the first founding father: aristotle on freedom and...

chapter two

The First Founding Father:Aristotle on Freedom and

Popular Government

Gregory R. Johnson

the western tradition of political philosophy can be di-vided into two opposed strands. On the one hand are the de-fenders of individual freedom and popular government. On theother are those who subordinate individual freedom to collec-tive goals imposed by ruling elites. These two strands of thoughtcan be traced back to the founding documents of the tradition:elitism and collectivism to Plato’s Republic, individualism andpopular government to Aristotle’s Politics.1 Thus, if we are tounderstand the connection of freedom and popular government

I wish to thank Glenn Alexander Magee, Charles M. Sherover, Tibor R.Machan, David Rasmussen, and Martin L. Cowen III for discussing the topicof this paper with me and for their helpful comments and suggestions. Theusual disclaimer applies.

1. I accept the arguments of Leo Strauss and his many students, not tomention Plato’s explicit statements, that the Kallipolis of the Republic is meantnot as a serious political proposal but as a thought-experiment for illuminat-ing the structure of the soul and for illustrating the ultimate incompatibilityof the philosophical life and the political life, that is, the impossibility of a“philosopher king.” See Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Charlottesville: TheUniversity Press of Virginia, 1964), ch. 2. But this does not imply that Platowas a friend of individualism and popular government. Nor does it changethe fact that the collectivist strand of the Western philosophical traditionconstantly harkens back to the Republic.

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and defend them persuasively, we must turn first to Aristotle’sPolitics.

To cite Aristotle as the father of individualism and populargovernment may, at first glance, seem implausible. After all,Aristotle did not think that individual freedom is the highestpolitical value. Indeed, he explicitly advocates using state co-ercion to morally improve citizens. Nor did he think that de-mocracy is the best form of government. Aristotle shares Plato’selevated conception of the philosophical life as the pursuit ofwisdom. Philosophy begins with opinions about the cosmos,the soul, and the good life, then ascends dialectically to thetruth. Opinion is the common coin of political life, but truth israre and precious, the possession of the few. This does not soundconsistent with the advocacy of popular government.

Nevertheless, Aristotle’s Politics offers a number of powerfuland persuasive arguments for popular government as a bulwarkof individual freedom. Such political theorists as HannahArendt, J. G. A. Pocock, Sheldon Wolin, and Mary P. Nicholsplace Aristotle in a tradition of republicanismthat stresses activecitizen participation in government.2 Furthermore, Fred D.Miller Jr. has argued persuasively that Aristotle is the father of

2. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1958), chs. 1–2; J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment:Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1975), 550; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision(Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 57–8; Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen:A Study of Aristotle’s Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992).Although Nichols takes seriously Aristotle’s case for popular participation,she explicitly differentiates her reading of Aristotle from those of Arendt,Pocock, and Wolin by emphasizing the necessity of statesmanship to guidepopular participation. In this, she seeks to incorporate elements of the aris-tocratic interpretation of Aristotle offered by Strauss (The City and Man, ch.1) and his students: Carnes Lord, “Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle’sPolitics,” Hermes 106 (1978): 336–57; Delba Winthrop, “Aristotle on Partic-ipatory Democracy,” Polity 11 (1978): 151–71.


30 / Gregory R. Johnson

the tradition of natural rights theory, one of the richest sourcesof arguments for individual freedom and popular rule.3 Finally,both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson saw Aristotle as one ofthe first formulators of the principles of the American founding,a view seconded by such scholars as Harvey C. Mansfield Jr.,Charles M. Sherover, Paul A. Rahe, and Carl J. Richard.4

1. the necessity of politics

Aristotle is famous for holding that man is by nature a politicalanimal. But what does this mean? Aristotle explains that “evenwhen human beings are not in need of each other’s help, theyhave no less desire to live together, though it is also true thatthe common advantage draws them into union insofar as nobleliving is something they each partake of. So this above all is theend, whether for everyone in common or for each singly” (Pol-itics 3.6.1278b19–22).5 Here Aristotle contrasts two different

3. Fred D. Miller Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). See also Aristotle’s Politics: A Symposium,The Review of Metaphysics 49, no. 4 (June 1996), which consists of six extensivepapers on Miller’s book and Miller’s reply. Roderick T. Long’s contribution,“Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” is an often persuasive attempt to pushAristotle even further in the direction of classical liberalism.

4. Adams and Jefferson are quoted in Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient andModern, vol. 3, Inventions of Prudence: Constituting the American Regime(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 27, 58–73; HarveyC. Mansfield Jr., America’s ConstitutionalSoul (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1991), chs. 8, 9, and 14; Charles M. Sherover, Time, Free-dom, and the Common Good: An Essay in Public Philosophy (Albany: State Uni-versity of New York Press, 1989), ch. 5; Carl J. Richard, The Founders and theClassics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1994), esp. ch. 5; cf. John Zvesper, “The American Foun-ders and Classical Political Thought,” History of Political Thought 10 (1989):701–18.

5. All quotes from Aristotle are from The Politics of Aristotle, trans. anded. Peter L. Phillips Simpson (Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1997). Simpson’s edition has two unique features. First, the Politics is


The First Founding Father / 31

needs of the human soul that give rise to different forms ofcommunity, one prepolitical, the other political.

The first need is material. On this account, individuals formcommunities to secure the necessities of life. Because few of usare capable of fulfilling all our needs alone, material self-interestforces us to cooperate, developing our particular talents andtrading our products with others. The classical example of sucha community is the city of pigs in the second book of Plato’sRepublic.

The second need is spiritual. Even in the absence of materialneed, human beings will form communities because onlythrough community can we satisfy our spiritual need to livenobly, that is, to achieve eudaimonia, “happiness,” which Aris-totle defines as a life of unimpeded virtuous activity.

Aristotle holds that the forms of association that arise frommaterial needs are prepolitical. These include the family, themaster-slave relationship, the village, the market, and alliancesfor mutual defense. With the exception of the master-slaverelationship, the prepolitical realm could be organized onpurely libertarian, capitalist principles. Individual rights andprivate property could allow individuals to associate and disas-sociate freely by means of persuasion and trade, according totheir own determination of their interests.

But in Politics 3.9, Aristotle denies that the realm of materialneeds, whether organized on libertarian or nonlibertarian lines,could ever fully satisfy our spiritual need for happiness: “It isnot the case . . . that people come together for the sake of life

introduced by a translation of Nicomachean Ethics 10.9. Second, Simpsonmoves books 7 and 8 of the Politics, positioning them between the traditionalbooks 3 and 4. I retain the traditional ordering in my citations, indicatingSimpson’s renumbering in brackets. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes arefrom the Politics. Quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics will be indicated withthe abbreviation NE.



alone, but rather for the sake of living well” (3.9.1280a31) and“the political community must be set down as existing for thesake of noble deeds and not merely for living together”(3.9.1281a2). Aristotle’s clearest repudiation of any minimalis-tic form of liberalism is the following passage:

Nor do people come together for the sake of an alliance toprevent themselves from being wronged by anyone, nor againfor purposes of mutual exchange and mutual utility. Otherwisethe Etruscans and Carthaginians and all those who have treatieswith each other would be citizens of one city. . . . [But they arenot] concerned about what each other’s character should be, noteven with the aim of preventing anyone subject to the agree-ments from becoming unjust or acquiring a single depravedhabit. They are concerned only that they should not do anywrong to each other. But all those who are concerned about agood state of law concentrate their attention on political virtueand vice, from which it is manifest that the city truly and notverbally so called must make virtue its care. (3.9.1280a34–b7)

Aristotle does not disdain mutual exchange and mutual protec-tion. But he thinks that the state must do more. It must concernitself with the character of the citizen; it must encourage virtueand discourage vice.

But why does Aristotle think that the pursuit of virtue ispolitical at all, much less the defining characteristic of the po-litical? Why does he reject the liberal principle that whetherand how individuals pursue virtue is an ineluctably privatechoice? The ultimate anthropological foundation of Aristote-lian political science is man’s neoteny. Many animals can fendfor themselves as soon as they are born. But man is born radi-cally immature and incapable of living on his own. We needmany years of care and education. Nature does not give us theability to survive, much less flourish. But she gives us the abilityto acquire the ability. Skills are acquired abilities to live. Virtue



is the acquired ability to live well. The best way to acquire virtueis not through trial and error but through education, whichallows us to benefit from the trials and avoid the errors of others.Fortune permitting, if we act virtuously, we will live well.

Liberals often claim that freedom of choice is a necessarycondition of virtue. We can receive no moral credit for a virtuethat is not freely chosen but is instead forced upon us. Aristotle,however, holds that force is a necessary condition of virtue.Aristotle may have defined man as the rational animal, butunlike the Sophists of his day, he did not think that rationalpersuasion is sufficient to instill virtue:

. . . if reasoned words were sufficient by themselves to make usdecent, they would, to follow a remark of Theognis, justly carryoff many and great rewards, and the thing to do would be toprovide them. But, as it is, words seem to have the strength toincite and urge on those of the young who are generous and toget a well-bred character and one truly in love with the noble tobe possessed by virtue; but they appear incapable of inciting themany toward becoming gentlemen. For the many naturally obeythe rule of fear, not of shame, and shun what is base not becauseit is ugly but because it is punished. Living by passion as theydo, they pursue their own pleasures and whatever will bringthese pleasures about . . . ; but of the noble and truly pleasantthey do not even have the notion, since they have never tastedit. How could reasoned words reform such people? For it is notpossible, or not easy, to replace by reason what has long sincebecome fixed in the character. (NE 10.9.1179b4–18)

The defect of reason can, however, be corrected by force: “Rea-son and teaching by no means prevail in everyone’scase; instead,there is need that the hearer’s soul, like earth about to nourishthe seed, be worked over in its habits beforehand so as to enjoyand hate in a noble way. . . . Passion, as a general rule, does notseem to yield to reason but to force” (NE 10.9.1179b23–25).The behavioral substratum of virtue is habit, and habits can be



inculcated by force. Aristotle describes law as “reasoned speechthat proceeds from prudence and intellect” but yet “has forcebehind it” (NE 10.9.1180a18). Therefore, the compulsion ofthe appropriate laws is a great aid in acquiring virtue.

At this point, however, one might object that Aristotle hasestablished only a case for parental, not political, force in moraleducation. Aristotle admits that only in Sparta and a few othercities is there public education in morals, whereas “In mostcities these matters are neglected, and each lives as he wishes,giving sacred law, in Cyclops’ fashion, to his wife and children”(NE 10.9.1180a24–27). Aristotle grants that an educationadapted to an individual is better than an education given to agroup (NE 10.9.1180b7). But this is an argument against thecollective reception of education, not the collective provision.He then argues that such an education is best left to experts,not parents. Just as parents have professional doctors care fortheir childrens’ bodies, they should have professional educatorscare for their souls (NE 10.9.1180b14–23). But this does notestablish that such professionals should be employees of thestate.

Two additional arguments for public education are found inPolitics 8.1:

[1] Since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that everyonemust also have one and the same education and that taking careof this education must be a common matter. It must not beprivate in the way that it is now, when everyone takes care oftheir own children privately and teaches them whatever privatelearning they think best. Of common things, the training mustbe common. [2] At the same time, no citizen should even thinkhe belongs to himself but instead that each belongs to the city,for each is part of the city. The care of each part, however,naturally looks to the care of the whole, and to this extent praisemight be due to the Spartans, for they devote the most seriousattention to their children and do so in common.(8.1[5.1].1337a21–32)



The second argument is both weak and question-begging. Al-though it may be useful for citizens to think that they belongto the city, not themselves, Aristotle offers no reason to believethat this is true. Furthermore, the citizens would not think sounless they received precisely the collective education thatneeds to be established. The first argument, however, is quitestrong. If the single, overriding aim of political life is the hap-piness of the citizens and if this aim is best attained by publiceducation, then no regime can be legitimate if it fails to providepublic education.6

Another argument for public moral education can be con-structed from the overall argument of the Politics. Because pub-lic education is more widely distributed than private education,other things being equal, the populace will become more vir-tuous on the whole. As we shall see, it is widespread virtue thatmakes popular government possible. Popular government is,moreover, one of the bulwarks of popular liberty. Compulsorypublic education in virtue, therefore, is a bulwark of liberty.

2. politics and freedom

Aristotle’s emphasis on compulsory moral education puts himin the “positive” libertarian camp. For Aristotle, a free man isnot merely any man who lives in a free society. A free manpossesses certain traits of character that allow him to governhimself responsibly and attain happiness. These traits are, how-ever, the product of a long process of compulsory tutelage. Butsuch compulsion can be justified only by the production of afree and happy individual, and its scope is therefore limited by

6. A useful commentary on these and other Aristotelian arguments forpublic education is Randall R. Curren, Aristotle on the Necessity of PublicEducation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).



this goal. Because Aristotle ultimately accepted the Socraticprinciple that all men desire happiness, education merely com-pels us to do what we really want. It frees us from our ownignorance, folly, and irrationality and frees us for our own self-actualization. This may be the rationale for Aristotle’s claimthat “the law’s laying down of what is decent is not oppressive”(NE 10.9.1180a24). Because Aristotle thinks that freedom fromthe internal compulsion of the passions is more important thanfreedom from the external compulsion of force and that forcecan quell the passions and establish virtue’s empire over them,Aristotle believes as much as Rousseau that we can be forced tobe free.

But throughout the Politics, Aristotle shows that he is con-cerned to protect “negative” liberty as well. In Politics 2.2–2.5,Aristotle ingeniously defends private families, private property,and private enterprise from Plato’s communistic proposals inthe Republic, thereby preserving the freedom of large spheres ofhuman activity. Aristotle’s concern with privacy is evident inhis criticism of a proposal of Hippodamus of Miletus that wouldencourage spies and informers (2.8.1268b22). Aristotle is con-cerned to create a regime in which the rich do not enslave thepoor and the poor do not plunder the rich (3.10.1281a13–27).Second Amendment enthusiasts will be gratified at Aristotle’semphasis on the importance of a wide distribution of arms inmaintaining the freedom of the populace (2.8.1268a16–24;3.17.1288a12–14; 4.3[6.3].1289b27–40; 4.13[6.13].1297a12–27; 7.11[4.11].1330b17–20). War and empire are great enemiesof liberty, so isolationists and peace lovers will be gratified byAristotle’s critique of warlike regimes and praise of peace. Thegood life requires peace and leisure. War is not an end in itselfbut merely a means to ensure peace (7.14[4.14].1334a2–10;2.9.1271a41–b9). The best regime is not oriented outward, to-ward dominating other peoples, but inward, toward the hap-



piness of its own. The best regime is an earthly analogue of thePrime Mover. It is self-sufficient and turned inward upon itself(7.3[4.3].1325a14–31). Granted, Aristotle may not think thatnegative liberty is the whole of the good life, but it is an impor-tant component that needs to be safeguarded.7

3. the elements of politicsand the mixed regime

Because the aim of political association is the good life, the bestpolitical regime is the one that best delivers the good life. De-livering the good life can be broken down into two components:production and distribution. There are two basic kinds ofgoods: the goods of the body and the goods of the soul.8 Bothsorts of goods can be produced and distributed privately andpublicly, but Aristotle treats the production and distribution ofbodily goods as primarily private, whereas he treats the pro-duction and distribution of spiritual goods as primarily public.The primary goods of the soul are (1) moral and intellectualvirtue, which are best produced by public education, and (2)honor, the public recognition of virtue, talent, and service ren-dered to the city.9 The principle of distributive justice is defined

7. For a fuller discussion of the value Aristotle puts on liberty, seeRoderick T. Long, “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” 787–802.

8. One could add a third category, instrumental goods, but these goodsare instrumental to the intrinsic goods of the body, the soul, or both, andthus could be classified under those headings.

9. As for the highest good of the soul, which is attained by philosophy,Aristotle’s flight from Athens near the end of his life shows that he recognizedthat different political orders can be more or less open to free thought, but Isuspect that he was realist enough (and Platonist enough) to recognize thateven the best cities are unlikely to positively cultivate true freedom to phi-losophize. I would wager that Aristotle would be both surprised at the free-dom of thought in the United States and receptive to Tocquevillian com-plaints about the American tendency toward conformism that makes such



as proportionate equality: equally worthy people should beequally happy, and unequally worthy people should be un-equallyhappy,commensuratewiththeirunequalworth(NE5.6–7). The best regime, in short, combines happiness and justice.

But how is the best regime to be organized? Aristotle buildshis account from at least three sets of elements.

First, in Politics 3.6–7, Aristotle observes that sovereignty canrest either with men or with laws. If with men, then it can restin one man, few men, or many men. (Aristotle treats it as self-evident that it cannot rest in all men.) The rulers can exercisepolitical power for two different ends: for the common goodand for special interests. One pursues the common good bypromoting the happiness of all according to justice. Specialinterests can be broken down into individual or factional inter-ests. A ruler can be blamed for pursuing such goods only if hedoes so without regard to justice, that is, without a just concernfor the happiness of all. When a single man rules for the com-mon good, we have kingship. When he rules for his own good,we have tyranny. When the few rule for the common good, wehave aristocracy. When they rule for their factional interest, wehave oligarchy. When the many rule for the common good, wehave polity. When they rule for their factional interest, we havedemocracy. These six regimes can exist in pure forms, or theycan be mixed together.

Second, Aristotle treats social classes as elemental politicaldistinctions. In Politics 3.8, he refines his definitions of oligarchyand democracy, claiming that oligarchy is actually rule by therich, whether they are few or many, and democracy is rule bythe poor, whether they are few or many. Similarly, in Politics

freedom unthreatening to the reigning climate of opinion. A cynic mightargue that if Americans actually made use of their freedom of thought, itwould be quickly taken away.



4.11[6.1], Aristotle also defines polity as rule by the middle class.In Politics 4.4[6.4], Aristotle argues that the social classes areirreducible political distinctions. One can be a rich, poor, ormiddle-class juror, legislator, or officeholder. One can be a rich,poor, or middle-class farmer or merchant. But one cannot beboth rich and poor at the same time (4.4[6.4].1291b2–13). Classdistinctions cannot be eliminated; therefore, they have to berecognized and respected, their disadvantages meliorated andtheir advantages harnessed for the common good.

Third, in Politics 4.14[6.14], Aristotle divides the activities ofrulership into three different functions: legislative, judicial, andexecutive.10

Because rulership can be functionally divided, it is possibleto create a mixed regime by assigning different functions todifferent parts of the populace. One could, for example, mixmonarchy and elite rule by assigning supreme executive officeto one man and the legislative and judicial functions to the few.Or one could divide the legislative function into differenthouses, assigning one to the few and another to the many.Aristotle suggests giving the few the power to legislate and themany the power to veto legislation. He suggests that officers beelected by the many but nominated from the few. The fewshould make expenditures, but the many should audit them(2.12.1274a15–21; 3.11.1281b21–33; 4.14[6.14].1298b26–40).

In Politics 3.10, Aristotle argues that some sort of mixed re-gime is preferable because no pure regime is satisfactory: “Adifficulty arises as to what should be the controlling part of thecity, for is it really either the multitude or the rich or the decentor the best one of all or a tyrant? But all of them appear unsat-

10. On the complexities of the executive role in the Politics, see HarveyC. Mansfield Jr., Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power(Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), chs. 2–3.



isfactory” (3.10.1281a11–13). Democracy is bad because thepoor unjustly plunder the substance of the rich; oligarchy is badbecause the rich oppress and exploit the poor; tyranny is badbecause the tyrant does injustice to everyone (3.10.1281a13–28). Kingship and aristocracy are unsatisfactory because theyleave the many without honors and they are schools forsnobbery and high-handedness (3.10.1281a28–33; 4.11[6.11].1295b13ff). A pure polity might be unsatisfactory because itlacks a trained leadership caste and is therefore liable to makepoor decisions (3.11.1281b21–33).

4. checks and balances, political rule,and the rule of law

Aristotle’s mixed regime is the origin of the idea of the sepa-ration of powers and checks and balances. It goes hand in handwith a very modern political realism. Aristotle claims that “allregimes that look to the common advantage turn out, accordingto what is simply just, to be correct ones, while those that lookonly to the advantage of their rulers are mistaken and are alldeviations from the correct regime. For they are despotic, butthe city is a community of the free” (3.6.1279a17–21).

It is odd, then, that in Politics 4.8–9[6.8–9] Aristotle describesthe best regime as a mixture of two defective regimes, oligarchyand democracy—not of two correct regimes, aristocracy andpolity. But perhaps Aristotle entertained the possibility of com-posing a regime that tends to the common good out of classesthat pursue their own factional interests.

Perhaps Aristotle thought that the “intention” to pursue thecommon good can repose not in the minds of individuals butin the institutional logic of the regime itself. This would be anenormous advantage, for it would bring about the commongood without having to rely entirely upon men of virtue and



good will, who are in far shorter supply than men who pursuetheir own individual and factional advantages.

Related to the mixed regime with its checks and balances isthe notion of political rule. Political rule consists of ruling andbeing ruled in turn:

. . . there is a sort of rule exercised over those who are similar inbirth and free. This rule we call political rule, and the ruler mustlearn it by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry com-mander by serving under a cavalry commander. . . . Hence itwas nobly said that one cannot rule well without having beenruled. And while virtue in these two cases is different, the goodcitizen must learn and be able both to be ruled and to rule. Thisis, in fact, the virtue of the citizen, to know rule over the freefrom both sides. (3.4.1277b7–15; cf. 1.13.1259b31–34 and2.2.1261a32–b3)

Aristotle makes it clear that political rule can exist only wherethe populace consists of men who are free, that is, sufficientlyvirtuous that they can rule themselves. They must also be eco-nomically middle-class, well armed, and warlike. They must, inshort, be the sort of men who can participate responsibly ingovernment, who want to participate, and who cannot safely beexcluded. A populace that is slavish, vice-ridden, poor, and un-armed can easily be disenfranchised and exploited. If powerwere entirely in the hands of a free populace, the regime wouldbe a pure polity and political rule would exist entirely betweenequals. If, however, a free populace were to take part in a mixedregime, then political rule would exist between different partsof the regime. The many and the few would divide power andfunctions between them. Not only would members of each classtake turns performing the different functions allotted to them,but also the classes themselves would rule over others in onerespect and be ruled in another. In these circumstances, then,checks and balances are merely one form of political rule.



In Politics 3.16, Aristotle connects political rule to the rule oflaw:

What is just is that people exercise rule no more than they aresubject to it and that therefore they rule by turns. But this isalready law, for the arrangement is law. Therefore, it is prefer-able that law rule rather than any one of the citizens. And evenif, to pursue the same argument, it were better that there besome persons exercising rule, their appointment should be asguardians and servants of the laws. For though there must besome offices, that there should be this one person exercisingrule is, they say, not just, at least when all are similar.(3.16.1287a15–22)

Aristotle’s point is simple. If two men govern by turns, thensovereignty does not ultimately repose in either of them but inthe rule that they govern by turns. The same can be said ofchecks and balances. If the few spend money and the many auditthe accounts, then neither group is sovereign, the laws are. Ifsovereignty reposes in laws, not men, the common good is safe.As Aristotle points out, “anyone who bids the laws to rule seemsto bid god and intellect alone to rule, but anyone who bids ahuman being to rule adds on also the wild beast. For desire issuch a beast and spiritedness perverts rulers even when they arethe best of men. Hence law is intellect without appetite”(3.16.1287a23–31). The greatest enemy of the common goodis private interest. Laws, however, have no private interests.Thus, if our laws are conducive to the common good, we neednot depend entirely on the virtue and public-spiritedness ofmen.

Aristotle would hasten to add, however, that no regime cando without these characteristics entirely, for the laws cannotapply themselves. They must be applied by men, and theirapplication will seldom be better than the men who apply them.Furthermore, even though a regime may function without en-



tirely virtuous citizens, no legitimate regime can be indifferentto the virtue of the citizens, for the whole purpose of politicalassociation is to instill the virtues necessary for happiness.

5. the good man and the good citizen

Having now surveyed Aristotle’s thoughts on the elements andproper aim of politics, we can now examine his arguments forpopular government. When I use the phrase “popular govern-ment,” it should be borne in mind that Aristotle does not ad-vocate a pure polity but a mixed regime with a popular element.

Aristotle’s first case for bringing the many into governmentcan be discerned in Politics 3.4. Aristotle’s question is whetherthe virtues of the good man and the good citizen are the same.They are not the same, insofar as the virtue of the good citizenis defined relative to the regime and there are many differentregimes, whereas the virtue of the good man is defined relativeto human nature, which is one. One can therefore be a goodcitizen but not a good man, and a good man but not a goodcitizen. History is replete with examples of regimes that punishmen for their virtues and reward them for their vices. Aristotledoes, however, allow that the good man and the good citizencan be one in a regime in which the virtues required of a goodcitizen do not differ from the virtues of a good man.

The chief virtue of a good man is prudence. But prudence isnot required of citizens insofar as they are ruled. Only obedi-ence is required. Prudence is, however, required of citizensinsofar as they rule. Because the best regime best encourageshappiness by best cultivating virtue, a regime that allows themany to govern along with the few is better than a regime thatexcludes them. By including the many in ruling, a popular re-gime encourages the widest cultivation of prudence and givesthe greatest opportunity for its exercise. The best way to bring



the many into the regime is through what Aristotle calls politicalrule: ruling and being ruled in turn, as prescribed by law.

Political rule not only teaches the virtue of prudence to themany, but it also teaches the virtue of being ruled to the few,who must give way in turn to the many. Because the few aspireto rule but not to be ruled, Aristotle argues that they cannotrule without first having been ruled:

The ruler must learn [political rule] by being ruled, just as onelearns to be a cavalry commander by serving under a cavalrycommander. . . . Hence it was nobly said that one cannot rulewell without having been ruled. And while virtue in these twocases is different, the good citizen must learn and be able bothto be ruled and to rule. This is, in fact, the virtue of the citizen,to know rule over the free from both sides. Indeed, the goodman, too, possesses both. (3.4.1277b7–16)

Aristotle names justice as a virtue that is learned both in rulingand being ruled. Those born to wealth and power are liable toarrogance and the love of command. By subjecting them to therule of others, including their social inferiors, they learn torespect their freedom and justly appraise their worth.

6. potlucks, chimeras, juries

Aristotle’s next case for bringing the many into the regime isfound in Politics 3.11.11 Aristotle seeks to rebut the aristocraticargument against popular participation, namely, that the bestpolitical decisions are wise ones, but wisdom is found onlyamong the few, not the many. Popular participation, therefore,would inevitably dilute the quality of the political decision mak-

11. For useful discussions of the arguments of Politics 3.11, see Nichols,Citizens and Statesmen (66–71), and Peter L. Phillips Simpson, A PhilosophicalCommentary on the Politics of Aristotle (Chapel Hill: University of North Car-olina Press, 1998), 166–71.



ers, increasing the number of foolish decisions. Aristotle acceptsthe premise that the wise should rule, but he argues that thereare circumstances in which the few and the many together arewiser than the few on their own. The aristocratic principle,therefore, demands the participation of the many:

. . . the many, each of whom is not a serious man, neverthelesscould, when they have come together, be better than those fewbest—not, indeed, individually, but as a whole, just as mealsfurnished collectively are better than meals furnished at oneperson’s expense. For each of them, though many, could have apart of virtue and prudence, and just as they could, when joinedtogether in a multitude, become one human being with manyfeet, hands, and senses, so also could they become one in char-acter and thought. That is why the many are better judges ofthe works of music and the poets, for one of them judges onepart and another, another and all of them, the whole.(3.11.1281a42–b10)

At first glance, this argument seems preposterous. History andeveryday life are filled with examples of wise individuals oppos-ing foolish collectives. But Aristotle does not claim that themany are always wiser than the few, simply that they can be,under certain conditions (3.11.1281b15).

The analogy of the potluck supper is instructive (cf.3.15.1286a28–30).12 A potluck supper can be better than oneprovided by a single person if it offers a greater number andvariety of dishes and diffuses costs and labor. But potluck sup-pers are not always superior—that is the “luck” in it. Potlucksare often imbalanced. On one occasion, there may be too manydesserts and no salads. On another, three people may bringchicken and no one may bring beef or pork. The best potluck,

12. For more on the potluck supper analogy, see Arlene W. Saxonhouse,Fear of Diversity: The Birth of Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought (Chi-cago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 222–24.



therefore, is a centrally orchestrated one that mobilizes theresources of many different contributors but ensures a balancedand wholesome meal.

Likewise, the best way to include the many in political deci-sion making is to orchestrate their participation, giving them adelimited role that maximizes their virtues and minimizes theirvices. This cannot be accomplished in a purely popular regime,particularly a lawless one, but it can be accomplished in a mixedregime in which the participation of the populace is circum-scribed by law and checked by the interests of other elementsof the population.

Aristotle’s second analogy—which likens the intellectual andmoral unity of the many to a man with many feet, hands, andsense organs, that is, a freak of nature—does not exactly assuagedoubters. But his point is valid. Although even the best of menmay lack a particular virtue, it is unlikely that it will be entirelyabsent from a large throng. Therefore, the many are potentiallyas virtuous or even more virtuous than the few if their scatteredvirtues can be gathered together and put to work. But historyrecords many examples of groups acting less morally than anymember on his own. Thus, the potential moral superiority ofthe many is unlikely to emerge in a lawless democracy. But itcould emerge in a lawful mixed regime that actively encouragesand employs the virtues of the many while checking their vices.This process can be illustrated by adapting an analogy thatAristotle offers to illustrate another point: A painting of a mancan be more beautiful than any real man, for the painter canpick out the best features of individual men and combine theminto a beautiful whole (3.11.1281b10–11).

Aristotle illustrates the potential superiority of collectivejudgment with another questionable assertion that “the manyare better judges of the works of music and the poets, for oneof them judges one part and another, another and all of them,



the whole.” Again, this seems preposterous. Good taste, likewisdom, is not widely distributed and is cultivated by the few,not the many. Far more people buy “rap” recordings than clas-sical ones. But Aristotle is not claiming that the many are betterjudges in all cases. Aristotle is likely referring to Greek dramaticcompetitions. These competitions were juried by the audience,not a small number of connoisseurs.

A jury trial or competition is a genuine collective decision-making process in which each juror is morally enjoined to payclose attention to the matter at hand and to render an objectivejudgment.13 Although each juror has his own partial impression,when jurors deliberate they can add their partial impressionstogether to arrive at a more complete and adequate account.To the extent that a jury decision must approach unanimity,the jurors will be motivated to examine the issue from all sidesand persuade one another to move toward a rationally moti-vated consensus. A jury decision can, therefore, be more ra-tional, well informed, and objective than an individual one.14

The market, by contrast, is not a collective decision-makingprocess. It does not require a consumer to compare his prefer-ences to those of others, to persuade others of their validity ordefend them from criticism, or to arrive at any sort of consensus.Instead, the market merely registers the collective effects ofindividual decisions.15

13. I wish to thank Martin L. Cowen III for suggesting the model of ajury trial.

14. For a beautiful description of the deliberative process of a jury, seeJohn C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in Union and Liberty: ThePolitical Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, ed. Ross M. Lence (Indianapolis: Lib-erty Fund, 1992), 49–50.

15. Friedrich A. Hayek’s classic essay “The Use of Knowledge in Soci-ety,” in his Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1948), argues that the market is superior to central planning becauseit better mobilizes widely scattered information. The market is, of course,



7. freedom and stability

Another argument for popular government in Politics 3.11(1281b21–33) is that it is more stable. Aristotle grants the Aris-tocratic principle that it is not safe for the populace to share in“the greatest offices” because, “on account of their injustice andunwisdom, they would do wrong in some things and go wrongin others.” But then he goes on to argue that it would not besafe to exclude the many from rule altogether because a city“that has many in it who lack honor and are poor must ofnecessity be full of enemies,” which would be a source of insta-bility. Instability is, however, inconsistent with the proper aimof politics, for the good life requires peace. The solution is amixed regime that ensures peace and stability by allowing themany to participate in governmentbut not to occupy the highestoffices. In Politics 2.9, Aristotle praises the Spartan Ephorate forholding the regime together, “since, as the populace share inthe greatest office, it keeps them quiet. . . . For if any regime isgoing to survive, all the parts of the city must want it both to existand to remain as it is” (2.9.1270b17–22; cf. Aristotle’s dis-cussion of the Carthaginians in 2.9.1272b29–32; see also4.13[6.13].1297b6).

larger than any possible jury and thus will always command more informa-tion. However, if one were to compare a market and a jury of the same size,the jury would clearly be a more rational decision-making process, for themarket registers decisions based on perspectives that are in principle entirelysolipsistic, whereas the jury requires a genuine dialogue that challenges allparticipants to transcend their partial and subjective perspectives and worktoward a rational consensus that is more objective than any individual deci-sion because it more adequately accounts for the phenomena in questionthan could any individual decision. It is this crucial disanalogy that seems tovitiate attempts to justify the market in terms of Gadamerian, Popperian, orHabermasian models and communicative rationality. For the best statementof this sort of approach, see G. B. Madison, The Political Economy of CivilSociety and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 1998), esp. chs. 3–5.



In Politics 2.12, Aristotle offers another reason for includingthe populace in government. Solon gave the populace “thepower that was most necessary (electing to office and auditingthe accounts), since without it they would have been enslavedand hostile” (2.12.1274a4–6). Here Aristotle makes it clear thathe values liberty and that he values popular government becauseit protects the liberty of the many.

8. expert knowledge

In Politics 3.11, Aristotle rebuts the argument that the manyshould not be involved in politics because they are amateurs,that decisions in politics, as in medicine and other fields, shouldbe left to experts. In response to this, Aristotle repeats his ar-gument that the many, taken together, may be better judgesthan a few experts. He then adds that there are some arts inwhich the products can be appreciated by people who do notpossess the art: “Appreciating a house, for example, does notjust belong to the builder; the one who uses it, namely, thehousehold manager, will pass an even better judgment on it.Likewise, the pilot judges the rudder better than the carpenter,and the dinner guest judges the feast better than the chef”(3.11.1282a19–22). If the art of statesmanship is like these, thenthe best judge of the quality of a statesman is not the few politicalexperts but the many political laymen who are ruled by him.The judgment of the populace should not, therefore, be dis-dained.

9. resistance to corruption

In Politics 3.15, Aristotle argues that popular regimes are moreresistant to corruption. Even in a regime in which law ultimatelyrules, particular circumstances exist that the laws do not antic-



ipate. Where the law cannot decide, men must do so. But thiscreates an opportunity for corruption. Aristotle argues thatsuch decisions are better made by large bodies deliberating inpublic:

What is many is more incorruptible: the multitude, like a greaterquantity of water, is harder to ruin than a few. A single person’sjudgment must necessarily be corrupted when he is overcomeby anger or some other such passion, but getting everyone inthe other case to become angry and go wrong at the same timetakes a lot of doing. Let the multitude in question, however, bethe free who are acting in no way against law, except where lawis necessarily deficient. (3.15.1286a33–38)

Aristotle’s argument that the many may collectively possessfewer vices than the few is merely a mirror image of his earliercollective virtue argument. Here, as elsewhere, Aristotle de-fends popular government only under delimited circumstances.The populace must be free, not slavish, and they must decideonly when the laws cannot.

10. delegation and diffusion of power

Politics 3.16 is devoted to arguments against total kingship. Oneof these arguments can be turned into a case for popular gov-ernment. Aristotle claims that total kingship is unsustainable:“It is not easy for one person to oversee many things, so therewill need to be many officials appointed in subordination tohim. Consequently, what is the difference between having themthere right from the start and having one man in this wayappoint them? . . . if a man who is serious is justly ruler becausehe is better, then two good men are better than one”(3.16.1287b8–12; cf. 3.16.1287b25–29). Because total kingshipis unworkable, kings must necessarily appoint superior men as“peers” to help them. But if total kingship must create an aris-



tocracy, then why not have aristocracy from the start? Thisargument could, however, be pushed further to make a case forpopular government. An aristocracy cannot effectively rule thepeople without the active participation of some and the passiveacquiescence of the rest. As we have seen, Aristotle argues thatthe best way to bring this about is popular government. But ifaristocracy must eventually bring the populace into the regime,then why not include them from the very beginning?

11. when regimes fail

In Politics 4.2[6.2], Aristotle returns to his list of pure regimetypes. The three just regimes are kingship, aristocracy, andpolity; the three unjust ones are tyranny, oligarchy, and de-mocracy. Aristotle proceeds to rank the three just regimes interms of the kinds of virtues they require. He identifies kingshipand aristocracy as the best regimes because they are bothfounded on “fully equipped virtue” (4.2[6.2].1289a31). Of thetwo, kingship is the very best, for it depends upon a virtue sosuperlative that it is possessed by only one man. Aristocracy isless exalted because it presupposes somewhat more broadlydistributed and therefore less-exalted virtue. Polity dependsupon even more widespread and modest virtue. Furthermore,the populace, unlike kings and aristocrats, lacks the full com-pliment of material equipment necessary to fully exercise suchvirtues as magnificence.

By this ranking, polity is not the best regime but the least ofthe good ones. But Aristotle then offers a new, politically real-istic standard for ranking the just regimes that reverses theirorder. Kingship may be the best regime from a morally idealisticperspective, but when it degenerates, it turns into tyranny,which is the worst regime. Aristocracy may be the second-bestregime from a morally idealistic perspective, but when it de-



generates, it turns into oligarchy, which is the second-worstregime. Polity may be the third choice of the moral idealist, butwhen it degenerates, it merely becomes democracy, which isthe best of a bad lot.

Because degeneration is inevitable, the political realist ranksregimes not only in terms of their best performances, but alsoin terms of their worst. By this standard, polity is the best of thegood regimes and kingship the worst. Kingship is best underideal conditions,polity under real conditions.Kingship is a sleekJaguar, polity a dowdy Volvo. On the road, the Jaguar is clearlybetter. But when they go in the ditch, the Volvo shows itself tobe the better car overall.

12. the middle-class regime

Aristotle displays the same political realism in his praise of themiddle-class regime in Politics 4.11[6.11]: “If we judge neitherby a virtue that is beyond the reach of private individuals, norby an education requiring a nature and equipment dependenton chance, nor again a regime that is as one would pray for, butby a way of life that most can share in common together and bya regime that most cities can participate in . . . ,” then a large,politically enfranchised middle class has much to recommendit: “In the case of political community . . . the one that is basedon those in the middle is best, and . . . cities capable of beingwell governed are those sorts where the middle is large . . . ”(4.11[6.11].1295b35–36). Because the middle class is thewealthier stratum of the common people, Aristotle’s argumentsfor middle-class government are ipso facto arguments for pop-ular government. Aristotle makes it clear from the beginning,however, that he is not talking about a purely popular regimebut a mixed one compounded out of a middle-class populace



and those elements of aristocracy that are not out of the reachof most cities (4.11[6.11].1295a30–34).

Aristotle’s first argument for the middle regime seems a soph-istry: “If it was nobly said in the Ethics that the happy way of lifeis unimpeded life in accordance with virtue and that virtue is amean, then necessarily the middle way of life, the life of a meanthat everyone can attain, must be best. The same definitionsmust hold also for the virtue and vice of city and regime, sincethe regime is a certain way of life of a city” (4.11[6.11].1295a35–40).

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes it clear that thefact that virtue can be understood as a mean between two vices,one of excess and the other of defect, does not imply either thatvirtue is merely an arithmetic mean (NE 2.2.1106a26–b8) orthat virtue is to be regarded as mediocrity, not as superlative(NE 2.2.1107a9–27). Here, however, Aristotle describes themean not as a superlative but as a mediocrity “that everyonecan attain.” This conclusion follows only if we presuppose thatthe morally idealistic doctrine of the Ethics has been modifiedinto a moral realism analogous to the political realism of Politics4.2.

Aristotle then claims that in a regime, the mean lies in themiddle class: “In all cities there are in fact three parts: thosewho are exceedingly well-off, those who are exceedingly needy,and the third who are in the middle of these two. So, since it isagreed that the mean and middle is best, then it is manifest thata middling possession also of the goods of fortune must be bestof all” (4.11[6.11].1295b1–3). Aristotle is, however, equivocat-ing. He begins by defining the middle class as an arithmeticmean between the rich and the poor. He concludes that themiddle class is a moral mean. But he does not establish that thearithmetic mean corresponds to the moral.

Aristotle does, however, go on to offer reasons for thinking



that the social mean corresponds to the moral mean. But themiddle class is not necessarily more virtuous because its mem-bers have been properly educated but because their social po-sition and class interests lead them to act as if they had been.

First, Aristotle argues that “the middle most easily obeysreason.” Those who are “excessively beautiful or strong or well-born or wealthy” find it hard to follow reason because they tendto be “insolent and rather wicked in great things.” By contrast,those who are poor and “extremely wretched and weak, andhave an exceeding lack of honor” tend to become “villains andtoo much involved in petty wickedness.” The middle class is,however, too humble to breed insolence and too well-off tobreed villainy. Because most injustices arise from insolence andvillainy, a regime with a strong middle class will be more likelyto be just.

Second, Aristotle argues that the middle class is best suitedto ruling and being ruled in turn. Those who enjoy an excess ofgood fortune—strength, wealth, friends, and so forth—love torule and dislike being ruled. Both of these attitudes are harmfulto the city, yet they naturally arise among the wealthy. Froman early age, the wealthy are instilled with a “love of ruling anddesire to rule, both of which are harmful to cities”(4.11[6.11].1295b12), and “because of the luxury they live in,being ruled is not something they get used to, even at school”(4.11[6.11].1295b13–17). By contrast, poverty breeds vice, ser-vility, and small-mindedness. Thus, the poor are easy to pusharound, and if they do gain power, they are incapable of exer-cising it virtuously. Therefore, without a middle class, “a cityof slaves and masters arises, not a city of the free, and the firstare full of envy while the second are full of contempt.” Such acity must be “at the furthest remove from friendship and polit-ical community” (4.11[6.11].1295b21–24). The presence of astrong middle class, however, binds the city into a whole, lim-



iting the tendency of the rich to tyranny and the poor to slav-ishness, creating a “city of the free.”

Third, Aristotle argues that middle-class citizens enjoy thesafest and most stable lives, imbuing the regime as a whole withthese characteristics. Those in the middle are, among all citi-zens, the most likely to survive in times of upheaval, when thepoor starve and the rich become targets. They are sufficientlycontent with their lot not to envy the possessions of the rich.Yet they are not so wealthy that the poor envy them. Theyneither plot against the rich nor are plotted against by the poor.

Fourth, a large middle class stabilizes a regime, particularlyif the middle is “stronger than both extremes or, otherwise,than either one of them. For the middle will tip the balancewhen added to either side and prevent the emergence of anexcess at the opposite extremes” (4.11[6.11].1295b36–40).Without a large and powerful middle class, “either ultimate ruleof the populace arises or unmixed oligarchy does, or, becauseof excess on both sides, tyranny” (4.11[6.11].1296a3; cf.4.12[6.12].1297a6).

Fifth is the related point that regimes with large middle clas-ses are relatively free of faction and therefore more concernedwith the common good. This is because a large middle classmakes it harder to separate everyone into two groups(4.11[6.11].1296a7–10).

Finally, Aristotle claims that one sign of the superiority ofmiddle-class regimes is that the best legislators come from themiddle class. As examples, he cites Solon, Lycurgus, and Cha-rondas (4.11[6.11].1296a18–21).

13. conclusion:aristotle’s polity and our own

If the proper aim of government is to promote the happiness ofthe citizens, Aristotle marshals an impressive array of arguments



for giving the people, specifically the middle class, a role ingovernment. These arguments can be grouped under five head-ings: virtue, rational decision making, freedom, stability, andresistance to corruption.

Popular government both presupposes and encourages wide-spread virtue among the citizens, and virtue is a necessary con-dition of happiness. Middle-class citizens are particularly likelyto follow practical reason and act justly, for they are corruptedneither by wealth nor by poverty. Popular participation canimprove political decision making by mobilizing scattered in-formation and experience, and more informed decisions aremore likely to promote happiness. In particular, popular gov-ernment channels the experiences of those who are actuallygoverned back into the decision-making process.

Popular participation preserves the freedom of the people,who would otherwise be exploited if they had no say in govern-ment. By preserving the freedom of the people, popular partic-ipation unifies the regime, promoting peace and stability,which, in turn, are conducive to the pursuit of happiness. Thisis particularly the case with middle-class regimes, for the middleclass prevents excessive and destabilizing separation betweenthe extremes of wealth and poverty.

Popular governments are also more resistant to corruption.It is harder to use bribery or trickery in order to corrupt deci-sions made by many people deliberating together in public thanby one person or a few deciding in private. This means thatpopular regimes are more likely to promote the common goodinstead of allowing the state to become a tool for the pursuit ofone special interest at the expense of another. Furthermore, ifa popular regime does become corrupt, it is most likely tobecome a democracy, which is the least unjust of the bad re-gimes and the easiest to reform.

All these are good arguments for giving the people a role ingovernment. But not just any people. And not just any role.



First, Aristotle presupposes a small city-state. He did notthink that any regime could pursue the common good if itbecame too large. This is particularly true of a popular regime,for the larger the populace, the less room any particular citizenhas for meaningful participation.

Second, he presupposes a populace that is racially and cul-turally homogeneous. A more diverse population is subject tofaction and strife. It will either break up into distinct commu-nities or have to be held together by violence and governed byan elite. A more diverse population also erodes a society’s moralconsensus, making moral education even more difficult.

Third, political participation will be limited to middle-classand wealthy property-owning males, specifically those who de-rive their income from the ownership of productive land, notthose who are merchants and craftsmen.

Fourth, Aristotle circumscribes the role of the populace byassigning it specific legal roles, such as the election of officersand the auditing of accounts—roles that are checked and bal-anced by the legal roles of the aristocratic element, such asoccupying leadership positions.

If Aristotle is right about the conditions of popular govern-ment, then he would probably take a dim view of its prospectsin America. First and foremost, Aristotle would deplore Ame-rica’s lack of concern with moral education. Aristotle’s disagree-ment would go beyond the obvious fact that the Americanfounders did not make moral education the central concern ofthe state. America has neglected to cultivate even the minimalmoral virtues required to maintain a liberal regime, virtues suchas independence, personal responsibility, and basic civility. Sec-ond, Aristotle would predict that multiculturalism and non-White immigration will destroy the cultural preconditions ofpopular government. Third, Aristotle would reject America’sever-widening franchise—particularly the extension of the vote



to women, non–property owners, and cultural aliens—as a sureprescription for lowering the quality of public decision makingin the voting booth and the jury room. Fourth, Aristotle wouldbe alarmed by the continuing erosion of the American workingand middle classes by competition from foreign workers bothinside and outside America’s borders. He would deplore Ame-rica’s transformation from an agrarian to an industrial-mercan-tile civilization and support autarky rather than free trade andglobal economic integration. Fifth, Aristotle would be alarmedby ongoing attempts to disarm the populace. Sixth, he wouldcondemn America’s imperialistic and warlike policies towardother nations. Finally, Aristotle would likely observe that be-cause genuine popular government is difficult with hundreds ofthousands of citizens, it will be impossible with hundreds ofmillions.

In short, if Aristotle were alive today, he would find himselfto the right of Patrick J. Buchanan, decrying America’s declinefrom a republic to an empire. Aristotle challenges us to showwhether and how liberty and popular government are compat-ible with feminism, multiculturalism, and globalized capitalism.

To conclude on a more positive note, however, althoughAristotle gives reasons to think that the future of popular gov-ernment in America is unpromising, he also gives reasons foroptimism about the long-term prospects of popular govern-ment in general, for his defense of popular government is basedon a realistic assessment of human nature, not only in its strivingfor perfection but also in its propensity for failure.



the first founding father: aristotle on freedom and...

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