The Esse/Essentia Argument in Aquinas's De ente et essentia

MacDonald, Scott Charles.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 22, Number 2, April 1984,pp. 157-172 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University PressDOI: 10.1353/hph.1984.0016

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The Esse/Essentia Argument in Aquinas's De ente et essentia

S C O T T M A C I ) O N A I . D

DeSPnTE ALL OF TIlE ATTFNTION w h i c h has b e e n p a i d to t he i ssues which A q u i n a s ra ises in an i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t in C h a p t e r 4 o f De e n t e et es.~entia'

(1 shal l call it t he E s s e / E s s e n t m [E/E] A r g u m e n t ) , no o n e has o f f e r e d a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f exac t ly wha t the a r g u m e t a t is. ~ T h e r e have b e e n d i s c u s s i o n s o f its g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r , o f t he i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f c e r t a i n o f its s e g m e n t s a n d con- c lus ions , a n d o f t he a r g u m e n t ' s p l ace in t i le b r o a d c o n t e x t o f A q u i n a s ' s t h o u g h t . I t s e e m s to me , h o w e v e r , t ha t o n e m u s t be c l ea r a b o u t t he p r e c i s e s t r u c t u r e o f t he a r g u m e n t b e f o r e o n e can a d d r e s s these m o r e g e n e r a l ques - t ions. In Sec t ion n, t h e r e f o r e , I shal l set ou t t he E/E A r g u m e n t in de t a i l a t td d iscuss s o m e m i s c o n s t r u a l s o f t he a r g u m e n t ' s s t r u c t u r e . O n the hasis o f t he e x e g e t i c a l w o r k d o n e in Sec t ion t, 1 shal l ske tch in Sec t ion '., an i n t e r p r e t a - t ion o f t he E/E A r g u m e n t p a y i n g spec ia l a t t e n t i o n to its s ta tus as an a r g u - m e n t fo r t he rea l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e.sse a n d essence . 1 shal l t h e n c o n s i d e r b r ie f ly in Sec t ion 3 o n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the a r g u m e n t which d i f f e r s f r o m mine .

i .1

At the b e g i n n i n g o f C h a p t e r 4 A q u i n a s re jec ts the view tha t s e p a r a t e sub- s t ances a r e c o m p o s e d o f m a t t e r a n d t o r m . :~ I n s o f a r as they d o no t e x h i b i t t he

' l)e ente el e~sentta, Leonine edition, vol. 43. The lext I shall be discussing is 376.9o . 377.154 m the l.eonine edition, l have provMed a translation of the lext in an appendix. Quotations ~'ill be from this translation, and 1 ~'ill give the line nulnl• twonl tile Iranslalion immediately following the quotation.

For a bibliography of the literature on De ente 4 see.John F. Wippel, "'Aqumas's Route Io the Real Distinction", Thomtst 43 (n979): e79, n. n.

"Separate substante" is Aquinas's designation for an entity whir h is immateria|, i.e., sepa- rated from matter. At the beginning of Chapter 4 Aquinas indicates that there are three types of separate substances: souls, intelligences--by which he means angels and the movc0"s of the heavenly bodies--and the first cause. In the course ot the argument he takes intelligences alone

[157]

158 E s s e / E s s e n t i a A~GUMENT

c o m p o s i t i o n o f m a t t e r a n d f o r m , s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n c e s a r e s i mp l e . T h e v iew tha t s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n c e s a r e in s o m e sense s i m p l e , h o w e v e r , is o p e n to two poss ib l e ob j ec t ions . F i rs t , it m i g h t be o b j e c t e d t ha t i f s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n c e s a r e s imp le , t hey a r e l ike G o d , w h i c h is i m p o s s i b l e . S e c o n d , it m i g h t be p o i n t e d o u t t ha t A q u i n a s h i m s e l f has c l a i m e d tha t i n d i v i d u a t i o n is d e p e n d e n t o n m a t t e r . 4 I f s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n c e s d o n o t h a v e m a t t e r , t h e n it will b e i m p o s s i b l e to i n d i v i d u a t e t h e m . A q u i n a s d e v o t e s t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e c h a p t e r to m e e t - i n g t h e s e two ob j ec t i ons . His tasks , t h e n , a r e to show tha t , a l t h o u g h s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n c e s l ack t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f m a t t e r a n d f o r m , t h e y a r e n o t ( l ike G o d ) s i m p l e in e v e r y way a n d a r e n o t p u r e a c t u a l i t y ? a n d tha t , a l t h o u g h t h e y h a v e no m a t t e r , t hey m a y still be i n d i v i d u a t e d . T h e f irst t a sk is t h e o n e A q u i n a s u n d e r t a k e s in t h e p a s s a g e wi th w h i c h I a m c o n c e r n e d .

A q u i n a s m a k e s c l e a r w h a t t he a r g u m e n t is s u p p o s e d to e s t ab l i sh by s ta t - i ng the c o n c l u s i o n at t h e ou t se t . H e says t ha t a l t h o u g h s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n c e s a r e f o r m a l o n e w i t h o u t m a t t e r , " n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e y a r e no t s i m p l e in e v e r y way n o r a r e t h e y p u r e ac tua l i t y b u t t h e y a r e p e r m e a t e d by p o t e n t i a l i t y " ( l ines ~ - 3 ) - T h e a r g u m e n t p r o c e e d s to e s t ab l i sh t ha t t hey a r e no t s i m p l e in e v e r y way ( l ines 2 6 - 2 8 ) a n d tha t t hey a r e a m i x t u r e o f p o t e n t i a l i t y a n d a c t u a l i t y ( l ines 4 9 - 5 1 ) .

I be l i eve t ha t t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a a c c u r a t e l y r e p r e s e n t s A q u i n a s ' s E/E A r g u m e n t : 6

( E / E l ) W h a t e v e r b e l o n g s to a t h i n g a n d is no t p a r t o f its e s s e nc e e i t h e r (a) c o m e s f r o m w i t h o u t a n d e f fec t s a c o m p o s i t i o n wi th t he es-

sence o r [ 4 - 6 ] (b) i t se l f c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e n t i r e essence . [ 1 1 - 1 2 ]

as representative of separate substances generally. The view of universal hylomorphism, the view Aquinas is criticizing in the present chapter, is that all substances contain matter and form. The designation "separate substance" would not, therefore, be acceptable to someone holding universal hylomorphism.

4 In Chapter 2, 373.254-73. 5 Strictly speaking, if an entity is not absolutely simple, then it follows that it is not pure

actuality. All that Aquinas has to do to show that intelligences are not pure actuality is to show that they are not absolutely simple. His argument, however, is more complex. He treats the issue of pure actuality in some detail and separately from the issue of absolute simplicity. He does this, I think, for two reasons. First, focusing on the issue of pure actuality allows him to show that the esse-essence relation is a species of the actuality-potentiality relation (see 2-3 below). Second, he wants to direct our attention to the potentiality-actuality distinction because it is the basis on which he will resolve the problem of individuation for separate substances. The resolution of that problem follows immediately after the E/E Argument (377-~ 67ff.).

6 The aim of the schema is to present Aquinas's argument in a logically rigorous way. To achieve that aim I have standardized terminology--e.g., 1 have used "essence" throughout although Aquinas's text sometimes uses quiditas instead of essentia, and I have paraphrased or slightly altered the text where doing so makes the formal presentation of the argument more perspicuous. The references in square brackets are to lines of the translation in the appendix.

J O U R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 2 APR 1 9 8 4 159

(E/E2) No essence can be under s tood without its parts. [6-7] (E/E3) Every essence [except the Divine essence] can be under s tood

without anything being under s tood about its esse . [7-8] [.'.(E/E4) A thing's e s s e is not part o f its essence.]

(E/E5) Suppose that there is something [call it X] which is es se alone, so that it is e s s e itself subsisting. [ i 9 - 2 o ]

(E/E6) Pluralization occurs in one of only three ways: (i) by the addit ion of some differentia,

(ii) by a form being received in d i f ferent matters, or (iii) by one thing being absolute and another being received in

something. [ 12-19] (E/E7) Anything which is e s s e alone cannot receive the addit ion of a

differentia. [2o-22] [.'.(E/E8) X cannot be more than one in virtue of (6i).]

(E/E9) Anything which is e s s e alone cannot receive d i f ferent matters. [22 - -24 ]

[.'.(E/Elo) X cannot be more than one in virtue of (6ii).] .'.(E/EI 1) I f there is anything which is its own es se , there is at most one such

thing. 7 [24-25] .'.(E/E12) For any o ther thing besides this one, its e s s e is o ther than its

essence. [25 -26 ] [(E/E13) Intelligences are entities which are o ther than this one.] 8

.'.(E/El4) T h e r e is e s s e besides essence in intelligences. [26-28] (E/E 15) Everything which belongs to something either

(a) is caused by the principles of its nature or (b) comes to it f rom some extrinsic principle. [29-32 ]

(E/E16) A thing's e s s e cannot be caused by the thing's essence, [i.e., a thing's es se is not accounted for by (i5a)], because it is impossible that a thing p roduce itself in esse . [32-35]

.'.(E/E17) It must be that every thing such that its e s s e is o ther than its essence has es se f rom another , [i.e., a thing's es se is accounted for by ( 15b)]. [35-36]

(E/E 18) One cannot go to infinity in efficient causes [4o-41] .'.(E/E19) T h e r e is something which is the cause of es se for all things in

virtue of the fact that it is e s s e alone. [37-4 o] (E/E2o) Everything which receives something f rom another is in potenti-

ality with respect to what is received, and what is received is the actuality of the thing. [45 -46 ]

[.'.(E/E21) All things [other than God] are in potentiality with respect to e s s e

which they receive f rom God.] .'.(E/E22) Potentiality and actuality are found in intelligences. [49-5 o]

7 In Section 1.4 below I shall discuss Aquinas's failure to take up (E/E6iii) before drawing this conclusion.

s Aquinas is using intelligences as representative of separate substances generally; see n. 3.

16o E s s e / E s s e n t i a ARGUMENT

In Sect ions 1.2--1. 4 below I shall take u p t h r ee f ea tu res o f this s c h e m a which m i g h t a p p e a r to be p rob lemat i c .

1 . 2

S o m e jus t i f ica t ion is necessa ry f o r the fact tha t p remiss (E/El) , and conse- quen t ly s teps (E /E1) - (E /E4) , o f the s c h e m a d e p a r t f r o m Aqu inas ' s actual text. Aqu ina s actual ly begins with the fo l lowing claim: "For w h a t e v e r is no t o f the c o n c e p t o f an essence o r qu idd i ty c o m e s f r o m wi thou t a n d effects a c o m p o s i t i o n with the e s s e n c e . . . " (lines 4 - 6 ) . I m a k e two add i t ions to this text, however , to f o r m p remiss (E/E1) o f the r econs t ruc t ion . First I have e x p a n d e d Aqu inas ' s "wha t eve r " to " w h a t e v e r be longs to a th ing ," a n d sec- ond , I have a d d e d a claim which A q u i n a s makes later in the text (at lines l l--l '~) to his initial claim to m a k e p remiss (E/E1) a d is junct ion . I shall discuss my reasons fo r m a k i n g the first add i t ion in this sect ion a n d m y reasons fo r m a k i n g the s econd in the next .

Subs t i tu t ing " w h a t e v e r be longs to a th ing" fo r Aqu inas ' s s imple "what - ever" a m o u n t s to n o t h i n g m o r e , I th ink, t han m a k i n g explicit w h a t he, p e r h a p s just if iably, leaves implicit . Strictly speak ing , the claim tha t w h a t e v e r is no t o f the c o n c e p t o f an essence c o m e s f r o m wi thou t a n d effects a c o m p o - sition with the essence is false. T h e r e are p len ty o f th ings which a re no t p a r t o f the c o n c e p t o f an essence which do no t c o m e f r o m wi thou t a n d e f fec t a compos i t i on with i t - -viz . , th ings which have n o t h i n g w h a t s o e v e r to do with the th ing in ques t ion . S q u a r e n e s s is s o m e t h i n g which is no t pa r t o f the essence o f a h u m a n being, bu t n e i t h e r does it c o m e f r o m wi thou t a n d e f fec t a c o m p o s i t i o n with the essence o f a h u m a n being. Squa renes s does no t b e l o n g to h u m a n beings at all. So the gene ra l p r inc ip le is no t abso lu te ly genera l , and the unqua l i f i ed "wha t eve r " needs to be qual i f ied if the claim is to be t rue.

N o o n e wou ld want to press this object ion agains t Aqu inas , h o w e v e r , because it is clear tha t he m e a n s by "wha teve r " s o m e t h i n g like " w h a t e v e r be longs to a th ing. ''~ A n y t h i n g which be longs to a t h ing or is t rue o f a t h i n g in actual i ty m i g h t plausibly be said e i the r to be a p a r t o f the th ing ' s essence o r to be extr insic to the essence bu t c o m b i n e d with it in the actual th ing . My

~' I am not ahogether happy widl my choice of the verb "belongs" here. I am following Aquinas's usage at line ~9 where the Latin term is co~memt. "Belongs" suggests the relation which a property bears to its subject, and so suggests that the thing to which the property or whalever other thing belongs has existence independently of that which belongs to it. Although Ihe general principle is intended to cover the property-subject relation it is meant to be broader and Io cover, anlong other cases, the e.~:~e-thing relation. E.~se, of course, does not belong to something which exists independently of it. l shall go on using the term "belongs" intending it to include hu! not to be restricted to the property-subject relation.

J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 2 A P R 1984 161

first addit ion to Aquinas's actual text, then, I take to be a mere filling out of what is implicit.

1.3

I make premiss (E/E1) of the a r g u m e n t a disjunction by adding what Aqui- nas says in lines t 1-x 2 to his in t roductory general principle because I think doing so displays most perspicuously the under ly ing logical structure o f the E/E Argument . The re is, I think, a di f ference between the rhetorical presen- tation o f the a rgumen t in the text and its actual logical structure. My schema attempts to lay bare the logical s t ructure while adher ing as closely as possible to the actual text of D e e n t e 4 .

As the text stands, Aquinas begins the a rgument with a general principle: Whatever belongs to a thing and is not part of the concept of its essence comes f rom without and effects a composition with it. As the a rg u me n t develops, however, it becomes apparen t that the general principle is too strong and requires qualification. Aquinas himself points it out. After draw- ing the apparen t conclusion: "There fo re it is clear that esse is o ther than essence or quiddity" (lines 10--1 1), Aquinas immediately adds the qualifica- tion: "unless perhaps there is something whose quiddity is its very e s s e " (lines 11-12). Aquinas notices that he is not entit led to the s traightforward con- clusion that esse is o ther than essence because there is a possibility which he has not yet dealt with--viz., that esse is the very essence of the thing. The general principle, then, is too s trong because it restricts the possibilities to two when there are in fact three. It claims that esse must be either part of the essence or other than the essence. Aquinas recognizes that in fact it could be part of the essence, other than the essence, o r identical with the essence. Having started with a major premiss which is too strong, Aquinas qualifies his conclusion: "There fore it is clear that esse is other than essence or quid- dity, unless perhaps there is something whose quiddity is its very e s s e . " The logical s tructure of the a rgument is displayed most straightforwardly if the qualification is incorporated into the general principle rather than added to the conclusion.

The following schema represents what I take to be the under ly ing logical structure (ULS) of the E/E Argument :

(ULS t )There are three ways to account for a thing's esse: either (a) its esse is part of its essence or (b) its esse comes to its essence f rom without, effecting a composit ion

with it, or (c) its esse is itself the entire essence of the thing.

(ULS2) It is not the case that (a).

162 E s s e / E s s e n t i a ARGUMENT

(ULS3) I f it is the case that (c), then it is so for at most one thing. .'.(ULS4) For all o the r things it must be the case that (b).

(E/El) cor responds to (ULS1), (E/E2)-(E/E4) co r r e spond to (ULS2), (E /E5) - (E/El l) co r r e spond to (ULS3), and the conclusion (E/E12) co r responds to the conclusion (ULS4).

Some commenta to r s have identified the first por t ion o f the E/E Argu- ment (lines 3 -1 x) as the Intellectus Essentiae (IE) A r g u m e n t because it appears to derive a distinction between esse and essence f rom considerat ions about the concept or not ion o f an essence (intellectus essentiae). '~ T h e IE A r g u m e n t runs as follows:

(IEI) Whatever is not par t o f an essence is o the r than the essence. (IE2) Esse is not par t o f any essence.

.'.(IE3) Esse is o the r than any essence ."

I f my remarks about the unde r ly ing logical s t ruc ture o f Aquinas's a r g u m e n t are right, then the IE A r g u m e n t is not to be found in De ente 4.

In fact, for Aquinas, the IE A r g u m e n t is unsound as it stands. (IE1) is false because, as Aquinas points out, it is too strong. T h e r e is a n o t h e r possi- b i l i t y - t h e possibility that esse and essence are ident ica l - -which (1El) does not account for. Aquinas does take account o f this third possibility in the E/E Argument . He draws the unqual i f ied conclusion that esse is o the r than es- sence only much later in the a r g u m e n t [lines 2 5 - e 6 ; (E/El2)]. T h e IE Argu- ment is not to be found in the E/E Argumen t , and the s t ructure o f Aquinas 's a rgumen t is r ep resen ted more accurately by (ULSI)-(ULS4).

1.4

It might appea r puzzling that Aquinas draws the conclusion (E/E 1 1) without t reat ing the case men t ioned in (E/E6iii). Aquinas appears to suggest that there are three ways in which pluralization can occur: (i) by addit ion o f some differentia , (ii) by a fo rm being received in d i f fe ren t matters, or (iii) by one thing being absolute and ano the r being received in something. He rejects (i) and (ii) as impossible accounts o f the plurali ty o f things whose essences are esse itself but he never takes up (iii). Commen ta to r s usually account fo r the gap in the a rgumen t by point ing out that (E/E6iii) is obviously an unaccept -

'~ Joseph Owens, "Quiddity and Real Distinction in St. Thomas Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies ~7 (1965): 5; Leo Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas's Early Writings," Pro- ceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54 (1963): l O5ff.; John F. Wippel, "Aqui- nas's Route," 282.

" Sweeney characterizes the argument slightly differently, "Existence/Essence," lo6.

J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 " 2 A P R t 9 8 4 ~63

able account o f plurality a m o n g things whose essences are esse itself? 2 But to account for the lack o f an explicit t rea tment o f this by supposing that Aqui- nas t hough t it too obvious to ment ion would over look a strategy o f a rgumen- tation c o m m o n in Aquinas 's writings.

The third account o f pluralization which Aquinas offers involves one thing's being considered as absolute and ano the r as received in s o m e t h i n g - - Aquinas offers the example o f a separated heat and a heat received in s o m e t h i n g - - a n d it is obviously t rue that that will not do as an account o f pluralization a m o n g things whose essences are esse itself. To argue for this way of pluralizing would be to admit that there is actually only one thing which is esse itself, namely, esse considered as absolute. '3 It is impor tan t to note, however, that it is this third account o f pluralization which Aquinas intends to use to account for the plurality o f esse in all existing things. T h e r e is only one thing, esse itself, which is absolute, and esse is received in o ther things as in effects f rom a cause. Aquinas, therefore , does not reject this third account explicitly even t hough it is unacceptable in the immedia te context because he intends to re tu rn to it and to accept it in a slightly d i f ferent context later in the a rgument . T h e way of pluralizing described in (E/E6iii) is in fact the way o f pluralizing which provides the conclusion for the whole a rgument . The conclusion is that there is one thing which is esse

itself and that all o ther things receive their esse f rom it: "It is clear, therefore , that an intelligence is form and esse and that it has esse f rom the first being which is esse alone . . . " (lines 41-43) .

The strategy which Aquinas uses here (and elsewhere), '4 then, is to pro- vide a m o n g the disjuncts o f a disjunctive premiss the account which will tu rn out to be the correct one or the impor tan t one for the positive purposes o f the a rgument . In consider ing each disjunct, Aquinas passes over the relevant one in o r d e r to re tu rn to it later in the final resolution o f the a r g u m e n t or discussion. T h e conclusion explicitly picks up the loose end left dangl ing

,2 For example, Wippel, "Aquinas's Route," 288-89; Joseph Bobik. Aquinas on Being and Essence (Notre Dame, 1965), 171.

~3 Bobik offers this explanation of the lacuna, ibid. ,4 See, for example, Aquinas's use of the same strategy in his In Boetii De hebdomadibus,

Marietti edition, M. Calcaterra, O.P., ed. (Rome, 1954), Lectio II, Section 24 (396-97). There Aquinas indicates that there are three different kinds of participation. The claim that id quod est participates in esse is properly understood in only one of the three ways. Aquinas eliminates the first two possibilities and leaves the third until much later in the treatise when he reaches the final resolution of the problem, where the third alternative turns out to be the right one. In the De hebdomadibus commentary Aquinas is more explicit about the strategy he is using. He indi- cates to the reader that he is leaving the third alternative aside for the moment: "Praetermisso autem hoc tertio modo participandi, impossibile est quod secundum duos primos modos ipsum esse participet aliquid" (397). For another example see Commentum in librum I Sententiarura, Dist. 8, Q. 1, A. 2, Solutio.

16 4 Esse/Essentia ARGUMENT

earlier and completes the a r g u m e n t neatly. Aquinas's failure to deal with the third account o f pluralization does not r ep resen t a lacuna in need o f expla- nation but is, in fact, a del iberate strategy which links pieces o f the a r g u m e n t together .

2

So far I have been conce rned mere ly with laying out Aquinas's a r g u m e n t as precisely as possible. I wish now to o f f e r some interpreta t ive remarks about the na tu re o f the E/E A r g u m e n t and its conclusions. I think that some o f my conclusions in Section 1 above about the s t ruc ture o f the a r g u m e n t will be useful in de te rmin ing substantive issues r ega rd ing its in terpre ta t ion.

2 . 1

One might be led by the rhetorical presenta t ion o f the a r g u m e n t to the view that the E/E A r g u m e n t begins with concepts alone entirely abstracted f rom the real world. F rom Aquinas's open ing words: "For whatever is not o f the concept o f an essence . . . . " it looks as t hough we are to begin by noticing that we have certain concepts---concepts o f essences- -and by u n d e r t ak i n g an inspection o f their contents. It appears that we are to begin by looking for the concept o f esse a m o n g the contents o f o u r concepts o f certain essences.

I think that such a view o f the start ing point o f the E/E A r g u m e n t is mistaken. T h e r e is no doub t that noticing that we have certain concepts o f essences and inspecting their contents are involved as a part of the a rgumen t , but these conceptual activities are not the starting point of the a rgumen t . Seeing that the a r g u m e n t does not begin in the conceptual realm will be crucial for unde r s t and ing the na tu re o f the a rgument .

T h e a rgumen t begins, I have suggested, with the following genera l prin- ciple:

(E/E1) Whatever belongs to a thing and is not par t of its essence e i ther comes f rom without and effects a composi t ion with the essence or itself consti tutes the ent i re essence.

T h e principle does not, it seems to me, start us o f f solely with concepts or their contents but with an observat ion about "whatever belongs to a thing," i.e., about characteristics o f things. '5 T h e principle enumera tes the d i f f e r en t ways in which some characterist ic which belongs to a thing can be re la ted to the essence o f the thing to which it belongs. I f F belongs to x, the principle claims, then there are a limited n u m b e r o f ways to account for F's be longing to x.

L~ It is difficult to find terminology that is not too suggestive of "property." I take "charac- teristic" here to be more general than "proper ty ." See n. 9 above.

J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 ; 2 A P R ~984 ~65

Now, since the principle with which the E/E Argument starts is an obser- vation about any characteristic, F, belonging to a thing, x, it is clear that the principle can have application only to cases in which the particular F in question does in fact belong to the particular x in question. In order for the general principle expressed in (E/E1) to get the argument off the ground, therefore, it must be assumed that the particular case to which the principle will be applied is one in which F does in fact belong to x. I f the particular value of F at issue in the argument does not belong to the individual, x, in question, then premiss (E/E 1) is a non-starter. So any argument which begins with (E/E1) must assume the knowledge that the particular value of F at issue does belong to the individual, x. The starting point of the E/E Argu- ment is the general principle together with the knowledge that the particular F belongs to the particular x.

What does this assumed knowledge that the particular F belongs to the particular x amount to? For certain values of F and x, values for which F is an essential characteristic of a particular species and x is the species or nature, e.g., when "rationality" or "ability to rise from its own ashes" is taken for F and "human being" or "phoenix" is taken for x, such assumed knowledge need not involve anything empirical. We can know that rational- ity belongs to a human being or the ability to rise from its own ashes to a phoenix without appeal to observations about the real world. But for all other values of F only observations about the real world can tell us that F belongs to x. If the argument assumes the knowledge that F belongs to x, and if the particular F in question is not an essential characteristic of the x in question, then the argument must assume some empirical knowledge.

Of course the particular case to which Aquinas wants to apply the general principle, and the particular case for which the need for assumed empirical knowledge is clearest, is the case of esse. In order for the principle to do any work and in order for the argument to get off the ground at all, Aquinas must assume the knowledge that esse in fact belongs to things; that is, that some things exist. Without the assumption that some things exist Aquinas's use of the general principle makes no sense and the argument never gets started. The starting point of the E/E Argument, therefore, is the general principle expressed in (E/E 1) together with the assumption that the principle is applicable to the case of esse; the starting point, that is to say, is the general principle together with the knowledge that some things exist.

2 . 2

Once it is seen that (E/El) is the general principle moving the E/E Argument the overall strategy of the argument becomes clear. If we know that things exist, and if (E/E 1) is true, then, in order to discover h o w esse is related to the

166 E s s e / E s s e n t i a ARGUMENT

essences o f things, we need only consider in tu rn each o f the possibilities suggested by (E/E1). I f we can show that two o f the possibilities cannot explain how the esse of" things is related to their essences, then we know that the remain ing one must o f f e r the correct account. This is the p r o c e d u r e Aquinas in fact follows; it is out l ined in the schema ULS in Section I. 3 above.

T h e three possible ways to account for the fact that a thing exists, it will be recalled, are the following:

(a) A thing's esse is par t o f its essence. (b) A thing's esse comes to its essence f rom without and effects a composi-

tion with it. (c) A thing's esse is itself the ent i re essence of the thing. '6

T h e sub-a rgument which disposes o f (a) occurs at (E/E2)-(E/E4). It is this part icular sub-a rgument which appears first in the actual presenta t ion o f the a rgumen t in the text o f Chap te r 4 and it is the por t ion o f the a r g u m e n t which involves inspecting the contents o f o u r concepts of essences. It is the por t ion o f the a rgumen t which shows that esse is not an essential characteris- tic o f any o f the things (o ther than God) to which it belongs. Aquinas be- lieves that we are able to grasp the essences of" things intellectually in con- cepts which are inde te rmina te with respect to esse , and so purely conceptua l considerat ions are sufficient to rule out (a). These purely conceptual consid- erat ions form only a sub-argument , however, within a larger s trategy the aim of which is the analysis o f existing things.

(E/E5)- (E/Et l) is the sub-a rgument which disposes o f (c) as a general account o f the relation between a thing's esse and its essence. T h e existence o f at most one thing carl be accounted for by (c), and all o ther existing things must be hand led by some o the r account.

T h e only remain ing possibility o f the three (presumably exhaustive) pos- sibilities is (b): A thing's esse comes f rom without and effects a composi t ion with the thing's essence. Hence, the main conclusion fi)llows immediate ly at (E/El2): For any o the r thing besides this one, its esse is o the r than its essence. T h e a rgumen t immediate ly genera ted by the general principle toge ther with the assumption that some things exist is complete . We have assumed that some things exist and we have el iminated all but one possible account o f how a thing's esse might be related to its essence. I f esse is related to a thing's essence, and only one possible account o f that relation remains, then the thing's esse and essence must be related in that way.

,tl It is necessary for the comple t enes s o f tile a r g u m e n t that these th ree possibilities be taken as exhaus t ive .

J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 2 A P R 1984 ~67

2. 3 T h e quest ion which has occupied commenta to r s is whether or not the con- clusion (E/El2) is to be taken as claiming that there is a real distinction between esse and essence or e,~se and thing. 1 think that there are two consid- erations which show that (E/El2) must be taken as the claim that there is a real distinction between esse and essence.

I have already laid out the first considerat ion. It is that the general princi- ple which de te rmines tile s t ructure and strategy o f the a rgumen t is a principle having to do with the relation between esse and the essence of an existing thing.

Things exist, which is to say that esse is a characteristic belonging to things, and the general pr inciple is a claim about the ways that such a characteristic carl be related to the essences o f the things to which it belongs. When all the possible relations have been corlsidered, the result must be a conclusion about tile relation o f esse to essence in existing things, i.e., in reality'.

T h e second considerat ion which shows that (E/El2) claims a real distinc- tion is the following. As we have seen, Aquinas offers tile E/E Arg u men t in o rde r to show that intelligences are ne i ther simple in every way nor p u re actuality. From (E/El e) Aquinas immediately derives the conclusion which establishes the first disjunct of" that negative disjunction, i.e., the conclusion that intelligences are not simple in every way. "I'he conclusion is: (E/El4) T h e r e is e,~,~e besides essence in intelligences. I can see no o the r way to read this conclusion than as claiming a real distinction between esse and essence in intelhgences. T h e r e is no way that (E/El4) can show that intelligences are not simple in every way unless it is the claim that there is a real distinction in intelligences, I f (E/El4) must be read as claiming a real distinction, and if (E/El4) follows f rom (E/El2), then (E/E12) must also be read as claiming a real distinction.

( E / E I 5 ) - ( E / E 2 2 ) take care o f the second disjunct o f the negative disjunc- tion, i.e., they show that intelligences are not pu re actuality. At (E/E12) the conclusion that es,se and essence are really distinct is left in its negative form: esse and essence are not the same; esse is o the r than essence. (E/E12) does not tell us how they are related in things which actually exist even though it tells us that they are not identical in those things. More a rgumen t is needed to show precisely what this otherness-rela t ion comes to. T h e a rg u men t f rom (E/Ei5) - (E/E22) provides the positive character izat ion o f the distinction. Es,se and essence are related as actuality and potentiali ty, and so actuality and potentiality are found in intelligences. Intelligences, therefore , are not p u re actuality. T h e a rgumen t is complete , and Aquinas has achieved his pu rpose of showing that his rejection o f universal hy lomorph i sm earlier in ( ' h ap t e r 4 does not commit him to the view that intelligences are simple in every way and pure actuality.

~68 E s s e / E s s e n t i a ARGUMENT

3 I wish in the last section to take up very briefly one in te rpre ta t ion o f the E/E A r g u m e n t in D e e n t e 4 which dif fers f rom mine. J o s e p h Owens has main- tained that Aquinas canno t have establ ished a real distinction be tween esse

and essence as early ira the a r g u m e n t as (E/El2). As ( )wens sees it, the real distinction is not establ ished until m u c h later, at (E/E19).'7c

It is Owens 's view that the re is a cer ta in fea tu re o f Aquinas 's ep i s t emology which is re levant to the in te rp re ta t ion o f the E/E A r g u m e n t as an a r g u m e n t for the real distinction. Aquinas believes that essences and the fact that certain things exist are known t h r o u g h d i f fe ren t activities o f the u n d e r s t a n d - ing. Essences are known t h r o u g h the first activity o f the unde r s t and ing , s imple a p p r e h e n s i o n , since essences are the p r o p e r objects o f the u n d e r - s tanding. T h e fact that s o m e t h i n g exists, on the o the r hand , is known th rough the second activity o f the unde r s t and ing , j u d g m e n t . '~

Accord ing to ()wens, it is a consequence o f this epistemologic:al posi t ion that mere ly recogniz ing that o u r concept o f esse and our concept o f an essence are d i f fe ren t concepts does not entail that es,,e and essence are d i f fer - ent in reality. It is possible that they are identical in reality despi te the fact that the unde r s t and ing , in vir tue o f the fact that it knows them in two di f ferent ways, f 'orms d i f f e ren t concepts o f them. Since the concept o f esse is not known originally t h r o u g h a p p r e h e n s i o n but is der ived f r o m what is originally known l h r o u g h j u d g m e n t , it cannot p rov ide the basis for an in- ference to conclusions about e3se in reality. Aquinas, then, as ev idenced by his rejection o f the ontological a r g u m e n t , could not allow that an a r g u m e n t which begins with the concept o f esse can ar r ive at a conclusion about the real distinction be tween esse and essence. ''-~

()wens a rgues that it is Aquinas 's view that, a l though o u r der ivat ive con- cept o f esse is not sufficient to g r o u n d an inference to conclusions abou t esse

in reality, the concept o f esse which we have as a result o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g that God exists-- i .e . , that the re is a na tu re which is esse itself exist ing in the real wor ld - - i s sufficient to g r o u n d such an inference. Once we have a concep t o f esse which c o r r e s p o n d s to a real na ture , God, we are in a position to see that esse cannot be identical with any o the r essence. Hence , esse must be really distinct f rom essence. Aquinas can draw this conclusion, accord ing to Owens, only a f te r p rov ing the exis tence o f God. ~''

,7 .Joseph ()wells, "Quiddity," 1-~2; "Stages and Distinction in De ente: A Rejoinder", Thorn-

tst-15 (t981). 99-1e3 - ,8 For a brief accotlnt of this |catttre of Aquinas's epistemology see ()wens, "'Stages," tc,1)-

07. "J Owens. "Stages," l l7--~l. ~" Owens, "Quiddity," 17-19; Owens, "Stages," i o8-, o.

J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 2 A P R 1984 169 Now, if the E/E A r g u m e n t in De ente 4 begins solely with considerat ions

having to do with the concept o f esse and concepts o f essences, then Aqui- nas's epistemological views and the restrictions they place on a rguments for the real distinction will be re levant for the in te rpre ta t ion o f the a rgument . Owens does think that the E/E A r g u m e n t starts in the conceptual realm a l o n e / ' He in terpre ts the beginning o f the E/E A r g u m e n t this way, I t h i n k , because he identifies the first stage o f the a r g u m e n t as the IE Argumen t /~ and the IE A r g u m e n t seems clearly to be conce rned solely with concepts and their contents. F rom this view of the start ing point o f the a rg u men t and f rom the epistemological considerat ions he adduces, Owens concludes that Aquinas cannot have established a real distinction between esse and essence pr ior to the point at which the E/E A r g u m e n t is car r ied beyond the concep- tual rea lm in which it began. T h e crucial shift f rom conceptual to existential realm, in Owens's view, occurs at (E/E16). About the por t ion o f the argu- ment r ep re sen ted in (E/E x 5) - (E/E 19) Owens says:

The demonstration is not a dialectical process. It does not consist in an elaboration of concepts. Rather, it is thrown out of the order of formal causality into the order of efficient causality . . . . It is concerned rather with the actuality in the thing that is known originally not through a concept but through judgment/3

Since, according to Owens, the E/E A r g u m e n t pr ior to (E/E15) is an elabora- tion o f concepts, there can be no conclusion pr io r to (E/E15) which claims that there is a real distinction. A real distinction is not established until the existence of God has been proved; that is, not until (E/E19).

I do not wish to discuss whe ther Owens is r ight in a t t r ibut ing to Aquinas this epistemological position and its consequences or whe the r they are views to which Aquinas ough t to have commit ted himself. What I do wish to challenge is Owens's view that Aquinas's epistemological views are re levant for in te rpre t ing the E/E Argument .

I have argued , in the first place, that the E/E A r g u m e n t beginning at (E/E1) is not merely an elaborat ion o f concepts. T h e only por t ion o f the a rgumen t which could be called an elaborat ion of concepts is (E/Ee)-(E/E4) which is an a r g u m e n t subord ina ted to the general strategy. T h e E/E Argu- ment does not begin with the IE A r g u m e n t (the IE A r g u m e n t does not occur in De ente 4) and it does not begin solely in the conceptual realm. T h e general pr inciple which gets the a r g u m e n t s tar ted assumes that some things exist, and so the ent i re E/E A r g u m e n t f rom the first premiss on is conce rned

~' His argument on page 16, Owens, "Quiddity," implies that he takes the argument up to my (E/E15) to be to be "an elaboration of concepts."

~ Owens, "Quiddity," 5ff. 23 Ibid., 16.

17o E s s e / E s s e n t i a ARGUMENT

with esse in things which, accord ing to Aquinas, is known originally t h r o u g h j u d g m e n t . T h e whole o f the a r g u m e n t , then, is conce rned with things in reality, and no shift f r o m the o r d e r o f fo rmal to the o r d e r o f efficient causality occurs later in the a r g u m e n t . I f the E/E A r g u m e n t does not begin solely in the concep tua l realm, then Aquinas 's view about the impossibili ty o f a rgu ing f r o m a concept o f esse to the condit ions o f esse in reality are irrele- vant for i n t e rp re t ing the E/E A r g u m e n t and have no bea r ing on w he the r or not (E/En 2) establishes a real distinction.

In the second place, I have a r g u e d that Aquinas 's s t ra tegy is not to de- duce conclusions abou t esse f r o m a concept o f esse and a concept o f essence. His s t ra tegy is to pin down the way in which an exist ing thing 's esse is re la ted to the thing 's essence. T h e s t ra tegy assumes that we have knowledge o f the fact that things exist, and a genera l pr inciple tells us what the possibilities are. T h e relat ions the a r g u m e n t considers are relat ions be tween the esse and essence in real things. I f the s t ra tegy o f the a r g u m e n t does not p roceed to (E/E~'~) f r o m cons idera t ions abou t the concept o f esse, then Owens ' s worr ies that we cannot have a concep t o f esse f rom which we can d raw conclusions about the relat ion o f esse to essences until we know that esse is a real na tu re are u n f o u n d e d with r ega r d to the E/E A r g u m e n t .

It seems to me, then, that taking the considera t ions which ( )wens intro- duces to be re levant to the in te rp re ta t ion o f the E/E A r g u m e n t is the result o f a confus ion about the s t ruc tu re and na tu re o f the a r g u m e n t . I f I am r ight about the s t ruc ture and na tu re o f the a r g u m e n t , then Owens 's cons idera- tions do no th ing to show that (E/E~ ~) cannot be the conclusion that esse and essence are really distinct.

I f one has still o ther , m o r e genera l phi losophical or historical reasons for want ing to deny that Aquinas could have established a real distinction by means o f the sort o f a r g u m e n t I have a t t r ibu ted to him, two s t r a igh t fo rward opt ions are open . One migh t claim that Aquinas 's views in D e en t e et e s s en t i a

are inconsistent with his later, m o r e m a t u r e views, or one might reject the E/E A r g u m e n t as unsound . I should think that the genera l pr inciple (E/E1) is the place to begin a cri t ique o f the a r g u m e n t . But I shall pu r sue ne i the r o f these suggestions. My p u r p o s e has been to show how the a r g u m e n t which Aquinas presen ts in l ) e e n t e 4 must be i n t e rp r e t ed if careful a t tent ion is paid to the actual s t ruc ture o f the a r g u m e n t . ~+

C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y

2+ 1 am very grateful to John Boler, Norman Kretzmann, and Eleonore Stump |or tom- merits on earlier versions of this paper and to Norman Kretzmann tor the many hours he spent discussing this material with me.

J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 " 2 APR 1 9 8 4

Appendix : St. T h o m a s Aquinas, D e e n t e e t e s s e n t i a , Chap te r 4 (376.9 ~ 377.154)

I71

1 T h e r e f o r e , a l though substances o f this sort are forms alone without mat ter , nevertheless they are not simple in every way nor are they pu re actuality but they are pe rmea ted by potentiality. This is clear in the following way. For whatever is not o f the concept o f an essence or

5 quiddi ty comes f rom without and effects a composi t ion with the es- sence, because no essence can be unde r s tood without those things which are parts o f the essence. But every essence or quiddi ty can be unde r - stood without anyth ing being unde r s tood about its e s s e - - f o r I can un- de r s t and what a man or phoen ix is and nevertheless not know whe the r

lo it has esse in reality. T h e r e f o r e it is clear that esse is o the r than essence or quiddi ty, unless perhaps there is someth ing whose quiddi ty is its very esse . And this thing can only be one and first because it is impossible that someth ing be pluralized except by the addi t ion o f some d i f fe ren t i a - -as the na tu re o f a genus is mult iplied into species---or by a fo rm being

15 received in d i f f e ren t matters---as the na ture o f a species is mult iplied into d i f f e ren t ind iv idua ls - -or by one thing being absolute and an o t h e r being received in s o m e t h i n g - - f o r example , if the re were a separa ted heat, it would, by its very separat ion, be o the r than heat which is not separated. But if one supposes that there is someth ing which is esse

2o alone so that it is esse itself subsisting, this esse would not receive the addi t ion o f a d i f ferent ia because then it would no longer be esse alone but esse and some fo rm besides it. And even less could it receive the addi t ion o f mat te r because then it would be not subsisting but material esse . T h u s what is left is that such a thing which is its esse can be only

25 one. T h u s it must be that for any o the r thing besides it its esse is o the r than its quiddi ty or na ture or form. T h u s it must be that in intelligences there is esse besides form, and so it has been said that an intelligence is fo rm and esse .

But every th ing which belongs to something e i ther is caused by the 3 ~ principles o f its na tu r e - - a s the ability to laugh in m a n - - o r comes to it

f rom some extrinsic pr inc ip le- -as light in the air f rom the influence of the sun. But it cannot be that esse itself is caused by the very fo rm or quiddity o f the thing (I mean as by an efficient cause) because then someth ing would be the cause o f itself and someth ing would p roduce

35 itself in esse , which is impossible. T h e r e f o r e it mus t be that every such thing the es se of which is o the r than its na tu re has esse f rom another . And because every th ing which is t h ro u g h an o th e r is r educed to that which is t h r o u g h itself as to a first cause, it must be that there is some

17~ E s s e / E s s e n t i a A R G U M E N T

t h i n g w h i c h is t h e c a u s e o f es se f o r a l l t h i n g s i n v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t t h a t i t is 4 ~ esse a l o n e , o t h e r w i s e o n e w o u l d g o to i n f i n i t y in c a u s e s s i n c e e v e r y t h i n g

w h i c h is n o t esse a l o n e h a s a c a u s e o f i ts esse , as h a s b e e n s a i d . I t is c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a n i n t e l l i g e n c e is f o r m a n d esse a n d t h a t i t h a s esse f r o m t h e f i r s t b e i n g w h i c h is es se a l o n e , a n d t h i s is t h e f i r s t c a u s e w h i c h is G o d .

4 5 B u t e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h r e c e i v e s s o m e t h i n g f r o m a n o t h e r is in p o t e n t i - a l i t y w i t h r e s p e c t to t h a t , a n d t h a t w h i c h is r e c e i v e d i n i t is i ts a c t u a l i t y . T h e r e f o r e i t m u s t b e t h a t t h e q u i d d i t y i t s e l f o r t h e f o r m w h i c h is t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e is in p o t e n t i a l i t y w i t h r e s p e c t to esse , w h i c h it r e c e i v e s f r o m G o d , a n d t h a t es se is r e c e i v e d i n t h e m a n n e r o f a c t u a l i t y . A n d so p o t e n t i -

5 ~ a l i t y a n d a c t u a l i t y a r e f o u n d i n i n t e l l i g e n c e s , n o t f o r m a n d m a t t e r , h o w - e v e r , e x c e p t e q u i v o c a l l y . *

* Huiusmodi ergo substantie, quamuis sint forme tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentie; et hoc sic patet. Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentie uel quiditatis, hoc est adueniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine hiis que sunt partes essentie intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia uel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo: possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura; ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia uel quiditate. Nisi forte sit aliqua res cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse, et hec res non potest esse nisi una et prima: quia impossibile est ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per addit ionem alicuius differentie, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species; uel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diuersis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diuersis indiuiduis; uel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione. Si autem ponatur aliqua res que sit esse tantum ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet addit ionem differentie, quia iam non esset esse tantum sed esse et preter hoc forma aliqua; et multo minus reciperet addit ionem materie, quia iam esset esse non subsistens sed materiale. Vnde relinquitur quod tails res que sit suum esse non potest esse nisi una; unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re preter earn aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas uel natura seu forma sua; unde oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse preter formam, et ideo dictum est quod intdligentia est forma et esse.

Omne autem quod conuenit alicui uel est causatum ex principiis nature sue, sicut risibile in homine; uel aduenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma uel quiditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res se ipsam in esse produ- ceret: quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne quod est per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit aliqua res que sit causa essendi omnibus rebus eo quod ipsa est esse tantum; alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res que non est esse tan tum habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa prima que Deus est.

Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod recep- turn est in eo est actus eius; ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas uel forma que est intelligentia sit in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et ita inuenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et materia nisi equiuoce.