The EU’s newborderlands

Judy Batt

October 2003

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Judy Batt is Professor of Central and South East European Politicsat the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University ofBirmingham. She is currently on leave from Birmingham, workingas a research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris.Recent publications include Region, state and identity in Centraland Eastern Europe (with Kataryna Wolczuk, Frank Cass, 2002),and The long-term implications of EU enlargement: the nature ofthe new border (with Giuliano Amato, European UniversityInstitute, Florence, 1999).

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AUTHOR’S ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This working paper draws on research conducted for ‘FuzzyStatehood’ and European Integration in Central and EasternEurope, a project which formed part of the ‘One Europe orSeveral?’ programme, financed by the UK’s Economic and SocialResearch Council. Thanks to Katinka Barysch and Heather Grabbeat the CER for editing the text and particularly Katinka’s additionsto Chapter 5.

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Contents

About the author

Author’s acknowledgements

1 Introduction 1

2 A new Iron Curtain? 5

3 Developments in the new neighbourhood 11

4 An explosive legacy 21

5 EU neighbourhood policy in the making 29

6 Regional co-operation along the EU’s new eastern border 37

7 What the EU should do 47

8 Conclusion 57

1 Introduction

Ten new members will join the European Union in May 2004,eight of which are located in Central and Eastern Europe. The EUhas been slow in getting to grips with the implications of itsbiggest-ever enlargement. An inter-governmental conference startedmeeting in October 2003 to prepare the EU’s institutions anddecision-making procedures. But the EU also needs to thinkthrough the impact on the wider Europe. Enlargement threatens tocreate new divisions between the countries coming into the Unionand those left outside.

Most of the EU member-states have removed border controlsbetween themselves to create a zone of passport-free travel calledthe ‘Schengen area’. While people and goods can move freely withinthe Schengen area, the EU has strengthened controls at its externalborders to keep out criminals, drug smugglers and illegalimmigrants. With enlargement, the EU’s external border will shifteastwards. It will stretch for thousands of kilometres from theArctic southwards via Ukraine to the Black Sea, and around theBalkans. The EU has so far focused its attention on how to makethis long and poorly guarded border more secure, so as to allow thenew member-states to join the Schengen area of passport-free travel.

The EU is right to be concerned about security threats comingfrom outside the Union. Its new external border will run throughregions characterised by poverty and political tensions. But theEU’s current members would be extremely short-sighted if theysought to counter these threats just by putting up new fences.They need to take into account the effects that the eastward shiftof external borders will have on their new neighbours.

The last decade has seen many positive developments in theregions that will soon be the EU’s new borderlands. Cross-bordertrade and business have flourished. Many countries and regionshave overcome long-established animosities, particularly thelegacies of the Second World War. However, EU enlargementcould threaten these achievements. New barriers to travel andtrade would leave the people on the other side of the border witha feeling of exclusion and anger. They would be cut off from theprosperous European market. Robbed of the prospect of improvedliving standards, they may well try to slip into the EU illegally orresort to crime and smuggling.

It was only in 2003 – one year before the first round of eastwardenlargement – that the EU started to formulate a comprehensivepolicy on how to deal with its new neighbourhood. The EU’sstated objective is to surround itself with a “ring of friends” as itenlarges into Central and Eastern Europe. In the past, the EU’smain tool for stabilising neighbouring countries has been to offerthem the prospect of eventual membership. This strategy hasbeen very successful. But it has clearly reached its limits, notonly because the EU is threatening to become unwieldy, but alsobecause the EU’s new neighbours, such as Russia and Ukraine,are neither willing nor able to assume the obligations ofmembership in the foreseeable future. But if the carrot ofaccession is no longer available, what can the EU offer its

neighbours as an incentive for rapid reform,deeper integration and enhanced co-operation?In a recent paper, the European Commissionsuggested that the EU should offer its neighboursaccess to the single European market – without,however, letting them take part in jointinstitutions and decision-making.1 This workingpaper will argue that the Commission’s proposalsmay not have the desired stabilising effect, atleast in the short to medium-term, unless the EUadds a stronger regional dimension.

2 The EU’s new borderlands Introduction 3

Clearly, the EU needs to improve its relations with the governmentsof neighbouring states and give more substance to them. But itshould also focus more on the regional dimension of its emergingneighbourhood policy. This working paper explains why theregions along the EU’s new eastern border matter for Europe’ssecurity. It provides potent examples of these regions’ turbulenthistory and illustrates the positive developments that have takenplace since the collapse of communism. It argues forcefully that theEU needs to be extremely careful in how it manages its newexternal frontier. Border checks and immigration controls must notbe allowed to turn into a new Iron Curtain.

This working paper focuses on the regional dimension ofneighbourhood policy, and it does not purport to give acomprehensive view of the EU’s relations with surroundingcountries. In terms of geography, the paper covers only the EU’snew eastern neighbours, namely the western countries of theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the WesternBalkans. It seeks to keep its regional focus throughout and doesnot discuss many of the issues that dominate the bilateral agendabetween the EU and its new neighbours – such as Belarus or theRussian exclave of Kaliningrad.

The paper ends with a series of practical suggestions of what theEU can and should do to improve border management and visacontrols. In formulating its frontier policies, the EU must alsoencourage cross-border co-operation between people, officials andbusinesses in the border areas. It recommends that the EU shouldlet the new Central and East European member-states play a majorrole in forging its neighbourhood policy. Finally, the EU mustimprove its own internal processes of decision-making, to make itsneighbourhood policy more effective.

1 EuropeanCommission, ‘WiderEurope – neighbour-hood: a new frame-work for relations withour eastern and south-ern neighbours’,Brussels, March 2003.http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/doc/com03_104_en.pdf.

2 A new Iron Curtain?

The extension of Schengen into Eastern Europe

To qualify for EU membership, the accession countries had to takeover the EU’s common rules on external border controls and visarequirements, known as the Schengen acquis. Since border controlis a politically sensitive issue, some of the EU’s existing member-states have insisted on a degree of flexibility when applying theSchengen rules to their own frontiers. But because many WestEuropeans worry about the security of the EU’s external borderafter enlargement, the new member-states will be required toapply all Schengen rules strictly. This implies the risk of deepdivisions between the enlarged EU and its new neighbours.Although a rapid extension of the Schengen regime to the newmembers appears to be in the EU’s short-term interest – in orderto build an effective barrier against crime and trafficking aroundthe enlarged EU – it may work against the Union’s long-termsecurity interests.

The Schengen agreement was signed in 1985 by five EU member-states – Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and theNetherlands – to create a zone of passport-free travel betweenthemselves. Other EU members subsequently joined, and in 1997the Schengen convention was incorporated into theEU’s treaty framework and made part of the bodyof EU law (called the acquis communautaire).2

Originally, the purpose of the Schengen area was tobring people closer together in a Europe withoutvisible internal borders. The aim was to allow forthe free movement of people and goods by

2 The UK andIreland have notsigned up to theSchengen area, butNorway andIceland – which arenot member-states –have joined it.

before 2006 at the very earliest. Technical difficulties also suggestthat the enlargement of the Schengen area will face long delays. Inparticular, the EU will have to overhaul the computer systems thatit uses to exchange information on missing persons, suspectedcriminals and stolen goods, called the Schengen InformationSystem. To enlarge the Schengen area securely, the system willhave to handle massive amounts of new information. Thetechnical upgrade is scheduled for completion by 2006, but it maywell overrun.

Although the East Europeans will not enjoy the benefits ofborderless travel until at least 2006, they will have to implementand enforce Schengen rules fully from the first day of their EUmembership. In fact, although EU countries such as Germany andAustria will not dismantle their border controls for years to come,the accession countries have already fulfilled their side of thebargain by taking over large parts of the Schengen acquis. Theyhave done this partly in response to EU pressure, but also becausethey share the EU’s concerns about organised crime and illegalimmigration. East European governments are keen to make theirborders not only more secure but also more efficient. Improvedborder controls, they hope, will shorten travel times, clamp downon smuggling (and thus bring in more tax and customs revenue),and reduce opportunities for petty corruption and arbitrarydecisions by customs and immigration officials.

However, the new members’ resources – both financial and human– are already stretched to the limit by the need to implement otherparts of the acquis and carry out structural economic reforms.Most of the new members will not have the money to modernisetheir border controls quickly or to expand their visa-issuingservices in neighbouring countries. The EU recognises that itcannot and should not let its poorest member-states bear the fullburden of securing the Union’s new external border. The EU hasalready spent millions of euro on upgrading border crossings andtraining customs officials in Central and Eastern Europe. At their

removing all controls at the common borders of the participatingstates. But at the same time, EU leaders resolved to strengthencontrols at the Union’s external borders to compensate for theabolition of internal checks.

This security aspect of border countrols has since gained inimportance, especially since 1989, when the collapse of the IronCurtain resulted in increased fears about an influx of illegalimmigrants and organised crime from east to west. With internalborder checks already dismantled, the EU has shifted its focusmore and more towards securing its external border against threatscoming from outside the Union. The EU member-states have also

reinforced their co-operation in other areas of internalsecurity, for example through the exchange ofinformation on illegal immigration and crime;enhanced co-operation between national police forcesand judiciaries; and steps towards a common visa,asylum and immigration policy.3

The EU’s shift of emphasis towards external border controls andco-operation in internal security puts a particular onus on the newmember-states as its first line of defence. Many in the current EUdoubt whether East European customs and immigration officialswill be able to police the new external border efficiently. They alsoquestion the ability of East European police forces and courtsystems to fight organised crime effectively. The EU has made itclear that the new member-states will not be granted an opt-out

from the Schengen acquis (or any other partof the acquis) like the ones that the UK,Ireland and Denmark have negotiated. Butthe East Europeans will not be admitted intothe Schengen area straightaway when theyjoin the EU.4 All EU member-states will haveto agree to the newcomers’ entry into theborderless Schengen area. Given existingsecurity concerns, this is unlikely to happen

A new Iron Curtain? 76 The EU’s new borderlands

3 See MalcolmAnderson andEberhard Bort,‘The frontiers ofthe EuropeanUnion’, Palgrave,2001.

4 The EU has also negotiateda transition period of up toseven years before peoplefrom the new member-statescan seek work in the currentEU countries. The free move-ment of workers, however, isdifferent from the right of allEU citizens to move aroundthe EU area freely.

originate in the countries directly across its borders but furtherafield, in Asia and Africa. Since the collapse of communism, someof the East European and Balkan countries have become keytransit routes for drug smuggling and human trafficking.Although the countries concerned have stepped up their fightagainst such activities, there is a mismatch between their means(in terms of money and human resources) and their motivation(because the final destination of drugs, illicit goods and migrantsis beyond their own borders).

The EU therefore needs to build lasting partnerships withneighbouring countries in the fight against trafficking andorganised crime. The success of these partnerships depends onmutual trust and a strong sense of common interest. However, thetransfer of Schengen rules to the new member-states in Centraland Eastern Europe threatens to work in the opposite direction.By creating new divisions and leaving the EU’s new neighbourswith a sense of exclusion, enlargement may well underminemutual trust and co-operation. What is more, EU enlargementcould stunt or even reverse the many positive cross-borderdevelopments – political, economic, cultural – that have takenplace since the collapse of communism in 1989. The followingchapter gives an overview of what is at stake.

Copenhagen summit in December 2002, EU leaders earmarked anadditional S860 million from the EU budget for this purpose for

the first two years after enlargement. However, thesegrants fall well short of effective burden-sharing,which would require the EU to move towards a jointmanagement of its external border.5

At the Seville summit in July 2002, EU leaders approved aCommission plan for ‘integrated management’ of the Union’sexternal border as a first step towards the establishment of acommon border guard. However, so far, the initiative has notprogressed beyond a number of pilot projects, notably joint navalpatrols in the Mediterranean and the co-ordination of land borderpatrols. The member-states have yet to agree on how to share thecosts of managing the EU external border, a question that willbecome all the more controversial (and urgent) after enlargement.

The EU’s fight against security threats will have to go well beyondhelping the new member-states to strengthen their borders.Security experts generally agree that visa requirements and borderchecks – however strict – are not a very effective defence againstcrime, drug smuggling and people trafficking. Well-organisedcrime rings and smugglers with good local knowledge will alwaysfind a way of circumventing controls. If the EU wants to addressthese threats effectively, it will have to engage more deeply withneighbouring states to tackle the roots of those problems. TheUnion will have to help them strengthen their law enforcementservices and judiciaries. It will have to foster mutual trust as thebasis for cross-border co-operation. And it will have to work withits new neighbours to stabilise border region economies. One ofthe most important tasks is to reduce poverty, which is often theroot cause of social upheaval and creates the conditions in whichcrime can thrive.

The challenge does not stop there. Most of the drugs, smuggledgoods and migrants that the EU is concerned about do not

8 The EU’s new borderlands A new Iron Curtain? 9

5 See AdamTownsend,‘GuardingEurope’, CER,May 2003.

3 Developments in the newneighbourhood

The growth of cross-border travel since 1989

For the people living in post-communist Central and EasternEurope, borders do not merely signify the geographicaldelimitation of their home countries. They are potent symbols ofpolitical freedom or its absence. During the years of communism,cross-border travel was severely restricted for the peoples ofCentral and Eastern Europe. Those wishing to travel had toendure the lengthy, complex and humiliating process of applyingfor a passport. They had to ask their employers and localauthorities for political references. They had to undergounpleasant negotiations with and interrogations from the policeofficers who issued the passports. And since all citizens had tosurrender their passports after each journey, they had to repeat theentire process each time they wanted to leave the country.

Communist governments not only controlled travel from east towest, they also restricted travel between the countries of the Sovietbloc. In fact, the citizens of the more liberal communist countries,such as Poland and Hungary, often found it easier to getpermission to travel to the West than to visit the Soviet Union. Attimes of regime crisis – in 1956 in Hungary, 1968 inCzechoslovakia and 1980-81 in Poland – neighbours within thesocialist bloc would usually close their borders completely. Inaddition, communist countries remained worried about territorialdisputes in those areas that had changed hands at the end of theSecond World War – such as the eastern parts of pre-war Germany

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How Schengen visas work

People from outside the EU who want to visit a Schengen country have toapply for a Schengen visa, which then entitles them to move around freelythe entire Schengen area. However, since the maximum duration of aSchengen visa is 90 days, those wishing to stay longer, such as exchangestudents, still need a national visa as well.

In theory, applicants for Schengen visas should be able to obtain theirdocumentation from the consular offices of any Schengen member-state. Inpractice, however, the member-states require those wishing to travel to morethan one country to obtain their visa from their main destination (thecountry the applicant is planning to spend most time in). Those who have nomain destination, say tourists on a round trip, are required to apply to thecountry of first entry. Nevertheless, visa applicants in countries such as Russiaand Ukraine often ‘shop around’ the different embassies for the shortestqueues.

Since the new member-states from Central and Eastern Europe will not jointhe Schengen area until several years after their EU entry, they will notinitially be able to issue Schengen visas, only national ones.

days of communism. Cities are few and far between in these areas,and those that exist were already dilapidated and decaying by theend of the communist era. Communist governments allowed thetransport and communications infrastructure that once linkedthese regions with western neighbours to rot. For example, thebridges over the river Bug along the Polish-Ukrainian border weredestroyed in the Second World War and never rebuilt. Links withfar-flung national capitals were equally underdeveloped. People inthe western Ukrainian region of Transcarpathia used to lamentthat ‘Transcarpathia is as far from Kiev as it is from God’. Theresult was widespread poverty and depopulation. For example,one-third of Transcarpathia’s working-age population left to seekwork elsewhere in the Soviet Union before 1989.

The economic upheavals that followed the break-up of the SovietUnion and the onset of market reforms dealt another severe blowto these border regions. As economic output plummeted in theformer Soviet Union and long-established (if usually artificial)trade links broke down, the people of the border regions startedto look west. In the Central and East European countries,economic stabilisation and recovery came much earlier than in theformer Soviet Union. The prospect of EU membership addedfurther momentum to economic reforms and growth in thesecountries. People from western Ukraine and elsewhere startedtaking advantage of the emerging economic opportunities acrosstheir borders. Ukrainian workers – usually unregistered – flockedto the building sites in Hungary’s booming towns or foundseasonal work on Polish farms. Shuttle traders – locally known as‘ants’ – crossed into Poland weekly or even daily, usually armedwith a suitcase or two full of smuggled cigarettes and cheapmerchandise, or a car-load of home-grown food. A flourishingnetwork of bazaars sprang up along the border.

But the direction of trade has not been one-way. Many shoppingcentres on the Polish side of the border now cater for thegrowing numbers of Ukrainian visitors. By the second half of the

which became Polish, and parts of Poland which were given toUkraine. The presence of ethnic minorities on both sides of thenew borders only added to the communist authorities’ convictionthat cross-border contacts of even the most modest kind werefraught with danger.

Not surprisingly, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europeregard their newly won right to travel as the most significantachievement of 1989-90 revolutions. This feeling has beenreinforced by widespread disappointment with other post-communist changes. Economic reform and market liberalisationwent hand-in-hand with rising unemployment and poverty levels.And many voters have become disillusioned with their newlydemocratic governments, which they see as self-serving andincompetent. The right to hold a passport and to cross borders,however, has remained a clear and unambiguous sign of thefreedom gained after 1989.

Millions have happily taken up the opportunities created by newborder regimes. In many East European countries, the number of

people using their passport to holiday in far-flunglocations is dwarfed by those who exploit openborders to seek business and employment. Forexample, between 1990 and 1997, the number ofpeople crossing Poland’s eastern border rose almostthreefold, from 11 million to 30 million a year,turning Poland into one of the world’s most frequentlyvisited countries.6 Most of these border crossings wereaccounted for by Ukrainians travelling westwards,many of whom rely on small-scale cross-border tradefor their livelihood.

Cross-border trade has thus become an important – sometimes themost important – source of income in regions that are in manyways disadvantaged. The rural areas along the former SovietUnion’s western border were already impoverished during the

12 The EU’s new borderlands Developments in the new neighbourhood 13

6 See Katarynaand RomanWolczuk, ‘Polandand Ukraine –moulding a strategic partner-ship through anew IronCurtain’, RoyalInstitute forInternationalAffairs, 2002.

generates a trade surplus of around $1.5 billion fromits unofficial border trade with Ukraine every year.9

The development of cross-border trade has helpedthese disadvantaged regions to survive, even in theabsence of significant support from nationalgovernments. Eastward enlargement – and theextension of strict Schengen border rules – threatensto disrupt these cross-border flows of goods andpeople. It also threatens to stunt or even reverse the politicalrapprochement that has taken place between the Central and EastEuropean countries now lining up for EU membership and thepost-Soviet countries that are excluded from the process. Mostcountries in the region have started to overcome a legacy of deep-seated mutual suspicion and animosity and instead movedtowards mutually beneficial co-operation. But these achievementsremain fragile. The following section provides importantexamples of the progress that has been made in cross-border tradeand co-operation in recent years.

Examples of neighbourhood relations in Central, Easternand South-eastern Europe

★ Poland and Ukraine

The rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine in the lastdecade has been one of the most positive developments in post-communist Europe. In the previous 150 years, a legacy ofhistorical enmity had built up between Poles and Ukrainians.Bursts of bitter ethnic warfare and large-scale forced migrationmarked relations between the countries during the Second WorldWar and its aftermath, when the Soviet Union annexed 200 milesof Poland’s eastern borderlands. During the communist era,governments, school teachers and historians on both sideshelped to perpetuate the hostile stereotypes that kept the twonations apart.

1990s, more than half of the consumer goods – such as food,furniture, and clothes – sold in western Ukraine came fromPoland. According to estimates from the UK government’sDepartment for International Development, informal cross-border trade in the western Ukrainian region of Lviv now

matches officially registered trade with Poland.Similarly, many Romanians cross into Hungary tostock up on sugar, milk and other daily necessitiesin new shopping centres along the border. Thelarge quantities purchased suggest that thecustomers are often firms rather thanindividuals.7

For the governments of the countries concerned, this flourishingunofficial trade obviously means losses in terms of tax andcustoms revenue foregone. But for the people of the borderregions, the benefits are obvious. Researchers estimate that240,000 people earn their living from the bazaar trade across thePolish-Ukrainian border, about three-quarters of whom have no

other source of income.8 For many others, occasionaltrips across the border supplement incomes thatwould otherwise fall below subsistence level. Forexample, this author was told in 2000 that aTranscarpathian schoolteacher could double his orher official monthly salary of $20 by making twotrips into Hungary to sell a tank-load of petrol on thelocal market.

People in the new member-states also benefit. Border towns thatwould otherwise suffer from their peripheral location arerecording above-average growth rates due to the border trade.This has helped to mitigate the growing economic disparitiesbetween western and eastern regions within the East Europeancountries. An estimated 30 to 40 per cent of small and medium-sized enterprises in the eastern Polish city of Lublin survivethrough commerce with Ukraine. Economists think that Poland

14 The EU’s new borderlands Developments in the new neighbourhood 15

7 See Gábor Hunyaand Almos Telegdy,‘Hungarian-Romaniancross-border economicco-operation’, WIIWCountdown ProjectDiscussion Paper,2001.

8 See Katarynaand RomanWolczuk, ‘Polandand Ukraine –moulding a strategic partner-ship through anew Iron Curtain’,RIIA, 2002.

9 House of LordsSelect Committeeon the EU,‘Enlargement andEU external frontier controls’,Session 1999-2000, 17th Report,HL Paper 110,October 2000.

Since the collapse of communism, however, the two states havemoved towards a strategic partnership in which Poland acts as apatron of Ukraine, promoting its European vocation andwestward orientation. Polish leaders across the political spectrumagree that the relationship with Ukraine is a cornerstone of theircountry’s foreign policy. They recognise that a stable, westward-oriented and independent Ukraine is in Poland’s national interest,and will continue to be so after EU accession.

Polish leaders think that the EU’s current policies towards Ukraineare inadequate. They fear that a tightening of the border regimeand the introduction of visa requirements for Ukrainians in 2003could foster feelings of exclusion in Ukraine. This, in turn, couldweaken the position of pro-western reformers. It could alsoimpede a wide-ranging engagement between the two countriesthat would help foster political and economic reforms in Ukraineand cement the country’s westward orientation.

★ Hungary and Romania

The status of Transylvania has historically been the source ofsome of the most intractable and bitter territorial and ethnicconflicts in Europe. The peace treaties after the First World Wartransferred a large part of eastern Hungary, includingTransylvania, to Romania. The majority of the inhabitants wereRomanian, but there was also a sizeable, and increasingly bitterHungarian minority. In 1940 Hungary seized much of thisterritory back, and forced population exchanges took place. Atthe end of the Second World War, the territory was restored toRomanian control. The remaining Hungarian minority wasregarded with deep suspicion, and the Ceaucescu regime furtherfomented mutual mistrust between ethnic groups.

Since the fall of Communism, nationalist thinking and rhetoric haveby no means disappeared from Romanian politics. Anti-Hungariantendencies have been exacerbated by the sometimes tactless

16 Developments in the new neighbourhood 17

ESTONIA

LATVIA

LITHUANIA

B E L A R U S

R U S S I A

RUSSIA

P O L A N D

CZECHREPUBLIC

SLOVAKREPUBLIC

AUSTRIA

HUNGARY

R O M A N I A

U K R A I N E

MOLDOVA

SLOVENIA

CROATIA

KALININGRAD

Ca

rp

at

hi

an

s

Tallinn

Warsaw

Lviv

Bratislava

Budapest

BelgradeBucharest

Szeged

Vojvodina

Transcarpathia

B a n a t

Tr a n s y l v a n i a

Timisoara

Novi Sad

Kiev

0 100 miles

0 200 kilometres

Scale

Pre-1939 Polish Eastern Territories

Transcarpathia

EU external border after May 2004

Transylvania

Banat

Vojvodina

now Lithuania, Belarus & Ukraine

Key border regions of EU non-member states after 2004

The eastern and southern borders of theenlarged EU

few countries that Serbs could visit without having to obtain avisa, which helped many to keep up a semblance of normal lifeunder the rule of Slobodan Milosevic .

The fall of the Milosevic regime in 2000 marked an opportunityfor a fresh start and the country’s return to Europe. But politicalstability is still precarious, as the assassination of reformist PrimeMinister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 showed. A high degree ofpopular mistrust – if not outright hostility – towards the West,the EU and NATO remains as a legacy of the last decade.Hungary is well placed to play a leading part in the EU’s effortsto support and accelerate Serbian reconstruction. It is a trustedinterlocutor in the former Yugoslavia and has valuableexperience to offer as a model of post-communist transformationand preparation for EU accession.

Tighter controls at the common border could well impedecontacts between the two countries, sending all the wrong signalsto Serbian citizens, including the 300,000 ethnic Hungarians wholive along Serbia’s northern border. In mid-2003 Hungary waspreparing to impose strict Schengen visa requirements on itsSerbian neighbours, in response to EU pressure. This will erectbarriers not experienced since the 1950s, when rifts betweenYugoslavia and the Soviet bloc led to closed borders. The newvisa requirements will hardly help overcome Serbian mistrust ofthe EU.

behaviour of Hungarian governments. Up to the present day, thequestion of Transylvania’s Hungarian minority is one of the mostsensitive political issues in post-communist Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, both sides have exercised self-restraint and are nowslowly but steadily groping towards reconciliation. They are tryingto move towards a more productive relationship that focuses onpresent-day issues rather than past grievances. SuccessiveRomanian governments since 1996 have given representatives ofthe Hungarian minority a greater say in political decision-making.Hungary, in turn, has expressed support for Romania’s swift EUaccession. Romanians still fear that Hungary could use its first-round accession to the EU to wrest unwelcome concessions fromRomania, but the deep-rooted mistrust that has characterisedmutual relations appears to be easing.

The EU’s decision in January 2002 to remove Romania from thelist of countries that need a Schengen visa to travel to the EUaverted a potentially damaging setback. Hungary would otherwisehave been forced to impose new travel restrictions, not only forRomanians but also for the Hungarian minority residing inTransylvania. Nevertheless, once Hungary has entered the EU itwill have to tighten its border controls with Romania, which couldbecome a source of renewed bilateral friction. It could also promptfurther emigration of ethnic Hungarians from Romania, if theyfind that they can no longer move easily between the two countries.

★ Hungary and Serbia

During communist times, Hungary had good relations with whatwas then Yugoslavia. Both regimes pursued relatively reformisteconomic policies, and their travel arrangements were moreliberal than those of most other communist countries. Hungarykept its border with Serbia open throughout the 1990s, despite theBalkan wars, the imposition of international sanctions and the1999 NATO bombardment. Hungary remained one of the very

18 The EU’s new borderlands Developments in the new neighbourhood 19

4 An explosive legacy

Centrifugal forces and the appeal of Central Europe

The temporary or even permanent exclusion from the EU ofcountries such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania and Serbiacreates considerable uncertainties for the regions that border theEU. On the one hand, proximity to the enlarged EU couldpotentially stimulate investment and economic growth in theirborder regions, as it did in western Hungary and Poland over thelast decade. However, regional development will very muchdepend on how the EU handles its new external border, and onwhether the central governments of the neighbouring countriesmake regional development and stability a priority.

As in the new member-states, EU enlargement is likely to deepenregional economic disparities within the neighbouring states. Butin these countries the potential political effects could be greater,possibly leading to threats to political stability in the EU’s widerneighbourhood.

The EU’s new external border runs through an area that ischaracterised by precarious and often fragile states and acomplex, sometimes explosive mix of ethnic groups, languages,cultures and religions. Many of the EU’s new neighbours arecountries that were cobbled together from pieces of the Habsburg,Ottoman and Russian Tsarist empires in the early 20th century.Their borders changed repeatedly during and after the SecondWorld War. The post-war communist regimes worked hard tosuppress any manifestations of regional, ethnic, religious orcultural idiosyncrasies. But the desire to define a distinct identity

further east, by the peoples that are finding themselves on the‘wrong’ side of the EU’s new eastern border. Just like the Czechs,Poles and Hungarians before them, they use the notion of‘Central Europe’ to remind their western neighbours that theyshare their history and culture as well as their aspirations for aprosperous and peaceful common future. People living near theborder often want their region to act as a gateway to Europe forthe whole country. They would like to spearhead the drive foreconomic and political renewal. They, too, want to ‘re-joinEurope’.

However, the notion of Central Europe – and the desire to lookwestward and re-integrate with Europe – could just as easilybecome a rallying cry by impoverished border regions againsttheir distant, unresponsive central governments. There is muchlingering resentment in these border regions against centralgovernments, which is often exacerbated by ethnic tensions.Communist regimes managed to suppress these tensions andanimosities, but they re-surfaced as soon as the old regimescollapsed. The peoples of the border regions were keen to re-assert their ethnic, cultural and religious identities. But centralgovernments in the region were reluctant to grant them greaterautonomy for fear that increased local powers and freedom couldprompt calls for independence and border revisions.

This reluctance, in turn, helped to perpetuate the suspicion thatmany border-area residents, in particular members of ethnicminorities, feel towards the centre. They often suggest that theirmore progressive, European outlook clashes with the ‘backward’,‘Asiatic’ or ‘Byzantine’ system in their capitals. Such suggestionscan be highly inflammatory, especially in cases where borderregions were once contested by neighbouring states, and whereallegiance to the (new) central power is still in doubt. Centralgovernments are quick to interpret any movements to re-assertregional identities as political subversion and a potentialchallenge to the nation-state’s integrity. They will be all the more

and to gain a degree of autonomy from the heavy-handed centralgovernments has lingered.

Long before the collapse of the old regimes, regional and ethnicmovements had started to become one of the few vehicles forpeople to express political opposition and to escape the unifyingblandness of communism. In particular, the inhabitants of theSoviet empire’s western countries and regions started to rediscovertheir ethnic and religious identities and their distinct historicalroots. Many developed a sense of belonging to a broader culturalspace that transcended geographical borders, a space looselydefined as ‘Central Europe’.

It was Milan Kundera, the exiled Czech writer, whoresurrected the notion of Central Europe as ahistorical, political and cultural entity in a famousessay in 1984.10 He lamented that the Soviets hadforcibly cut off the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and

other Central Europeans from their ‘natural’ roots in mainstreamEurope. They were now tied to the ‘wrong’ empire and in dangerof being forgotten by a complacent and indifferent West.Although Kundera loosely equated Central Europe with theterritory of the former Habsburg Empire, he defined the conceptnot only, or even primarily, in geographical terms. Rather, he sawit as a cultural, emotive, even spiritual concept. For Kundera andmany after him, the peoples and lands of this vaguely definedarea represented the essence of European identity. Having beenfought over in all of Europe’s major conflagrations, theythemselves continued to battle for Europe’s core values, such asfreedom and self-determination, and the legacy of its civilisation.

This sense of belonging to Central Europe was among thepowerful driving forces that made Hungary, Poland, Slovenia andothers dash towards EU membership as soon as communismcollapsed. But now that these countries have come within reachof ‘re-joining Europe’, Kundera’s ideas have been taken up

An explosive legacy 2322 The EU’s new borderlands

10 Milan Kundera,‘The tragedy ofCentral Europe’,New York Reviewof Books, April26th 1984.

Transcarpathia’s other minority groups – mainly Hungarians andRoma, along with small groups of Slovaks, Germans andRomanians – all get along remarkably well, using Russian as thelingua franca and rejecting Kiev’s imposition of Ukrainian as thestate language. Economically, the inhabitants of this impoverishedregion depend heavily on their cross-border dealings with Hungary,Slovakia and Poland. Since Slovakia imposed visa requirements onUkrainians in June 2000, some of this traffic has diverted intoPoland, which did not require visas from people with Ukrainianpassports until 2003. The Hungarian minority in particular hasbenefited from closer contact with the Hungarian mainland, whichwas virtually impossible during the communist period.

Many members of the minority groups emigrated westwardsbecause they were afraid that stricter EU border controls and visarequirements could shut them off fromneighbouring countries. In an attempt to forestalla large-scale influx of ethnic Hungarians fromUkraine, the Hungarian government passed ahighly controversial bill that awards ethnicHungarians residing in other countries access tojobs, social benefits and education in Hungary,provided they do not settle in Hungary.12 The billhas been criticised by the EU and it may also fuelinter-ethnic tensions within Ukraine, should theHungarian minority be seen as enjoying certainprivileges denied to other Ukrainian citizens.

★ Banat in south-west Romania

The Banat region in its current shape encompasses two countiesalong Romania’s south-western border. The historical Banat wasabout one-third larger in territory. It was part of the Kingdom ofHungary until 1920, when the Treaty of Trianon divided itbetween Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes(later Yugoslavia), leaving only a fraction in Hungary to the

24 The EU’s new borderlands

reluctant to implement the kind of regional administrativereforms and devolutions that are necessary to allow the borderregions to react to the new challenges of EU enlargementeffectively.

If EU enlargement is seen as exclusionary, and if the border regionsfeel cut off from both their Central European destiny and theircountries’ centres of power, these deep-rooted animosities may wellflare up again. The next section contains a series of regionalsketches to illustrate just how explosive a legacy many of the EU’snew neighbours are harbouring. The EU ignores these potentialsources of political instability at its peril. The Union will have towork much harder to engage with its new neighbours, not only withthe central governments in the capital but also with the regions thatlie just across its new external border.

Sketches of the EU’s new borderlands

★ Transcarpathia – Ukraine’s westernmost region

Transcarpathia is an economic and politicalbackwater that has changed hands several times overthe past century between Hungary, Czechoslovakia,the USSR and independent Ukraine.11 Separated fromthe rest of Ukraine by the high barrier of theCarpathian mountains, it is a multi-ethnic region witha special identity of its own. The Rusyns (Ruthenes)are the largest group, but they were declared

Ukrainian after 1945 and their Greek Catholic churches werehanded over to the Russian Orthodox church. In the late 1980s,the Rusyns started a national revival, asserting their separatecultural and linguistic identity. After the break-up of the SovietUnion, the central government in Kiev rejected all demands forTranscarpathian autonomy as a threat to the territorial integrity ofthe new state, particularly in the context of similar movements inCrimea and Donbas.

An explosive legacy 25

11 For furtherdetails, see JudyBatt and KatarynaWolczuk, ‘Region,state and identityin Central andEastern Europe’,Frank Cass, 2002.

12 See Brigid Fowler,‘Fuzzing citizenship,nationalising politicalspace: a frameworkfor interpreting theHungarian ‘StatusLaw’ as a new formof kin-state policy inCentral and EasternEurope’, ‘One Europeor Several?’ WorkingPaper no. 40/02,University of Sussex,January 2002.

became the source of the Serbian national revival during theHabsburg empire. In Tito’s Yugoslavia, Vojvodina gained aconsiderable degree of autonomy, which it used to promote a policyof multi-ethnic co-existence. This legacy, together with the region’srelative affluence, helped to protect it against the ethnic wars thatswept through the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s.

When Slobodan Milosevic rose to power, one of his first moveswas to abolish Vojvodina’s autonomy (along with that of Kosovo,which had enjoyed an analogous status). As a result, Vojvodinabecame the heartland of opposition to Milosevic ’s rule, and itsvariegated democratic, regionalist and ethnic minority partieswere crucial components of the Democratic Opposition of Serbiacoalition that ousted him in the autumn of 2000.The majority of parties in the Vojvodinaprovincial assembly are united in demanding arenewal of Vojvodina’s autonomous status. Afterprotracted wrangling, the Serbian assemblypassed an interim bill largely restoring the statusquo ante in January 2002. Nevertheless,Vojvodina regionalists want more devolution,which Belgrade is wary of granting for fear offurther disintegration of the state.13

Vojvodina also contains a sizeable Hungarian minority of about300,000. The Hungarians have been pressing for specialautonomous status for those districts within Vojvodina thatborder on Hungary and where they constitute a majority. Someregionalists play on Vojvodina’s Central European heritage andorientation, which they contrast with the supposedly ‘Balkan’characteristics of the capital, Belgrade. The regionalists can alsogain political capital by exploiting economic grievances, inparticular widespread suspicions that Belgrade is ‘robbing’ theirprovince which have been fuelled by bitter disputes overprivatisation revenue. Vojvodina’s inhabitants are gravelyconcerned that Hungary’s EU accession and the imposition of

south-east of Szeged. The region’s capital is the city of Timisoara,where in December 1989 a popular uprising began that turnedinto the nationwide revolution against the Ceausescu regime.

Romanian Banat and Timisoara are overwhelmingly populatedby Romanians, but there is intense local pride in the region’smulti-ethnic and Central European heritage that bridges thedivide between Romanians and the assertive local minorities ofHungarians, Germans and Serbs. Like Transcarpathia, the regionhas successfully maintained ethnic peace since the collapse ofcommunism. The shared regional identity has fostered Banat’ssense of mission as Romania’s gateway to Europe, leading theway in economic reform, pluralist democratisation and tolerance.

Even more than other Romanians, the Banaters are frustrated with theperceived ineptitude and corruption of their national political leaders.Banat’s local elites have rejected the nationalist tendencies oftenemanating from Bucharest, but many of the region’s ethnicRomanians have proved less immune. Nationalism appears to haveparticular appeal to those Romanians who moved to Banat during thecommunist era from poorer parts of the country. Many of them losttheir jobs when the formerly state-owned enterprises for which theyused to work struggled to survive in the turbulent economic climateof the 1990s. Their disappointment with the achievements oftransition was exacerbated when the EU decided to exclude Romaniafrom the first round of EU enlargement. In the 2001 election, Banatersregistered their disillusionment by either abstaining or voting for thefar-right Greater Romania Party of Vadim Tudor, whose xenophobicand anti-EU populism appeared to offer the only alternative toestablished political elites. Banat’s tolerant multiculturalism and itsquest for a common Central European destiny are clearly fragile.

★ Vojvodina in northern Serbia

Vojvodina, just like Banat, has historically been home to anextraordinary variety of ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the region

26 The EU’s new borderlands An explosive legacy 27

13 See Judy Batt,‘“Fuzzy statehood” versus hard borders:the impact of EUenlargement onRomania andYugoslavia’, ‘OneEurope or Several?’Working Paper no.46/02, University ofSussex, July 2002.

5 EU neighbourhood policy in the making

The limits of enlargement

In the past, the EU has mainly used the carrot of EU accession (orthe stick of exclusion) to foster economic reform and politicalstability in its neighbourhood. The strategy has been a bigsuccess, not least in the case of the eight Central and EastEuropean countries set to join in 2004 (along with Cyprus andMalta). In these countries, the prospect of EU accession – and thecompetitive pressure of wanting to be in the first round – hasallowed successive governments to implement often painfulreforms at breakneck speed. It has also fostered a strong cross-party political consensus that has sustained political stability.

The prospect of EU accession promises to have a similarlybeneficial impact on the other countries queuing formembership. Bulgaria and Romania started their accessionnegotiations in 2002, and the EU has endorsed their target datefor entry in 2007. The EU has also accepted Turkey as an officialcandidate for membership, although it has made the start ofaccession talks conditional on further political and economicreforms. Croatia handed in its application for membership inFebruary 2003 and hopes to catch up with Bulgaria andRomania in its accession preparations. The EU is also offeringthe prospect of membership to the countries of the WesternBalkans – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia andMontenegro, and Macedonia – through its ‘Stabilisation andAssociation Process’.

28 The EU’s new borderlands

stricter visa rules could further damage the regional economy.One Serbian MP from the province warns that Serbia’s exclusionfrom EU enlargement will be tantamount to “isolation from therest of Europe, almost as bad as sanctions”. Talking to theauthor, a local Hungarian MP described the prospect as a“tragedy” and “a disaster in the eyes of the local populationregardless of ethnic background”.

However, it is clear that enlargement as a strategy for stabilising theneighbourhood has reached its limits. First, successive enlargementrounds are threatening to paralyse the EU’s overburdenedinstitutions and decision-making procedures. Second, as the EU’sborders shift outwards its new neighbours appear less and lesssuited for membership. Some of the EU’s neighbours – in particularthe southern Mediterranean countries, such as Morocco andAlgeria – fail to fulfil the most basic condition for EU membership,that of being a European country (Article 49 of the Amsterdamtreaty). Others could qualify as European, but are currentlyregarded as too poor (Moldova), too undemocratic (Belarus) or toodifficult (Russia) to be integrated into the EU in its current form.And even if these countries gained candidate status one day, the EUwould only face the same problem again as its border continued toshift outwards.

The EU therefore has to work out a new strategy forengaging with neighbouring countries that does notrely on the carrot of accession. To deal with non-candidate countries, the EU has in the past used‘Association Agreements’, or ‘Partnership and Co-operation Agreements’ (PCAs) in the case of Moldova,Russia and Ukraine.14 The PCAs typically foreseegradual mutual trade liberalisation, the instigation ofa regular political dialogue and intensified co-operation in areas such as science and education. Inpractice, however, the PCAs have been a

disappointment. They have proved inflexible, leaving little room forbilateral relations to evolve over time. In principle, they open up theprospect for economic integration, but they do not offerpreferential access to the large and lucrative EU market. Theyprovide few incentives for neighbouring countries to implementreforms and foresee only very limited technical and monetaryassistance for such reforms. As a result, trade relations between theEU and its neighbours have remained flawed, and the promisedpolitical dialogues have produced little of substance. The EU’s role

in its neighbouring countries has remained minimal. Even seniorofficials in those countries fail to understand how the EU works, aproblem which has been exacerbated by the EU’s own internaladministrative complexity.

The Commission’s ‘Wider Europe’ paper

The EU has been slow to wake up to the challenges posed by the2004 enlargement round. It was only in March2003 – just over a year before the actual accessiondate – that the European Commission published acomprehensive set of policy proposals on how todeal with those neighbouring countries that donot enjoy the prospect of eventual membership.15

The EU’s stated aim is to “develop a zone ofprosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ringof friends – with whom the EU enjoys close,peaceful and co-operative relations”.

To this end, the Commission suggests, the EU should harness itsentire range of policies – trade, aid, foreign policy, regional co-operation programmes and so on – to support economic reformsand democratisation in neighbouring countries. Although the newneighbourhood policy would take the PCAs and other existingagreements as a starting-point, it would go beyond them. It wouldoffer what the EU calls “progressivity”: those countries that aremaking good progress in reforms, particularly on the economicside, would be offered improved EU market access and deeper co-operation with the EU in areas ranging from investmentpromotion to crisis prevention (see box on pages 32-33). Theultimate prize would be a relationship similar to that enjoyed bythe members of the European Economic Area (now onlyLichtenstein, Norway and Iceland), which enjoy full access to theEU’s single market.

30 The EU’s new borderlands EU neighbourhood policy in the making 31

14 The EU negotiated aPartnership and Co-operationAgreement withBelarus in 1995,but then suspendedits adoption in1997 in reaction tothe Belarusian government’s slidetowards authoritarianism.

15 EuropeanCommission, ‘WiderEurope – neighbour-hood: a new frame-work for relations withour eastern and south-ern neighbours’,Brussels, March 2003.http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/doc/com03_104_en.pdf.

The Commission paper only deals with those neighbouringcountries that do not enjoy the prospect of membership, namely thewestern CIS and the southern Mediterranean. The Commissionacknowledges that Ukraine and Moldova have expressed aninterest in eventual EU accession but suggests that the EU first needsto conduct a debate about where it wants its eventual borders to lie.Although EU membership for the Western Balkan countries is stillmany years away, they are not taken into account in the EU’sneighbourhood policy. The confusion about the geographicalcoverage of the policy is reinforced by the fact that the ‘WiderEurope’ taskforce (dealing with non-candidate countries) is led bythe commissioner for enlargement, Günter Verheugen, while theWestern Balkan countries (potential candidates) remain in theportfolio of the external relations commissioner Chris Patten.

The Commission paper’s main underlying ideas are sound. The EUneeds to use available incentives such as trade preferences and aid

32

Recommendations in the Commission’s‘Wider Europe’ paper

★ promote the adoption of common rules, standards, andregulatory structures to allow neighbouring countries access tothe EU’s internal market;

★ establish preferential trade relations with neighbouringcountries, and set timetables and benchmarks for progresstowards a free-trade area;

★ simplify its visa regime and open up greater opportunitiesfor legal immigration, with a view to moving towards the freemovement of people and workers over the long term;

★ intensify its co-operation with the new neighbours tocombat common security threats, such as terrorism, organisedcrime or environmental hazards; the EU should support itsneighbours’ efforts to reform their court systems, train theirpolice forces and fight corruption;

★ become more deeply involved in conflict prevention andcrisis management in the wider Europe; the EU should, forexample, take a more active role in helping Moldova to resolvethe long-running conflict in Transdnistria; it should also makeextra funds available for post-conflict stabilisation andreconstruction;

★ integrate neighbouring countries into its transport, energyand telecommunications networks, as well as EU researchprogrammes; for this purpose, the EU should make loans and

33

risk capital available through its funding arms, such as theEuropean Investment Bank;

★ find new ways to promote EU investment in neighbouringcountries;

★ develop a new ‘Neighbourhood Instrument’ to supportregional and sub-regional co-operation and sustainabledevelopment on the eastern border;

★ open new sources of finance; in particular get the EuropeanBank for Reconstruction and Development and the EuropeanInvestment Bank to work with other international lenders,such as the World Bank, to support projects in infrastructure,education, health and social safety-net provisions inneighbouring countries.

more effectively to help its neighbours to achieve balanced growthand stable political systems. It needs to differentiate better betweenthose countries that are still struggling to meet their obligationsunder the existing PCAs and those that want to move towardsdeeper economic integration and more political engagement. TheCommission’s suggestion that the EU should work out regional orcountry-specific ‘action plans’ with its neighbours is also welcome.These plans would take into account the degree of co-operation andintegration already achieved. They would set clear targets andbenchmarks against which further progress could be measured. Theaction plans could therefore help the EU’s policy towards Russiaand other neighbouring countries to move away from its peculiarmix of highly technical, small-scale co-operation, and grand butinconsequential rhetoric.

However, the core of the Commission’s neighbourhood policyproposal, namely to offer neighbouring countries that are willing toreform and co-operate “a stake in the single market” isproblematic. To gain access to the single market, the countries inquestion would have to take over large parts of the EU’saccumulated rule-book, the acquis. They would have to meet EUproduct standards and follow EU rules in areas such as competitionpolicy, industrial subsidies, public procurement, utilities marketliberalisation and consumer protection. The Commissionacknowledges that this may well be beyond the post-Sovietcountries with their stretched financial and administrativeresources. It therefore suggests that the EU should offer thesecountries more support, not only to speed up legal approximationbut also to cushion the social and economic impact of furthereconomic opening and structural reforms.

But there are two other potential problems with making the singlemarket the cornerstone of the EU’s new neighbourhood policy. First,it is not clear whether the acquis – which was drawn up by and forhighly developed market economies – is a suitable legal frameworkfor countries that are still struggling to implement even basic

economic reforms. Second, as the case of the European EconomicArea shows, joining the single market without joining the EU hasserious implications for sovereignty. The countries concerned mustadopt EU rules in many areas of economic policy without, however,having a say in developing these rules. Thisasymmetry of obligations and influence promptedmost former EEA members, such as Sweden andAustria, to apply for EU membership. The EU’s newneighbours, however, will not have that option. Asa result, countries such as Ukraine, Russia andMoldova may find the EU’s new neighbourhoodpolicy framework less than compelling.16

EU leaders officially endorsed the Commission’s suggestions for aneighbourhood policy at their June 2003 summit and theysuggested that the EU start drawing up the envisaged action plansin 2004. However, it remains to be seen whether the member-statesare serious about putting the Commission’s recommendations intopractice. The Commission’s core idea about extending the singlemarket’s ‘four freedoms’ (free movement of goods, services, capitaland labour) to the new neighbours has already been watered down.In particular the suggestion that the neighbourhood policy couldeventually lead to the free movement of people and workersbetween, say, Russia and the EU appears to be too politicallycontroversial for many EU countries to sign up to. Moreover, EUmember-states will have to prove how serious they are about amore constructive engagement with neighbouring countries whenthey draw up the EU’s new budget framework for 2007-2013.Many of the Commission’s suggestions – for reinforced cross-border co-operation, support for legal approximation, policetraining, poverty reduction and post-crisis reconstruction – willprove costly. It is not clear whether the EU will be prepared to putits money where its mouth is.

Given that the member-states’ political commitment is uncertain,it is all the more important for the EU to include a regional

34 The EU’s new borderlands EU neighbourhood policy in the making 35

16 See Tim Gould, ‘TheEuropean EconomicArea as a model for thewider Europe’, background paper forthe EFTA meeting ofMPs and SocialPartners, Norway, June2003.

dimension in its dealings with its neighbours. The Commission’s‘Wider Europe’ paper does argue for a reinforced regionaldimension. In particular, it suggests that the EU should foster co-operation with its neighbours in areas such as bordermanagement and regional economic integration. And it proposesthe establishment of a new financial support scheme, called the‘Neighbourhood Instrument’. This would initially bundle

together existing funding instruments forregional cross-border co-operation, butcould be transformed into a genuinelyunified funding instrument under the EU’snew budgetary framework that will runfrom 2006 to 2013.17

The EU’s East European neighbours will welcome the newproposals. At present, even determined regional and nationalgovernments are often confused and put off by the plethora of EUfunding instruments, each with its own application procedures anddisbursement rules. However, the Commission proposals for aregional dimension are vague, and the new NeighbourhoodInstrument will do little more than co-ordinate the disbursement ofexisting funds. The next two chapters will illustrate the difficultiesthe EU has encountered in fostering regional cross-border co-operation. They will make concrete and practical proposals on howthe EU could improve and reinforce the regional dimension of itsneighbourhood policy.

6 Regional co-operation along theEU’s new eastern border

Cross-border regional co-operation is a means of mitigating theimpact of border controls without challenging them head-on. Itcan help to transform them into sources of contactand interaction rather than separation and conflict.18

Western Europe has a long history of fostering suchcross-border co-operation. In addition to theCouncil of Europe’s initiatives, the EU has supportedcross-border co-operation between its member-states since the early 1980s, funding them through‘Interreg’ programmes.

In many places, cross-border co-operation amounts to little morethan agreements between local authorities to work together onmundane but important issues like waste disposal and sewagemanagement, or joint planning to cope with emergencies such asfloods. In other cases, however, member-states have established‘Euroregions’ which cover territory across an international frontier.These more ambitious initiatives establish lasting networks ofpeople, businesses and officials on both sides of the border. Alongalmost all of the state borders in Europe, clusters of regions haveforged some form of institutionalised co-operation to fosterregional economic integration and regeneration, educational andcultural exchanges, and joint environmental and infrastructureprojects. These activities are often small-scale, but they havepractical value as well as symbolic importance.

The most far-reaching co-operation between regions can be foundalong the border zone stretching from the Benelux states

36 The EU’s new borderlands

17 European Commission,‘Paving the way for a new neighbourhood instrument’,Brussels, July 2003,http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/we/doc/com03_393_en.pdf.

18 See Council ofEurope, ‘Handbookon transfrontier co-operation for localand regional authorities inEurope’, 2000.

southwards to the Rhineland – the former zone of conflict betweenFrance and Germany. The most advanced is EUREGIO, founded in1958 on the border between the Netherlands and Germany, with anelaborate institutional framework amounting to a common regionalgovernment that transcends the border dividing the two states.

The EU has supported similar cross-border co-operationprogrammes in the East European candidate countries, includingthe establishment of Euroregions along the future external borderof the enlarged EU. The most prominent examples are the BugEuroregion, uniting regions in north-eastern Poland, westernUkraine and parts of Belarus; the massive Carpathian Euroregion,with participating regions in south-eastern Poland, westernUkraine, eastern parts of Hungary and Slovakia, and north-western Romania; and the DKMT Euroregion, uniting south-eastern Hungary, south-western Romania and the northernSerbian province of Vojvodina (it is named after the region’s mainrivers: Danube, Körös, Maros and Tisza).

The East Europeans hope to replicate the success of the EUEuroregions by promoting cross-border contacts and integrationand fostering mutual understanding and historical reconciliationbetween peoples divided by national frontiers. Local elites havethrown their weight behind these initiatives. They often see them asa means of countering threats of poverty, depopulation andcriminalisation that are inherent in their regions’ peripherallocation. They hope to turn their regions into gateways formutually beneficial interaction with the enlarged EU. They alsooften hope to foster – albeit vaguely defined – Europeanisationthrough regional integration. The brochure introducing theCarpathian Euroregion, straddling Poland, Slovakia, Hungary,Ukraine and Romania, serves as a vivid example of the optimismthat such initiatives can engender:

[The Carpathian Euroregion] is unique among the hundred-plus transfrontier co-operative structures in the world, and is

38 The EU’s new borderlands

truly a microcosm of the New Europe. Although widediversity defines the region in terms of language, religion, andethnicity, the zones of each country belonging to theEuroregion share as many similarities as they do differences.A common history and geography, similarities in economicdevelopment, and common aspirations for economicprosperity and integration create a sense ofcommunity and a willingness to work togetheramong local leaders and the larger population.19

Against such optimistic expectations, the practical significance of thenew Euroregions has been disappointing. Although some of themare now more than a decade old, most of their objectives andaspirations still only exist on paper. Some of the problems thatregional officials have encountered are similar to those faced byWest European Euroregions. But the East Europeans have alsostruggled with a peculiar set of problems. These are partly related tothe artificial historical and economic divisions created duringdecades of communist rule. But they are also the result of thedifficult legacy of central planning, which has left many of theparticipating regions without the financial, economic andadministrative resources required to make the Euroregions a success.

★ Significant differences in constitutional and administrative systems

One of the challenges that all Euroregions (west and east) have hadto overcome is the diversity in legal powers and political authorityamong their participating regions. This diversity is the result ofdifferent degrees and forms of devolution in the neighbouringcountries involved. Some of the participating regions form part ofwell-functioning federal systems with a high degree of localautonomy, while their counterparts are located in highly centralisedstates. Communism left a legacy of centralisation across EasternEurope. As a result, those regional administrations seeking toparticipate in Euroregion projects often have to refer almost everyaspect of planned cross-border initiatives back to their capitals.

Regional co-operation along the EU’s new eastern border 39

19 CarpathianFoundation Report1995-97.

In the mid-1990s, most of the East European candidate countriesstarted to devolve powers and administrative functions to preparetheir regional governments for the future influx of EU regionalaid. However, this has not resulted in uniform developments (theEU itself offers few guidelines for regional reform). And thedevolution of powers has been much less pronounced in the CIScountries that are their partners in the Euroregion projects. Here,lingering concerns about territorial integrity often make centralgovernments reluctant to grant authority and administrativepowers to regional and local governments. As a result, lowerlevels of government find it hard to initiate and manage cross-border projects efficiently without constant recourse to thenational government.

★ Large – and widening – economic gaps

The process of EU accession has generally supported rapidstructural change and economic development in the candidatecountries. The same, however, does not hold true for the laggardsamong the candidates and those countries that are not part of theaccession process. As a result, the economic gap between the ‘ins’and the ‘outs’ has widened over recent years. Hungary, for example,has steamed ahead with its economic transformation whileRomania has continued to lag behind. Poland has performed wellfor most of the 1990s, but Ukraine’s reform process has been slowand patchy, and growth has been disappointing until recently. Theseeconomic divergences – in terms of economic structures, wage levelsand so on – are the source of much of the informal cross-bordereconomic activity described in earlier chapters. But the economicgaps also impede more regular and predictable economic co-operation between the border regions.

After enlargement, these gaps are likely to widen. EU membership isexpected to boost growth in the new member-states, mainly throughfurther integration into the single market, the disbursement of EUfunds for regional development and the new members’ eventual

40 Regional co-operation along the EU’s new eastern border 41

P O L A N DU K R A I N E

S L O VA KR E P U B L I C

H U N G A R Y

S E R B I A

R O M A N I A

Carpathian Euroregion

Danube-Körös-Maros-Tisza Euroregion

EU future external frontier

CROATIA

Arad

Timisoara

Szeged

Novi Sad

Belgrade

Budapest

Kosice Uzhorod

Przemysl

Lviv

Dniester

Danube

Dun

a

Baia Mare

0 100 miles

0 200 kilometres

Scale

The eastern Euroregions

along its new external border. Nevertheless, long queues are stillthe rule rather than the exception. And the situation is set to getconsiderably worse once the new member-states have to applystricter Schengen controls to all those wishing to cross the border.An underdeveloped and dilapidated road and rail infrastructurewill exacerbate the traffic jams that are already building up.

★ Nationalist suspicions and the intervention of high politics

National leaders have often been much less enthusiastic about theestablishment of Euroregion projects than have regionalrepresentatives. In the early 1990s for example, the governmentsof Romania and Slovakia reacted with mistrust to plans for theestablishment of the Carpathian Euroregion. They suspected ahidden Hungarian agenda since many of the participating regionswere former Hungarian territory, inhabited by sizeableHungarian minorities. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian governmentmistrusted Polish motivations for wanting to take part in theproject, fearing that the country may still secretely hope toreclaim territory in western Ukraine. Ukraine also worried abouta potential separatist movement of the Rusyn and Hungarianminorities in Transcarpathia.

The DKMT Euroregion – encompassing Hungarian, Romanian andSerbian border regions – faced political problems of a different kind.The government of what was then Milosevic ’s Yugoslavia was keento see the northern Vojvodina province join the Euroregion as a wayof breaking out of the country’s isolation, and potentially evadingeconomic sanctions. The Hungarians and Romanians were opposedto giving the project such overtly political overtones. Following theNATO bombardment of Serbia in 1999, and the assassination of theVojvodina provincial governor who held the DKMT chairmanshipat the time, Vojvodina’s participation was suspended. The fall of theMilosevic regime in 2000 in theory cleared the way for Vojvodina’sreturn to the project. But an assertive regionalism in the province hassince caused open tensions with the Serbian capital, Belgrade. Many

adoption of the euro. The ‘outs’ will enjoy none of these benefits andas a result they are likely to fall further and further behind.

★ Underdeveloped transport and communications infrastructure

Transport and communications infrastructure in the easternborderlands has remained chronically underdeveloped. During thecommunist regimes, the border remained closed, obliterating anyneed to develop cross-border roads, bridges, rail or power links.And since the early 1990s, the candidate countries have prioritisedthe upgrading of the infrastructure that connects them with the EU.National governments in the candidate countries, as well as theireastern neighbours, are reluctant to spend scarce public investmentfunds on cross-border infrastructure projects in marginalisedregions. And the regions themselves are usually too poor to financemajor investments.

As a result, infrastructure bottlenecks have become an obstacle tocross-border co-operation in many places. For example, arepresentative of the Carpathian Euroregion complains that it isquicker to get from Baia Mare (in north-western Romania) to NewYork than to travel to Przemysl (in south-eastern Poland). Similarly,the establishment of the DKMT Euroregion that straddles Hungary,Romania and Serbia was met with much political fanfare in 1997.Yet there was no direct transport connection between theEuroregion’s two main cities, namely Timisoara in south-westernRomania and Szeged in south-eastern Hungary. As a result,officials, businessmen or other participants in cross-border co-operation programmes had to endure an 80-kilometre detour toreach the next border crossing point. The opening of a newcheckpoint in 2000 has greatly reduced travel times between thetwo cities (although so far the roads across the border are only fitfor passenger cars, not goods vehicles).

The EU has invested heavily in the technical upgrading of existingborder checkpoints and the establishment of new border crossings

42 The EU’s new borderlands Regional co-operation along the EU’s new eastern border 43

Serbian politicians now fear that any initiatives that strengthenVojvodina’s regionalism may have a knock-on effect on Kosovo andon Serbia’s relations with Montenegro, and thus lead to a furtherdisintegration of the state.

★ Scarce adminstrative resources

State administrations in the formerly communist countries aregenerally starved of funds and expertise, and officials are oftenboth inefficient and corrupt. As anyone who has done business inone of Eastern Europe’s more far-flung regions will testify,administrative shortcomings are often more pronounced at theregional and local levels than in the capitals. Since most of theEuroregion projects require the active participation of regionalgovernments and officials, these problems are a clear obstacle tocross-border co-operation.

The candidate countries have gone much further with reformingand streamlining their bureaucracies than their eastern neighbours.Nevertheless, even countries such as Hungary and Poland foundthat the demands of the Euroregion projects exceeded their limitedresources. Their bureaucracies were already stretched by the needto prepare their countries for EU accession. Therefore, progress inthe Euroregion projects has often relied entirely on the involvementof international organisations. For example, the US-based Institutefor East-West Studies was a major backer of the CarpathianEuroregion. Once the Institute moved on to other projects, progressin the Euroregion stalled. It then fragmented into smaller, mainlybilateral cross-border projects that are more manageable andrealistic given the financial and, not least, human resourcesavailable at the local level.

For the overstretched and often inefficient bureaucracies of Centraland Eastern Europe, it is clearly difficult to establish and sustaininstitutionalised cross-border co-operation. The situation was oncequite similar in Western Europe. Most Euroregion projects failed to

advance beyond narrow technical agreements and emptydeclarations of good intent. The situation only changed in the1980s, when the EU started to devote significant financial andadministrative resources to cross-border co-operation under itsInterreg programmes. Subsequently, the momentum of cross-border co-operation has been much easier to sustain. Localcommunities began to realise the potential benefits and becamemore willing to be involved. And the European Commission startedto see these flourishing projects as a good way of promotingEuropean integration ‘from below’.

However, although the EU now has ample experience with settingup frameworks for cross-border co-operation, it has not managedto exploit fully its potential in the case of its new external border.To be fair, the establishment of such frameworks was particularlydifficult in the highly fluid and uncertain environment of economicand political transition. Nevertheless, many of the actors involvedin new Euroregion projects, be they local officials or non-governmental organisation (NGOs), found the EU less helpfulthan they had expected.

The candidate countries’ participation in Euroregion projectsoften clashed with other aspects of their EU-inspired policyagenda. For example, the EU in the early 1990s encouraged thecandidate countries to seek more regional trade integration, toforestall the development of a ‘hub and spoke’ integration model.However, once the EU accession talks got under way in earnest,the candidates found that many of the bilateral and multilateralfree trade agreements they had concluded with their neighbourswere incompatible with EU rules for trade with ‘third countries’.Subsequently, the accession countries became more reluctant tosign agreements on cross-border economic co-operation withinthe Euroregions framework, fearing that these, too, may proveincompatible with EU membership. Similarly, efforts to reinforcecross-border co-operation seemed somewhat futile once thecandidates and their neighbours realised that the extension of

44 The EU’s new borderlands Regional co-operation along the EU’s new eastern border 45

7 What the EU should do

Mitigate internal administrative and legal divisions

The EU has only just begun to draw up a comprehensiveneighbourhood policy to improve its relations with the newneighbours. The EU member-states have yet to discuss and approveof the specific content of this ‘Wider Europe’ concept. They willhave to start with reforming the institutional framework forformulating and implementing these policies. At present, the EUdivides its policies into three broad areas, called ‘pillars’, each ofwhich contains different decision-making procedures and rests ona distinct legal basis. The EU’s neighbourhood policy sitsawkwardly between the three pillars. For example, the EUconducts economic co-operation with the neighbours through oneset of institutions and procedures, deals with foreign policythrough another, and tackles matters of internal security andmigration through yet another. But even within the individualpolicy areas, the different parts of the European bureaucracy oftenwork together poorly.

These administrative divisions will clearly impede the co-ordinationof different parts of the neighbourhood policy agenda. Projectplanning and implementation will be unnecessarily slow andcomplex. This set-up will also lessen the enthusiasmof the new neighbours for working with an EU thatappears tediously complicated and confusing.

The abolition of the EU’s three-pillar structure – likely if the EU’snew constitution is ratified around 2006 – will leave it better ableto respond to the problems of its new borderlands.21 In the

Schengen rules threatens seriously to disrupt cross-border tradeand travel.

Furthermore, the East European officials involved in theEuroregion found it frustratingly difficult to secure EU support –in terms of advice and funding – for their projects. Within theEuropean Commission, different parts of the bureaucracy (whichis divided into directorates-general) deal with the new membersand those countries that do not have candidate status. The EU alsooperates separate funds and technical assistance programmes for

each group of countries, namely Phare for thecandidates, Tacis for the countries of the formerSoviet Union and Cards for the Western Balkans.20

The co-ordination and co-operation between thesevarious funds and programmes is often poor. As aresult, even those border regions that were keen towork together to overcome their historicaldivisions often failed to overcome the bureaucraticdivisions within the European Commission.

46 The EU’s new borderlands

21 See ‘The CERguide to the draftEU constitution’,CER, July 2003.

20 After enlargement,the 10 new member-states will be entitledto the EU’s supportprogrammes for member-states, in particular the regionalsubsidies paid outthrough the StructuralFunds.

meantime, however, the EU will have to work hard to mitigate theproblems created by its internal fragmentation. And it will have towork harder to improve the co-ordination between itsdirectorates-general and the respective assistance programmes forthe new member-states, the remaining accession candidates andthe eastern neighbours.

Make the most of the new member-states’ experience

The EU needs to make greater efforts to involve those most directlyaffected by the shift of the external border – namely national andregional politicians from the new members and the neighbouringcountries – in the formulation and implementation of itsneighbourhood policy. Many of the new members not only haveimmediate national interests at stake, they also have a wealth ofexperience with the cultures and political reflexes of theneighbouring states. They are therefore well placed to bring freshideas and impetus to developing a comprehensive neighbourhoodpolicy and to improving existing cross-border policies. In somecases, the new members have started acting as interlocutors, usingtheir established contacts with the new neighbours to explain EUobjectives. Their experience with economic and political transitionhas been helpful in drawing up proposals to support reforms in theEU’s new neighbourhood.

The EU was somewhat slow to take advantage of the interests andexpertise in its future members. Poland, for example, has longoffered to play a significant role in shaping the EU’s policiestowards Ukraine and Belarus, as well as providing input for theEU’s ‘Wider Europe’ initiative more generally. But until recently,Polish policy-makers found that their ideas on how to deal withUkraine were more likely to be taken up in the US than inBrussels. It was only in 2002 that the Danish government, whichheld the EU presidency at the time, asked Poland to take part inthe EU’s neighbourhood policy discussions. Although Poland’suseful role as an interlocutor is now widely accepted, some Polish

policy-makers have become disillusioned with the EU as aneffective foreign policy partner in the process.

Hungary, meanwhile, has thrown its weight behind Romania’saccelerated EU accession – efforts that the EU has welcomed andtaken seriously. The EU should now encourage Hungary andRomania to work together to support Serbia’s re-entry into theEuropean integration process. Such co-operation would not onlystrengthen ties between Hungary and Romania, but it would alsogive Romania a purposeful, responsible role in an area that is ofacute concern to the EU. Although both the Hungarian andRomanian governments stood firmly behind the West at the timeof NATO bombardment of Serbia, public opinion in bothcountries is broadly sympathetic to the Serbs and other Balkanpeoples, and would strongly support actions that encourage theirre-integration into Europe.

Improve the visa regime

The new member-states are struggling to prepare their borders forthe onerous requirements of the Schengen regime – even though, asexplained in Chapter 2, they cannot expect to join the Schengenarea until 2006 at the earliest. They need to modernise checkpoints,reform their relevant bureaucracies and train customs andimmigration officials. So far, the EU has helped the new membersonly with strengthening the customs and control infrastructurealong the new external border, but not with building up efficientsystems for visa applications and processing. Unless the newmembers greatly expand and upgrade their consular facilities, theintroduction of Schengen visa requirements will create bottlenecks.To maintain present cross-border traffic levels,Polish consular services in Ukraine and Belarus,for example, would have to issue around 5,000visas per day, requiring an extra 250-300 staffand significant technical upgrading of existingconsular offices.22 In its ‘Wider Europe’

48 The EU’s new borderlands What the EU should do 49

22 See Stefan BatoryFoundation, ‘The half-open door: the easternborder of the enlargedEuropean Union’,Warsaw, March 2001.

★ Reduce the price of a Schengen visa

Ukrainians can expect to pay S20-50 for a single entry or short-staySchengen visa, and up to S100 for a long-stay one (for more than90 days), depending on the issuing country. In a country where themonthly average wage is little more than S80, this is a formidableexpense for most people. The EU should think about reducing visafees in all member-states to a level that is more affordable for theaverage household, for example S5-10 for a single entry visa andS10-15 for multiple entry. Alternatively, EU member-states shouldfollow the example set by Poland and Slovakia. Both countriesagreed in 2003 to issue visas to Ukrainians free of charge. In return,Ukraine will continue to let in Poles and Slovaks without visas.

★ Issue visas at the border

The optimal solution for border area residents would be if theycould obtain their visa directly at the border. This would requiremuch-improved information-sharing between the existing Schengencountries and the new member-states. To gain full access toSchengen, the new member-states will in any case have to link up tothe Schengen Information System. Once the database is readilyavailable at all major border crossings – sometime after 2006 – thenew members should be able to start issuing visas at their borders.

★ Find innovative solutions for local cross-border traffic

The EU and the new members have long worked out specialfacilitated travel regimes for people living within 25 kilometres oftheir mutual border. After enlargement, the EU should extend theseregimes to larger border regions, and especially to non-EU residentsof Euroregions. The EU should think about issuing ‘smart card’visas. These could be swiped through an electronic check-point, andwould allow residents of border areas to cross as often as theywished for single-day visits. If the visit exceeded a certain time limit(say 12 or 18 hours), the smart card would automatically be

proposal, the Commission opens up the prospect of visa-free travelbetween the EU and neighbouring countries – but only in the longterm. In the meantime, the EU needs to do its utmost to facilitateand speed up existing visa processes. The EU could start with thefollowing measures:

★ Move to a system of appointments for visa interviews

Visa applicants in Eastern Europe regularly queue for hours outsidethe consular offices of the EU member-states. Often, they do noteven make it to the front of the queue within the office’s openinghours, which is particularly frustrating for those who have travelledfrom remote border regions to apply for a visa in the capital orlarge provincial cities. A visa applicant from western Ukraine, forexample, would typically spend 36 hours on a train to travel toKiev and back. An applicant from western Romania faces a 20-hour return journey to Bucharest. Add several hours, sometimesdays, of queuing and the need to return after a couple of days tocollect the visa, and an applicant may have to set aside the largerpart of a working week to obtain a visa. Moreover, the EU shouldrequire interviews only for the first award of a Schengen visa.Subsequent visa applications should be routinely processed on asame-day basis, or by post – provided the applicant has not abusedprevious visa conditions.

★ Grant more multiple-entry visas

The EU’s Schengen regulations already allow the member-states toissue multiple-entry visas that are valid for up to one year and allowthe holder to spend up to six months in the EU at a time. These,however, are not widely used. The EU’s member-states should grantmore national multiple-entry visas to certain categories ofapplicants, including business-people (providing an incentive forcross-border traders to move out of the ‘grey economy’), residentsof border regions, local authority representatives, and peopleworking in education, culture and NGOs.

50 The EU’s new borderlands What the EU should do 51

where those regions contain sizeable ethnic minorities. The EUneeds to carefully explain to central governments why it is seekingto strengthen ties with regional administrations in their countries.At every step along the way to its new neighbourhood policy, theEU must aim to create a sense of mutual interest and engagementwith all the actors involved.

Bearing these sensitivities in mind, the EU should increase itspresence and engagement in the areas along its new external border.So far, the EU’s presence in these regions comes mainly throughincreased security operations along the border. As a result, manypeople living in these areas could be left with the feeling that the EUis a fortress and a threat to their livelihood. In order to counter suchperceptions, the EU should:

★ Establish regional representative offices

The EU should open up permanent offices in the larger towns nearthe border. The European Commission already runs delegations inall countries bordering the EU. It should supplement thesedelegations with regional representative offices.

The EU regional offices would:

★ inform EU policy-makers about the impact of the Union’snew border;

★ become a direct point of contact for local and regionalauthorities, NGOs and individual citizens, as well asdispensing information and advice about applications forvisas or EU funding opportunities;

★ serve as EU information resource centres for local schoolsand universities and, more generally, help to improve thepeople’s understanding and appreciation of the EU.

What the EU should do 53

retained upon return and future entry would only be possible witha full Schengen visa.

Reinforce the regional dimension of EU neighbourhoodpolicy

The EU’s neighbourhood policy needs a stronger regionaldimension – targeted specifically at the areas on both sides of thenew border. As explained in earlier chapters, EU enlargement willhave a particularly severe impact on the economic and socialconditions in these areas. Conversely, economic stagnation andsocial crises in the borderlands could threaten the EU’s abilityeffectively to manage its new external border. If the border islocated in an unstable area of economic deprivation, the threats ofcorruption, organised crime and smuggling will multiply, and theEU will have to commit significant additional resources for securingit. At the same time, it will find it all the more difficult to attractreliable and well-trained staff to remote and depressed areas.

It is perhaps inevitable that the EU conducts its neighbourhoodpolicy primarily through dealing with the capitals of the countriesinvolved. However, the EU needs to be aware of the fact that thenational capitals in these often highly centralised states are poorlyconnected – politically, economically and in terms ofinfrastructure – with the country’s peripheries. Politicians andofficials in the capital may be ill-informed, indifferent orinsensitive to the needs of their border regions. And even if theyare aware of these needs, they may not be able to muster thefinancial or human resources to meet them. Therefore, if the EUwants to counter threats of unstable borderlands, it cannot affordto rely on a perspective derived mainly from contacts in thenational capitals.

At the same time, the EU must take into account the politicalsensitivities that regularly characterise relations between centralgovernments and border regions in those countries, especially

52 The EU’s new borderlands

relevant for this aspect of neighbourhood policy; it shouldalso work out the details of the EU’s new funding mechanism(the Neighbourhood Instrument) and lobby the EU member-states to provide sufficient financing for it in the next EUbudget;

★ work closely with the Council of Europe, which is alreadyactively supporting the development of Euroregions and hasboth experience and legal expertise to offer; the EU’s newEuroregion task force and the Council of Europe couldprovide joint training and exchange of experiences and bestpractice with established Euroregions;

★ encourage the member-states to give Euroregions legalpersonality under national law (even though they extendbeyond national borders); legal personality would make itmuch easier for the Euroregions to apply for EU projectfunding;

★ accord high priority to education and educational exchangeswithin the framework of Euroregions; the EU shouldencourage and support student and teacher exchangeprogrammes, the development of common curricula forregional history, language training and campaigns to raise theawareness of neighbouring cultures; the EU should supportfinancially stretched regional universities that often find itparticularly difficult to develop new fields of study relevant topolitical and economic transformation and Europeanintegration;

★ make a special effort to involve ethnic minorities in EUeducation programmes, to support their aspiration to act as abridge between neighbouring states and to improve mutualunderstanding between minority and majority populations.

What the EU should do 55

In a further step, the EU could develop its regional representativeoffices into full consulates, which would require authorisation fromthe EU member-states to issue visas on their behalf. Citizens wouldparticularly appreciate such a move in countries where the EU’snational consulates are located in distant capitals. Theestablishment of additional visa-issuing facilities would also reducethe backlog and queues in the existing EU consulates that havebecome such as source of frustration.

★ Harness the potential of Euroregions

Another way for the EU to counter fears that it is mainly interestedin border security would be to harness the potential of the existingEuroregions that straddle its new external border. For reasonsexplained above, the Euroregion projects are popular with localleaders and the public at large, but they function poorly in practice.The EU should give these existing institutional frameworks forcross-border co-operation a prominent place in its neighbourhoodpolicy.

To strengthen the Euroregions the EU should:

★ make it a priority to help the development of decentralisedlocal and regional government structures that are capable ofmanaging cross-border co-operation;

★ support NGOs in border regions involved in cross-borderactivities;

★ set up a dedicated task-force to work with the Euroregions,perhaps as a sub-division of the ‘Wider Europe’ task-force setup by the Commission in July 2003; this new task-forceshould develop a common approach to promotingEuroregions all along the EU’s external border; it shouldprovide an institutional focus for the co-ordination of theEU’s various activities and funding programmes that are

54 The EU’s new borderlands

8 Conclusion

The way in which the EU manages its new external border will havefar-reaching ramifications, not only for the border regions, but alsothe new member-states, their eastern neighbours and thus thedevelopment of the wider Europe. The EU’s policy so far has beendriven largely by the security concerns of current member-states.The Union has not sufficiently taken into account the profoundimpact that EU enlargement will have on the Union’s newneighbours. The Commission’s ‘Wider Europe’ proposals recognisethe mutual dependence of the EU and its eastern neighbours. TheStability and Association Process for the Western Balkans aims tobreak down barriers to reconciliation and cross-border co-operation between these states. But the EU also needs to promotethe integration of these states with the enlarged Union, and thatmeans first of all finding ways to mitigate the potential negativeeffects of its new external border.

EU enlargement threatens to widen the economic gap between the‘ins’ and the ‘outs’. It could re-ignite old political and culturalresentments between the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Itcould undo some of the achievements of the past decade, duringwhich many of the region’s peoples have started to overcome deep-seated mutual suspicions and animosities.

EU enlargement will re-shape the wider Europe. But it will haveparticularly severe and immediate effects on the regions thatstraddle the EU’s new external border. After decades of neglect, thefragile regions along the Polish-Ukrainian border have becomeheavily intertwined as their residents have gone to and fro in searchof trade and employment opportunities. Both Romania’s westernregions and the Vojvodina in northern Serbia have benefited from

insecurity are the source of all the things that the EU fears most:mass illegal immigration, smuggling and organised crime. Theexternal border is the EU’s ‘face’ in the new neighbourhood. TheEU needs to improve its image not only by managing that border ina mutually beneficial way, but also by increasing its presence in theborderlands beyond border guards and immigration officials – forexample through representative offices and strong support forEuroregion projects. If the EU is serious about surrounding itselfwith a “ring of friends”, it needs to do its utmost to work with itsnew neighbours to build an area of freedom and prosperity thatincludes the whole of Europe.

★

Conclusion 59

their proximity to Hungary. They are now relatively buoyantregions within otherwise poor and unstable economies. All alongthe EU’s new eastern border, multi-ethnic communities have revivedtheir memory of what it means to be part of mainstream or‘Central’ Europe, and they now take pride in their ability to live andwork together.

The eastward shift of the EU’s external border – withits strict visa regime and customs controls – threatensthese achievements. It could bring economic stagnationand political tensions to the border regions. Manypeople in the EU may wonder why they should careabout the fate of far-away regions such as Banat orTranscarpathia. However, history shows that Europeignores the plight of “far-away peoples of whom weknow nothing” at its peril.23 The EU’s newborderlands are among Europe’s most fragile areas.Traditionally neglected by European capitals, they

have seen some of the Second World War’s fiercest battles. Some ofthe border areas are still struggling to recover from a legacy ofeconomic devastation, inter-ethnic hostility, even genocide. It is inthe EU’s self-interest to have good relations with its neighbours. Ifthe EU focuses solely on making its new external border‘watertight’, it will breed frustration and anger in its newborderlands. People in Ukraine or Serbia see the EU as their destinyand their natural cultural orientation. They will be all the moredisappointed if EU policy engenders a sense of exclusion andneglect. A narrow-minded EU approach would also undermine theposition of reformist forces in countries such as Ukraine, wherepro-reform often means pro-western and pro-EU.

The EU must not allow its external border to resemble a new IronCurtain. No fence will be high enough, no border controls strictenough to protect the EU if its new borderlands develop into poor,unstable and neglected areas, full of people who lack any prospectof significant improvement within their lifetime. Poverty and

58 The EU’s new borderlands

23 This term is theone that BritishPrime MinisterNevilleChamberlain usedin 1938 to refer tothe Czechs andSlovaks, largeparts of whosestate he had justconceded to Hitlerat Munich.

Centre for European Reform29 Tufton Street London SW1P 3QL UKT: 00 44 20 7233 1199 F: 00 44 20 7233 1117www.cer.org.ukinfo@cer.org.uk

October 2003ISBN 1 901 229 48 3 ★ £5/SS8