Citation: 36 Rutgers L.J. 165 2004-2005 Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)Wed Apr 30 13:31:28 2014-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do? &operation=go&searchType=0 &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0277-318XTHE ENDOF EMPIRE:DWORKIN ANDJURISPRUDENCEIN THE 21 st CENTURYBrian Leiter*Onthehappyoccasionof theestablishmentof theRutgersInstituteforLawandPhilosophy-happynot onlyfor thefacultyandstudentsof RutgersUniversity,butalsoforthefieldof jurisprudencemoregenerally-itseemsappropriatetotakestockof thefieldoflawandphilosophyoverthepastquarter-century,toseewherethefieldhasbeen,whereitisgoing,andwhatitisnow time toleavebehind.Onthelatterscore,I shallfocus,inparticular,onthewell-knownanddistinctivejurisprudentialcontributionsofRonaldDworkin,especiallyascrystallizedinhis1986bookLaw's Empire,whicharenow,I fear,a prime candidateforviews thefieldhasoutgrown.Thismayseemasurprisingsuggestiontomanyoutsidethefieldof legalphilosophy,but,asIshallsuggest,itisincreasinglythesottovoce-andsometimesmanifest--consensuswithin.TheNewYorkUniversitySchoolofLawwebpagedescribesRonaldDworkinas"probablythemostinfluentialfigureincontemporaryAnglo-Americanlegaltheory"'andsays"Dworkinisprobablyoneof thetwoorthreecontemporaryauthorswhomlegalscholarswillbereading200yearsfromnow.",2 Bothstatementsare,I shallsuggest,ratherhyperbolic,atleastwithrespecttoDworkinthelegalphilosopher(Ioffernoassessmentof theimportanceorlong-termimpactofhiswritingsonequality3).Notwithstandingthemajesticsweepandambitionofhisjurisprudentialcorpus,myconclusion-whichI'vecometoonlygraduallyoverthelast*JosephD.JamailCentennialChair inLaw,Professor of Philosophy,andDirectoroftheLaw&PhilosophyProgram,UniversityofTexasatAustin;VisitingProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityCollegeLondon.ThisisaslightlyrevisedversionofanaddresspresentedonMay24,2004on theoccasionof theinauguraldinnerto celebratethecreationoftheInstituteforLawandPhilosophyatRutgersUniversity.IamgratefultoLesGreenforhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft,toDennisPattersonfortheinvitationtodeliverthelecture,toMatthewKramerandMarkMurphyforsomecorrections,andtomembersof theaudienceattheRutgersdinnerforlaughingattherightpointsandfortheirconsensusviewthat this was"ninetypercentright."i.NewYorkUniversitySchoolofLaw,Faculty Biography - ProfessorRonaldDworkin,athttp://www.law.nyu.edu/faculty/profiles/bios/dworkinrbio.html(lastvisitedNov.30,2004)(quoting READINGDWORKIN CRITICALLY(AlanHunted.,1992)).2.Id.3.See,e.g.,RONALDDWORKIN,SOVEREIGNVIRTUE(2000).R UTGERS LAW JOURNALdecadeofreading,writing,talkingandteachingaboutproblemsinlegalphilosophy-isthatinlegalphilosophy,Dworkinnowdeservestogothewayof Skinnerin psychology,that is,the wayof a figurewhosework,atonetime,wasastimulustonewresearch,butwho,intheend,led-or,inDworkin'scase,tried tolead-hisfielddownadeeplywrong-headedpath.TheonlygoodnewsinthestoryaboutDworkin'simpactonlawandphilosophyisthat mostof thefielddeclinedtofollow theDworkinianpath-something,interestingly,that thosenot workinginlegalphilosophygenerallydonotknow.GiventhelimitedamountoftimeIhavetoday-nottomentiontheamountof alcoholmyaudiencehas alreadyconsumed-I'mgoing to supportthispolemicalthesiswith justtwokindsof considerations.First,inmostoftheareasthat havemadelawandphilosophyanintellectuallyvibrantareainrecentdecades,Dworkin'sworkhasbeenlargelyirrelevant.Thisiscertainlynoobjectiontohiscontributions,justthehyperbolethatsurroundsthem.Second,intheareaswhereDworkinhashadanimpact-namelythedevelopmentof hisown theoryof lawandadjudication-hisviewsare,I amafraid,implausible,badlyarguedfor,andlargelywithoutphilosophicalmerit. Thefirstpointshallbeeasierto establishthiseveningthan thesecond,needless to say.I take themupinturn.Letusbeginwithashort-andnot,I think,especiallycontentious-listof themajordevelopmentsinthefieldof lawandphilosophyoverthepastgeneration:First,thereisthedevelopmentwell-representedbythisinauguralconference,namelytheexpansionofcriminallawtheorybeyondthetraditionalquestionsaboutthe justificationof punishmentand the"limits"ofthecriminallaw(thatis,whatbehaviorisproperlycriminalized?)toanintensefocusontheconceptuallogicandmoralunderpinningsofcriminallawdoctrines: thenatureofintentionsandacts,thedistinctionbetweenjustificationandexcuse,thelogicof theparticularexcuses(duress,insanity,andsoon),aswellasthenatureof attempts,omissions,andspecificcrimeslike rape.Intheworkof theoristssuchasLarryAlexander, MitchellBerman,GeorgeFletcher,JohnGardner,KentGreenawalt,MichaelMoore,StephenMorse,andPaulRobinsonthesubstanceof thecriminallawitselfhasbeensubjectedto unparalleledtheoreticalandphilosophicalprobing.4 Atthesame4.See,e.g.,LarryAlexander, InsufficientConcern: AUnified Conception of CriminalCulpability,88CAL.L. REv.931(2000);LarryAlexander,Inculpatory and ExculpatoryMistakesand theFact/Law Distinction, 12LAW&PHIL.33(1993);LarryAlexander,Self-Defense,Justification, andExcuse,22PHIL.&PuB.ArF.53(1993);LarryAlexander,[Vol.36:165INSTITUTE FOR LA WAND PHILOSOPHYtime,eventheolderquestionsaboutpunishmentandthemorallimitsof thecriminallawhavereceivedimportantnew treatmentsbymanyof thesesameauthors-aswellasby,mostimportantly,JoelFeinberg,butalsobyJohnDeigh,DavidDolinko,AntonyDuff, JeanHampton,DouglasHusak,NicolaLacey,AndrewvonHirsch,andmanyothers.5Second,thegrowthof seriousphilosophicalworkontheconceptualandmoralfoundationsofprivatelawoverthepasttwodecadeshasbeenextraordinary,andhasperhapsbeenmostresponsible,alongwithcriminallawtheory,forbringingphilosophyintothecoreofthelawschoolcurriculum.Weseethisdevelopmentintheworkofphilosophersandphilosophically-mindedlegalscholarslikeJulesColeman,RichardCraswell,CharlesFried,HeidiHurd,StephenMunzer,StephenPerry,ArthurRipstein,T.M.Scanlon,JaneStapleton,JeremyWaldron,RichardWright,andBenjaminZipursky,tonameonlyafewof themostprominentcontributorsto thisliterature.6Reconsidering theRelationship AmongVoluntary Acts,StrictLiability, and NegligenceinCriminalLaw,7SoC.PHIL.& POL'Y84(1990);MitchellN.Berman,Justification and Excuse,Lawand Morality, 53DUKEL.J.1 (2003);MitchellN.Berman,TheEvidentiary TheoryofBlackmail:TakingMotivesSeriously, 65U.CHI.L.REV.795(1998);GEORGEFLETCHER,RETHINKINGCRIMINALLAW(1978);JohnGardner& StephenShute,TheWrongness of Rape,inOXFORDESSAYSINJURISPRUDENCE,FOURTHSERIES(JeremyHordered.,2000);JohnGardner,TheGistof Excuses,I BUFF.CRIM.L.REV.575(1997);KentGreenawalt,ThePerplexing Borders ofJustification and Excuse, 84COLUM.L.REv.1897(1984);MICHAELS.MOORE,PLACINGBLAME:A THEORYOFCRIMINALLAW(1997);MICHAELS.MOORE,ACTANDCRIME(1993);StephenJ.Morse,Culpability and Control, 142U.PA.L.REv.1587(1994);StephenJ. Morse,Excusing the Crazy:The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58S.CAL.L. REV.777 (1985);PAUL H.ROBINSON,STRUCTUREANDFUNCTIONIN CRIMINALLAW(1997).5.See,e.g.,JOELFEINBERG,THEMORALLIMITSOFTHECRIMINALLAW,4vols.(1984-1988);JohnDeigh,On theRight tobePunished: SomeDoubts, 94ETHICS191(1984);DavidDolinko,Three Mistakes about Retributivism, 39UCLA L.REV.1623(1992);DavidDolinko,SomeThoughtsaboutRetributivism,101ETHICS537(1991);R.A.DUFF,TRIALSANDPUNISHMENTS(1986);JeanHampton,The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13PHIL.&PUB.AFF.208(1984);Douglas N.Husak,WhyPunish the Deserving?, 26NOUS447(1992);NICOLALACEY,STATEPUNISHMENT:POLITICALPRINCIPALSANDCOMMUNITYVALUES(1988);NicolaLacey,Penal Theory and Penal Practice:ACommunitarianApproach, in THEUSEOFPUNISHMENT(S.McConvilleed.,2003);ANDREWVONHIRSCH,CENSUREANDSANCTIONS(1993).6.See,e.g.,JULESL. COLEMAN,RISKANDWRONGS(1992);RichardCraswell,ContractLaw, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,88MICH.L.REv.395(1989);CHARLESFRIED,CONTRACTASPROMISE(1981);HeidiHurd,Nonreciprocal RiskImposition,UnjustEnrichment, and the Foundationsof Tort Law,78NOTREDAMEL.REV.711(2003);STEPHENR.MUNZER,ATHEORYOFPROPERTY(1990);StephenR.Perry,Responsibility for Outcomes2004)RUTGERS LAWJOURNALThird,thefundamental,butmostabstract,philosophicalquestionsaboutlaw-thekindsofquestionsatthecoreof theworkof HansKelsenandH.L.A.Hart,thetwodominantfiguresintwentieth-centurylegalphilosophy-havebenefitedfromthesystematicanalysisandrefinementofcentralconceptsthatwerepreviouslyunder-theorized,conceptslike"authority,""reasons,""rules,"and"conventions." Inthehandsof theoristssuchasJohnGardner,LeslieGreen,GeraldPostema,JosephRaz,FrederickSchauer,andScottShapiro,theseconceptshavetakencenterstageinjurisprudentialdebatein recent decades.Fourth,overthelastquarter-century,wehaveseenarevivalofphilosophicallysubstantialversionsof naturallawtheory,versionsthatcanstandapartfromthetheologicalpremisesthathaverenderedmuchofthehistoricaltraditionirrelevantinthepost-Enlightenmentworld.Inthework ofnaturallawtheoristslikeDavidBrink,JohnFinnis,MichaelMoore,andMarkMurphy,importantaspectsof thetraditionof Aquinasfindaplaceatthe jurisprudentialtable.8and the Lawof Torts, inPHILOSOPHYAND TORTLAW(GeraldPostema ed.,2001);StephenR.Perry,TheMoral Foundations of Tort Law,77IOWAL.REV.494(1992);ARTHURRIPSTEIN,EQUALITY,RESPONSIBILITY,ANDTHELAW(1999);T.M.Scanlon,Promises and Contracts, inTHETHEORYOFCONTRACTLAW(PeterBenstoned.,2001);JaneStapleton,LegalCause:Cause-in-Factand theScopeof LiabilityforConsequences, 54VAND.L.REv.941(2001);JaneStapleton,Law,Causation,and Common Sense,8OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.111(1988);JEREMYWALDRON,THERIGHTTOPRIVATEPROPERTY(1988);RichardWright,Causation inTort Law, 73CAL.L.REV.1735(1985);BenjaminZipursky,Rights, Wrongs and Recourse inthe Lawof Torts, 51VAND.L.REV.1 (1998);JohnC.P.Goldberg&BenjaminZipursky,TheMoral of MacPherson,146U.PA. L.REV.1733(1998).7.See,e.g.,JohnGardner,Legal Positivism:512Myths,46AM.J.OFJURIS.1999(2001);JohnGardner&TimothyMacklem,Reasons,inTHEOXFORDHANDBOOKOFJURISPRUDENCEANDPHILOSOPHYOFLAW(JulesColeman&ScottShapiroeds.,2002);LESLIEGREEN,THEAUTHORITYOFTHESTATE(1988);LeslieGreen,TheConcept of LawRevisited,94 MICH.L.REV.1687(1996);LeslieGreen,Positivism and Conventionalism, 12CAN.J.L.&JUR.35(1999);GeraldPostema,Coordinationand Convention at theFoundationsof Law,11J. LEG.ST.165(1982);JOSEPHRAZ,THE AUTHORITYOFLAW(1979);JosephRaz,Authority,Law, and Morality, 68 THEMONIST295(1985);FREDERICKSCHAUER,PLAYINGBYTHERULES(1991);ScottShapiro,On Hart's WayOut, 4LEGALTHEORY469 (1998).8.See,e.g.,David0.Brink,LegalInterpretation,Objectivity,andMorality,inOBJECTIVITYIN LAWANDMORALS(BrianLeitered.,2001);David0.Brink,Legal Theory,Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review,17PHIL.&PUB.AFF.105(1988);JOHNFINNIS,NATURALLAWANDNATURALRIGHTS(1980);MichaelS.Moore,ANatural LawTheoryofInterpretation, 58S.CAL.L.REV.277(1985);MARKC.MURPHY,NATURALLAWANDPRACTICALRATIONALITY(2001);MarkC.Murphy,Natural LawJurisprudence, 9LEGALTHEORY 241(2003).[Vol.36:165INSTITUTE FOR LA WANDPHILOSOPHYFifth,whilemoralandpoliticaltheorywastheprimary,indeedexclusive,pointof referencefor jurisprudentialwriters of the1960sand70s,thelastquarter-centuryhasseenphilosophyof language,metaphysics,andepistemology(threefieldsinwhichRutgers,asithappens,istheworldleader)emergeastheprimaryvehiclesforphilosophicalinsightintothefamiliarquestionsaboutthenatureoflawandlegalreasoning,therelationshipbetweenlawandmorality,andthephilosophicalfoundationsofvarioussubstantiveareasof law(criminallawandevidence,mostnotably).Thisdevelopmenthasbeenmanifestinmyownworkonavarietyoftopics-fromtheobjectivityoflaw,tothe jurisprudenceof AmericanLegalRealism,to thesocialepistemologyof evidencelawg-andhasbeenequallyimportantinthewritingsonlawandlegalphilosophyof TimothyEndicott,AlvinGoldman,LarryLaudan,AndreiMarmor,MichaelMoore,DennisPatterson,andNicosStavropoulos,amongothers.'0Whatcannotfailtostrikeanyinformedobserverof thefieldisthatinnoneof thesefivemajordevelopmentsinlaw-and-philosophyscholarshipoverthepastquarter-centuryhasDworkin'sworkplayedasignificantrole.Inthecaseswhereithasplayedaminorrole,ithasbeenasafoil(forexample,fornaturallawtheorists"orforthosewritingonobjectivityinlaw12 oronvagueness13)orasabackgroundsourceofinspiration(for9.See,e.g.,BrianLeiter,LawandObjectivity,inTHEOXFORDHANDBOOKOFJURISPRUDENCEANDPHILOSOPHYOFLAW,supranote7;BrianLeiter,RethinkingLegalRealism:Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76TEX.L.REV.267(1997);BrianLeiter,Prospects and Problems for the Social Epistemology of Evidence Law,29PHIL.ToPIcS319(2001).10.See,e.g.,TIMOTHYENDICOTT,VAGUENESSINLAW(2000);ALVINI.GOLDMAN,KNOWLEDGEIN ASOCIALWORLD272-314(1999);LarryLaudan,IsReasonableDoubtReasonable?, 9LEGALTHEORY295(2003);ANDREIMARMOR,INTERPRETATIONANDLEGALTHEORY(1992);MICHAELS.MOORE,OBJECTIVITYINETHICSANDLAW(2004);DENNISPATTERSON,LAWAND TRUTH(1996);NICOSSTAVROPOULOS,OBJECTIVITYINLAW(1996).11.So,e.g.,MarkMurphy,inhis recentimportant"stateof theart"essayonNaturalLawJurisprudence, 9LEGALTHEORY241(2003)mentionsDworkinjustonceatthestart,noting that, "Whileit is notentirely misleadingtodescribe"Dworkinasa naturallaw theorist,"itishardtosquarethenotion...withDworkin'slimitedtheoreticalambitions,thatis,toprovide anaccount of ourpracticeof law ....A parochial naturallaw theoryisno naturallawtheoryat all."Id. at241& 241n.2.12.See,e.g.,BrianLeiter,Objectivity, Morality and Adjudication, inOBJECTIVITYINLAWANDMORALS66(BrianLeitered.,2001)[hereinafterLeiter,Objectivity, Morality andAdjudication]; MichaelS.Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology, and LegalTheory,60S. CAL.L. REV.453(1987).13.See.e.g.,ENDICOTT, supra note10,at63-72.2004]R UTGERS LAW JOURIALexample,inStavropoulos'swork4).Toreturn,then,totheNYUwebpagehyperbole,wecansaythis:ontheevidenceof thedevelopmentsthathavemadelawandphilosophyanexciting,active,andimportantfieldoverthelasttwenty-fiveyears,itwouldreflectonlypalpableignorancetodescribeDworkinas"themostinfluentialfigure."Heis,infact,almostentirelyabsent.NowitmightbeobjectedthatI'veomittedtwolivelytopicsofdiscussioninlegalphilosophyinwhichit appearsDworkinhasbeenamoreimportantpresence.First,andmostobviously,onemightpointtotheso-called"Hart/Dworkindebate,"thedebatewhosestartingpointisDworkin's1967critiqueof Hart's1961bookTheConcept of Law.Second,onemightalsonotethemorerecent"methodology"debatein jurisprudence,thedebateaboutwhetheratheoryoflawcanbeapurely"descriptive"theory,orwhetherit mustnecessarilyaskabout themoralmeritsof particularkindsoflawsandlegalsystemsinordertohavea satisfactorytheoreticalaccountofitssubjectmatter.SinceIhavedealtwithbothdebatesingreaterargumentativedetailelsewhere,5 Iwillonlyreport,conclusorily,myunderstandingof the"stateof play"in thesedebateshere.Onthefirst:theHart/Dworkindebate,sovibrantinthe1970sandearly1980s,16 islongover,anditisuncontroversial(outside,perhaps,thesmallcoterieof Dworkin'sformer students)that Dworkin"lost,"asitwere,on thecentralissuesaboutpositivism'sabilitytoaccountforlegallybindingprinciplesandaboutHart'sdoctrineof judicialdiscretion.7 Inmanycases,DworkinsimplygotHartwrong,andinothercases,positivistsproducedcompellingrejoinders.18 Itisstrikingthatintheposthumouslypublished14.See, e.g.,STAVROPOULOS,supra note10.15.BrianLeiter,BeyondtheHart/Dworkin Debate:TheMethodologyProbleminJurisprudence,48AM.J. JURIS.17(2003).16.Onethinksof seminalpapersbyRolf Sartorious,JosephRaz,DavidLyons,PhilipSoper,andJulesColeman,amongothers-manyof whichareusefullycollectedinRONALDDWORKINANDCONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE(MarshallCohened.,1983).17.See Leiter, supra note15,at19-24.18.In a forthcomingpaper (toappearinTHECAMBRIDGECOMPANIONTODWORKIN(A.Ripsteined.)),Scott Shapiromakesthesurprising suggestionthatthereis anotherDworkinianchallengepositivistshaveignored,namely,Dworkin'schallengetopositiviststoaccountfordisputesaboutthegroundsoflaw(i.e.,thecriteriaoflegalvalidity).YetasShapironotes,positivists infact haveofferedtworeplies tothis (rathermarginal)phenomenon:namely, thatdisputesaboutthegroundsof lawareeither incoherentor disingenuous.Theyareincoherent(orconfused)insofarasthegroundsoflawareexhaustedbytheconventionalpracticeconstitutingtheruleofrecognition;theyaredisingenuousinsofarasdisputantsaboutthe(Vol.36:165INSTITUTE FOR LA WANDPHILOSOPHY"Postscript"toTheConcept of Law,Hartfairlycomplainsinmorethanadozen places thatDworkinmisstatedHart'sviews.Indeed,Hartbeginsthe"Postscript"byreferringtoa(nevercompleted)"secondsection"whereheplannedtorespondtocriticsotherthanDworkin.Abouttheseother critics,Hartwrites:"HereIhavetoadmitthatinmoreinstancesthanIcaretocontemplatemycriticshavebeenright.. . ."19OnonlyonepointdoesHartcreditDworkinwithsimilarinsight:namely,ina1972paperarguing againsttheoriginalversionofHart's"practicetheoryofrules,"DworkindemonstratedquitepersuasivelythatHartwasmistakentoclaimthattheexistenceofadutyalwaysrequirestheexistenceofwhatHartcalleda"socialrule,"thatis,apracticeofconvergentbehaviorinwhichthoseengagedinthebehavioracceptaruledescribingtheirconductasastandardto whichtheyfelt boundtoadhere.Nowtobefair,Dworkin'scriticismsof Hart,eventhemistakenones,wereundoubtedlyanimportantstimulustothedevelopmentoflegalpositivismoverthepastthirtyyears-forexample,thedebatebetweensoft/inclusiveandhard/exclusivepositivismclearlyaroseoutofDworkin'schallengetoHarttoaccountfornon-pedigreedprinciplesthatjudgessometimestalkaboutasif theywerelegallybinding.0 AslongasHartandlegalpositivismaretopicsofstudy,therecanbelittledoubtthatDworkinwillremainafigureofinterestforintellectualhistorianswantingtounderstandthe developmentof positivisttheoriesof law.OnthesecondpointI canbeevenbriefer:theprimarystimulusfortherecent"methodology"debateinlegalphilosophyhasbeentheworkofgroundsof lawaretryingtodisguisetheirlaw-making(as,e.g.,judgesoftendo).Thefirstpossibility-incoherenceorconfusion-presentsasomewhatdifferenttheoreticalissuethanthesecond.Inthesecondcase,itiseasyenoughtosaythatweshouldnotbemisledbysuperficialappearances:everyoneknowsthat thosewhowantto prescribeanoutcomeinlawwillprefertoclaimthattheyarecompelled toreachthat outcomebytheexistinglaw.Inthefirst case,weneedsomeadditionalreasontopreferthe"confusion"explanationtotheface-valueexplanation.Thatreason,forpositivists,would,of course,bethegeneralexplanatoryand descriptivefruitfulnessof theirtheory of law.SinceDworkin'stheory,whichwouldfavortheface-valueexplanation,isitself explanatorilyunfruitfulandextravagant-asI'lldiscussbelow-there isnoreasontoprefer hisaccountof themarginalphenomenonof disputesaboutthegroundsof law.19.H.L.A.HART,THECONCEPTOFLAW239 (2ded.1994)(emphasisadded).20.SeeLeiter,supra note15,at24. Oddly,oncethedebatebegan,Dworkincontributednothing toit,and,instead,beganresorting to ad hominemattacksonthosewhodisagreedwithhisview-seethe discussion,below.2004)R UTGERS LAWJOURNALStephenPerry,21notDworkin,andwhilePerrygesturesatDworkin'sinfluence,itisclear-indeed,evenacknowledgedbyPerryhimself?2-thattheprimaryintellectualforcebehindthisdebateisChapter1 of JohnFinnis'sNatural Lawand Natural Rights, towhichDworkinhimself isalsoclearlyindebted.EvenifDworkinhasnotbeenamajorfigureinanyofthefivesignificantdevelopmentsinlegalphilosophynotedatthebeginning-oreveninthemorerecentmethodologydebate-hehas,indisputably,beenaveryactivepresenceinonearea:namely,thesystematicdevelopmentof hisownviewof lawandof adjudication.Thisenterprisebeginswithhisearlycritiquesof Hartinthelate1960sandearly1970s,continueswiththe1975paper"HardCases"' 23 andthenlargelyconcludeswiththe1986bookLaw'sEmpire,24 thoughhehasofferedsomeemendationsandclarificationsinahandfulofarticlessince.Sowhatisthestatusofthese"positive"contributionstolegalphilosophy?Hereisabriefand,admittedly,slightlypolemical(only slightly)summary:(1)Atonetime,Dworkinmaintainedthatatheoryoflawandadjudicationhadtoattendtotwokindsoflegalstandards,"rules"and"principles,"standardsdistinguishedbythelogicof theirapplicationinlegaldisputes.2'Dworkingaveupthisdistinction(afterothersshowedittobeunstable26),andthus,ineffect,gaveuponeof thekeyfoundationsofhisattack onHart's doctrineof judicialdiscretion.(2)Atonetime,Dworkinmaintainedtheimportanceof distinguishingbetween"policies"and"principles,"since,heclaimed,itwastheactualpracticeof judgestoeschewpolicyargumentsinfavorof principled(i.e.,21.SeeStephenR.Perry,Interpretationand Methodology in Legal Theory, in LAWANDINTERPRETATION(A.Marmored.,1995);StephenR.Perry, Hart's Methodological Positivism,inHART'SPOSTSCRIPT(JulesColemaned.,2001)[hereinafterPerry,Hart's MethodologicalPositivism].22.Perry, Hart's MethodologicalPositivism, supra note21,at313("MythinkingaboutmethodologyinlegaltheoryhasgreatlybenefitedfromFinnis'sgeneraldiscussionofthistopic,andinparticularfromhisilluminatingcritiqueof Hart.").23.RonaldDworkin,Hard Cases, reprinted inRONALDDWORKIN,TAKINGRIGHTSSERIOUSLY(1977)[hereinafterDWORKIN,TAKING RIGHTSSERIOUSLY].24.RONALD DWORKIN,LAW'SEMPIRE(1986)[hereinafter DWORKIN,LAW'SEMPIRE].25.TheModel of RulesI,inDWORKIN,TAKINGRIGHTSSERIOUSLY,supra note23,at22-28.26.SeeJosephRaz,LegalPrinciples and theLimitsof Law[hereinafterRaz,LegalPrinciples], reprinted inRONALDDWORKINAND CONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE,supra note16.[Vol.36:165INSTITUTE FOR LA WANDPHILOSOPHYrights-based)arguments.27AfterNeilMacCormick'sseminalLegalReasoningand Legal Theory28 andJohnBell'sPolicy Arguments in JudicialDecisions,30 Dworkinquietlyabandonedthis wildlyimplausibleclaim.Overtpolicy decisionsaresimplyeverywhereinthecases.31(3)Dworkinsaysatheoryof law"mustexplainhowwhatit takestobelawprovidesageneral justificationfor theexerciseof coercivepowerbythestate,andpresentsthistheoryasachallengetoHart's.YetHartneverclaimedthatthiswastheconceptoflawhewastryingtoexplain,andDworkinnevershowsthatourconceptoflawisreallysuchthatanorm'sbeinglegallyvalidthereby"providesageneraljustificationfortheexerciseofcoercivepowerbythestate.33 ThishascontributedtoawidelysharedsensethattheHart/Dworkindebate,liketheoldHart/Fullerdebate,wasacaseofshipspassinginthenight-thoughatleastHart,unlikeDworkin,realizedclearlythat thisis whathadhappened.34(4)DworkinarguedinLaw'sEmpirethatallinterpretationis"constructiveinterpretation,"thatis,interpretationwhichaimstoshowtheobjectinterpretedinits"bestlight.",35 Thisimplausiblethesiswassubjectedtowitheringcriticismsbyadiversegroupofphilosophersinterestedininterpretationinthearts,literature,andlaw,6 andnooneinanyhermeneuticareaofphilosophyhasfoundplausibleoradoptedhisapproachtointerpretation.Twentyyearsafterheadvancedtheseideasaboutinterpretation,therearenoDworkiniansworkinginliterary,artistic,or27.DWORKIN,TAKINGRIGHTSSERIOUSLY,supra note23.28.NEILMACCORMICK,LEGALREASONINGANDLEGAL THEORY(1978).30.JOHNBELL,POLICY ARGUMENTSIN JUDICIAL DECISIONS(1983).31.1 owe this pointtoLes Green.32.DWORKIN,LAW'sEMPIRE,supra note 24,at190.33.Thepeculiarityof Dworkin's postureissimply compoundedbythefactthat his owntheoryof "lawasintegrity"reliesforitsjustificationofcoercivepoweronthetheoryof"associativeobligations,"whoseparadigminstanceisthefamily:wetakeourselvestohaveobligationstofamilymembers,notwithstandingthelargelynon-voluntarynatureofthatassociation.Yet thisis anaccountfraughtwithproblems whenextendedtolaw,problemsnowmuch-noted.See,e.g.,LeslieGreen,Lawand Obligations, inTHEOXFORDHANDBOOKOFJURISPRUDENCEANDPHILOSOPHYOFLAW, supra note7,at 532-35.34.See,e.g.,HART,supra note19,at 241.35.DWORKIN,LAW's EMPIRE,supra note 24,at65-68.36.See,e.g.,DavidHoy,Interpreting theLaw:Hermeneutical and PoststructuralistPerspectives,58S.CAL.L.REv.135(1985);MARMOR,supra note10.2004]R UTGERS LAW JOURNALmusicalinterpretation.Dworkinappears tohaveabandonedhisgeneralthesisabout thenatureof interpretation,or, inanycase,stoppedtalking aboutit.(5)Dworkinclaimsthatalltheoriesof lawexcepthisownfallpreytowhathecalls"thesemanticsting."AccordingtoDworkin,legalpositivistspurportedlythinkthat "wecanarguesensibly withoneanotherif, butonly if,weallacceptandfollowthesamecriteriafordecidingwhenourclaimsaresound.37 Iflegalpositivistsbelievedthis,thenitwouldfollowthattheycouldnot explaindisagreementbetweenlawyersabout the"groundsof law,"thatis,aboutthe criteriainthatlegalsystem'srule of recognition.Infact,ofcourse,nopositivistacceptsthesemanticviewwhichwould"sting"theminthemannerdescribed;38 asJosephRazputsarepresentativepositivistrejoinder:"Eachpersontakeshisuseof termsandconceptstobegovernedbythe commoncriteria for theiruse ....Thecriteria thatgovernpeople'suseoflanguagearesimplythecriteriagenerallyreliedonintheirlanguagecommunityfor theuseof those terms.' 39 OrasDworkinhimself putsit morerecently:"Thepurposeofmy'semanticsting'argumentwas[toshow]...that...sharingaconceptdoesnotnecessarilymeansharingcriteriaforitsapplication.' 4OSinceeveryoneagrees,theargument"stings"noone.Theconfusionabout the"semanticsting"iscloselyrelated,I suspect,toDworkin'srecentpenchantforcomplainingthathehasnoideawhatHartcouldhavemeantincallinghisowntheory"descriptive"andasaimedatelucidatingthe"concept"of law.YetDworkinhimself beginsarecentattackonlegalpositivismbysummarizinghisownviewasbeingdescriptiveinexactlythesenseatissueforlegalpositivists:"I arguedthat[positivism]isnot faithfultothe actualpracticesof citizens,lawyers,and judgesincomplexpoliticalcommunities:inpractice,I said,peoplewhoargueaboutthecontentoflawdrawonmoralconsiderationsinawaythatpositivismcannotexplain."41 Butpositivismexplainsit,andhasexplainedit,fordecades,thoughDworkinneverseemstonotice;42 nordoesDworkinrespondwhen37.DWORKrN,LAW'SEMPIRE,supra note24,at45.38.See,e.g.,JulesColeman,Methodology,inTHEOXFORDHANDBOOKOFJURISPRUDENCEANDPHILOSOPHYOFLAW,supra note7,at314-19.39.JosephRaz,TwoViewsof the Nature of theTheory of Law:APartialComparison,4LEGAL THEORY249,263(1998).40.RonaldDworkin,ThirtyYearsOn,115HARv.L.REv.1655,1684(2003)[hereinafterDworkin,Thirty Years On].41.Id. at1655.42.See,e.g.,Raz,Legal Principles,supra note26;HART,supra note19,at 263-68.[Vol. 36:165INSTITUTE FOR LA WANDPHILOSOPHYpositivistsaskDworkinhowheproposestodemarcatethoseinvocationsofmoralitythataresupposedtobelegallybindingfromthosethataresimpl ycasesofjudges"legislatingfromthebench"orexercisingdiscretion.Dworkin,whoinvokes"actuallegalpractice"asthebenchmarkof adequacyforalegaltheory,knowsfullwellthatin"actualpractice"lawyersandjudgesrecognizethisdistinction,andit hasbeena fundamentaldifficultyforDworkinthathehasnoaccountof it.But therealpointIwanttoemphasizehereis justthis:Dworkinhimself hasessentiallythesameviewasHartastowhatadescriptivelyadequatetheoryoflawwouldlooklike,allthetalkabout "interpretation"notwithstanding.(6)Dworkinclaimsthat thereexistsaright answerasamatterof lawinall(oralmostall)cases.Thethesis,aseveryoneknows,strikeslawstudentsandlawyersasextravagantlystrange,butthequestioniswhatphilosophicalproblemsafflictit?Hereisone:sincetherightanswerasa matterof lawforDworkinturnsexplicitlyonmoralconsiderations,itwasobjected,mostfamouslyby JohnMackieinthelate1970s,44 thatif therearenotobjectivelyrightanswerstomoralquestions,therecannotbeobjectivelyrightanswerstolegalquestions.Dworkin'sresponsehasbeentodeny therelevance,eventheintelligibility,of twothousandyearsof metaethicaltheorizingabouttheobjectivityofmorality,fromPlatotoStevensontoMackietoRailton.Hedoessothroughaseriesof argumentssobaroqueandmuddled45 thattheyhavebeencompletelyignoredbythoseworkinginmetaethics,withonenotableexception:SimonBlackburn,nowtheProfessorofPhilosophyatCambridgeUniversity,respondedtoDworkin'sargumentsatlengthandconcludedbyderidingDworkin's"incursions...intophilosophy[as]...wearying, pointless andunprofitable.' 4 6(7)Finally-andthishasreallybeenthemostpersistentlyannoyingfeatureofhiswork-Dworkinhasthroughouthiscareerruntogethertheclaimthat"such-and-suchisavalidlawinthisjurisdiction"withclaimsaboutwhichpartyoughttoprevailinsomeparticulardispute.Legalpositivistshavealwaysbeenclearthattheir theoryconcernedtheformer,butbycollapsingthetwo,Dworkinsaddlespositivistswithimplausibleclaims43.See,e.g.,RAZ,supra note7,at 48-50.44.SeeJohnMackie,TheThird Theoryof Law,reprinted inRONALDDWORKINANDCONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE,supra note16.45.SeeLeiter,Objectivity, Morality and Adjudication, supra note12.46.SimonBlackburn,inSymposium,Ronald Dworkin,Objectivityand Truth:You'dBetter BelieveIt.25Phil. &Pub.Aff.87(1996),athttp://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/961Iblac.html(Sept.11,1996).2004]R UTGERS LAW JOURNALaboutadjudicationthattheirtheorydoesnot,infact,entail.WhatisastonishingisthatthisconflationhasbeenpointedouttoDworkininprintandinseminarsfordecades,yethecontinuestopropoundit.Hereisanillustrative passagefromDworkin'smost recentpublication,hisHartLectureatOxford,whichhasrecentlyappearedintheOxford Journal of LegalStudies.47 Dworkinasksthereadertoconsiderthehypotheticalcaseof Mrs.Sorensonwhohassuedmultipledrug-makers,allofwhomproducedthekindof drugthat injuredher, butnoneof whomsheknowstohave producedtheparticulardrugshetook--obviously,thehypotheticalillustratesthefamiliarmarket-shareliability theoryfromtortlaw. AccordingtoDworkin,Hart'ssourcesthesis[thethesis that "theexistenceandcontentof lawcanbeidentifiedbyreferencetothesocialsourcesoflaw"48]isveryfarfromneutralbetweenthepartiesin Mrs.Sorenson'scase.... No'source'of thekindHarthadinmindhadprovidedthat peopleinMrs.Sorenson'spositionareentitledto recoverdamagesona market-sharebasis,or stipulatedamoralstandardthatmight havethatupshotor consequence.Soif HartisrightMrs.Sorensoncannotclaimthatlawisonherside....Mrs.Sorenson'slawyersarguedtothecontrary.Theydeniedthesourcesthesis:theysaidthatgeneralprinciplesinherentinthelawentitledtheirclienttowin.SoHart'sviewisnotneutralintheargument:ittakessides.Ittakessides,infact,ineverydifficultlegal dispute,infavourof thosewhoinsist that thelegalrights of thepartiesareto besettled entirelyby consultingthe traditional sourcesof law.4 9But this misstatesHart's view,asDworkinby now mustsurelyknow:Hart'sview,as expressedin thesourcesthesis,simplydoes not"takesides"onhowMrs.Sorenson'scasecomesout.The sourcesthesis entailsthat, to theextentthat ajudge has a duty to decide according to law, thenthe judgemustapplythesource-basednorms;butitisnopartof thesourcesthesis, or Hart'sview,todenythatinsomecases,thedutytoapplylegallyvalidnormsis,andought to be,overriddenbyotherequitableandmoralconsiderations.50Sotherewehaveit:sevendistinctiveDworkiniantheses,noneveryplausible,manyspectacularlywrong-headed,allextensivelycriticized,and47.RonaldDworkin,Hart's Postscript and theCharacter of PoliticalPhilosophy, 24OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.1 (2004)[hereinafterDworkin, Hart's Postscript].48.HART, supra note19,at269.49.Dworkin,Hart's Postscript,supra note 47,at 20.50.ThankstoLes Greenforhelpinformulatingthisaspectof Hart'sview.(Vol.36:165INSTITUTE FOR LAWANDPHILOSOPHYsomeabandonedalreadybyDworkinhimself. That,asfarasIcansee,isDworkin's"positive"legacyincore jurisprudence.SupposingIamrightaboutallthis,theredoesremainafinalpuzzle:namely,whyisRonaldDworkinsofamousinlegalcirclesifhispositivejurisprudentialcontributionturnsout,sadly,toamounttosolittle?Theexplanationresidesin twoimportantfactsaboutDworkin'swriting.First, heisanextremelygood writer:smooth,inviting,glib,anaturalforTheNewYorkReviewof Books.Heis,inmanyways,thequintessential"sophist"oflegaltheory,inboththegoodandbadsensesofthatterm:hisrhetoriciscompelling,ofteninspired,andtherhetoricalgiftcarriestheboldandimplausible jurisprudentialthesesalong.Second,andnotunrelated,Dworkinhasrepeatedlycommentedonthepressing legalissuesconfrontingtheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt, thusguaranteeinghima widelegalaudienceintheUnitedStateswherethebusinessof theSupremeCourtloomslargeontheacademichorizon.WhileHart,tobesure,mayhavehadadirectinfluenceonthedecriminalizationof homosexualityinBritain,51neitherhenoranyother jurisprudenthasintervenedwithsuchfrequencyon"hot"legalquestions(evenifDworkincanclaimnopracticalsuccesscomparabletoHart's)."NowwhileDworkinoftenwritesasifhisargumentsaboutaffirmativeaction,freespeech,judicialconfirmations,therightsof defendants,andsoon,dependedonhis jurisprudentialclaims,thegoodnewsisthattheyarealmostalldetachablefromthem.NopoliticallyliberallegalpositivisthasanyreasontoquarrelwithDworkin'sdefenseof liberalvaluesinlaw,exceptinthetrivialsensethatDworkinpretendstheseliberalvaluesarealwaystherequirements of law, as opposedtosimplymorallyattractiveanswerstothelegalandpolicyquestions.3 ButDworkinisjustlyfamousasaliberalAmericanconstitutionaltheorist,whoseexpansiveview of the Constitution'smeaninghasbeenaninspirationfor many.4 Thisfact,alas,hasledmanyto51.See,e.g.,H.L.A. HART,LAW,LIBERTY,ANDMORALITY(1963).52.AsLesGreenhasremindedme,onthemostpressingissuesof theday-suchas,mostrecently,thecriminalandimmoralinvasionof Iraqby theUnitedStates-Dworkinhasbeenlargelysilent.53.Distinguishingbetweenthesetwopossibilitiesisnotmerefussiness:itfundamentallyaffectsthekindsof argumentsappropriateto justify theclaimsatissue,aswellasimplicatesviewsaboutthe properrole of courtsinademocraticsociety.54.See,e.g.,CHRISTOPHEREISGRUBER,CONSTITUTIONALSELF-GOVERNMENT(2001);LAWRENCEG.SAGER,JUSTICEINPLAINCLOTHES:ATHEORYOFAMERICANCONSTITUTIONALPRACTICE(2004).Itisperhapsworthnoting thatProfessorsEisgruberandSagerwereboth,atone time,Dworkin'scolleaguesatNewYorkUniversity.2004)RUTGERS LAWJOURNALassumethat theremustbemeritintheunderlyingphilosophicalviewsaboutlawwhichDworkinhimselfpresents,wrongly,asnecessaryforhissubstantivearguments.ThereisnowreasontothinkthatDworkinhimself recognizesthegrimstateofaffairsforhisidiosyncraticjurisprudentialprogram,asIhavedescribedithere.TheevidenceIhaveinmindisthatinrecentyearsDworkinhasincreasinglytakenthedesperaterouteofaccusinghisjurisprudentialopponentsof beingnot just wrong, but of beinguninteresting,boring, andhavingbad motives.So,forexample,inanessaypublishedrecentlyon"Hart'sPostscriptandtheCharacterof PoliticalPhilosophy,"55Dworkinconcludeswith thefollowing anecdote:Afewweeksago,talking toProfessorJohnGardnerof OxfordUniversity,IsaidthatI thoughtthatlegalphilosophyshouldbeinteresting.He jumpedonme."Don'tyousee?"hereplied."That'syourtrouble."I amguiltyof hischarge. 56Thesurroundingtextmakesclearthatlegalpositivists-JohnGardnerisone-are not,needlesstosay,"guilty"of being"interesting."Unfortunately,DworkinomitstheactualcontextofGardner'sstatement,which-asreportedtomebyGardner-concernedDworkin'sassumptionthatphilosophicalquestionsaboutlawhadtobeofinterest,i.e.,practicallyrelevant,tolawyersand judges.IamfairlyconfidentthatProfessorGardner-likeProfessorsColeman,Green,Hart,Kramer,Marmor,Raz,Waluchow,andsoon-findslegalpositivism,andthephilosophicalissuesitraises,quiteinteresting.But theyaremodestenoughtorecognizethat itdoesnot exhaustthe problemslawyersand judgesconfront.MoredramaticwasDworkin'shatchet job intheHarvardLaw Reviewin2003onJulesColeman'sbookThe Practice of Principle, inwhichDworkinjeeredatlegalpositivismasa kindof "scholastictheology."Asevidenceofthis "sacredfaith"of thepositivists, Dworkinwrites that,They[meaningpositivists]teachcourseslimitedto"legalphilosophy"oranalyticjurisprudenceinwhichtheydistinguishandcomparedifferentcontemporaryversionsofpositivism,theyattendconferencesdedicatedto55.Dworkin,Hart'sPostscript,supra note47.56.Id. at 36.[Vol.36:165INSTITUTE FOR LA WANDPHILOSOPHYthosesubjects,andtheycommenton eachother'sorthodoxiesandheresiesinthemost minutedetailin their owndedicated journals.57Putasidethefalsehoodthatlegalpositivistswhoteachlegalphilosophyignorenon-positivistauthorslikeFinnis,Fuller,andDworkin,whatisastonishingaboutthispassageisthatwecouldchangethetargettophilosophersof mindandrewrite itasfollows:They teachcourseslimitedto"philosophyof mind"ortheoriesof contentinwhichtheydistinguishandcomparedifferentcontemporaryversionsof thecausaltheoryof content,theyattendconferencesdedicatedto thosesubjects,andtheycommentoneachother'sorthodoxiesandheresiesinthemostminutedetailin their owndedicatedjournals.PriortoDworkin,onemighthavethoughtthiswassimplyadescriptionofscholarship, notanactivitythat wasrisibleor reprehensible.Oddly,theonlycontemporaryphilosopherwhowouldthinktoderidephilosophyof mindinthesetermswouldbeRichardRorty,afigureforwhomDworkinotherwisehaslittlepatience.ThisRorty-styleanti-intellectualismdoes,alas,seemtohavetakenaholdonDworkin,forinthesamereviewessay,helevelsthefollowingremarkablead hominem atlegalpositivists,namely,that theirrealmotiveistopreserve"legalphilosophyasanindependent,self-containedsubjectandprofession."Solegalpositivistsacceptpositivismnotbecausetheythinkittrue,butbecauseitmakesitpossibleforthemtohaveacareer!Dworkincontinues:"PositivistssinceHart...havedefendedwithgreatfervoraguild-claim:thattheirworkisconceptualanddescriptiveinawaythatdistinguishesitfromavarietyof othercraftsandprofessions.58 Well,yes,Hartdoesbelievethat,thoughDworkinmighthaveaddedthatHartdoesn'tthinkthisdistinguisheshismethodfromthecraftandprofessionofphilosophy,atleastastraditionallyconceived.Weshouldbeappalled,Iimagine,if someonethoughtitappropriatetoattack,say,FrankJackson's57.Dworkin,ThirtyYearsOn,supra note40,at1679.The"dedicatedjournal"isareferenceto LegalTheory, whichI edit withLarry AlexanderandJulesColeman.The journalis not,of course,"dedicated"tolegalpositivism,thoughthatis one of manytopicscoveredbycontributors.58.Id.2004]RUTGERS LAW JOURNALrecentdefenseofconceptualanalysisinethicsandmetaphysics59 onthegroundsthatitmakesphilosophyindependentof otherdisciplines,andthusJackson'srealmotivationmustbetopreserveaprofessionalnicheforphilosophers!Dworkin'srecentrhetoric,then,borders,I'mafraid,ontheunprofessional,thoughperhapsit isexplainedby thefact that,withliterallyahandfulofexceptions,thejurisprudentiallandscapeinboththeUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStatesisnowpopulatedbylegalpositivists:inthatverytangiblesense, thefieldispassingDworkinby.Itisafairlyreliablesign,I think,thataresearchprogramisonitslastlegswhenthebestitsproponentcandoisaccusethosenotengagedintheprogramofhavingbad"motives"andofnotbeingvery"interesting."Interest,likebeauty,isintheeyeof thebeholder,andjust aswewouldbesuspiciousif Dworkincomplainedthatthetheoriesoflegalpositivistswere"ugly,"weshouldbeequallyworriedwhenheresortstocallingthem"uninteresting":theonlyphilosophicalissue,I'mafraid,iswhetherthey'retrue.Dworkin,alas, haslargelygivenup tryingtoshowthat theyaren't;and,whatisworse,hehasfailedtorespondtothearmyof legaltheoristswhohavearguedthathisown viewsarefalse.I shallconcludeonapersonalnote.IhavenevermetRonaldDworkin.6 Once,aboutahalf-dozenyearsago,hee-mailedmeoutofthebluetoexpresshisappreciationforanobscurearticleof mine-or, perhapsI shouldsay,"amoreobscure-than-usualarticleof mine"-showingthatQuinewasnotapostmodernist.61Itwasakindgesturebyafamousman,andI'veobviouslyrepaid that kindnessbadly.Butphilosophyisnotaboutkindness,it'saboutgettingthingsright.Alargenumberof thosewhoworkinlegalphilosophysayprivatelywhatI've59.FRANKJACKSON,FROMMETAPHYSICSToETHICS:ADEFENCEOFCONCEPTUALANALYSIS(1998).60.AsDougHusakpointedouttome,thissaysmoreaboutDworkin'sdisengagementfromhisprofessionalcolleagues,thanaboutmynot"gettingout"enough.Dworkin,forexample,hasneverattendedtheannualAnalyticPhilosophyof Lawconference,themajorprofessionaleventinthefield--eveninthe yearwhenit was heldathisuniversity!Giventhewidespreadperceptionsabouttheargumentativefeeblenessof hisownviews,thismaysimplybeprudenceon hispart.61.BrianLeiter,WhyQuine is not a Postmodernist, 50 SMUL.REv.1739 (1997).[Vol.36:165INSTITUTEFOR LA WAND PHILOSOPHYsaidpubliclythisevening.Perhapsbecause,unlikethe vastmajorityof thosewhoworkinjurisprudence,IneverpassedthroughOxfordduringmystudies,I neverinternalizedthe "reverencefor thegreatman"whichkeepssomany otherssilent.Perhapsbecause Ididmygraduatework at theUniversityofMichigan,inaphilosophicalclimatethatwasferociousandoftenmercilessinitspursuitofanargument-andinwhichthestandardsofexcellenceinphilosophyweresetbythelikesof AllanGibbardandPeterRailton-IhavereactedbadlytoDworkin'smerry-go-aroundof confusingdistinctions, his endlessreinventionof thewheel(asthoughno philosophicalworkonthetopichadcomebefore),hisfailuretorepresenteitherhiscriticsor histargetscorrectly,andhisdismissalof seriousphilosopherslikeRailtonasmakingirrelevantorunintelligibleclaimsaboutbasicphilosophicalquestions.Thehistoriansof20th-centuryjurisprudencewillcertainlywanttounderstandtheideasandargumentsof anintellectuallyagileandrhetoricallygiftedthinker namedRonaldDworkin.But thelegalphilosophersof the21 st_century,includingthoseatthenewInstituteforLawandPhilosophyatRutgersUniversity,willnot:theywillmaketheirmark,Ipredict,onajurisprudentiallandscapeinwhichtheDworkinianskylineisafadingimageonthe horizon.Thefieldwillbebetterforit.2004]