the enemy as a system_1

Strategy For The 21st Century

Prometheus ProcessPrometheus Process

venturistincorporated

Strategy To Tactics

Strategy To Tactics

USAF F-117 Weapons SchoolFebruary 2004

John A. Warden III

Strategy For The 21st Centuryventuristincorporated

Copyright Venturist, Inc. 2004 – All Rights Reserved

Superior Tactical Capability Does Not Ensure Success

Superior Tactical Capability Does Not Ensure Success

• Tactical Superiority Doesn’t Guarantee Success And Success Doesn’t Require Superior Tactics– US and North Vietnam– Apple and IBM Personal Computer– Germans vs Western Allies, WWI & II

• Strategy Is The Path To Consistent Success



Concept GenesisConcept Genesis

• No More Vietnams• Dissatisfaction With No-win Cold War-era

Attrition Plans For Europe And Korea• Concern That US Was Not Using Airpower To

Maximum Advantage• Need For Understandable, Functional War

Strategy—Especially Air Strategy• Significant Air Staff Experimentation Prior To

Gulf War I On European War Scenarios• First Live Test—January 1991



The Essence Of StrategyThe Essence Of Strategy

Where?

What?

How?

Exit?

Where Do You Want To Be In The Future?

What Are You Going To Apply Your Resources Against?

How Are You Going To Apply Your Resources?

Exit Plans For Everything?



Don’t Snatch Defeat From The Jaws Of Victory

+

-

Where?

What?

How?

Exit?

Internal

External

Parallel Campaigns Against Multiple Centers of Gravity From A Strategically Aligned Organization

Design the Future

Target for Success

Campaign to Win

Finish with Finesse



The Four Imperatives For Strategic Success

The Four Imperatives For Strategic Success

Design The Future Target For Success Campaign To Win Finish With Finesse

Environment

Future Picture

Guiding Precepts

Measures of Merit

Relevant Systems

Centers of Gravity

Desired Effects

Parallel Attack

Organization

Orchestration

Exit Points

Termination Plan

Reconstitution

WhereWhere HowHowWhatWhat ExitExit



Plan and Operate In The OpenPlan and Operate In The Open

Use A Red Team



PrecisionPrecision

Number of Bombs To Drop To Have A 90% Probability of One Bomb Hitting A Target A Third The Size of A Football Field

Conflict Average Miss Distance Number of Bombs

WW II (B-17s) 3300 Feet 9070

Desert Storm (F-117) < 10 Feet 1

Target Size:60 X 100 Feet

6000 sq ft

Reduced SupportLower CostFar Faster

Precision of EffectFewer Platforms

Capital Intense PlatformsFaster Platforms

Smaller Platforms



Gulf War ObjectivesGulf War Objectives

• Grand Strategic—Win The Peace By Eliminating Iraq’s Ability To Be A Strategic Threat To Its Neighbors Without Destroying It And Creating A Vacuum—Must Be Functional After War– Iraq Out Of Kuwait– Kuwait Government Restored– Regional Stability– Americans And Other Foreigners Safe

• Associated Precepts– War Against Saddam Hussein, Not Iraqi People– Minimize Civilian Casualties and Damage– Minimize Coalition Losses– Fight Asymmetrically



Imperative IIWhy Targeting Is Critical

Imperative IIWhy Targeting Is Critical

• Never Enough Resources AvailableTo Do Everything

• Have High Probability of Winning Despite Inadequate Resources

• Must Chose Where To Apply Resources

• Effort and Resources Must Be Applied Against Something—In Other Words: Targets

• Failure to Choose The Right Targets Dooms Operations Before They Begin

• The Right Targets Are The Key to Creating The Change Needed To Realize The Future Picture

• Targets Are Part of A System



System CharacteristicsSystem Characteristics

• Disparate Elements With Mutual Interaction• Need Information To Function As A System• Have Energy• Have Inertia—Resist Change—And Exhibit

The Hysteresis Effect• Have Centers Of Gravity• Have Similar Patterns Of Organization• Are Fractal (Patterns Repeat From

Large To Small)



Systems Have EnergySystems Have Energy

System ModelEnergy Change

Negative

Energy Change Positive



Systems Resist ChangeSystems Resist Change

And Exhibit The Hysteresis Effect



Surface-To-Surface Missiles (SCUD)

Chem-Bio Capability

W ell Developed "State of the Art" Air Defenses

RadarsMissiles

AAA

Aircraft750 Shooters200 Support

24 Main Operating Bases30 Dispersal Bases

Over 200,000 Potential "Targets"

I n I raq!

Over 200,000 Potential "Targets"

I n I raq!

Systems andCenters of Gravity

Systems andCenters of Gravity

Leadership

System Essentials

Infrastructure

Population

Fielded Forces

E(s) = f(Leadership) x f(Processes) x f(Infrastructure) x f(Population) x f(Fielded Forces)

P(s) = f(physical) x f(morale)



Centers Of Gravity (COGs)Centers Of Gravity (COGs)

• The Leverage Points In The System Between You And Your Future Picture

• Have Disproportionate Impact

• High Return On Energy Investment

• Resources Limited? Attack Centers Of Gravity



Network Theory AndCenters Of Gravity


Number of Links

Num

ber

of N

odes

with

Lin

ks

Distribution of Node Linkage

From Barabasi & Bonabeau





Number of Links

Num

ber

of N

odes

with

Lin

ks

Distribution of Node Linkage

From Barabasi & Bonabeau

+

-

-



System AttributesThe Five Rings

System AttributesThe Five Rings

Person StateCompany/

Market

LeadershipLeadership

System Essentials

System Essentials

InfrastructureInfrastructure

PopulationPopulation

Fielded ForcesFielded Forces

Brain

Circulatory,Neuro System

Bones, Muscle

Cells

Leukocytes

President, KeyMedia, Policy

Makers

CommunicationsEnergy

Highways

DemographicGroups

Military, Police, Merchants, Agencies

CEO, Board, Market Leaders

Innovation, Finance,

Communications

Plants, Value Networks,

Installed Base

Employee Groups, Customers

Sales, Buyers, Retail Outlets



The Leadership RingThe Leadership Ring

• Those Elements Of A System That Consciously Try To Move It In AParticular Direction– Almost Always Several Leadership Elements– Rarely Will They Have Same Motivations– Relatively Autonomous, Choose What To Do– May Not Have Formal Titles– May Be Individuals Or Entities– Normally Provide Very High Leverage

• Examples Include: President, Government Ministers, Senior Military, Key Media, Key Financiers,Key Influencers



The System Essential (Processes) Ring

The System Essential (Processes) Ring

• Those Elements Of A System That Convert Energy From One Form To Another

• Examples Include: Internal And External Communication, Electricity, Recruiting, Training, Financing, And Production

• The Processes Ring Offers Great Leverage For System Change Because A Change In This Ring Will Affect The Rest Of The System



The Infrastructure RingThe Infrastructure Ring

• Those Elements Of A System That Are Relatively Stationary And Constant– May Be Physical Such As A Road, Or May Be

Conceptual Such As An Organization Structure

• Examples Include: Buildings, Roads, Rivers, And Wires And Cables



The Population RingThe Population Ring

• The Demographic Groups That Categorize The People Who Are Part Of A System (Young, Old, Male, Female, Rich, Poor, Professionals, Clerics)

• Demographic Groups Tend To Respond To Similar Stimuli (Publications, Messages, Rewards)

• In The Population Ring, You Address Groups, Not Individuals. For Example: Officers In General, Not General Smith

• The People In The Population Ring Demographic Groups May Show Up As Individuals In Other Rings. – For Example, General Smith Would Be Part Of The

“officers” Demographic, But May Also Be The Air Force Commander In The Leadership Ring



The Fielded Forces (Agents) Ring

The Fielded Forces (Agents) Ring

• Those Elements In A System That Do Tactical Jobs– Fielded Forces Have Latitude In How To Do A Job, But

Not Whether To Do It

– Fielded Forces Execute Policy But Do Not HaveThe Authority To Create It (But May Influence It)

– Agents Are The Instruments Of The System

• Examples Include: A Fighter Squadron, A Division, A Corps

• Fielded Forces Are Important But Are Difficult To Change And Keep Changed So The Leverage Tends To Be Low For Overall System Change



Normal Leverage By RingNormal Leverage By RingR

etu

rn O

n In

ves

tmen

t

LeadershipRing 1

Lo

wH

igh

Sys EssentialsRing 2

InfrastructureRing 3

Population Ring 4

Fielded ForcesRing 5



Finding Centers of GravityFinding Centers of Gravity

• Once The Five Ring Pattern of Systems Is Understood, It Is Easy To Find COGs For Any System

• Review Future Picture • Map The Relevant Systems• In A System, Start With The Leadership Ring

– Identify Elements In This Ring Which Will Have A Disproportionate Impact and Which Will Advance Realization of Future Picture

• After The Leadership Ring, Do The Same Thing For The Remaining Four Rings: Processes, Infrastructure, Population and Agents

• A Key Center of Gravity May Not Exist; If So, Create It



Map The Relevant SystemGeopolitics

Map The Relevant SystemGeopolitics

Enemy Military

Your Military

Your Nation

Energy

$

Media

LeadersComm

People

Don’t Start Here

Potential Allies

Allies

UN, NATO, Etc

Start Here!

AlliesEnemy Nation

Energy

$

Media

LeadersComm

Production

People

Or Here



Mil HQs

Enemy Gov

Your Media

Comm Repair Teams

Energy System

Transport System

IADS

Navy

CAOCSupport

IADSOr Here

Start Here!

Map The Relevant SystemMap The Relevant System

F-117s

Enemy Media

B-2s

Don’t Start Here

Or Here



Iraq I: Finding Centers of Gravity

Iraq I: Finding Centers of Gravity

Air & Missile Offense

Saddam HusseinSaddam Hussein National

Communications

Railroads

military officers

Air Defense

Baath PartyBaath Party

ElectricalSystem

Bridges

shiiites

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Defense

PetroleumSystem

sunnitesWeapons of Mass

Destruction Programs

middle class

tikritis

clerics



Leadership Processes Fielded ForcesInfrastructure Population

Iraq IFinding Centers of Gravity

Iraq IFinding Centers of Gravity

Saddam Hussein

National Communications

Railroads military officers Air Defense (IADS)

Key Baathists

ElectricalSystem

Bridges shiiites Air & Missile Offense

Snr Defense Leaders

PetroleumSystem sunnites

Weapons of Mass Destruction Prg

middle class

tikritis

clericsUS Intell

US Military

US Police

other nationals

own people

US Transport

US R&D

National Communications

US Congress

George Bush

National Leaders

Key Buildings



Systems Are FractalSystems Are Fractal



Fractal COGsThe Electrical System

Fractal COGsThe Electrical System


Minister of Interior

PowerConversion

Transmission Lines

managersState Security

Forces

Chief, Iraqi Electrical Grid

Generation engineers Repair Teams

Site ManagerVoltage

Conversionlinesmen

end users

End Use Sites



Decide The Desired EffectsDecide The Desired Effects

• To Reach Your Future Picture, Change The Relevant Systems By Affecting Their Centers of Gravity

• Decide What Each Center of Gravity Must Become—The Desired Effect (s)—To Force NeededSystem Change– Desired Effect Is Not How You Will Make The Change

• Stay At The “Desired Effects” High Level Until You Can’t Stand It; Going To “HOWs”Sub-optimizes Efforts

• If You Know The COG And The Desired Effect, There Is A Way To Make It Happen—Always



Desired Effects andImpact Plans

Desired Effects andImpact Plans

• A Key Component of Success Is Action—Making Something Happen

• Impact Plans Show Actions Associated With A COG• Basic Strategic Components of An Impact Plan

– Desired Effect: What Needs To Happen To A COG(Its End State)

– Measure of Merit: Measures Progress Toward The Desired Effect

– Timeframe: When Must The Desired Effect Be Realized

• Basic Tactical Components Of An Impact Plan– Action: How Will It Be Done, Who Will Have Responsibility,

and What Will It Cost: (Details Worked In Imperative III—Campaign To Win)



Iraq I--Determining Desired EffectsAn Impact Plan Extract 1990-1991

Iraq I--Determining Desired EffectsAn Impact Plan Extract 1990-1991

SaddamHussein

Electrical System

Sample Centers of Gravity

DesiredEffect

Measureof Merit

TimeFrame

Roads and Bridges

Military Officers

Air Offense

Ineffective Leadership During

The War

Little or No Electricity Available

Around Country

Unable To Support Surface Mobility

Officers Separated From Saddam

Unable To Conduct Effective Strategic

Ops

Insufficient Supplies Reaching Deployed

Fielded Forces

Physically Gone, No Evidence of Rational

ResponseLights Out In

Baghdad (and the Other Major Cities)

Defections, Unit Surrenders, Rebellions

US Ops Not Seriously Hindered

First 24 Hours of War

First Hour of War For Baghdad Area; 3-5 Days For Rest

First Week With Results Clear In

Three Weeks

During Course of War

First 3 Days



Generic IADS Impact PlanGeneric IADS Impact Plan

• Desired Effect 1: Unable To Hinder US Air Attack Operations

• Measure Of Merit: No Losses To IADS• Time Frame: First 6 Hours• Desired Effect 2: IADS Restored After End Of

War• Measure Of Merit: Functions Effectively

Against Non-US Threats• Timeframe: 30 Days After War Termination




IADS Centers of GravityIADS Centers of Gravity

AF Commander

Communications officers AD Sqdns

ElectricalSystem

enlisted Radar Sqdns

sects

Logistics ethnic

Fly Sqdn

Intel

Sec Police

others

pilots

Logistics

US R&D

Communications

JFC

JFACC

Wing Cmdr

Runways

SecurityDetection

Roads & Bridges

Air Def Cmdr

Fielded Forces(Agents)

Zone Cmdrs

Facilities

SAM Sqdns



IADS--Determining Desired EffectsA Sample Impact Plan Extract

IADS--Determining Desired EffectsA Sample Impact Plan Extract

Sample Centers of Gravity

DesiredEffect

Measureof Merit

TimeFrame

AF Cmdr

Communications

Detection

Electricity

Air Def Ftr Sqdn

Unable to coordinate operations

Communication between IADS nodes ineffective

Unable to see strategic air situation

No grid power available

Unable to make effective attacks

Units operating autonomously

No competent AF level instructions

Units late in responding to in-bounds

All ops on backup-power

No aircraft launches

6 Hours

6 Hours

4 Hours

2 Hours

12 Hours



Using Fractals From Strategy To Tactics

Using Fractals From Strategy To Tactics

1. Review The Desired Effect, Measures, And TimeFrames

2. Do A Fractal Analysis Of The Center Of Gravity

3. Identify The Fractal COG (s) That Must Be Affected

4. Create “Strategic” Impact Plans For The

Chosen Fractal COG (s)

5. Develop Action Plans (tactics) For The Key

Fractal COG(s)

6. Red Team 7. Execute 8. Review In Open Planning



Desired EffectsFocus On Results

Desired EffectsFocus On Results

• Realize Future Picture By Affecting The System—Individual, Country,Market, Company

• Force Changes In The Energy Level of The Target Systems

• Measure Success Against Effect on Function, Not On Inputs Or Tactical Results

• Make The “Desired Effects” A Reality!– Recognize Effort, Reward Success



Imperative II: Target For SuccessThe System Process

Imperative II: Target For SuccessThe System Process

Right External System

Future Picture

Right Internal System

Current External System

Current Internal System

TIME

Current Picture



Imperative III—Campaign To WinImperative III—Campaign To Win

• Systems Stand Between An Organization’s Present Position And Its Future Picture

• Use Campaigns To Change Internal And External Systems To Reach The Future Picture

• Build An Aligned Organization Able To Conduct Parallel Operations

• Execute Parallel Operations To Improve Probability Of Success Dramatically Over Serial Operations

• Orchestrate Resources For A Symphony,Not A Cacophony



Serial WarfareSerial Warfare

Battle 2 P(S) = .9

Battle 1 P(S) = .9

Battle 4 P(S) = .9Battle 3 P(S) = .9

Battle 6 P(S) = .9

Battle 5 P(S) = .9

Win The War P(S) = .38

Battle 7 P(S) = .9



Parallel Attack--IraqParallel Attack--Iraq



Cost of Operations

Enemy Has Time To React

Enemy Counter-Offensive

Enemy Begins To Acquire Allies

Enemy Employs Special Weapons

World Opinion Shifts

Domestic Support Wanes

Time To Attack Enemy Centers of Gravity Very Short Very Long

Low

High

Likelihood of Achieving Objectives

Time Value of ActionWar

Time Value of ActionWar

Theoretical Perfect Plan,

Highly Parallel, No

Enemy Reaction

SerialDomainParallel

Domain

Ps



Program Cost

Time Value of ActionAcquisition

Time Value of ActionAcquisition

Users Want Changes

Cost-Overruns Inspire Foes

Program #s Scaled Back

Alternative Solutions

World Changes

System Irrelevant

Time Required To Complete All The Steps Associated With A New Weapon System

3 Years 20 Years

Low

High

Likelihood of Achieving Objectives

SerialDomainParallel

Domain

Ps

The Ideal Program: Very Compressed,

Highly Parallel. Like U-2, F-117,

GBU-28

10 Years



• Forces and Assets Withheld Or Ready To Be Made Available For Employment At A Critical Juncture

– Availability Reduces Risk Significantly• Employment of Reserves Should Make Fundamental Change

In A Situation

– Battle of Britain– The Unexpected Tour Bus At The Fast Food

Restaurant• Use To Reinforce Success, Check Failure, Ensure Results

– Battle of The Bulge• Failure to Maintain Reserves Frequently Fatal

– France –June 1940– Hewlett-Packard Kittyhawk Project

Maintain and Use ReservesTo Make A Difference

Maintain and Use ReservesTo Make A Difference



The Problem: Paralysis Of Fifty Target System With Ten Single Bomb AircraftThe Problem: Paralysis Of Fifty Target System With Ten Single Bomb Aircraft


20% Miss Rate/day (All Causes)

Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 51

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10



10 Aircraft, 5 Waves, No Reserves, Re-attack Previous Wave Missed Targets10 Aircraft, 5 Waves, No Reserves, Re-attack Previous Wave Missed Targets



1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

w2

w2

80%

x

x

x

x

x

x

w3

w3

w3

w3

60%

x

x

x

x

x

w4

w4

w4

w4

w4

50%

x

x

x

x

w5

w5

w5

w5

w5

w5

40%

x

x

x

30%




2/10 Aircraft In Reserve Worst Case

2/10 Aircraft In Reserve Worst Case


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

x

x

x

x

x

x

r2

r2

75%

x

x

x

x

x

x

r3

r3

75%

x

x

x

x

x

x

r4

r4

75%

x

x

x

x

x

x

r5

r5

75%

x

x

x

X

X

X

75%





Air Attack—2/10 Aircraft In Reserve Best Case

Air Attack—2/10 Aircraft In Reserve Best Case


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

x

x

x

x

x

x

r1

r1

100

x

x

x

x

x

x

r2

r2

100

x

x

x

x

x

x

r3

r3

100

x

x

x

x

x

x

r4

r4

100

x

x

x

X

X

X

r5

r5

100





System EquationsSystem Equations

•1. FPNew= f(∆Esys)

•2. PsFP= ∆Esys/T

•3. ∆Esys=∆|Ecog1 + Ecog2 + Ecog3 … .|

•4. ECogF= (Ec0)(F)

•5. F = (Resources)(Acceleration)



Think Like An ArchitectThink Like An Architect

Think Like An Architect

Not Like A Bricklayer!



Impose Your Plan!Impose Your Plan!

• The Best Plans Seize The Initiative

– And Deprive Your Opponent Or Market Of The Ability To React

• The Next Best Plan Forces Reaction—Which May Necessitate Subsequent Response

• The Worst Plan Cedes The Initiative, Takes Planning Out Of Your Hands, And Forces You To React



External

Internal

Strategically Aligned Organization

ParallelOperations

Open Planning

Strate

gic

Measu

res

Guiding Precepts

Smart End Games

+

-

Design the Future

Target for Success

Campaign to Win

Finish with Finesse

Strategy For The 21st Century

Prometheus ProcessPrometheus Process

venturistincorporated

Strategy To TacticsUSAF F-117 Weapons School

February 2004

Strategy To TacticsUSAF F-117 Weapons School

February 2004

Insights and Discussion

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the enemy as a system_1

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muscle cells leukocytes

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linksfrom barabasi

determining desired effects

neuro system bones

infrastructure wave 3x

population wave 4x

processes wave 2x