the ethics of conspiracy theorizing

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The Ethics of Conspiracy Theorizing

Juha Ra ¨ikka ¨

Published online: 4 November 2009

Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

1 Introduction

Philosophers have not been particularly interested in conspiracy theories. The few

contributions that have appeared have concerned mainly epistemic questions.

Following Karl Popper, who famously criticized the conspiracy theory of society in

his Conjectures and Refutations, many authors have argued that conspiracy theories

tend to be unwarranted.1 The list of alleged sins is long. It has been claimed that

many conspiracy theories can be rejected simply by pointing out that the supposedconspirators did not have connections to each other or were too stupid to have

designed such a vicious plan or lacked technological and material resources to carry

it through. Furthermore, according to some critics, conspiracy theories tend to be

irrefutable, appeal to unlikely motives, include explanatory gaps, conflict observed

facts they grant, provide failed predictions, suffer from internal inconsistency, and

attribute omnipotence to the alleged conspirators.2 Philosophers who have adopted a

more positive attitude toward conspiracy theories have responded to the critics by

arguing that nothing in conspiracy theories indicates that they are unwarranted

by definition. Some conspiracy theories have been correct. Governments and

J. Raikka (&)

1 See Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 1972), pp. 123–125; Karl

Popper Karl, Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 1945).2 See Lee Basham (2001) ’’Living with the Conspiracy,’’ The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 3 (2001), p.

275; Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 7; Brian L. Keeley, ‘‘Of Conspiracy Theories,’’ The

Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 96 (1999), pp. 109–126; Brian L. Keeley, ‘‘Nobody Expects the Spanish

Inquisition! More Thoughts on Conspiracy Theory,’’ Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 34 (2003).

J Value Inquiry (2009) 43:457–468

DOI 10.1007/s10790-009-9189-1



government agencies throughout the world have engaged in conspiracies. Therefore,

theories which claim that they do are not obviously faulty or foolish.3

Some authors who have participated in the debate on the epistemic acceptability

of conspiracy theories have also considered the desirability of conspiracy theorizing.

Creating and disseminating conspiracy theories is a mental and social activity. Thusit is natural to ask whether it is a desirable activity. It is generally known that our

attitudes toward conspiracy theories may have important consequences. The

worldview common to conspiracy theorists seems to be both frightening and

reassuring.4 On the one hand, belief in a conspiracy may lead to fear or sorrow. To

borrow a term from historian Richard Hofstadter, the conspiracy theorist is a

‘‘double sufferer,’’ since she is afflicted not only by the real world, but by her

pessimistic fantasies as well.5 On the other hand, the view that we live in an ordered

universe in which large-scale conspiracies are common may give us hope that the

world is not as absurd and chaotic as it sometimes seems. The worldview typical of

conspiracy theorists promises a world that is meaningful rather than arbitrary.

Furthermore, a belief in a conspiracy may be entertaining. The explanations of

social events provided by historians and social scientists tend to be relatively boring,

as they refer to all kinds of accidents and unintentional side-effects of actions,

whereas conspiratorial explanations resemble action movies.

In what follows, the ethical status of conspiracy theorizing, especially political

conspiracy theorizing, will be briefly evaluated. In particular, we will consider why

people tend to disapprove morally certain conspiracy theories and why they are

justified in doing so. It seems that the possible undesirable social outcomes of

conspiracy theorizing as a whole do not explain the moral uneasiness that we mayfeel toward certain theories. The ethical evaluation of conspiracy theorizing as a

cultural phenomenon should be distinguished from the ethical evaluation of

particular conspiracy theories. Political conspiracy theorizing may be a valuable

cultural phenomenon, even if most or all political conspiracy theories have moral

costs.

2 Defining Political Conspiracy Theories

Political conspiracy theorists offer conspiracy theories to explain social events by

referring to genuine political conspiracies whose existence is not widely known or

presumed. There are many well-known non-political conspiracy theories. Jim

Morrison did not really die in 1971. His death was a fake. Elvis Presley did not

3 See Charles Pigden, ‘‘Complots of Mischief,’’ in David Coady, ed., Conspiracy Theories: The

Philosophical Debate (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2006), p. 165.4 See Barkun, op. cit., p. 4.5

Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (London: JonathanCape, 1966), p. 40. See also Timothy Melley, Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar

America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), and Jonathan Vankin, Conspiracies, Cover-Ups, and

458 J. Raikka



really die in 1977. His death was a fake too. Paul McCartney died in the 1960s. A

replica took his place in the Beatles. Political conspiracy theories are typically

public rather than non-public. Here is an example of a non-public conspiracy theory.

Alfred and Helen spent a couple of days in New York, and they told others that it

was purely serendipity that they met there. According to John, however, theirmeeting was not a coincidence; instead, they had conspired to meet there. Non-

public conspiracy theories are relatively common, much more common than public

conspiracy theories.

Political conspiracy theories can be divided into global and local theories. In

offering their theories, both global and local conspiracy theorists aim to explain

particular historical events such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the April of

1986, the death of Princess Diana in the August of 1997, or the destruction of the

World Trade Center towers in 2001. A conspiracy theory is global rather than local

when the person who advances it aims to explain global or international events or

when the explanation the person provides refers to international affairs. A

conspiracy theory that is used to explain John F. Kennedy’s murder with reference

to a plot by the Central Intelligence Agency that is also said to have had important

connections to the Mafia and Cuba, is a global conspiracy theory, although the main

focus of it lies in local, national, matters. An example of a local conspiracy theory

may be found in a claim that a particular Prime Minister’s former lover published

intimate details of their relation because she was encouraged and paid by the Prime

Minister’s political opponents.

So called total conspiracy theories are not political conspiracy theories in the

relevant sense, although they may provide explanations to political events. Totalconspiracy theories are sometimes referred to as truly global or mega-conspiracy

theories. Total theories are advanced to explain the course of world history or the

whole of global politics by referring to a conspiracy or a series of conspiracies. In

advancing political conspiracy theories, people refer to event conspiracies, but

people who advance total theories assume the existence of at least one super

conspiracy.6 People who advance total conspiracy theories may claim, for instance,

that both past and present events must be understood as the outcome of efforts by an

immensely powerful but secret group such as the Illuminati or Templars; that

decades ago aliens arrived with unidentified flying objects and now control the state

of affairs with benevolent assistance of the United States government or military; or

that the Antichrist lives among us and Satanic forces rule the world. If a total

conspiracy theorist tries to explain, say, the murder of Jimmy Hoffa, she will refer to

an explanation that explains not only Hoffa’s death but many other things as well. It

is characteristic of total conspiracy theories that they are put forward to suggest the

existence of a permanent conspiracy or conspiracies. Total conspiracy theorists may

also claim that conspiring groups are so secret that people do not even know that

they exist. Although total theories can be and have been used for political purposes,

they do not cause political quarrels as systematically as political conspiracy

The Ethics of Conspiracy Theorizing 459



theories. Hence, total theories are not, strictly speaking, political theories, although

total theories may naturally have political relevance.

Every now and then political conspiracy theories are warranted and provide more

or less correct explanations of events. However, when conspiracy theories turn into

official wisdom, people cease to call them conspiracy theories. The theory thatrevealed that President Nixon was indirectly involved in the Watergate burglary was

once a conspiracy theory but now is a part of the official explanation of the White

House tragedy in 1972. It follows that not all explanations that explain historical

events by referring to conspiracies are called conspiracy theories. Official

explanations can be theories and they can include references to conspiracies, but

they cannot be conspiracy theories, at least if they are official explanations of right

authorities. The view that the well-known events on 11 September in 2001 were due

to a conspiracy on the part of al-Qaeda is not a conspiracy theory. This way of using

the concept of conspiracy theory is not accepted by all writers on the subject, but

there are good grounds to follow it, as it is in line with the ordinary meaning of

‘‘conspiracy theory.’’ If all the explanations that include references to conspiracies

and secret action were conspiracy theories, then the history of the world would be a

massive conspiracy theory, which it is not.

3 On the Social Effects of Conspiracy Theorizing

What should we think about the ethicalacceptabilityof political conspiracy theorizing?

A brief overview on the comments concerning the ethics of conspiracy theorizingsuggests that it all depends on the social consequences of the activity as a whole.

Many comments have been favorable. It has been argued that political conspiracy

theorizing is a welcome phenomenon, as the information gathering activities of

conspiracy theorists and investigative journalists force governments and government

agencies to watch out for their decisions and practices. According to Steve Clarke:

‘‘there are several things that can be said in favour of conspiracy theorizing.’’7 In his

view, ‘‘the conspiracy theorist challenges us to improve our social explanations’’ and

occasionally ‘‘the conspiracy theorist identifies a genuine conspiracy.’’8 Furthermore,

the prevalence of conspiracy theories ‘‘helps to maintain openness in society…. The

conspiracy theorist may be a victim of a cognitive error, but it is perhaps to our

advantage that they remain in error.’’9 David Coady and Charles Pigden have defended

a similar view. According to Coady, critics of conspiracy theories ‘‘could be accused

of being (no doubt inadvertently) enemies of the open society, because they discourage

an activity that is essential to its survival, conspiracy theorizing.’’10 Pigden argues that

7Steve Clarke, ‘‘Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing’’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences,

Vol. 32 (2002), p. 148.8

Ibid.

9 Ibid.10 David Coady, ‘‘The Pragmatic Rejection of Conspiracy Theories’’ in David Coady, ed., Conspiracy

460 J. Raikka



Popper and other critics of conspiracy theories have provided conspirators ‘‘with an

intellectually respectable smokescreen behind which they can conceal their conspi-

rational machinations.’’11 In the introduction of Conspiracy Encyclopedia, published

in 2005, the editors explain that conspiracy theorizing is valuable, since it protects

basic freedoms, writing: ‘‘Conspiracy theorists can inform themselves and cut throughthe official disinformation, to arrive at conclusions which dare to confront the

orthodox versions of events. From such theories, real criminal conspiracies are often

revealed and the methods of conspiracy theory have become a modern tool in

investigative journalism. The failure of the mainstream press to cover such matters,

proves to some that it has become corrupted by the other three Estates: the Church, the

Aristocracy, and the Capitalists. Investigative journalism and conspiracy theory have

now become the Fifth Estate, protecting freedom of thought and freedom of speech.’’12

Some comments have been less optimistic. According to critics, political

conspiracy theorizing tends to undermine trust in democratic political institutions

and its implications may be morally questionable, as it has close connections to

populist discourse, as well as anti-Semitism and racism.13 It is also often claimed

that conspiracy theorizing not merely undermines democratic deliberation but

creates a risk to social order, as conspiracy theories often encourage people to view

society in a polarized way.14 Furthermore, critics have pointed out that conspiracy

theorizing generates not only false but harmful beliefs about the root causes of

social events. In their view, it is important that people understand that most social

events should be explained by referring to social structures and inequalities rather

than to acts and intentions of individual agents as suggested by conspiracy theories.

This argument is often attributed to critics on the left, especially to Noam Chomsky,and the argument seems as much strategic as moral. Mark Fenster introduces the

logic of what he calls left critics as follows: ‘‘left critics argue that proper political

analysis leads directly to effective political activity. Identifying both the general and

historically specific economic and political structures that dominate enables activists

to organize protests strategically and to build collective, alternative institutions in

order to effect real social change. Conspiracy theory, on the other hand, either

misattributes dominance to individuals, or simplistically places the blame for the ills

of the world on individuals rather than on underlying, structural causes. As a result,

it cannot lead to effective political activity; rather, it leads to harmful scapegoating;

or it misleads activists into thinking that merely removing an individual or a secret

group will transform society.’’15

11Charles Pigden, ‘‘Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories?’’, Philosophy of the

Social Sciences, Vol. 25 (1995), p. 4.12 Conspiracy Encyclopedia: The Encyclopedia of Conspiracy Theories (London: Collins & Brown,

2005), p. 11.13 See Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture (Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 1991), ch. 3, and Alasdair Spark, ‘‘Conjuring Order: The New World

Order and Conspiracy Theories of Globalization,’’ in Jane Parish and Martn Parker, eds., The Age of Anxiety: Conspiracy Theory and the Human Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 49.14 S F t it




It is hard to say what might be the real or potential outcomes of conspiracy

theorizing as a cultural phenomenon. It is likely that it may have both desirable and

harmful consequences, depending on the time and place where this activity becomes

popular. An interesting question is whether conspiracy theorizing really is essential

to the survival of open society, as argued by optimists. An equally interestingquestion is whether we should think that conspiracy theorizing undermines trust in

democracy, as suggested by the critics, or instead that the lack of trust in democracy

explains the current popularity of conspiracy theorizing.

For our purposes, it is more important to pay attention to the fact that every now

and then people have negative attitudes toward single conspiracy theories. If we

assume that they are justified in having their negative attitudes, we can ask what

justifies them. It is unlikely that the negative attitudes toward single theories are

justified merely because the theories are mistaken and their defenders lack epistemic

virtues. At least in some cases, the negative attitude has a clear moral tone. As such,

epistemic mistakes do not justify moral condemnation.16 It is also unlikely that

people are justified in their negative attitudes toward single conspiracy theories just

because the theories represent conspiracy theorizing, an activity that may have

morally questionable social and cultural consequences in the long run. Perhaps the

alleged harmful effects of conspiracy theorizing as a whole provide further support

to the view that a single conspiracy theory is unethical, but there must be something

else in it as well.

4 Unethical Conspiracy Theorizing

We might think that some conspiracy theorists are just liars who do not believe in

their own theories even themselves. Some conspiracy theories include libels or

slurs. Ostensible conspiracy theorizing is thought to provide an excuse to

disseminate this kind of slander. In some cases it is difficult to say whether the

conspiracy theorist is serious or whether she theorizes simply because of strategic

reasons. An example of such conspiracy theory might be the claim that global

warming propaganda is based on a massive conspiracy.17 However, even when the

theorists are obviously serious, we may feel moral uneasiness. It is not always lying

or suspicion of intentional abuse that concerns us.

Consider the story of two historians, Alice and Brandon, who have both written a

book on the history of the foreign ministry of some country. Alice believes that all

institutions have a tendency to grow and increase bureaucracy. She uses this

theoretical framework when she interprets data and evidence. Unfortunately, she

16 See Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, N.H.: Brown University Press, 1987); see also

James Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,

1993); Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, eds., Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and

Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Neil Levy, ‘‘Radically Socialized Knowledge and

Conspiracy Theories,’’ Episteme, Vol. 4 (2007).17 See Myanna Lahsen, ‘‘The Detection and Attribution of Conspiracies: The Controversy over Chapter

462 J. Raikka



draws many mistaken conclusions and describes people’s actions and intentions in a

wrongful way, placing them in a false light. Her desire to be faithful to her

theoretical framework leads her to misinterpretations. Even if her book is consistent,

it is scientifically unsatisfactory. People are worried about her professional

competence and ethical standards. Brandon does not work within a particulartheoretical framework, but again the investigations suffer from gross misinterpre-

tations. Brandon used to work for the ministry of foreign affairs before he was fired.

He is strongly prejudiced in favor of interpretations that show how incompetent and

arrogant his ex-superiors and ex-colleagues were. The result is a book that is more

or less seriously written, but, when published, faces deep moral condemnation.

Although both Alice and Brandon make similar mistakes, Brandon is morally more

liable than Alice because Brandon is personally involved.

It seems that some conspiracy theorists resemble Brandon. Although political

conspiracy theorists may be serious when they blame people, it happens fairly often

that the alleged conspirators are their political enemies or belong otherwise to a

group they do not like. There are both left-wing and right-wing conspiracy theorists.

Left-wing conspiracy theorists tend to blame right-wing politicians and capitalists,

and the right-wing conspiracy theorists tend to reprove left-wing politicians and

groups such as labor unions and immigrant organizations. Seemingly objective

conspiracy theories are not always objective. Too often the conspiracy theorist gets

her motivation for conspiracy theorizing from her prejudices about religions, mass

media, professional elites, public health authorities, academia, intelligence agencies,

the police and the military. Typically the conspiracy theorist doubts certain

institutions and agents before she has a conspiracy theory. It is seldom the case thather suspicion of conspiracy leads her to doubt certain institutions and agents. Very

often the conspiracy theorist wishes to witness a conspiracy; this is why she often

also witnesses it, or so she thinks. The same is true of investigative journalists who

develop conspiracy theories. They wish to see conspiracies, not always because they

have biased attitudes toward certain groups and agents, but because witnessing

conspiracies benefits them professionally and sometimes economically too. Thus,

too often conspiracy theorists not only place people in a false light in the public eye,

but do so in order to benefit, ideologically or personally, although they do not

always realize this. There is empirical evidence for this.18

No doubt there are many conspiracy theories that do not cause feelings of moral

condemnation, at least not generally. The conspiracy theory according to which

President George W. Bush planned the destruction of World Trade Center towers

for the events on 11 September in 2001 in Manhattan, and so was responsible for the

many deaths that resulted from the airliners crashing into the buildings is almost

surely mistaken, though some people might not feel notable moral indignation with

respect to the theory. President George W. Bush was a politician and a public figure,

and the thought may be that all kinds of public accusations are in some sense

permissible when it comes to politicians and public figures, since they have

relinquished their right to privacy. If, however, somebody alters the conspiracytheory about 11 September and names people, say secretaries, who knew what was




going to happen but did not bother to warn other, our intuitions shift immediately.19

We start to think that this theory needs to be based on strong evidence if such claims

are made in the public sphere. The less public the persons in question are, the more

there should be evidence. Unhappily, conspiracy theorists who name ordinary

people or use definite descriptions of them are not always based on strong evidence.Unfortunately conspiracy theories by conspiracy theorists who name people are

relatively common, at least when it comes to conspiracy theories of investigative

journalists. Their conspiracy theories are often local and concern issues such as the

use of public money and the relations between funding bodies and organizations to

be funded.

5 The Difficulty of an Overall Estimation

An evaluation of single political conspiracy theories may suggest that they often

have moral costs. Not only are people placed in a false light, but when this is done,

however inadvertently, it is done in order to gain something. How serious are the

moral costs? We may ask whether we should conclude that Clarke, Coady, and

Pigden are wrong when they praise conspiracy theorizing simply because of its

alleged desirable social effects or whether we should come to the conclusion that

political conspiracy theorizing may be a valuable cultural phenomenon, even if

many political conspiracy theories have moral costs.

For a comparison, let us consider the following argument in defense of what is

often called the war against terrorism, where the conclusion is that the war againstterrorism is morally justified, as it serves extremely important goals such as

democracy, justice, and freedom. It is true that the individual actions in the war

violate systematically human rights and narrow basic rights of people all over the

world. In target countries human sacrifices are common. The war harms especially

women and children in many areas. No doubt, these are moral costs of the war, but,

the argument continues, they are small price to pay. Although some individual

actions may be unnecessary and could be replaced by more humane actions, an

effective warfare requires actions that are not morally acceptable if evaluated one by

one. Intentional killing of non-combatants is generally morally impermissible, but in

the context of terrorism it may be morally permissible and even required in order to

remove the terrorist threat.

Whatever the initial plausibility of the argument may be thought to be, it will not

convince the opponents of the war against terrorism. It is unclear whether the

alleged goals of the war are consistent with the means used in it. It is also unclear

whether the means are necessary or even effective. People who defend conspiracy

theorizing by referring to its desirable social consequences should be ready to face

similar suspicions. An important question is whether all morally questionable

conspiracy theories could be replaced by morally unproblematic conspiracy theories

without losing their alleged desirable consequences. If not, we may ask if we should

464 J. Raikka



conclude that the costs are so minor that they must be accepted. After all, we are not

talking about massive human rights violations in the context of conspiracy

theorizing. Clarke seems to assume that the price is worth paying, but his

understanding of the costs of conspiracy theorizing differs considerably from the

understanding described above. According to Clarke, giving a ‘‘thousand conspiracytheories some consideration is a small price for us to pay to have one actual

nefarious conspiracy, such as the Watergate conspiracy, uncovered sooner rather

than later.’’20 The price of conspiracy theorizing is not always limited to that of

giving them some consideration. Whether it could be so limited is an open question.

6 Media and Morality

As we have seen, conspiracy theorizing consists of developing and disseminating

conspiracy theories. Traditionally the people who develop the theories have seldom

also been the people who disseminate them. Today, the internet provides a forum for

conspiracy theorists to disseminate their theories without a support of traditional

media. When morally questionable conspiracy theories are made public, the people

who disseminate them must bear some responsibility. It will be worth considering a

few points related to questions of journalistic ethics, as the present argument implies

that investigative journalists and activists who operate in the public sphere often act

wrongly or at least create moral costs.21

It is clear that newspapers and other media should be free to publish claims and

suspicions that are not fully substantiated yet.22

They need not wait until adequateproofs are available, and they do not have to follow academic standards in their

procedures. The media operate in the marketplace. If a newspaper decides not to

publish unqualified rumors, other papers will do so and earn financial gain. Vague

and incomplete findings provide readers with a possibility to discuss them; this is

certainly one of the most important functions of a free press. It is acceptable if a

newspaper not only reports that someone claims that a specific group of people

conspires against others but also makes such claims if strong evidence is available.

Even if there is only a low chance of the conspiracy theory being warranted, the

consequences of it being warranted may be so serious that the press may be justified

in treating it as if it were warranted. The costs may be too high, if the information

provided by an implausible conspiracy theory happens to be true and people fail to

act on it. We know now that Renault Tracks and Volvo Construction Equipment that

are owned by Volvo AB made illegal payments to the former Iraqi government in

20 Clarke, op. cit., p. 148.21 Conspiracy Encyclopedia, op. cit.22

See Andrew Belsey and Ruth Chadwick, eds., Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media (London:Routledge 1992); see also Elliot D. Cohen, ed., Philosophical Issues in Journalism (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1992); John C. Merrill, Journalism Ethics: Philosophical Foundation for News Media




order to sell products under the so-called oil for food program that was governed by

the United Nations in 1996-2003. The regime of Saddam Hussein demanded

kickbacks and Volvo AB and its subsidiaries were willing to make a deal and

deceive the United Nations. It is not clear that we would know these things if the

newspapers had not published some early rumors and suspicions of the allegedconspiracy. The early suspicions led to more official investigations. In March of

2008 a verdict was handed down fort Volvo AB to return nearly nine million dollars

in profits that two of its subsidiaries had made and pay fines worth about eleven

million dollars, even though some kinds of extra fees are commonly accepted in

business in the Middle East and Central Asia, and Volvo AB was not the only

company who made a contract with the regime of Saddam Hussein.

When it comes to political conspiracy theorizing, publishing suspicions can be

morally problematic, because harsh claims are made in too early a stage of the

investigations. Let us consider the widely held conspiracy theory related to

genetically modified food, which has been relatively popular among environmental

activists and people who try to seek personal benefit by raising mass hysteria about

gene technology.23 The theory still has many supporters. There is much debate on

how to define ‘‘genetically modified food,’’ but roughly speaking, the term is used to

refer to the food that is at least partly made of genetically modified organisms, such

as genetically modified seeds, plants, or animals. According to the conspiracy

theory, not only do we lack sufficient scientific evidence that genetically modified

food will not cause special and serious health risks for millions of peoples, but we

have evidence that it is very likely to cause such problems. The evidence, however,

is kept hidden. The Monsanto Company is a huge multinational agriculturalbiotechnology corporation that has spent millions of dollars on genetically modified

seed research. According to the theory, their research results indicate that

genetically modified food will probably kill people, but they have not published

their results, as they are protected by patent laws and laws concerning business

secrets. The company needs the world to consume genetically modified food as

quickly as possible. Money is more important than human lives.

This conspiracy theory and similar theories are problematic. The theory is

intellectually problematic because researchers have not been able to show that

genetically modified food causes any special health risks. As well, genetically

modified food has been in the market for years, yet nothing disastrous has happened.

Furthermore, there are some biological reasons to think that genetically modified

food cannot have special health risks as opposed to environmental risks, even in

principle. The theory is morally problematic because it implies that there are

researchers, their assistants, secretaries, and economists in the Monsanto Company

who are willing to risk the lives of millions of people just for money. This is not a

particularly flattering claim. The staff is placed in a false light in the public eye in

order to benefit, ideologically or personally. There are thousands of people who do

not work for Monsanto themselves, but who know people who do.

An alternative would have been not to create a conspiracy theory at all. It wouldhave been enough to publish the warranted claim that Monsanto refuses to make

466 J. Raikka



public their research results concerning genetically modified seeds and ask whether

there are research results available from other, relevantly similar, activities. In the

same context it could have been pointed out that the ethical standards of Monsanto

are perhaps somewhat questionable, as the poor in rural areas of the developing

countries have become partly dependent on the company that provides seeds to localfarmers. This kind of reporting would have been fair or at any rate more fair. It

might have led to further investigations. In some cases further investigations provide

us with further evidence. In some stage we are morally justified to start conspiracy

theorizing. This happened in the Volvo AB case, but it did not happen in the

Monsanto case. According to Conspiracy Encyclopedia, there is ‘‘no evidence that

Monsanto or other corporations have knowingly sold potentially dangerous

genetically modified products without proper testing.’’24 Morally acceptable

conspiracy theories need not always be warranted, but they should be based on

sufficient evidence, as they involve claims that are very harsh from some points of

view. It may be morally excusable to place people in a false light in the public eye

and claim that they are probably conspiring against others, at least in cases in which

there is a lot of evidence available on a conspiracy and every reason to believe in

conspiracy, but in which there is no conspiracy.25

7 Concluding Remarks

As we have seen, the ethical evaluation of conspiracy theorizing as a cultural

phenomenon should be distinguished from the ethical evaluation of particularconspiracy theories. Until now, the debate on the ethics of conspiracy theorizing has

centered upon the question of what the social consequences of this activity as a

whole might be. While this question is meaningful, it is important to notice that

single conspiracy theories tend to have moral costs. Not only are people placed in a

false light in the public eye, but this is done, however inadvertently, in order to gain

something. It is doubtful that every conspiracy theory that has moral costs is

necessary in order to reach the alleged desirable results.

Conspiracies are common. It is relatively easy for many people to slip into a

conspiracy without really noticing it. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argues

that the free market is prone to conspiracies: ‘‘People of the same trade seldom meet

together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a

conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.’’26 According

to Smith, there is not much we can do to prevent conspiracies. In his view, it is

‘‘impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be

executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice.’’27 If Smith is right, as he

24 Conspiracy Encyclopedia, p. 203.25

See Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1989).26 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: Classic

H B k 2009) bk 1 h 10




may well be, then we have a good reason to adopt a sort of a favorable attitude

toward conspiracy theorizing as a cultural phenomenon. Even if conspiracy theories

do not prevent conspiracies, they may make potential conspirators to think twice.28

28 I would like to thank Lee Basham, Lars Binderup, Vibren van der Burg, Bob Goodin, Eerik Lagerspetz

468 J. Raikka



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