the enduring significance of bangladesh's war of independence

8/3/2019 The Enduring Significance of Bangladesh's War of Independence

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The Enduring Significance of Bangladesh's War of Independence: An Analysis of EconomicCosts and ConsequencesAuthor(s): Saud Choudhry and Syed BasherReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 41-55Published by: College of Business, Tennessee State UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4192901 .Accessed: 26/11/2011 05:36

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The Journalof Developing Areas Volume36 Number1 Fall 2002

THE ENDURING SIGNIFICANCE OFBANGLADESH'S WAR OFINDEPENDENCE: AN ANALYSIS OFECONOMIC COSTS ANDCONSEQUENCES

Saud ChoudhryTrentUniversitySyed BasherYorkUniversity

ABSTRACTThe BangladeshWarof Independence,n terms f itshuman ndeconomic xperience,astedonlynine months. Still, it foreverchanged he character, ace and prospects f economic ife inBangladesh.Whent ended,heeconomywas eftprostrate;ortunesadbeensweptawayandmuchof thecapitaltockwas destroyedrin disrepair.Thispaper rovides systematicccountingf allthesedirect nd ndirectosts,as wellastheir mpact n post-warconomicife. Even hemostmodestassumptions lace the direct and indirectcost estimatesat $9.53 billion and $14.08 billionrespectively,argreaterhan the $200 millionclaimedby the UnitedNationsReliefOperationsSurvey.Inshort,he warwasnota minor vent ither y absoluter relativemeasures.twasmanyfoldsgreaterhan hemagnitudef effortmplied ythesecessionist'sirstcallto arms.Thewarringpartiesmayhaveexpected large onflict;what hey ailed o anticipate asacataclysm.INTRODUCTION

The causationof Bangladesh'sWar of Independence 1971)' has been extensivelydiscussed and debated.Many hypothesesand explanationshave been proposedand stillmore areemerging oday,making hecausationof thewar themost discussedquestion n thecountry's historiography.Hence there now exists a large inventory of interpretationsbuilding upon such diverse themes as sectionalism,regionalism,economic antagonism,politicalineptitude tc., nonewinningsubstantialavour o the exclusion of othersandfewer


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42 SaudChoudhryndSyedBasher

still, that can be completelydiscarded.While recent scholarshiphas been very active andproductive in assessing the political and military events surrounding he conflict, it issurprising hata dispassionate ppraisal f the War'seconomiccosts has not received ts fairshareof scholarlyattention.In fact, no systematic omputation f the War's immediateandlong-termeconomic impacthas been attempted o date. Existingstudies on this topic are atbest ad-hoc, focussing primarilyon the war's humancasualtiesand the value of destroyed2physicalcapital.Some aggravatematters ven further y notdiscounting rdeflating.This paper will attempt to bring some analytical order to the morass of empiricalobservations emanatingout of existing approaches.We will argue that a systematiccompilation of the War's total and distributive ffects should include both the directandindirectcosts: the costs of destruction nd expropriation f materials or militarypurposes,damages to physical infrastructure,he effect of commercial stoppages, the implicitmanpower osts of conscription nd fatalities, oregoneconsumption tc. Ideally,one shouldalso assign causativeweightsto any structural hangeobserved.This is probably mpossiblegiven the absence of detailed industry-wideand region-widedata in Bangladesh.Datalimitations definitely prohibitthe incorporation f all of these factors into a systematicappraisalof the conflict's totaleconomic impact.Consequently, nly relevantand availabledatawereemployed to enablestudentsand scholars o premisetheirdiscussionson groundsthat are not solely emotive.Their monetaryvalues were deflatedby price changes and theopportunity ost of capitalto obtainthe net cost. While not claiming to be exhaustive, hisapproachwill hopefully provide new insights into some of the broader ssues surroundingthe War's economic impact, as well as stimulate furtherresearch and analysis of thisimportant vent in Bangladesh'seconomic and socialhistory.Ourpaper is organised nto the following sections: SectionII providesan estimateofthe war's direct costs by adding up the value of destroyedphysical and humancapital.Forthe latter,we used a humancapital approach o determine he forgone eamings of the wardead,as thatwould indicate he extentto which the grossnationalproducthad been affectedby the casualtiesof war.

Section III discusses the drawbacksof this procedureand goes on to supplement heearlier indingswith an estimateof the War's indirectcost on both the wartimepopulationaswell as on subsequentgenerations.This is done by first creating a hypotheticalwarlesseconomy that presumablygrows at the pre-warrate and exhibits a peace-timeconsumptionstream hat also grows correspondingly. he discounteddifferencebetweenthehypothetical(no-War)consumption treamand actualpost-warconsumption, onstitutes he indirectcostof the conflict. Finally,Section IV providesa summary ndconcludingassessment.THE DIRECT COST OF THE WAR

Directestimatesof warcosts generally ncludemonetary xpenditures n the wareffortas well as the value of destroyedhumanandphysical capital.Warexpenditure iguresarehowever almost non-existent n thepresentcontext,reflecting he chaoticsupplyeffortsof acash-strapped, rovisionalgovemment nexile3.With contributionscomingfrom a variety


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EnduringSignificance 43

of sources- sympathetic oreigngovernments,privateaid agencies,expatriateBangladeshisliving in Englandand NorthAmerica4 s well as privatecitizens still residing n the occupiedterritories records could not be properly maintainedand at times may have even beendeliberatelyneglected. In addition, he fact that combatantswere almost never paid or paidinfrequently n much depreciatedcurrency, also accounts for incomplete data on warexpenditures.Nevertheless t does appearpossible to make reasonable stimatesof the war'sdirect costs by calculating the value of destroyed human and physical capital only. Theaforementioned missions are not likely to substantially lter our netcost calculations,sincethe War was of nine months durationonly and the combatantswere primarilyvolunteersoldiers.DESTRUCTION OF PHYSICALCAPITAL

Physicalcapital destruction s measuredas the differencebetween the pre-war(1970)value of physical capital and that at the end of the War (1973). Both the pre-warand post-war figuresare takenfrom EasterlyandLevine (1999) withappropriate djustments o makethe two figures comparable.This involved subtracting he discountedand deflated value ofthe stock of post-warphysicalcapitalfromthatexisting on the eve of the war. Table 1belowquantifies he resulting oss of physicalcapital,using threealternativeates of discount.Table 1. Physical Capital Destruction (Billions of US$)

Discountrates Post War 1970 Physicalcapital Destructionas aPhysicalCapital Capital Destructiondue (%)of pre-warStock Discounted Stock to capital stock.......... ..........__.... _F_

(4)(1) (2) (3) (3) - (2) (5)

Bank rate 5.00%b 36.48 45.15 8.67 19.18

Money market 35.97 45.15 9.18 20.32rate 5.50%c

Defense savingcertificate 31.73 45.15 13.41 29.72

Rate 10.00%NOTES: a .Thepost-warcapitalstock is US $42.24 billion.The discountrates aretaken fromIMF,1997, Yearbook. The capitalstockfiguresare foundin Easterlyand Levine(1999). b. Depositbankrate n Pakistan,1970. In 1971, the discountrate n Bangladeshwas also 5.00%. c. Moneymarket atein Pakistan,1970


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Table 1 illustrateshow extensive the materialdamagehad been. Seldomhas a short-lived conflict caused such disorganisation nd change in a country'seconomic life orentailedsuch burdensand sacrifices as did Bangladesh'sWarof Independence.When itended, the economy was left prostrate; ortuneshad been swept away and much of thecapital stock was destroyed or in disrepair.As shown above, even a modest 5 percentdiscount rate places the value of destroyedphysical capital at US$ 8.67 billion (orapproximatelya fifth of the country'spre-warcapitalstock)5.The most visible form ofdamage was to btansport acilities and it was several years before a fully functioningtransport ystemcould be said to have beenrestored.Thisposeda serious mpedimento thecountry'seconomicrecoveryas it hindered hesmooth low of goods andservices.While notclaiming hat heestimates nTable1 are exact andcomprehensive, urpaperdoes suggestcertain tandardshatarenecessary orcalculatinghesame.It is likelythatwemay have erred,andif so, it is probablyn the directionof underestimatinghe truecapitalloss. One factorbiasingtheseestimatesdownwardss a lack of full accountingof thewar'swantondestruction.Reports of travellersand war correspondentsndicate that in remoteborderareas,entirevillages,warehouses,mills,deserteddwellings(assumed o be homes ofrebels) were systematicallydestroyed.Even in the war-freedistricts,propertyhad beenneglectedandhaddepreciated n value.Absoluteaccuracyon a problemof this magnitudesnearly impossible, even though its quantifications important or comprehending hemagnitude f economicreconstruction'.HUMAN CAPITALLOSS

The loss resulting romwarfatalitiesconstitutes he othercomponentof ourdirectcostcalculations.Exactcasualtyfigures are not knownandestimatesrangefrom300,000 to asmany as 1,247,000 (Rummel;1997:331)7.Themonetaryoss attributableo thesealtemativecasualtyestimates s provided n Table 2 below. Since government ecordsdo not classifyfatalities by age, gender,occupationor educationalattainment,we decided to treat thefatalitypopulation as a homogeneousgroup. Per capita income of a specific year wasassumed o represent he individual's amed income (in thatparticular ear)had he or shesurvived he war.It was fruther ssumed hateachof thedeceasedwould havea working ifeof 25 years. Based on these assumptions, he presentvalue of the (deceased's)expectedincomestreammay be expressedas:

niGi=liM Gi exp(-pit)dtwhere Giis theexpectedaverage ncomeof thei-individualwho diedin theconflicti is thediscountrate

nA s theworkhorizonof thei-thindividualt is theworkingperiod


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Enduringignificance5

The cost of a single war death s thus computedas thepresentvalue of the foregoneincomewhich could have been earned by the deceased. The same when multiplied by the totalnumberof war dead providesanapproximation f the valueof humancapitaldestruction.Our human capital estimatesalso considered the loss of earnings capacity of thosemaimedor wounded.Figureson combatantswounded n theconflict was obtained rom therecords of the MuktijoddhaKalyan Trust (Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust). Thisorganisation rovidesfinancialassistance o the woundedcombatants ccording o the extentof theirdisabilityand we used theirfigures n our cost calculations. n calculating he humancapitalcost in this category,we assumed that there was a total loss of eamingcapacity forthoseconfined to wheelchairs; oss of 50 percentearningspotential or those with 20 to 60percentdisability;and finally,a loss of 70 percentearningspotential for the most disabled(60 to 90 percentdisability).The drawbackhere is theexclusion of civilians who may havebeen disabled by the conflict. Since the FreedomFightersWelfare Trust caters only to theneeds of the formercombatants,no reliable estimateof wounded civilians appears o be inexistence8.

Table 2. Economic Costs of the Human Casualties of War At aRate of Discount of (Billions of US$)

5% 10%Wounded 0.0011 0.006(All categories)WarDeada 0.857 0.4989War Deadb 3.566 2.074

NOTES: a. Economic costs counting the war dead at 300,000 b. Economiccosts countingthe wardead at 1,247,000As Table 2 illustrates, he total humancapital costs for Bangladesh can be variouslyestimatedat $0.86 billion or $3.57 billion dependingon the casualtyfigureconsideredandthe discount rate used. In addition,Bangladeshmade almost no net income during the warand the (greatly reduced) consumption t did achieve was drawnfrom its stock of capital.Even the most modest humancapital cost figure of $0.858 billion representnearly 13.2percentof thepre-warGDP and this suggests thatthe issue of the impactof waroughtalso

to tum on mattersrelating o personaleconomic costs and the resultingsocial discomforts,ratherhanthe destruction f physicalcapitalonly.The chilling aspect of this humancapital destruction s thatthe atrocities committedrepresenta classic combinationof gendercideandelitocide.Mascarenhas1972:116-117)


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contends hatthe carnagehad been carefullyplannedand the victimsdeliberatelyargeted:"Membersof the Awami League (the secessionist political party)- alloffice bearersand volunteerseven down to the lowest linkin thechain ofcommand....students college anduniversityboys and some of themoremilitant girls.... Bengali intellectuals such as professorsand teacherswheneverdamnedby thearmyas "militant".

Mascarenhas hus showsa clear linkbetweenthevictimsandtheirsocial class. Inshort,it was a carefullyplannedstrategy hat oftentargetedyoungmales for the most annihilatory9excesses9. Considering that the victims were mostly intellectuals and youngcollege/universitystudents, our use of per capita income figures as proxies for foregoneearnings,appears o have beenquite ustified.It ought to be pointed out thatthe calculationsabovedo not includethe cost of gender-selective atrocities, suffered by Bengali women almost all through he conflict. An exactcountof rape victimsis impossible o obtain n a countrywherefemalechastityandvirginityare cardinalprinciples. Susan Brownmiller (1993:81) reportsthree different figures -200,000, 300,000 or 400,000 - on rape victims. Any consensusis reallyunimportant ere,since even the lowest estimate (200,000) would make the 1971 events in Bangladeshcomparable o the infamousJapanese apes n Nanjingand those committedby the Germansin Russia during World War II. Also it is difficult to quantifythe consequenteconomiccosts, mainly because the victims had survivedthe conflictandone is not certainhow thetraumamay have affectedtheir ives in the aftermath.

Table 3. Total Direct Cost of the War (Billions of US$)Estimate a Estimate l1b

Destructionof physical 8.67 8.67capitalTotal Humancapitalloss 0.858 3.566TotalDirect Cost 9.528 12.236

NOTES:a. Estimate assumes discount ateof 5 percent ndcounts he wardeadas 300,000.b.EstimateIassumes discount ateof5 percent nd hehigher uman asualty stimatef 1,247,000.To summarise,Table 3 demonstrateshow large and expensive the war eventuallybecame. Yet a carefulassessmentof the immediatepre-warperiodand its politics,suggeststhat both parties had grossly underestimatedhe consequencesof their actions.The WestPakistanisexpected the confrontation o be no largerthan any "police action", devotedprimarily to upholdingfederal laws and protecting govemment property; ikewise the


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Enduringignificance7

secessionists(Bangladeshis) xpected the war to be very short-livedand as such, their leastcostly alternative.Evidently, the biggest surpriseof the war was how large it eventuallybecame.INDIRECT COSTS OF THE WAR

The direct cost estimates above are obviously deficient as they can not fully accountfor all costs actually incurred.In this section we develop an alternative indirect) methodof cost estimation that compares the actual post-war economy with a hypothetical war-free economy. While various assumptionsconcerningthis hypotheticaleconomy's rate ofgrowth may be made, we simply assume that in the absence of war the economy wouldhave continued to expand at its pre-warrate. In the process, the (hypothetical) economywould experience a particularrate of growth in per capitaconsumption. The discounteddifference between two consumption streams - the hypothetical minus the actual -constitutes our indirectestimate of the cost of war. The rationalefor such an approach sthat measured income may not decrease during wars. In fact it could even increase onaccount of the massive expendituresexpended on the war effort. On the other hand, acontraction n consumption s inevitable in every instance and as such, we treat foregoneconsumptionas a moreappropriate ndicatorof war costs.Table 4 shows that until 1992 hypotheticalconsumptionremained in excess of theactual, mplyingthatthe war continued o exactaneconomic toll even two decadesaftertheevent.These indirectcosts are an importantndicator f losses accruing o all survivors romthe disappearanceof specific business and earnings opportunities. With indirect costconstruedprimarily s foregone consumption, nythingandeverything hat affected earningability have been implicitlyaccounted or. In other words, we were able to incorporatehesufferings of the entire surviving population- wounded combatants,maimed civilians,traumatisedwomen etc. The direct cost estimates tend to be less comprehensive n theircoverage.

Althoughwe have based our indirectcost estimateson two differentdiscountrates,werealise that a considerationof other discount rates might be useful. Table 4 clearly showsthateven at a modest 5 percentdiscountrate, Bangladeshison average consumed roughly$500 million less, thanhad per capita consumption ontinued o grow at the pre-warrates.These losses that continued even two decades after the conflict's end, are sometimesattributedo a variety of other causes as well, the oft-cited one being frequentcommercialstoppagesdue to the country's endemic political instability'?. n addition,one shouldalsorecognise that the severance of all economic ties with Pakistan, aced Bangladeshwith themonumentalask of adjustingts economyto a new economic order.New marketshad to befoundfor productspreviouslyexported o Pakistan;new sourcesof input supplyhad to bedeveloped;also the vacuumcreatedwhenthePakistaniowners of industrial ndcommercialenterprises led or weredispossessedhad to be filled.All or mostof thesefactorsmust havecontributed o a lowering of measured consumption,as they may have been pivotal inpreventing he exploitationof scaleeconomies ncertaincriticalsectors.


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Evidentlyour indirectcost estimates,dependon ourassumptions onceniingtherateatwhich the economywould have grownin the absenceof the conflict.One can reasonablyargue hatTable4 mayhaveoverestimatedhe actualmagnitude f costs for two reasons:1. The actualconsumption treamalso embodiesthe effect of businessfluctuationsexperienced by the post-war economy. Since these disturbanceswere notconsidered when constructing the hypothetical consumption colunm, thediscrepancybetween the two may in fact be less thanthat reportedabove. It ishowever difficultto ascertain he magnitude f thiserror,mainlybecauseone does

not know to whatextent the businessfluctuationswerecausedby extemalfactorsandto whatdegreeby the war'swantondestruction.2. The loss estimatewill be smallerthanthatreportedabove, if one arguesthatthehypotheticalwar-free economy would have grownat a rate considerably lowerthan assumed.After all the oil crises of 1974, 1977 and 1980 - all hit Bangladeshhard as she faced the staggeringproblem of financing her growing energyrequirements.Butwhile oil is an important ommodityandOPEChad quadrupleditsprice,grainan evenmorevital commodityhadquadruplednpricefollowingthepoor harvestof 1972-73. In the world market ood prices were soaring:January1974 Rotterdamprices for importedUS hardwheat were over $6 per bushel -$3.30 abovethe level of the previousyear(Schertz;1966:524).This sharp ncreasein grainpricesquicklyerodedBangladesh'sown cash procurementor food, at atime whengovernment ood stocks were alreadybelow whatcouldbe considerednormal. A serious food crisis began taking shape, one that gained runawaymomentumwhen US aid commitmentsmade in the Fall of 1973 were still notforthcoming.

All these factors createda food crisis of unmanageableproportions,now knownas theautumn famine of 1973 . In the faceof these overwhelmingdifficultieson the food front,our hypotheticalwar-less economy could not have sustainedits projectedconsumptiontrajectory.Future researchon this topic mightconsidermakingadjustmentordeviationsfromthe trendvaluesduring hoseturbulent ears.SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT

The seriousgaps in information oupledwiththeoutpouring f passionatecommentaryand analysis, is perhapswhy the topic of the economic costs of the Bangladeshwar isfraughtwith controversyand conflictingand alternative nterpretations. ven to date, thedebatedoes not appearto be diminishingor approaching ny consensusof interpretation.Furthermore,he discussionis sometimestaintedby personalbiases - the views of authorswho have been involved with this topic far too intensively( e.g., Jahan,Brownmiller,Rummelet al.,) and fartoo long (e.g., Mascarhenas,Lifschultz,Parkinson t al.,) - to be able


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Table 4: The Indirect Costs of the 1971 War: Foregone Consumption(Millions of US$)Year Actual Hypothetical PVDFC Indirect Cost

Consumption Consumption(Cbt)b (5%)e (10%)f(Cat)1972 4685.799834 5149.491691 0 463.6918577 463.69185771973 5795.454656 6368.954428 1 546.1902589 521.3634291974 8642.252595 9497.462443 2 775.7005418 706.7849978

1975 13030.93141 14320.43096 3 1113.918198 968.82010031976 6764.275158 7433.646327 4 550.6933176 457.18951531977 6175.581832 6786.697781 5 478.8253368 379.45492361978 8737.356426 9601.977446 6 645.1935175 488.05602531979 9745.379651 10709.75144 7 685.3610296 494.87521531980 10893.7344 11971.74373 8 729.6391474 502.89930861981 12717.64163 13976.13902 9 811.2386404 533.7257471982 10755.07555 11819.36364 10 653.3805645 410.32913141983 11117.47856 12217.62891 11 643.2351197 385.59598331984 12231.91932 13442.35118 12 674.0137499 385.68089221985 13100.81408 14397.229 13 687.5165117 375.52522391986 12442.42405 13673.68679 14 621.8713495 324.22996051987 14535.76244 15974.17529 15 691.9011747 344.34459991988 15297.85125 16811.67799 16 693.50147 329.45280431989 15023.15734 16509.80124 17 648.6178088 294.124571990 17345.76366 19062.2453 18 713.2335745 308.72431041991 16563.04742 18202.07395 19 648.6184533 267.99393441992 16304.41112 17917.84382 20 608.0858161 239.8264901Total 241906.1124 265844.3724 14084.42744 9182.68902NOTES: a. The figure for actual consumptionhas been calculated using Summersand Heston(1998), The Penn WorldTables 5.6 and Easterlyand Yu (2000), The GlobalDevelopmentNetworkGrowthDatabase,WorldBank. We deflated he nominalconsumption iguresby the CPI(usinig1968as the base year) to obtain consumptionin real terms. b. In order to calculate the hypotheticalconsumption e first calculatedhe consumptionrowthrate(fi) of _thepre-war eriod. Weconsidered965-69as theprewareriod.Thebasicassumptionmployedere s that n the absenceof war,consumptionouldhave ncreasedt the sameannualateasduringhe 1965-69period.Ourcalculationshow hatannually,heaverageateof growth f consumptionbetween 965and1969)was 0.09Hence1 is 0.09. c. Present aluediscountactor.d. Indirectosthasbeencalculatedsing

1992 Cht - Catthe following formula,IndirectCost = . e. depositbank ratein Pakistan,1970.t = 1972 ( f+or(t- 197r)f. Rate n defenseavings ertificate-aopularonrmfprivateavings.


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to claim Jovian detachment.Settingthese caveats aside, we have long felt the need toconducta dispassionate,discipline-basednvestigation f threepossibilities: a) the warhadno effect on the overall growthrate; b) it hada retardingffector (c) it had anacceleratingone. Alternatively,one could argue that the war could have accelerated some sectors,retarded thersandhadno effecton others; hus on net,the impacton trendrates of growthwas neutral.This paperreached he followingconclusions n its questfor answersto theseand similarquestions:1. The hostilitiesbroke out because both sides viewed recourse o war as their least

costly alternative.Why the war became so large - much largerthanany policeaction upholdingfederallaws;several folds greater han the magnitudeof effortimpliedby the secessionist's irstcall to arms is a challenge orfuture cholarship.Our feeling is thatboth partieshad madeobjective,reasonablepredictionsabouttheir prospects n the war before resorting o it but thatan unusual um of eventshad invalidated heirexpectations.2. The directcost statisticcaptures ll warcosts exceptthosethatmaybe attributedopolitical instability,unrecorded seizures and confiscations etc. The indirectestimate on the other hand, capturesall costs since it measurestotal foregoneconsumptionof the entire survivingpopulation. Intuitivelyone would expect theindirectestimate figure to outweigh the direct cost figureso that the differencebetween the two, can be consideredas the cost that was not included n the directestimate.Ourfindings also show, thatBangladesh ncurred 9.53 billion in directcosts and $14.08 billion in indirectcosts (assuminga 5 percentdiscount rate andcountingthe war dead at 300,000). Counting he war dead at 1,247,000 the directcost estimateincreasesto $12.24 billion. It is clear that in either instance theindirect cost estimate is greater than the direct measure. This is as expectedbecausethe direct cost statistic s more narrowlydefined and excludes other warcosts such as those arising from political instability,commercialdisruptionetc.The indirect cost estimate, on the other hand, captures all possible costs andbenefits, since it is a measureof the total consumption oregone on accountof thewar. Hence, foregone consumption, ot income, is the more appropriatemeasureof thecost of a war. Even thoughmeasured ncomemay not decreaseduringa war(it may even increasedue to increasedmilitaryexpenditures), onsumption ouldfall dramatically.As such the cost of a war may be positive even though ncomeremains constant. Furthermore, ll physical capital, destroyedor created by thewar, is accounted or in our indirectmeasure n tenrs of the consumption hat itinhibits n termsof the consumption hat t inhibits.3. Finally, the indirectcost estimateof $14.08 billion confirmsour earlierassertionthatin actuality,war costs were far greater han the $200 million claimed by theUnited Nation's Relief Operation Survey (cited in Faaland and Parkinson;


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Enduringignificance 1

1976:12). The Bangladeshgovemment'sown statistics are similarly suspect asdifferent figures have been reportedat various times. A 1972 circular from theMinistry of Informationplaced the destructionof physical capital figure atapproximately 1.6 billion. The Ministryabsolves itself of any responsibility orcalculating he other costs by arguing hat"the loss of life, destructionof homes,griefand agony cannotbe calculated n termsof monetary alue."Critics may question our findingson the following grounds:the paper's inability toassess the war's true mpacton trendratesof growthbecauseof businesscontractions uring

the immediatepre and post-waryears; and finally,a failure to highlightthe variability nratesof output or key industries ndcommodities, eflecting mportant tructural hanges nthe post-wareconomy. Some historiansnmightven questionour use of quantitative ata todocument structural hanges. In their view, qualitativechanges in the country's post-warpolitical andsocial institutions may well have been the most important esultsof the war,and a quantitative nalysis such as ours can not suffice to illuminatewhat are essentiallyverbal, historicalgeneralisations.While these arguments re not withoutmerit, a counter-argumentwouldbe that he focuscould be on severalother ssues as well, - e.g., a shift in thelocus of nationalpolitical power, already underwaybefore the war; or, the desperatestrugglebetweentwo competingeconomic ideologies in the war's aftermath, ach aspiringto underwritets own economicand social agenda.Today, in Bangladesh, we are witnessing the slow death of the state-dominatedeconomic system put in place at the war's end. The transitiono marketorientation hatisstill underways irreversibly ltering herelationship etweenthepeople and theirpolitical,social and economic institutions.Consequently,the most visible structuralchanges inBangladesh oday are perhaps hegrowthof businessenterprise nd thegrowingconversionof mercantilecapitalisminto industrialcapitalism.The pace howeverhas been painfullyslow, falling shortof completefulfillmentbecausetherisingindustrial-capitalistlass is notin possessionof the instrumentalitiesf political power.Futureresearchon this topic maywantto revisittheseissues,to illuminate he full impactof changes n thebasicpoliticalandsocial institutionsas a resultof the war. Ourown plan is to conducta broader ollow-upinvestigation that will examine the War's impact on Pakistan's economy as well.Specifically, we will examine if Bangladesh would have gained from an alternative(peaceful)solutionsuchas compensated mancipationr even unilateralnon-compensated)emancipation.Apriori, t is our belief thatPakistanalso wouldhavefaredbetterby acceptingcompensated mancipation.


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52 SaudChoudhryandSyed Basher

ENDNOTES' Whenthe Britishabandoned ndiain 1947, Bangladeshbecame the easternprovinceofPakistan i.e., EastPakistan. But the union with West Pakistanwas an unhappyone bothpoliticallyandeconomically. The frustrationrewmainlyfromtheir ackof sharing n theeconomicfruitsof independence ndmodernization.Ironically, heeventualdisintegrationof Pakistancame in the aftermath f the country'sfirst ever democraticelection in 1970.The Awami League won an overwhelmingvictory in East Pakistan,while the PakistanPeople's Party(PPP) won a majorityof the seats in West Pakistan. The elections thusresulted n the creationof two regionallydominantparties,each bentuponweildingpowerat the nationallevel. The Awami League asserted ts rightto govern on the basis of itspredominanceundermajoritarianule; the PPP based its claim on the need for broaderregional representationo assure governmental egitimacy. Each threatenedto makegovernance difficult if its claims to govenmmentwere not honoured. In the politicalnegotiations hatfollowed, the country'scaretakermilitarygovernment nitially appearedcommitted o searchingfor a negotiatedsettlementof the dispute. Also such a prospectappearedquitepromising duringthe earlyweeks of negotiations. However,on February22, 1971 the generals n WestPakistan ook a decisionto crushthe Awami Leagueanditssupporters.Themilitarycrackdownwas finallylaunchedon March25, 1971 transforminga secessionistpoliticalconflictinto an all-out civil war. Afterragingforninemonths,theconflict came to a speedy resolutionwhen Indiadecided to intervene. On December3,1971, Indiaseeking to returnhemillionsof Bengalirefugees, auncheda full-scalemilitaryinvasion. The Pakistanidefenses, demoralizedby months of guerrillawarfare,quicklycollapsed. Finally, on December 16, 1971, the PakistaniCommanderagreed to anunconditionalurrenderndBangladeshwasbom.* Many have relied on a bewildering variety of sources for war damage estimates.Mascarenhas 1986: 21) refers to anenormouschart n the office of Dr. ViktorUmbricht,head of UNROD (UN Relief Operationsin Dhaka) as a ready reckoner for the wardamage. UNROD estimated hat at least 1.5 millionhouseshad to be rebuilt;$78 millionwas needed for food andhousing in the spring of 1972; $80 million for additionalfoodimports;$15 million for railwayrepairs;$13 million for inland water transport;$200million for industrialand agricultural quipment,inputs, etc. What gave the UNRODestimatestheircredibility,was the fact that UNROD was widely hailed as the greatestsingle internationaloutpouringof money, food, equipment and technical assistanceknownto date." The provisionalgovernment'simmediateconcem was to provide for the millions ofrefugees (10 millionaccording o theAsianRecorder,17(38),p.1030) who hadpoured ntoIndia.The financialburdenof refugeerelief was estimated by the WorldBank at about$700million in the fiscal year 1971-72 alone(WorldBankReport,17(41),p.10400.


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4. In addition o touching ndividualactsof generosity,one also remembers he 'Concert orBangladesh'organizedby Ravi Shankar,GeorgeHarrison nd others n New Yorkin 1971.In lateryears,this served as a model for BandAid andLive Aid Relief for faminestrickenAfrica5 FaalandandParkinson1976; 12) quotea UnitedNationsRelief Operationdocument hatestimatedthe war's materialdamagesat US$ 1200 million. This figureis highly suspectsince they never explain how this figure was actually calculated. Interestingly, otal UNassistance o Bangladeshhadreached$1200 million by the endof 1972; at around he sametime,the UnitedNations Relief Operationsn Dhakacame outwith its "Surveyof Damagesand Repairs"placingwar damagesat $1,200 million as well. The primaryobjectiveheremighthave beento demonstrate,hattheUnitedNationsassistanceprogramshadfullymadegood wartimedamageswithina shortspan ofjust two years.6. One couldarguethateven if these losses were accounted or, they would notsubstantiallyalterthe figuresin Table I. This is becausethe agriculturalapitalequipmentdamagedwasmostlyof the rudimentaryype;the ruralhomesdestroyedweremostlybamboohuts whichin any case require requent epair.7- Rummelalso cites otherswho place the casualtyestimatesat between 1 million to 3million. In our own cost calculationswe did not consider the brutalreprisalkillingsfollowingtheachievementof independence.Perhaps150,000 people weremurderedby thevengeful victors (Rummel; 991 p.334). This includednon-Bengalis as well as "Bengalimen..thosewho were coercedor bribed o collaboratewith the Pakistanis..."Jahan;p.298).8. Civilians maimedor woundedin the conflict are accounted or in our indirectestimatesprovided n Section1II.9 Rummeldescribesa gendericidal itualreminiscent f Nazi practices owardJewishmales.""In hat becameprovince-wideacts of genocide,Hindusweresoughtout andkilled on thespot...soldiers would check males for the obligated circumcision among Moslems. Ifcircumcised,hey might ive; if not, suredeath".10. Politicalinstabilityandturmoilbecame chronicfollowingthe assassinationof PresidentSheikh Mujibur Rahman, a short three years after Bangladesh achieved politicalindependence.GeneralZia eventually assumed power following a brief chaotic powerstruggle.While on the surfacehe appeared o have restoredmuch neededpoliticalstability,in realityhe was the targetof twentymutiniesand coup attempts n five years.The 21stkilled him.(Mascarhenas;986:v)." Choudhry 1985) has suggestedthatthe Bangladesh amineresulted rom the US refusalto ship committedaid throughouthe period 1973-74. It is true thatalternatingloods anddrought presentedthe occasion for the famine. But floods and droughtare permanentfeaturesof theclimaticcondition nBangladesh.Theyoccur at oft repeatedntervalsandthe


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54 Saud Choudhryand Syed Basher

result is usually dislocation,higher foodpricesand increasedmalnutrition, otwidespreadfamines.12.Post-warpoliticaland social institutionshave been in a state of flux, undergoingmarkedtemporalswings broughton by ideologicalconflicts. To elaborate:when the country irstemerged in 1971, it symbolized the attainmentof political sovereigntyon the basis ofBengali language and culture. Parliamentary emocracy,secularismand socialism wereproclaimedas the foundationsof the country'spoliticalsystem. The same were pushedtothe backgroundwhen Bangladeshwas declaredan Islamic stateon June 8, 1988. Manyargue that this oscillation between ethnicityand religion is actuallybased on politicalexpediencyand in tun affects Bangladesh'srelationswith her most importantneighbor,India.REFERENCESAsianRecorder 1971), Effectof RefugeeInfluxon Economy,WorldBankReport,17 (41).(1971), Totalof Refugees,17(38).Bhattacharyya,.K., (1988), Genocide in East Pakistan/Bangladesh: Horror Story, AGhoshPublishers,Calcutta, ndia.Brownmiller,S., (1993), Against OurWill:Men,Womenand Rape,FawcettBooks, New

York.Choudhry,Saud A., (1982), Food Policy, Inequality ndUnderdevelopment:he PoliticalEconomyof Food and Famine in Bangladesh:,UnpublishedM.A. Thesis, McGillUniversity,Montreal,Canada.Easterly,W and Levine, R., (1999). It is Not Factor Accumulation:Stylized Facts andGrowthModels,Mimeo,WorldBankand Universityof Minnesota,September1999.Easterly, W and Yu, Hairong (2000). GlobalDevelopmentNetworkGrowthDatabase.WorldBank.URL:http://www.worldbank.org/research/growthIGDNdata.htmFaaland,J., and J.R. Parkinson (1976). Bangladesh:The Test CaseforDevelopment,C.Hurstand Co.,London.Heston, Alan and Summers,Robert 1998). PennWorldTables.URL:Http://cansim.epas.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/pwt.htmlJahan, Rounaq 1972), Pakistan:Failure n NationalIntegration,ColumbiaUniversityPress,New York.(1980), BangladeshPolitics:ProblemsandIssues,Dhaka University Press Ltd.,Dhaka.Lifscultz, Lawrence (1979) Bangladesh:TheUnfinishedRevolution,Zed Press,New York.Mascarenhas,A. (I1971),Therapeof Bangladesh,Vikas,Delhi.Mascarehhas,A. (1986), Bangladesh:A Legacy of Blood, HodderandStoughtonLtd.,Suffolk,England.


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Ministryof Information1972). PhysicalCapitalDestruction. Collected fromWarMuseum,Segunbhagicha,Dhaka1000Rummel, R.J. (1997), Death By Government, Transaction Publishers,London,U.K.Schertz,Lyle P., (1974), WorldFood Prices and thePoor,ForeignAffairs,April, 1974.Sisson, Richard and Leo E. Rose, (1991), War and Secession: Pakistan, India, andtheCreationof Bangladesh,Universityof CalifomiaPress, California.United Nations Relief Operations(1972) ? Survey of Damages and Repairs, Dhaka,Bangladesh.

the enduring significance of bangladesh's war of independence

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