the es kom factor

7/29/2019 The Es Kom Factor

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The Eskom factor:

Power politics andthe electricity sectorin South Africa

Repo

rt2012

Based on the research report: The Electricity Governance Complex.Michael Koen of the Civil Society Research and Support Collective. 2012


2/162 The Eskom factor: Power politics and the electricity sector in South Africa

For more information contact: [email protected]

Based on the research report: The Electricity Governance Complex.

Michael Koen of the Civil Society Research and Support Collective. 2012

Acknowledgements: Melita Steele, Nina Schulz, Fiona Musana, Michael Baillie

Edited by: Melita Steele, Nina Schulz and Fiona Musana

Published in June, 2012

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Cover photograph: Greenpeace/Benedicte Kurzen, 2011

Cover inner: Greenpeace/Oswald Chikosi, 2011

Back cover: Greenpeace/Benedicte Kurzen, 2011

1. Introduction 3

2. Historical, political and economic inuence of Eskom 5

2.1. Early Electricity Provision 5

2.2. The Minerals-Energy Complex 5

2.3. The Corporatisation of Eskom 6

2.4. The Post-Apartheid Transition period 1990-1994 7

3. Inuence and accommodation: Eskom and Government

Policy 1994-2001 9

4. Commercialisation of Eskom: 2001-2012 11

5. Eskom and Water 12

6. Conclusion 13


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3The Eskom factor: Power politics and the electricity sector in South Africa

Eskom Holdings Limited (ESCOM) is a household name

in South Africa, and has a long and inuential history in the

country, and on the African continent. Established in 1923 as

the Electricity Supply Commission ESCOM, the state-owned

utility1 is responsible for generating, transmitting and distributing

electricity to industrial, mining, commercial, agricultural and

residential customers. In essence, Eskom has an effective

monopoly in the electricity sector, which also places a

tremendous amount of responsibility in the utilitys hands.

Eskom has undergone some major changes from its origins

in 1923: the utility has seen periods of almost complete

autonomy, greater regulation, an oversupply crisis, rolling

blackouts, and massive electricity price hikes. The result is that

in 2012 the utility is almost entirely dependent on coal2,

remains most responsive to mining and large corporate

interests due to its central mandate of driving economic

development3, and continues to invest in large-scale,centralised electricity generation. However, the country

simultaneously faces a host of major development challenges,

exacerbated by the legacy and structures of apartheid.

These include a dramatic gap between rich and poor, lack of

infrastructure, high levels of urbanisation and unemployment,

extreme inequality and poverty, and huge backlogs in service

delivery to the majority of South Africans.4

But what is the real story behind Eskoms decisions? This

document seeks to outline Eskoms role in South Africa,

its evolution as a state-owned company, and its current

status as a key player in South African politics.

The investment recommendations and decisions made by

Eskom are particularly important, with wide-ranging impacts

for all South Africans. The utility has publicly acknowledged

the potentially negative impacts of climate change5 and the

need to reduce the coal content of the electricity generation

mix in South Africa. However, only a tiny proportion of Eskoms

electricity portfolio is currently contributing to this fundamental

solution that Eskom CEO Brian Dames refers to.

Of the utilitys 237,000 GWh total generation, the electricity

output from wind was only 2 GWh in 2010.8 Initially a

commitment was made to reduce coal reliance by 10% by

2012 at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development

(WSSD).9 Instead, coal intensity has increased.

Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissionsEskom is almost entirely reliant on coal. As a result,

according to the Carbon Monitoring for Action (CARMA)

database, in 2007 the utility was the second largest

power utility emitter of CO2 globally.10 11

Eskom states that it is necessary to double total capacity to

around 80,000 MW by 2025 to keep the lights on in South

Africa.12 In reality, the vast majority of this capacity will be used

by industry and will remain coal-based. Some 9,000 MW of

this will be provided by two of the worlds largest coal-red

power stations (Kusile and Medupi), both currently under

construction. However, the decision to invest in more coal has

signicant implications.

By building Medupi and Kusile power stations, Eskom

and the South African government have committed to

signicantly increasing South Africas annual emissions andcontribution to climate change, combined with substantial

health, coal mining and water use impacts.13 Kusile alone

will generate an estimated 37 million tonnes of carbon dioxide

(CO2) equivalent emissions annually, increasing the countrys

total contribution to climate change by an immense 10%.14

1. Introduction

1 Eskom is a State Owned Enterprise (SOE). In its current form this means it is a commercialised entity incorporated with the Government of South Africa (GOSA) as its sole

shareholder represented by the Department of Public Enterprises. The board is therefore accountable to public nance legislation in addition to the normal duciary responsibilities

relating to protability. This is a fundamental departure from the previous dispensation with regards to the legal character of Eskom where the mandate was to provide developmental

power for neither prot nor loss.2 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. Johannesburg: Eskom.3 Koen, M. 2012. Based on the unpublished research report: The Electricity Governance Complex. Civil Society Research and Support Collective.4 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.5 Eskom. 2010. Climate Change and Sustainability Department, Eskoms 6 point plan. Available: http://www.eskom.co.za/content/GI0004_6_POINT_PLAN~2~1.pdf.6 All of these gures come from Eskoms Integrated Annual Report 2011.7 As at 31 March 2011 (Eskom, 2011).8 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. p.324 Johannesburg: Eskom.9 Eskom. 2006. Annual Report 2006. p.74. Johannesburg: Eskom.10

Grant, L. 2007. Eskom comes second on world emissions list. Retrieved November 27, 2011, from Treevolution. Available: http://treevolution.co.za/2007/12/eskom-comes-second-on-world-emissions-list/.11 This status of second largest utility emitter is also referred to by (Makedi, 2011) in an Eskom presentation to the Renewable Energy Africa conference: Makedi, A. 2011. Eskoms

view on renewables. Presentation at the Renewable Energy Africa Conference. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from Renewable Energy Africa Conference. Available: http://www.reafrica.

co.za/Images/Presentations%20Day%201/Ayanda%20Nakedi.pdf.12 Eskom. 2007. Annual Report 2007. Johannesburg: Eskom.13 Greenpeace. 2011. The True Cost of Coal in South Africa: Paying the price of coal addiction. Available: http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/Global/africa/publications/coal/

TrueCostOfCoal.pdf.14 Ibid.

Eskom facts and gures6Eskom can quite rightly be described as a giant:

Ranked in the top 10 utilities in the world in terms of generation and sales;

Has 27 (including one nuclear) operational power stations;

Generates about 95% of the electricity used in South Africa, and over 40% of all electricity consumed in Africa;

Mining alone used 14.3% of Eskoms supply by 2011; and In 2011 had a net maximum capacity of 41,194 MW.7



GOOGLE MAPS - 2012 GOOGLE

Map: the location of the Medupi and Kusile coal power plants currently underconstruction in South Africa.


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2. Historical, political and economic influenceof Eskom

2.1.Early Electricity Provision

In 1923, the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) was

founded.15 In line with the 1922 Electricity Act, ESCOM was

established as a relatively autonomous entity, not subject

to any form of parliamentary oversight, nancial controls

or state auditing. Importantly, ESCOM would produce and

supply electricity neither for prot or loss. In this context,

new generation and distribution capacity needed to be

created at the lowest possible cost. This was to be done

either through a new build programme or acquisitions to

facilitate a cheap and abundant supply of electricity.16

In pursuit of this abundant supply, ESCOM made

decisions with far-reaching economic consequences.17

However, because ESCOM was relatively independent of

government, with no accountable board, the utility tended

to align its objectives with the dominant electricity demands

of the mining companies from its earliest days.18

The continued accommodation of mining and industrial

interests was achieved as ESCOM grew into an absolute

monopoly by 1948. The rapid growth of industry after

this period meant ESCOM needed to constantly build

new capacity. During the period of massive economicgrowth in the 1960s, Eskoms expansion plans became

increasingly ambitious, and ever-larger MW units were

being commissioned. However, throughout the 1970s,

projects began to suffer from diseconomies of scale,

where the logistics and associated delays (and consequent

nancing costs) in fact increased the comparative price of

provision.19

By the early 1980s, decision makers realised that growth

predictions were wrong. Demand had been overestimated,

but it was too late: the building of new power stations

was irreversible, due to long lead times and cancellation

penalties. ESKOM responded in two ways, rstly by

mothballing aging plants20 and thereby saving on input

costs, and secondly by seeking new markets. Attempts to

create such markets included the provision of electricity

to black households, so-called homeland states and

neighbouring countries.21 An additional new market was

created through supplying electricity to the energy intensiveindustries, such as smelters.

2.2.The Minerals-Energy Complex

Historically, South Africa has followed a heavily capital

and energy-intensive development pathway, based

almost entirely on coal.22 This pathway has been driven

by resource extraction and the development of a connected

set of interrelated economic activities termed the Minerals-

Energy Complex.23 24 Eskom has been the cornerstone

of the Minerals-Energy Complex

25

, and in turn, theComplex has become central to the economy.26 This

Complex consists of mining, minerals processing, the

energy sector and linked industries. It is primarily based

on mining, and then on limited beneciation, underpinned

by the provision of some of the cheapest electricity in the

world.27

Eskom, a pivotal player in the governance of electricity, operates within a framework that is

largely dominated by the needs of mining and other large industries.

15

Conradie, S. a. 2000. A Symphony of Power. The Eskom Story. Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications (Pty) Ltd.16 South Africa.1922. Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act no. 42 of 1922. Act to provide for the supply and control of electricity and for other purposes incidental thereto. Cape

Town: Government Printers.17 South Africa.1922. Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act no. 42 of 1922. Act to provide for the supply and control of electricity and for other purposes incidental thereto. Cape

Town: Government Printers.18 Steyn, G. 2006. Investment and Uncertainty: Historical experience with power sector investment in South Africa and its implications for current challenges. 15 March 2006.

Retrieved March 12, 2012, from UCT graduate School of Business: http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/les/Eskom-InvestmentUncertainty.pdf.19 The Eskom Integrated Annual report (2011, p.87) is for example at pains to point out that the current MW price of capacity in the new build process is in line with the international

build prices, be it at the upper end. This is probably in response to reports such as the Study of Equipment Prices in the Power Sector (World Bank, 2008) showing comparative

build costs in India, China and even some parts of the USA and Europe as cheaper than those of Medupi and Kusile. (see Yelland, C. 2011. Further cost increases on the cards

for Eskoms Medupi and Kusile power stations. Retrieved May 4, 2012, from ee publishers. Available: http://www.eepublishers.co.za/article/further-cost-increases-on-the-cards-for-

eskoms-medupi-and-kusile-power-stations.html).20 Steyn, G. 2006. Investment and Uncertainty: Historical experience with power sector investment in South Africa and its implications for current challenges. 15 March 2006.

Retrieved March 12, 2012, from UCT graduate School of Business. Available: http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/les/Eskom-InvestmentUncertainty.pdf.21 As far back as 1980 Eskom reports, Similarly good progress was made providing electricity supplies to Black urban areas and the national states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana

and Venda. Plans for Escom to augment existing bulk supplies to Soweto, South Africas biggest black city are on schedule. ESCOM. 1980. Annual Report. p. 10 Johannesburg:

ESCOM.22 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.23 Fine, B., and Rustomjee, Z. 1996. The Political Economy of South Africa. From Minerals-Energy Complex to Industrialisation, London, Hurst.

24 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.25 Historically dened, the Minerals-Energy Complex is a system in which low paid labour was exploited, and cheap coal based energy with costs externalised to society was used to

support an accumulation regime of a few highly centralised rms focused primarily on capital intensive commodity based industrial activities and the export of basic commodities and

low value add products.26 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.27 Ibid.



The Minerals-Energy Complex has historically accounted

for the majority of South Africas electricity consumption

and emissions, contributing far less to GDP.28 This system

is based on the theory that in order to grow the economy,

it is necessary to have the large centralised baseload

production of electricity, which is distributed through a grid

to energy intensive users.29 Eskom holds signicant

referential30 and representational power within

important government departments, policymaking,

policy inuencing and regulatory bodies. This in turn,

institutionalises the Minerals-Energy Complex.

The South African economy is extremely energy intensive

compared to international standards31, with only a handful

of countries having higher intensities. In addition, South

African industrial energy efciency is on average signicantly

lower than in other countries.32 This is an important factor,

given that at the moment industry and mining consume

over 60% of the electricity produced in the country,

and the inclusion of commerce takes this gure to

almost 75%.33 Therefore, residential energy use makes

up a far smaller portion of nal energy demand than inother countries, and demand from poor households is even

smaller.34 Only 16-18%35 of South Africas electricity

is used by residential consumers, an outcome of the

energy intensive nature of the economy, and the extreme

income differential in the country.36

Furthermore, industrial prices are substantially

cheaper than average residential prices. Eskom has

made frequent reference to its industrial tariffs as the

cheapest in the world37, however residential consumers

pay signicantly higher prices.38 For example, secret price

deals between Eskom and the Australian mining companyBHP Billiton, are estimated at about 350% less than a

low income residential customer in 2008/9, and less than

half of Eskoms reported production price in the period.39

With an estimated 12.3 million South Africans still

without access to electricity40, clearly the focus on the

Minerals-Energy Complex has had an extensive inuence

on the provision of energy for households, commerce and

services.41 It has also undoubtedly had an inuence on the

fact that coal constitutes such a high proportion of South

Africas primary energy consumption, in fact the highest in

the world in 2003, followed closedly by China.42

As the layers of governance and planning increased from

1987, Eskoms accountability became even more unclear.

This lack of accountability makes it harder for society

to control the Minerals-Energy Complex. Eskom plays

a central role in this Complex, which serves to exploit

resources and externalise environmental and social costs

to society as a whole, while creating prots for local and

international corporations. It seems clear that a more

equitable, genuinely accountable system is required.

This means that the dominance of the Minerals-Energy

Complex and South Africas underlying electricity

generation and supply paradigm must be challenged.

Eskoms role in AfricaThe trade in electricity in Southern Africa is dominated

by sales to just three end users43, who in 2011 used

9,322 GWh, at an average cost of 22.6c/kWh. In

comparison, Eskom sold half that amount of electricity

to utilities in seven countries in the region at an average

cost of 50.8c/KWh.44 Eskom has been deeply engaged

in energy-related projects in Africa45, but following the

supply crisis in South Africa in 2007, the utility has

largely withdrawn from Africa, and is now only involved

in managing generation facilities in Uganda and Mali.

2.3.The Corporatisation

46

of EskomIn the middle of the 1970s, the global crisis in the capitalist

economy saw a signicant decline in growth, which led to

a change in global economic policy. This was the dawn of

the so-called neoliberal period characterised by the rule

of the market, deregulation and privatisation, decreased

spending on social services, the disappearance of the

28 Fine, B. And Rustomjee, Z.1996. The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to Industrialisation. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.29 Historically Eskom was created to centralise power supply in this paradigm. Residential access to electricity is a by-product and not the purpose of the current supply paradigm.30 Eskom has historically retained tight control over information and modelling processes often considered condential for commercial or competitive reasons. This has tended to

hinder open policy and scientic option debate around a number of key areas.31 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.32 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive tolow-carboneconomy in South Africa. Climateand Development1 (2009) 47-65; Hughes,

A, Howells, M. and Kenny, A. 2002. Energy Efciency Baseline Study. Capacity Building in Energy Efciency and Renewable Energy(CABEERE). Report No. 2.3.4. Report No.

P-54126. p.52. Department of Minerals & Energy, Pretoria. Available: http://www.dme.gov.za/energy/efciency_projects.stm.33 Republic of South Africa, Department of Energy. 2010. South African Energy Synopsis2010. p.52 and p.66. Available: http://www.energy.gov.za/les/media/explained/2010/

South_African_Energy_Synopsis_2010.pdf.34 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.35 Republic of South Africa, Department of Energy. 2010. South African Energy Synopsis2010. p.52 and p.66. Available: http://www.energy.gov.za/les/media/explained/2010/

South_African_Energy_Synopsis_2010.pdf.36 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.37 See Eskom Annual Reports, 2001-2009.38 Koen, M. & Bahadur, A. 2010. Eskom: Business as Usual in Africa. Available: http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3603/at_download/fullle.39 Ibid. p.79.40 International Energy Agency. 2011. World Energy Outlook, Access to Electricity. WEO-2011 new Electricity Access Database. Available: http://www.iea.org/weo/docs/weo2011/

other/Energy_Poverty/WEO-2011_new_Electricity_access_Database.xls; Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG). 2012. Integrated National Electrication Programme (INEP)

Implementation: Department of Energy, Salga, Eskom Brieng. 13 February 2012. Available: www.pmg.org.za/report/20120214-department-energy-salga-eskom-implementation-

integrated-national-elec.41

Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.42 Ibid.43 These companies are however, not identied in Eskoms 2011 Integrated Annual Report.44 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. Johannesburg: Eskom.45 Libya, Zanzibar, Uganda, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Mauritius. And Eskom Enterprises has also participated in energy-

related projects in India and China.46 In this context, Corporatisation is dened as: to be inuenced by or take on the features of a large commercial business.


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ideas of the public good/community, and for much of Africa,

the implementation of Bretton Woods imposed structural

adjustment programmes.

The South African state started to adopt some neoliberal

principles47 after the economy failed to recover

signicantly through the 1980s.48 The role of the state

in the economy was deregulated and reduced. This was

done through various means, including privatising state

owned companies. ESCOM was not exempt from these

reforms. The de Villiers Commission in 198549 marks the

start of reform in the sector50: rst, corporatising and later

commercialising Eskom. During this process, a system

was established that continues to reect the contestation

between the government, vested business interests, and

Eskom management until today.

A new corporate body named Escom, replaced the

Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM). The government

appointed the new Electricity Council to govern Escoms

corporate body, which was made up of major stakeholders

from business and the municipalities.51 The State Presidentappointed a chairperson.

In 1986, Chairman Maree summarised the new character of

Escom and its ethos of professional managerialism as the

only sure way to meet the challenges of electricity supply in

South Africa is to run Escom as a professionally managed

business undertaking.52

As part of the corporatisation, the 1985 and 1987

amendments removed the stipulation that electricity should

be supplied in the public interest [with] operations being

carried out neither for prot or loss.

53

This was replacedby consideration for consumer needs being satised in

the most cost effective way, subject to resource constraints

and the national interest.54 The name of the utility was also

changed to Eskom in 1987.

Eskom earningsIn 2009, the utility earned on average 24.7c for every

kWh it sold. By 2011, Eskom was earning 40.3c on

average55, and recorded a net prot of R13.2 billion

as at March 2012.56 Eskom has not paid dividends to

its shareholder, the government of South Africa, since

2008 because of its capital expenditure needs.57

The restructuring of Eskom resulted in an unmonitored

electricity pricing policy. Instead of ensuring parliamentary

oversight, the drafters of the new Act, who included

members of ESCOMs legal department, managed to insert

a clause that exempted Eskom from the requirement to

have a license issued by the ECB [Electricity Control Board]

and thus from having its prices regulated.58

Eskoms reluctance to submit its prices for government

regulation was at times met with resistance by industry.

When Eskom raised tariffs to pay for the heavy debts it had

incurred, this provoked industry and the mines to call for

tighter government control to force it to operate on business

principles. If this sounded contradictory, Eskom then raised

the alarm about politicians in the engine room even as

it maintained its occupation of the DME [Department of

Minerals and Energy].59 After a long period of relative

autonomy, the utility resented the new interference by

the state and tried to secure as much independence as

possible.

Eskoms corporate sense that it was a law unto itself waseven more sharply revealed as the political transition

began. According to its then boss, Ian McRae, staff feared

that the new ANC government would nationalise the

corporation.60 Consequently, Eskom selectively embraced

portions of the governments emerging policy. At the same

time, Eskom resisted the wholesale carving up and sale of

the organisation.

2.4.The Post-Apartheid Transition period

1990-1994

By the end of apartheid, the dominant Minerals-Energy

Complex combined with discriminatory race policies, had

devastated South African society. Freedom brought with

it expectations for change and a need for government to

deliver a better life for all.61 It was a political imperative

that government should deliver on this. At the same time

business had expectations of improved economic growth

and prots through the re-integration of South Africa into the

global economy. At rst, these seemed to be complimentary

objectives. But the reality proved to be completely different.

47 Gentle, L. 2009. Escom to Eskom: From racial Keynesian capitalism to neo-liberalism (1910-1994). In Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the power grid. (D. McDonald,

Ed.) Johannesburg: HSRC Press.48 Gelb, S. 1991. South Africas Economic Crisis. Cape Town: David Phillip, Publishers.49 de Villiers, W. d. 1985. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in South Africa.(Afrikaans). Pretoria: Government Printer.50 Conradie, S. a. 2000. A Symphony of Power. The Eskom Story. Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications (pty) ltd.51 South Africa. 1985. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Electricity Amendment Act, Act No. 50 of 1985. Pretoria: Government Printers.52 Escom.1986. Annual Report. p. 4. Johannesburg: Escom.53 South Africa. 1922. Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Act no. 42 of 1922. Act to provide for the supply and control of electricity and for other purposes incidental thereto. Cape

Town: Government Printers.54 South Africa. 1985. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Electricity Amendment Act, Act No. 50 of 1985. Pretoria: Government Printers; South Africa. 1987. Statutes of the

Republic of South Africa, Eskom Act, No. 40 of 1987. Pretoria: Government Printers.55 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. Johannesburg: Eskom.56 Business Day. 2012. Eskom prot rises 60%. Available: http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=174215.57 Dames, B. 2011. Presentation on Eskom Audited Annual Results Presentation for the year ended 31 March 2011. October 2011. Retrieved May 5, 2012, from Eskom.co.za.

Available: http://www.eskom.co.za/content/AnnualResultsnal~1.pdf.58 Eberhard, A. 2005. From State to Market and Back Again. South Africas Power Sector Reforms. Economic and Political Weekly, 10 December 2005 pp. 5309-5307.59 Hallowes, D. M. 2007. Peak Poison: The elite energy crisis and environmental justics. Johannesburg: groundWorks, p.33.60 Ibid.61 The slogan a better life for all became the mobilising call and campaign slogan in 1994 by the African National Congress.



Cheaper electricity for all: price deals and

electrication

Eskom took the initiative in 1991 and proposed a price

agreement with government to reduce the real price of

electricity by 20% by 1996.62 The Eskom Chairmans

review pledges, Eskom is sufciently condent of its future

business performance to undertake to its customers that

it will reduce the real price of electricity over the next ve

years by 20%.63

That the intended beneciaries would be the energy

intensive corporations of the Minerals-Energy Complex was

made explicit by Chairman Maree: This reduction in the

price of electricity will place many of our energy-intensive

customers in a much stronger position to compete on

international markets and thus stimulate the export of raw

materials and manufactured goods and encourage new

investment in energy intensive industries.64

The focus on the low-price of electricity also features inEskoms 1992 vision: Eskom is committed to being an

efcient and effective organization [sic], so as to be able to

make electricity available to its customers at the cheapest

possible price. It is also committed to making electricity

available to all in South Africa, who want it and can afford

it[emphasis added].65

However, the notion of who wants it and can afford it

meant that communities needed to pay for it. The income

requirement (cost recovery) needs of Eskom were very

clearly stated by Maree, It is therefore absolutely clear

that any electrication programme can only be achieved if

the community wants it and are prepared to pay for it. In

reference to the National Electrication Forum (NEF), which

was a broad consultative mechanism including communities,

he emphasised the notion of a negotiated process: It is also

clear that communities need to be involved in the planning

and provision of electricity to them.66

Inevitably, community consultation became sidelined

as the NEF consultation process became narrower and

more technocratic with the establishment of the Electricity

Working Group (EWG) consisting of representatives from

Eskom, ministries, and municipalities, but excluding labour

and other civil society formations.67 The EWG gave rise to agovernment-based committee, the Electricity Restructuring

Interdepartmental Committee. This committee then made

the recommendations forming the basis of the 1998 White

Paper on Energy Policy (which included measures such as

regional distributors, a shift to cost reective tariffs, and the

opening of generation to competition).

62 By 1996 Eskom had in fact reduced real prices by 67% from 1985. Available: http://heritage.eskom.co.za/heritage/Chairmen/Reuel%20Khoza.htm.63 Eskom.1991. Annual Report. Johannesburg: Eskom, p.5.64 Eskom.1991. Annual Report. Johannesburg: Eskom.65 Eskom.1990. Annual Report. Johannesburg: Eskom. p.1.66 Eskom. 1991. Annual Report. Johannesburg: Eskom. p.6.67 Greenberg, S. 2008. Market liberalisation and continental expansion: The repositioning of Eskom in Post Apartheid South Africa. In Electric Capitalism. Johannesburg: HSRC Press.

Greenpeace

/Oswa

ldChikos

i,2011.


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3.Influence and accommodation: Eskom andGovernment Policy 1994-2001

Eskom undoubtedly has a dual role. On one hand,

the utility can be seen as an extension of government

and its policy. On the other hand, Eskoms corporate

(and later commercial) logic led to a preservation of

its organisational position, and continued to facilitate

the accumulation of wealth within a framework of the

Minerals-Energy Complex.68

Due to the dominance of the Minerals-Energy Complex,

since 1987 South Africas underlying electricity generation

and supply paradigm has never been challenged.69

The reality is that the policy environment has become

increasingly confusing, and sometimes contradictory.

This, combined with overlapping roles and responsibilities

within the governance of the utility has deected attention

away from the underlying paradigm of large centralised(baseload) generation, serving energy intensive users at

the expense of both the environment, and peoples health

and access to energy.

The objectives of the post-apartheid government have

clearly inuenced the actions of the utility in many

fundamental ways. Transformations in terms of employment

equity, addressing past discrimination and, more recently,

broad based black economic empowerment, have all been

appropriately high on the states agenda. Similarly, it was

crucial that the discriminatory patterns of service delivery

be addressed post-1994.

While some of Eskoms actions were no doubt an

accommodation of the new governments developmental

needs, the utilitys growing commercial motivation also

played a role. The corporatisation of Eskom and a need

to soak up excess capacity through the creation of new

markets meant that many of the issues that would be central

for the new government already had an existing commercial

rationale within Eskom. The accommodation of government

needs can therefore been seen as the intensication of a

pre-existing commercial direction, rather than a reversal of it.

The role of electrication

The initial national electrication process was a clear

imperative for the new government and Eskom responded

accordingly, effecting 2 812 847 connections between 1991

and its commercial incorporation in 2001.70 71 Securing

former Black Local Authorities (BLA) distribution networks

meant that Eskom was able to ensure it remained relevant

during the transition by positioning itself to take on the

electrication backlog to predominantly black households.

To date, 4 050 968 homes have been electried since 1991,

based largely on a prepaid metering system.72

However, Eskoms electrication drive was based on the

commercial rationale that extending the domestic market

would improve income generation as well as independencefrom the state. But average consumption fell far short of

what Eskom assessed was needed to make the programme

commercially viable.73 74 People simply could not afford to

buy enough electricity to make this protable.75 Indeed,

providing large-scale electrication to a large proportion

of South Africas population since 1990 has actually had

relatively little impact on overall electricity consumption.

The addition of over three million new (primarily low-income)

residential customers between 1990 and 2004 only increased

Eskoms sales by approximately 4%.76

In April 2001

77 78

, the Department of Minerals and Energybegan funding the Integrated National Electrication

Programme (INEP) directly.79 Nonetheless, Eskom retained

a strong inuence over the process: Eskom personnel

were simply seconded to the Department. According to

Clarck (2007: 17) Macro [electricity] planning is currently

undertaken by the Integrated National Electrication

Programme Business Planning (INEP BP) Unit. Previously

housed within Eskom, this unit is now separate from it,

though most of its staff have been seconded, on ministerial

request, from Eskom.80

68 Hallowes, D. M. 2007. Peak Poison: The elite energy crisis and environmental justics. Johannesburg: groundWorks.; McDonald, D. 2009. Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa

on the power grid. Johannesburg: HSRC Press.; Koen, M. and Bahadur, A. 2010. Eskom: Business as Usual in Africa. Available: http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3603/

at_download/fullle.69 McDonald, D. 2009. Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the power grid. Johannesburg: HSRC Press.70 Eskom. 2002. Annual Report. Johannesburg: Eskom.71 Nearly all of these new connections have used pre-payment technology customers buy tokens or top-up electronic cards to activate their electricity dispenser. Many connections

involve informal houses (shacks) and use pre-wired ready boards typically with a few lights and plug points.72 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. p. 182. Johannesburg: Eskom.73 The average consumption of 100 kWh fell far short of the 350 kWh Eskom assessed was needed to make the programme commercially viable.74 Clarck, A. 2005. Resource-based Technology Innovation in South Africa: Innovations in South Africas Off-grid. Johannesburg: HSRC Press.

75 In 2001 for instance, the average monthly revenue per prepaid customer was just R30. Source: Eskom Annual Report 2001.76 Winkler, H., Marquand, A. 2009. Changing development paths: From an energy-intensive to low-carbon economy in South Africa. Climate and Development1 (2009) 47-65.77 Eskom. 2002. Annual Report. Johannesburg: Eskom.78 Eskom, which had been funding the programme from tariffs to this point, was about to start paying taxes and dividends to government in its commercialised form (South Africa,

2001) and therefore argued electrication should come out of these payments.79 Hallowes, D. M. 2007. Peak Poison: The elite energy crisis and environmental justics. Johannesburg: groundWorks.80 Clarck, A. 2005. Resource-based Technology Innovation in South Africa: Innovations in South Africas Off-grid. p. 17 Johannesburg: HSRC Press.



In more recent times, the pace of electrication has slowed

as a result of rising costs per connection and the level

of government funding for electrication. According to a

parliamentary brieng by the Department of Energy, Eskom

and the South African Local Government Association

(Salga), by 2012 there has actually been a decrease in real

terms of the electrication allocation.81 In addition, it was

reported that the INEP operational budget is not sufcient

to plan, implement and monitor projects effectively.82

At the same time, the South African government has an

ambitious timeline for establishing universal access to

electricity in South Africa by 2014. Eskom has raised doubts

about meeting this deadline, and in 2011, Eskom was

unable to meet its electrication target.83 The utilitys

current 10-year electrication programme does not cater

for universal access by 2014, but claims that a 2021/2022

timetable is more realistic. According to Eskom If this

programme has to be expedited, it will severely limit the

ability to execute the spend in other categories and increase

the operational expenditure due to increased connection

numbers84, once again highlighting the contested natureof this countrys electricity sector.

The governments managed liberalisation of the

electricity sector

In the late 1990s international globalisation trends meant

that the focus was not on whetherto liberalise, but rather

on how to liberalise the electricity sector.85 The South

Africa government had opted for what they referred to as

managed liberalisation.86 As a result of this approach,

the cabinet prevented Eskom from engaging in any further

generation capacity development from the time of the 1998

White Paper on Energy Policy, to 2004.89

In a speech to the Africa Energy Forum in 2001, Minister

of Minerals and Energy at the time, Phumzile Mlambo-

Ncguka, summarised the governments objectives thus:

The energy sector is being restructured in order to ensure

that we reduce the cost of energy, improve economic

efciency, attract local and foreign direct investment,

diversify energy resources for environmental reasons,

and ensure security of energy supply. This will ensure the

delicate balance between States imperative to spur on

economic growth and its social responsibilities...[In] order to

limit the expected upward pressure on electricity prices due

to Eskoms new dividend and tax payments status, there

is a need to build new generating capacity, to encompass

environmental considerations, and to reform the...[sector].

Government will ensure that these price increases will be

kept as low as possible, so that South Africa maintains its

competitiveness, cross subsidies for the poor, and free

basic services to bring relief to the poor.90

However, the states emphasis on social responsibilities

nevertheless meant that in practice those duties were

increasingly shifted to individuals. The large-scale

introduction of prepaid metering systems was one

outcome of this process. It ensured consumer discipline

with disturbing consequences: households would simply

cut themselves off when they could not afford to pay for

electricity. The potential social benets of extending

electricity access were therefore completely undermined.

81 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG). 2012. Integrated National Electrication Programme (INEP) Implementation: Department of Energy, Salga, Eskom Brieng. 13 February

2012. Available: www.pmg.org.za/report/20120214-department-energy-salga-eskom-implementation-integrated-national-elec.82 Ibid.83 Eskom states this as one of the challenges: Not meeting the target of 158 430 overall electrication connections this year (149 914 made) in Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual

Report 2011. p. 168 Johannesburg: Eskom.84 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. p. 180. Johannesburg: Eskom.

85 Koen, M. 2011. Theres an Elephant in the Room. Greenwash and Socialwash in Eskoms sustainability reporting. Durban: Working Paper. CSRSC.86 The partial privatisation of risks and the introduction of quasi-markets in the administration of benets under the strict control and management of the Government.87 Dames, B. 2011. Presentation on Eskom Audited Annual Results Presentation for the year ended 31 March 2011. October 2011. Retrieved May 5, 2012, from Eskom.co.za.

Available: http://www.eskom.co.za/content/AnnualResultsnal~1.pdf.88 CSRSC calculations, based on gures in Eskoms 2011 Integrated Annual Report.89 Department of Minerals and Energy. 1998. White Paper on Energy Policy. Pretoria: Government Printers.90 Mlambo-Ncguka. 2001. Politics of Electricity Sector Reform in South Africa: Managed Liberalisation and Developmentalism (2009-2014). Retrieved October 10, 2009, from Africa

Energy Forum. Available: www.researchandmarkets.com.

Eskoms electricity customersOnly 139 customers account for 34.9% of Eskoms total revenues87, however these customers generally pay less than

half what the majority of customers pay. In 2011, mining and industry customers paid an average of 36.2c/KWh, while

4.5 million direct residential customers paid on average 66.4c/KWh.88

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4. Commercialisation of Eskom: 2001-2012

Following on from the Eskom Conversion Act in 2002,

Eskom was converted from a statutory body to a public

company (Eskom Holdings Limited), with the South

African government as the sole shareholder. A board

was then established, but was comprised almost entirely

by big business, with a handful of academics and a

sole representative of the DPE.91 The impacts of the

governments managed liberalisation approach are clear,

with the Eskom Conversion Act attempting to balance

the competing narrative of Eskoms developmental role

and the need for affordable electricity.92 In reality, these

competing interests have never been resolved.

Indeed, it was this approach that prevented Eskom from

investing in new capacity before 2004, and precipitated

an electricity supply crisis in 2007, which continues to

date, despite policy acknowledgement of the problem ten

years previously.93 The crisis in 2007 meant that Eskomwas told to accelerate building new capacity quickly, and

urgently began investing in a new build programme. This

programme consists almost entirely of new major coal-red

capacity (Medupi and Kusile) as a supposedly least cost

and proven technology solution. Thus, the earlier policy

immobility, followed by the urgency to seek solutions to the

supply crisis meant that the necessary space to develop

better alternatives was completely absent.

The National Energy Regulator (NERSA) became

operational in 2008, but given the monopolistic nature of

South Africas electricity market, the regulators dominantrole thus far has been to adjudicate Eskoms price

applications. The nature of these decisions has had the

effect of deecting accountability from both the state and

the state-owned enterprise.

Since 2001, government roles in the electricity sector

have become increasingly complicated with the following

departments involved in one way or another: The Department

of Public Enterprises, The Treasury Department, The

Department of Energy, The Department of Minerals, The

Department of Environmental Affairs and The Department

of Local Government.

In fact, by 2012 the contestation for control of

Eskom from different economic interests (including

the Minerals-Energy Complex and Eskom itself),

inappropriate governance and regulation structures,

role confusion and policy uncertainty have in fact

resulted in less accountability to the real owners of the

utility: the people of South Africa.

91 Greenberg, S. 2008. Market liberalisation and continental expansion: The repositioning of Eskom in Post Apartheid South Africa. In Electric Capitalism. Johannesburg: HSRC

Press.

92 South Africa.2001. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Eskom Conversion Act, No. 13 of 2001. Pretoria: Government Printers.93 Department of Minerals and Energy. 1998. White Paper on Energy Policy. Pretoria: Government Printers.94 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. p. 182. Johannesburg: Eskom.95 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. Johannesburg:Eskom.96 Labour Research Services. 2011. Bargaining Indicators for 2011. Cape Town: LRS.97 Koen, M. 2012. Based on the unpublished research report: The Electricity Governance Complex. Civil Society Research and Support Collective.

SalariesIn 2011, Eskoms CEO earned R478 000 per month(including bonuses).95 Compared to this, the median

minimum monthly wage in South Africa was R3162 per

month in 2011.96 Based on these calculations, the ratio

of the CEOs salary to a minimum wage income is thus

151:1.97

In 2012, South Africas electricity sector looks like

this:

An estimated four million households have been

connected to electricity since 199194, but these

connections are characterised by chronic under

consumption of less than 100kWh per month;

The social development potential of electricity has

been largely negated by cost recovery policies resulting

in disconnections and self disconnection through

prepaid metering systems;

Domestic consumption is still a fraction of industrial

consumption and poor households an even smaller

fraction of this;

Service related protests are common place and often

relate to electricity;

No signicant renewable sources of energy have been

developed; The carbon footprint of the utility continues to grow

substantially;

Dwindling water resources are further threatened by

technology choices;

Coal mining has boomed along with the negative

impacts of acid mine drainage and toxins;

Allegations of corruption in the award of tenders for

capital expenditure projects continue to surface;

Real prices for electricity reduced by around 67% over

20 years, and then have escalated by 300% in just a few

years;

A supply crisis in 2007 followed by scheduled outagesreferred to as load shedding resulted in large scale

economic harm and job losses;

Debt and spiralling prices limited the countrys ability to

respond to the global economic crisis;

A controversial World Bank loan has been sourced for

building additional coal-red generation capacity

(Medupi); and

Amidst these problems large bonuses continue to be

paid to the utilitys leadership.



5. Eskom and Water

In a water-scarce country like South Africa, the

decisions taken around the consumption of water have

major implications. As a strategic water user, Eskoms

investment decisions do play a role in the equation:in

2011 alone, Eskom consumed 327.252 Ml of water.98 The

new power stations currently under construction (Medupi

and Kusile) are to be dry-cooled as part of Eskoms climate

change adaptation strategy and its claimed commitment

to the environment.99 Importantly, because both of these

power stations are being built in already polluted areas,

both stations will require the installation of a ue gas

desulphurisation plant, signicantly increasing the water

usage of these power stations.

But using dry-cooled technology is not a shift in Eskoms

strategy. Over 20 years earlier, Eskom had already opted

for dry-cooled technology in the previous build programme.

This was out of necessity as there were insufcient waterresources to support the intended power stations.100 The

annual report of 1983101 describes Kendal, Matimba and

Majuba stations as air-cooled based on lessons learned

from the smaller Grootvlei station that was already dry-

cooled, as not enough water could be found to service the

station.

These three stations were planned during a severe drought

in 1982/3. During this period, many existing power stations

were unable to run at capacity because of insufcient water

supply. It cost R100 million to augment water to the large

power stations during the drought, which was done throughemergency pumping schemes in the Eastern Transvaal. In

a demonstration of the Minerals-Energy Complex at work

in a crisis, the 1983 annual report describes the measures

taken, water affairs developed a scheme to augment the

supplies of water in the Eastern Transvaal by reversing the

ow of the Vaal River by pumping water up the river over

a series of seven weirs. The scheme was completed in

20 weeks at a cost of some R28 million, to which ESCOM

contributed R19 million and SASOL, another large water

user in the Eastern Transvaal the remaining R9 million.102

However, the lessons of the drought were quickly forgotten,

as the construction of Majuba in the late 1980s shows. In

1995 it was decided to go ahead with the last three units.

Costs had spiraled, as the coal reserve was far lower

than the geological survey had predicted. This meant that

coal had to be transported by road and rail, and Majubas

cost of generation was far higher than anticipated. As a

consequence, the last three units commissioned were once

again cheaper, water-inefcient, water-cooled options.103

It is often accepted that Eskom is the source of knowledgeand expertise in the electricity sector. However, the lessons

of the past are clear: demand projections can be wrong,

coal reserve estimation is far from exact and the nature of

South Africas water supply is incredibly fragile. Despite

this, Eskom continues to make the same decisions, and

potentially the same mistakes that it did in the past.

It is estimated that the hidden costs of Kusile could be as

much as Three Trillion Rand over its 50 year lifespan.104

The water impacts dominate these externality costs

approximately 70% of the external costs are water-

related

105

, and per unit of electricity produced, Kusile willuse 173 times more water than wind power would. Building

in inexibility, instability, and water uncertainty into South

Africas electricity system.

98 Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. p.11. Johannesburg: Eskom.99 Eskom. 2006a. Annual Report. Johannesburg: Eskom.;Eskom. 2011. Integrated Annual Report 2011. Johannesburg: Eskom.100 Steyn, G. 2006. Investment and Uncertainty: Historical experience with power sector investment in South Africa and its implications for current challenges. 15 March 2006.

Retrieved March 12, 2012, from UCT graduate School of Business. Available: http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/les/Eskom-InvestmentUncertainty.pdf.101 ESCOM. 1983. Annual Report. Johannesburg: ESCOM.102

ESCOM. 1983. Annual Report. p. 21. Johannesburg: ESCOM.103 Steyn, G. 2006. Investment and Uncertainty: Historical experience with power sector investment in South Africa and its implications for current challenges. 15 March 2006.

Retrieved March 12, 2012, from UCT graduate School of Business. Available: http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/les/Eskom-InvestmentUncertainty.pdf.104 Greenpeace. 2011. The True Cost of Coal in South Africa: Paying the price of coal addiction. Available: http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/Global/africa/publications/coal/

TrueCostOfCoal.pdf.105 The report measured the scarcity value or opportunity cost of water.

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6. Conclusion

Eskom clearly plays an inuential role in South Africas

electricity, policy and regulatory environment. The utility

has staff seconded to numerous government bodies, and is

often called upon to offer technical, logistical and nancial

support to the government, as well as participating in forming

parliamentary opinion through various subcommittees.106

However, it is inherently difcult to analyse the sustainability

performance of a state-owned utility like Eskom.

The question becomes: to what extent does one focus

on Eskom itself, as opposed to the relevant government

departments, policy processes, parliamentary oversight,

and regulatory institutions? Drawing the lines as to where

Eskoms responsibility and accountability lies often proves

difcult, given that the utility occupies an effective monopoly

position in the absence of any real competition. Eskoms

shift in an increasingly commercial direction has had

two key consequences: while government oversight hasincreased, overall accountability has decreased. The

outcome is clear: a lack of genuine accountability for

Eskom, as well as the government. And this lack of clarity

works for both parties, in that they are continuously able to

shift responsibilities from one to the other pointing out that

it is not them making the decisions, or with the expertise.

Eskoms decisions have repeatedly conrmed the utilitys

commitment to the central paradigm of large scale centralised

generation and grid-based distribution to energy-intensive

corporations, which lies at the heart of the Minerals-Energy

Complex. Government holds a series of roles or spheresof inuence and accountability with regards to the utility.

These are, amongst others, that of shareholder, regulator,

policy creator and political patron. This leads to confusion

over accountabilities and the extent of strong directive

inuence and control by the state, introduces the possibility

for corruption, ad hoc interference, and most importantly, a

lack of accountability amongst all players.

As a result Calland and Pienaar107 make the comment

that Picking holes in the governance of electricity supply,

and energy policy more generally, is like shooting sh in a

barrel. Whether it is the development and sequencing of

key policy documents, the absence of proper stakeholderconsultation, leadership failure, or the lack of clarity about

intra-governmental roles and responsibilities, there are

more hooks on which to hang a public debate than in a

cloakroom.108

The results of a quarter century of electricity sector reform

have been excellent from the perspective of the mines,

banks and heavy industry. However, from a social and

environmental sustainability perspective, the results have

been deeply worrying. The Minerals-Energy Complex

remains central to the type of electricity investment Eskom

decides to make. Indeed, Eskom is at the heart of this

paradigm, and both promotes and benets from it.

But one thing remains clear: The ground-breaking

decisions South Africa needs to make today cannot

become the victim of play-offs in responsibility and a lack

of accountability. The question of Who is responsible

demands urgent answers in the face of an accelerated

climate crisis, the growing gap between rich and poor,

unacceptably high levels of inequality and unemployment,

lack of service delivery, lack of access to affordable

electricity, a potential water crisis, and the continueddominance of big industry and vested interests.

Continuing along South Africas current pathway is clearly

not going to address any of these problems. The countrys

electricity system relies on coal, large scale centralised

generation and decision-making behind closed doors. The

centrality of energy-intensive industries comes at the

expense of all South Africans, making prots for a

privileged few. Therefore, the dominance of the Minerals-

Energy Complex and South Africas underlying electricity

generation and supply paradigm must be challenged.

In the pursuit of a sustainable future, a major paradigm shift

is required. This means that it is time for real accountability

from the government, and from Eskom. The utility needs

to stop building new coal-red power stations, and

should instead invest in the substantial rollout of large-

scale and decentralised renewable energy projects. It is

also time for the Minerals-Energy Complex to become far

less central to the South African economy. A just transition

away from coal and towards renewable energy is required

to secure the countrys electricity supply, create jobs, ensure

energy access, and avoid a water crisis exacerbated by

catastrophic climate change. It is time for Eskom to nally

learn the lessons of the past. It is not yet too late.

106 A parliamentary subcommittee plays an oversight role of state owned enterprises while others focus on the development of policy and legislation in the areas that affect decisionsrelating to development, environment, energy etc.107 Calland is director of Idasas Economic Governance Programme, which convenes the multi-stakeholder Electricity Governance Initiative of SA (EGI-SA), and associate professor

in public law at UCT. Pienaar is senior researcher: public ethics and governance.108 Calland, R. A. 2009. Left in the dark, public could pay heavy price for decades. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from Business Day. Available: http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/

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Greenpeace Africas campaign to end SouthAfricas coal addiction

South Africa is among the highest emitters of carbon dioxide in the world, and burning coal is one of the primary

sources of these emissions.

Currently, more than 90% of South Africas electricity comes from coal. Eskom continues to insist that coal is thecheapest source of electricity, and is investing in two mega new coal-red power stations.

The reality is that there is no future in coal. The true cost of coal is destruction at every step, and coal-red electricity

production uses massive amounts of scarce water, creates prots for a privileged few, has failed to deliver electricity

to over 12 million South Africans, and destroys peoples health and wellbeing.

Greenpeace Africa campaigns for an Energy [R]evolution to end South Africas addiction to dirty and risky coal and

nuclear energy, replacing them with renewable energy and energy efciency.

If the country commits to this option, we can phase out coal in a just transition over the next 40 years, tackle energy

poverty and avoid catastrophic climate change. This will mean that half of South Africas electricity could come from

renewable energy by 2030, and an estimated 150 000 direct jobs could be created in the energy sector in less than20 years.

To achieve this goal, Greenpeace campaigns for Eskom to stop the construction of Kusile to prevent its massive

environmental, economic, and social impacts. By building new coal-red power stations, Eskom and the South

African government are locking the country into a dirty, expensive future. Instead, Eskom must become genuinely

accountable to the people of South Africa by investing in the substantial rollout of large-scale and decentralised

renewable energy projects.

The True Cost of Coal is simply too high for South Africans to continue to pay.


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RSA Ofce:

10A and 10B Clamart House, Clamart

Road, Richmond, Johannesburg,

South Africa

Postal address:

Greenpeace Africa

PostNet Suite 125

Private Bag X09, Melville

Johannesburg, 2109

South Africa

DRC Ofce:

Greenpeace Environnemental

Organisation 8, avenue lodja, Q.

Socimat Commune de la Gombe,Kinshasa,

Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo

Senegal Ofce:

2, Avenue Hassan II, 6eme etage,

Dakar, Senegal

[email protected]

www.greenpeaceafrica.org

Greenpeace exists because this fragile

Earth deserves a voice. It needs solutions.

It needs change. It needs action!

Greenpeace is an independent global

campaigning organization that acts

to change attitudes and behavior, to

protect and conserve the environment

and to promote peace. It comprises of

28 independent national/regional ofces

in over 40 countries across Europe, the

Americas, Asia, the Pacic and Africa

as well as a co-coordinating body,

Greenpeace International.

Greenpeace has been working in Africa

to end environmental destruction and

ghting for the right of Africans to a

healthy environment since the early

1990s. Our campaigns focus on climate

change, halting the destruction of tropical

forests and preventing the degradation ofmarine ecosystems.

Greenpeace

/Bene

dicteKurzen,

2011

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