the end of power - adam moscoe

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March 2014The End of Power by Moisés Naím

Adam Moscoe, MA Candidate,

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

Conversations about the future of global governance typically focus on who or

what holds power at a given moment in time. Discussions surrounding the hypothesized

decline of the United States as a hegemon inevitably turn to the question of which actors

will inherit the reigns of global order. While the majority of recent literature on global

governance devotes attention to shifts in power, Moisés Naím – a former cabinet minister

in Venezuela – argues in The End of Power that power is not merely shifting from State

actors to non-State actors, but rather that power itself is mutating into a form as diffuse as

it is destabilizing. Naím agrees with Zbigniew Brzezinski that we are living in a “post-

hegemonic era” where “no nation has the capacity to impose its will on others in a

substantial or permanent way” (131). Defining power as the “ability to direct or prevent

the current or future actions of other groups and individuals” (16), Naím explores how

individuals – healthier and better-educated than ever – are creating and joining niche

networks that suit their unique preferences with respect to everything from national

politics to charitable giving.

Traditional barriers to power, such as natural monopolies and government

restrictions, are weakening in response to three revolutions: the More revolution, which

involves an increase in output and population and overwhelms barriers to power, making

control and coordination difficult; the Mobility revolution, which is propelling

unprecedented movement of people, goods, and ideas, and which circumvents barriers to

power, leaving megapowers without a defined constituency or captive audience; and the



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Mentality revolution, characterized by “major changes in mindsets, expectations, and

aspirations” (11), including higher quality of life expectations among the middle class,

that undermine barriers to power. These three revolutions are – perhaps irreversibly –

constraining megapowers from exerting power through four interrelated channels: muscle

(coercion), code (norms and moral obligation), pitch (the power of persuasion), and

reward (the power of inducement). While muscle and reward can reshape incentives and

the structure of a situation, pitch and code alter assessments and perceptions of a situation

without changing incentives. Yet all four channels are weakened as barriers to power are

lowered. Naím does not see megapowers – from the Republican Party to the Catholic

Church – as disappearing, but he observes that decentralized organizations are denying

them options for dominating and expressing power. Power decay allows smaller actors to

challenge incumbents, yet it also risks bringing about Hobbes’ “war of all against all”

(18), a “crippling paralysis” whereby untamed pluralism and unlimited niche

organizations (micropowers) impede the formation of consensus on collective action to

address the complex issues with which humanity is currently grappling.

Naím draws upon a rich array of empirical evidence to support his concept of

power decay, and his lucid writing illuminates trends in geopolitics, business, and several

other fields. However, his case studies would be more useful were they more explicitly

connected to the aforementioned three revolutions and four channels, as they are in

chapter 5 in the discussion of national politics. One evidential problem is that he over-

extends the concepts of market power – the ability of firms to charge higher than the

marginal cost – and barriers to entry – such as economies of scale (in which larger firms

are more efficient and smaller firms are less able to compete). While these concepts can



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be easily employed to explain the rise of small businesses that use “disruptive

technologies” (182), prioritize speed over scale, and take advantage of lower barriers to

entry, he stretches these economic explanations to non-commercial arenas, such as

international politics, without accounting for differences in institutional types. Moreover,

the evidence Naím provides to explain power decay is often highly specific yet easily

misread as foreshadowing the dissolution of megapowers entirely. He notes, for instance,

that “the probability that a company will fall from its standing…has increased” (162),

that union density has declined, and that security alliances are weakening while informal

‘coalitions of the willing’ (or of the ‘angry’) are becoming more prevalent. He stresses

that decentralized groups – from Kickstarter to Pentecostal churches – are not replacing

established megapowers but rather are constraining their options for exercising power.

Yet considering he analyzes long-term phenomena and the transformation of social life,

the evidence upon which he relies – plenty of annual reports and speculative magazine

surveys – is often shallow.

Where there is no shortage of evidence, however, is in the failure of the

increasingly fragmented and paralyzed international community to address contemporary

problems, from curbing climate change to regulating asymmetric warfare. Power decay

and the proliferation of niche actors decrease cooperation, exacerbate collective action

problems and weaken incentives to provide global public goods all while causing

“disorientation and heightened anxiety” (231). Some of Naím’s judgements are

questionable. For example, in contrasting “minilateralism” – where the smallest number

of countries needed to make a change assemble to do so without the risk of veto by great

powers – from multilateralism, he romanticizes the extent to which the latter advanced



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progress since the Second World War, from decolonization to nuclear deterrence, to the

Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, he does not adequately justify his lack of

confidence in ‘minilateral’ initiatives – context-sensitive solutions designed by like-

minded actors – to bring about tangible improvements in quality of life. Just because an

increase in entropy due to decentralization will constrain authority and power projection

does not necessary mean it will impede all forms of governance (140) and worsen global

outcomes. Furthermore, Naím fails to justify his evident optimism for impending

“positive political and institutional innovation” (243), as he offers no evidence to suggest

the sordid alternative – growing extremism and polarization in national politics – can be

mitigated. In spite of these limitations, Naím skilfully maps how the three revolutions –

more, mobility, and mentality – are reshaping capacities and aspirations, sprouting niche

organizations, and challenging incumbents and established megapowers.

The End of Power raises a number of fascinating questions that Naím does not,

and perhaps could not be reasonably expected, to resolve. First, are the three revolutions

yielding power decay or rather the restructuring of power into formations that are more

convenient for elites, such that everyone can be king of their own isolated castles? Are

the power dynamics at play within micropowers somehow more mild than those within

megapowers? Second, at what point might the harm caused by political paralysis due to

inaction on vital policy challenges – such as climate change – spur coalition building,

compromise and collaboration? Third, what are the long-term implications of polarization

and extremist politics, such that small actors can increasingly “take a stand on a

parochial, ideological, or even whimsical issue, often for short-term domestic political

reasons rather than because of any defense of principle” (152)”? How will we respond to



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a state of enduring impasse? Fourth, what are the social-psychological implications of a

world in which individuals interact almost solely with those who share their specific

context and worldview, and in which no real negotiation or consensus is pursued with

respect to the allocation of scarce resources? How might collective action problems be

exacerbated in a world where everything seems tailor-made for our preferences and

understandings? Fifth, assuming Naím is correct that megapowers are not on the verge of

disappearing, is there a threshold point at which power decay might pose an existential

threat to these megapowers? Sixth, is it possible to test whether the policy outcomes of

minilateralism differ in any meaningful way from those derived through multilateralism

(i.e. through the United Nations or other institutions)? Seventh, what is the marginal

benefit and marginal cost of pursuing consensus-based, universally-applicable solutions

to global problems when such processes increasingly lead to the adoption of watered-

down resolutions that meet the lowest common denominator (see the discussion of the

Copenhagen climate summit, 152)? Eighth, how might we reconcile what appear to be

two contradictory ideas: the need for stability and predictability (228) as well as for “risk-

taking activism” (230)? Ninth, how can accountability be ensured in a decentralized

distribution of power? To what norms or principles should diverse private actors be held

accountable, and how and by whom? For example, Naím is enthusiastic about new and

less cumbersome ways of managing foreign aid, from large private foundations to

microloans, but he fails to address concerns regarding accountability, as discussed by

Mazower in his conclusion to Governing the World. Tenth, do smaller, decentralized

organization have an advantage over megapowers in terms of legitimacy, since they more

faithfully represent the views of their (smaller set of) members? For example, a common



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complaint among union members is that they feel their unions take strong positions

contrary to their beliefs. Eleventh, how might we resolve the clash between the three

revolutions and the ongoing existence of State-owned enterprises and State-imposed

limits on institutional innovation?

The End of Power offers an important contribution to the literature on global

governance since it dares to imagine what globality – the end being pursued by

globalization – might look like. Naím’s discussion of power decay and institutional

innovation is compelling and unsettling, for it appears we are witnessing the triumph of

the niche and the end of solidarity due to the growing constraints on – but, crucially, not

the elimination of – megapowers in politics, diplomacy, business, and nearly all

dimensions of social life.

the end of power - adam moscoe

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