollars into port security, there are two main factors to consider: magnitude and probability. The magnitudes of the cost of investment and that of the economic losses from an attack must be weighed and compared. RAND estimates that a nuclear explosion at the Port of Los Angeles would cost more than $1 trillion and closing U.S. ports would cut world trade by 7.5 percent.13 Spend-ing $16 billion to ensure that proper scanning of cargo occurs at all 700 ports that ship to the U.S. is only a fraction of $1 trillion. While $16 billion is significant, an attack would have a greater burden on the U.S. economy.

In terms of probability, there are two scenarios that need to be evaluated: the likelihood that a terrorist will launch a nuclear attack against the U.S., and the prospect that such attack is successful. The probability of a nuclear terrorist attack is high enough to be a real

concern for policymakers when determining funding and strategies for security. Nuclear attacks achieve a terror-ists’ main goal: largest amount of destruction.14 Regard-ing possibility of success of an attack, it is clear that the programs in place are not viable due to lack of funding. In FY 2012, only 4% of all cargo that arrived in the U.S. was scanned. Donahue argues that this is “hardly a secure defense.” The importation of nuclear or radiolog-ical material is unacceptable and the government must develop and fund a stronger security plan.15 It may be costly, but a strategy must exist to eliminate the vulnera-bilities in maritime trade to decrease the probability that a terrorist could place a nuclear weapon into a container and detonate it at an American port. It is in the U.S.’ best interest to increase invest-ment in port security. Ports today pose the greatest risk for a nuclear terrorist attack because of the inadequate security in place. Expanding scanning programs to encompass foreign ports that ship to the U.S. is a sound investment and a requirement to ensure the safety of the U.S. The magnitude of an attack–both in terms of loss of life and economic losses–far outweighs the probability of one. Moreover, when evaluating the economic signif-icance of the funds needed to increase port security, it is important to note that the magnitude of the economic loss incurred by a nuclear terrorist attack far outweighs that of the investment in the security needed to avoid it. Though the likelihood is not high, the consequences of an attack necessitate action in order to prevent them and the government must dedicate billions of dollars to achieve this goal. These funds should be used to for four purposes: (1) to provide additional funding to ports around the country to ensure that they have the necessary equipment and that equipment is fully maintained in or-der to avoid security gaps; (2) provide the level of fund-ing PGSP requires to be effective; (3) to scan a higher percentage of containers at U.S. ports; (4) to implement measures to increase security in foreign ports.

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On September 27, 1968, Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms sent a memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson. In it, various senior intelligence officials warned of the dangers that then-presidential candidate Richard Nixon would face were he to travel to Mexico for the Olympic Games. “We think that anti-US extremists among the Mexican students would undertake demonstrations against [Nixon] specifically, and that those would be likely to turn ugly,” Abbot Smith, Director of the Office of Natioinimalnal Estimates, wrote.1 Less than a week later, a student demonstration in Tlatelolco Square indeed turned ugly. On October 2, 1968, military snipers shot and killed between 30 and 300 student protestors. Police arrested thousands. This paper will examine a number of questions that arise from this incident: What involvement did top American government actors have in the events that transpired? What does it mean to be an “anti-US extremist?” And what can the American response to the Tlatelolco Square incident explain about the massacre and about the actions and motivations of the Mexican military on that day? Through a close analysis of 30 declassified U.S. government documents, it becomes clear that top American officials were alarmist and that they knowingly used inaccurate information to associate Mexican student protestors with international communist movements. Through this association, they vilified students and propagated the sentiments that led to the killings at Tlatelolco Square.

In the decades before the massacre, Mexican government actors became increasingly concerned with the growing Soviet Bloc and the “threat” of communism. In his book Rebel Mexico, historian Jaime Pensado explores how the Cold War influenced porrismo, or “student thuggery/provocation.”2 He contends that events in the 1950s, including the Cuban Revolution, escalated tensions between leftist student groups and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) government in Mexico, and that international communist and anti-communist movements are crucial explanatory variables of the massacre. In Plaza of Sacrifices, Elaine Carey also foregrounds the Cuban Revolution, noting the rise of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro as strong anti-capitalist male figures that inspired Mexican youth. Building off

of their analyses, this paper hopes to demonstrate that in the months before the massacre, the CIA knowingly promoted inaccurate information that fed into the hysteria that led to the Tlatelolco Massacre. The declassified U.S. documents make clear that American officials, unlike their Mexican counterparts, did not see Mexican students as communist puppets until the months before the massacre. In a CIA report from March 28, 1968 on “Security Conditions in Mexico City,” the author describes “anti-US elements in Mexico,” but he does not include students on the list. “These [elements] include the small Mexican Communist Party, the larger Populist Socialist Party, and various small extremist groups,” he writes.3 In a brief mention of student protestors, he hypothesizes that The Vietnam War “would probably be the principal focus” of their demonstrations.4 Unlike the alarmist rhetoric around Richard Nixon’s visit six months later, this report highly encourages Vice President Hubert Humphrey to travel to Mexico. Over the course of the summer of 1968, however, protests increased in frequency and volume, and American officials began unabashedly labeling students as communist threats to the United States. In a CIA weekly report from July 19, the author explains, “The Cuban consul in Veracruz has provided propaganda material and advised the students on the staging of the demonstration.”5 Now, American officials were making links that many Mexicans had made in the previous decade. This report, the first of the unclassified documents to mention a foreign influence on the students, marks the start of a new tone. In the mind of the government, the students had become entwined with the most hated ideology in America: communism. Within two weeks, memorandums to President Johnson started employing unfounded evidence to accuse the Soviet Union of directly funding student protestors in Mexico. Relying only on claims by Mexican police, American diplomats passed along messages that “Moscow may have ordered the militant tactics.”6 While the CIA officials acknowledge that Mexican officials—in the American opinion—often blamed foreign countries for their domestic issues, they dismiss this possibility. The alarmist intelligence officials were committed to the communist narrative. The CIA authors use the word “communism” as

“Classic” Communists: The Cold War in Tlatelolco SquareWritten by Hugh McGlade

a blanket descriptor that refers to specific behaviors and mentalities, and through language, they automatically brand student protestors with those traits. “The disorders that began in Mexico City on 26 July are a classic example of the Communists’ ability to divert a peaceful demonstration into a major riot,” the author writes in the opening sentence of a CIA weekly report from August 2, 1968.7 Who are “Communists?” And what is the “Communists’ ability?” By avoiding context and specificity, the author places the Mexican protestors in the same arena as other communist “enemies” to the United States—the Viet Cong, the Castro Brothers, the Czechoslovakian President Antonín Novotný . While undoubtedly dissimilar to communist guerilla fighters, the student protestors were perhaps not even communist. In her book Massacre in Mexico, Elena Poniatowska compiles testimonies and evidence that illuminate elements of democratization in the student movement of 1968. In October 1968, Professor M. Mayagoitia wrote:

“These political tricks, these trappings are what have disgusted young students who find every door closed to them and all the jobs set aside for politicians and the PRI, unless they ‘fall in line’ and ‘get on the bandwagon.’”8

Mayagoitia voices an opinion that many of the sources in the book articulate—the idea that the daily frustrations of unemployment, entrenched elitism, and political oppression inspired these young people—not, as the CIA believed, a firm communist, anti-American ideology. In the documents, the immediate response to the Tlatelolco Massacre reinforces the contention that the U.S. government wanted to see the students as subversive enemies of the state, and not as citizens worthy of protection. The CIA saw the Tlatelolco Massacre as a further example of the incompetency of the PRI and of the threat that students posed. In a memorandum to the President on October 4, an intelligence analyst projects about the effects of Tlatelolco, writing, “The ‘martyrs’ created during the past week will probably provide a new rallying point for university student.”9 By including the word “martyr,” the author implies that the dead students worked on behalf of a clear ideology that warranted martyrdom. By placing the word in quotation marks, he minimizes the worth of the life of the student. In other words, he removes any sense of respectability from the martyr while acknowledging the existence of a coherent communist movement. While the White House publicly condemned the events, this document confirms that the U.S. was passively complicit in the massacre by embracing the threat of communism, and creating a plausible justification for the Mexican military and police to violently suppress student protests. Six days after the massacre, the CIA provided concrete information to President Johnson that the massacred students were not armed or directly influenced

by foreign communist powers, yet the White House maintained its hardline concerns about communism in Mexico. “Although the Mexican press continually play the theme of foreign involvement, no conclusive evidence to the effect has been presented to date,” the report says.10 The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City called “direct involvement by foreigners…nearly negligible.”11 Throughout the Olympics, near daily reports appeared—mostly updates on the intense military response of the Mexican government to student uprisings. After the games finished, the reports become monthly, and a document from January 17, 1969, summarizes the student movement of 1968 as “internal political damage.”12 These documents do not prove a direct link between the American and Mexican governments. In fact, they do not even demonstrate an indirect link. But they do highlight the overwhelming power of the Cold War, the complicity of U.S. government actors in the false association of Mexican students with Soviet communists, and the ruthless self-interest of the U.S. government. I do not mean to overemphasize the role of America in the affairs of Mexico. Undoubtedly, there existed massive domestic political dynamics that led to the massacre, but it is important to also consider the international influences—caused in large part by the Olympics—that allowed the Mexican media and government to vilify the student protestors. I hope to have demonstrated the complicit nature of the Johnson Administration, and the adoption by the Mexican government of “communism” as a scapegoat. While the Cold War is easily understood as an international ideological battle between two superpowers, the conflict often manifested itself violently outside of American and Soviet borders. While Mexico did not experience a proxy war, it is important to recognize that people like the students that died in Tlatelolco Square, mislabeled “subversive enemies,” were victims of the ideological clashes of the Cold War.

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Why Did Tunisia’s Transition to Democracy Succeed? Written by Jacob Potts

In December of 2010, a call for change emerged in the Middle East when Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian vegetable cart owner, set himself ablaze in protest of bu-reaucratic hindrance of his business in the small Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid1. This event led to pro-democracy protests in Tunisia, which culminated in the toppling of Zine El Ben Ali, the Tunisian dictator who ruled for 24 years2. Other Arabs, seeing the success of the Tunisians, led pro-democracy protests that toppled Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya3. However, five years later, there has been limited progress in regards to democracy. Egypt’s democratically elected Islamic gov-ernment was overthrown by the military in 20134, who have returned to the authoritarian practices of ousted ruler Hosni Mubarak5. Libya quickly fell into a civil war between an Islamist extremist government and the Islam-ic democratically elected and internationally recognized government, a conflict exacerbated by regional and tribal tensions6. But among all of this, Tunisia has been the only country that has continued its movement towards a democratic future. To quote the Washington Post, “Tuni-sia is rightly hailed as the lone success story of the Arab Spring: the only country that has threaded a path from the uprisings of 2011 to genuine multiparty democracy today.”7 What has allowed Tunisia to make this unique venture towards democracy where so many others, like Libya and Egypt, have failed? And more importantly, can this help other nations achieve democracy?

After the revolution of 2011 in Tunisia, there were many actions that were taken by the transitional government, elected in the 2011 parliamentary elections, which proved to be essential for continuing on the road of democracy. First, the government quickly disbanded the secret police of Tunisia in early 20118. The secret po-lice of Ben Ali was the primary enforcer of his policies, particularly those against political dissidents and Isla-mists9. In Egypt, although the military was not entirely subordinated in the Mubarak regime, it was used as the means to enforce Mubarak’s policies, but not during the uprising10. According to Stephen Grand of the Brookings Institute, “a military’s ability to employ lethal force often gives it significant political influence at home”11. Thus, Tunisia’s choice to revolt independently of the military proved to be beneficial to maintaining democracy in the country. Unfortunately, entrusting the military in the

transition to democracy can prove to be a major mistake, as the military can be interested in providing stability to the country or advancing military power in government instead of fostering democracy12. This occurred in Egypt, where the military used their power to return Egypt to authoritarian rule13.

Second, in the post-revolution states of the Arab Spring, Islamist parties were quick to gain power. This is because of their longstanding opposition to the dictator-ships in each country and their commitment to Islam in a highly religious area14. But, what differentiated the Is-lamic party that gained power in Tunisia, Al-Nahda, from The Muslim Brotherhood was it’s strong pro-democratic philosophy and actions after it gained power Al-Nahda was created in the 1970s and had internal disputes over how radically they should act15. Rachid al-Ghannouchi was highly influential on Al-Nahda16. Ghannouchi helped found Al-Nahda17, and early on he felt that democratiza-tion and working within the law was an acceptable route for Al-Nahda to achieve their goal of a country following Sharia law18. However, other leaders of the party did not listen to his ideas19. After the 1989 election, Ghannouchi fled the country for Great Britain20. Once the Revolution of 2011 had concluded, al-Nadha was legalized and he returned to Tunisia21. Ghannochi’s influence could be felt in the party even before the Revolution, as the party followed his example of advocating for democracy. For example, since the 2000s al-Nahda’s leaders have met with a wide variety of opposition parties in order to dis-cuss democracy in Tunisia22.

Once Al-Nahda was elected into power, they worked to create a coalition with the two leading secular parties, Congress for the Republic and Etakol23. Fur-thermore, they were willing to compromise in order to maintain democratic consensus, made concessions, and they respected a free media and independent judiciary24. These are significant because it helped establish trust and confidence between Al-Nahda and secular groups. This is in stark contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who did not take steps to build trust with sec-ular groups and were thus treated more warily. Lastly, Al-Nahda placed an emphasis on involved the youth in their movements. The youth are incredibly important in the Middle East, as 65% of the population of the Middle East-North Africa region is under the age of 3025. While

Tunisia’s young is divided over their opinion on Al-Nah-da26, Al-Nahda attempted to incorporate youth into their movement. They allowed for the creation of an Al-Nah-da Youth Group27, which has its own unique platform28. Additionally, Al-Nahda has a youth bureau, which has committees on student affairs, leadership skills, cultural activities, political affairs, and media affairs29. Youth are additionally offered an exception to the requirement that Al-Nahda position holders must have five years experi-ence, because this is seen as helping to improve the lives of the youth30. This is important because it gives young Muslims a reason to join Al-Nahda, simply because their voices can be heard. Having the youth’s voice in Al-Nah-da also should the youth help influence Al-Nahda’s pol-icy positions. Generally speaking, the youth in Tunisia wanted to remove all elements of Ben Ali’s authoritarian government31. Therefore, their influence, while not nec-essarily calling for democratic tactics, may help Al-Nah-da from resorting to authoritarian tactics when a crisis emerges by changing the overall mindset of the party.

Contrarily, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt were much different in both ideology and action. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 and their goal was to cultivate pious Muslims32. However, over time there was a split in the organization in regards to violent jihadist action33. In the Brotherhood, there was the da’wa faction, the pragmatic conservatives, and the reformists. The da’wa faction is ideological conservative, with much of its support coming from control over bureaucratic operations and allocation of resources34. The pragmatic conservatives—who are the established faction of the Brotherhood—still have a conservative outlook, but place an emphasis on engagement and participation35. Lastly, there are the reformists, many of whom left to join a more moderate faction, Hizb al-Wasat. Those reformists who did not leave the Brotherhood advocated for an emphasis on party pluralism and women’s rights in the Brotherhood’s platform. The reformists, especially the youth, in the Brotherhood were most involved in the Revolution in Egypt36.

However, once the Muslim Brotherhood was elected in Egypt, there were great problems. In Novem-ber of 2012, Morsi claimed that he was above judicial review in order to avoid changes to the Islamists con-stitutional council, and he later pushed for state control over registration and funding of civil society groups37. This culminated in a petition by the Tamarod movement demanding Morsi’s resignation that collected millions of signatures38. The military demanded that Morsi stepped down in the next 48 hours, and once he refused, the military suspended the constitution, took control of the government, and announced early presidential elec-tions39. This varies greatly from Al-Nahda in two sig-nificant ways. The Brotherhood was very divided in its beliefs, but it was the conservatives who held the most power in the party40 While reformists who were involved in the Egyptian Revolution preached democratic reforms,

most of the party did not have the same beliefs, which may have led to misconceptions about the Brotherhood among members of the public. Al-Nahda, on the other hand, became intellectually invested in democracy once Ghannouchi became the intellectual leader of the party, simply because of Ghannouchi’s ideology. Additionally, they did not allow radical Islamist conservative members to remain influential in their party, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, whose conservative members control many important positions. Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood did not sufficiently reach out to the youth of Egypt. Researcher Nur Laiq interviewed many youths in Egypt, and she found that many young people in Egypt are discontent with the Muslim Brotherhood, who they see as solely interested in power and has become the new es-tablishment to fight against41. While some famous youth organizers were offered positions in the Morsi govern-ment, they refused, citing that they wanted to be outside the establishment42. Generally speaking, the youth’s voice was not considered in Muslim Brotherhood, simply because of the large generational gap and the hierarchi-cal structure of the organization43. This greatly hurt the Brotherhood because it not only fractured support for them, but it will cause ideas advocated for the young such as youth employment to go by the wayside.

Lastly, Tunisian politicians, in the face of crisis, decided to compromise and act in a peaceful manner in order to settle disputes. This occurred in 2013, after the attack on the Embassy in Tunis and two assassinations of major opponents of Al-Nahda by Jihadists44. Many Tunisians were concerned that Al-Nahda may have been supportive of the jihadists, which led to strikes and caused democratic transition to go to a standstill45. Nidaa Tunis, the other major opposition party, attempted to take advantage of the situation by calling for the resignation of the government and the dissolution of the Transitional Constituent Assembly (the organization that was writing the constitution)46. This caused a standoff between Nidaa and Al-Nahda, but The Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), an old and powerful union organization, along with the Employer’s Association, offered to mediate the dispute47. After negotiations, the two sides agreed that Al-Nahda would leave the government within three weeks, and the assembly would complete the constitution and prepare for the 2014 elections48.

This is significant for several reasons. First, it was several organizations working together that had been at odds with each other for some time. Al-Nahda and UGTT had disagreed severely in the past, with UGTT calling a general strike after the first assassination of an al-Nahda opposition leader49. Additionally the UGTT and the Employer’s Association had been at odds over ideological differences as well50. Their commitment to compromise is something a democracy must have, even if you are at great odds with your opponent. Additionally, Al-Nahda agreed to leave government, which is incredi-bly noteworthy, because it proved that al-Nahda truly has

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an interest in fostering democracy.51 This is significantly different than Egypt’s experiences. Instead of compro-mise, people who were upset with Morsi’s rule asked the military to intervene, which proved to be a serious blunder and caused Egypt’s democratic experiment to collapse52. Tunisia’s success with democracy has been a truly unique experience. Tunisia’s actions after the revo-lution, such as mediating disputes, dissolving the secret police, and a democratic Islamic party allowed Tunisia to continue its course towards democracy. Can these states learn from Tunisia and succeed in democracy? I do not believe it is possible. The Tunisian move to democracy was a process that took hundreds of years, and was the result of many elements working in tandem. While Egypt and Libya had some of the same factors that helped Tunisia head towards democracy, they were unable to have this culminate into democracy because of key missing factors. Egypt had little to no democratic educa-tion and no major attempts of secularization, and Libya had a long history of instability, almost no democratic experience, limited political participation and no civil

society whatsoever. A factor such as educating citizens towards democracy is a process that requires multiple generations to undergo the process of learning of how to politically participate. Even if the people of these countries advocated for these changes, they would most likely not happen because of constraints in the country. In Egypt, this would be highly unlikely, as the authori-tarian Sisi government would fear that making reforms such as a democratic education and greater freedom for civil society might undermine the power of the military government. But this does not mean that lessons cannot be learned from Tunisia. For example, the actions of Al-Nahda prove that popular Islamic movements should not be brushed off as insincere about their pro-democrat-ic claims. Instead, these movements must be carefully scrutinized and analyzed in order to determine their in-tentions. Therefore, it should be recognized that Tunisia’s path towards democracy was unique in nature, and while lessons can be learned from the Tunisian experience, it is in no way a model for democratization in the Arab World.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Argument for United States RatificationWritten by Jessica Margolis

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) calls for the prohibition of nuclear explosions anywhere on earth and prevents treaty members from conducting nuclear tests. The treaty was created and signed by the United States in 1996, however, the Senate has never ratified it and its rat-ification has become controversial in the realm of nuclear warfare. While there are a variety of justifications in favor of ratifying the CTBT, this paper will focus mainly on the political benefits. Ratification upholds modern U.S. testing practices by continuing the twenty-three year moratorium that the county currently observes, and supports American interests internationally. The United States should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as it aligns with current U.S. nuclear testing policies and would further U.S. nonproliferation interests abroad, without decreasing the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Current United States Testing Policies

Ratifying the CTBT coincides with the nuclear testing moratorium that was established in the United States in 1992. The initial Exon-Hartfield-Mitchell mora-torium was temporary and spurred by the announcement of a similar halt on testing in Russia, but it was formally extended by President Clinton in 1993 and has been in practice ever since.1 Testing was expensive, logistically difficult, and Clinton wanted to lead the movement for an international testing ban. Additionally, between the first United States test in 1945, and the last in 1992, the U.S. conducted 1,030 tests: more than any other nuclear-capa-ble state in the world.2 The U.S. has the most sophisticat-ed nuclear arsenal in the world and the most experience testing it, meaning that the U.S. military has sufficient knowledge of its capabilities and that additional testing remains unnecessary.

Resuming U.S. testing would spur an interna-tional security dilemma, creating an upward spiral of tension between the U.S. and adversaries.3 Additionally, the resumption of testing “could lead to a worldwide push for testing and new weapons,” by countries such as Russia and China, who already feel threatened by the current strength of the U. S. military4. These countries would likely interpret new testing as a threat to their own

security and the international status quo, creating an in-centive for both countries to recommence their own tests and research.

North Korea would also interpret the resump-tion of U.S. testing as a major threat and may see it has a reason to partake in unpredictable nuclear behavior. Since the moratorium was established, North Korea became a nuclear capable state in 2006 and has contin-ued to develop its arsenal, as relations with the U.S. have worsened. North Korean leadership is irrational and as we have seen in the last year with new testing, provoking additional development has been destructive to interna-tional interests and security. Continuing the moratorium is in the best interests of the U.S. as diverging from it will increase tensions with foreign adversaries, foster the security dilemma and threaten national security. Additionally, the sustainability and functional-ity of the United States nuclear arsenal is ensured by a number of initiatives, and does not require supplemental testing. The most notable of these programs is the Stock-pile Stewardship Program (SSP), which displays that, “the United States has the technical capabilities to main-tain confidence in the safety and reliability of its existing nuclear-weapons stockpile under the CTBT,” without further testing.5 This program aims to confirm the reli-ability and safety of the existing nuclear arsenal through analyzing test data, running computer modules and conducting experiments. The SSP also works in tandem with the Lifetime Extension Program to inspect weap-ons, and refurbish or replace failing parts. Together these programs have yielded a significant amount of research about the functions and lifespan of nuclear weapons that was not previously discovered through nuclear testing. The SSP has proven effective over the past twenty-three years and continues to serve the military, proving that the U.S. does not need nuclear tests to ensure the reliability of its arsenal and that current U.S. practices can comply with the CTBT.

U.S. Nonproliferation Interests Abroad

United States ratification of the CTBT will encourage other countries to ratify the treaty, prevent-ing them from advancing their nuclear arsenals and

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strengthening the treaty regime. The CTBT requires that 44 specified countries sign and ratify the treaty before it enters into force.6 There are eight countries in this annex that have yet to ratify the treaty, and the United States is one of them. The other seven countries are China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan.7 Because many of these countries challenge American interests and diplomacy, it would be beneficial to curtail their development of more advanced weapons by convincing them to ratify the CTBT. Without the ability to conduct additional nuclear tests, U.S. adversaries will be unable to collect the research necessary to create a more ad-vanced arsenal. Iran, for example, “could not confidently build warheads for delivery by ballistic missile” without conducting additional tests.8 By ratifying the U.S. also makes a formal commitment not to test and complies to inspections, which solves the commitment and infor-mation problems present in its vague moratorium. Less tangibly, ratification of the CTBT is also a gesture that implies an American desire to de-escalate nuclear ten-sions and decrease the security dilemma. The remaining seven countries will perceive these actions as a decrease in the potential for American nuclear hostilities and be more inclined to bind themselves to the CTBT. The U.S. should do everything in its power to prevent other states from gaining additional nuclear information that could be used to build stronger arsenals. By ratifying the CTBT, the U.S. can show its commitment not to test, and encourage other states to ratify the treaty, avoiding future challenges to United States superiority.

Additionally, the CTBT calls for a complex verification regime, which would increase U.S. ability to monitor other countries’ nuclear activity and compli-ance to the treaty. The International Monitoring System (IMS) will eventually include 337 global facilities, which will actively document all regional nuclear activity to reveal compliance with the CTBT.9 The IMS calls for the installation of 31 stations in Russia, 11 in China and 17 in the Middle East, giving the U.S. unprecedented access to data about antagonistic states.10 However, the Inter-national Data Centre of the CTBT only transmits data to member states, making ratification of the treaty nec-essary for access to the information. If data trends from other states appear suspicious, the regime allows mem-bers to request an investigation of state activity or an on-site inspection at the location of interest.11 However, the treaty must enter into force for either of these clauses to be invoked, which demonstrates the importance of U.S. ratification and encouragement of worldwide ratification. This is especially pertinent because the system is able to detect, “nuclear explosions with yields well below one kiloton,” meaning that the U.S. could track even the most clandestine tests.12 This advanced monitoring will deter

all countries from attempting to develop new nuclear weapons, as they cannot test them without alerting the international community. Lastly, the program will sig-nificantly enhance the detail and strength of U.S. intelli-gence to better inform military policies. Ratification of the CTBT and access to the verification regime would dramatically increase the United States’ ability to moni-tor aggressors and investigate their nuclear activities.

Enduring Reliability of the U.S. Arsenal

There are two primary concerns popular with those who oppose CTBT ratification. First, critics fear that ratification will decrease the strength of the US nuclear deterrent. They argue that testing can “boost the credibility of U.S. efforts to deter or defeat the use of WMD by others, thereby promoting U.S. security”.13 This argument asserts that the U.S. deterrent threat is dependent on its nuclear superiority, which can only be demonstrated through the testing of weapons. However, the United States’ ability to deter is dependent upon the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, not the vastness of its superiority. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) hypothesizes that if two nuclear states with second-strike capabilities launch a nuclear attack on one another, both will be equally destroyed because they are mutually vulnerable.14 MAD will not be undermined as long as the U.S. retains its second-strike capabilities and abili-ty to thoroughly annihilate an opponent, which can be ensured by the SSP. An inability to perform tests will not decrease the American deterrent because the reality of MAD and the U.S. second strike overshadow the effects of nuclear grandstanding. The second common concern against ratification is that the United States military may need the capacity to test new types of nuclear weapons in the future. Sup-porters of this argument imagine a time in which we may have a use for nuclear weapons that we do not currently possess, which is a minute possibility. It is unlikely that the U.S. would face a situation in which it could not suf-ficiently use a weapon from the vast array in the current arsenal. As National Defense Specialist Jonathan Meda-lia states, the U.S. “current weapons suffice for almost any conceivable military mission”.15 Many experts agree that the U.S. has such a varied amount of nuclear weap-ons at its disposal, that it will be unnecessary to develop new ones. Additionally, the country can still develop innovative conventional weapons or delivery systems to address any pressing military concerns. Lastly, if the U.S. did find a drastic need to test a new weapon, the President could withdraw from the CTBT under the “supreme national interest clause” in order to conduct a test.16 However, the need would be small considering the

United States aims only to use nuclear weapons as a last resort.

Conclusion

United States ratification of the CTBT would turn the decades old moratorium on testing into a binding commitment, decreasing international tensions between aggressor states, and encouraging CTBT ratification and compliance throughout the world. Ratification by additional states will allow the U.S. to closely monitor the nuclear activity of other countries, and prevent the acquisition of knowledge from new tests. Additionally, resumption of U.S. nuclear testing would have dramatic international political consequences, making the ratifi-cation of the CTBT a low-cost and high-reward move.

Lastly, ratification will not decrease the American nucle-ar deterrent and will not pose a significant strategic chal-lenge, as the U.S. does not need to test nuclear weapons to ensure the functionality and sustainability of its arse-nal. Furthermore, it is a stressful time for nuclear policy, as international regimes struggle with the implementa-tion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in Iran and an increasingly belligerent North Korea. It is now more important than ever that the U.S. stays committed to all international nuclear commitments, and leads the way in enforcing additional surveillance. Ratifying the CTBT is a strategic way to promote cooperation in the nuclear realm, while advancing U.S international inter-ests and maintaining the American arsenal as a symbol of international deterrence and non-proliferation.

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BibliographiesAndrew Shifren References

1. Takahara, Akio. “Détente for China and Japan.” The New York Times. December 09, 2014. Accessed December 16, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/detente-for-china-and-japan.html.2. “Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Novem-ber 7, 2014. Accessed December 16, 2014. http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000150.html.3. Ravina, Mark. “Founding of the Tokugawa Regime.” Accessed December 16, 2014. http://www.history.emory.edu/RAVINA/EastAsianCiv/Pages/Founding%20of%20Tokugawa%20371.html

Daniela Mintz References

1. CFR Editorial Staff. “Targets for Terrorism: Ports.” Council on Foreign Relations. January 01, 2006. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-security/targets-terrorism-ports/p10215.2. Allison, Graham T., Ashton B. Carter, Joseph Cirincione, et al. Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism. Report. October 19, 2007. Accessed April 20, 2015. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Reducing%20Nuclear%20Threats-FINAL.pdf.3. Abt, Clark C. Abt Associates Inc. The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability. Report. April 30, 2003. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/es-economic_impact_of_nuclear_terrorist_attacks.pdf.4. Medalia, Jonathan. Federation of American Scientists. Report. January 24, 2005. Accessed April 19, 2015. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf.5. Donohue, Nathan. “Inherent Insecurity at U.S. Ports.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 07, 2012. Accessed April 22, 2015. http://csis.org/blog/inherent-insecurity.6. Ibid.7. Abt, Clark C. Abt Associates Inc. The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability. Report. April 30, 2003. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/es-economic_impact_of_nuclear_terrorist_attacks.pdf.8. “Maritime Security.” American Association of Port Authorities. March 2015. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/PolicyPositions/Maritime%20Security.pdf.9. “FY 2015 Port Security Grant Program.” FEMA. April 04, 2015. Accessed April 22, 2015. https://www.fema.gov/fy-2015-port-security-grant-program.10. “Maritime Security.” American Association of Port Authorities. March 2015. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/PolicyPositions/Maritime%20Security.pdf.11. Meade, Charles, and Roger C. Molander. Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack. Report. 2006. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf.12. Flynn, Stephen E. “Port Security Is Still a House of Cards.” Council on Foreign Relations. January 30, 2006. Accessed April 19, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-security/port-security-still-house-cards/p9629.13. Allison, Graham T. “How Likely Is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the U.S.?” Council on Foreign Relations. April 18, 2007. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-at-tack-united-states/p13097.14. Menesick, Stephen. “Preventing the Unthinkable: An Overview of Threats, Risks, and US Policy Response to Nuclear Terrorism.” Global Security Studies 2, no. 3 (Summer 2011). Accessed April 18, 2015. http://globalsecurity-studies.com/Menesick%20Nuclear%20Final.pdf.15. Donohue, Nathan. “Inherent Insecurity at U.S. Ports.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 07, 2012. Accessed April 22, 2015. http://csis.org/blog/inherent-insecurity.

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Hugh McGlade References

1. Document 16. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968.” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 10. Washington: The George Washington University. Accessed De-cember 13, 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB10/intro.htm.2. Jaime Pensado, Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long 60s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 2.3. Document 1. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents.”4. Ibid. 5. Document 2. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents.”6. Ibid.7. Document 4. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents.”8. Elena Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico (New York: The Viking Press, 1975), 12. 9. Document 18. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents.”10. Document 20. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents.”11. Document 22. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents.”12. Document 29. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents.”

Hugh McGlade Additional References

1. Carey, Elaine. Plaza of Sacrifices: Gender, Power, and Terror in 1968 Mexico. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2005.2. Castillo Troncoso, Alberto del. La fotografía y la construcción de un imaginario: Ensayo sobre el movimiento estudantil de 1968. Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Mora, 2012. 3. Doyle, Kate. “Tlatelolco Massacre: Declassified U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968.” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 10. Washington: The George Washington University. Accessed De-cember 13, 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB10/intro.htm.4. Gómez, Pablo. 1968: la historia también está hecha de derrotas. Mexico, D.F.: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 20085. Lorey, David E. The University System and Economic Development in Mexico Since 1919. Stanford: Stanford Universiy Press, 1993. 6. Pensado, Jaime M. Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long 60s. Stan-ford: Stanford University Press, 2013. 7. Poniatowska, Elena, trans. Helen R. Lane. Massacre in Mexico. New York: The Viking Press, 1975.

Jacob Potts References1. Abouzeid, Rania. “Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire.” Time. Time Inc., 21 Jan. 2011. Web. 14 Nov. 2015.2. Wickham, Carrie R. “Introduction to Deep Democracy in the Arab World.” Emory University, Decatur. 3 Sept. 2015. Lecture.3. Wickham, Carrie R. “Introduction to Deep Democracy in the Arab World.” Emory University, Decatur. 3 Sept. 2015. Lecture.4. Kingsley, Patrick, and Martin Chulov. “Mohamed Morsi Ousted in Egypt’s Second Revolution in Two Years.” The Guardian. N.p., 4 July 2013. Web.5. Soueif, Ahdaf. “In Egypt, an Authoritarian Regime Holds Sway Again.” The Guardian. N.p., 18 Oct. 2014. Web.6. Stephen, Chris. “War in Libya - the Guardian Briefing.” The Guardian. N.p., 29 Aug. 2014. Web.7. Serchuk, Vance. “Give Democratic Tunisia the U.S. Support It Needs and Deserves.” Washington Post. The Wash-ington Post, 2 Jan. 2015. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 8. “Tunisia Interim Leaders Dissolve Secret Police Agency.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 9. Ibid. 10. Black, Ian. “All Eyes on Egypt’s Military as Hosni Mubarak Fortifies Position.” The Guardian. N.p., 30 Jan. 2011. Web. 11. Grand, Stephen R. Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us about the Prospects for Arab Democracy. Print. 197.

12. Ibid. 186. 13. Wickham, Carrie R. “Introduction to Deep Democracy in the Arab World.” Emory University, Decatur. 3 Sept. 2015. Lecture. 14. Grand, Stephen R. Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us about the Prospects for Arab Democracy. 194. 15. Murphy, Emma. Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali. New York, NY: St. Mar-tin’s in Association with U of Durham, 1999. 72 16. “Profile: Tunisia’s Ennahda Party - BBC News.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 17. Ibid. 18. Murphy, Emma. Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali. New York, NY: St. Mar-tin’s in Association with U of Durham, 1999. 72 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 194. 21. “Factbox: Who Is Tunisia’s Islamist Leader Rachid Ghannouchi?” Rueters. N.p., 30 Jan. 2011. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 22. Lynch, Marc. “Tunisia’s New Al-Nahda.” Foreign Policy. N.p., 28 Apr. 2011. Web. 05 Dec. 2015. 23. Serchuk, Vance. “Give Democratic Tunisia the U.S. Support It Needs and Deserves.” Washington Post. The Wash-ington Post, 2 Jan. 2015. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 24. Ibid. 25. Wickham, Carrie R. “The Youth of the Arab World.” Emory University, Decatur. 1 Dec. 2015. Lecture. 26. Laiq, Nur. “Talking and Listening to Youth.” PsycEXTRA Dataset (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 30. 27. Ibid. 32. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 47. 30. Ibid. 31. Wickham, Carrie R. “The Youth of the Arab World.” Emory University, Decatur. 1 Dec. 2015. Lecture. 32. Wickham, Carrie. “The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak.” Foreign Affairs. N.p., 14 June 2011. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 33. Ibid. 34. Wickham, Carrie. “The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak.” Foreign Affairs. N.p., 14 June 2011. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Wickham, Carrie. “The Muslim Brotherhood After Morsi.” Foreign Affairs. N.p., 02 July 2015. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid.. 41. Laiq, Nur. “Talking and Listening to Youth.” PsycEXTRA Dataset (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 9 42. Ibid. 14 43. Ibid. 41. 44. Marks, Monica. “What Did Tunisia’s Nobel Laureates Actually Achieve?” Washington Post. The Washington Post, 27 Oct. 2015. Web. 14 Nov. 2015. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Grand, Stephen R. Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us about the Prospects for Arab Democracy. Print. 186.

Jessica Margolis References

1. “Why Ratify the CTBT?” U.S. Department of State. October 8, 1999. Accessed April 20, 2015. http://fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/news/fs_991008_whyctbt.htm2. Collina, Tom Z. and Daryl G. Kimball. “No Going Back: 20 Years Since the Last U.S. Nuclear Test.” Arms Con-trol Association. September 20, 2012. Accessed April 20, 2015.3. Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cor-nell University Press, 1989.4. Medalia, Jonathan. “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con.” Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. June 28, 2005. Accessed April 19,2015.5. Ibid.6. Taheran, Shervin. “U.S. Official Reaffirm Support for CTBT.” Arms Control Association. October 1, 2015. Ac-cessed April 19, 2015. 7. Ibid.8. O’Leary, Hazel R. and Daryl G. Kimball. “Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” Los Angeles Times. September 14, 2011. Accessed April 18, 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/14/opinion/la-oe-oleary-nuke-ban-201109149. Pifer, Steven. “New Support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” Brookings Institute Press. March 30, 2012. Accessed April 18, 2015. 10. “Why Ratify the CTBT?” U.S. Department of State. October 8, 1999. Accessed April 20, 2015. http://fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/news/fs_991008_whyctbt.htm11. “Overview of the Verification Regime.” CTBTO Preparatory Commission. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/background/overview-of-the-verification-regime/12. Pifer, Steven. “New Support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” Brookings Institute Press. March 30, 2012. Accessed April 18, 2015. 13. Medalia, Jonathan. “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con.” Congressional Research Service, The Li-brary of Congress. June 28, 2005. Accessed April 19,2015.14. Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cor-nell University Press, 1989.15. Medalia, Jonathan. “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con.” Congressional Research Service, The Li-brary of Congress. June 28, 2005. Accessed April 19,2015.16. “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Safeguards.” The White House. September 22, 1997. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbtsafeguards.htm

Jessica Margolis Additional References

1. Collina, Tom Z. and Daryl G. Kimball. “Now More than Ever, The Case for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Briefing Book.” Arms Control Association. February 2010. Accessed April 19, 2015. http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/ACA_CTB_Briefing_Book.pdf2. Johnson, Rebecca. “Unfinished Business: The Negotiation of the CTBT and the End of Nuclear Testing.” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. New York and Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2009. 3. Kalionzes, Theo. “Why a new anti-nuclear movement should push for an old idea: a comprehensive test ban.” Bul-letin of the Atomic Scientists. October 6 2014. Accessed April 20 2015. http://thebulletin.org/why-new-anti-nuclear-movement-should-push-old-idea-comprehensive-test-ban76904. “North Korea’s Nuclear Tests.” BBC News. February 12, 2013. Accessed April 22, 20

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