Author: Ece DINCASLAN

The European Union and Morocco Relations

After a decade of reforms through modernization, liberalization and relative

democratization, the European Union (EU) granted Morocco “advanced status” on October

2008. However, what does advanced status suggest is not clear. Does the EU give Morocco a full

membership status? Answer to this question is a direct no, but other questions are harder to

respond. Is the status of Morocco actually advanced for the EU, or is it just a gesture of the EU to

applause the reforms of Morocco? In addition to vagueness of the current situation, the future is

not clear either. To what extend advanced status will bring further integration of Morocco to the

EU? Will this lead to a full membership, or at least accession to the common market? Or does

advanced status not suggest any significant meaning for further integration? In order to answer

these questions, the paper analyzes the history of Morocco – EU relations, reviews the current

literature in order to formulate the present developments, and tries to conceptualize the nature of

the relations to predict the possible outcomes for the future. Special emphasis is given to

Moroccan internal political structure since it plays a key role for EU – Morocco relations. In

addition, the attitude of the EU towards Morocco is also essential. A strong comprehension of

the Moroccan political structure and the responses of the EU is necessary to understand the

integration of Morocco to Europe. However, the paper first addresses the importance of the

issue, and why and how the integration process develops, in order to build a strong informational

background.

The relationship of the EU and Morocco is particularly important for the European

studies because geographically Morocco is a very close neighbor of the EU and a Mediterranean

state, which make it a part of both the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the European-

Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (Baracani, 2005). Furthermore, the case of Morocco provides

a significant example for the EU, since promotion of democracy and human rights are important

aspects of the foreign policy of the EU (Haddadi, 2003, p. 74). After a series of political reforms

initiated by the King Mohammed VI and directly supported by the EU, Morocco‟s progress on

democracy and human rights surpassed the regional standards (Kausch, 2009). Thus, Morocco

eventually became “a pioneer in the ENP” and the advanced status is granted in October 2008

(Akgul, 2010). Therefore, Morocco is a test for the EU to examine its influential strength and

strategies, as well as a platform to illustrate its democratizing effect. Every step of Morocco

towards democracy and human rights is a credit for the EU since the EU directly backs up the

Moroccan reforms. In short, Morocco can be a success story of the EU, and a showcase to

demonstrate its “transformative power” (Behr, 2010).

The major factor which leads to the further integration of Morocco to the EU is, as stated

above, Morocco‟s geographical location. In addition to the short distance between Morocco and

Spain -Spain shores can be seen from the coasts of Morocco (Kausch, 2009), Spain holds two

small territories, Ceuta and Melilla on the south of the Gibraltar Strait (Migdalovitz, 2010). Thus

this geographical intimacy causes crucial issues such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking

(Migdalovitz, 2010), security and terrorism (Haddadi, 2003), free trade, fisheries, transportation

and energy transition (Kausch, 2009). Because of these important issues, Morocco and the EU

found themselves obligated to cooperate and to develop a strong relationship. Moreover, both the

EU and Morocco have further incentives. The EU is the Morocco‟s major trading partner; almost

60% of Morocco‟s total trade is with the EU (European Commission, 2010). In 2007, the EU

exported €15.1 billion worth products and services to Morocco (European Commission, 2010).

This close trade relations consequently lead to further integration of Morocco to the EU.

Although the integration process has taken a major course after the inauguration of King

Mohammed VI, his predecessor Hassan II applied to the European Communities (preceding

institution) for accession decades earlier, in 1987. However, the application was turned down on

the basis that Morocco is not considered European (Akgul, 2010). King Hassan II initiated a

political reform process in 1992 but major reforms took place under his successor King

Mohammed VI. Consequently, relationship between the EU and Morocco escalated

tremendously due to liberalization of Morocco through reforms (Kausch, 2009). Moreover, the

EU launched the ENP in 2003 in order to enhance “stability, security and well being” and

prevent “the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged Union and its neighbors”

(Baracani, 2005, p. 6). The ENP targets to develop strong ties with the states who are not offered

full membership incentives. (Baracani, 2005). In this respect, European Commission President

Romano Prodi promised “sharing everything but institutions” to the ENP states (Prodi, 2002). As

Chilosi states; “the promise refers to the possibility for neighbours to have the same treatment

and economic advantages of EU membership, except the participation in EU institutions”

(Chilosi, 2006, p. 2). Thus, the ENP brought Moroccan – EU relations to a new dimension. The

position of Morocco was enhanced as an ENP country. Morocco is the first country in the region

to conclude the Action Plan with the EU on 2005 (Kausch, 2009). In addition, Morocco is also in

the EMP; a party to Agadir Agreement and an important member of the “Euromed process”

which seeks to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (European Commission, 2010).

European Commission defines the aim of the EU and Morocco as to establish “a close economic

relationship that is more than association, less than accession” (European Commission, 2010).

This integration process consequently led the EU to grant „advanced status‟ under the framework

of ENP to Morocco in October 2008 (Kausch, 2009). The close relationship between the EU and

Morocco reached a new peak with the Granada Summit in March 2010. The joint statement of

the EU and Morocco underlines the importance of the summit:

“This summit between the EU and Morocco constitutes an unprecedented event for both parties. … It bears witness to the pioneering and distinctive nature of the EU-Morocco partnership. It illustrates the degree of maturity and confidence attained in the political dialogue and highlights the strategic importance of the EU-Morocco partnership” (Council of The European Union, 2010, p. 1).

As stated above, the political structure of Morocco plays a crucial role on its relations

with the EU since promotion of democracy and human rights are integral parts of EU‟s foreign

policy (Haddadi, 2003). This nature of the EU-Morocco relations is also significant in the Joint

Statement of Granada Summit: “The EU and Morocco reaffirmed their attachment to respect for

and protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the consolidation

of the rule of law, democracy and good governance, which are one of the fundamental pillars of

the EU-Morocco partnership” (Council of The European Union, 2010, p. 5). After several

reforms influenced from the EU and its member states, Morocco emerged as “a shining

example” among Arab countries, and its level of political liberalism is distinctive in the region

(Kausch, 2009, pp. 165-166) Thus, its peculiar status in the region contributed to the Morocco-

EU relations (Kausch, 2009, p. 169). However, reform process is still controversial, as scholars

underline that Morocco‟s current ambition for democratization has not reached to an absolute

level since achievements indicate relative regional successes rather than “irreversible” steps

towards “genuine democracy” (Haddadi, 2003; Kausch, 2009, p. 166).

One of the most important reformation step was the establishment of Equity and

Reconciliation Commission (IER) to investigate human rights violations between 1956 and 1999

(Kausch, 2009). Additional projects to compensate the victims of human rights violations (e.g.

disappearances) conducted such as EU backed MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP) (Haddadi,

2002). Even compensation was a starting step, it was not sufficient: “Though compensation was

granted in hundreds of cases, the issue still occupies centre stage as some victims and their

families ask for truth and justice as the only way of achieving settlement and reconciliation”

(Haddadi, 2003, p. 77). Nevertheless, these improvements are still important since it shows an

ambition to promote human rights.

In addition to IER, several other reforms were also important such as a comprehensive

revision of the civil personal code (mudawanna), decentralization steps by the establishment of

“super walis”, “granting official recognition to the Berber language as part of the Moroccan

cultural identity and future integration in the school system” (Haddadi, 2003, p. 76), legislation

about torture, and “the opening of the political space for political parties” (Kausch, 2009, p. 167).

In 2002, Morocco witnessed so-called the first free and fair elections. In 2007, international

observers as well as observers of NGO‟s admitted to monitor the elections for the first time in

Morocco history (Kausch, 2009). The election of 2007 is celebrated by important political actors

of the EU such as the Portuguese EU Presidency, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel

Moratinos and Nicolas Sarkozy (Kausch, 2009). Even though the 2007 elections met

international standards, “only 37% of the voters turned out and 19% cast blank ballots, reflecting

widespread disillusionment with the political process and popular understanding of the

powerlessness of the legislature” (Migdalovitz, 2010, p. 1). Furthermore, the European

Commission underlined that “the low voter turnout might be an indicator that voters do not see

their votes translated into meaningful change” (Kausch, 2009, p. 172).

The political space for the political parties, indeed, is very narrow in Morocco. Although

there were elections in 2007 which met international standards, the real power is still in the

hands of the Monarchy and its surrounding elite, the Makhzen:

“The powers are distinguished in law and discourse, but in practice there is neither separation nor balance of powers, with the palace-led executive exerting leading influence over the legislature and judiciary. Government and parliament execute the will of the Makhzen rather than the will of the electorate. The King presides over the Council of Ministers and appoints the government as well as high officials in strategically important ministries (interior, foreign affairs, defence, and religion). Royal counsellors, loyal technocrats of the King’s personal entourage, are the true decision makers in the ministries. At the local level, the regional governors (Walis), usually close to the palace, take all significant decisions. The King also approves and adopts legislation, can rule by decree and can veto any parliamentary or governmental decision. Political

parties have so far been too weak to provide meaningful political alternatives. The lack of independence of the highly corrupt judiciary and the gap between legal provisions and their practical use undermine the practical value of many legal reforms. In short, decision-making power on significant political change does not lie in the hands of elected individuals and institutions, and a separation of powers, both institutionally and in terms of political practice, is not even under consideration” (Kausch, 2009, p. 168).

Even the reforms were conducted as royal initiatives and introduced a “new concept

authority” rather than spontaneous steps to a genuine democracy (Haddadi, 2003, p. 76). In this

sense, reforms mostly introduced a fast political liberalization whereas democratization process

was, in fact, very slow (Haddadi, 2003, p. 77). In addition Kausch suggests that “the switch from

open repression to a semi-authoritarianism with formally democratic structures and discourse in

Morocco … suggests that incumbent regimes increasingly see open repression as less sustainable

than making concessions to liberalism as a way to retain power and privileges” (2009, p. 170).

Both Haddadi and Kausch underlines the EU‟s soft response to Morocco‟s dedication to

conserve the very nature of its political structure. In a nutshell, the EU focuses on the

achievements of Morocco while neglecting the authoritarian political structure, and it does not

push for further reforms and steps towards genuine democracy and human rights, but settle with

what Morocco‟s Monarch and political elite presents. Haddadi states that the EU‟s policy is

neither imposing nor demanding but “too cautious, worried about upsetting the government and

persistent in its attitude of „change within continuity'” (2003, p. 87). Furthermore he warns that

“such a slow attitude towards promoting democracy in Morocco might risk discrediting

democratization itself in the eyes of the population” (2003, p. 87). Kausch asserts that “both

discourse and action suggest that European policies towards Morocco do not aspire to back full

political freedom and genuine democracy in Morocco” (2009, p. 175). In addition, Kausch

criticizes the EU‟s response as “applause policy” which “creates a distorted image of what the

EU perceives as the reality of Moroccan political life, thereby indirectly bolstering the ruling

elite and weakening the position of Moroccan democracy activists” (2009, p. 172).

Ivan Martin is skeptical on the advanced status of Morocco (2009). In his self

explanatorily titled article “EU-Morocco Relations: How Advanced is the „Advanced Status‟” he

claims that “the Advanced Status does not introduce any novelty” (2009, p. 241). Furthermore,

he adds that the advanced status does not suggest “a clear legal status” either (2009, p. 243).

Martin underlines the lack of rules and guidelines, and the vagueness of the concepts such as „an

increasingly close and mutually beneficial partnership” (2009, p. 244). Hence the relations have

not been building on concrete guidelines and legally binding frameworks but ad hoc

arrangements. Moreover, the status of Morocco may be „advanced‟ in rhetoric, but in reality the

position of Israel and other ENP states under „Eastern Partnership‟ are far more advanced than

Morocco since their relations are conducted by the European Council (Morocco-EU relations are

handled through Association Council) and based on concrete guidelines and legal frameworks

(Martin, 2009, p. 243). In addition, the „Eastern Partnership‟ set „full visa liberation‟ and „labor

mobility‟ goals which are omitted for Morocco (Martin, 2009, p. 243). Although Behr is more

hopeful than Martin, he also underlines the possibility of advanced status turning into “just

another empty bureaucratic shell” (2010).

In conclusion, Morocco‟s current political structure is far from the EU norms even

though its performance is outstanding in regional standards. It is true that relationship between

the EU and Morocco has been gradually escalating, but we can not talk about a genuine

integration so far, and it is not prospected even in the long term. Integration will not go beyond a

FTA, the EU funding to Morocco, collaboration in the foreign policy and some gestures of

positive intent such as current observer status of Morocco in the EU institutions, technical and

financial cooperation, participation of Morocco in EU programmes and the EU-Morocco Joint

Parliamentary Committee foreseen in the Granada Summit (Council of The European Union,

2010, pp. 8-9). Accession of Morocco to the customs union with common external tariff policy

or the common market with free flow of capital and labor is as unlikely as the full membership.

In short, the close relationship between the EU and Morocco refers to a relative case; being

closer than other regional actors rather than an absolute closeness, and advanced status does not

necessarily indicate advancement but a gesture for the reforms of Morocco.

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