the epistemological challenge of revisionary metaphysics

volume13,no.12 june2013

The Epistemological

Challenge of Revisionary

Metaphysics

Uriah KriegelJean Nicod Institute

© 2013 UriahKriegelThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/013012/>

Introduction

Descriptivemetaphysicsisconcernedwithwhatthestructureofreal-itywouldbeifitwereaccuratelymirroredinthestructureofourcon-ceptualscheme,theconceptualschemeweactuallyhave.Revisionarymetaphysicsisconcernedwithwhatthestructureofrealitywouldbeif itwereaccuratelymirrored in theconceptualschemeweought tohave.1Itisnaturaltosupposethattheconceptualschemeweoughttohaveisthatwhichcarvesnatureatitsjoints,capturingthe“true”struc-tureofreality.Ifso,revisionarymetaphysicsiseffectivelyconcernedtoexposetheconceptual-scheme-independentstructureofreality.2

AtthetimeStrawson(1959)firstarticulatedthedistinctionbetweendescriptiveandrevisionarymetaphysics,theformeroccupiedcenterstageinmetaphysicalpractice.Infact,skepticismabouttheviabilityofrevisionarymetaphysicsisarecurringthemeinphilosophy.3Notwith-standing this troubledhistory,nowadays revisionarymetaphysics isascendant,widelyconsideredtheonlymetaphysicsworthpursuing.4

1. Thesecharacterizationsaremeantasinformal.Theterms‘structureofreality’,‘conceptualscheme’,and‘mirroring’cancertainlyappearvague,atleastpriortophilosophicalelucidation.Ileavethemintuitivebecausetheparticularelu-cidationtheyultimatelyoughttoreceiveshouldnotaffectthethesisofthepaper.Informally,wemayunderstand‘thestructureofreality’asamatterofwhatentities thereareandhowtheyarerelated; ‘conceptualscheme’asamatterofwhatconcept-levelmentalrepresentationstheaveragesubjecthasandhowtheyarerelated;and‘mirroring’intermsoftherepresentationrela-tionbetweenthelatterandtheformer.

2. Theissueofrevisionarymetaphysics’characterizationisnotentirelyclearinStrawson.Hewrites(1959:9): ‘Descriptivemetaphysicsisconcernedtode-scribetheactualstructureofourthoughtabouttheworld,revisionarymeta-physicsisconcernedtoproduceabetterstructure.’Presumablywhatmakesthestructurebetter,however, isprecisely that it captures thestructure theworldreallyhas.

3. DuringStrawson’scareer,itwasmostlyCarnap’s(1950)distinctionbetweeninternalandexternalquestions inmetaphysics,andhisargumentsagainsttheintelligibilityofexternalquestions,thatunderwrotethewidespreadskep-ticism.Forreasonsthatwecannotgointohere,theinternal/externaldistinc-tionmapsquiteneatlyontothedescriptive/revisionaryone:arguably,inter-nalquestionsarethequestionsdescriptivemetaphysicsattemptstoanswer,externalonesthosethatrevisionarymetaphysicsdoes.

4. Workingmetaphysiciansdonottypicallyusetheterm‘revisionarymetaphys-ics’,butmostdotakethemselvestostudytheworld’srealstructure,notthe

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Formy part, I find it hard to swallow this kind of epistemologi-calskepticism(Iwillexplainmyresistancein§4.)Itdoesseemtome,however,thatgiventheprominenceofrevisionarymetaphysicsincur-rentphilosophicalpractice,itsepistemologicalunderpinningsaredis-concertinglyunderdeveloped.Withthisinmind,Iwishtoprosecutesystematicallyanepistemologicalchallengetorevisionarymetaphys-ics.Thechallengeistoidentifypotentialgroundsonwhichwemightjustifiably believe one among a number of competing revisionary-metaphysicaltheories.Goingthroughthe“usualsuspects”fortheorychoice,Iwanttoarguethatrelativelyunsurprisingassumptionscastdoubtontheexistenceofsuchgrounds.The“usualsuspects”arethreetypesofconsiderationonemightadducetosupportatheoryovercom-petitors: (1) that itaccommodates theempiricalevidencebetter; (2)thatitaccordsbetterwithintuition;(3)thatitfaresbetterwithrespecttothe‘super-empirical’or‘theoretical’virtues.Ifnoneofthesecanbeshowntosupportametaphysicaltheoryasmorelikelytobetruethanitscompetitors,thenhoweverunpalatablethisistocontemplate,wewouldhavetoprovisionallyacceptthatinmanyareasofrevisionarymetaphysicswecanneverknowwhichtheoryistrue.7Asnoted,Iampersonallynotyetresignedtothiskindofepistemologicalskepticism,butnoramIclearonhowitmightbeovercome;hence‘challenge’.

Eachof§§1–3discussesoneofthe“usualsuspects”.In§1,Iarguethat, at least in paradigmatic, central cases, the choice among com-petingtheoriesinrevisionarymetaphysicsisunderdeterminedbytheempiricalevidence:thecompetingtheoriesaccommodatetheempiri-caldataequally.In§2,Iraiseconsiderationssuggestingthatappealtointuitionscannotremovethisunderdetermination:althoughsomein-tuitionscanfunctionasevidence/dataindescriptivemetaphysics,they7. Notethattheresultingcaseforepistemologicalskepticism(whichispresent-

edhereinahypotheticalmode,sinceIamnotmyselfresignedtoityet)isimportantlydifferent fromBennett’s.Bennett supportsher epistemologicalskepticismwithapairofcasestudies:disputesaboutmereologicalcomposi-tionandaboutmaterialconstitutionandcollocation.WhatIdevelophere,bycontrast, isa“top-down”case,inwhichprincipledreasonsareadducedforrejectingappealtoanyofthepotentialgroundsforbeliefinonemetaphysicaltheoryoveranother.

Yet concerns about its theoretical underpinnings remain. Over thepastdecade,severalphilosophershaveconsistentlypressedaseman-ticchallenge,claimingthatrevisionary-metaphysicaldisputesaretypi-callyverbal,withdisputantseffectivelytalkingpasteachother.Thus,EliHirsch (2002, 2005, 2007) has argued that disputants in central,paradigmaticmetaphysicaldisputesusequanitifiertermsindifferentsenses,andanumberofotherauthorshavemadesimilarclaims(e. g.,Sidelle2002,Thomasson2007,Chalmers2009);manyareinspiredbyCarnap(1950).

Besidethesemanticchallenge,revisionarymetaphysicsmayalsoface an epistemological challenge. Karen Bennett (2009: 42) has sug-gestedthatoften‘thereislittlejustificationforbelieving’oneoftwoopposingontologicalpropositions.Formostontologicalpropositionsoftheform<thereareFs>,thereisequalepistemicjustificationforas-sentasfordissent.Moregenerally,onemightproposethefollowingskeptical thesis: foranypairof revisionary-metaphysical theoriesT1 andT2,suchthatT1andT2are(i)internallycoherentand(ii)mutuallyinconsistent,thereisnotepistemicjustificationforbelievingT1morethanT2 orT2more thanT1.

5 This thesisdoesnot call intoquestiontheexistenceoffacts of the matterthatsettlemetaphysicaldisputes,northepossibilityof formulatingdisputessotheycomeoutsubstantiveratherthanverbal.Butitdoescallintoquestionourabilitytoknowthedispute-settlingfacts,andtothatextenttheepistemologicalviabilityofpursuingrevisionarymetaphysics.6

oneitisattributedbyourpre-philosophicalconceptualscheme.

5. Thenotionof‘believingmore’maybeinterpretedintermsofcredences.Theskepticalthesiswouldthenbethatthereisnotepistemicjustificationtohavehighercredenceinoneofthetworevisionary-metaphysicaltheories.

6. Itcertainlycallsintoquestionourvisionofwhatthe‘endofmetaphysicalin-quiry’mightlooklike:ifthereisnowaytosettlemetaphysicaldisputesabouttheconceptual-scheme-independentstructureoftheworld(i. e.,revisionary-metaphysicaldisputes), then thepursuitof revisionarymetaphysicswouldappeartobeoflimitedpurpose.Itmayissueinclarificationofwhichglobalpackage deals are genuinely coherent and stable, but it cannot illuminatewhichamongseveralsuchpackagedealsoughttobebelieved.



1. Revisionary Metaphysics and Empirical Adequacy

Consideranontologicaldebateontheexistenceofflowers.Asfarasdescriptivemetaphysicsisconcerned,thereisnoreasonwhyitshouldflourish:clearlytheontologyimplicit inourconceptualschemepos-itsflowers.Asfarasrevisionarymetaphysicsisconcerned,however,thematterisfarfromstraightforward.Accordingtosomemetaphysi-cians,strictlyspeakingtherearenoflowers,onlysub-atomicparticlesarranged flower-wise (Merricks 2001, Rosen and Dorr 2002, Sider2013).10Accordingtoothers,flowersexistinadditiontoparticles,how-everarranged,butsodomuchmorearbitrary-lookingobjects,suchasthefusionofthefloweronmydesk,thedeskitself,andthemoon(VanCleve1986,Lewis1991).Anintermediatepositioncountenancesflow-ersbutnotanyoldflower-involvingpluralityofobjects (Markosian1998,Smith2005,Kriegel2008).11

Howshouldwedecidebetween(a)theflowernihilismthatadmitsonlyparticlesarrangedflower-wise,(b)theblossominguniversalismthat admits flowers and any other arbitrary concoctions involvingthem,and (c) the restrictivism thatadmitsflowersbutnotarbitraryconcoctions?Inotherareasofinquiry,thefirsttouchstoneoftheorychoiceisempirical adequacy:howwellthevarioustheoriesaccommo-datetheempiricalevidence.‘Accommodation’hereshouldbeunder-stoodrathernarrowly:asamatteroftheaccuratepredictionoffutureobservations, description of present observations, and ‘retrodiction’(‘postdiction’)ofpastobservations.12Wemighthopethatcompeting

10. BothRosenandDorrandSiderdenytheexistenceofanyconcreteparticularsother thanmereologicalsimples.Merricks,bycontrast,accepts inadditiontheexistenceofconsciouscomposites.Unless it turnsout thatflowersareconscious(say,becausepanpsychismorpanexperientialismistrue),hison-tologywouldnotincludeflowers.

11. Theintermediatepositiontypicallyaccepts‘medium-sizeddrygoods’ofthesortfolkintuitionsconsidertobeobjects.Assuch,itcouldverywellbepro-posedasathesisindescriptivemetaphysics.However,theviewcouldalsobeofferedinthesamespiritasthetwootherrevisionaryclaimsmentionedinthemaintext.

12. Thestatusofexplainingthedataisproblematic.Iwilltakeuptheissuein§3.2.

lackanyevidentiaryconnectiontothesesinrevisionarymetaphysics.8 In§3,Isuggestthatthetheoreticalorsuper-empiricalvirtues—parsi-mony,unity,andsoon—cannothelpeither:whileit isunclearhowsuchvirtuesaresupposedtobetruth-conduciveeveninthecontextofscientificorfolktheorizing,therearespeciallyacutereasonstodoubttheirtruth-conducivenessinthecontextofmetaphysicaltheorizing.9 Theupshotwouldbeaclearchallengetotheepistemologicalfounda-tionsofmetaphysicsaspracticedtodaybymany.Unlessthechallengecanbemet,therationalstancetowardtheaverageissueinrevisionarymetaphysicswouldbetowithholdjudgmentonwhichamongtheco-herentoptionsisthetrueone.

One lastnotebeforestarting.Someof theconsiderations raisedbelowmightstrikethereaderasmorecompellingwhenappliedspe-cificallytoontology,ratherthanmetaphysicsmorebroadly.(Wemaysuppose,forthesakeofthisdiscussion,thatontologyisthebranchofmetaphysicsconcernedwithexistencequestions.)Althoughmyownsense is that theseconsiderationsapplyat least somewhat toallofmetaphysics, this isnot immensely important formypurposes.Forlargeportionsof currentwork inmetaphysics are focusedononto-logicalquestions,especially theontologyofmaterialobjects. If theepistemologicalchallengepresentedhereturnsouttochallengeonlyrevisionary ontology (rather thanmetaphysics), it would still be apressingchallenge.

8. Ifcertainintuitionscouldserveasevidenceinrevisionarymetaphysics,thiswouldsupplyrevisionarymetaphysicswithproprietary,non-empiricaldatathatmayremovetheunderdeterminationofrevisionary-metaphysicaltheoryby(overall)evidence.Theabsenceofsuchevidence,conversely,meansthatrevisionarymetaphysics is “stuck”with the same evidence as empirical in-quiry,evidenceitistypicallyunderdeterminedby.

9. Ifso,thetheoreticalvirtuesareunfittorecommendrevisionary-metaphysicalthesesforacceptanceas true.Theymayrecommendthemforsomeotherkindofacceptance,butnotforacceptance-as-true,thatistosay,notforbelief.Moreonthatinduecourse.



W1,W2,andW3asmerelyepistemicallypossibleworlds.Thepresentpointispreciselythatobservationisepistemically neutralasbetweennihilism,restrictivism,anduniversalism.Theworldwould lookthesame—affordthesameobservations—regardlessofwhetheritcon-tainedflowersoronlyfloralarrangementsofsimples.

Itmightbeobjected that in fact theobservationsdo tell againstflowernihilism,sincesomeofourobservationsarepreciselyas of flow-ers!Butthenihilistwouldprobablydenyanyreportoftheform‘Sob-servesflowers’andassertinitsstead‘Sobservesfloralarrangements’.Itisintuitiveforustoreportourobservationalstatesusingtheconceptof flowers, because our conceptual scheme is ontologically commit-tedtoflowers.Butanihilistracewithadifferentconceptualschemewouldreporttheverysameobservationinflower-freevocabulary.Theobservations themselves are the same; theonlydisagreement isonhowtoreportthem.

Theobjectormayinsistthatthereisadifferencebetweenourob-servationsandthenihilistrace’sthatgoesbeyondreportage.Forper-ception, and hence observation, is theory-laden and has conceptual content,soitscontentisaffectedbythekindofconceptstheobserverpossesses.Inobservingtherelevantaspectsoftheworld,wedeploytheconceptofaflower, they theconceptofafloralarrangementofsimples. It isplain,however,thatrevisionarymetaphysiciansdonottakefloralobservationstosettle the issue theyare interestedin—orthedisputewouldneverhave gottenoff the ground.Thenihilist iswellawareofournaturaltendencytoconceptualizethefloralaspectsof theworld in terms of flowers. But she explains this tendency intermsofourperceptionbeingladenwithafalseontologicaltheoryoftheworld.Furthermore,shemightholdthatmaturehumanitycouldlearntoperceivetheworldcorrectly, thatis, inawaythatimplicatestrue theories(seeChurchland1979).15Sincenihilismisthetruetheory

15. Churchlandarguedthatalthoughcurrentlyourperceptionofthesunisbe-holdentoafolkphysicsthatisgeocentric,therightkindofeducationcouldleadfuturegenerationstoperceivethesuninawaythatisladenwithahelio-centrictheory.

theoriesinrevisionarymetaphysics,suchas(a)–(c)above,wouldbedistinguishedintheirempiricaladequacy,someaccommodatingtheempiricaldatabetterthanothers.

Unfortunately, thishopewillalmostcertainlybefrustrated.Nihil-ism,universalism,andrestrictivismaccommodatetheempiricaldataequally:observationsofthe‘floralaspectoftheworld’(thephraseissub-optimal)areconsistentwithallthreeviews.Nihilismwouldclaimthatsuchobservationsareproducedbycertainarrangementsofparti-cles—floralarrangements—whileuniversalismandrestrictivismthatthey are produced by flowers. The observations themselves do notdiscriminatebetweenthesetwoepistemicpossibilities,sincefloralar-rangementsofparticleslookexactlylikeflowers.13Onecannotsimplylook and seetodecidetheissue.Ultimately,thisisbecausewhilewecanperceive (largeenough) collectionsofparticles,wecannotperceive(instantiationsof)thecompositionrelation.Thissuggeststhat(a)–(c)areempirically equivalent.

Tobringthisout,supposeforthesakeofargumentthatmereologi-calcompositioniscontingent,assomehavesuggested(Rosen2006,Cameron 2007, Bohn 2009). Then there are three metaphysicallyqualitativelyindistinguishablepossibleworldsW1,W2,andW3,suchthatinW1therearenoflowers,inW2thereareflowersbutnotarbi-traryflower-involvingconcoctions,andinW3thereareflowersandanyarbitraryconcoctionsofwhichtheyarepart.14Tosaythatmereo-logicalnihilism,restrictivism,anduniversalismareempiricallyequiv-alentistosaythatallthreeworldslook the same—toahumansubject,certainly,butarguablytoanysubject.Nopossibleobservationcouldtellyouinwhichofthethreeworldsyoulive.Now,themetaphysicalcontingencyof composition is of course very contentious. But it isalsoinessentialtothepoint.Wecanfollowthesamereasoningwith

13. Indeed, revisionarymetaphysicians often emphasize this in an attempt toblunttheforceofinstinctualskepticalreactionstotheirradicallyrevisionarymetaphysicaltheories(see,e. g.,Merricks2001).

14. Let worlds be ‘qualitatively indistinguishable’ just when themereologicalsimplesinthemarethesameandhavethesameintrinsicproperties.



super-empirical(or theoretical)adequacy in§3.(Inproceedingthus,I donotmean to suggest that inquiry is neatly factorizable into anempiricalstageandasuper-orpost-empiricalstage.18)Thepurposeofthepresentsectionissimplytopointoutthatempiricaladequacyassuchisincapableofdoingsuchdiscriminating.Myclaimthusfarhasbeenthatthisismostcertainlythecaseforthedisputeamongnihilists,universalists,andrestrictivists.19

Howmanyothermetaphysicaldisputesare likefloralmereology inthisregard?Howmanyconcernempiricallyequivalentmetaphysicaltheories?Arguablymost,possiblyall.Spaceandenergylimitationsdonotpermitanexhaustiveexaminationhere,butconsiderthecaseofsomeperennialproblemsofmetaphysics:productionandregularitytheories of causation both accommodate observations of causal ex-changes;theoriesofpropertiesasPlatonicante remuniversals,asAr-istotelianin reuniversals,andas(bundlesof)tropesallaccommodateobservationsofqualitativesimilaritiesanddissimilarities;substratumandbundletheoriesofobjectsbothaccommodatetheirowndata.Foreach,wecanconceiveofcorrespondingepistemicallypossibleworldsthatlook the same.

Itmightbeobjectedthatinsomeareasmetaphysicaltheorieshavebeenclaimed toaccommodateempiricaldatabetter than theircom-petitors.Thus,Balashov(2000,2010)hasmadeasustainedargumentthat the theory of relativity favors perdurantism over endurantismabout persistence. It might be claimed that manymetaphysical de-batesmightturnouttobeamenabletothissortofempiricalresolution.Myresponse is threefold.First, it isofcoursecontroversialwhether

18. Inpracticetheprocessinterminglesallthoseaspects.Ionlymeantosuggestthatitisusefultothinkoftheprocess’endresultasretrospectivelyamenabletoanalysisintoanempiricaldimensionandasuper-empiricaldimension.

19. Notewell: this claim is fully consistentwith therebeinganobjective factofthematterthatmakesoneofthethreetheoriestrueandtheothersfalse.Fortruetheoriescanverywellbeempiricallyequivalenttofalseones—andoftenare.

inthisarea,thiswouldinvolveperceivingtherelevantchunksoftheworldasmerefloralarrangements.16

Inanycase,theremustbeanotionofobservationthatisnotcon-cept-laden (at leastnot ladenwithflower concepts), sinceasnotedabovewecannottellby lookingwhichamongnihilism,restrictivism,oruniversalismistrue.Evenclassicproponentsofthetheory-ladennessofobservation,suchasHanson(1958Ch.1), recognizesomenotionsofobservationasnottheory-laden(e. g.,anotionofseeingsuchthat,uponlookingatthesun,KeplerandTychoseethesamething).17Han-sonhimselfarguedthat this thinnernotionofobservationissimplynotthemostusefulforilluminatingscientificinquiry.Butforallthatitmaybethemostusefulforilluminatingmetaphysicalinquiry.Andin-deed,theongoingdebateabouttheontologyofmereologicalcompos-itesmakesnosenseifweuseatheory-ladennotionofobservationthatrendersnihilismdisconfirmedbymundaneobservationsofthefloralaspectoftheworld.Thedebatewouldhavebeensettledlongago.

A different objection to the empirical equivalence of the abovefloralontologiesmightbe thatalthoughall threecanaccommodatetheobservationaldata,somedoitbetter thanothers.Thus,arguablyrestrictivismexplains thedatamoresimply,nihilismmoreparsimoni-ously, anduniversalismmoreuniformly.Regardlessofwhether suchclaimsaretrue,however,theydonotconcerntheempiricaladequacyofthecompetitors,narrowlyconstrued(intermsof‘accommodation’asdefinedabove).For theyconcernsuper-empiricalvirtuessuchassimplicity, parsimony, andunity. Iwill discuss theprospects fordis-criminatingamongrevisionary-metaphysicaltheoriesintermsoftheir

16. Giventhis,topointoutthatourobservationsareladenwiththeconceptofflowerismerelytoclaimthatthefolkontologyrecognizesflowers,andthatconsequentlythatourconceptualschemeisflower-friendly.This,however,issomethingwealreadyknew,andsomethingofrelevancetodescriptivemeta-physicsonly.

17. Hanson(1958:5)writes:“Wemustproceedcarefully,forwhereveritmakessensetosaythattwoscientistslookingatxdonotseethesamething,theremustalwaysbeapriorsenseinwhichdoseethesamething.Theissueis,then,‘whichofthesesensesismostilluminatingforunderstandingofobser-vationalphysics?’”



When two competing theories are empirically equivalent, what wehave on our hands is underdetermination of theory by empirical evi-dence. In the philosophy of science, such underdetermination hasbeentheobjectofmuchdiscussion(seetheliteratureontheso-calledQuine-DuhemThesis),22ofteninthecontextofdebatesonscientificrealism.Particularly influentialhasbeenvanFraassen’s (1980) argu-mentfromunderdeterminationtohisbrandofscientificanti-realism,‘constructiveempiricism’.Thecentralthesisofconstructiveempiricismisthatacceptingascientifictheorydoesnotinvolvebelievingittobetrue.Perhapsitisusefultoacceptit,perhapsitisacceptedforsomeotherreason;butitisnotforbeingbelievedtobetruethatitisaccept-ed.23 Onecentralargumentforthisisfromunderdetermination,andproceedsroughlyasfollows:when two incompatible scientific theories are empirically equivalent, we have no reason to believe either to be true; for virtually any scientific theory, we can think up an empirically equivalent incompatible theory; therefore, we have no reason to believe virtually any scientific theory to be true.24

The debate over constructive empiricism is ongoing, but to mymind a parallel argument aboutmetaphysical theorieswould be pri-ma faciemuchmoreplausible.Theparallelmeta-metaphysicalthesiswouldbethatacceptinga(revisionary-)metaphysicaltheorydoesnotinvolvebelieving it tobe true.And theparallelargumentwouldbethis: when two incompatible metaphysical theories are empirically

22. TheclassicdiscussionisinDuhem1914.

23. AsvanFraassen (1980:12)puts it: “Scienceaims togiveus theorieswhichareempiricallyadequate;andacceptanceofatheoryinvolvesasbeliefonlythatitisempiricallyadequate.”NotethatvanFraassenseemstoworkwithaconceptionofbeliefasapotentialcomponent,oraspect,ofacceptance.Onenatural interpretationisthatacceptanceisagenusofwhichbelief isaspe-cies—believingsomethingisamatterofacceptingitas true.

24. Torepeat,wemaystillacceptascientifictheory,say,becauseitisusefultodoso,butthisisnotthesameasbelievingittobetrue.AsvanFraassenwouldputit,wemaystillacceptonetheoryoveranotherforpragmaticreasons,butthisisnottobeconfusedforacceptingitforepistemicreasons,andonlyepis-temicreasonscanleadustoacceptatheoryas true,asopposedto(say)ac-ceptingitas useful.

relativitytheoryindeeddiscriminatesbetweentheoriesofpersistence;Gilmore(2002,2006),forinstance,persistentlyarguesforrelativisticendurance.Secondly,evenifthisdisputeisempiricallyresolvable,fornowitstandsastheexceptionthatprovestherule.Iftheepistemologi-calchallengeIamattemptingtoformulatechallengesmany,butnotall, revisionary-metaphysicaldisputes, then it is still importantandwor-risome.Thirdly,ifwhatsettlesthedebatebetweenperdurantismandendurantismis thetheoryofrelativity, thenitmaybereasonabletoregardthedebateasonlysuperficiallymetaphysical.Atheart,theissueisscientificratherthanmetaphysical,empiricalratherthanphilosoph-ical.20Afterall,itisthephysicist,notthemetaphysician,whoallegedlydemonstratesthetruthofperdurantism.

Thisbringsupamoregeneralpoint:at least forcentral,paradig-maticdebatesinrevisionarymetaphysics,thedebatestartspreciselywheretheempiricaldataend.Itislegitimatetoholdthatbytheirverynature,metaphysical disputes concern empirically intractable issues(thisispartofwhatmakesthemmetaphysical).Whenanissueturnsouttobeamenabletoempiricalresolution,weare(quiterationally)temptedtosaythatitwasmisclassifiedasmetaphysicalallalong.

Itmightbeobjectedthatwhileextrapolationfromfloralontologytootherontological debates is justified, extrapolation tometaphysical debatesmoregenerallyisnot.Asnotedabove,Iwouldbehappytodirectthepaper’sepistemologicalchallengeagainstrevisionaryontol-ogyonly.Still,Isuspectthatthecaseapplieswithsimilarforcetonon-ontologicalmetaphysicaldebates,andwillconductthediscussionasthoughthisisthecase.21

20.Thisdoesnotrequiremaintainingacategoricaldistinctionbetweenscienceandphilosophy.Evenifthetwolieonaspectrum,adisputethatturnsouttoberesolvedbyappealtoempiricaldatawouldappeartolieratherclosertothescientificendofthespectrum.

21. Thereisalsothepossibility,ofcourse,thatthepresentepistemologicalcaseextends,evenmoregenerally,toallphilosophical theories,includingon-meta-physicalphilosophicaltheories.



(Putnam1975:73).The thought suggests the followingbitofabduc-tivereasoning:theoryTisempiricallyadequate(e. g.,predictivelysuc-cessful); thebest explanationofT’s empirical adequacy isT’s truth;therefore,plausibly,Tistrue.Thissortofinferencegeneratesareasonforbelievingthetruthofanyempiricallyadequatetheory.Theargu-mentwas originally applied to scientific theories, but the reasoningcanbereadilyadaptedformetaphysicalones(seeSider2009).27Suchaninferenceisfrustrated,however,whentwoincompatibletheories(whetherscientificormetaphysical)areempiricallyequivalent.Forwecannotinfersimultaneouslytothetruthoftwoincompatibletheories,onpainofcontradiction.Therifeempiricalequivalenceamongmeta-physicaltheoriesthusundercutsthissortofreasontoinferthetruthofametaphysicaltheoryfromitsempiricaladequacy.

Itmightbearguedthatwhereasscientifictheoriesareanswerabletoempiricalevidenceonly,theremaybeanother,non-empiricalsourceofevidencethatmetaphysicaltheoriesmustanswertoaswell.Thatis,metaphysicsmayhaveitsownproprietarydatatofacethetribunalof.Inparticular,thehistoryofmetaphysicsrevealsapersistentappealtointuitionasagroundforpreferringsomemetaphysicaltheoriesoverothers.Itmightbesuggestedthatempiricaladequacyisonlyonepartofametaphysicaltheory’soverallevidentialadequacy,theotherbeingits intuitive adequacy. Thus althoughunderdeterminedby empiricalevidence,metaphysicaltheorymayyetbedeterminedbyintuitiveevi-dence.Thisisthetopicofthenextsection.

2. Revisionary Metaphysics and Intuitive Adequacy

Thereare,infact,twodistinctkindsofappealtointuitionintheannalsofmetaphysics.Ontheonehand, thereare intuitionswhosepropo-sitionalcontentconcernswhethera(typicallycounterfactual)object,feature,or scenario fallsunderacertain (typicallypre-philosophicalor ‘folk’) concept. On the other hand, there are intuitions whose

27. Siderarguesthatthebestexplanationofscience’ssuccessinvolvesnotonlyscientificrealismbutalsoontologicalrealism.IargueatlengthagainstSider’sadaptationofthemiracleargumentinKriegel2011.

equivalent,wehaveno reason to believe either to be true; for anymetaphysical theory,we can conceive of an incompatible empiricalequivalent;therefore,wehavenoreasontobelieveanymetaphysicaltheorytobetrue.

Van Fraassen’s argument has faced two outstanding objections.The first is that empirically equivalent theories are often super-empiricallynon-equivalent, and this givesus reason tobelieveonetheorymorethananother;thisissuewillberevisited§3.25Theotherobjection is that the mere conceivability-in-principle of an empiri-callyequivalentcompetitordoesnotunderminethereasonablenessof believing a scientific theory—only concrete, actually developedcompetitorshavethispower(LaudanandLeplin1991,Kitcher1993).Fromthisobjectionadebatehasensuedoverhowoftenascientifictheoryhasanempiricallyequivalentactualcompetitor,withscientificrealistsarguingthatthisisquiterareandanti-realiststhatitismorecommonthansuspected.Thiscontroversyconcernsuslittle.WhatIwishtonoteisonlythis:whileitiscontroversialhowoftenscientific theorieshaveactualempiricallyequivalentcompetitors,itisentirelyuncontroversialthatmetaphysicaltheoriesvirtuallyalwaysdo.Indeed,aswesawaboveitisarguablydefinitive,andcertainlycharacteristic,ofmetaphysicaldebatesthattheyconcernempiricallyequivalentin-compatible(actual)theories.Thusthiskindofobjectionhasnoforceinthemetaphysicalarena.26

Underdeterminationof theoryby evidence is also crucial for un-dermining the main argument against van Fraassen-style anti-real-ism—the ‘miracle argument’. This is the straightforward thoughtthat scientific anti-realismmakes “the success of science a miracle”

25. VanFraassen’sresponseistoclaimthatatheory’ssuper-empiricalvirtuesdonotportrayitasmorelikelytobetrue.Theyprovideonlyapragmaticreasontoacceptthetheory,notanepistemicone.

26.Thatis,thiskindofobjectiontothethesisthatacceptingascientifictheorydoesnotinvolvebelievingittobetruehasnoforceagainsttheparallelar-gumentforthethesisthatacceptingametaphysicaltheorydoesnotinvolvebelievingittobetrue.Thisraisesthequestionofwhatacceptanceofameta-physicaltheorydoesinvolve.Iwillreturntothisquestionin§4.



thisway,singularintuitionsplayanevidentialrolevis-à-visconcep-tual-analytictheses.

This might be hoped to help with the underdetermination ofmetaphysical theorybyempiricalevidence.For itmaywellbethatmanymetaphysical theories incorporate an element of conceptualanalysis. To the extent that they do, then, metaphysical theoriesshouldbe testablenot onlyby empirical evidencebut alsoby theevidenceofintuition.

Onecouldtrytoresistthisbyclaimingthattheentireenterpriseofconceptualanalysisisdefunctandunviable.Idonotsharethisas-sessment,however,sowillraiseadifferentissuehere.Iwanttoclaimthatwhile intuitionsaboutwhatobjectorscenariofallsunderwhatconceptcertainlyconstituteevidencefortheoriesaboutthemetaphys-ics implicit in our conceptual scheme (i. e., descriptive-metaphysicaltheories), it is unclearhow they could constitute evidence for theo-riesabouttheconceptual-scheme-independentstructureoftheworld(revisionary-metaphysicaltheories).

Tostart,observe that inmanyareasactualmetaphysicalpracticedoesnotaccord(singular)intuitionthekindofevidentialroleitplaysintraditionalconceptualanalysis.Ifitdid,thechoicebetweenapro-flowerandananti-flowerontologywouldbestraightforward.Forpre-philosophicalintuitioninstructsthatthefloweronmydeskqualifiesas—fallsundertheconceptof—anobject,entity,orexistent.30Indeed,ourflowerconcept isarguablygovernedbyanalyticconditionalsoftheform‘ifthereareflorallyarrangedsimplesatL,thenthereisaflow-eratL’(Thomasson2007).So,metaphysicianswhoaccordedanevi-dentialroletosingularintuitionsaboutflowers,chairs,cars,andsoonwouldhavetoconcludethatnihilismissomassivelydisconfirmedastonotmeritseriousconsideration.Yettypicallymetaphysiciansdonottaketheissuetheyareinterestedintobesostraightforwardlysettled.

30.At thesame time,pre-philosophical intuition instructs that thepluralityoftheflowerandmoondoesnotqualifyasanobjectoranentity.Soamongflower-friendlyontologiestherestrictivisitwouldobviouslyfarebetterthantheuniversalist.

propositionalcontentconcernstheallegedlymanifesttruthofsomegeneralprinciple(universallyorexistentiallyquantified).Iwillcallintuitionswiththeformercontentsingular intuitions,andthosewiththe latter content general intuitions. Gettier intuitions about knowl-edge andKripkean intuitions about reference are prime examplesof singular intuitions; Kim’s principle of causal closure and Lewis’principle rejecting ontic vagueness are examples of general intu-itions.28Myclaiminthissectionisthatinneithercaseisitclearhowthe intuition provides evidence for revisionary-metaphysical theo-ries.Iargue,in§2.1,thatwhileitisclearhowsingularintuitionsmayprovideevidencefortheoriesindescriptivemetaphysics,itisunclearhowtheyaresupposedtohaveanevidentiaryconnectiontotheoriesinrevisionary metaphysics;andin§2.2,thatwhilegeneralintuitionsarerelevanttorevisionarymetaphysics,itdoesnotseemtobeinanevidentialcapacitythattheyare.

2.1. Singular IntuitionsAppealtosingularintuitionsisthehallmarkofconceptualanalysis,wherebyweseektoarticulateaconcept’sapplicationconditionsby(first)examiningscenarios(potentiallyimaginary)inwhichthecon-ceptintuitivelyappliesorfailstoapply,and(second)attemptingtoextractthegeneralrulesthatmustbegoverningtheconcept’sappli-cation.Theprocedureisfamiliar,soIwillnotbelaborithere.29Whatmattersforourpurposesisthatinthisprocedure,singularintuitionsfunctionasdatapoints that conceptual-analytichypothesesareex-pected to accommodate. Thus,Gettier intuitions count as counter-evidence,ordisconfirmation,of thehypothesis that theconceptofknowledgeisproperlyappliedtoallandonlyjustifiedtruebeliefs.In

28.SeeGettier1963,Kripke1972,Kim1989,andLewis1991.

29. Insayingthattheprocedureisfamiliar,Idonotmeantosuggestthatitisob-vioustoreflectionexactlyhowitworks.Imerelymeantosuggestthatmanyofusarefamiliarwiththeprocedurefromourworkadaypractice(oratleastfromgraduateschool!)andknowitwhenweencounterit.



Tosummarize,singularintuitionsclearlyplaytheroleofevidenceintheenterpriseofconceptualanalysis,butconceptualanalysisseemstobeawayofdoingdescriptivemetaphysics,notawayofdoingrevi-sionarymetaphysics.34Unlesswe can show that conceptual analysiscanplaydoubledutyasamethodofrevisionarymetaphysicsaswell,orthatsingularintuitionscanbeevidenceforrevisionary-metaphys-icaltheoriesinsomeotherfashion(unrelatedtoconceptualanalysis),singularintuitionswouldappearirrelevanttorevisionarymetaphysics.

Itmightbesuggestedthattherelevanceofconceptualanalysistore-visionarymetaphysicscouldbesecuredwithinFrankJackson’s(1998)frameworkof‘seriousmetaphysics’(ashecallsit).Seriousmetaphys-ics is the project of producing a “comprehensive account of some subject-matter — the mind, the semantic, or, most ambitiously, every-thing — in terms of a limited number of more or less basic notions” (1998: 4). Given a list of all and only true statements (in English, say), we may wish to draw a subset in terms of a privileged, basic vocabulary, with the thought that all statements couched in non-basic vocabulary could be in some sense accounted for by statements couched exclusively in the basic vocabulary. One way to think of this is as an axiomatization project of sorts. The goal is to do something like axiomatizing our over-all theory of the world, except that the relation between basic and non-basic statements in serious metaphysics is probably laxer than the strict

theorizing,and thushavenoevidential statuswith respect to the relevanttheories.

34. Inotherwords,singularintuitionshavedirectevidentialrelevancetodescrip-tivemetaphysics, invirtueoftheirroleasdataforconceptualanalysis,butwhileconceptualanalysisisasine qua nonofdescriptivemetaphysics,itsrel-evancetorevisionarymetaphysicsitunclear.Ifso,at leastintheircapacityasdata for conceptualanalysis, singular intuitionshaveadirectevidentialrelevancetodescriptivemetaphysics,butnottorevisionarymetaphysics.Ac-cordingly,while(singular-)intuitiveadequacyisamajorsourceofevidentialsupportfordescriptive-metaphysicaltheories,ithasnoevidentialroletoplayvis-à-visrevisionary-metaphysicalones.

Indeed,thegreatmajorityappeartoprefernihilismanduniversalismoverrestrictivism.31

Whythisdismissiveattitudetowardsingularintuitions?Therea-sonissimple.Unlikedescriptivemetaphysics,revisionarymetaphys-icsisnotconcernedwiththestructureofourconceptsorconceptionsofreality,butwiththestructureofrealityitself.Insofarasitstudiesthe concept of existence, for instance, its target is not the conceptwehavebuttheconceptweoughttohave;notthefolkconcept,butthephilosophicalconcept.Thus,Sider(2009,2011)ishappytoallowthat theexistentialquantifier in Englishbehaves insuchaway that‘thereareflowers’comesouttruein English.Butheinsiststhatwecandefineanexistentialquantifierinsomeother,superiorlanguage,‘On-tologese’,whichcarvesnatureatits‘quantificationaljoints’;forSider,the truth of mereological nihilism ensures that ‘there are flowers’comesoutfalse in Ontologese.Whiledescriptivemetaphysics iscon-cernedwiththefolk’snaïveconceptofexistence(expressedby‘thereis’inEnglish),revisionarymetaphysicsisconcernedsolelywiththeontologist’srefinedconcept(expressedby‘thereis’inOntologese).32 If so,pre-philosophical intuitionsaboutwhatexistsare relevant totheconceptualanalysisofthefolk’sconcept,butnottheontologist’s.Tothatextent,theyarecentraltothetaskofdescriptivebutnotrevi-sionarymetaphysics.33

31. It may be objected that revisionary metaphysicians in fact do not acceptthatrestrictivismaccommodatessingular intuitionsbetterthanitscompeti-tion,onthegroundsthatthecompetitioncanaccommodatethoseintuitionsequallywhenitavailsitselfofthedeviceofparaphrase.Thus,thenihilistac-commodatesfloralintuitionsbyparaphrasing‘thereareflowers’into‘thereare simples arrangedflower-wise’.However it is not at all clearhow suchparaphrase recovers intuitions aboutflowers, and in any case, appeal to itwouldvery likelyyieldwidespread (singular-)intuitiveequivalenceamongcompeting revisionary-metaphysical theories, since it is widely suspectedthatsuchparaphrasescanalmostalwaysbecookedup.

32. Sidermakeshismoveintermsoflanguages,butplausiblycouldjustaswellmakeitintermsofconceptual schemes.

33. Itmightbe thought that refinedphilosophical intuitions could still beusedtofleshoutphilosophical concepts (suchas theontologist’sconceptofexis-tence),butsuchintuitions,ifthereareany,liedownstreamofphilosophical



thispre-orpara-philosophicaltheory.Makingexplicitthemetaphys-ics implicit insomenon-philosophical theory is thehallmarkofde-scriptivemetaphysics.

Considerhowthe‘seriousmetaphysics’frameworkappliestoourdebateinfloralontology.Surelyconceptualanalysisofourflowercon-ceptmakestheoverallscientifictheoryoftheworldentailthatthereareflowers.Indeed,itispreciselytheexistenceofparticlesarrangedflorallythatwouldentailtheexistenceofflowers,giventheaforemen-tioned Thomasson-style analytic conditionals. So if Jackson is right,theserious-metaphysicalquestionofwhetherthereareflowersisex-tremelystraightforward:conceptualanalysistellsusthatifthereareparticlesarrangedflorally,thenthereareflowers;sciencetellsusthatthereareparticlesarrangedflorally;so,thereareflowers.Butthere-visionary-metaphysicalquestionisnotsostraightforward,whichsug-gests that the twoprojects aredeeplydifferent. Importantly,mereo-logicalnihilistsneverdenytheexistenceofflorallyarrangedparticles(indeed,theymakeapointofassertingtheirexistence).NordotheydenytheanalysisoftheEnglishterm‘flower’thatprovidesfortheen-tailmentofflowertruthsbyfloral-arrangementtruths(typically,theymakenoclaimaboutwordsandconcepts).38Indenyingtheexistenceofflowersdespiteacceptingtheexistenceoffloralarrangementsandtherelevantanalysisof‘flower’,nihilistsmustthereforebemisconstru-ing themandateofmetaphysics—asunderstoodby Jackson, that is.TheirconceptionofmetaphysicsmustgobeyondJackson’s,tryingtodomorethanmakeexplicitthemetaphysicalcommitmentsimplicitinthisorthatnon-philosophicaltheory.39

38.Andeven if theydid, thatwould turn theirdebatewithpro-flowerontolo-gistsintoadebateaboutwhatwordsmean,withthefactsabouttheworld(asdescribedinthebasicvocabulary)set.Itisclearthatrevisionarymetaphysi-ciansdonottakethemselvestobedebatingthemeaningofwordswhileinagreementonthefacts.

39.Relatedly,giventhatfloralontologiesareempiricallyequivalent,maturesci-enceisboundtounderdeterminethequestionofwhetherthereareflowersornot.Helponthisquestionmustcomefromoutsidematurescientifictheory.YettheonlythingJacksonproposestodooutsidethattheoryisdefiningterms

deductive relation appealed to in axiomatics — perhaps it is something like Chalmers’ (2012) ‘scrutability’ relation.35

Animportantspecialcaseofbasicandnon-basicvocabulariescon-cernSellars’(1963) ‘scientificimage’and‘manifestimage’.Insofaraswehopetoreconcileourmanifestimage(roughly:theeverydaypic-tureoftheworld)withthescientificimage(thewaysciencetellsustheworldis),weshouldhopethatmanifest-imagestatementscanbeaccountedforintermsof(are‘scrutablefrom’)scientific-imagestate-ments.36Conceptualanalysis iscrucialtothisprojectbecauseoftheelusivedaylightbetweenreductionandelimination.Givenacompletedescriptionoftheworldinbasicscientificvocabulary,wemaywishtoknowwhetherthisorthatphenomenondescribedinmanifest-imagevocabularyhasaplaceintheworld—andifso,whatplace.37Address-ingthisquestionrequiresthatweknowthegeneralconditionsunderwhichchunksoftheworldcanbeproperlydescribedinterminologyfromthenon-basicvocabulary.Identifyingthosegeneralconditionsisthebusinessofconceptualanalysis.

Theproblemwiththissuggestionisthatwhileitdefendstheroleof conceptual analysis in ‘seriousmetaphysics’, the connection be-tween ‘seriousmetaphysics’ and revisionarymetaphysics isunclear.On the faceof it, seriousmetaphysics is anexercise inmakingex-plicitwhatisotherwiseimplicitinanalreadyestablishedtheoryoftheworld.Granted,thisisnotthefolk’stheorybutmaturescientifictheory.Crucially,however, it isnot a theorydevisedbymetaphysi-cians.Itisatheorydevisedthroughsomeotherkindofinquiry,andthemetaphysician’s job isonly tomakeexplicitwhat is implicit in

35. Strictdeductionistherelationbetweenaxiomsandtheoremsinaxiomatizedtheories.The scrutability relation (between thebase and the rest) is laxerthanstrictdeduction,however,andincludeswhatevercanbearrivedatbya priorireasoning.Inanycase,ifacomprehensiveserious-metaphysicaltheoryisnotquiteanaxiomatizedworldmodel,itissomethingwemightcalla“scru-tabilized”worldmodel.

36.Presumably,manifest-image statements are stated innon-basic vocabulary,whereasscientific-imagestatementsarestatedinbasicvocabulary.

37. ThisiswhatJackson(1998Ch.1)callsthe‘locationproblem’.



counterfactualratherthanactualcases.Thereasonwedonotappealto the conceivability offlowers infloral ontology is that there seemtobeactualflowersaplenty.Butgiventhatsingularintuitionsaboutactual cases turnedout tobe relevant todescriptive rather than re-visionary metaphysics, so should singular intuitions about counter-factualcases.Whetheraboutcounterfactualoractualcases,singularintuitionstrackwhatqualifiesassomethingunderour concepts.Singu-larintuitionsaboutflowersrevealwhetherworld-chunkssatisfytherequirementsonflowerhoodsetbyourconcept(thefolkconcept)ofaflower.Itisnotclearhowsingularintuitionscaninstructusabouttheworlditself,independentlyofourconcept(ion)sthereof.Certainlyitistherevisionarymetaphysician’schallengetotellushowtheymight.(Iwillconsideroneoptionmomentarily.)

Letmeexpandonthispointalittle.Recallthatoneobjectiontotheempiricalequivalenceoffloralontologieswastheideathatweactual-lyobserveflowers.Andrecallthatthenihilistresponsewasthatwhatwe in fact observe arenot flowers butmerelyfloral arrangementsmisdescribed by the folk asflowers.This response, of claiming thattheintentionalobjectoftheactofobservingissimplymisdescribed,canbemadeequallywithrespecttotheintentionalobjectoftheactofconceiving.JustaswecanmisdescribeourselvesasconceivingofwaterthatisnotH2Owheninfactweareconceivingofasubstancethatisnotwaterbutresembleswatersuperficially,sowecanmisde-scribe ourselves (e. g., in late preemption scenarios) as conceivingofE’s lackofcounterfactualdependenceonCwhen in factweareconceivingofsomeE’slackofcounterfactualdependenceonC.40ThestrategyisfamiliarfrommanyareasofphilosophywherethemodalthesesarepresentedasKripkeana posteriorinecessities.Aslongasthemodalclaimsconcernthestructureoftheworld,andnotmerelyourconceptualscheme,thisstrategyisaslegitimateasthenihilist’s

40.Lewis’(1986)discussionofthin,‘modallyfragile’events,whoseidentitycon-ditionschangewiththeslightestchangeintheirspatialortemporalproper-ties,attemptstohandlelatepreemptioncasespreciselyinthisway.

Itwouldseem,then,thatJackson’sframeworkdoesnotquitesecureanevidentialroleforsingularintuitionsinrevisionary metaphysics.Itsecuressuchanevidential role inseriousmetaphysics,but the latterseems to amount to regimenting and systematizing descriptivemeta-physics,orsomeextensionthereof(fromfolksytonon-folksytheories).

Anothersuggestionmightbethatsingularintuitionsplayaneviden-tial role inrevisionarymetaphysics in thecontextnotofconceptualanalysisbutofmodal epistemology.Revisionary-metaphysical theoriestypically attempt to capture the essence of their target, saywhat it is.Thustheycruciallymakeidentityandessenceclaims(e. g., ‘causality=counterfactualdependence’and‘itisintheessenceofcausalitythatCcausesEiffhadCnotoccurredEwouldnothaveoccurred’).Onthereasonableassumptionthatidentityandessencearenecessary,suchclaimsentailmodaltheses(e. g.,‘necessarily,CcausesEiffhadCnotoccurredEwouldnothaveoccurred’).Thesemodaltheses,oftheform<necessarily,p iffq>,canbe falsifiedbycitingapossiblescenario inwhichpistruebutqisfalse(e. g.,latepreemptionscenariosindiscus-sionsofcounterfactualtheoriesofcausation).Now,aplausiblestorycouldbetoldthatitispreciselysingularintuitionsthatgeneratesuchcounter-examples: singular intuitions instruct us about the conceiv-ability ofcertainscenarios,providinguswithpropositionsoftheform<conceivably,p & ~q>;propositionsoftheform<conceivably,p & ~q>constituteprima facie evidenceforpropositionsoftheform<possibly,p & ~q>;andpropositionsoftheform<possibly,p & ~q>arelogicallyequivalenttopropositionsoftheform<notnecessarily,piffq>.Inthisway,singularintuitionsprovideprima facie evidenceagainstmodalthe-ses,whichasnotedareentailedby the identityandessenceclaimscharacteristicofrevisionarymetaphysics.

To appreciate how this suggestion is problematic, considerfirst that conceivability data are just singular intuitions applied to

throughconceptualanalysisandlookingforentailmentrelationsbetweenthethusdefinedtermsandthemature-scientificdescriptionoftheworld.



Tosummarize,whatIhavecalledsingularintuitionsarebestthoughtofasevidenceforthesesofconceptualanalysis,whichareessentialto descriptive metaphysics; attempts to recruit conceptual analysisforrevisionarymetaphysics,ortoproduceanindependentevidentialroleforsingularintuitionsinrevisionarymetaphysics,appearsuspect.Giventhat,singularintuitionscannotsupplementempiricaldataasasourceofevidencethatmightdiscriminateamongempiricallyequiva-lentrevisionary-metaphysicaltheories.

2.2. General IntuitionsRevisionary metaphysicians routinely appeal to general intuitionsin justifyingpreferring their theoriesover rivals’.Thus,Lewis (1991)andSider(2001)havearguedthatrestrictivismviolatestheintuitivelycompellinggeneralprinciple that thesourceofvaguenessmustulti-matelylieinlanguageorconcepts,nottheworld—thereisno‘objec-tive’or‘worldly’or‘ontic’vagueness.Hereacertaingeneralintuition(aboutwhattheworldmustbeobjectivelylike)doessomeepistemicwork,sinceit iswieldedtoaffectthedialectic. Itmightbetemptingtosuggestthattheepistemicworkinquestionisevidence-providingwork.Inotherwords,ifageneralintuitionthatpconfersjustificationonthebelief thatp, itmightbetemptingtothinkthat itdoessobygeneratingsomekindofevidenceforp.Theproblemisthat,asIwillnowargue, it isunclearwhatmightbeevidence forwhatwhenweciteageneralintuitioninthecourseofaphilosophicaldispute.Con-sequently,itisunclearhowaccommodatinggeneralintuitionscouldbeaformofaccommodatingevidence.Atthesametime,Iwillargue,thereisaplausiblealternativeaccountofgeneralintuitions’epistemicroleintermsofenhancingtheoreticalorsuper-empiricaladequacy.

Question:whenonebelieves thatp on thebasis of intuiting thatp, whatpropositionissupposedtobeevidenceforp?Oneoptionisthat

strategyinhandlingtheapparentobservationofflowers;itis,infact,thesamestrategy.

Thereisonelastsuggestionwemustconsider.Thisisthethoughtthatsingularintuitionsinstructusnotaboutconcepts,butaboutproperties.When one intuits that some object qualifies as a flower, that someeventqualifiesasacausaltransaction,orthatsomequantityqualifiesaswater,theintuition’spropositionalcontentshouldnotbeconstruedas<thatobjectfallsundertheconceptflower>,<thateventfallsundertheconceptofcausation>,or<thatquantityfallsundertheconceptofwater>. It shouldbeconstruedas<thatobject instantiates theprop-ertyofflowerhood>,<thateventinstantiatestherelationofcausation>,and<thatquantityinstantiatesthenaturalkindpropertyofbeingwa-ter>.Inthisway,singularintuitionstellusabouttheproperty’sinstan-tiation conditions,notjustthecorrespondingconcept’sapplication condi-tions.Theytellusabouttheworld,notourconceptionthereof.

Thisviewwouldclearlysecureanevidentialroleforsingularintu-itionsinrevisionarymetaphysics.Itdoesinvolve,however,thenotionthatsingularintuitionsacquaintuswith,orotherwisemakeusdirectlyawareof,universalsandotherabstracta.Notoriously,thepsychologyandepistemologyofthissortofacquaintancewithabstractaisacanofworms.Irecognizethatthereexistmodelsofwhatmightunderliedirectacquaintancewithabstracta(e. g.,Bealer1998,Chudnoffforth-coming). Ifoneof these turnsout tobeworkable, itcouldcertainlyprovide the resources tomeet theepistemologicalchallenge to revi-sionarymetaphysicsIamdeveloping.Formypart,Iremainskeptical,forreasonsthatwillcomethroughin§2.2.Inanycase,itwouldbesur-prisingtolearnthattheonlyreasonrevisionarymetaphysicsislegiti-mateisthatweareblessedwithdirectacquaintancewithabstracta.41

41. Thisisimportant,becauseonegetstheimpressionthatphilosophersofmanystripesengageinrevisionarymetaphysics,includingnominalistswhodonotaccepttheexistenceofabstractaandstaunchnaturalistwhorejectacquain-tancewithsuch.



natureofthisconnectionisamatterofconsiderabledebate,44butisinanycaseunlikelytoholdbetweenintuitedandintuitings.Againtheis-suehastodowiththeintelligibilityofcausal(andnomic)connectionsbetweenabstractentitiesandconcretementaleventsandstates.45 Itisclearhowatabletriggersatable-perception,butveryunclearhowacausalclosuretriggersacausal-closure-intuition.Certainlyitistherevisionarymetaphysician’s challenge tomake sense of the idea ofmentalstatesresonatingwithabstractainthisway.

Alternatively,therevisionarymetaphysicianmightwishtoofferanon-causalstoryaboutwhatunderliesthetruth-trackingcharacterofgeneralintuitions.Itremainstobeseenhowthiscouldbedone.46Butthereisadeeperreasonforsuspicionhere.Evensettingasidecausalconsiderations,thedeepinsightbehindthereliabilistapproachtojus-tificationseemstobethis:amentalstatedisplayssensitivitytothewaytheworldiswhenpartoftheexplanationofwhythatstateoccurred(andnotanother)isthattheworldisthewayit is(andnotanother

44. SeeDretske1981,Millikan1984,Fodor1990,amongothers.

45. Iamassumingherewhatisplausible,thatapropositionsuchas<thephysi-calrealmiscausallyclosed>(or<therecannotbeonticvagueness>)isanabstractentity,andthatmentaleventsandstatesareconcrete.Thereare,tobesure,waysofthinkingofeventsand/orstatesasabstract,andperhapsofstatesofaffairsasconcrete,butthecrucialcontrastforpresentpurposesisthis:mentaleventsandstatesaredatedoccurrences,wherepropositionsareatemporal.

46.Onesuggestionmightbethatalthoughthetruth-trackingcapacityrequiresthedependenceof the intuition thatp onp, thedependenceneednot becausalornomic. It couldbe, instead,constitutive. JustasXantippe’swidow-hooddependsonSocrates’deathconstitutivelyratherthancausally,sotheintuition thatp dependsonp constitutively rather than causally: that intu-ition,andnotjustoneverylikeit,couldnotoccurunlessp.However,thisiseffectivelytoconstruegeneralintuitionsasfactivestates.Theproblemwiththisisthatifintuitionsarefactivestates,thentheyareaspeciesofagenuswemaycallseeming-intuitions,andit is thegenusratherthanthespeciesthatplays the relevant epistemic role in revisionarymetaphysics (i. e., it isgeneralseeming-intuitionsratherthanintuitionsthatweappealtoinmeta-physics).Obviously, if intuition is factive, thephilosophercanneverknowwhetherwhatsheishavingisanintuitionorastatesubjectivelylikeanintu-itionbutnon-factive(i. e.,aseeming-intuition).Whatsheappealsto,then,isthestate—whateveritis—thatissubjectivelylikeanintuition.

whenonebelievesthatpbecauseoneintuitsthatp, pconstitutesevi-denceforitself.Anotheristhatwhenonebelievesthatpbecauseoneintuitsthatp,<Iintuitthatp>isevidencefor<p>.Athirdisthatthereissomepropositionqthatisevidenceforp,suchthat(i)q≠pand(ii)q bearssomeintimaterelationRtotheintuitingofp.

Thefirstoptionseemssomewhatperverse.Whileperiodically inthehistoryofphilosophysomepropositionshavebeenclaimedtobe‘self-evident’,thisusuallymeantthatentertainingthemwassufficientforappreciatingtheirtruth;notthattheirtruthprovidedevidencefortheirtruth—astrangenotionindeed.42

Thesecondoptionseemsmorepromising.Reliabilistaccountsofperceptualjustificationhavemadeitplausiblethat<Iperceivethatp>isevidencefor<p>.Forperceptualexperiencesaresaidtobereliableinthesenseofbeingtruth-tracking:ifpwerenotthecase,onewouldnotbeperceivingthatp.43Thustheoccurrenceofone’sperceptionofpisareliableindicatorofpobtaining,making<aperceptionofpoc-curred>evidencefor<p>.Perhapsthesamecouldbesaidofintuition:ifgeneralintuitionsaretruth-tracking,inthatonetendsnottointuitthatpunlesspobtains,then<Iintuitthatp>isareliableindicatorof,andhenceevidence for,<p>.Thisgivesusamodelofhowgeneralintuitionscouldbesaidtoconstituteevidencefortheintuitedproposi-tion.Unfortunately,theanalogyseemstobreakdownwhenwecon-siderwhatmightunderlie intuition’s alleged truth-tracking character.Whatunderliesitintheperceptualcase,itseems,isabroadlycausal(ornomic)connectionbetweenperceivedandperceivings.Theexact

42. Iwishneithertoacceptnortodenythatsomepropositionsaresuchthatonecanappreciatetheirtruthsimplybyentertainingthem.Ionlywishtostressthat entertaining a propositiondoes not provide evidence for the proposi-tion.Whenthereisevidenceforp,itisalwayssomeotherpropositionthatprovides,orratherconstitutes,thatevidence.Itisnever(i)thepropositionp itselfor(ii)anon-proposition.

43. Theliteratureonreliabilismandtruth-trackingisbynowabundant,butfortheoriginalclassics,seeGoldman1967,Dretske1971,andNozick1981.Forarecentcomprehensivediscussion,seeRoush2005.



itselfevidenceforthebeliefthatthereisnoonticvagueness(an‘intui-tivebelief’).Thissuggestionisdoublyproblematic,however.

First, talk of perception providing evidence but not through itspropositionalcontentisnotimmediatelyintelligible.Whilethereisacasualwayofspeakingofperceptionsorintuitionsprovidingevidenceforbeliefs,thisseemsellipticalforsayingthatthecontentperceivedorintuitedprovidesevidenceforthecontentbelieved.Thisseemstoleadbacktopropositions.50

Moreimportantly,Ihavealreadyarguedthattheproposition<Iin-tuit thatp>doesnotprovideevidence for theproposition thatp (atleastpendingacompellingstoryaboutintuitionaltruth-tracking).Thepresentsuggestion is that the intuitionthatp itself isevidence forp.ButgivenwhatIhavealreadyargued,thiswouldrequiremyintuitionthatptobeevidenceforpeventhoughtheproposition<Iintuitthatp>isnot.Itishardtomakesenseofthenotionthattheepistemicstatusoftheintuitionthatpandofthepropositionregardingitcomeapartinthisway.51

Perhapsthemoststraightforwardaccountofintuitivejustificationisthekindofdogmatismor conservatismdeveloped, for instance,byHuemer(2001,2005).52Herethenotionthatintuitingthatpjustifiesbelievingthatpisderivedfromtwoprinciples:(i)thatifitseemsto

50.The onlyway it does not is if we understand the relevant content of per-ceptiontobenon-propositional.Butthisleadstoevenstrangerviews.Sup-poseperceptionhas ‘objectual’ rather thanpropositionalcontent—what isperceivedissimplythetable.Thentheresultingviewisthatthetableitself(orwhateverone takes tobe the intentional contentofa table-experience,whethertheexternalphysicaltableorsomeabstract,mental,orMeinongianentity)isevidenceforthepropositionthatatableispresent.Thisisevenlessintelligiblethantheideathatatable-experienceisevidencefortheproposi-tionthatatableispresent.

51. Moreplausibly,unlessastorycanbetoldaboutthetruth-trackingcapacityoftheintuition,theintuitionitselfcannotgenerateevidencewheretheproposi-tionregardingitcouldnot.

52. See especially Huemer 2001 Ch.3 for the general view of justification(whichhecalls ‘phenomenalconservatism’)andHuemer2005Ch.5 for its

way).Thuswhenp ispartof theexplanationofwhySbelievesthatp,thatcastsSasappropriatelysensitivetothewaytheworldis.ButwhenwetrytoexplainhowKimcametointuitthatthephysicalrealmiscausallyclosed,itseemslikethewrongexplanationtosaythatthephysicalrealm’scausalclosuremadehimintuitthis.ThatexplanationofhowKimcamebytheintuitionfeelsoddandunsatisfying.DittoforLewis’intuitionthattherecanbenoonticvagueness:itisnottheab-senceofonticvaguenessthatexplainsthepresenceofhisintuition.47

Thethirdoptionforcastinggeneralintuitionsasevidenceisinfactageneralizationofthesecond:whenoneintuitsthatp,thereissomeotherpropositionq (relatedR-wise to the intuiting) thatconstitutesevidenceforp.48Thisiscertainlyworthpursuing,butitisunclearatpresentwhatqorRmightbe.Someconcreteproposalsareneededifwearetoevaluatethisoption,andIamunfamiliarwithanyaccountofintuitivejustificationthattakesthisform.Itisthusanaspectoftherevisionarymetaphysician’sepistemologicalchallengetoprovidesuchanaccount:sheowesusanaccountofqandR.49

Oneobjectionmightbethatnotallevidenceconsistsinpropositions.Thusitissometimessaidthatperceptualexperiencesthemselvescanconstituteevidenceforperceptualbeliefs: theveryactofperceivingthetableistheevidenceforone’sbeliefthatatableispresent.Like-wise, intuiting that there isnoonticvagueness (an ‘intuitiveact’) is

47. This is alsowhy I am skeptical of the attempt to cast singular intuitionsasacquaintinguswithpropertiesandtheirinstantiationconditionsratherthanconceptsand theirapplicationconditions,asmentioned toward theendof§2.1.

48. Thesecondoptionisjustthespecialcasewhereq=<Iintuitthatp>andRisadescriptionorreferencerelation.

49. Somephilosophershaveassertedmoreboldlythatthisparticularaspectofthechallengecannotbemet, that is, that intuitionscannot functionasevi-dence—see Goldman 2007, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009, Ichikawaforthcoming.



connectedinsomewaytotruth,preciselybecausebeliefpresentsitscontentsastrue.Theideaisthis:generalintuitionsarenottruth-con-nected; epistemic justification is truth-connected; therefore, generalintuitionsdonotconstituteepistemic justification.54Therevisionarymetaphysician’schallengeistoshowwhatiswronginthisreasoning.

What is the truth-connection of justification? A simple but de-mandingviewisthereliabilistonethatforsomeconsiderationCtoconferepistemicjustificationonS’sbeliefthatp,Cmustmakeitmorelikelythatpistrue.Thisisan‘externalist’requirementessentiallyre-ducingthetruth-connectiontotruth-tracking.Amoreliberalglossonthetruth-connectionofjustificationmayallowthatCconferjustifica-tiononS’sbeliefthatpevenifCdoesnotmakeitmorelikelythatpistrue—providedthatSbelieves(orperhapsthatShasreasontobelieve)thatCmakesitmorelikelythatpistrue(seeCohen1984).55Thebrain-in-vat’sperceptualexperiencesdonotmakeitmorelikelythatthingsarethewaytheyperceptuallyseemtobe;buttheenvattedbrainbe-lieves(andhasreasontobelieve)thattheydo.56Sotheenvattedbrainisjustifiedinbelievingthatthingsarethewaytheyperceptuallyseemtobe,onthisinternalisttwistonreliabilism.

Ihavealreadyarguedthatgeneralintuitionsareprobablynottruth-tracking.Thismeansthattheydonotpossesstheexternalisttruth-con-nection.ButIthinkitalsosuggeststhat,inthecontextofmetaphysical

54. Thefirstpremisehereispartiallysupportedbytheabovediscussionofthetruth-tracking capacity of general intuitions.However, the notion of truth-connectionispotentiallymoreliberalthanthatoftruth-tracking,aswewillseemomentarily,sotherevisionarymetaphysicianmayhavesomeextraop-tionshere.Atthesametime,itisworthnotingthattheaddedliberalityofthenotionoftruth-connectionmakesthesecondpremisemoreplausible.

55. Ahyper-liberalviewisthatCcanconferjustificationonthebeliefevenif(i)itdoesnotmakeitmorelikelythatpistrueand(ii)thesubjectdoesnotbelievethatitdoes,providedthesubjectdoesnothavethebelief(orperhapsdoesnothavereasonstobelieve)thatCdoesnotmakeitmorelikelythatpistrue.Onthisview,thepresenceofageneral intuitionthatpcombinedwiththeabsenceofatruth-tracking-underminingbeliefsufficestoconferjustification.

56. Itisadmittedlyoddtospeakofabrainbelievingsomething.WhatIhaveinmindherewouldbemoreaccuratelyputbysayingthattheperson,orsubject,orcognitiveagentconstituted(orrealized)bythebrainbelievessomething.

one thatp, then one is prima facie justified in believing thatp, and(ii) that intuitions are a kind of seeming (‘intellectual’ seeming). Itfollows that if one intuits thatp, thenone isprima facie justified inbelievingthatp.

Regardlessofhowplausiblethisapproachis,itisimportanttonotethatitmakesnoclaimthat<Iintuitthatp>(ortheintuitingofpitself)isevidencethatp.Infact,Huemer(2005:120)explicitlysaysthatagen-eralintuitionthatppresentsnoevidenceforp;itjustifiespinsomeotherway.53 Thus evenon themost intuition-friendly epistemology,generalintuitionsarenottakentoserveasevidence.

Still,itcouldbeinsistedthat somekindofepistemicjustificationisinvokedhere,whetherevidentialornot.Thiscouldjustifypreferringonerevisionary-metaphysicaltheoryoveranother(themoreintuitiveovertheless).

Letusbracketthequestionofhowgenuinelyrevisionaryarevision-ary-metaphysicaltheorycanbeifitsadoptionisgroundedinitsintu-itiveness.Asitstands,Huemer’sapproachdoesnotilluminatehowanintuitivebeliefissupposedtobemorelikely to be truethananunintui-tiveone.Concedingthatintuitingthatpdoesnotprovideevidenceforp,onecanalwaysinsistthatitnonethelessjustifiesbeliefthatp.Buttobelievethatpisoneandthesameastobelievethatpistrue(atleastforcreatureswhopossesstheconceptoftruth),sowhateverjustifiesbelief thatpmustsuggest inonewayoranother the truthofp. It isunclearhowsimplybeingvisitedbytheintuitionthatpsuggeststhetruthofp.

Thepointcanbeputintermsofthetruth-connectionofepistemicjustification.Itiscommontoholdthatepistemicjustificationmustbe

applicationtointuition.Asimilarformofdogmatism/conservatismisdevel-opedalsobyChudnoff2011andBengsonMs.

53.Whatway?Huemer(2005:120)writes:“PhenomenalConservatismandmyversionofintuitionismareformsoffoundationalism:theyholdthatwearejus-tifiedinsomebeliefswithouttheneedforsupportingevidence.Theroleofconditions(1),(3),and(5)[theoccurrenceofcertainintellectualappearances]inthetheoryofjustificationisthatofconditionsunderwhichcertainbeliefs…require no evidence,ratherthanthatofevidencesupportingthosebeliefs.”



conservesmoreofthem.58Thisisclearlyenhancedbyametaphysicaltheorythataccommodatessomegeneralintuition:sincetheintuitionisanexistingdoxasticcommitment,andisoftenassociatedwithafolkbelief,consistencywithitallowsustoconservebothanintuitivecom-mitmentandafolkbelief.

Another virtue often enhanced by accommodating general intu-itions isunity.A theory consistentwith some intuitivegeneralprin-cipleis liablemutatis mutandis tobemoreunifiedthanoneinconsis-tentwithsuchaprinciple,at leastwhen thegeneral intuitionhasauniversally quantified content (e. g., that every physical event has aphysicalcause,orthateveryconcreteparticularisprecise/non-vague).Auniversalprinciple,whichappliestoeverysingleentityofsomeon-tologicalcategory,wouldsubsumeunderitacomprehensivenumberofentities,thusenhancingonetheory’soverallunity.

Theremaybeother theoreticalvirtuesenhancedbyaccommoda-tionofgeneralintuitions.Butthereisnoneedtobelaborthepoint:itisclear fromwhathasalreadybeensaid that theoverall theoretical(super-empirical) adequacy of a theory is straightforwardly affectedby its accommodationof general intuitions.This offersus awayofmakingsenseoftheepistemicroleofgeneralintuitions,especiallyintheabsenceofanyclearlyviablestoryabouthowtheymightplayanevidentialrole.

Toconclude, in§2.1 Iarguedthatsingular intuitionscannotplayanevidential role in revisionarymetaphysics, only in descriptivemeta-physics;andin§2.2,thatwhateverelsetheymaydo,generalintuitionsdonotprovide evidence for revisionary-metaphysical theories.Thereseem to be no other types of intuition appealed to by metaphysi-cians.Meanwhile,§1arguedthatempiricalevidencedoesnottypically

58.Quine and Ullian, in their classic discussion, characterize conservatism(which,bytheway,theylistasthefirsttheoreticalvirtue)asfollows:“thelessrejectionofpriorbeliefsrequired,themoreplausiblethehypothesis—otherthingsbeingequal”(1970:67).

inquiry, theydonotmeet themore internalist truth-connection.Forconsiderthepositionoftherevisionarymetaphysicianattheendofmetaphysical inquiry,when all the coherentmetaphysical positionsoneverymetaphysicalissuearelaidoutbeforeher,alongwiththeirlogicalinterrelations.Havingbeenexposedtothenotionoftruth-con-nection and truth-tracking, thismetaphysicianwouldhave to comeupwithareasontobelievethatgeneralintuitionsaretruth-connectedifshewantstorelyonthemtojustifyrevisionary-metaphysicaltheo-ries.Unlikethenon-philosophical(‘naïve’)subject,theend-of-inquirymetaphysicianisawareofthenotionoftruth-trackingandthedebatesurrounding the truth-tracking capacity of intuition. So pending ademonstration of intuitions’ truth-tracking capacity, the metaphysi-cianshouldnotbelievethattheyaretruth-tracking(letalonehaverea-sonforsobelieving)—whichiswhattheinternalisttruth-connectionrequires.Thusattheendofinquirygeneralintuitionswillbeneitheractually truth-conducivenorbelieved to be truth-conducive.57

Iconcludethatitisfarfromclearhowgeneralintuitionscouldfunctionasevidence inrevisionarymetaphysics.Thisisnotyettosaythattheyhavenoepistemicroleinit;merelythatiftheydoitisnotbyvirtueofconstitutingevidence.Accommodatinggeneralintuitionsisnotaformof accommodatingevidence. Inowwant to suggest thatwhat it is aformofisenhancingtheoreticaladequacy.Thecaseforthisisstraight-forward,andrestsontheobservationthattherearetheoreticalvirtueswhichareclearlyenhancedbytheaccommodationofgeneralintuitions.

Perhapsthemostobviouscaseisthevirtuesometimescalledcon-servatism. The idea behind conservatism is that, other things beingequal,atheoryispreferableoveritsrivalswhenitconflictswithfewerof one’s existing beliefs (and other doxastic commitments), that is,

57. Moreoveritwouldbeimpossibleforthemetaphysicianattheendofinquirytohavenobeliefsonthematter,inawaythatwouldsatisfythehyper-liberalviewonthetruth-connectioncanvassedintheNote55.



Mostphilosopherswouldrejectthesweepingclaimthatthetheo-reticalvirtuesarealwaysandeverywherenon-truth-conducive.Inthissection,Iwanttoconsiderthepossibilitythat,evenifsometheoreticalvirtues are truth-conducive in the contextof scientific (and/or folk)theorizing, there are special reasons to think theymaynot be truth-conduciveinthecontextofmetaphysicaltheorizing.61

Unfortunately, there isnoacceptedorganonof theory-evaluationand theoretical-virtue-assessment. The theoretical virtues aremany,sometimesdiffusedbutsometimesoverlapping,oftenill-definedandalwaysquitevague.Inconsequence,thereisnohopeofmountingadecisive and all-encompassing case either for or against their truth-conduciveness.HereIfocusontwogroupsofvirtuesappealedtowithspecialfrequencyinmetaphysics:(i)parsimony,simplicity,andmod-esty (§3.1); (ii)unificationandcoherence/cohesion (§3.2). I thenof-ferbrief remarksonthreeothervirtuesmorecommonlymentionedinotherdomains:conservatism,testability,andfecundity(§3.3).Mysuspicionisthatnoneoftheseistruth-conduciveinthemetaphysicalcontext,thoughshowingthiswouldrequireamorethoroughexami-nation.Mygoalhere is to set apreliminary challenge to the revision-arymetaphysician: show me a theoretical virtue that is truth-condu-cive—andhowitistruth-conducive—inmetaphysicaltheorizing.

3.1. Parsimony, Simplicity, ModestyOf all the theoretical virtues, parsimony is themost prominent inmetaphysical discussions. Fortunately, it is also one of the clearest,thankstoOckham’sRazor:entities should not be multiplied without necessity. Still, several different principles may be at play here. Four are prominent:

61. Itisimportanttokeepinmind,inanycase,thatIdonotassumeheretheviewthatthesuper-empiricalortheoreticalvirtuesmustbetruth-conducivetojus-tify.Iallowthattheymightjustifyevenwithoutbeingtruth-conducive—aslongastherelevantsubject(i. e.,therevisionarymetaphysicianattheendofinquiry)believes(orhasreasontobelieve)thattheyaretruth-conducive(seethediscussionin§2.2ofgeneralintuitions’truth-connection).

discriminateamongrevisionary-metaphysicaltheories.Theupshotisthattheorychoiceinrevisionarymetaphysicscannotberationallyaf-fectedbyeitherempiricalorintuitiveevidence.Sinceplausiblytherearenootherpotentialsourcesofevidence,wehavehereunderdeter-mination of revisionary-metaphysical theory by total evidence (notjustempiricalevidence).Ifso,theorychoiceinrevisionarymetaphys-icsmustrestexclusivelyonextra-evidentialconsiderations.Therevi-sionarymetaphysicianthenfacesadoublechallenge:toshow(i)thatsomeextra-evidentialconsiderationsdo indeedfavorsomerevision-ary-metaphysicaltheoriesovercompetitors,and(ii)thattherelevantformof‘favoring’makesthefavoredtheorylikeliertobetrue.Inthenextsection,Iarguethat(ii)proveshardtomeet.59

3. Revisionary Metaphysics and Theoretical Adequacy

Some philosophers—most notably van Fraassen (1980)—have ar-gued that the super-empirical or theoretical virtues are one and allpragmaticratherthanepistemic.Bythisitismeantthatsuchvirtuesrecommendthevirtuoustheoryforacceptanceas useful,butnotnec-essarilyforacceptanceas true.Fornoneofthemisindicative,inanycontext,oftheprobabletruthofthevirtuoustheory.Putsuccinctly,theideaisthatthesevirtuesarenottruth-conducive.60Ifthisisright,thenwecanneverhaveepistemicreasonstochooseamongcompetingevi-dentiallyequivalentrevisionary-metaphysicaltheories(whichIhavearguedisarifecircumstance).

59.Torepeatapointfrom§1,noneofthisismeanttosuggestthattheprocessofinquirycanbeneatlydividedintoanevidence-gathering/accommodatingpartandatheorizationpart;merelythattherearetwodifferentdimensionsalongwhichtheendresultoftheprocessofinquirycanbeassessed.

60.VanFraassen isnotalonedenying the truth-conducivenessof the theoreti-calvirtues.Lycan, forexample,explicitly concedes that “conservatismasacanonoftheory-preferencehasnojustificationintheepistemologicalsense,butneitherhavesimplicity,testability,fruitfulness,andtheothertheoreticalvirtues”(1988:166).Beebe(2009)offersausefulsurveyandanalysisofthedifficulty in establishing the truth-conduciveness of the theoretical virtues,witharatherpessimisticconclusion.



barrenness of the world: theworldcontainsveryfewentities.Istherea reason tobelieve thisprinciple?Construedasana posterioriprin-ciple,itsuffersfromthedistinctdisadvantagethatthereisadearthofevidenceforit.Itisunclearwhatkindofinductivegeneralization,orabductiveinference,mightsupportit.63Construedasana prioriprin-ciple,itisunclearwhyweshouldexpecttheworldtobesubordinatedtoitsdictates.Asnoted,onewouldthinkthattheworldcontainsjustasmanyentitiesas ithappens to;howmanywewouldbepleasedwithitcontainingappearsirrelevant.Sothereappearstobenorea-sontobelieveinthebarrennessoftheworld.

Thus thereare twoproblemswithappeal to thebarrennessprin-ciple:first,thereisnomotivationfortheprinciple,andsecond,suchappealseemstomisrepresenttherationalizingroleofparsimonycon-siderations.Therecertainlyappeartobepragmaticadvantagestoparsi-mony,ifonlyintermsofthemetaboliccostofinformationprocessing(toputitcrudely).Theremayalsobeaestheticadvantages,insofarasminimalismisarecurringthemeacrossmanyartisticgenresandtradi-tions.64Butsuchadvantageshavenothingtodowiththelikelihoodoftheworldbeingacertainway.

Itispartoftherevisionarymetaphysician’schallenge,then,totelluswhat it isaboutparsimonythatmightrecommendparsimonioustheoriesforacceptancespecificallyas true.Acceptingatheorybecauseitisaestheticallypleasing,orbecauseitisusefultodoso,willnotdo.Inshort:itistherevisionarymetaphysician’schallengetoshowusinwhatwayparsimonyistruth-conducive.

63. Indeed,itisunclearwhatphenomenamightappearintheinductivesampleortheabductiveexplanandum.Thatis,itisunclearwhattheinductivegen-eralizationorabductiveinferenceissupposedtobegeneralizationorinfer-encefrom.

64.Certainlyexpresslyminimalistcontemporaryartwouldqualify–Iamthink-ingofDanFlavin’sinstallations,AgnesMartin’scanvasses,andFrankStella’sworkinthevisualarts,aswellasJohnCage’sandArvoPärt’smusic(amongothers’).Butaestheticminimalismrecursmuchmorewidely,fromJapanesegastronomyandpoetrytoPolynesiansculptureandmuchAmericantwenti-eth-centuryprose(thinkHemingway).

(a)Token-parsimony:atheorypositingfewertokenentitiesispreferable,other thingsbeingequal, toa theorypositingmoretokenentities.

(b)Type-parsimony:a theorypositing fewer typesofentity ispreferable,other thingsbeingequal, toa theorypositingmoretypesofentity.

(c) Basic-token-parsimony: a theory positing fewer basic/fun-damental token entities is preferable, other things beingequal,toatheorypositingmore.

(d) Basic-type-parsimony: a theory positing fewer basic/fun-damental typesofentity ispreferable,other thingsbeingequal,toatheorypositingmore.62

I will now suggest that the token-parsimony principle is non-truth-conducivewhenapplied to revisionary-metaphysical theories. I con-ductthediscussionwithtoken-parsimonyastargetbecauseit isthemoststraightforward,butasfarasIcantelltheconsiderationsIraiseapplyequallytoallfourparsimonyprinciples.

Suppose theory T1 ismore token-parsimonious than T2. This ap-pears to recommend, indeed rationalize, preferringT1overT2.But ifaskedwhy token-parsimonymakesitrationaltopreferT1overT2,wewouldbedisinclined toansweras follows: it is rational topreferT1 overT2becausetheworldislikelytocontainrelativelyfewtokenenti-ties,andsothemoreparsimonioustheoryismorelikelytoreflectthewaytheworldis.Thisanswerseemsmisguided,utterlymisconstruingtherationalizingforceofparsimony.Presumably,theworldhasjustasmanytokenentitiesasitdoes,regardlessofourtheorizing.

To assume that parsimony is compelling because it renders theparsimonioustheorymorelikelytodescribecorrectlythenumberofentitiestheworldreallyhasistoassumeaprinciplewemaycallthe

62.Schaffer(2007)arguesforthesuperiorityofthebasicness-involvingversionsoverthemoretraditionalconstrualsintermsofnumberofoverall(typesof)entities.Biggs(forthcoming)incorporatesbothintoasinglemega-principle.



primitivelawsitpostulates.67Butthiswouldseemtogroundsimplic-ity in akindofparsimony (namely,with respect toprimitive laws)rather thanparsimony insimplicity.Perhapsa theory isobjectivelysimplerthefeweritsunexplainedexplainers—propositionsthatdosomeexplaininginthetheorybutforwhichthereisnoexplanationin it.68 But it is not clear that this is genuinely objective, given theappealtotheepistemologicalnotionofexplanation(whicharguablyreliesonthenotionofunderstanding).Thusitwouldappearanon-trivial task to produce an objectivemeasure of simplicity, one thatmightcastitastruth-conducive.Thistooisanaspectoftherevision-arymetaphysician’schallenge.

However the issue of measure is resolved, appeal to simplicityfacesthesameproblemasappealtoparsimony:forsimplicitytobetruth-conducive,aprincipleof thesimplicity of the worldwouldhavetohold.ButasvanFraassen(1980:90)pointsout,“itissurelyabsurdtothinkthattheworldismorelikelytobesimplethancomplicated”.Againadestructivedilemmawouldarise:asa posteriori,theprincipleofthesimplicityoftheworldisremarkablyunsupported;asapriori,itisarbitraryunlessKantian.Andinanycasetheappealtosuchaprin-cipleseemstomisrepresent therationalizing forceofsimplicity.Wedonotprefersimpletheoriesbecausewereasonthat,sincetheworldissimple,asimplertheoryismorelikelytocapturetheworld’sinde-pendentlevelofcomplexity.Afterall,wehavenotheory-independenthandleoftheworld’sobjectivelevelofcomplexity.

67.Primitivelawsareonesthatgroundbutarenotgroundedby/inotherlaws.Thenotionofgroundinghereistheoneoftendenotedbythe‘invirtueof’—anotiononwhichthereisnoagreementasyet,butwhichappearstobecentral.Foraclassicaldiscussion,seeFine2001.

68.Lycan(2002:415)putsthisintermsofthenumberof‘primitiveexplanatorynotions’involvedinatheory.Presumably,‘primitive’meansherethattherearenoexplanationsofit,eventhoughitservesintheexplanationofothernotions.

One thought might be that the barrenness principle should beembraced in a Kantian spirit: as a transcendental, synthetic a priori principlewherebythemindsetspreconditionstheworldmustmeetinordertobeintelligible.Ihesitatetorejectthisasunworkable,butnotethat itwouldseemantithetical tothephilosophicalorientationofmostlatter-dayrevisionarymetaphysicians.65Andforgoodreason:it makes (this aspect of) theory choice in revisionary metaphysicsamatterofwhich theory involvesabetter impositionof themind’sconceptualschemeontotheworlditstudies.WearetopreferT1overT2 because T1 better imposes the mind’s weakness for desert land-scapeson theworld.Whatwearenotdoing is choosing the theorythatbetterrepresentstheworld’sstructureasitis‘initself’,mind-andconceptual-scheme-independently.

Anothersuggestionmightbethataparsimonioustheoryispreferablebecauseitissimpler.Theideaistogroundthetruth-conducivenessofparsimony in thatof simplicity.And indeed it is intuitive thatparsi-monyenhancessimplicity.It is lessclear,however,thatsimplicityistruth-conducive.

For starters, although characterizing simplicity is a thorny issue,themostnaturalmeasuresaresubjective: theeasinesswithwhichatheoryisgrasped;thespeedwithwhichitelicitsaphenomenologyofunderstanding;thenumberofsentencesitrequirestoexpressit;andsoon.66Butifourgoalistocharacterizesimplicityinawaythatmightcast itas truth-conducive,what iscalled for issomeobjective measure(s). Perhaps a theory is objectively simpler the fewer the

65. Thisdoesnotapply,ofcourse,toStrawsonhimself,whoseKantiandisposi-tion ispalpable.But itdoesseemtocharacterizemostworkingmetaphysi-cians,atleastthosewithrealistmeta-metaphysics.

66.Harman(1992:203)mentionsthesesubjectivetakesonsimplicity,andQuineandUllian(1970:71–3)agonizeoverthissubjectivity,presumablypreciselybecauseofitsthreattothetruth-connectionofsimplicity(thoughtheydonotusethisterminology).



their sculpture-fusion).69As far asparsimony is concerned,nihilismedgesoutrestrictivismandbotharefaraheadofuniversalism.Inter-estingly,however,asfarasmodestyisconcerned,thethreearelockedin a tie: eachmustmake thirty-one claims.Whena scientific theorypositsfiveratherthanthirty-oneentities,itcommitstotheexistenceoffiveputativeentities,butdoesnot inadditioncommittothenon-existenceof the remaining twenty-six. It thusmakesonlyfiveclaimsinthearea.Bycontrast,whennihilismpositsonlyfiveentitiesinthewrap,itdoescommittothenon-existenceoftheremainingtwenty-sixputativeentities. It thusmakes thirty-oneclaimsinthearea—justasmanyasuniversalism.70Moregenerally,foranyworldwithnmereo-logicalsimples,whilenihilismpositsnobjects,universalism2n–1,andrestrictivismn<m<2n–1,allthreemustmake2n–1existenceclaims.71

Similarremarksapplytoothercentral,paradigmaticdebatesinre-visionarymetaphysics.Whetheronepositsuniversalsorattemptstomakedowithcollectionsofparticulars;whetheronepositshaccaeities

69.Noteveryrestrictivistviewwouldpositonlyonecompositeobjecthere;anyview that posits fewer than twenty-six compositeswould strictly speakingcountasrestrictivist.Theonlyobviouslyplausibleone,however,andinanycasetheonlyoneIwillconsiderhere,istheonethatpositsasinglecompos-iteinthewrap.

70.Similar remarks apply to the postulation of primitive laws and/or unex-plainedexplainerscharacteristicofsimplicity.

71. Thisway of putting thingsmay be problematic, given that claim individu-ation is a slipperymatter. Insteadof listing everyputative entity shedoesnottaketobeanentity,thenihilistcouldsimplylistalltheputativeentitiesshedoes take tobeentitiesand thenadda “that’sall” clause.Thisnihilistwouldbemakingn+1 claims,not2n–1.Still,thefundamentalpointissound,astheamountof informationconveyedbymaking2n–1claimsabout indi-vidualputativeentitiesorn+1claimsthatincludea“that’sall”claimwouldbestrictlythesame.Perhapsawisemeasureofmodestywouldcountsolelysingularclaimsaboutindividualputativeentities,orperhapsitwouldappealtoamountofinformationinsteadofthenumberofclaims.Butwhateverthemeasure ofmodesty endsupbeing, it hadbetter return the result that ni-hilism,restrictivism,anduniversalismareequallymodest,astheyappeartoinvolveessentiallythesamekindofexposuretopossibleerror.(Inaddition,itwouldbe somewhat curious if theory choice in revisionarymetaphysicscamedowntopickingamongtheoriesthatcompeteatfindingcleverwaysofsayingless.Thiscertainlydoesnotfeellikewhatoneisdoinginconsideringrevisionary-metaphysicalissuesandtryingtocomedownonthem.)

Might the truth-conducivenessofparsimonyandsimplicityalikebegroundedinthatofmodesty?Modestyisthevirtuewherebyonetheorysaysless—makesfewerclaims—thananother.Thevirtueinthiscancertainlybecastinthesameproblematicwayaswithparsimonyandsimplicity.ThusQuineandUllian(1970:68)write:“Ittendstobethecounselofmodestythatthelazyworldisthelikeliestworld.”Clearly,aprincipleofthelaziness of the worldwouldbenobetterthanthoseofthebarrennessandsimplicityoftheworld.Amoreviablewaytocastthevirtueinmodestyistonotethatsayinglessexposesonelesstoerror,keepingone’sstandingliabilitiestoaminimum.Therearefewerwaysforamodesttheorytogowrongthanforanimmodestone—andthisdoesseemtobetruth-conducive.

Thetruth-conducivenessofmodestycouldthenbeusedtogroundthatofparsimonyandsimplicity.Considerparsimony.SupposeT1pos-itsfiveentitiesintheexplanationofphenomenonP,whileT2positsthirty-one(includingtheoriginalfive).Thentherearetwenty-sixmoresimpleexistentialclaimsT2makesandthereforetwenty-sixextrawaysforT2toincludeafalsehood.Otherthingsbeingequal,itwouldseemthatT1isindeedmuchlikeliertocomeouttrue,andpreciselybecauseit ismoremodest. Thus the fact that parsimony enhancesmodestywouldmeanthatitinheritsthelatter’struth-conduciveness.Similarre-markscanbemadeaboutsimplicityanditspositingoffewerprimitivelawsorunexplainedexplainers.

However,thereisanimportantdisanalogybetweenscientificandmetaphysicaltheoriesthatmakesmodestylessapplicabletothelat-ter. Supposewe took five particles,made amicro-sculpture out ofthem(inthemanneroftheartistWillardWigan),andmetaphysicallyvacuum-wrappedthesculpture.Howmanyentitiesarethere inthewrap?Threeviewssuggestthemselves:anihilistview,accordingtowhichtherearefive;auniversalistview,accordingtowhichtherearethirty-one(thefiveparticlesandtwenty-sixfusionsthereof);andare-strictivistviewaccordingtowhichtherearesix(thefiveparticlesand



features.Inanycase,mycontentionhereisthatitisunclearhowei-therunificationorcoherencearesupposedtobetruth-conducive.

Startwithunification.Tobesure,atan intuitive,pre-theoretic level,unification certainly “feels” truth-conducive. Aristotle (1098b4) re-marksthat“withwhatistrueallthingswhichreallyareareinharmony,butwiththatwhichisfalsethetrueverysoonjars”.YetAristotleoffersnoargument for thisoptimism,andvindicating the feelingof truth-conducivenessprovesharderthanexpected.

Thefirstchallengehereishowtocharacterizeunification.Inphi-losophyof science, the relevantdiscussion is typicallyconducted inthecontextofdebatesonthenatureofscientificexplanation,inpartic-ulartheexplanationoflawsbyother,morebasiclaws.73Theassump-tionisthatalawismorebasicthanotherswhenitunifiesthem,andthequestionbecomeshowtocharacterize therelationR thatholdsamonglawsL1,L2,andL3whenandonlywhenL1unifiesL2andL3.

Amorefundamentalquestion,however,iswhyweshouldpreferamoreunifiedtheoryoveralessunifiedone.Again,itisnotreallyinquestionthatunificationdoesrationalizeacceptanceofatheory.Thequestion ishowtoelucidate this rationalizingroleofunification. Inparticular,itisanopenquestionwhetherunificationprovidesuswithanepistemicrationaleforpreferringatheory(asopposedtopragmatic,aesthetic,etc.).

Inaseminaldiscussion,Friedman(1974)developsanaccountofunificationthatsuggestsatwo-partapproachtoitsrationalizingrole:(i)themoreunifiedatheoryis,themorelawsitsubsumesundermorebasicones, thuseconomizingonthenumberof lawswehavetoac-ceptasprimitiveandinexplicable;(ii)thefewerthelawswehavetoaccept as primitive and inexplicable, the greater our understanding

73. Theexplanationoflawsby(morebasic)lawsistobecontrastedwith(i)theexplanationof singulareventsby lawsand(ii) theexplanationof singulareventsbysingularevents.

orattemptstomakedowithbundlesofproperties;whetheronepos-its quiddities or attempts tomake dowith funds of causal powers;whether one posits a ‘secret connexion’ underlying causation or at-temptstomakedowithactualand/orcounterfactualregularities—inallthesecases,andothers,onemustmaketheexactsamenumberofclaimswhateverone’sview,theclaimsbeingdistinguishedmerelybythepresenceorabsenceofanegationsign.Thecompetingtheoriesineachof thesedebatesarethereforeequally(im)modest. (Therea-son for thisseemstobe thatmetaphysical theoriesaresupposedtobeglobal,ortotal:theyhavetosaythewholetruth.Theymustconse-quentlycommittomyriadclaimsaboutwhatisnotthecase.Thistotalcharacterisbuiltintotheirnatureinawayitisnotintothenatureofscientificandfolktheories.Atleastthisisonenaturaldiagnosisoftheequi-modestyofmetaphysicaltheories.)

Evenifmodestyistruth-conducive,then,thefactthatmetaphysicaltheoriesare typicallyequi-modestmeans thatmodestydoesnotdis-criminateamongthem.72Theupshotisthatamongparsimony,simplic-ity,andmodestywedonotfindatheoreticalvirtuebothtruth-condu-civeanddiscriminating.Parsimonyandsimplicityarediscriminatingbutnottruth-conducive,modestytruth-conducivebutundiscriminat-ing. Thus it is unclear how revisionary-metaphysical theory choicecouldrelyonparsimony,simplicity,andmodesty.

3.2. Unification and Coherence/CohesionIn the philosophyof science, one of themost discussed theoreticalvirtuespertainstotheunityorunificatorypowerofatheory.Inepis-temology, amuchdiscussed featureofbelief systems is their coher-enceorcohesion. It isnotentirelyclear fromthe literaturewhethertheseareatbottomoneandthesamefeatureortwoslightlydifferent

72. Furthermore, parsimony and simplicity donot inheritmodesty’s truth-con-duciveness when applied to metaphysical theories. For while a scientifictheory’sparsimonyandsimplicityenhanceitsmodesty,aswehavejustseeninametaphysicaltheorytheydonot,sincethetheorymuststillmakeclaimsaboutallthoseputativeentitiesitdoesnotpositandallthoseputativeprimi-tivelawsorunexplainedexplainersitdoesnotpostulate.



metaphysical ‘explanation’ isnotatallclear.Aphilosophercouldle-gitimatelyholdthatinfactthereisnosuchthing.Myownviewisthatthereisasenseinwhichmetaphysicaltheoriescanbesaidtoexplaintheirdata,buttheydosopurelyinvirtueofunifyingthem—subsum-ing them under ever more general metaphysical principles.76 Thiswouldgroundthevirtueofexplanationinthevirtueofunification(atleastinthemetaphysicaldomain).Ifso,theexplanationofdatawouldbeanaspectof theexplanatorytheory’ssuper-empiricalrather thanempiricaladequacy.And,cruciallyforourpresentpurposes,thenon-truth-conducivenessofunificationwouldextendtoexplanationinthemetaphysicaldomain.77

Thereare,of course, accountsof explanatoryunificationother thanFriedman’s.ButasfarasIcantell,noneoffersasubstantiallydifferentglossonthevirtueinunification—whyitisweoughttofavormoreunifiedtheories.Onemighthopeforhelpfromepistemologicalquar-ters,wherephilosophershavedevelopedvariousaccounts,aswellasformalmeasures,ofthedegreeofcoherenceexhibitedbyasystemofbeliefs.78Here‘coherence’isamatternotjustoftheabsenceoflogicalinconsistency,butalsoofthepresenceofvariousentailmentandproba-bilisticrelationsamongthebeliefsinthesystem;theterm‘cohesion’

76.Thuswhatever themerits ofKitcher’s (1981)unification theoryof scientific explanation, I think it is probably the right sort of theory formetaphysical explanation.

77. Inanycase,meetingtheepistemologicalchallengetorevisionarymetaphys-ics by leaning on the notion of metaphysical explanation would requireoffering an account ofmetaphysical explanation that casts it as truth-con-ducive. Thismay involve denying the unification account ofmetaphysicalexplanationand/orthenon-truth-conducivenessofunification.Inaddition,however, it would also require a positive account of explanation and itstruth-conduciveness.

78.Thisisofevidentepistemologicalsignificance,giventhecentralityoftheno-tionofcoherencetocoherentistaccountsofepistemicjustification.

of theworld.74This seemsquitepromisingasanaccountof thevir-tueinunification.Itdoesnot,however,casttheeffectedunityasanindicatoroflikelytruth.First,onFriedman’saccount,thevirtueofuni-ty ineffectreducestothatofsimplicity(aminimumofunexplainedexplainers)orparsimony(ofprimitivelaws),whichwehavealreadyseentobeproblematic.Secondly,whileFriedmanshowsthatunifica-tionenhancesunderstanding,hedoesnothing toestablish that theindependentleveloftheworld’sunderstandability(or intelligibility,orcomprehensibility)issuchthatweoughttoexpectthekindofenhancedunderstandingaffordedbyaunifiedtheory.

Thepointmayseemrepetitivebynow,butitisworthemphasizing.Insofarasthespeed,effortlessness,andvivacityofourcomprehensionoftheworldreflectedaccuratelytheworld’sobjectivecomprehensibil-ity,wecouldtakethosemeasuresofcomprehensiontobeindicatorsoftherelevanttheory’struth.75Theproblemisthatwehavenoindepen-denthandleontheworld’sobjectivecomprehensibility,sowehavenowayofestablishinghowaccuratelyour theory’s levelofcomprehen-sionreflectstheworld’slevelofcomprehensibility.

Recallthatin§1wedefinedthe‘accommodation’ofdataintermsofatheory’sprediction,description,andretrodictionofdata.Wedidnotincludeaspartofthistheexplanationofdata.Themainreasonforthisis this.Despitedecadesof livelydebatesoverthenatureofscientific explanation,littleilluminationhascarriedovertothepresentlymoreobscurenotionofmetaphysicalexplanation.Whatexactlycountsasa

74. Friedman (1974: 15)writes: “I claim that this is the crucial property of sci-entific theoriesweare looking for; this is theessenceofscientificexplana-tion—scienceincreasesourunderstandingoftheworldbyreducingtheto-talnumberof independentphenomenathatwehavetoacceptasultimateorgive.Aworldwithfewerindependentphenomenais,otherthingsequal,morecomprehensiblethanwithmore.”

75. Here the world’s ‘comprehensibility’ just means the degree to which theworldlendsitselftocomprehension;onemayormaynottakethistocometothesameasintelligibility.



assumptionshasnever, tomyknowledge,beencontested.Typically,coherentistshavepreferredrespondingbyeither(i)denyingthealleg-edlyinnocuousassumptionsusedintheproofs,(ii)denyingthatepis-temicjustificationmustbetruth-conducive,or(iii)arguingthatthereare other epistemic desiderata (different from truth-conduciveness)furtheredbycoherence.Letmecommentoneachoption.

Fulldiscussionof theallegedly innocuousassumptionsmadebytheproofswouldtakeustoofarafield,andinanycaseIhavenoth-ingoriginaltosayaboutthem.Ionlywishtoregistermysociologicalimpressionthattheexpertstakethemtoberathermodest.Still,theirplausibilityhasbeenchallenged.83Therevisionarymetaphysicianmayhopethat thesedebateswillbesettled inher favor,with theproofsof coherence’s non-truth-conduciveness undermined and—ide-ally—contraryproofsproduced to theeffect thatcoherence is truth-conducive. At present, however, this seems like a shot in the dark.Whiletheanti-coherenceproofsaredebated,noonehasyetmanagedapro-coherenceproof.Yetmeetingtheepistemologicalchallengeofrevisionarymetaphysicswould require positive reasons to think co-herenceistruth-conducive.

Theoptionofdenyingthetruth-conducivenessofepistemicjustifi-cationisalsounpromising.Asnotedin§2.2,thereissurelyatruth-con-nection involvedinepistemicjustification.Perhapsthistruth-connec-tiondoesnotrequirethatthecoherencebetruth-conducive.Perhapsitonlyrequiresthatwebelieve(orhavereasontobelieve)thatitis.Butifcoherencecannotbeshowntobetruth-conducive,theend-of-inqui-ryrevisionarymetaphysicianwouldnotevenbelieve(norhavereasontobelieve)thattheyaretruth-conducive.Socoherencewouldnotex-hibiteventheweaker,internalistkindoftruth-connection.

Themost plausible option is to pursue the third response. Prob-ably the most developed version of this response is Dietrich andMoretti’s(2005)formaldemonstrationthat,whilecoherencemaynotbetruth-conducive,itis confirmation-conducive.Inotherwords,while

83.Forexample,byHuemer(2011).

wouldforsoothmakeabetterlabel.79Onecouldpropose,inanycase,that the coherence/cohesionof revisionary-metaphysical theories istruth-conducive,sothatmorecoherenttheoriesaremorelikelytorep-resentthewaytheworldactuallyis.Inowturntoarguethatthisfacessomeextraordinaryobstacles.

Thereissomethingprima facie suspiciousaboutthenotionthatco-herenceistruth-conducive.80ThesystemofstatementsconstitutedbyThe Brothers Karamazov,augmentedwithcertainbackgroundassump-tions(ofthesortsusceptibletoimaginativeresistance),81formsanex-traordinarilycoherentsystem,yetonethatisnowisetruth-linked.ThispedestrianobservationisunderscoredbytworecentproofsinBayes-ianconfirmationtheorythatventuretodemonstratethatcoherenceisnottruth-conducive,inthatmorecoherentsystemsarenotlikeliertobe true (BovensandHartmann2003,Olsson2005).Bothproofs re-quirecertainassumptionstobeinplaceinordertogothrough,buttheconsensusseemstobe that theseare fairly innocuous.82The formalderivation of the non-truth-conduciveness of coherence from these

79.Logicalconsistencyisofcourseanaspectofcoherence,butonlyafirstaspect.Inaseminaldiscussion,Bonjour(1985Ch.5)listsfouraspectsofcoherenceofbeliefsystemsthatgobeyondlogicalconsistency:degreeofprobabilisticconsistency,inferentialconnectedness,divisibilitytoinferentiallyconnectedsubsystems, and lack of explanatory anomalies. Formoredetails, seeBon-jour’sdiscussion.

80.Moreprecisely,whatissuspiciousisthenotionthattheaspectsofcoherencethatgobeyond logicalconsistencyare truth-conducive.There isastraight-forward sense inwhich,pending theadoptionofparaconsistent logic, theconsistencyofatheoryisverymuchtruth-conducive,asitmakesitpossible forthetheorytobetrue.

81. Imaginative resistance occurs when certain background assumptions aresuchthattheauthorofapieceoffictioncannotstipulatethemaway.Forex-ample,Dostoyevskycannottellusthat,intheworldofThe Brothers Karamazov, althoughpobtainsandifpthenqobtains,qdoesnotobtain;orthatinthatworld,redisnotacolor;orthatgenocideisnotwrong.Forfullerdiscussion,seeGendler2000.

82.Two assumptions standout. Thefirst is that thedegreeof coherenceof asystemofbeliefsisdeterminedbyprobabilitiesofthebeliefs’propositionalcontents.Thesecondisthattheindividualprobabilityofeachbelief’spropo-sitionalcontent is independentof thatofanyother’s.Bothseemattractive,pre-theoretically.



Iconcludethatappealtothetheoreticalvirtuessurroundingunifica-tionandcoherenceforthepurposesofrevisionary-metaphysicalthe-orychoicefacesanumberofsignificantobstacles.Granted,myargu-mentationhasreliedonformalproofsinBayesianconfirmationtheorythatIdidnotpresentandamoflimitedcompetencetoevaluate.Hereagain,though,Ithinkit istherevisionarymetaphysician’schallenge,andburden,toshowushowarevisionary-metaphysicaltheory’sunityor cohesionenhances the likelihood that it correctly represents theworld’sstructure.Thediscussionabovemerelyattemptstopointattheharderpartsofthechallenge.

3.3. Other Theoretical VirtuesIclosewithbriefremarksonthreeothertheoreticalvirtuessometimesmentioned in philosophy-of-science discussions: conservatism, test-ability,andfecundity.

Thevirtueofgreatestimportanceinthepresentcontextisconser-vatism: aswe saw in §2.2, accommodating general intuitions is cer-tainlyaformofenhancingconservatism.85Thusonebasisfortheorychoice in revisionary metaphysics could be the accommodation ofgeneralintuitions,butonlyprovidedthatatheory’sconservativenesscanbeshowntomakeitmorelikelythatthetheoryistrue.

On the face of it, however, thiswould seem extremely implau-sible.Asamatterofpsychological fact,conservatismis immenselycompelling.Thereisdoubtlessagreatpragmaticvalueinadoptingthemoreconservativeof twotheories—formulating itwouldhavelowermetaboliccost,certainly.Butthequestionofitsepistemicvalueisfarfromclear.Aproposedtheoryisconservativetotheextentthatitiscontinuouswithestablishedbeliefs.Whatisitaboutatheory’scontinuity with established belief thatmakes it more likely to de-scribetheworldaccurately?

85.Wealsomentionedthataccommodatinggeneral intuitionslikelyenhancesunity.Butsinceunityhasjustbeenarguedtobenon-truth-conducive,totheextentthattheyenhanceunityaccommodatinggeneralintuitionswouldnotmakeitmorelikelythattheaccommodatingtheoryistrue.

thecoherenceofasetofbeliefsdoesnotmakeanyoftheindividualbeliefs in itmore likely tobe true, it doesguarantee thatwhat con-firmsonebeliefalsoconfirmsthebeliefsthatcoherewithit,thusen-hancing the theory’soverall ‘confirmedness’—essentially, itseviden-tialadequacy.Uponreflection, this is intuitive.Supposee isapieceofevidencethatconfirmsp.Ifpbelongstoasetoflogicallyunrelatedpropositions,thereisnoreasontoexpectetoconfirminanywayothermembersoftheset.Bycontrast,ifpbelongstoastronglycoherentsetofpropositions,emayalsoconfirmtheotherindividualmembersoftheset(aswellastheconjunctionofthemall).Thusthesystem’sco-herencepropagatesconfirmationthroughthesystem.

The confirmation-transmitting properties of coherence are goodnewsforcoherentists,butmaybeofnohelptorevisionarymetaphysi-cians.Forrevisionarymetaphysics ischaracterizedbyunderdetermi-nationofcomplete theorybytotal evidence,makingthepropagationofconfirmationwithindifferentpartsofthetheoryirrelevant.Supposethattwotheories(T1;T2)aresuchthat(i)eachhastwoparts(T1a,T1b;T2a, T2b), (ii) all four theory-parts (T1a, T2a, T1b, T2b) are equally inter-nallycoherent,and(iii)thetwopartsofT1coherebetterthanthetwoparts ofT2.Under such conditions, andother things equal, if somebodyofevidenceeconfirmsT1aandT2aequallywell,thenT1bisbetterconfirmedthanT2b.Thisisbecauseofthebetterpropagationofcon-firmationfromT1atoT1bthanfromT2atoT2b.However,ifeconfirmsequallywellnotpartsofT1andT2,butT1andT2 themselves,thenthereisnofurtherpropagationofconfirmationtoconsider.84Andthisisthecharacteristicstateofaffairsinrevisionarymetaphysics:thetotalbodyofevidenceconfirmsequallycompletetheories.

84.Theonlypossibilityforthisconsiderationtoregainitsrelevanceisifwebe-comeinterestedinthewayT1andT2mightintegrateintoyetlargertheoreti-caledifices.However,onceweconsideroveralltheoriesoftheworldinre-visionarymetaphysics,wherethereisnopotentiallarger,subsumingtheory,thatpossibilityfallsbythewayside.



itasnotterriblydifferentfromdescriptivemetaphysics,whoseman-date is tomakeexplicit themetaphysics implicit in the folk theoryoftheworld—thetheoryoftheworldalready(i. e.,pre-philosophi-cally)believed.89Iconcludethatconservatismisinseveralwaysanunpromisingpathoutoftheepistemologicalchallengefacingthere-visionarymetaphysician.

Parsimony, simplicity, modesty, unity, coherence, and conserva-tismarearguablythemostimportantandmostcommonlycitedtheo-retical/super-empiricalvirtues.Variouslistsofthetheoreticalvirtuescontainother,morerarifieditems.Typicallythesearenotprima facie promisingcandidates for truth-conduciveness; remindingourselvesof thisshouldbeuseful.Consider testability.A theory is testable totheextentthatitisopentofalsification.Thisisclearlybetterthoughtofasausefulheuristicthanasatruthindicator:thenotionthattheworldisinandofitselfa‘powerfulfalsifier’isneitherclearnorplau-sible.Nextconsiderfecundity.Atheoryisfruitfulorfecundtotheex-tentthatitopensupnewavenuesofinquiryandenergizesresearchinthearea.Thismayrenderatheoryintellectuallyexciting,butitisunclearwhyitissupposedtorenderitmorelikelytoconformtothewaytheworldis:aprincipleoftheexcitingness of the worldwouldbeflatteringbutnotplausible.

Iconcludethat,pendingdemonstrationthatunityorcohesionmaybetruth-conducivedespitetheBayesiantheoremstothecontrary,mod-estyistheonlytruth-conducivetheoreticalvirtueofrevisionary-meta-physicaltheories,butunfortunatelydoesnotdiscriminateamongthem.Inanycase,giventheunderdeterminationofrevisionary-metaphysical

89.In fact, since themost conservative theory is always the one currently be-lieved(itinvolvesnodeparturefromestablishedtheory),therationalthingtodoforrevisionarymetaphysicians,inthatcircumstance,mightconceivablybetostopdoingrevisionarymetaphysics.Theonlypointofrevisionarymeta-physicswouldbetoexposeinconsistenciesinthefolk’smetaphysicsandpro-posethemostminimalistfixpossibletothem.Oncethis isdone,however,therewouldbenothingleftfortherevisionarymetaphysiciantodo.

QuineandUllian(1970)discussconservatismatsomelength,andseemtothinkof itsvirtueasessentiallycontinuouswithmodesty’s.Perhaps the thought is that the less it departs fromestablishedbe-lief, the fewernew waysa theoryhasofgoingwrong.Theproblemwiththis,fromthestandpointoftruth-conduciveness,isthatarevo-lutionary, unconservative theory may not only introduce potentialnewwaysofgoingwrong,butmayalsopotentiallypurgeoldwaysofgoingwrong.Sothereisnoreasontothinkthat,oftwotheoriesmakingtheexactsamenumberofclaimsbutdiffering indegreeofconservativeness, themoreconservative is lessexposed to error.86Tosupposeotherwisewouldbetocommittothegeneralprinciplethattheworldisalwaysandeverywheremoreorlessthewayitisalreadybelieved to be—an absurd proposition.87 In short: conservatism isprobablynottruth-conducive.Inconsequence, insofarasaccommo-datinggeneralintuitionsisaformofenhancingconservatism,itmaybepsychologicallycompellingfornon-epistemicreasonsbutnotin-dicativeoflikelytruth.

Furthermore, if theory choice in revisionary metaphysics camedown simply to choosing themore conservative theory, thiswouldrenderrevisionarymetaphysicssurprisinglydull.88Itwouldalsocast

86.Theremaybeotherways to account for thevalue in conservatism,whichwouldcast it inamoretruth-conducive light.Butnotmanycometomind.Oneistoconstrueconservatismasrelyingoninferencefrompastsuccessatsurvivaland/orflourishingofsubjectswithcertainbeliefstothetruthofthebeliefs they are holding.However, the inference is straightforwardly prob-lematicinasmuchassheerempiricaladequacyofone’sbeliefswouldpresum-ablyexplainjustaswellone’ssurvivalandflourishing.

87.Theabsurdityhere isprimarilydue to the ‘alwaysandeverywhere’partoftheclaim.Forittobeageneralvirtueofatheory,conservatismwouldhavetoapplynotjusttoourcurrenttheoryoftheworld,buttoeverytheoryoftheworld.Forexample, itwouldhave toapply to thecaveman’s theoryoftheworld.Supposetwoüber-cavemenproposenewtheories,T1andT2,suchthatT1conservesmoreofthecaveman’stheory,C,thanT2does.T1’sgreaterfaithfulnesstoCdoesnotseemtoenhancethelikelihoodthatitdescribestheworldaccurately.

88.Iamassumingherethatalltheothertoolsfortheorychoicewehavebeendiscussingfailforrevisionarymetaphysics(e. g.,forthereasonscitedinourdiscussion).



revisionarymetaphysicsmoreor lessaswedonow,andwithmoretransparentepistemologicalandmethodologicalfoundationstoboot.

Alessoptimisticscenarioinvolvessomebutnotallpartsofthechal-lengebeingmet.Thismightforceachangeinourconceptionofwhatthepursuitofrevisionarymetaphysicsisabout.Suppose,forinstance,that singular or general intuitions can be shown to play an eviden-tialroleinrevisionarymetaphysicsafterall,butthattherifeempiricalequivalenceandnon-truth-conducivenessoftheoreticalvirtuestand.Thenrevisionarymetaphysicswouldreducetothefollowingrelativelyuninspiringexercise:identifyalltheinternallycoherenttheoriesandchoosethemost intuitiveone.Orsupposetheonlypartof thechal-lengethatismetisthatparsimonyturnsouttobetruth-conduciveaf-terall.Thenrevisionarymetaphysicswould(disappointingly)reduceto identifyingall the internally coherent theories andadopting thatwhichpositsthefewestentities.

Themorepartsofthechallengecanbemet,thecloserwegettothebest-casescenario,andtothe ‘uncritical’conceptionofwhatpursuitofrevisionarymetaphysicscanhopetoachieve.Thefewerpartscanbemet,thefurtherwedriftawayfromthatscenario.Intheworst-casescenario,nopartofthechallengecanbemet.Competingrevisionary-metaphysicaltheoriesarealwaysempiricallyequivalent,intuitionsplayanevidentialroleonlyindescriptivemetaphysics,andnotheoreticalvirtue isbothtruth-conduciveanddiscriminating.Notethateveninsuchcircumstances,forallthathasbeensaidheretheworldcouldstillhaveaconceptual-scheme-independentstructure(withnaturaljointsandall the restof it) anddisputes aboutwhat that structure is likecouldstillbeframedinasinglelanguage(withoutdisputantstalkingpasteachother).90Itisjustthatnoresolutionofsuchdisputeswouldbepossible,becausewecouldnotformjustified beliefsaboutwhatthestructureislike.Inthatrespect,theconceptual-scheme-independent

90.Ifso,thereisneitherametaphysicalnorasemanticproblemwithrevisionarymetaphysics.

theorybyempiricalandintuitiveevidence,andthenon-truth-condu-civenessof theother theoretical virtues, itwouldbe curious if revi-sionarymetaphysics reduced to the simple exercise of determiningwhichcoherentmetaphysicalpackageis themostmodest.Certainlythisdoesnotseemtobetheexerciserevisionarymetaphysicianstakethemselvestobeengagedin.

Itismuchmoreplausible,atleasttomymind,thatrevisionarymetaphysicsreducestotheexerciseofdeterminingwhichcoherentmetaphysical package is themostunified. Aswe have seen, how-ever,itwouldbeanon-trivialchallengetoshowthatmetaphysicalunificationistruth-conducive.Theloomingworryisthatunlesswedoso, thechoiceamongevidentiallyequivalentrevisionary-meta-physical theories becomes not a choice of the theorymost likelytobetrue,butsomeotherkindofchoice(apragmaticoraestheticchoice,perhaps).

4. Conclusion: Possible Reactions to the Challenge

The epistemological challenge facing revisionary metaphysics—atleasttheonepresentedhere—isadisjunctiveone:showushowrevi-sionary-metaphysicaltheoriesmightdifferintheirempiricaladequacy(whileremaininggenuinelymetaphysical);or howsingularintuitionscan be relevant to revisionary (and not only descriptive)metaphys-ics;orhowgeneralintuitionscanfunctionasevidenceforrevisionary-metaphysicaltheories;orhowrevisionary-metaphysicaltheoriescandifferintheirmodesty;orhowparsimony,simplicity,unity,coherence,and/or conservatismcanbe truth-conducive.Whatare thepossiblereactionstothischallenge?

Thebest-casescenarioisthatallparts(‘disjuncts’)ofthechallengecan bemet. Competingmetaphysical theories turn out to differ inempirical adequacymoreoften thanexpected, singularandgeneralintuitionsturnouttobelegitimateevidenceinrevisionarymetaphys-ics, and the theoretical virtues turn out to be truth-conducive (anddiscriminating). In that scenario, we can certainly go on pursuing



PerhapsBerkeley’sownvarietyofidealism,wherebytablesandchairsareideasinGod’smind,turnsouttobeincoherent.Butsurelysomekindofidealismiscoherent,andcouldveryplausiblybemadeempiri-callyequivalentwithrealism,accommodatingallthesameperceptualexperiences. Indeed, one could devise a brand of solipsism-of-the-momentwithout physical entities or persistingmental entities thatwouldbecoherentandempiricallyequivalenttothestandardrealistpictureofpersistingphysicalandmentalentities.Itishardtobelievethatsuchaviewwouldonlybelessusefulorlessbeautifulthanstan-dardrealism,andwouldnotalsobelessplausibleandlesslikely to be true.Yetifweinsistthatsuchaviewislesslikelytobetruethan(theempiricallyequivalent)realism,wemustadmitthatsomethingaboutits intuitive and/or theoretical adequacymakes itmore likely tobetrue,andthereforethatsomepartoftheepistemologicalchallengetorevisionarymetaphysicscanbeovercome.

Forthisreason,Iamtemptedtothinkthatultimatelyrevisionarymetaphysicscanmeettheepistemologicalchallengeit faces.95Theremust be away some revisionary-metaphysical theories are epistemi-cally preferabletoothers.Theremustbesomeconsiderationsthatrec-ommendacceptingsomeofthemas true.However,tosaythatachal-lengecanbemetisnotquitethesameastomeetit,andnotthesameastoarticulatehowitistobemet.Actuallymeetingtheepistemologi-calchallengeofrevisionarymetaphysicswouldrequireaddressingasmanyof thechallenge’sdisjunctsaspossible.Doing thiswouldnotonlylaytoresttheworrythatwecanneverhaveknowledgeofthecon-ceptual-scheme-independentstructureof theworld,butalsocrystal-lizetheepistemologicalandmethodologicalfoundationsofthesearchforthatkindofknowledge.96

95. ItisforthisreasonthatIthinkofitasachallengeofrevisionarymetaphysicsratherthanachallengetoit.

96.Forcommentsonapreviousdraft,IwouldliketothankEliChudnoff,Caro-lina Sartorio, andAmieThomasson. Foruseful exchanges, Iwould like tothankEliChudnoff,WillLeonard,ColinMcGinn,LucaMoretti,ElliotPaul,andAmieThomasson.Ihavealsobenefitedfrompresentingrelevantmate-rialatBostonUniversity,CREA,HumboldtUniversity,andtheUniversityof

structureofrealitywouldbesomethingofaKantiannoumenon:wecouldknownothingofit,except(atmost)thatitexists.91

Oneverynaturalreactiontothisworst-casescenariowouldbetoabandonpursuitof revisionarymetaphysicsaltogether.92Analterna-tive reactionwouldnot abandon theory choice in revisionarymeta-physicsbutinsteadradicallyrecastit.Byasortofintellectualreverseengineering, we might consider what values other than truth thetheoretical virtues are conducive to, and recast the aim of revision-arymetaphysicsaccordingly.Forevenifthetheoreticalvirtuesarenottruth-conducive,surelytheyareconducivetosomethingvaluable.IfwecouldidentifyavalueV,suchthatmanyofthetheoreticalvirtuescom-monlyappealed to inmetaphysicaldiscourseareV-conducive, thenwecouldrecastrevisionarymetaphysicsasaimedattheachievementnotoftruthbutofV.93Wehavealreadymentionedpragmaticandaes-theticvalues,whichmayserveaspotentialsubstitutioninstancesofV;buttheremaybeothers.94

This is quite a radical reaction to the epistemological challengefacing revisionarymetaphysics, and I suspect anoverreaction. For itishard tobelieve that typically competing revisionary-metaphysicaltheoriesareinfactepistemicallyequivalentandareonlydistinguishedbytheirnon-epistemic(pragmatic,aesthetic,etc.)character.Considerthechoicebetweenrealismandidealismaboutmedium-sizedobjects.

91. Pursuingthemetaphysicsof theKantiannoumenonissenseless,ofcourse,andpursuingthemetaphysicsoftheKantianphenomenonisjustdoingde-scriptivemetaphysics.Thusinthispicturethereisnosensibleprojectforre-visionarymetaphysics.

92.Thiswouldstillleavedescriptivemetaphysicsasanepistemologicallyviableproject. So abandoning revisionarymetaphysicswould not quite be aban-doningmetaphysics.

93. ItmaywellbethatVisahighlycomplexorcompositevalue,ofcourse,or(whatmaycometothesame)thatitisinfactaconjunctionofvalues.Anditstrikesmeascoherent,thoughnotquiteplausible,thatthereisinrealitynothingvaluableinthepursuitofmetaphysics.

94.TakingVtobeapragmaticvaluewouldresultinasortofpragmatismaboutrevisionarymetaphysics,perhapsakintoPoincaré’s(1905)conventionalismaboutscienceandindeedCarnap’s(1950)ownapproachtometaphysics.



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the epistemological challenge of revisionary metaphysics

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