The End of the Cold War: The End of History and the End of Political Ideas?

Introduction

From the collapse of the Iron Curtain to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the events of 1989-91

represent a major historical turning point in International Politics. The end of the cold war

marked the end of the political and military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet

Union, the end of the division of Europe and the end of the extension of superpowers conflict

to the Third World. However, has the end of the cold war meant the end of history or the end

of political ideas?

For Fukuyama, the end of the cold war meant 'The End of History' 1He states that there was

no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy

and no serious ideological competitors left to liberal idea. On the other hand, Martynov argues

that the end of the cold war only marked the end of east-west division, but not the end of

history.2 Gray also highlights that history has not ended for post-Soviet peoples as they have

not shaken off one nineteenth-century ideology, Marxism, to adopt another, liberalism.3 This

essay exposes how the end of the cold war has not ended history and political ideas by

outlining the different interpretations of the cold war, examining the concept of the End of

History and highlighting the emergence of different political ideas in a Post-Cold War era.

Different Interpretations of the Cold War

At the heart of the cold war is the bipolar enmity characterized by two major ideological

differences about how society should be organized, Liberalism and Marxism. John Mueller

interprets the cold war as an ideological battle that ended with the collapse of communism in

the Soviet Union.4 Schlesinger also interprets it as a fundamental debate between liberalism

1 Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, London, Hamish Hamilton, pp. 2112 Martynov, V. (2000) 'The end of east-west division but not the end of history', UN Chronicle, 37 (2),

www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2000/issue2/0200p18.htm (accessed 5 November 2009)3 Gray, J. (1992) 'Cleopatra's nose', National Review, 11 May, pp. 464 Muller, J. (1994) 'The catastrophe Quota: Trouble after the Cold War', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38 (3) (Sep,

1994), pp. 357

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and communism and was resolved with the triumph of liberalism.5 Accordingly, Gaddis takes a

somewhat similar view by echoing the Truman Doctrine that the cold war was really a battle

between alternative ways of life, freedom and autocracy.6 In short, the cold war was a battle of

two ideas over the different visions of how society and the economy should be organized in

terms of welfare, rights, justice, economic growth and social cohesion, that can be referred to

as 'ideological conflict'.

Alternatively, the cold war is being interpreted as a clash of national interests between the

Superpowers. Since World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union imposed a bipolar

world order. In terms of territorial hegemony and power politics, the Superpowers focused

competition for global dominance. They played crucially in the international system by

projecting their force into the world. The first major confrontation of the Cold War took place

over Berlin in 1948. Although the origins of the Cold War were in Europe, the 'hot wars' were

played out in Asia and the Third World between the superpowers, i.e. Taiwan straits crisis

between USA and People Republic of China in 1954-55, Cuban missile crisis between USSR

and USA in 1962, Arab-Israeli war between Egypt, Israel, Syria, USA and USSR in 1973, etc.

As Scott states, some civil wars and regional wars were intensified and prolonged by

superpower involvement.7 Thus, it is obvious that the Cold War was composed of a

geographical and military confrontation that kept the divisions of Europe and Germany as well

as an ongoing struggle for the future global dominance, that can be referred to as

'superpower rivalry'.

To some extent, the cold war is being interpreted through the proliferation of nuclear

technologies and weapons systems. Stimson argues that the advent of nuclear bomb in 1945

has profoundly affected political considerations in the globe and the Soviet government had

sensed the tendency of nuclear technology.8 Alperrovitz further claimed that, President

Truman already knew Japan was defeated, however, his real motive was to coerce the Soviet 5 Schlesinger, A. (1992) 'Some lessons from the Cold War' in Hogan, M. (ed.) The End of the Cold War: Its meaning and

implications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press6 Gaddis, J. (1987) The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, New York, Oxford University Press7 Scott, L. (2005) 'International History, 1945-1990', in Baylis, J. & Smith, S. (eds) The Globalization of World Politics,

Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 1038 Stimson, H. L (1945) 'Henry L. Stimson on sharing the atomic bomb, September 1945' in Hanhimaki, J.M. And Westad,

O.A. (eds) (2003) The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 32

2

Union to serve post-war American interests in Europe and Asia. 9 Whatever motives behind

the advent of atomic bomb, it actually triggered the emergence of nuclear weapon states

towards the global battlefield. During the cold war, both US and Soviet Union were known to

have developed offensive nuclear weapons such as long-range bombers, intercontinental

ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missiles to strike its targets and provide defense against

nuclear attack. Thus, the growth in Soviet and American arsenals is often characterized as a

nuclear technology race and the cold war was being interpreted as 'arms race'.

The End of the Cold War

One of the most striking features of the end of the cold war was its suddenness. In December,

1991, USSR ceases to exit and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comes into

being. In the immediate aftermath of the end of the cold war, scholars tended to focus on the

implications of the end of the cold war. During 1990s, Francis Fukuyama's concept of the 'end

of history' was the most influential liberal theory of the post-cold war era. In his book of 'The

End of History and the Last Man', Fukuyama argues that the end of the cold war represents

the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the end of the history by stating asWhat we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of

post-war history, but the end of the history; as such that is the end point of mankind's ideological

evolution and the universalization of the Western liberal democracy as the final form of human

government 10

His arguments were based on the key liberal assumptions of democratic peace theory, the

role of institutions and the existence of globalized capitalism. Fukuyama takes account the

democratic peace theory11 which states that democracies do not go to war with one another

and breeds peace while authoritarianism breeds war by claiming that the triumph of liberalism

means the end of wars and bloody revolutions. He also has a liberal optimism of the role of

institutions that can overcome the logic of anarchy by mediating inter-state and intra-state

conflicts. He also endorsed the major requirement of the states to adopt the principles of

9 Alperovitz, G.(1965) Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power, New York, Simon and Schuster

10 Fukuyama (1992) p. xii11 Kant (1970) 'Perpetual Peace' in Forsyth, M., Keens-Soper & Saviger (eds) The Theory of International Relations:

Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitschke, London, Allen & Unwin

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economic liberalism to participate in global capitalized markets as global capitalism can bind

all states more closely together.

His claims seem right when we interpret the cold war as 'ideological conflict' between US and

Soviet Union and the dismantling of the Soviet Union was seen as the collapse of

communism. However, the collapse of communism in Soviet Union has not meant the end of

ideology as a whole and the triumph of liberalism. In the same year in which communist

authority collapsed in Europe, it was reaffirmed in China. As Cox argues, China remains with

strong residues of communist ideology articulated by a powerful party bureaucracy with an

important state sector coexisting alongside a highly dynamic, open capitalist systems driven

forward by foreign investment.12

Moreover, the post-Soviet peoples have not shaken off Marxism to adopt liberalism, as

claimed by Gray.13, instead, they returned to their immemorial ethnic and cultural identities as

well as national and religious enmities. Accordingly, Samuel Huntington also claimed that the

next key conflicts in the world will be not economic or ideological, but cultural.14 These

assertion were obviously proved by the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a by-product of the

end of the cold war. In the summer of 1990, Meirsheimer predicted that old ethnic hatreds

would again resurface and thrust the continent back into the chaos and the bloodshed.15 After

1990, the Balkans descended into barbarity, thus, Meirsheimer's predictions about Europe

going 'back to the future' looked prescient. In fact, the integration of the European economic

space has not been accompanied by a parallel development of common foreign policy. The

role of institutions could not be able to mediate conflicts effectively in Balkans history. The

unified Germany appeared to act total indifference from its allies by insisting on recognizing

Bosnia independence. History has not ended for post-soviet peoples.

On the other hand, if we interpret the cold was as 'superpower rivalry' between US and Soviet

Union, the end of cold war has meant the end of rivalry among the superpowers. However, it

has not meant the end of a clash of national interests between the countries. Russia has

managed to integrate two comparative advantages of hydrocarbons and weaponry to rebuild

12 Cox, M. (2005) 'From the Cold War to the War on Terror', in Baylis, J. & Smith (2005) p. 14513 Gray (1992) p.4714 Huntington, S, (1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), pp. 16315 Mearsheimer, J. (1990), 'Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War', International Security, 15 (1): pp.30

4

the 21st century Russia as a great power. A rising China has generated one of the great

foreign policy debates in the United States. Power politics are still played out by the great

powers in the Third World. One of the obvious example is Kosovo. While the West advocates

the independence of Kosovo, Russia opposed this and states that if Kosovo claims

independence, Russia may recognize secessionist state lets such as Abkhazia, Karabakh and

Transistria. 16 Drawing from the observations about national interests, collapse and

disintegration, Kaplan also argues that old-fashioned conflicts between ideologies were giving

way to less easily regulated and more fundamental clashes over resources such as water,

cropland forests, and even fish.17 His assertions were further proved by water conflicts in

Africa and growing energy conflicts in Eurasia. In fact, the end of the cold war ended the

superpower rivalry, however, did not end the clash of national interests.

Furthermore, if we interpret the cold war as 'arms race', the end of cold war results in United

States, Russia and Europe moving from a situation where nuclear weapons once has a high

profile in strategic thinking to low profile issue. A few important arms control treaties were

signed. However, concerns about the proliferation of nuclear capabilities has shifted to the

spread of nuclear technology. Prior to its demise, the Soviet Union had embraced a large

nuclear weapons arsenals. Thus soon after its demise, there was a growing concern over the

spread of technology and appropriate situation-response measures were introduced. On the

other hand, there was a growing concern of the role of non-state actors and transnational

nuclear supply networks and fear of nuclear smuggling. As Howlett states, the fear that ethnic

groups involved in civil conflict might resort to nuclear threats, has become a feature of post-

cold war security debate.18

Conclusion

The end of the cold war marked the end of a strategic confrontation between the USSR and

the United States as well as the end of a geographical and military confrontation that kept

16 Cohen, A. (2007) 'Petroleum Power and Military Might: the Russia Challenge in the 21st century', Parliamentary Forum, House of Commons, September 18th, 2007, http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=498 (accessed 5th

November, 2009)17 Kaplan, R.D. (1994) 'The Coming Anarchy', Atlantic Monthly18 Howlett, D. (2005)'Nuclear Proliferation', in Baylis & Smith (eds) p. 509

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Europe and Germany divided for the best part for forty years. However, the end of the cold

war has not meant the end of history and the end of political ideas. There has been a

supremacy of liberalism, but, not the triumph of political and economic liberalism. Political

ideas are still alive, not the end of ideologies. There are ongoing struggles and conflicts over

national interests and resources. Overall, the history has not ended yet.

Khin Ma Ma Myo (8/11/2009)

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