the extent and impact of higher education governance reform across europe

7/29/2019 The extent and impact of higher education governance reform across Europe

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GOVERNANCE REFORMPART ONE

The extent and impact of higher education

governance reform across Europe

Final report to the Directorate-General for Educationand Culture of the European Commission

Contract: 2006 1407 / 001 001 S02-81AWB

Part One:Comparative Analysis and Executive Summary


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ThisstudywasrequestedbytheEuropeanCommission,DirectorateGeneralEducationandCulture.

ThisreportdoesnotreflecttheviewsoftheEuropeanCommission.Theinterpretationsandopinions

containedinitaresolelythoseoftheauthors

Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS)University of TwenteP.O. Box 2177500 AE EnschedeThe Netherlands

T +31 53 489 3263F +31 53 434 0392W www.utwente.nl/cheps

E [email protected]
http://www.utwente.nl/chepsmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.utwente.nl/cheps


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The extent and impact of higher education

governance reform across Europe

Final report to the Directorate-General for Education and Cultureof the European Commission

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report is divided into four parts, each of which is submitted asa separate volume

Part One

Comparative Analysis and Executive Summary

Part TwoSummaries of the Quick Scan Surveys ongovernance reform in 32 European countries

Part ThreeFive case studies on governance reform

Part Four

Governance Reform Survey Results


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Governance reform project team

Project leaders

Prof. Jrgen Enders CHEPSJon File CHEPS

Senior Experts

Prof. Frans van Vught CHEPSMarc Durando EUN Partnership, Brussels

Senior Advisors

Prof. Jaak Aaviksoo University of Tartu

Prof. Guy Neave CHEPSProf. Pavel Zgaga University of Ljubljana

Research Team

Research co-ordinatorDr. Bjrn Stensaker NIFU-STEP

Researchers

Dr. Harry de Boer CHEPS

Frans Kaiser CHEPSDr. Ingvild Marheim Larsen NIFU-STEPProf. Peter Maassen University of Oslo/NIFU-STEPDr. Sigrun Nickel CHEDr. Hans Vossensteyn CHEPSProf. Frank Ziegele CHE

NationalCorrespondents

ESMU/HUMANE Network

CoordinatorsNadine Burquel ESMURuth Walther ESMU

Austria Prof. Hans Pechar, IFF Hochschulforschung

Belgium (VL) Prof. Luc Francois, Universiteit Gent

Belgium (French Community) Prof. Anne-Marie Kumps, Universit Catholique de Louvain

Bulgaria Prof. Marko Todorov, University of Rousse

Croatia Prof. Ivan Vickovic and Prof. Vlasta Vizek Vidovic, University of Zagreb


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Cyprus Andreas Christofides, University of Cyprus

Czech Republic Helena ebkov, Centre for Higher Education Studies

Denmark Prof. Bente Kristensen, Copenhagen Business School

Estonia Aune Valk, University of Tartu

Finland Dr. Liisa Savunen and Hanna Manner, Finnish council of university rectors

France Yves Chaimbault, Universit des Sciences et Technologies de Lille 1

Germany Prof. Peter Mayer, FH Osnabrck

Greece Antigoni Papadimitriou, Aristotle UniversityFoteini Asderaki, Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs

Hungary Prof. Gyrgy Bazsa, University of Debrecen

Iceland Prof. Jn Torfi Jnasson, University of Iceland

Ireland Dr. Ellen Hazelkorn, Dublin Institute of Technology

Italy Dr. Pasquale Mastrodomenico, Cristina Conti and Barbara Rosetta, Universit degli Studi delPiemonte Orientale "Amedeo Avogadro"Lara Gadda, Polytechnic of Milan

Latvia Jnis Stonis, University of Latvia

Liechtenstein Christoph Jenny and Helmut Konrad, Ministry of EducationMarion Steffens, Hochschule Liechtenstein

Lithuania Prof. Birut Pocit, Vilnius University

Luxembourg Prof. Lucien Kerger, Universit du Luxembourg

Malta Prof. Peter Mayo, University of Malta

Netherlands Christiaan van den Berg, Association of Universities in the Netherlands

Norway Bjrn Berg, Norwegian Association for Researchers

Poland Barbara Godlewska-Bujok, Warsaw University

Portugal Dr. Lusa Cerdeira, Universidade de Lisboa

Romania Prof. Adrian Miroiu, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration

Slovakia Jozef Jurkovic, Ministry of Education

Slovenia Dr. Nada Trunk irca and Alen Balde, University of Primorska

Spain Dr. Rafael Zorrilla, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid


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Sweden John Frstenbach, Royal University College of Music in Stockholm

Turkey Prof. Cem Alptekin, Bogazici University

United Kingdom Prof. George Gordon, University of Strathclyde

Research andAdministrative Support

Maya van de Berg CHEPS

Jarno Deen CHEPS

Andrea Kottmann CHEPS

Aleksandra Kova CHEPS

Liudvika Leisyte CHEPS

Arend Zomer CHEPS

Dr. Ase Gornitzka NIFU-STEPAris Kaloudis NIFU-STEP

Vibeke Opheim NIFU-STEP

Nils Henrik Solum NIFU-STEP

Marlies Golbach CHEPS

Gillian Luisman CHEPS

Karin van der Tuin CHEPS

Tanja Ologe CHE

On-line surveymanagement

Paul Greim Interface, Kassel


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Comparative analysis on governance reform in European highereducation1

1. Introduction 2

Europeanhighereducationisnostrangertochange;forthebetterpartoftwodecadesthesectorhasbeen included inthemuchbroaderWesternandEasternEuropeanreforms(Neave1988,PollittandBouchaert 2000). Since the late1990s though the rate of change has accelerated to unprecedentedlevels, largelyon theshouldersof threekeydevelopments: theSorbonneandBolognaDeclarations(1998, 1999), whose objectives are to make study programmes more compatible across EuropeansystemsandtheLisbonStrategy(2000),whichseekstoreformthecontinentsstillfragmentedsystemsintoamorepowerfulandmoreintegrated,knowledgebasedeconomy.SubsequentcommunicationsfromEuropean policymakers have underlined that higher education institutionswillbe crucial toEuropesfuturewellbeingand,ineffect,thelynchpinthatbindthesemajorprocessesandstrategiestogether.

The Bologna Process aimed to establish a European Higher Education Area by 2010. Whileundersigningcountriesoriginally interpretedtheDeclarationintheirownways,theprocessrapidlyachieved a dynamic towards abroader focus and outreach. Focusing at first on reforming studyprogrammes into the twocycle bachelormaster structure, soon concerns about comparabilitypushed quality assurance and accreditation and degree recognition firmly into the picture as theBerlincommuniqu(2003)atteststo. BolognasperspectivebroadenedinBerlinwiththeinclusionofthe thirdphase (Ph.D.) anddid so again inBergen (2005) through the explicitmentioning of theimportance of higher education in further enhancing research and the importance of research inunderpinninghighereducation for theeconomicandculturaldevelopmentofour societiesand forsocialcohesion.By2005,BolognasreachhadfinallycrossedtheLisbonStrategy,atleastforthe25

member

European

Union.

InMarch2000theEuropeanUnioncommitteditselfinLisbontotheambitiousobjectiveofbecomingthemostcompetitiveanddynamicknowledgebasedeconomy in theworld,capableofsustainableeconomic growthwithmore andbetterjobs and greater social cohesion.European policymakersintentionstookonamoreconcreteformin2003whenthegoalofraisingEUcountriesinvestmentsinR&D to 3%ofGDPwasoutlined inBarcelona.However, severalyears of laggingprogress forcedpolicymakers to essentially restart the processby refocusing onbroader economic growth andinnovation.

Itwas inthisnewphasethattheroleuniversitiescouldplay inthenewknowledgebasedeconomybegantoattractfurtherattention:Europemuststrengthenthethreepolesof itsknowledgetriangle:

education,

research

and

innovation.

Universities

are

essential

in

all

three

(COM

2005:

152).

The

situation,astheCommissionsummarisedit,wasnotgood:Governmentswerefindingitincreasinglydifficulttomatchtherisingcostsofscienceandprovidingqualityeducation.Givenhighereducationsystems strongdependence on public funding, the situationwas onlyworsening: low enrolmentratesunmetdemand,afailuretopreparestudentsfortheEuropeanlabourmarket,toofewjobsforteachers/researchersordifficulties inattractingand retaining top talentwerebecoming thealltooclear signs that the core infrastructureofEuropesknowledge economywas indisarray.AdjustingandmodernizingthegovernancearrangementsinthesectorisinthissituationseenasanimportanttopicintherealizationoftheLisbonAgenda.

It should,however,alsobeemphasized that theBolognaDeclarationandLisbonAgendahavenotbeentheonlyinfluenceschangingEuropeanhighereducationinstitutions.Inmany(WestEuropean)

1ThispartofthereportwaswrittenbyBjrnStensaker,JrgenEndersandHarrydeBoer2Anexecutivesummarycanbefoundonpages3438


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countriesaseriesofreformsalreadywereunderwayinthe1980sandmanycurrentreforminitiativeshave their origin in this time period. The changing role of the state visvis higher educationinstitutions(i.e.intheformofenhancinginstitutionalautonomyandstressingqualityassuranceandaccountability) are wellknown themes of the last two decades. This has convincinglybeen putforward inNeaves (1988) article on the rise of the evaluative state and further analysis ofhighereducationpolicyincomparativeperspectives(Goedegebuureetal.1994),OECDstudiessuchastheirEducationPolicyAnalysis2003,orEurydices2000studyontwodecadesofhighereducationreform.3These early reforms cover many different areas including the structure of higher education,managementandcontrol,financing,qualitycontrolandevaluation,courseplanning,access,studentfinancialaid,internationalization,andteachingandassessment(SeeEurydice2000).Inthisrespect,itcanbesaidthatEuropeanhighereducationhasendureda longwaveofreform(HaugandKirstein1999).

Interestingly, onemight argue that this firstwave of reform is the target for the secondwave ofreformsinwhichtheBolognaprocessandLisbonagendaarecentralelements.AsReichertandTauch(2005)rightlyargue in theirTrends IV, Thereformwave inEuropeanhighereducationseems togoevenfurtheranddeeperthantheBolognareformsthemselves.InsomecountriesBolognaisusedtointroducereformsthatareactuallynotpartoftheBolognaprocess.Manyhighereducationactswereestablishedinthe1980sandthe1990s.Sincethentheyhavebeenupdated,whiletheBolognaprocesshasbeenusedasaformofspringcleaning.

Thus,alongwiththeBolognaprocessandtheLisbonAgendahighereducationhasforyearsseentheintroduction of more markettype mechanisms and modern types of governance. Keywords likeaccountabilityandconceptslikeNewPublicManagementornetworkgovernance(statesupervision,the evaluative state) are gradually replacing the traditional focus on state control and academiccollegialgovernance.Statecontrol isgivingway tomoreselfmanagement in thenameofefficiencyand responsiveness to societys diverse needs. Institutions arebeing encouraged to increase theircapacityandwillingnesstobecomeengagedintheproductionofusefulknowledge(Schimank,Kehmand Enders 1999). Through competition and greater institutional autonomy higher education

institutions

are

being

driven

to

become

more

sensitive

to

their

varied

consumers

demands

for

relevance. Stateoversight isevolving intosometimeselaboratesystemsof incentivesandsanctionsthat allow governments to continue utilizing their higher education sectorsby steering from adistance.

Thechangesoccurringtodayrepresent,inpart,anefforttoredressgovernmentfailures(Wolf,1993)ofthepast. Atthesametime,thepaceandreachofthechangesnowtakingplaceraisethedistinctpossibility that policymakers are fixing one problemby creating another. Marketsbreed marketfailuresandeconomistsarequicktopointoutthatuniversitiesarefundamentallydifferentfromthetextbook firms thatshapestandard theories (Winston,1999). IfEurope is tosucceed in itsefforts tocreatebothaHigherEducationandResearchAreathatwilldriveitseconomyintheyearsaheadthenstrikingabalancebetweentheseextremeswillbecrucial.However,beforegovernancepoliciescanbe

fine

tuned,

a

better

understanding

of

the

magnitude

and

success

(or

failure)

of

the

changes

now

occurringisfirstinorder.

This is increasingly difficult as the new modes of governing are distinct from the traditionalhierarchical controlmodel (Maassen 2006). In a number of countries new cooperativemodes aredevelopingwhere state and nonstate actors participate inmixed networks (Enders 2004: 372).Afurther issue is related to the essential characteristics of the higher education sector and its

3AccordingtotheEurydice2000studyTwodecadesofreforminhighereducationinEurope:1980onwards,Oneofthemost

significantreformsobservedhasbeentheincreasedautonomygiventohighereducationinstitutions,especiallyuniversities,in

most European countries and the move away from the interventionary state towards a more facilitatory state in the

terminologyofNeaveandVanVught(1991).Thisprocesshasoftenentailedthereleasingofhighereducationinstitutionsfromdetailedcontrolthroughlegislationbygivingthemtherighttopasstheirownstatutesinthebroadeningareaoverwhichthey

haveautonomy.

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professional organizations. While governance arrangements usually emphasize formal structure,bodiesanddecisionmakingstructures,thegovernanceofhighereducationinstitutionsisstillstronglyinfluencedby informalnetworks, collegial agreements andmoreprocessorienteddecisionmakingstructures(Gornitzka,KoganandAmaral2005).Itthiswaygovernanceandtheacademicculturearetightlyinterwoveninacomplexwebofinteractionsandeffects.Thelatterpointisprobablyakeytounderstand the effectiveness of governance arrangements in higher education. Since teaching,researchandknowledgetransferaredependentontheacademicstaff,akeyissueofgovernanceistocreateinstitutionalconditionsstimulatingthecreativityoftheprofessionals(EU2005).Governanceisin this perspective about identifying the institutional structures and processes that create optimalconditionsforstaffperformance.

Theconsequencesofthe(recent)governancereformsonperformancearenotyetclear.Theaimoftheanalysispresentedinthefollowingoverviewisthuslimitedtoacloserinvestigationofthefollowingtwoissues: How andbywhatmeanshavenationalgovernance frameworks changed?Whatare themajor

themesanddevelopments? How andbywhatmeans has the autonomy of higher education institutions and professional

leadershipchanged?Whatarethemajorthemesanddevelopments?

Finally,wewillreflecton thepossible linksbetween (good)governancearrangementsandsystemperformance.

1.2. Data and methodology

Basically,thisstudyhasdrawnonthreedifferentsetsofdata: 32nationalreportsonrecentchangesingovernancearrangements; 5indepthcasestudiesofnationalframeworksforandinstitutionalgovernancearrangementsof

highereducationinstitutions;and awebbasedsurveyconductedamonginstitutionsparticipatingintheSocrates/Erasmusnetwork.

Further desk research, literature review and consultation with experts in the field have beenundertaken. This approach has provided us with very updated, and to some extent, comparableinformationonrecentchangesinthevariouscountries.

Bytriangulatingthedatasets,theycanprovideuswithsubstantiveinformationonthedevelopmentsofEuropeanhighereducationinthoseareaswheretheyallpointinthesamedirection,oraddressthesamephenomenon.Two typesof triangulationhavebeen applied in this study:1)methodological triangulation thatrelates to the fact thatdifferentapproacheshavebeenused tocollectandanalysedata.2)observertriangulationthatrelatestothefactthatdifferentinformantshavebeenapproachedforeachdataset.Thiscoherentmethodologicaldesignincreasesboththevalidityandreliabilityofthestudy(Kirk&Miller1986).

First,while thenationalreportsaremainlydependentonsingleauthorsand theirperceptionof thechanges going on, surveydata and other available information (e.g.,Eurydiceupdates)havebeenusedasa checkon thenational reports.Second, the indepth case studiesweremainlybasedonshort study visitsbymembers of the research team. This informationwas gathered through anddiscussedwithdomesticexperts inthefield,andbyrelatingthefindingstootheravailableresearchstudies (national surveydataor special researchprojectsongovernance)on the selected countries.Given the time constraints of the project, this approach still has some limitations in terms of thecompleteness and adequacy of the data gathered and crosschecked. In particular thewebbasedsurveysuffersfroman insufficientresponserate.Anextensionofthewebbasedsurveybeyondthedeadlineof theproject improved the response rate, although the final result is still insufficient forisolatedgeneralisations.Inthisreport,identifiedgeneraltrendsareasaconsequence,alwaysbasedon

severalsourcesofinformationanddata.

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2. How and by what means have national governance frameworks changed?

TheEuropeanuniversity landscape isprimarilyorganizedat thenationalandregional levelsand ischaracterizedbyahighdegreeofheterogeneity that isreflected in itsorganization,governanceandoperating conditions. From abirds eye view, reregulation in the form of enhancing institutionalautonomyhascertainlybeenoneoftheoverarchinggovernancetrendsinEuropeanhighereducation

over the last twodecades(MaassenandStensaker2003).Theanalysisshows,at thesame time, thatinstitutional autonomy is a highly contested concept and has many faces (de Boer 2006). ForuniversitiesintheUK,forexample,deregulationofauthorityandresponsibilityhasoftenbeenlessofan issuebecauseof theautonomy traditionallygranted to the institutions.Thisdoes,however,notmean that increasing leadership and management capacity in a changing environment is not animportant factor. Foruniversities and other higher education providers on the continent, freedomfrom traditional governmental rules and regulations that limit organizational capacities for selfsteering and responsiveness has become more of an issue due to deregulation and increasingcompetition(deBoer,EndersandSchimank2006;KehmandLanzendorf2006).

Anumberofcasestudiessuggestthatsuchaprocessbeginswiththeadoptionoflumpsumfunding,theeliminationofstatecontrolovercontractingandaccess tocapitalmarketsand thedelegationof

authority over ownership ofbuilding and capital assets (Laske,Lederbauer,Loacker andMeisterScheytt 2006;Nickel,Witte andZiegele 2006).Delegation of authority overpersonnelmatters is amorecontroversialissueasareregulationsaffectingthedesignanddeliveryofacademicprogramsorthe institutionalcapacitytoselectstudentsortosettuitionfees.Insomecountriesautonomyhasadifferentmeaningbecauseauthorityhasbeendelegated tothe individual facultiesmore than to theinstitutions. Insection3mostof these issueswillbedealtwith from theperspectiveof institutionalautonomy.

Generallyspeaking,thestatesnewrolemaybetermedfacilitativeasitattemptstocreateaviablehighereducationenvironment inwhich itcontrols theoutcomesatasystems levelwithoutdetailedinterference.Buthereagain,newsteeringdeviceshavebeenintroducedforwhichoutputfundingandmultiyear agreements with the (individual) higher education institutions provide illustrativeexamples. In effect, governments are not withdrawing from responsibility for higher educationsystemsbut are in search for newmeans of system oversight and performancebased steering oforganizations.Insomecountriesonecanspeakofthestateasthe marketengineerwhileemergingquasimarkets still vary a lot in their degree of competition and the extent to which they areregulated by government. For example, the provision of continuing education or academicconsultancy activities is largely unregulated in most countries because these activities are notperceived as academic corebusiness. Traditional academic programs and degrees are often stillsubject to governmental regulation and access to this market is frequently controlled by stateauthoritiesor authoritiesdelegatedwith this responsibility.Competition on the researchmarket ispromoted by moving away from the tradition of institutionbased research funding towardsperformancebased funding, and the competitive funding of research projects through researchcouncilsoragenciesatthenationalandinternationallevel.

Responsibilities thatwere formerly thoseof the statehave thusnotonlybeen transferred tohighereducation institutionsbutalso tootherorganizationssuchasresearchcouncils,accreditationbodiesetc.Newactorsatthenationallevel(e.g.ministriesofeconomicaffairs)andregionallevelareenteringthe higher education scene, especially given their interest in the emerging knowledge society andtechnology transfer. In this respect the states rolebecomes one of a networkmanager (steeringthroughnetworks)andnewregimesofgovernanceemerge:wenowseeamoremultiactor,multilevelgovernanceframeworkemerginginanumberofcountries.Withinthiscontext,fiveinterrelatedthemescanbe identifiedwhencomparingthenationalreports,thecasestudiesand thesurveydatafrom abottomup institutional perspective: multivocal governance in higher education, growingcompetition, new funding arrangements, shifts in the internal governance of higher education

institutions,

and

quality

assurance

infusing

the

institutional

level.

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2.1. Higher education insti tutions in a multi -vocal governance environment

Thefirstthemeidentifiedisthathighereducationinstitutionsasactorshavegainedinimportanceinthesteeringofthesystem.Theriseoftheuniversityasamanagedorganisationreflectsnotonlythegrowing influenceofinstitutionalleadershipwithintheorganisation(seealsosection3)butalsotheroleofuniversitiesaskeyactors innationalhighereducationpolicy.Thisoftenmeansadecrease indirect governmental interference in higher education in certain areas matched by attempts tostrengthen institutionalautonomyaccordingly.At the same time,governmental reformeffortsmayimply even stronger state regulation than in the past, and not only a process of transmittingresponsibilityfromthesystemtotheinstitutionallevel.

This is illustrated in Table 1which indicates that according tomore than 750 respondents acrossEuropegovernmentalinfluenceonnationalhighereducationpolicyhasnotdecreasedbutincreased.Delegation of responsibility from governments/ministries of education does not imply a lessinfluentialroleofgovernmentasperceivedby therespondents.Denmarkexemplifiesoneaspectofthis development: the contractualisation of relationships between government and the highereducation institutions. The establishment of development contracts between the Ministry andindividualinstitutionsimpliesthatinstitutionalautonomyisclearlyframedbystrategicgovernmentalambitions concerning how the sector and the institution should develop in the future. Newarrangements concerning responsibilities anddutiesdo not imply that governments are steppingbackfromtheirresponsibilityforhighereducation.

Table1: Changes in the influence ofkey actors onnational higher education policy 19952006(in%,n=754)

Moreinfluencethanbefore Considerablymoreinfluencethanbefore

TheNationalAssembly/Parliament(or

equivalent)

32 9

Government/MinistryofEducation(orequivalent)

42 19

Regionalgovernment/authorities

25 9

Nationalorganisations(advisorybodies,representativebodiesetc.)

44 11

Institutional

leadership

(rectors/presidents/vicechancellorsorequivalent)

46

24

EuropeanCommission 48 19

Externalstakeholders(industry,business,etc)

58 15

Thetablealsoillustratesthemultiactorperspectiveofpresentdayhighereducationgovernance.Formany actorswe see increased influence on national higher education policies.Apparently highereducationisseenasanimportantsectorinthemovetowardstheemergingknowledgesociety.

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Inmany systems authority is also transferred from thenational level to anew intermediate level.Whiletheargumentsforthisshiftareoftenrelatedtothedelegationofnonpolicyissues,itcouldbearguedthatthereisanemergingagencificationtakingplaceinanumberofcountries(GornitzkaandMaassen 2000).The latterdevelopment isparticularly evident in theareaofqualityassurance,butsometimes also in the funding area. The problem some countries seem to face is that these newagenciesoftentakeonordevelopanunclearorsemiautonomouspositionbetweenthestateandtheinstitutional level.They hold an intermediary position in the principalagent relationshipbetweengovernmentsandhighereducationinstitutionsthuscreatingamorecomplexpicture intermsofthetransparencyofthewholenationalgovernancearrangement.Inthisway,attemptstoclarifytherolesandresponsibilitiesofgovernmentsandhighereducationinstitutionsaresometimesblurred.

Further, external stakeholders (industry and business) are gaining influence in national highereducationpolicy.Traditionally,theirpositionhasbeenweakbutincreasinglyeffortsarebeingmadeto involve them in governmental policy networks and decisionmaking processes as well as inconsultationoninstitutionalprofilesandstrategies.

Finally, many of our respondents in the survey indicate a growing influence of the EuropeanCommissiononnationalhighereducationpolicy.Whencomparingthevariousnationalreports,andwhenanalyzing the surveydata,one isstruckbyhownationalpoliciesare increasingly influencedand framedby aEuropeandimension concerningbothhigher education and research withoutdenying the importance of domestic agendas. The EuropeanCommission is seen as an emergingpolicy actor domestically, not only on the national level,but increasingly alsoby academics anduniversityleaders(vanVught2006;Maassen&Olsen2007).Atthesametime,nationalgovernmentsand institutional leadership are considered tohave a greater influence onmanypolicy issues (seesection3). It isprobable thatnationalgovernmentsand institutional leadershipanticipate theviewsandpoliciesoftheEuropeanCommission.

Although European competence in higher education policy making is formally limited, thisapparently is of less importance than its more informal influence at the supranational level. A

possible

explanation

is

that

higher

education

policy

is

currently

becoming

more

intertwined

with,

and

partlydependenton,developments inotherpolicyareaswhere theEuropeanCommissionplaysamore formalrole.VanVught (2006:33)argues that therole theEuropeanCommissionplays in thearea of research and innovation means that it is also a significant contributor to the emergentEuropeandimensioninhighereducation.

2.2. Competition as a key element in governance frameworks

Thesecondtheme,closelyrelatedtothefirst,istheincreasedemphasisoncompetitionasameanstoenhance the efficiencyand thequalityof the sector.Viewed together,ourdata show a remarkabletendencyofanincreaseincompetitioninalmostall32systems.

Table2:

Changes

in

levels

of

competition

1995

2006

(in

%,

n

=779)

Changesincompetitionlevelswithrespectto. Morecompetitionthanbefore Muchmorecompetitionthanbeforetherecruitmentofacademicstaff 51 19

.therecruitmentofstudents 44 40

.publicfundingingeneral 43 32

.basicresearchfunding 36 41

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How this competition is framed differs from country to country,but, in general,we can observevariousformsofquasimarketsemerging.Thedifferencesbetweencountriesrelateto:

how much institutions are exposed to competition (the UK and the Netherlandsbeing, forexample,countrieswhereinstitutionsareincreasinglyexposed)

theareasdefinedasopentocompetition(forexampleresearchfunding,recruitmentofstudentsoracademicstaff)

the systemic consequences of the competition regime (for example, inNorway institutions arecompetingforafixedamountofresourcesallocatedonthebasisofresearchoutput,implyingthatsomewillwinandsomewillloseasaresultoftheprocess).

Whileefficiencyandqualitymaybeenhancedbyincreasedcompetition,systemeffectivenessseemstoremainaproblem tobedealtwith inanumberofcountries. Ifmarketcompetition is to lead to theexpected outcomes, then institutions must have control over critical inputs and the processes ofproduction. Governments experimenting with competition in higher education thus need toexperimentwiththederegulation.Universitiesareincreasinglypressingforthesechangesthemselvesbecause their experiences with competition reveal the inefficiencies of traditional forms of stateregulation.

2.3. New funding arrangements

Thereisanoticeableinterestinthe32countriesinreformingtheirhighereducationfundingsystems.Eventhoughournationalreportsdonotprovidehardevidenceon the leveloffundingallocated tohighereducation,otherstudiesonchangesinthefundingregimesinEurope(CHINC2006)indicatethattherehasnotbeenageneralreductioninthelevelofpublicfunding.Assuch,stabilityratherthanchangeseemstocharacterisethe levelofpublicfundingofhighereducation inEuropeoverthe lastdecadealthoughthewaysresourcesareallocatedischangingandthefundingcostsperstudentaredeclining(duetomasseducation).Ingeneralthishasmeantatrendtowardspublicfundingforthesectorbeingbasedonperformanceorexcellence (see thediscussiononcompetitionabove)with the

generalaimofimprovingtheefficiencyofthesector.Insomecountries,ourstudynoticesinitiativestoincreasethe leveloffundingforhighereducation,especiallythroughthe introductionor increaseoftuitionfees.Theemergingpatternconcerningtuitionfeesisstillverymixedwithrespectto:

howmuchtuitionmaybecharged, whethertuitionfeesaresetatanationalorinstitutionallevel, whethertuitioncanbechargedforallprogrammesoronlyincertaindisciplines/areasoratcertain

levelsofhighereducation, whether tuition isuniversaloronlycharged forcertaingroupsof students (international,adult

education,lifelonglearningetc.)

Faced with a context of financial stringency, governments and higher education institutions are,

however,movingsteadilytoconsidersuchsourcesofrevenue.Thebasicquestionformanycountriesishowthe(growing)demandforhighqualityhighereducationcanbemet.Thepolicyresponsesarebasicallyoftwotypes:first,thosethatattempttolowercostsbymerginginstitutionsforeconomiesofscale, creating or strengthening low cost institutions, or increasing studentfaculty ratios etc.; and,second,thosethatattempttosupplement limitedpublicrevenuewithprivaterevenue,forexample,with tuition fees, philanthropic donations, or institutional or faculty entrepreneurship. The highereducationreformagendasofmostcountriescontainsomeelementsofboth.

2.4. Quality assurance infusing the inst itut ional level

Another central element visible in the data is related to the development of new organisational

structures

(independent

agencies)

and

new

policy

initiatives

related

to

quality

assurance

over

the

past

decade(seealsoSchwarz&Westerheijden2004).Thisattentiongiventoqualityassuranceisvisibleinall the32 countriescoveredby the study.Althoughnotallhave established independentagencies,

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national legislation ingeneral requireshigher education institutions to establish theirown systemsandproceduresforqualityassurance.Whileinmostcountriesafocusonqualityassurancehasbeenon the national agenda for some years, our data suggests thatmuch attention is currentlybeingdirectedatestablishingproperinstitutionalsystemsandproceduresinthisarea.Table3indicatesthatmany institutions have alreadymademuch progress in establishing their own systems, especiallywith respect to teaching and learning, although there seems tobe a longerway to go concerningsystemsforassuringresearchquality.

Table3: Quality assurance systems for teaching/learning and research in higher educationinstitutions(in%,n=623)

Developedbutstillnew Developedandinuseforatleastthreeyears

Institutionalsystemfortheevaluationofteachingandlearning

24 56Institutionalsystemfortheevaluationofresearch 21 32

Interestingly, our data suggest that there is not necessarily a link between national systemcharacteristicsand institutional systemsandprocedureswith respect toqualityassurance.Whileatpresentnationalsystemsforqualityassurancecanbedivided into twomaincategories:accreditation(usuallyofbothpublicandprivatehighereducation)andevaluation(usuallyonlyfocusingonpublichigher education) systems, this divide is of less importance for determiningwhat sort of qualityassurancesystemsandproceduresaredevelopedattheinstitutionallevel.Hence,whiletheUKcanbesaid tohave implementedanationalsystemofevaluation (althoughaccreditationdoes takeplace),there are still systematic and quite thorough national procedures for auditing institutional qualityassurancesystems.Likewise,whileNorwayhasimplementedasystemofinstitutionalaccreditation,

this

still

implies

that

institutional

quality

assurance

systems

are

externally

audited.

Thus,

the

national

controlofwhetherinstitutionstaketheirresponsibilitiesinthisareaseriouslyisnotdependentonthetypeofnationalqualityassurancesystem.Thismaybeoneof thereasonsforemergingattempts tointegrate various national quality assurance systems in some countries eitherwith respect to themethodsusedandhowtheyare interrelated(e.g.,Sweden)orwithrespectto linkingeducationandresearch(e.g.,France).

Concerning transnationalquality assurance schemes,ourdataprovide few indications that this isemergingonalargescale.Atthepolicylevelsomeinitiativeshaverecentlybeentaken,forexampleaNordicevaluationprocedureforjointmastersdegreeshasbeensuggested(Stensaker&Dan2006).

2.5. The many faces of inst itut ional autonomy

A further element noticeable in the data is themany governmental efforts to change institutionalgovernancestructures.Thesereformsare ingeneral in linewithattemptstostrengthen thestrategiccapabilities of higher education institutions, usually accompanied by subsequent changes ininstitutionalstructuresandwaysoforganisingteachingandresearch.InmostcountrieschangeshavetakenplaceasaresultofamendmentsintheActsregulatingthesector.However,withrespecttothedegreeofinstitutionalautonomy,thereformsdifferalongtwodimensions: structuralfreedom:thefreedomtodetermineinternalstructuresandorganisation stakeholderinvolvement:thedegreeof(internalandexternal)stakeholderinvolvement

Concerning structural freedom, there is a greatvarietybetween countries inhowmuch autonomyinstitutional leadership (theboard/rectoror equivalent)has indetermining the internalgovernancearrangements.While somecountrieshave leftsuchdecisionsentirely to the institutional leadership

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(e.g., Finland), others specify themain internal governance structures in national legislation (e.g.,Latvia).

Asregards internalandexternalstakeholder involvement in institutionalgovernancearrangements,there is similar variation. While some countries have specified which stakeholders must berepresentedininternalgovernancestructures(belowthecentralinstitutionalleadership),othersgiveinstitutions the autonomy to decide this themselves (Eurodice 2005). When focusing on thegovernancearrangementsatthecentralinstitutionallevel,nationallegislationisstillquitespecific,notonly specifying whichbodies are required,but also their composition and the representation ofstakeholders.

Ingeneral,thechangesininstitutionalgovernancestructuresmatchnationalreformattemptsinthatamendments of legislation have led to a clearer specification of roles and responsibilities at theinstitutional level (seealso section3).Thisoftenmeans that theoldadvisory structures (senates,etc.)aretakingonlessprominentroles,whileexecutivebodies(boards,etc)havestrengthenedtheirroles both on paper and in practise. For example, in some countries (e.g.Netherlands, parts ofGermany, Denmark) the role of senates/councils has changed formally from decisionmaking toadvisory. Inothercountries (e.g.France), the institutionalgovernancestructureshavebecomemoreexecutive, at least on paper, as part of an increase in institutional autonomy, although manyinstitutionshavelittleexperienceinusingthisautonomyandexecutivepower.Inthenextsectionwewilldealwithinstitutionalautonomymoreextensively.

3. Issues of institutional autonomy as seen from the institu tions perspective

Institutionalautonomyisanimportantissueindiscussionsonhighereducationgovernance,anditisalsoahighlycontestedsubject.Manyhighereducationreformsoverthelasttwodecadesdealinoneway or another with institutional autonomy, as is evident in the 32 national reports. Enhancinginstitutionalautonomy isnotjusta formalprocessof transferringauthorityfromthenational totheinstitutionallevel:itisalsomeanttostrengthentheselfregulatingcapacitiesofinstitutionsaswellastoembed theprincipleofsubsidiarity.Thecreationofconduciveconditions forstrategic leadershipandeffectivemanagementofuniversitiesiscloselylinkedtothisissueofinstitutionalautonomy.

Inorder todescribeandanalyze institutionalautonomymoreaccurately theprojecthas focusedonresponsibilities in eight areas: institutional mission/strategy development; internal governancestructures;theintroductionofnewstudyprogrammes;thequalityofteachingandlearning;internalfinancialpolicies;conditionsofemploymentofstaff;accesspoliciesandadmissionpolicies,and thedevelopmentofpublicprivatepartnerships.Whoisengagedtowhatextentintheseareas?Arethesemattersfortheinstitutionstodecide?Oraregovernmentandotherexternalstakeholdersinvolvedaswell?Additionally,weaddresstheissueofinstitutionalleadershipandmanagementandaskwhatthefeaturesofpresentdaygoverningstructureslooklike.Theresultswithrespecttoalloftheseareasarepresentedinthefollowingsubsectionsandarebasedontheoutcomesofthenationalcountryreports,thefivecasestudiesandthewebbasedsurvey.Thetablesrefertothecurrentresultsofthesurvey.

3.1. Defining the mission and strategy of higher education insti tutions

More institutionalautonomydoesnotnecessarily include the freedom for institutions todeterminetheirownmission (profile)aswellas the freedom todevelop thestrategies forhow toachieve thismission.Inmanycountriesnationalauthoritiesstillhaveastronginterestindeterminingthemissionsof institutions.Sometimesbecausetheyareconstitutionallyresponsiblefortheprovisionofeffectiveeducation, other timesbecause they are accountable for the most efficient use of the tax payersmoney.Inotherwords,thedivisionoffunctionsandtasksamongdifferentinstitutionsinanationalsystemisusuallyseenastheresponsibilityofthestate.

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The country reports as well the results from the survey (table 4) indicate that the state uses itsauthoritytoinfluencethemissionsofinstitutionsandtheiroverallstrategy.ParticularlytheMinistriesofEducation(ortheirequivalent)areengagedinthis.Insomecountriesthenationalgovernmentroleis takenoverbyregionalor localandstateauthorities (e.g.Austria,Germany,SpainandRomania).Also,notsurprisingly,institutionalleadershipisintensivelyinvolvedindeterminingthemissionsoftheir institutions.Ourdataclearlysuggestthatdetermining institutionalmissions is inmostcasesajoint effort of the Ministry of Education and the central executives of the institutions. A secondconclusion,alsovisibleintable4,isthatmanyactors,bothinsideandoutsidetheinstitution,alsohavea role in determining institutional missions. The academic community (academics and students),parliaments and external stakeholders have some influence in this area. This means in terms ofinstitutionalautonomythatinstitutions(management,academicstaffandstudents)havetotakeintoaccounttheviewsandopinionsofotherswhendeterminingtheirmissions.

Ourdatafromthenationalreportsandthesurveydoesnotprovidemuchconclusiveinformationon how the various actors influence the missions and strategies of institutions. In some casesinstitutional management may consult external stakeholders when they develop or adjust theirmission. Inothercases thestatemay impose the institutionsmission,orrequires thatmissionsandstrategic plans mustbe approvedby the Ministry. Yet in other cases the state may enter into acontractualrelationshipwiththeuniversityinwhichmissionandstrategyareagreed.

Table4: The influence of stakeholders in determining the institutional mission and overallstrategyofahighereducationinstitution(in%,n=749)

Someinfluence Muchinfluence

TheNationalAssembly/Parliament(orequivalent)

36 19

Government/Ministry

of

Education(orequivalent) 27

57


30 12


44 14

Institutionalleadership(rectors/presidents/vice

chancellors

or

equivalent)

21 73

Academicstaff 53 20

Students 49 12

Institutionaladministrative/supportstaff

36 6


49 18

TheEuropeanCommission 36 16

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3.2. Internal governance and management structures

Havingthediscretiontodesigntheinstitutionsorganisationalstructuresintermsofgoverningbodiesand their composition, authority and responsibility can alsobe seen as an important aspect ofinstitutional autonomy. Can institutions draw up their own structures? Are these imposed bygovernment? Do external stakeholders have a voice in such matters? As expected the Europeanpictureisascatteredone.Herewecanonlyusebroadbrushstrokes.

First,inmostofthe32countriesstudied,nationallegislationdetermines(tosomeextent)theinternalgovernanceandmanagementstructuresatleastfortheinstitutionstoplevel.Thelevelofdetailinprescribing governingbodies, their composition and powers varies greatly and we see differentmodels in this regard. In some cases national legislations acts as ablue print, whereas in othercountriesnational legislation leaves ample room (and obligations) for institutionalmanagement todraw up statutes and other kinds of internal regulations. Therefore, as indicated in table 5,institutional leadershipishighly involved indeterminingthe internalgovernancestructuresoftheirinstitutions.

Secondly,theroleandauthorityofacademicsandstudentsalsovariesconsiderably.Insomecountriessenatesplayamajorroleindeterminingtherulesofthegamefortheirinstitution.Inothercountriestheir roles aremore limited.Nevertheless,academics and studentshave, ingeneral, somevoice indeterminingthegoverningstructureoftheirinstitutions.

Thirdly,theinfluenceofexternalstakeholdersislimited,althoughindustryandbusinessseemtohavesomeimpact,whichmaybeduetothefactthatsomecouncilsorboardsmayhaveexternalmembersthatcancodecideonmattersoforganizationaldesign.

Fourth, if significant changes in the internalgoverning structureofan institutionaredesirable, thenational legislatormayneed to change (partsof) itsnationalhigher education law. In this respectinstitutional autonomy is bounded. Reforming institutional governance still depends in manycountriesonmovesatthenational level.Thishashappened insomecountriesandsomeofthecasestudiesshow (AustriaandNorway) thatnationalgovernmentshavegranted institutionssignificantautonomyinthisrespect.IntheNetherlandstootheamountoffreedomforinstitutionstodesigntheirorganisationalstructurehasincreasedandmayincreasefurtherintheforeseeablefuture.

Fifth,withintheboundariesofnationallaws,theinstitutionsgoverningstructureisinsomecasesaninternal affair: internal stakeholders aremuchmore engaged in such considerations than externalstakeholders.

Table5: The influence of stakeholders in determining the internal governance structures of ahighereducationinstitution(in%,n=744)

Some

influence

Much

influence


27 13


33 30


19 6

Institutionalleadership

(rectors/presidents/vicechancellorsorequivalent)

18 75

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Academicstaff 52 20

Students 43 9

Institutional

administrative/supportstaff 37

8


28 9


3.3. The development of new study programmes

Alsowithrespectto thequestionofwho isauthorized todevelopnewstudyprogrammesweseeahighlyscatteredpicture.Asafirstgeneralobservationweseethatthisisinmanycountriestoalargeextent a responsibility within the ambit of the institution itself. Institutional management andacademics are very influential in this respect.Seen from an institutionalperspective, thehandsondevelopment of new study programmes is in most cases a responsibility of the individualdepartment/facultywithformalapprovaloftenlocatedattheinstitutionallevel.Thisisclearlyanareawhereacademicstaff ingeneralhasmuch influence,eitherthroughspecialistcommitteesorgeneralbodiessuchasanacademicsenate.

Second, the Ministries of Education also have considerable influence in some countries as doprofessionalassociationswithrespect toarangeofprofessionalstudyprogrammes. Inanumberofcountriesthedevelopmentofnewstudyprogrammesisaprocessthatishighlydependentonexternalapproval, first and foremost with respect to whether accreditation is required. Since programme

accreditation

is

the

dominant

procedure

in

a

number

of

European

countries,

institutional

autonomy

is

somewhatrestricted.Especiallysinceinsomecountries,authorisationandfundingmustbeprovidedby theMinistry or otherbodies at the national level (e.g. in theUK the funding council is quiteinfluentialwithrespecttotheallocationofresourcestonewprogrammes). Finally,itisinterestingtoseethatexternalstakeholdersalsohavesomeinfluenceontheseissues.

Table6: Theinfluenceofstakeholdersontheintroductionofanewstudyprogrammeatahighereducationinstitution(in%,n=742)


TheNationalAssembly/Parliament(or

equivalent)

12 6


22 38


20 8


32 12

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Institutionalleadership(rectors/presidents/vicechancellorsorequivalent)

22 72

Academic

staff

37

52

Students 40 9


19 6


44 16


3.4. Quality assurance

As noted earlier, the formal responsibility for quality assurance is increasingly takenby highereducation institutions themselves. Institutional management, academics and to a lesser extentstudentsareinfluentialwhen itcomestosettingtherulesforqualityassessmentintheirinstitutions(seeTable7).TheMinistryofEducation(oritsequivalent)playsasignificantroleinseveralcountries.Itsroleismoretoensurethattheinstitutionstaketheirresponsibilitiesseriously,althoughthetaskofevaluatingthisisfrequentlydelegatedtoindependentnationalagenciesforqualityassurance(eitherthroughaccreditation,evaluationoraudit).

Using the five casestudies as examples,we see significant institutional autonomy concerning thedesignofinstitutionalsystemsandprocedures.TheratherbroadandgeneralEuropeanstandardsonqualityassuranceresultingfromtheministerialmeetinginBergenin2005areyetanotherindicationof the discretion exercised not onlyby individual countriesbut also institutions. These Europeanstandardsreflect thepossibility for institutions todesign theirownsystemsaccording to theirownneeds. Hence, with respect to quality assurance there appears to be a substantial amount ofinstitutionalautonomyintermsofdesigninginternalprocedures.

Typically, institutional systems for quality assurance focus on teaching and learning, and fewerinstitutionshavedevelopedtheirownsystemsforassuringthequalityofresearch(seealsotable3).Theimpactofthevariousqualityassurancesystemshasbeenmostlynoticeableatthenationallevel(seeSchwartz&Westerheijden2004),and related to theoutcomeofvariousaccreditation systems.Thereare institutionalreports that indicate that theeffectsaremixedwithon theonehandmorebureaucracy(formalisation,reporting,managementinterference)emergingandatthesametimemoreprofessionalisationconcerningtheorganisationofteachingandlearningactivities.Theseobservationsare in line with other studies on the impact of quality assurance processes (see Stensaker 2003,Westerheijdenetal2006).

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Table7: Theinfluenceofstakeholdersindetermininghowthequalityofteachingandlearninginahighereducationinstitutionshouldbeassessedandassured(in%,n=739)


TheNational

Assembly/Parliament

(or

equivalent)

24 8


33 43


16 7


35 26


27 67

Academicstaff 39 44

Students 46 24


31 7

External

stakeholders

(industry,

business,etc) 31

8


3.5. Finance and resource allocation within insti tutions

Does an institutionhave thepower todetermine for itself how itwill allocate itsbudget?This isanotherimportantindicatorofinstitutionalautonomy.Ourdatasuggestthatthisisthecaseinmostofthecountries.Institutionalmanagementandtoalesserextentthegovernmentdecidehowbudgetsaredistributed internally. Thus, it seems that institutions have substantial freedom in this respect,although the hand of government can stillbe seen. Concerning the internal resource allocationschemesofhighereducationinstitutionsinthe32countries,thelogicofnationalschemesprimarilyfunding institutions through lumpsumbudgetsbased on formulas is often followedby theindividual institution.Thismeans in practice thatwhile resource allocation is formally adecisiontakenbyinstitutionalleadership,thedistributionofresourcestoinstitutionalsubunitsoftenfollowsthesamerulesappliedbygovernmentinallocatinglumpsumbudgetsthroughtheformula.

The extent to which institutions adjust national funding schemes to fit internal strategies,characteristics and needs varies a lot. While some institutions seem to extend and replicate thenationalfundingschemesallthewaydowntotheindividualdepartment,othersmodifythenationalfundingmodeltoreflectinternalpriorities.

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Table8: The influenceofstakeholdersindetermining theinternalfinancialpoliciesofahighereducationinstitution(in%,n=732)


TheNational

Assembly/Parliament

(or

equivalent)

24 21


27 49


16 10


22 6


15 76

Academicstaff 40 9

Students 17 3


27 10

External

stakeholders

(industry,

business,etc) 19

6


Institutionalautonomyindetermining(thelevelof)tuitionfees(ifsuchfeesareallowed)onlyexistsina few countries, and this is a matter often strictly controlledby national authorities, at least fordomesticstudents.ThereareusuallyspecialarrangementsfornonEUstudentsasregardstuitionfees.Forexample, inDenmark, theNetherlandsand theUK, it is left to the institutions todetermine thetuitionlevelforsuchstudentgroups.

3.6. Human Resource management

DoEuropeanhighereducationinstitutionshavetheabilitytoselecttheirownstaffandtodeterminetheirworkingconditions?Accordingtoourfindingsthisisgenerallyspeakingthecase.Aswithsomeof the other issues, institutional leadership throughoutEuropehasmuch influence indeterminingconditionsofemployment(table9).Whenanalysingthe32nationalreports,currentpracticeisthatinmany countries the institutions themselves formally select and employ their staff anddevelop theinstitutionalhumanresourcepolicies.Atthesametime,nationalauthoritiesarestillveryinfluentialinmany countries where, for instance, salaries are a result of national negotiations, national wageagreements,or independentnationalwage tribunals (e.g. Iceland).Other stakeholdersdonothavemuch impactwhen it comes tohuman resourcemanagement,with the exceptionof somenationalorganisations and the academic staff itself that have some influence.We conclude that in Europe

today

higher

education

institutions

have,

in

general,

significant

leeway

to

make

their

own

decisions

in

the area of human resource policies, although national governments set some of the frameworkconditionsthatcircumscribetheinstitutionsroomtomanoeuvre.

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Table9: Theinfluenceofstakeholdersindeterminingtheconditionsofemploymentofahighereducationinstitution(in%,n=733)


The

National

Assembly/Parliament(orequivalent)

29

18


31 43


12 10

Nationalorganisations(advisorybodies,representative

bodies

etc.)

27 11


24 67

Academicstaff 43 16

Students 13 2


28 8


13 2


Insomecountriesinstitutionalresponsibility forhumanresourcepoliciescoincideswithattempts tostrengthen the attractiveness of higher education institutions as a working place. Two mainexplanations are related to this development. First, increasing attractiveness is seen as vital forcompetingwithotherhighereducationinstitutionsaswellaswiththeprivatesectorfortalentedstaff.Second,there isagrowingrecognitionthatmanyacademicstaff inhighereducation institutionsaresoontoreachretirementage,and this agingof thestaff initiates thinkingabouthow toensure the

next generation of academic staff. Although not a dominant theme in the national reports, incountriessuchasHungaryandDenmarkonecannoticeseveralinitiativesaimingatincreasingsalarylevels(relativetothatoftheprivatesector),ortheimplementationofmeasuresaimedatsecuringthebest talentavailable.Examples include the introductionor increase in thenumberofpostdocandotherrecruitmentpositions(e.g.Norway).

3.7. Student access and selection

Another important aspect of institutional autonomy concerns the selection of students. Caninstitutionsdecideforthemselvesonthenumberandprofileofthestudentstheywishtoenrol?Whosets the criteria for these policies? First, amixed picture emerges as to thedegree of institutional

autonomy

in

setting

criteria

for

access

and

in

selecting

students.

The

traditional

approach,

evident

in

a

substantialnumberofcountries,involvesrathercentralisednationalproceduresandregulations.Theimpactof thenationalgovernmentonstudentaccessandselection isvisible inmanycountries (see

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table10).Insystemswithlimitedinstitutionalautonomyasregardstheseissues,wealsoseedifferentprocedureswithrespecttodifferent institutional types (e.g.,France),ornoticeablerolesfornationalagencies (e.g. Sweden). Such agencies may influence access and selection issues, for examplebyspecifyingthenumberofapplicationsorinstitutionsthatareavailabletotheindividualstudent.

Atthesametimeweobservethatinsomecountriesinstitutionsdohavetheresponsibilityforstudentaccesspoliciesandstudentselection: institutionalmanagementandacademicstendtoplayaroleinthis context.Finally, there are examples of adifferentiated approach: guidelines from thenationalauthorities, but a significant degree of freedom for institutions within these guidelines. Somegovernmentsareexperimentinginthispolicyarea,anticipatinganopenhighereducationsystem(e.g.theNetherlands).Externalstakeholders,includingtheEuropeanCommission,hardlyplayanyroleindeterminingstudentaccesspoliciesandstudentselection.

Table10:The influenceofstakeholders indeterminingaccesspoliciesandadmissioncriteria forfirstyearBachelorstudentsatahighereducationinstitution(in%,n=726)


The

National

Assembly/Parliament(orequivalent)

25

20


28 50


9 8

Nationalorganisations(advisorybodies,representative

bodiesetc.)

24 9


33 50

Academicstaff 32 29

Students 17 3


18 4


13 2


Our data from the national reports indicate that there is a shift towards enhancing institutionalautonomy with respect to student access and selection issues in some European countries (e.g.Finland,Germany,theNetherlands,Poland,andtheUK).Insomecountries,institutionsareactiveinrecruitingparticularstudentgroups,forexampleinternationalstudents(e.g.theNetherlands,Finland,the UK), or ethnic minority groups and women in certain disciplines. Student numbers andconsequentlyaccessandselectionareveryimportantsincetheyarealmostalwaysdirectlyrelatedto

funding.

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3.8. Public-private partnerships

Of theeightdimensionsof institutionalautonomy investigated,publicprivatepartnershipsare theleastregulated.This implies that inprinciple institutionshavesignificant freedom toestablishsuchrelationships. Institutionalmanagement and academics are themost engaged in establishing suchrelationshipswiththegovernmentandwithindustryandbusiness(seetable11).

We observe a growing tendency to emphasise universityindustry links in national policy andreform debates in a number of countries. The extent towhich the development of publicprivatepartnerships isseenas important to institutions ishoweverunclear.Many institutionshave limitedexperiencewithdevelopingandmaintainingnewpartnershipswithexternalstakeholders.Possibleexplanationsforthelowlevelsofinterestinsuchactivitiesmayberelatedeithertothelackofacultureandtraditionofsuchpartnershipsinhighereducationinstitutions,oralackofinterestfromthesideofbusinessandindustry.Moreover,unfamiliarityandincompatiblemodusoperandiareotherexplanationswhy intenseuniversityindustry collaboration is limited inmany countries. Finally, itmustbenoted thatgiven themissionof someof institutions suchpartnershipsarenotparticularlyrelevant.Andofcoursetherearedifferenceswithininstitutionsforseizingsuchopportunitiesrelatedtoacademicdisciplines.

Table11:The influence of stakeholders in determining the policies of a higher educationinstitutionintheareaofenteringpublicprivatepartnerships(in%,n=722).



28 11


36 27


29 9


30 7


18 72

Academicstaff 39 20Students 11 1


21 5


39 26


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3.9. Conclusion: insti tutional autonomy and inst itut ional leadership

BecauseofoneofthemainfeaturesofEuropeanhighereducationthevarietyamongthe32highereducationsystems it is impossible todraw firmconclusions thatdojustice to thereforms thataregoingonwith respect to institutionalautonomy ineachandeverycountry.Moreover,wearewellawarethattherangeofgovernancereformsacrossEuropenotonlydiffersintermsofcontentbutalsoin termsof timing.Somecountriesadopted reformsconcerning institutionalautonomyearlier thanothers. And given their different histories, backgrounds and political realities countries havedevelopedtheirownversionsoftheverysamewaveofreform.Atthelevelofdiscourse(talk)thereare clear similarities across Europe, but at the operational level (action) diversity reigns.Nevertheless, our data from the national reports and the survey allow us tomake some generalobservations.

First,onthebasisoftheeightpolicyissuespresentedintheprevioussubsectionsweseethatthenational government, particularly the Ministry of Education, and institutional leadership andmanagementhasthemost influenceonallofthese issues.Assuggestedbymuch literatureonNewPublicManagement the data also show that academics today play amoremodest role (de Boer,EndersandSchimank2006).Theirinfluenceismainlyrelatedtotheprimaryprocesses(developmentofnewstudyprogrammesandissuesofqualityassurance).Otherstakeholdersindustry,students,and national agencies are, in general less influential.Given this overall picture, ajudgment oninstitutional autonomy is a matter of degree. In quite a few countries state regulation is stillsignificantly limiting institutionalautonomy,while inothercountries institutionshaveconsiderablediscretioninmanyoftheeightpolicyareas.

Second,inContinentalEuropeweobserveatendencytoenhanceinstitutionalautonomy.Oneoftheconsequencesofreshufflingauthoritiesandresponsibilitiesbetweenthevariouslevelswithinhighereducationsystemsisthat,whiletheroleofthenationalgovernmentisstillclearlyvisible,manypolicyissuesaredecidedattheinstitutionallevelandmanypowersareattributedtothetopmanagementofinstitutions. Themain trend taking the exceptions for granted is the strengthening of highereducation institutionsas (corporate)organizations (DeBoer,Enders&Leisyte, inpress).Enhancinginstitutional autonomy often means a strengthening of institutional leadership and management,particularly in those higher education systemswhere traditionally the institutional top levelwasrelativelyweak.

In the remainderof this sectionwewillhavea closer lookat the internalgovernance structuresofhighereducationinstitutionsinEurope.Wepresenttheperceptionswithrespecttogoodgovernanceprinciples. For this purposewemainly rely on the survey data. The sample of the survey has arelativelyhighproportionofinstitutionalleadersandmanagers.Thismaycausesomebias,giventheexperiencesofcomparableresearchintheNetherlandswhereleadersandmanagersexpressedmorepositive feelings about the governance andmanagement of their institutions than academics andstudents(deBoer,GoedegebuureandHuisman,2005).

Inourdata,particularlyinsomeofthecasestudies,weseethattraditionalnotionsofcollegialityandconsensusbaseddecisionmakingareunderpressure,makingroomforbusinesslikeleadershipandmanagement, aimed among other things at professionalizing institutional governance andmanagement(newpublicmanagement).Whilesuchchangeshavecausedturbulenceinanumberofcountries(e.g.theUK,Austria),littleresearch(withtheNetherlandsasanexception,seecasestudy)hasthusfarbeenconductedontheeffectsofnewgovernancestructuresontheorganizationalclimateandwhetherthenewstructuresaretrustedbyacademics,studentsandotherstakeholders.ThisisaninterestingissuetopursuesincecharacteristicssuchasopennessandparticipationareemphasizedasessentialelementsofgoodgovernancethroughouttheEuropeanarea.

Tables12,13and14refertotherespondentsperceptionsoftheinternalgovernancestructuresoftheir

institutions,

including

these

principles

of

good

governance.

The

first

conclusion

is

that

only

in

a

limitednumberofinstitutionsaresuchprinciples(particularlytheinclusionofexternalstakeholdersandthecoherenceofpolicies)seentobelacking.Ingeneral,therespondentsseetheirinstitutions,at

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least to some extent, ashaving clearlyunderstoodprocedures, adequatemonitoring and reportingsystems, significant participation from staff and students, and asbeing effective. The figures doindicate that few respondents signal the absence of key characteristics that are generally seen asreflectinggoodgovernance.

Table 13 confirms these positive feelings:many respondents agree that their governing structuresenhancethestrategiccapabilitiesoftheinstitution,stimulateincreasedinstitutionalperformance,arecharacterizedby clear responsibilities and duties, stimulate increased entrepreneurialism and arecapableofdealingwithfuturechallenges.Mostrespondentsdisagreewiththestatementthatthereistoomuchdominanceofinstitutionalleadership.Theinstitutionsare,accordingtothemajorityoftherespondents,bureaucratic,whichmaybe an indicationof toomuchmicromanagementwithin theinstitution due to proactivebehaviorby institutional management (reregulation instead of deregulation).

In the new settings the emergence of more micromanagement is evident because one of theconsequencesofenhanced institutionalautonomyhasbeenhigherlevelsofaccountabilityaswellasmore stringent and detailed procedures for quality assurance (the rise of the evaluative state).Greaterinstitutionalautonomyhasmeantgreaterresponsibilityforhighereducationinstitutions.Thismeansthatinstitutionshavetoredefinethewaysinwhichtheyinformtheirstakeholdersabouttheirperformances, and this in turn triggers more outward and performance oriented leadership.Additional demands are placed on institutional leadership, which require new modes ofcommunication with and assistance from decentralized units (faculties, schools, institutes,departments).Newproceduresandrulestructuresarebeingputinplacesometimescausingmorebureaucracy. In many cases this has led to a further rationalization in the institutions and newhierarchiesinwhichinstitutionalleadershipholdsacentralrole.

Although the overall picture presented here is rather positive, respondents still see room forimprovement: they would value more openness, effectiveness and, to a lesser extent, greateraccountabilityandmoreparticipationofstaffandstudentsindecisionmaking(seetable14).

Table12:Characteristicsofcurrentinternalgovernancestructuresinhighereducationinstitutions(in%,n=622)

Towhatextentisthecurrentinternalgovernancestructuresinyourhighereducationinstitutionischaracterisedby

Notatall Yes,tosomeextent

Yes,toalargeextent

Openness(e.g.,clearlyunderstoodprocedures,accesstoinformation) 5 49 46

Theinclusionofexternalstakeholders(e.g.,industry,localcommunities) 18 58 21

Accountability(e.g.,monitoringandreportingsystems) 6 50 42

Significantparticipationfromstaffandstudents 6 56 37

Effectiveness(e.g.,inmeetingimportantinstitutionalobjectives) 5 61 31

Coherence(e.g.,policiesareintegratedacrossdifferentpolicyareas,andacross

faculties/schools)

10 62 24

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Table13:Assessmentofcharacteristicsofcurrent internalgovernancearrangements inEuropeanhighereducationinstitutions(in%,n=622)

Thecurrentinternalgovernancearrangementsinmyhighereducationinstitution

(strongly)disagree (Strongly)agree

.enhancethestrategiccapabilitiesoftheinstitution(e.g.,longtermthinking)

18 79

.arebureaucratic(e.g.,timeconsuming) 37 61

.stimulateincreasedinstitutionalperformance(e.g.,increasedefficiency)

25 71

.createastrongfocusonthequalityofteachingandlearning(e.g.,actionstoimproveprogrammequality)

26 72

.arecharacterisedbyclearresponsibilitiesandduties

32 65

.aretoodominatedbytheinstitutionalleadership(e.g.,president,rector)

59 38

.stimulateincreasedentrepreneurialism(e.g.,publicprivatepartnerships)

39 52

.arecapableofdealingwithfuturechallenges(e.g.,increasedcompetition)

23 69

Table

14:

The

preference

for

some

characteristics

of

current

internal

governance

structures

in

highereducationinstitutions(in%,n=616)

Towhatextentwouldyouprefertheinternalgovernancestructuresofyourhighereducationinstitutiontobemorecharacterisedby:

Notatall Yes,tosomeextent

Yes,toalargeextent

Openness(e.g.,clearlyunderstoodprocedures,accesstoinformation)

5 23 71

Theinclusionofexternalstakeholders(e.g.,industry,localcommunities)

13 52 31

Accountability(e.g.,monitoringandreportingsystems) 9 36 53

Significantparticipationfromstaffandstudents 7 38 54

Effectiveness(e.g.,inmeetingimportantinstitutionalobjectives)

4 25 70

Coherence(e.g.,policiesareintegratedacrossdifferentpolicyareas,andacrossfaculties/schools)

5 29 64

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Thepicturethatispresentedaboveisaverygeneraloneandlocalsituationswillvary.Overall,therehasbeenatremendousamountofgovernancereformacrossEuropeanhighereducation indifferentareasandwithdifferenttimeframes.Ournationalreportsaswellasotherstudiesinthefieldillustratethis.According to therespondents tooursurveyasignificantnumberofchangeshavebeen for thebetter,butatthesametimetheyseeroomforfurtherimprovement.

4. Governance reforms and system performance from an institutional perspective

Thequestiononemayaskafter thisupdateongovernance reformand change inEuropeanhighereducation, is whether it is possible to find a linkbetween governance reform and the overallperformanceofthesystems.Althoughtherearereservationsas towhether it ispossibletoestablishsuchcausallinks,oursurveydataindicatethatinformantsdoseesomelinks.Astable15shows,themanypolicyinitiatives taken since1995are ingeneralnotperceivedasbeingveryeffectivebyourrespondents.Theoverallpicture thatderives from this is thatpoliciesare seenasbeing somewhateffectivewhilefurtherimprovementsareneeded.

Table15:Policyreformsandtheirperceivedeffectiveness1995 2006(in%,n=782)

Policiesintroduced

Policiesperceivedassomewhateffective

Policiesperceivedasveryeffective

accesstohighereducation

79 56 24

graduationrates 69 52 14

.employabilityofgraduates

52 52 9

.internationalmobilityofstudents

86 53 26

.internationalmobilityofacademicstaff

68 47 17

.thequalityofteachingandlearning

84 55 16

.researchoutput 73 53 21

.theexternalfundingofhighereducation

57 47 11

.theefficiencyofthehighereducationsector

72 52 10

This is perhaps themain reasonwhywe currently are seeing various forms of contractual steeringarrangements as thepreferredway forward formany governments.This implies that the notion ofinstitutional autonomy is increasingly followed by a stronger emphasis on the division ofresponsibilitiesandrolesbetweennationalauthoritiesandhighereducationinstitutions.Italsoimpliesthathierarchicalgovernancearrangementsarebeingreplacedbyarrangementsmorecharacterisedbynegotiation and the individualisation of policy initiatives taken. This may sometimes result in

decentralisation,

but

an

outcome

can

also

be,

as

shown

in

our

study,

that

the

state

reclaims

responsibility in areas considered tobe of national or strategic importance. In terms of system

30


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coordinationweseeagrowingrecognitionthatgovernancerelationshipsarenotonlybecomingmorecomplexanddynamicbutarealsoinvolvingmoreactorsfromdifferentlevels.

With respect to governmental instruments and reforms affectinghow contractual relationships aredesigned and used, one could argue that the emphasis on contractual steering arrangements hastriggered an interest in the standardisation and integration of available governmental steeringinstruments.This integrationand standardisationprovidesnationalgovernmentswithbenchmarksand more room to manoeuvre when entering negotiations with individual institutions aboutperformance goals and other output measures,but such instruments may also have effects onperformance as they open up the possibility of institutional (and introspective) comparisons on arangeofissues.

Intheareaofqualityassurance,forexample,onecanarguethatperformancegainsaretobemadebymovingtheoperationalresponsibilityforqualityassurancedownfromthenationaltotheinstitutionallevelviacontractualisation.Knowledgeandknowhowforimprovingteachingandlearningcanbeexpected tobemore systematicallydistributed throughoutEuropeanhigher education institutions.Interestingly,andasshownearlier,thisisperhapslessdependentontheactualnationalmethodsforexternal control of the institutional responsibilities in this area (whether accreditation, audit orassessmentsareused),andmoredependentonhownationaland institutionalneedsarenegotiatedthroughpractice.

Finally,aninterestingobservationcomingtotheforeinallourdataisanincreasinginterestinreformperse.Hence,quiterecentreformsseemtobefollowedbynewreformsexpandingorrelatingtopastreforms.Theresultisthatonecanobserveabroadeningofthescopeofreform,butalsoaspeedingupof thereform tempo.Thismight imply that thecountries involvedare improving theircapacity forimplementing reform, with the potential consequence that future changes in the governancearrangementsmaybemorecomprehensive,andperhapsmoreeffective than inthepast(PierreandPeters2000).Reformmayalsolinktheareaofhighereducationtootherpolicydomainsasevidentinthe increasing role the European dimension plays in domestic policymaking (van Vught 2006;

Maassen

and

Olsen

2007).

Although

we

have

little

hard

data

on

this

from

our

study,

there

are

hints

in

severalnationalreports thatdomesticreformagendas inhighereducationarehighly influencedbygeneralpublicsectorreforms inthe individualcountry,wherethehighereducationsector ispartofbroaderreformefforts.

5. References

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COM(2005)MobilisingthebrainpowerofEurope.CommunicationfromtheCommission,Brussels.deBoer,H.F.(2006)Governanceinhethogeronderwijs.InG.tenDam,H.vanHout,M.Mirande,C.

TerwlouwandJ.Willems(red.),HandboekHogerOnderwijs.Assen:VanGorcum.deBoer,H.F.,J.Enders,andU.Schimank(2006)OntheWayTowardsNewPublicManagement?The

GovernanceofUniversitySystemsinEngland,theNetherlands,Austria,andGermany.InD.Jansen,NewFormsofGovernance inResearchOrganizationsDisciplinaryApproaches, InterfacesandIntegration(forthcoming).

deBoer,H.F.,J.Enders andL.Leisyte (2007)Public sector reform inDutchhigher education:Theorganizationtransformationoftheuniversity.PublicAdministration(forthcoming).

DeBoer,H.F.,L.GoedegebuureandJ.Huisman(2005)GezondeSpanning:BeleidsevaluatievandeMUB,Beleidsgerichte studies in Hoger Onderwijs 114, Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur enWetenschap,DenHaag

Euridyce(2000)TwodecadesofreforminhighereducationinEurope:1980onwards,EuropeanCommission(DGEducationandCulture)http://www.eurydice.org/Documents/ref20/en/FrameSet.htm

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Eurydice(2005)FocusonthestructureofhighereducationinEurope2004/05.NationaltrendsintheBolognaprocess.Brussels:Eurydice.

Enders,J. (2004)Higher education, internationalization, and thenationstate:Recentdevelopmentsandchallengestogovernancetheory.HigherEducation,47,pp.361382.

EU(2005)TheEuropeanCharterforResearchers.www.europa.eu.int/eracareers/europeancharter.Goedegebuure, L.C.J., F.Kaiser, et al. (1994) Internationalperspectives on trends and issues in higher

educationpolicy.

Higher

Education

Policy.

An

international

perspective.Oxford:IAU&Pergamon

Press.Gornitzka,.,Kogan,M.&Amaral,A. (2005)Reformandchange inhighereducation.Analysingpolicy

implementation.Dordrecht,Springer.Gornitzka,.&Maassen,P.A.M.(2000)HybridsteeringapproacheswithrespecttoEuropeanhigher

education.HigherEducationPolicy,13,pp.267285.Haug,G.,andJ.Kirstein (1999)Trends I:Trends inLearning structures in higher education,European

UniversitiesAssociation.http://www.eua.be/eua/en/publications.jspxKehm,B.andU.Lanzendorf(2006)ReformingUniversityGovernance.ChangingConditionsforResearchin

FourEuropeanCountries.Bonn:Lemmens(forthcoming).Kirk,J. & Miller, M.L. (1986) Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research. Qualitative Research

Methodsseries,no.1.Sage:London.Laske, St., Lederbauer,D.,Loacker, B.&MeisterScheyttC. (2006) Struktur und Selbstverstndnis

sterreichischerUniversittsrte.JuliumsfondprojektNr.10345.Innsbruck.Maassen,P.A.M. (2006)TheModernisation ofEuropeanhigher education.Amultilevel analysis.Paper

presentedtotheDirectorsgeneralMeetingforHigherEducation,Helsinki,1920October.Maassen,P.A.M.&Olsen,J.P.(eds.)(2007)UniversitydynamicsandEuropeanIntegration.Dordrecht:

Springer(forthcoming).Maassen,P.A.M.&Stensaker,B.(2003)Interpretationsofselfregulation:Thechangingstatehigher

educationrelationshipinEurope,inBegg,R.(ed.)Thedialoguebetweenhighereducationresearchandpractice.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers.

Neave,G.(1988)Onthecultivationofquality,efficiencyandenterprise:AnoverviewofrecenttrendsinhighereducationinWesternEurope,19861988.EuropeanJournalofEducation,23(1/2):723.

Neave,

G.

and

F.

A.

van

Vught

(1991)

Prometheus

bound.

The

changing

relationship

between

government

andhighereducationinwesternEurope.Oxford:PergamonPress.Nickel, S., Witte J. & Ziegele F. (2006) Universittszugang und finanzierung. Analyse der

sterreichischenHochschulsteuerungundPerspektiven.StudycommissionedbytheAustrianRectorsConference(RK). Tobepublishedin2007.Gtersloh.

Pierre,J.andB.G.Peters(2000)Governance,PoliticsandtheState.HoundmillsBasingstoke:Macmillanpress.

Pollitt,C.andG.Bouckaert(2000)Publicmanagementreform:acomparativeanalysis.OxfordNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Reichert, S. and C. Tauch (2005) Trends IV: European Universities Implementing Bologna, EuropeanUniversitiesAssociation.http://www.eua.be/eua/en/publications.jspx

Schwarz, S..&Westerheijden,D. F. (eds.) (2004)Accreditation and evaluation in the European higher

education

area.

Dordrecht:

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Schimank,U.,B.Kehm,andJ.Enders (1999) Institutionalmechanismsofproblemprocessingof theGermanuniversitysystem:Statusquoandnewdevelopments.InD.BraunandF.X.Merrien.Towards a newmodel ofgovernancefor universities?A comparative view.London/Philadelphia:JessicaKingsley.53:17994.

Stensaker, B. (2003) Trance, Transparency and Transformation. The impact of external qualitymonitoringinhighereducation.QualityinHigherEducation,9,pp.151159.

Stensaker, B & Dan, T. (2006) Nordisk kvalitetssikring av hyere utdanning.Muligheterforgjensidiggodkjenningogktsamarbeid?NIFUSTEParbeidsnotat16/2006.Oslo.

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6. Executive Summary

6.1. Background and objectives of the study

ThereportsummarisesfindingsfromastudycommissionedbytheEuropeanCommission,DGEducationandCulture(20061407/001001S0281AWB).Thepurposeofthestudywastoexaminegovernancereformsthathavebeentakenplaceinhighereducationin32Europeancountriesatnationaland

institutionallevelineightareas:institutionalmissionandstrategy,governanceandmanagementstructures,developmentofnewstudyprogrammes,qualityassurance,financeandresourceallocation,humanresourcemanagement,studentaccessandselection,andpublicprivate

partnerships.

The

primary

aims

were

to

closer

investigate

the

following

two

issues:

- Howandbywhatmeanshasnationalgovernanceframeworkschanged?Whatarethemajorthemesanddevelopments?

- Howandbywhatmeanshastheautonomyofhighereducationinstitutionsandprofessionalleadershipchanged?Whatarethemajorthemesanddevelopments?

TheprojectwascarriedoutintheperiodJuneDecember2006bytheCenterforHigherEducationPolicyStudies(CHEPS),UniversityofTwente,theNetherlands(coordinator),CHECentreforHigherEducationDevelopment,Germany;NIFUSTEP,Norway;andtheEuropeanCentreforStrategicManagementinUniversities(ESMU),Belgium.

6.2. Methodology

Toanswertheresearchquestions,acombinationofmethodsandapproacheshasbeenused:- acomparativeanalysisofnationalgovernancereformreportsofthe32countries

involved,withparticularattentiontotheeightareasmentionedabove;- awebbasedsurveyofacademicstaffandmanagementinaselectednumberof

institutionswithinthe32countriestocapturetrendsinreforminitiatives;- thesamesurveywasusedtogatherviewsoftherespondents(includingexternal

stakeholders)regardingtheimpactsofthereformswithintheeightareas;- aindepthdescriptionandanalysisoffivecountiesexemplifyinggoodperformanceina

numberoftheselectedareas.

Theanalysisisbasedonthetriangulationofdatatocompensateforsomeweaknessesinthedata,inparticularalowresponserateinthesurvey.

6.3. Findings on changes in national governance frameworks

TheEuropeanuniversity landscape isprimarilyorganizedat thenationalandregional levelsand ischaracterizedbyahighdegreeofheterogeneity that isreflected in itsorganization,governanceandoperating conditions. Generally speaking, the states new role maybe termed facilitative as itattempts to create a viable higher education environment inwhich it controls the outcomes at asystemslevelwithoutdetailedinterference.

However,governmentsarenotwithdrawingfromresponsibilityforhighereducationsystemsbutareinsearchfornewmeansofsystemoversightandperformancebasedsteeringoforganizations.

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Responsibilitiesthatwereformerlythoseofthestatehavethusnotonlybeentransferredtohighereducationinstitutionsbutalsotootherorganizationssuchasresearchcouncils,accreditationbodiesetc.Newactorsatthenationallevel(e.g.ministriesofeconomicaffairs)andregionallevelareenteringthehighereducationscene,especiallygiventheirinterestintheemergingknowledgesocietyandtechnologytransfer.Inthisrespectthestatesrolebecomesoneofanetworkmanager(steering

throughnetworks)andnewregimesofgovernanceemerge:wenowseeamoremultiactor,multilevelgovernanceframeworkemerginginanumberofcountries.Withinthiscontext,fiveinterrelatedthemescanbeidentifiedwhencomparingthenationalreports,thecasestudiesandthesurveydatafromabottomupinstitutionalperspective:multivocalgovernanceinhighereducation,growingcompetition,newfundingarrangements,qualityassuranceinfusingtheinstitutionallevel,andshiftsintheinternalgovernanceofhighereducationinstitutions.

Thefirstthemeidentifiedisthathighereducationinstitutionsasactorshavegainedinimportanceinthesteeringofthesystem.Theriseoftheuniversityasamanagedorganisationreflectsnotonlythegrowinginfluenceofinstitutionalleadershipwithintheorganisationbutalsotheroleofuniversitiesaskeyactorsinnationalhighereducationpolicy.Thisoftenmeansadecreaseindirectgovernmental

interference

in

higher

education

in

certain

areas

matched

by

attempts

to

strengthen

institutional

autonomyaccordingly.Atthesametime,governmentalreformeffortsmayimplyevenstrongerstateregulationthaninthepast,andnotonlyaprocessoftransmittingresponsibilityfromthesystemtotheinstitutionallevel.

Thesecondtheme,closelyrelatedtothefirst,istheincreasedemphasisoncompetitionasameanstoenhancetheefficiencyandthequalityofthesector.Viewedtogether,thestudyshowaremarkabletendencyofanincreaseincompetitioninalmostall32systemsofhighereducation.Howthiscompetitionisframeddiffersfromcountrytocountry,but,ingeneral,wecanobservevariousformsofquasimarketsemerging.Thedifferencesbetweencountriesrelateto:

- howmuchinstitutionsareexposedtocompetition(theUKandtheNetherlandsbeing,for

example,

countries

where

institutions

are

increasingly

exposed)

- theareasdefinedasopentocompetition(forexampleresearchfunding,recruitmentofstudentsoracademicstaff)

- thesystemicconsequencesofthecompetitionregime(forexample,inNorwayinstitutionsarecompetingforafixedamountofresourcesallocatedonthebasisofresearchoutput,implyingthatsomewillwinandsomewillloseasaresultoftheprocess).

Concerningthethirdtheme,thereisanoticeableinterestinthe32countriesinreformingtheirhighereducationfundingsystems.Eventhoughournationalreportsdonotprovidehardevidenceontheleveloffundingallocatedtohighereducation,otherstudiesonchangesinthefundingregimesinEuropeindicatethattherehasnotbeenageneralreductioninthelevelofpublicfunding.Assuch,

stability

rather

than

change

seems

to

characterise

the

level

of

public

funding

of

higher

education

in

Europeoverthelastdecadealthoughthewaysresourcesareallocatedischangingandthefundingcostsperstu