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    www.oxfam.org

    THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

    A historic opportunity to deliver an arms trade treaty that saveslives

    Oxfam is a member of

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    Oxfam International July 2012

    This paper was written by Deepayan Basu Ray, Martin Butcher and Ben Murphy. Oxfam acknowledges

    the assistance of ATT Legal, Ed Cairns, Tom Fuller, Christian Gauthier, Daniel Gorevan, Libby Hayward,

    Robert Lindner, Anna Macdonald, John Magrath, Jonathan Mazliah, Claire Mortimer, Chris Stevenson-

    Drake, Nicolas Vercken and Helena Whall in its production. Primary research for Chapter 4 was conducted

    by Holger Anders.

    For further information on the issues raised in this paper, please e-mail [email protected]

    This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy,

    campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright

    holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in

    any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission

    must be secured and a fee may be charged. E-mail [email protected].

    The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.

    Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-78077-083-3 in July 2012.

    Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK.

    Oxfam

    Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations networked together in 92 countries, as part of

    a global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty. Please write to any of the

    agencies for further information, or visit www.oxfam.org.

    mailto:[email protected]://www.oxfam.org/http://www.oxfam.org/mailto:[email protected]
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    THE FINAL COUNDOWN

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    CONTENTS

    Foreword ........................................................................................ 5

    1 Overview ..................................................................................... 7

    Grasping a historic opportunity .................................................................................. 7

    Why this Treaty and why now? .................................................................................. 8

    The solutions are right before our eyes ..................................................................... 9

    A logical solution to a complex problem..................................................................... 9

    Call to action and recommendations for negotiators ................................................ 10

    2 The Devil is in the detail ........................................................... 11

    The case for regulation of the arms trade ................................................................ 12

    Why is this important? ............................................................................................. 12

    How could the ATT help? ........................................................................................ 13

    Call to action and recommendations for negotiators ................................................ 14

    3 Armed robbery .......................................................................... 17

    The development costs of uncontrolled arms transfers ............................................ 18

    The impact of corruption and lack of accountability ................................................. 19

    A mutually reinforcing initiative: Embedding development in the ATT ...................... 20

    Call to action and recommendations for negotiators ................................................ 21

    4 Stop a bullet, stop a war .......................................................... 23

    Silencing the guns: The importance of effective ammunition controls ...................... 24

    Enhancing transparency and accountability ............................................................ 24

    Strengthening existing controls................................................................................ 25

    How can the arms trade treaty help? ....................................................................... 25

    Call to action and recommendations for negotiators ................................................ 27

    5 Piecing it all together ............................................................... 29

    The case for global regulation of the trade in parts and components ....................... 30

    Parts and components in small arms production ..................................................... 30

    Closing potential loopholes in the Arms Trade Treaty .............................................. 31Call to action and recommendations for negotiators ................................................ 32

    Notes ............................................................................................ 35

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    FOREWORDConventional arms, and particularly small arms like pistols and rifles, have posed the greatest

    threat to human security since the end of World War II. While there are a number of treaties

    controlling the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, no similar

    agreements exist for conventional arms.

    It is not difficult to fathom that conventional arms have an incalculable destructive capacity the

    history of the 20th century is replete with examples of the chaos they can create. It is, however,

    more difficult to reconcile that their international trade has little to no legally binding global rules.

    This lack of comprehensive regulation remains an absurd reality of the 21st century.

    This lack of comprehensive control has resulted in incalculable costs to lives and livelihoods

    around the world. Irresponsible arms transfers have initiated or exacerbated armed violence

    and armed conflict to epidemic levels in some communities, robbing families of futures, and

    paralyzing communities.

    A number of countries have resolved to deal with the problem of an unregulated arms trade

    through the development of high national, sub-regional, or regional standards. Unfortunately,

    they have too often fallen victim to the activities of those who operate outside their jurisdiction.

    Without a set of global rules that binds everyone to a certain standard, it remains impossible to

    make meaningful progress, particularly on arms control issues.

    Following three years of heavy civil society lobbying, the UN General Assembly passed a reso-

    lution in 2006 to begin discussions on what a global Arms Trade Treaty ought to look like. Three

    years later, in 2009, the General Assembly passed a resolution to set in motion a formal proce-

    dure that would culminate in July 2012 with a four-week long Diplomatic Conference for the Ne-

    gotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

    The Diplomatic Conference for an ATT therefore represents a historic opportunity to put in placemeaningful controls on the international sale and transfer of arms, including ammunition, parts,

    and components. However, this negotiation will not be a straightforward process. Many fun-

    damental challenges remain to be ironed out by negotiations.

    This set of briefings outlines some of the key elements that must be in an ATT for it to protect

    lives. That includes: (a) legally binding criteria to assess risks emerging from arms sales; (b)

    the inclusion of items of control like ammunition; (c) the risk of irresponsible transfers of arms on

    socio-economic development; and (d) the role that the international trade in parts and compo-

    nents for weapons and military equipment now plays in the modern arms trade.

    These are some of the key elements that the ATT must effectively address, along with other keyissues such as a comprehensive list of all conventional arms and ammunition, and risk assess-

    ment criteria that not only includes development, but also human rights, humanitarian law, the

    potential for armed violence including gender based violence, corruption, and diversion of

    arms to other groups.

    There is a lot riding on these negotiations. But as the following briefings suggest, most of the

    answers already exist. The challenge will be in not compromising, in staying ambitious, and

    finding the political will to define and agree a treaty that will have a meaningful impact for gen-

    erations to come.

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    1 OVERVIEW

    Chapter summary

    In July 2012, governments have a historic opportunity to create a strong Arms Trade Treaty

    that saves lives and livelihoods and builds a more secure future for all the worlds citizens. Strong treaties gain new members and set international standards; weak treaties rarely get

    stronger. Governments must not compromise during the final countdown for the sake of

    securing universal agreement.

    The Treaty must cover all conventional arms, ammunition, parts and components, and all

    types of arms transfers.

    It must include strong criteria that prevent arms being transferred where there is a

    substantial risk that they will be used in violation of international human rights or

    humanitarian law, or will undermine development.

    It must have strong measures for transparency and accountability, and an effective

    implementation and enforcement mechanism. These must also assist countries to

    effectively implement and monitor the Treaty.

    Grasping a historic opportunity

    The arms trade is out of control. The irresponsible trade of arms is devastating lives and

    livelihoods around the world. In West Pokt, Kenya, Kiptela Tum's life has been irrevocably

    affected by the easy access to weapons and ammunition, Arms are a big problem because all

    of my three brothers have died because of guns. Now I am the only one to take care of the

    whole family and life is very hard.1

    Nyang'ataing Yaratome, from the same community, must

    come to terms with the loss of his son and eight other relatives because of armed raids on their

    village.2

    These terrible life experiences are replicated around the world on a daily basis, and the

    world can no longer continue turning a blind eye.

    The overwhelming majority of states have recognised this, and have agreed to negotiate an

    Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).3

    When governments convene in July 2012, they have a historic

    opportunity to achieve a common objective to bring the arms trade under control and reduce

    human suffering. But they must exercise caution. Under no circumstances should countries

    agree to a watered down Treaty that fails to achieve its objectives to reduce human suffering.

    There are strong lessons to be learned from the past 20 years of arms control efforts.

    Agreements like the Mine Ban Treaty (1997) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008)

    were successful because they established strong, clear and unambiguous legal obligations on

    all states parties, and helped to create new customary international standards.4

    Unless there are unambiguous and comprehensive legal obligations that apply evenly across

    the world, arms control mechanisms can be easily circumvented. Without a clear, strong set of

    rules to control the arms trade, excessive military expenditure will continue unabated,

    undermining global efforts to achieve development goals and reduce poverty. Without

    obligations on transparency, the shadowy and secretive global trade in arms and ammunition

    will continue unabated, fuelling corruption and hindering accountability. And without a

    comprehensive scope, unscrupulous arms dealers will continue to make huge profits by trading

    in parts and components far more lucrative than the trade in complete weapons systems and

    platforms. These challenges are considerable, but not insurmountable. To address them, the

    ATT must have a clear and compelling humanitarian rationale, recall the rights and

    responsibilities of all states to their citizens, and create a robust and comprehensive system to

    control the international trade in arms. Decades from now, those looking back on the 21stcentury should be able to judge the 2012 Treaty as a defining moment for global peace,

    development and security.

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    Why this Treaty and why now?

    The global arms trade is out of control

    The absence of a global regulatory framework resulted in at least $2.2bn worth of arms and

    ammunition being imported by countries under arms embargoes between 2000 and 2010.5

    Regional embargoes or partial UN embargoes (especially those that are specific to certain

    regions within countries) are destined for failure as Syria horrifically, continues todemonstrate. Despite mounting evidence of brutality and abuses, perpetrated by both sides,

    Russia has actively blocked all attempts to impose a comprehensive UN embargo on the Assad

    regime.6

    The only mechanism in place so far is the EU embargo, which prevents all EU member

    states from selling arms and ammunition to Syria. There is no such UN embargo. All non-EU

    countries are therefore free to sell any quantity of arms and ammunition they like.

    Arms are pouring into conflict-affected areas, increasing armed violence, fuelling

    corruption, and destroying all hopes of development.

    Military expenditure in fragile and conflict-affected countries around the world increased by 15

    per cent between 2009 and 2010, while Official Development Assistance (ODA) to these

    countries increased by only 9 per cent.7 A large share of the increase in ODA and humanitarianaid was due to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010.

    8Once the response to this earthquake

    has been factored in, ODA to the remaining fragile and conflict-affected states grew by a mere

    3.5 per cent. In 2010, this group of states accounted for less than 1 per cent of global wealth,9

    but 7 per cent of all arms sales (around $1.7bn).10

    Furthermore, Oxfams research has shown a clear link between corruption and the arms trade.

    All low-income and lower middle-income countries that allocated more than 10 per cent of their

    central government expenditure to the military in 2009 scored poorly on global corruption

    indices.11

    Much of the international arms trade remains shrouded in secrecy, particularly the trade

    in ammunition.

    There is little publicly available evidence to help understand the size and scale of the

    international trade in ammunition. Estimates suggest that the annual value of the trade in

    ammunition for small arms and light weapons is $4.3bn more valuable than the trade in

    firearms.12

    The international trade in ammunition is even less accountable and transparent than

    the trade in arms.13

    For example, there is no way of knowing just how much ammunition the

    Syrian authorities have imported since the start of the uprising in 2011. In fact, the discovery of

    a Russian shipment of several tonnes of ammunition bound for Syria in January 2012 was

    purely accidental.14

    There is little control or regulation of the global trade in parts and components.

    The ATT must address this massive loophole. The ability to procure spare parts and other

    critical replacement components is central to the arms trade. If the Treaty does not address this,

    it will effectively allow countries to equip their entire armed forces outside of the Treaty.

    Moreover, this trade is not insignificant the overall value of global parts and components sales

    was more than $9.7bn between 2008 and 2011.15

    This vast stockpile of weapons parts ranges

    from high-end components for aircraft, down to triggers, firing pins, and other parts for small

    arms and light weapons. The lack of effective controls of this trade means there is no way of

    knowing how much of it is being diverted into the black market. In turn, the flourishing of this

    black market means that violators of international law and human rights can maintain their

    destructive capabilities with relative ease.

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    The solutions are right before our eyes

    Unless the Treaty establishes a set of strong and comprehensive global regulations, arms will

    still find their way into the wrong hands. A useful starting point, therefore, are the national,

    regional, and multilateral standards already in place.

    Additionally, the ATT can build on existing regional and sub-regional initiatives; in 2012, 100

    countries are already party to various regional agreements that include legally binding

    obligations to control the trade of arms and ammunition.16 These regional initiatives are also a

    good means of determining what can be effective in a range of different scenarios and contexts.

    No globally negotiated standard should be lower than existing regional standards.

    In the run-up to the July negotiations, some states have expressed concerns about the potential

    cost and burden of implementing the ATT. The first and most obvious answer to this is that the

    cost of not having effective global arms controls is much higher, both in terms of lives lost and

    economics. Beyond this, there are a number of funding mechanisms already in place that could

    help countries become ATT-compliant. For example, drawing on ODA funds earmarked for

    security sector reform (SSR) could help to strengthen the capacity of police and customs

    officials, while also building in strong accountability and transparency mechanisms. In 2010

    alone, 101 countries received more than $832.5m worth of SSR-related assistance of direct

    relevance to national implementation of the ATT.17

    A logical solution to a complex problem

    1. The ATT must have robust and legally binding criteria.The ATT must be unambiguous in the obligations it places on member states. The Treaty must

    use prohibitive language that prevents states transferring arms if there is a substantial risk that

    these arms will:

    Be used to perpetrate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law;

    Undermine socio-economic development or involve corrupt practices;

    Provoke or exacerbate armed conflict or armed violence, including gender-based armed

    violence.18

    2. The ATT must be comprehensive in the scope of weapons and types of transfers covered.

    The ATT must include all weapons that is, all military, security and police arms, related

    equipment and ammunition, components, expertise, and production equipment. It must also

    include all types of transfers: import, export, re-export, temporary transfer, and transhipment, in

    the state-sanctioned and commercial trade, plus transfers of technology, loans, gifts, and aid.

    And it must include all transactions, including those by dealers or brokers, and those providing

    technical assistance, training, transport, storage, finance, and security.19

    Precedents already exist in the form of a number of regional and multilateral instruments, suchas the ECOWAS Convention, the Best Practice Guidelines on the Implementation of the Nairobi

    Protocol, the EU Common Position, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. These identify a broad

    range of weapons, transfers, and transactions to apply controls over.

    3. The ATT must include strong, effective international assistance and co-operation

    mechanisms to help countries ratify and implement the Treaty.

    For many states with limited national transfer control systems, well-defined mechanisms for

    assistance and co-operation will be vital for effective implementation of the Treaty. The

    international co-operation and assistance framework proposed under the Treaty will have a

    critical bearing on its success. Therefore, the ATT must include effective mechanisms to identify

    and match needs with resources. These mechanisms should be explicitly linked tocomplementary and existing initiatives (such as bilateral and multilateral assistance

    mechanisms, and thematic assistance like that of SSR) for maximum impact.20

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    4. The ATT must be ambitious but realistic in terms of national implementation obligations,

    ratification, and dispute resolution.

    The Treaty must set the minimum requirements for national implementation, which include

    provisions for transparency, monitoring mechanisms, and evidence of capacity to enforce the

    Treaty and thereby demonstrate compliance.21

    Establishment of these mechanisms and

    processes will place states in a much stronger position to control and monitor all movements of

    arms and ammunition from, through, and to their national territory.

    The Treaty should also outline a realistic mechanism for resolution of disputes, which may

    include referral to external bodies, such as the International Court of Justice, if a state party is

    confirmed to be in persistent and flagrant violation of the Treaty.

    Finally, the Treaty must ensure that entry into force requirements are not dependent on any

    one country or specific group of countries.

    Call to action and recommendations for negotiators

    Above all else, states must not forget the urgent humanitarian need to bring the 21st

    century

    arms trade under control. The core humanitarian, human rights, and development rationale forthe ATT must not be compromised for universal agreement or profit.

    Evidence about what happens when the arms trade is poorly regulated is there for all to see.

    But the requirements for an effective arms control system are also clear to see. The ATT must

    produce a system that is credible and fit for purpose. The cost of failure is simply too high.

    A strong Treaty must include:

    A set of strong criteria that will stop the transfer of arms to those who abuse human rights,

    violate humanitarian law, or seek to undermine development;

    A thorough risk assessment process to determine when transfers are likely to have serious

    negative repercussions;

    All conventional arms and ammunition, as well as all parts and components, in its scope, so

    that there are no loopholes;

    Effective mechanisms to help countries that will need assistance to comply with Treaty

    requirements;

    Clear and unambiguous requirements on countries to comply, including obligations to

    systematically report on all their arms transactions.

    If this Treaty conference is to become a historic moment, and have a meaningful impact on the

    lives of millions of vulnerable people around the world, governments must keep this simple

    message in mind: there can be no compromise on the key elements needed for a strong Treaty.

    To compromise would create a weak Treaty, full of loopholes and inconsistencies. A robust and

    ambitious ATT, on the other hand, would oblige states to exert more scrutiny over arms exports

    and limit the ability of unscrupulous arms dealers. It would prevent irresponsible arms transfers,

    limit the ability of human rights abusers to obtain deadly weapons and ammunition, and reduce

    the extent to which much-needed resources are diverted from essential services in order to buy

    arms. It would strengthen democratic control and oversight on a deadly trade still fraught with

    corrupt practices, which has a devastating impact on the peace and security of regions and

    communities.

    In short, states must remain ambitious, accept no compromise, and ultimately agree an Arms

    Trade Treaty that will save lives. There can be no other rationale.

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    2 THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAIL

    The importance of comprehensive and legally binding criteriafor arms transfers

    Chapter summary

    The absence of comprehensive, international legal obligations to prevent irresponsible

    transfers of arms has resulted in at least $2.2bn worth of arms and ammunition being

    imported by countries under arms embargoes between 2000 and 2010;

    To have real impact, a prospective Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) must include legally

    binding criteria that prevent arms transfers to abusers of human rights or into situations

    where there is a substantial risk that they will undermine development or exacerbate

    armed violence; The ATT can build on existing regional and sub-regional initiatives: as of 2012, 100

    countries are already party to various regional agreements that include legally binding

    obligations to control the trade of arms and ammunition.

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    The case for regulation of the arms trade

    The global trade in most consumer goods is internationally regulated and carefully controlled. In

    contrast, the global trade in arms and ammunition is not. Currently, there are no legally binding,

    robust, and universally applicable criteria governing the transfer of weapons across borders.

    This is despite the fact that more than 2,000 people are killed every day due to armedviolence.22

    This lack of regulation has profound implications for the lives and livelihoods of

    millions of women, men, and children throughout the world.

    Between 2000 and 2010, and despite the 26 UN, regional, and multilateral arms embargoes in

    force during this period,23

    Oxfam estimates that at least $2.2bn worth of arms and ammunition

    was imported by countries under arms embargoes.24

    The arms trade urgently needs a set of

    legally binding international rules to control the transfer of weapons. These rules, or criteria,

    must be based on thresholds defined by legally binding obligations in international human rights

    law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter, and relevant UN conventions, covenants,

    and treaties. Without this, some states have little incentive to prevent the irresponsible trade in

    arms.

    In order to have meaningful impact, arms embargoes and other prohibitions require a global

    regime with clear, unambiguous legal obligations on states to refrain from certain types of

    activities, such as states shall not transfer arms The UN Diplomatic Conference on the Arms

    Trade Treaty (ATT DipCon) will take place in July 2012. This offers member states of the UN a

    historic opportunity to create a global, comprehensive, rules-based mechanism to control the

    global trade in arms. For these negotiations to be successful and achieve real humanitarian

    impact, states must agree a set of rules that prevent the transfer of arms where there is a

    substantial risk that those arms would:

    Be used to perpetrate gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations

    of international humanitarian law;

    Undermine socio-economic development, or involve corrupt practices; or

    Provoke or exacerbate armed conflict or armed violence, including gender-based armed

    violence.

    Why is this important?

    1. Stopping human rights abuses

    The lack of robust and legally binding obligations governing the sale and transfers of arms

    allows those perpetrating human rights abuses to continue to stock their arsenals. In 2010, for

    example, Syria imported more than $1m25

    worth of small arms and light weapons, ammunition,

    and other munitions, as well as air defence systems and missiles worth an additional $167m.26

    Some of these arms have played a central role in the Syrian governments crackdown on

    protesters,27 in which the UN estimates that as many as 7,500 civilians were killed in 2011. 28 A

    report from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights outlined a litany of

    government abuses, including apparent shoot-to-kill policies against protesters by snipers.29

    The report further stated that, Information provided to the commission illustrates the extensive

    resources that the government and armed forces have devoted to efforts to control protests. In

    addition to regular military units armed with automatic weapons, the military deployed snipers,

    Special Forces units, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and intelligence units during

    operations to end demonstrations.30

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    The humanitarian impact of the

    arms transfers to Cote dIvoire

    while it was under an arms

    embargo is stark. In 2006,approximately 26,000 Ivoirians

    sought refuge in other

    countries, and 709,000

    remained internally displaced.

    Source:

    UNHCR 2006 Statistical Yearbook

    http://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.html;

    UNHCR Global Report 2006

    http://www.unhcr.org/4666d2340.html

    2. The failure of embargoes and other instruments to prevent arms transfers

    Oxfams estimate, that $2.2bn worth of arms was

    imported by states in contravention of embargoes, is

    conservative; the actual amount is likely to be much

    higher. There is a lack of data on arms transfers for

    many of the relevant countries. In addition, Oxfams

    estimates do not capture the substantial volumes of

    arms transfers into fragile situations just beforearms

    embargoes were imposed, as took place in Cte

    dIvoire, Iran, and Syria.31

    They also do not include

    cases where arms embargoes could not be agreed

    multilaterally, despite the existence of a strong moral

    and humanitarian case for doing so. The failure by the

    UN Security Council in 2011-2012 to impose an arms

    embargo on Syria while the Syrian government

    continues to import arms and ammunition freely is

    just the most recent illustration of this.

    Furthermore, states must learn the lessons of previous

    efforts at arms control particularly the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light

    Weapons (UNPoA). The UNPoA is not a legally binding mechanism, and so has not been able

    to develop a globally applicable rules-based system. As a result, the UNPoA has generated little

    or no meaningful humanitarian impact since its establishment in 2001.

    3. Ensuring clear guidance on legal obligations

    The ATT must include unambiguous legal obligations and clear guidance to member states.

    This will minimise the scope that states have for interpretation of their responsibilities. Space for

    interpretation can result in dangerous oversight or inaction. For example, the EU has imposedan arms embargo on Syria, which all member states have been obliged to enforce since May

    2011. However, lack of specific guidance on how to enforce this resulted in Cypriot authorities

    failing to stop a cargo vessel containing arms and ammunition from Russia bound for Syria

    when it transited through the port of Limassol in January 2012.32

    4. Minimising opportunities for the misuse of arms

    Unambiguous guidelines for governments making risk assessments when considering the

    transfer of arms and ammunition are critical to the success of the ATT. Recent transfers of arms

    to the Middle East and North Africa suggest that European arms exporters did not believe that

    there was a significant likelihood of these heavy weapons being used against domestic civilian

    populations.33 This assumption was used to justify arms sales to the governments of Libya as

    recently as 2010, despite credible evidence to the contrary.34 Subsequently, some of these

    weapons were used to deliberately target civilian protesters and were also used in

    indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas.

    How could the ATT help?

    The ATT must create a legally binding instrument that includes a comprehensive set of risk-

    assessment criteria for all future arms transfers. The criteria must be robust, covering the

    potential consequences of arms transfers for human rights law, humanitarian law, socio-

    economic development, corruption, and armed violence. But most importantly, these criteria

    must be unambiguous and legally binding. Without this, the status quo will not change.

    http://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.htmlhttp://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.htmlhttp://www.unhcr.org/4666d2340.htmlhttp://www.unhcr.org/4666d2340.htmlhttp://www.unhcr.org/4666d2340.htmlhttp://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.html
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    If a robust and comprehensive mechanism controlling arms transfers had been in place, it would

    have been very difficult for non-state armed actors like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

    (LTTE) to acquire sophisticated Chinese weapons and ammunition during the 20-year conflict in

    Sri Lanka. There is evidence that the LTTE purchased both small arms and ammunition for

    heavier weapons (such as mortars and artillery) from China. One report stated that, Recent

    photographs of rebel troops available on pro-LTTE websites show a range of evidently newChinese weaponry including the modern 5.56 mm QBZ-95 bullpup-design assault rifle, which

    cannot have been captured from government forces.35

    This contributed to the escalation of the

    conflict between the LTTE and government forces with devastating consequences for civilians

    in Sri Lanka. The UN estimates that between 80,000 and 100,000 people have been killed and

    more than 200,000 people displaced since the war in Sri Lanka began in the 1980s.36

    The ATT represents a historic opportunity to bring together complementary, thematic, regional,

    and parallel initiatives on arms transfer controls under one comprehensive framework. Legally

    binding criteria enacting high standards are not an anomaly: 100 countries that are party to

    various regional mechanisms have already agreed to robust, legally binding obligations to

    control the trade of arms and ammunition.37

    A further 35 countries are party to arms control

    instruments that seek to create a common operational standard: the Wassenaar Arrangementand the OSCE instrument on small arms and light weapons. Each of these mechanisms

    articulate the key elements necessary to make the ATT effective namely, prohibitive decision-

    making processes if there is a risk that the arms would negatively impact on human rights and

    development or contribute to corruption or armed violence. The ATT would harmonise these

    initiatives into one comprehensive, legally binding, and universal instrument.

    Call to action and recommendations for negotiators

    The UN preparatory process towards the ATT has revealed that there is a considerable appetite

    amongst member states to agree a treaty. The challenge will be to ensure that the treaty is of

    sufficient quality and substance. To be effective, the ATT must deliver a comprehensive, robust,and legally binding global mechanism that is as unambiguous as possible.

    This can be achieved in three ways.

    1. Language of shall not

    If the ATT is to have any significant humanitarian value it must emphasise prohibitive language.

    It must use the terms shall not, should not, must not, or will not and their equivalents in all

    other languages. Where this will matter most is in the wording of the criteria; the individual and

    contextual considerations that allow or deny specific arms transfer requests.

    2. Comprehensive criteria linked to shall not

    Prospective arms transfers must be prohibited under the ATT where there are substantial risks

    that they will:

    Be used to perpetrate gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations

    of international humanitarian law;

    Undermine socio-economic development or involve corrupt practices; or

    Provoke or exacerbate armed conflict or armed violence, including gender-based armed

    violence.

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    3. Global standards must not be lower than existing regional and multilateral agreements

    A global treaty must build on existing agreements to avoid any uncertainty about acceptable

    thresholds for arms transfers. The criteria for arms transfers in the ATT must be wholly

    consistent with and no less ambitious than existing mechanisms such as the EU Common

    Position, the ECOWAS Convention, the Nairobi Protocol, and the OAS Model Legislation. All of

    these regional agreements include comprehensive criteria and legally binding obligations built

    on shall not language in their respective texts.

    The 2012 ATT DipCon is an historic opportunity for UN member states to define acceptable

    parameters for arms transfers, and to make these legally binding. To this end, negotiators must

    not compromise on the robustness of the transfer criteria. In situations where there is a high risk

    of negative consequences, arms transfers must be explicitly prohibited.

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    3 ARMED ROBBERY

    How the poorly regulated arms trade is paralysing development

    Chapter summary

    The poorly regulated global trade in arms and ammunition weakens the ability of

    governments to sustain progress in development, both by fuelling and exacerbating

    conflicts and armed violence, and by diverting resources away from poverty reduction

    activities.

    Military expenditure in fragile and conflict-affected countries grew by 15 per cent

    between 2009 and 2010, while Official Development Assistance (ODA) to these

    countries grew by only 9 per cent.

    Irresponsible arms transfers fuel corruption, with knock on effects on development andaccountability. All low- and lower middle-income countries which allocated more than

    10 per cent of their central government expenditure to the military in 2009 scored poorly

    in corruption indices.

    Through a strong focus on development, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) can help prevent

    serious impediments to development, consolidate regional initiatives to safeguard

    development, and strengthen national capacity to become treaty-compliant.

    Existing funding mechanisms are already in place which could help countries become

    ATT-compliant. In 2010 alone, 101 countries received development assistance of direct

    relevance to national implementation of the ATT.

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    The development costs of uncontrolled arms transfers

    The irresponsible, excessive proliferation of arms and ammunition fuels and exacerbates

    conflict and armed violence. This is why arms control initiatives have major implications for the

    processes of socio-economic development. By implementing social and economic policies, as

    well as those relating to poverty reduction, development, security sector and arms control,governments can create the necessary environment to access essential services and enable

    people to make the choices and decisions that affect their daily lives.

    The poorly regulated trade in arms and ammunition weakens the ability and willingness of

    governments to create these enabling environments. Development gains are reversed as

    communities are paralysed; closing schools, placing immense strain on health systems,

    discouraging investment, and undermining security.

    The arms trade is big business it is estimated that military spending around the world totalled

    $1.6 trillion in 2010.38

    Sales to fragile and conflict-affected states39

    accounted for 7 per cent of

    all arms sales (around $1.7bn) in 2010.40 In the same year, the global share of GDP for these

    countries amounted to just 0.7 per cent of the total, and ODA amounted to $27bn.41

    Anadditional $4.8bn was provided in humanitarian aid that year to these countries.

    According to the World Bank, 1.5 billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or

    large-scale organised criminal violence, and no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country

    has yet achieved a single UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG).42

    On average, these states

    lag 40 to 60 per cent behind other low and middle-income countries in MDG achievement.43

    The UN estimates that, in addition to current levels of ODA, a further $5070bn is required to

    meet the MDGs by 2015.44

    It is therefore particularly worrying that military expenditure in fragile and conflict-affected

    countries grew by 15 per cent between 2009 and 2010, while ODA to these countries grew by

    only 9 per cent.45 The increase in ODA was grossly uneven, with the largest increasesconcentrated in four countries and 12 countries experiencing reductions in ODA. In some cases,

    military expenditure was nearly treble that of public expenditure on health or education. It is

    worth recognising that the growth in military expenditure in these countries has happened

    despite the global recession.

    Between 1990 and 2006, Africa lost an estimated cumulative total of $284bn as a result of

    armed conflict on average $18bn per year. This was nearly the same as the total amount of

    ODA that the continent received during this time.46

    This has had dire impacts on socio-

    economic progress. The World Bank estimates that the economic cost of lost production due to

    conflict ranges from 2 per cent to 3 per cent of GDP. In addition, military spending increases

    typically by 2.2 per cent during civil wars,

    47

    drastically reducing the resources available to tacklecritical threats such as HIV/AIDS. To put this in context, in 2008 the MDG Africa Steering Group

    identified an annual requirement of $14bn to scale up effective HIV prevention and universal

    access toAIDS treatment across the continent.48

    Armed violence has shrunk national economies in Africa by a staggering 15 per cent.49

    Countries neighbouring those in conflict are also affected, losing up to 0.7 per cent of their

    annual GDP for each neighbour involved in civil war.50

    Furthermore, armed violence and conflict

    place considerable strain on the delivery of public services, which means that governments and

    public officials are forced to make difficult decisions on spending. In Zambia it costs $1015 to

    treat a patient with malaria, or to provide antiretroviral therapy and a months course of anti-

    tuberculosis medication in government health centres.51

    At these rates, it would be possible to

    scale up service delivery to meet the MDG targets on major diseases, given that Zambiasannual per capita expenditure on health is $48.52 This investment is comprehensively degraded

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    when hospitals must instead treat patients injured by gunshot wounds or anti-personnel land

    mines, at a cost of between $100 and $3,000 each.

    In even relatively stable countries such as Zambia, evidence continues to suggest that paying

    for the effects of armed violence undermines service delivery. As a result, the benefits of

    stability and peace are slow to reach the most vulnerable members of society. This is more

    evident still in fragile or conflict-affected states and in countries that have recently emerged from

    conflict. This insecurity often creates conditions that drive demand for tools of violence, in turn

    undermining the rule of law, diminishing security, and deepening poverty and suffering in a

    vicious cycle.

    The implications of military expenditure in Eritrea

    Eritreas military continues to be the largest recipient of central government resources.

    Estimates for 2006 suggest that military expenditure was equivalent to 6.3 per cent of GDP

    ($163m in absolute figures) the eighth highest share in the world that year. The armed

    forces accounted for 9.3 per cent of the countrys total labour force, the highest ratio inAfrica by far. Eritreas arms imports were equivalent to nearly 35 per cent of total ODA

    received between 2000 and 2006. This is significant, because ODA to Eritrea accounted

    for an average of 36 per cent of the countrys gross national income (GNI) in this period

    The prioritisation of military expenditure has in many ways stifled socio-economic

    development. For example, expenditure on health in 2011 was a mere 1.5 per cent of GDP

    and education accounted for only 2 per cent, resulting in a literacy rate of just 58 per cent

    for those aged above 15. Eritrea remains well behind the rest of Africa in its human

    development scores and ranks globally at 177 out of 187 countries on the UNDP Human

    Development Index. It has also scored poorly on transparency and corruption indices like

    the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.

    Sources: CIA World Factbook 2011; OECD DAC (2008), p.41.; UNDP Human Development Index (2011)

    The impact of corruption and lack of accountability

    The notoriously secretive nature of the arms trade has allowed corruption to flourish. Many

    governments continue to be secretive about the details of their defence budgets, and in some

    cases military expenditure comes from off-budget sources, which have few or no public

    oversight mechanisms.53

    The unregulated arms trade has also facilitated irresponsible

    procurement. All low- and lower middle-income countries which allocated more than 10 per cent

    of central government expenditure to the military in 2009 scored poorly on corruption indices,

    such as Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index, that year.54

    This also held true when extended to include the data most recently available prior to 2009 for

    the rest of the countries in these two classifications.

    Without strong, accountable, and transparent governance structures, development processes

    cannot take root and succeed in transforming lives.

    In 2005, Transparency International estimated the global cost of corruption in the defence

    sector to be a minimum of $20bn per year, based on data from the World Bank and SIPRI.55

    This equates to the combined global ODA provided to Iraq, Afghanistan, the DRC, Congo,

    Pakistan, and Bangladesh in 2008, or the total sum pledged by the G8 in LAquila in 2009 tofight world hunger.56

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    Corrupt arms deals not only affect the security of the recipient country, but also pose a

    significant opportunity cost for countries to consider. In 1999, an arms deal between South

    Africa and a number of European defence companies triggered numerous allegations of

    corruption. The initial budget was estimated to be R9.2bn ($1.2bn), but by 2005 this had

    increased to an estimated R66bn ($9.1bn).57

    To put this into context, by 2008, for every R1

    spent by the government of South Africa on providing assistance to South Africans living withAIDS, an equivalent R7.63 was being spent on financing the arms deal.58

    In a country where the

    formal unemployment rate is around 30 per cent, the additional finances that were allocated for

    this deal could have been invested into significant productive and socially beneficial initiatives.59

    In summary, the irresponsible transfer of arms undermines development efforts when:

    The easy availability of and access to conventional arms and ammunition initiate, prolong,

    and aggravate armed violence and conflict;

    Arms transfers affect prospects for peace, and undermine the rule of law and reconciliation

    efforts in post-conflict environments;

    Expenditure on arms increases national debt and diverts vital and limited funds away from

    public services such as education and health care;

    Expenditure on arms involves or encourages systemic corruption.

    A mutually reinforcing initiative: Embedding development in theATT

    1. Preventing serious impediments to development

    Although an ATT is not a panacea, it represents a key tool to impede irresponsible and

    destabilising arms purchases. Firmly embedding development criteria for arms transfers in the

    ATT would ensure that arms would not be transferred to places such as Myanmar, where in

    2006 the value of arms imports was equivalent to a staggering 72 per cent of all ODA received

    by the country.60

    Other notable examples that year included Yemen (71 per cent) and Eritrea

    (34 per cent).61

    Another case in which an ATT could have prevented a transfer was the 2001 sale by a British

    company of a military air control system for civilian purposes to Tanzania for 28m. At the time,

    the UN International Civil Aviation Organisation reported that the system was not adequate and

    too expensive for civil air control.62

    A former industry official reportedly received 8m in bribes,

    almost one-third the value of the entire deal.63

    2. Consolidating regional initiatives to safeguard development

    A number of regional instruments, such as the ECOWAS Convention, the Best Practice

    Guidelines on the Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, the EU Common Position, and the

    Wassenaar Arrangement, commit states to assess the developmental impact of arms transfers

    in recipient countries. The ATT must ensure that these regional thresholds on the implications

    for socio-economic development are not undermined, and must create an architecture that

    reinforces these minimum standards.

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    3. Strengthening national capacity to become treaty-compliant

    Many states have suggested that the ATT must put in place mechanisms to curtail the diversion

    of arms from the proper authorities and markets to illicit, terrorist, or clandestine groups. One

    way to do this is to ensure that security sector officials are appropriately trained and incentivised

    to do their jobs to the highest standards. Projects focusing on security sector reform aim to do

    just that, and three areas of this are directly relevant to the ATT. These are:

    Monitoring, training, or retraining civil administrators and police forces in routine policing

    functions;

    Training in customs and border control procedures;

    Civilian oversight and democratic control of security expenditure.

    The international assistance and co-operation mechanisms for the ATT must link explicitly to

    these complementary initiatives. This is primarily because the areas relevant for the ATT are

    also eligible for existing funding mechanisms through ODA budgets in particular. In fact,

    statistics show that states are prepared to financially support these priorities. Cumulative

    expenditure on ODA-eligible security sector activities by major donors in 2010 amounted to$832.5m.

    64Even after adjusting for Afghanistan ($124.3m), global ODA-eligible security sector

    expenditure in 2010 amounted to over $708m. Including Afghanistan, 101 countries received

    assistance in 2010, with Indonesia, Angola, Sudan, and Haiti each receiving in excess of $20m

    in funds.65

    Call to action and recommendations for negotiators

    A specific criteria on development, alongside other criteria on human rights and international

    humanitarian law is the best way to ensure that arms sales do not have a negative impact on

    socio-economic development. This criteria will not stop legitimate arms transfers, which can

    help provide a secure space for development.66

    There are five ways in which specific language in the treaty can protect development.

    The preamble of the treaty must make reference to all relevant development-focused legal

    obligations, as enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    relevant UN conventions and covenants, and other legally binding regional and sub-regional

    treaties, such as the Arab Charter on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and

    Peoples Rights. It must recognise the symbiotic relationship between arms control, peace and

    security, and socio-economic development. It must also recognise the implications of poor arms

    control on armed violence, gender-based violence, corruption, poverty, serious violations of

    human rights law and international humanitarian law, displacement of people, organised crime,

    and the illicit trade in arms and narcotics.

    The criteria of the ATT must stipulate that the transfer of conventional arms must be prohibited

    if there is a substantial risk that those arms would seriously impair poverty reduction. Transfers

    that negatively impact on efforts to achieve higher standards of living and on conditions of

    economic and social progress and development, or which contravene the principle of least

    diversion to armaments of human and economic resources, must also be prevented by the ATT.

    The treaty must create a set of anti-corruption standards that states can use to assess specific

    transfers on a case-by-case basis. These standards should focus on the types of arms to be

    exported, the end-users, and the relevant controls already existing in the countries where the

    end-users are based. These standards should also focus on brokers/agents/intermediaries and

    the commissions they receive, as well as on the price/financial value of the deal in question.

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    4 STOP A BULLET, STOP A WAR

    Why ammunition must be included in the Arms Trade Treaty

    Chapter summary Guns are useless without bullets. An Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that does not control

    ammunition will not achieve its purposes.

    Ammunition is bigger business than weapons. Twelve billion bullets are produced each

    year nearly two bullets for every person in the world. The global trade in ammunition

    for small arms and light weapons is worth more than the trade in firearms and light

    weapons themselves: an estimated $4.3bn per annum.

    The international trade in ammunition is even less accountable and transparent than

    the trade in arms. Ammunition flows are difficult to monitor, so the risk of diversion to

    unauthorised or illicit users is increased.

    Several countries, including the USA, China, Egypt and Syria, are arguing that

    ammunition should be excluded from the ATT. Some of these countries say the sheervolume of trade makes it too difficult to monitor. This would be a colossal mistake.

    There are now several reasonably simple and effective ways to track ammunition

    transfers. Inclusion in the ATT would significantly strengthen these mechanisms and

    the resolve to implement them. Failure would undermine what best practice already

    exists.

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    Silencing the guns: The importance of effective ammunitioncontrols

    Wars cannot be fought without ammunition. When the principal targets of attack are civilians, as

    has been the case in many recent conflicts, a lack of ammunition can even make a difference

    between atrocities being carried out or not. For example, in June 2003, anti-government forcesattacking Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, were forced to retreat when they ran out of

    ammunition. It was only when they received fresh illegal supplies from neighbouring Guinea

    that they were able to resume their onslaught, which proved to be the longest and most

    devastating attack on Monrovias civilians.67

    Countless lives were lost and a massive

    humanitarian operation had to be undertaken by Oxfam and others.68

    In 2007, a lack of ammunition forced warring pastoralists in South Sudan to resolve their

    disputes peacefully.69

    In 2010, the panel of experts monitoring the UN Security Council arms

    embargo in Somalia reported that the absence of readily available ammunition for certain types

    of weapons had limited their popularity and use by armed groups.70

    An Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that does not cover ammunition will fail to achieve what it has setout to do that is, to help prevent human suffering, armed conflict, and serious violations of

    international humanitarian law and human rights. It is illogical to argue otherwise. Guns can be

    almost endlessly recycled and re-used, moving from conflict to conflict.71

    The phrase when the

    war ends, the guns remain is often heard in parts of Africa, where it is estimated that more than

    50 per cent of small arms and light weapons in circulation are used illegally, not only in conflicts

    but in armed robbery, organised crime and terrorism.72

    This self-perpetuating cycle of violence can only continue so long as it is fuelled by the

    irresponsible transfer of ammunition. A global system of strong, legally binding controls on

    ammunition transfers under an ATT would help stem the flow of ammunition to human rights

    abusers, repressive regimes and illicit armed groups, rendering many of their weapons ineffective.

    Enhancing transparency and accountability

    The trade in ammunition is even less accountable and transparent than the trade in arms. Only

    a small number of countries report on their ammunition exports and there are hardly any reports

    by intergovernmental agencies covering this trade. Often data on ammunition is not categorised

    separately and is just lumped in with data on arms exports,73

    making it difficult to determine the

    actual volume of international trade in ammunition and to monitor where it actually ends up.

    However, it is certain that the trade in ammunition is very, very big business. An estimated 12

    billion rounds of ammunition are produced each year74

    nearly two bullets for every person in

    the world. Studies estimate that the trade in ammunition for small arms and light weapons is

    worth $4.3bn per annum more valuable than the trade in small arms and light weapons

    themselves (an estimated $2.68bn).75

    It is also growing at a faster rate.76

    Oversight and documentation of ammunition transfers is all the more important because

    ammunition is even more easily transferable than arms, and thus can be more easily diverted

    from legitimate to illicit users. Some of the biggest gaps in information relate to undocumented

    ammunition transfers to countries undergoing high-intensity conflicts, including Afghanistan and

    Somalia,77

    where, even if the initial transaction was legitimate, there are significant risks of

    diversion. In 2009, 57 per cent of a sample of rifle magazines found on Taliban casualties in

    Afghanistan contained cartridges or bullets identical to ammunition that the USA had provided

    to its ally, the Afghan government forces.

    78

    Similarly in Somalia, the UN Monitoring Groupestimated that, in 2008, as much as 80 per cent of the arms, ammunition and other material

    supplied to support the Transitional Federal Government had been diverted to opposition

    groups, the Somali arms market, or for private purposes.79

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    Strengthening existing controls

    Several countries, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam and the USA, have argued that

    including ammunition in the ATT would be too difficult to implement and manage given the

    sheer volume produced and exported, as well as the challenges faced in tracing individual

    rounds.

    80

    They say that having ammunition in the ATT would create a huge set of newobligations that would be too difficult to monitor.

    However, despite deficiencies in practice, the overwhelming majority of states that export

    military equipment already have controls for ammunition through their arms export control

    systems. Most countries assess licence applications for arms and ammunition transfers in the

    same way and apply the same risk assessment thresholds. The USA does this and similar

    explicit arrangements are in force in the EU and within countries participating in the Wassenaar

    Arrangement.81

    Several regional and multilateral instruments also explicitly seek to control the cross-border

    trade in ammunition. These include the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light

    Weapons and the 2005 Best Practice Guidelines on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Hornand Eastern Africa.

    82

    The problem, as is often the case, is not with the existing regulations per se, it is that they are

    not always properly enforced or backed up with robust oversight and monitoring mechanisms.

    This applies to the international arms trade more generally. On the one hand, transparency has

    improved steadily over the past 20 years. On the other hand, reporting remains inconsistent and

    incomplete.83

    Few governments provide regular and comprehensive information about their

    arms transfers; only 34 states have publicly reported on their arms exports at least once since

    2006.84 It is important to note, however, that 28 of these 34 managed to include ammunition in

    their reporting as a separate and discrete category.

    The ATT is intended to change that by strengthening existing controls and enhancingtransparency and accountability in the arms trade generally. With regards to ammunition, the

    least transparent aspect of that trade, the ATT should seek to replicate, widen, encourage and

    strengthen the best practice that already exists, rather than ignore it and weaken or still further

    undermine it. Just as it will not be necessary to monitor the transfer of every single firearm

    individually, under the ATT an effective risk assessment system will not mean that the journey of

    every individual bullet has to be monitored.

    How can the arms trade treaty help?

    1. Enhancing national control systems for ammunition

    The ATT will set out a global regulatory framework for authorising and recording international

    transfers of arms. To do this effectively countries will have to: establish a national system,

    including clear legislation; develop and strengthen administrative capacity for processing all

    aspects of transfers; and introduce mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance.

    Establishing these systems will have to be done regardless of whether ammunition is included,

    but existing best practice illustrates that once in place, national export control systems are fully

    capable of controlling ammunition transfers in the same way as arms.2. Setting out risk assessment criteria for both arms and ammunition transfers

    The ATT will set out a list of risk assessment criteria against which transfers of arms will beassessed before approval. Using this system does not require monitoring each individual

    firearm, or each individual bullet, in order to assess the risk of misuse or diversion of arms or

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    ammunition to unauthorised end users. Rather, under the ATT, transfer licensing authorities

    would apply a systematic methodology that considers past trends or patterns, intelligence, and

    credible information about prior misuse or diversion by the stated end-user. Such assessments

    would also consider whether there is a substantial risk of ammunition being used to commit

    serious human rights violations. Exporting states would be obliged to consider the track record

    of the end user and bear a share of the responsibility if arms or ammunition were subsequentlydiverted.

    In fact, in some ways it should be easier to monitor end use and identify sources of diversion of

    ammunition than of firearms. This is because ammunition used in conflicts typically originates

    from state actors who were originally in legal possession of it, rather than from private

    individuals. A job lot of small arms ammunition produced for state actors is typically only

    transferred to a single, or a small number of, end users.

    An Undeniable Risk: Tracing illicit ammunition in CtedIvoire

    In 2010, the UN Group of Experts on Cte dIvoire were asked to trace several thousand

    rounds of illicit ammunition found in the hands of civilians in the capital. The Groups work,

    and subsequent follow-up investigations, established that the ammunition had been

    manufactured in Serbia, sold to an agent in Israel, and then legally re-transferred to the

    military in Burkina Faso. It had then disappeared and re-appeared on the streets of Abidjan

    in neighbouring Cote dIvoire.

    While the exact details of the diversion could not be established, the Group maintained that,

    based on credible evidence, the ammunition likely entered Cte dIvoire via Burkina Faso,

    revealing clear challenges to the capacity of the Government of Burkina Faso to ensure the

    security of its national stockpile and prevent diversion. Further investigations, physical

    evidence, and key informant reports verified that Burkina Faso was the primary conduit for

    illicit supplies of both arms and ammunition to Cte dIvoire, illustrating a high risk of arms

    originating from the Security Forces of Burkina Faso being diverted for illicit use.

    Source: UNSC (2011) Report of the Group of Experts on Cte dIvoire pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security

    Council Resolution 1946 (2010), UN document S/2011/272, paras 124, 127, pp.31-2; paras 129-30, pp.33-4

    3. Transparency and reporting

    Given that current levels of public reporting on the transfer of ammunition are so low, improved

    reporting on such transfers, as a discrete category under an ATT, would greatly reduce the

    significant gaps in information which currently blight the system. Improved public reporting onauthorised ammunition transfers would increase opportunities for citizens to scrutinise and hold their

    governments to account for their arms transfer decisions. It would also provide a valuable source of

    information for UN Groups monitoring implementation of UN Security Council embargoes.85

    Existing best practice for reporting on ammunition transfers has not been shown to pose undue

    logistical challenges. Despite claims that ammunition transfers are so large as to represent an

    unmanageable part of the global arms trade, the number of licences that EU member states

    granted for ammunition transfers in 2010 amounted to a mere 4.8 per cent of the number of

    licences granted for all military equipment.86

    Since the ATT will apply only to international transfers, reporting will not oblige states to divulge

    sensitive information, such as existing stockpile quantities or domestic production.87Additionally, as reporting will occur months, if not years, after a transfer has been authorized,

    sensitive security information about military operations will not be jeopardised.

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    5 PIECING IT ALL TOGETHER

    Why the Arms Trade Treaty must regulate parts andcomponents for weapons and military equipment

    Chapter summary

    Modern weapons and military equipment cannot be made or maintained without parts and

    components. But these are traded around the world in a globalised market that is poorly

    regulated.

    Between 2008 and 2011, the global trade in parts and components was worth at least

    $9.7bn.

    Weapons are assembled from components sourced from all corners of the world

    frequently from countries without any effective arms transfer controls. The poorly regulated trade in spare parts allows irresponsible users to circumvent arms

    embargoes.

    The Arms Trade Treaty provides a unique opportunity to regulate the specialised parts and

    components used in the arms trade and, indeed, will be fatally flawed if it does not do so.

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    The case for global regulation of the trade in parts andcomponents

    Modern weapons and military equipment cannot be made or maintained without the parts and

    components that are traded around the world in a globalised market. Without regulating this

    trade alongside the trade in complete weapons, it will be impossible to reduce the impact ofirresponsible arms transfers on human rights, security, and development.

    Between 2008 and 2011, the global trade in parts and components was worth at least $9.7bn.89

    This vast stockpile of weapons parts ranged from high-end components for aircraft to parts for

    small arms and light weapons (SALW). Without this huge movement of parts and components,

    the arms trade as we know it could not exist.

    Parts and components in small arms production

    The vast majority of the weapons and ammunition used in conflicts in Africa, including rifles,

    rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mortars, machine guns, and similar SALW are imported

    from outside the continent.90 There is, however, a burgeoning industry of SALW production in

    several sub-Saharan African countries, which has been facilitated with the assistance of

    countries outside the region. In many cases this trade is legitimate, but in others the weapons

    are used to commit violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

    One of the products in widespread production and circulation across Africa is the Kalashnikov

    (or the AK-47) rifle dubbed by Oxfam in 2006 as the worlds favourite killing machine.91

    The

    effects of this rifle have been particularly devastating to Africa. Between 1990 and 2005, the

    continent lost more than $18bn every year due to armed conflict.92 Today, some 50 to 70 million

    rifles are in circulation, and have been used in nearly all the continents wars and rebellions in

    the past 70 years. This is in part due to multiple local production sources, and also the activities

    of criminal brokers like Viktor Bout. Cheap and simple to maintain, the AK-47 is the weapon ofchoice in many countries lacking in technological capacity.

    Several Ethiopian companies produce Kalashnikov rifles, mortars, grenade launchers, and

    small arms ammunition. The Gafat Armament Engineering Complex (GAEC) began producing

    the Kalashnikov variant, the AK-103, in the 1990s, with assistance, parts, and raw material from

    North Korea.93

    Further parts were imported in 2006.94

    This weapon was used in the Ethiopia

    Eritrea War of 19982006 and in the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2008.

    Nigerias Defence Industries Corporation also produces a version of the Kalashnikov rifle and its

    ammunition, with assistance from China.95

    The firm claims that it is able to assemble Belgian

    mortars, Soviet-era rifles, and RPGs, as well as Belgian and Italian light machine guns.

    Like other producers in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia, and Zimbabwe none of these

    companies could function without assistance, technology, and parts and components from

    outside Africa and many of these are transferred without effective controls that would ensure

    that this trade supports security rather than undermines it.

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    Closing potential loopholes in the Arms Trade Treaty

    At one end of the scale, there is a steady increase in online retailers selling components for

    SALW around the world.96

    At the other, global defence companies build tanks, aircraft, and

    other major systems with parts and components from multiple sources and from many

    countries. BAE, for example, sources major components from six countries for its Challenger 2

    tank, which is built in the UK.97

    Some less industrialised countries buy equipment such as tanks or aircraft in kit form; these are

    transported as components to be put together in the buyer country, in licensed production. In

    2011, the Egyptian government signed an extension to a longstanding deal to assemble

    American M1A1 Main Battle Tanks in Egypt. By the end of the contract, the government will

    have bought 1,130 M1A1s for assembly in Egyptian factories.98

    Chinese K-8E jet trainer

    aircrafts are also being assembled in Egypt through a similar deal.

    99

    The trade in parts and components is now a global business. Not regulating deals like these

    under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will create a loophole large enough for nations to equip their

    entire armed forces outside of the treaty.

    The ability to procure spare parts is essential to maintain weapons and vehicles, and the weak

    regulation of this trade has significantly blurred the lines between the licit and illicit markets

    resulting in a flourishing black market for military spare parts.

    Without spare parts, weapons quickly become useless. This applies not only to weapons in the

    hands of legitimate and responsible security forces, but also to those in the hands of groups

    who may use them to violate human rights or fuel conflict. Because of such concerns, Libya and

    Iran have been subject to a series of national, regional, and UN embargoes. The very differentability of these two countries to acquire spare parts underlines the importance of regulating this

    trade in order to uphold international law and avoid fuelling the illegal arms trade.

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    Libya and Iran

    In 2011, Libya had a theoretical total of 374 combat aircraft, but most of these were

    inoperable, limiting the Gaddafi regimes ability to attack its own civilians.100 As early as

    2004, US military analyst Anthony Cordesman had described Libya as the worlds largestmilitary parking lot, as so few of its combat aircraft were in service, after international

    sanctions had made spares largely unobtainable.101

    Even before NATO introduced a no-fly

    zone over the country, there had been few reports of attack helicopters or combat aircraft

    actually being used. Pilots reported flying just a handful of missions, and one aircraft

    actually crashed due to mechanical failure.102

    However, the uncontrolled trade in parts has allowed other countries to undermine arms

    embargoes.Iranhas a network of dealers operating in both legal and illegal markets to

    circumvent US and UN sanctions. It has a substantial air force, including around 300

    combat aircraft,103

    60 per cent of which are estimated to be operational at any one time.

    These are kept operational by the trade in spare parts and by significant domestic

    production of components through reverse engineering of equipment that Iran alreadyowns or has been able to obtain on the black market.104

    In 2010, a French dealer was

    imprisoned in the USA for attempting to export F-5 fighter jet engines and parts to Iran,105

    and the Irish company Mac Aviation Group was charged with purchasing F-5 parts from

    US firms and illegally exporting them to Iran.106

    For all these reasons particularly the globalised nature of the arms trade it is vital that parts

    and components are included in a legally binding international ATT. This does not mean that the

    sale of every nut, bolt, or spring should be controlled. But it does mean regulating those parts

    and components that are specifically designed, manufactured, or modified for military purposes,

    and which are critical to functioning weapons and their ammunition.107

    Without global regulation of the trade in parts and components, it will be impossible to

    effectively regulate any part of the arms trade, as companies will be able to circumvent the rules

    by shipping weapons in pieces from multiple countries around the globe. If the legitimate trade

    in parts and components is globally regulated in a transparent manner by the ATT, then

    identifying and shutting off the illicit trade will become much easier. The trade standards

    contained in the ATT, incorporated into national law by all states party to the treaty, will be the

    only way to know what is being traded and where, and thus to allow that trade to be controlled.

    Call to action and recommendations for negotiators

    States that support a robust and effective ATT must advocate strongly for the inclusion of

    specialised parts and components in the scope of the treaty. This would not include simple

    items, but only those specifically designed and manufactured for the arms industry.

    The global trade in parts and components is an integral part of the arms trade. Weapons and

    military equipment are built from parts sourced from across the world, or can be shipped across

    borders in pieces for assembly.

    Parts and components are also an integral part of after-sales servicing to maintain or repair

    equipment, including by irresponsible users. This is true for major items of equipment, such as

    aircraft and tanks, and also for small arms and light weapons.

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    All governments should ensure that:

    The ATT includes in its scope all specialised parts and components designed and produced

    for the arms industry or able to be used in defence equipment;

    Just like all completed weapons and systems, the transfer of parts and components is

    subject to comprehensive risk assessments undertaken by exporting authorities

    particularly because exports of obscure components may well have a critical role in reviving

    the full lethal capacity of a weapon or system;

    Transfers of such parts and components are fully included in ATT reporting requirements,

    with reports made public to enhance transparency and accountability.

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    NOTES

    1Interviews with residents of West Pokot, Kenya in June 2012.

    2Ibid.

    3 UN General Assembly Resolution 64/48 from 2009 outlined a timeline of discussions and consultations,culminating in a four-week Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty to be held in July 2012.

    4It must be noted that both the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and

    Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (colloquially referred to as the Mine Ban Treaty)and the Convention on Cluster Munitions are prohibitions/bans, which the ATT is not. Furthermore, bothhave been negotiated in forums outside the UN.

    5D. Basu Ray (2012) The Devil is in the Detail: The importance of comprehensive and legally binding

    criteria for arms transfers, Oxfam Briefing, Oxford: Oxfam International, May, p. 2

    6J. Irish (2012) France to push Russia on Syria sanctions, expels envoy, Reuters, 29 May

    7D. Basu Ray (2012) Armed Robbery: How a poorly regulated arms trade is paralysing development,

    Oxford: Oxfam International, June, p. 2

    8 In Haiti, between 2009 and 2010, development assistance increased threefold (from $1.1bn to $3.0bn),and humanitarian assistance increased eleven-fold (from $142m to $1.56bn (OECD StatExtracts 2012)

    9The total cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) of this group of fragile and conflict-affected states

    amounted to around 0.7 per cent of total global GDP for 2010. Source: OECD StatExtracts 2012; WorldDevelopment Indicators

    10Composite of 2012 World Development Indicators data and OECD StatExtracts 2012

    11Armed Robbery, op. cit., p. 4

    12B. Murphy and D. Basu Ray (2012) Stop a Bullet, Stop a War: Why ammunition must be included in the

    Arms Trade Treaty, Oxford: Oxfam International, May, p. 3

    See also P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder (2009) Sifting the Sources: Authorized small arms transfers,

    in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7; P. Herron, N.Marsh, M. Schroeder (2011) Larger but Less Known: Authorized light weapons transfers, in Small ArmsSurvey 2011: States of Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 9

    13Ibid.

    14L. Harding (2012) Cyprus stops Syria-bound Russian ammunition ship, the Guardian, 11 January,

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/11/cyprus-stops-syria-russian-ship

    15M. Butcher and D. Basu Ray (2012) Piecing it Together: Why the Arms Trade Treaty must also regu-

    late parts and components, Oxfam International, June, p. 2

    16The Devil is in the Detail, op. cit., p. 4

    17OECD StatExtracts 2012

    18The Devil is in the Detail, op. cit., p. 5

    19Control Arms Coalition (2009) The Vital Components of an Arms Trade Treaty,

    http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ATT-one-pager_english.pdf20

    This could include, inter alia: (a) development or review of legislation and administrative procedures; (b)development or strengthening of states parties international arms transfer control systems; (c)enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies; (d) development of international arms transferdata-management; (e) development of the capability to produce an annual report; (f) development ofcapacity to prevent diversion; (g) training of relevant personnel; and (h) victim assistance. See: ControlArms Coalition (2011) Promoting Implementation of the ATT, Position Paper No. 4, June,http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Implementation.English.NEW_.final_.pdf

    21Ibid.

    22Whereas the headline figure from the 2011 Report of the Geneva Declaration Secretariat is 526,000

    people who are directly killed by armed violence each year, the figure dramatically increases when the

    indirect conflict deaths are added to the figure, to give an estimate of 742,000 per year averaging toabout 2092 deaths per day. Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011), Global Burden of Armed Violence2011: Lethal Encounters, Geneva, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, pg.70.

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/11/cyprus-stops-syria-russian-shiphttp://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ATT-one-pager_english.pdfhttp://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ATT-one-pager_english.pdfhttp://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Implementation.English.NEW_.final_.pdfhttp://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Implementation.English.NEW_.final_.pdfhttp://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ATT-one-pager_english.pdfhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/11/cyprus-stops-syria-russian-ship
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