the first ten years of the korean constitutional court

7/24/2019 The First Ten Years of the Korean Constitutional Court

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THE FIRST TEN YEARS

OF

THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA


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THE FIRST TEN YEARS

OF

THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

(1988 1998)

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA

2001


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THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE KOREAN

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Copyright 2001 by

The Con st it ut ional Court

Prin ted in Seoul

The Republic of Korea

All rights are reserved. No part of this book

may be reproduced in any form, except for brief

quotations for a review, w ithout written per-

mission of the constitutional court of Republic

of Korea


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Preface

Th i s volu me i s a n Engli s h t ra ns la t i on of T e n Y e a r s o f t h e K o r e a n

Constitutional Court publ ished in December 1998 in commemo rati on

of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Court. The publi-

cation of this volume is aimed at introducing foreign readers to the

Korean system of constitutional adj udication an d the remarkabl e a-

chievements of the Constitutional Court for the ten years since its

inception.

The presen t Constitution, the product of a bipartisan consensus

i n t h e w a k e o f t h e J u n e D e m o c r a c y M o v e m e n t i n 1 9 8 7 , e m b o d i e d s e v -

eral important moments in the development of constitutionalism in

Ko rea. Fo r in stance, it impro ved upo n the president-c entered con-

c e n t r a t i o n o f p o w e r , t h e a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t o r a l s y s t e m ,

and other problems of the political system under the pre-1987 au-

tho rita rian regimes, and pro vided fo r stron ger protectio n fo r peo pl es

basic rights. Especial ly, a Euro pean -styl e c ons ti tuti onal cou rt was

established as a venue of relief for infringement of basic rights, and

the thus founded Constitutional Court engaged in active scrutiny of

the constitution al ity of statutes an d consti tuti onal co mpl aints fo r the

past ten years and played a decisive role in firmly establishing con-

stitutionalism in Korea. The devel opment and present structure of

Ko rean c onst it ut io nal ad judi cat ion , and th e C our t' s achi evemen ts f or

the ten years after the founding are detailed in the body of this

volume. After the publication of the Korean version of

Ten Years

of the Korean Cons titutional Court

, the activities of the Court con-

tinued. A cumulative total of about 6,800 cases were filed, out of

which 6,300 were disposed of. Among the disposed cases, about

three hundred statutes and regulations were struck down, an d abou t

o ne hundred co nstitution al compl ain ts al leg ing infrin gement o f ba sic

righ ts by publ ic authority were u phel d. Con stitutiona l adjudicati on

took firm roots in the Korean constitutional system.

Describin g one co untry's sys tem in another's l angu age con ta ins

many dangers. Most of all, whether jargons of the Korean system

s h o u l d b e d i r e c t l y t r a n s l a t e d o r m a t c h e d w i t h a n a l o g o u s f o r e i g n c o n -

cepts is an important issue. In order to protect the readers from

u n n e c e s s a r y p r e j u d i c e , w e a d h e r e d t o t h o s e E n g l i s h e x p r e s s i o n s f a i t h -

ful to the Korean mea nings and used Anglo-American concepts only

when the former were too awkward or the latter were so accurate

as not to leave any room for confusion. Although the original ex-

pressions were preserved as much as possible, the differences in

n u a n c e s t h a t a r i s e o u t o f t h e g r a m m a t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n K o r e a n


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and English were carefully resolved in favor of the original intent.

A caution is in order that the volume does not translate the whole

of the original. Minor parts of the original were deleted and revised

by the Resea rch Officers of th e Constitution al Court i n consi derati on

of the needs of foreign readers. Also, the volume is also not up-

dated with the changes after the publication of the original.

W e h o p e t h a t t h i s v o l u m e b e c o m e s a w o r t h y r e s o u r c e f o r f o r e i g n

r e a d e r s a n d r e s e a r c h g r o u p s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e K o r e a n C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d

its constitutional adjudication system.

Professor Park Kyung-sin, Handong Univers ity, and Professor

Ki m Jo ng-cheo l, Hanyan g Un iversity, worked together to tra nsl ate

t h e o r ig i n a l . A l s o , P r o f e s s o r I m J i -b o n g o f K u n k u k U n i v e r s i ty m a d e

useful suggestions as to the choice of words, and the Research Of-

ficers of the Constitutional Court assisted in many ways as well. I

would like to express gratitude to all those that made their best

effo rts to publ ish thi s vol ume.

May 31, 2001

Park Yong-sang

Secretary General

The Constitutional Court of Republic of Korea


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Preface

Since the Korean people's yearning and aspiration for democ-

ratization of the country fructified in establishment of the Consti-

t u t i o n a l C o u r t o f K o r e a o n S e p t e m b e r 1 , 1 9 8 8 , t e n y e a r s h a v e p a s s e d .

In commemo ration of th e ann iversary, the Co nstituti on al Co urt pub-

l ishes t hi s vo lume.

Over the ten years, the Cons titutional Court docketed about four

thousand cases and disposed of about 3,700 among them. They in-

cluded one hundred seventy or so cases where laws and regulations

were h eld un con sti tu tio nal a nd about seven ty c ases o f constitution al

complaints where exercises of governmental power were held to be

i nf ri ngi ng on bas ic ri ghts .

The numbers alone are not enough to evaluate the Court's ac-

tivities. However, in c omparis on to the real ity of cons titutional ad-

j u d i c a t i o n f o r t h e p a s t f o r t y y e a r s b e f o r e i t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t , t h e C o u r t

can be said to have truly done its best, and discharged its duty as

t h e h i g h e s t i n s t i t u t i o n a d j u d i c a t i n g o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s , d e s i g n a t e d

to defend the constitutional order and protect people' s basic rights.

As the results of the Court's activities, l egislative activities be-

came more cautious and the instances of human rights violations by

p u b l i c au t h o r i t ie s h a v e b e e n o n t h e d e c l i ne . T h e C o n s t i tu t i o n b e c a m e

a living norm that permeates peoples consciousness, and they now

value their basic rights more than ever. This means that consti-

tutional adjudication has taken roots in our lives as the new means

of protection of basic rights, and also that the Constitution is re-

c o v e r i n g i t s o r i g i n a l f u n c t i o n , n a m e l y c h e c k i n g t h e p o w e r o f t h e s t a t e .

At the threshold of the twenty first century, we are at an im-

p o r t a n t j u n c t u r e i n b u i l d i n g a f o u n d a t i o n f o r a f r e e d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y

where human dignity and worth is respected and al l pursue ha ppi-

nes s freely and equ al ly.

We are at a difficult moment calling for reevaluation and over-

haul of the basic structures of our polity, society, and economy, and

their efficiencies. Of course, the state and people must join their

efforts, but they must do so particularly in establishing a country

truly ruled by law where constitutional ideas and values are re-

spec ted.

The Constitution is the main pillar supporting the foundation of

a country. I f the Constitution does not stand upright, socia l j ustice

and economic development is unthinkable. The more difficult the


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t i m e s a r e , t h e m o r e k e e n l y f e l t i s n e e d f o r t h e w i l l t o o b e y t h e C o n -

stitution. State power should be exercised in accordance with the

constitution al norms and in order to pro vide the maximu m protecti on

for human dignity, and creativity. Only then, we can maximize our

potential in all sectors of our society and make one powerful leap

into the promising twenty first century.

At this point, recapitulating the changing faces of the Court and

its decisions was thought to be helpful as the Court reflects upon

the present and orients with respect to the future, and resulted in

t hi s volume.

T h i s b o o k c o n t a i n s t h e h i s t o r y o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n s i n c e

r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e F o u n d i n g C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e C o n -

stitutional Court and the changes thereof, and the important cases

accumulated by the Court in the ten years. The relatively short

history of the Court may not satisfy the zealous but we sincerely

h o p e t h a t t h i s b o o k w o u l d b e a s t e p p i n g s t o n e f o r p r o m o t i n g a b e t t e r

understanding of the Court and constitutional adjudication and ulti-

matel y brin ging th e Con stitu tio n cl oser to our l ives.

Finally, I salute wholeheartedly all the editors and other related

personnel for their unreserved efforts for publication of this book

t hr ough man y ha rd shi ps a nd l imi ta ti on s.

December 3 1, 199 8

Chang Eung-soo

Secretary General

Th e Con stitu ti onal Court of Republ ic o f Korea


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The Statue of the Protector of the Constitution in the Grand Hall

(Choi Eu-soon 100260)


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EXPLANATION OF

ABBREVIATION & CODES

K CC R : K o re an C o ns ti tu t io na l C ou rt R ep o rt

K CC G : Ko r ea n C o ns t it ut io n al C o ur t G az et t e

Cas e C odes

- Hu n- Ka : co nsti tut io na li ty cas e r ef er red b y o rd inar y

co ur ts ac co rd in g t o A rt ic le 4 1 o f t he C on -

stitutional Court Act

- H u n- Ba : c on s ti t ut io na l it y c as e f i le d b y i n di vi du al

co mplainant(s) in the f orm of const itutional

complaint according to Article 68 (2) of

the Cons titut io na l Co urt Act

- H un -Ma : c onst itu ti on al c omp la in t c as e f il ed b y i n d i -

v i d u a l c o m p l a i n a n t ( s ) a c c o r d i n g t o A r t i c l e 68

(1) of the Constitutional Court Act

- H un -Ra : c as e i nv ol vi ng d is pu te r eg ar di ng t he com-

petence of governmental agencies filed ac-

cording to Article 61 of the Constitutional

Court Act

* F or example, 96Hun-Ka2 mean s the c onstitution -

ality case referred by an ordinary court, the docket

n um be r o f w hi ch is N o. 2 i n t he y ea r 19 96.


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i

Table of Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction of the Constitutional Adjudication

System to Korea and its Development

. Significance of Constitutional Adjudication 3

.

T h e O r i g i n s a n d T y p e s o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l A d j u d i c a t i o n

4

. T he D ev e lo pm en t of t he K or ea n S ys te m o f C on st it ut io n al

Adjudication 6

1. Constitutional Adjudication in the First Republic 7

2. Constitutional Adjudication in the Second Republic 7

3. Constitutional Adjudication in the Third Republic 8

4. Constitutional Adjudication in the Fourth Republic 9

5. Constitutional Adjudication in the Fifth Republic 10

Chapter 2

The Constitutional Court and its First Ten Years

. Creation of the Constitutional Court 15

1. The 9th Co nstitution al Amendment and th e Con stitu tio nal -

Political Environment 15

2. Creati on of the Consti tuti on al Court 16

3. Legis lati on of the Cons titut ion al Court Act 17

4. Powers of th e Con st itu ti onal Cour t 20

A. Adjudicative Powers 20

(1) Constitutional review of statutes upon request 20

(2) Impeachment 21

(3) Diss ol ut ion of Political Parties 21


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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

ii

(4) Competence Dispute 22

(5) Constitutional Complaint 22

B. Rule-Making Powers 23

5. Growth of Consti tuti on al Adj udicat ion 24

6. Fu ture Tasks and Prospect 26

. Organization of the Constitutional Court and its

Changes

29

1. The Presiden t of the Consti tut ion al Court 30

2. Ju st ice s of the Co nstitut ion al Court 32

3. The Council of Justices 34

4. Depa rtmen t of Cour t Administ ra tion 35

A. Overview 35

B. Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General 36

C. Of fices, Bureaus, Divisions 36

5. Constitutional Research Of ficers 38

6. Various Committees 39

. Adjudication Procedures 40

1. Overview 40

2. Proced ure for Requ est ing for Adj udication 42

A. Request for Adjudication 42

B. Fi ling and Allo cat ion of Ca ses 42

C. Court-appointed Counsels 48

3. Review Process 49

A. Briefs and Hearings 49

B. The Justices' Conference 52

4. Closure of the Case 55

A. Drafting and Announcement of the Decision 55

B. Types and Effect of Decision s 57

C. Applying other laws mutatis mutandis to the body of

procedura l law of the Const itut ion al Court 61


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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

iii

. Administrative Affairs 62

1. Auxiliary Activities 62

A. The Library of the Con sti tut ion al Court 63

B. Publi cati on of Case Report s and Materi als 63

(1) The Korean Con stitu tional Court Report 63

(2) The Korean Con stitu tional Court Gazet te 64

(3) The Con sti tut ional La w Revi ew 64

(4) Mater ia ls on Con sti tut ional Adjudicat ion 64

(5) Publication of Contra ct Research 64

(6) Other Publications 64

C. Computerization 65

2. Budget 66

3. Courthouse 66

4. Public Relat ions an d Publ ic Servi ce 67

Chapter 3

Decisions of the Constitutional Court

. Introduction 71

1. Introductory remarks 71

2. The Rel ation ship between the C ons titutio nal Co urt and

other state agencies 72

A . Th e Rel ationshi p between th e Con stitu ti onal Court and

the National Assembly 72

B . The Rel ation ship between the Co nstitutio nal Co urt a nd

the Ordinary Courts 76

C . Th e Rel ationshi p between th e Con stitu ti onal Court and

the Executive 80

3. Introduction of the Modified Forms of Decisions 86

A. The Decision of Nonconformity to the Constitution 87

B.

D e c i s i o n s o f L i m i t e d U n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y / C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y

90

4. Es ta blis hment of the Jurisdi ction o f th e C on sti tu tio nal

Court 93


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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

iv

A. Consti tut ion al comp lain t challen gi ng the p rosecutor's

decision of non -instit uti on of pro secuti on 93

B. Con st ituti on al comp lain ts challen gi ng executi ve ord er s,

rules and regulation s, or dinances 94

C.C o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m p l a i n t c h a l l e n g i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n

not subject to judicial review 95

D. Consti tuti on al comp lain t challen gi ng executi ve

prerogative actions

95

E.C o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m p l a i n t c h a l l e n g i n g l e g i s l a t i v e o m i s s i o n 96

F. The Ext en si on of justi ci able i nter ests for Consti tution al

complaints 98

G. Extension of the standing rul e in competence disputes 99

5. Major Decision s of the Cons titut ion al Court 100

A. Decisions of the First Term of the Constitutional Court 100

(1) General evaluation 100

(2) Brief summari es of major deci sions 101

B.Dec i s i ons of t h e S ec ond Term of t h e Cons t i t u t i ona l Cou rt 114

(1) General evaluation 114

(2) Brief summari es of major deci sions 115

C. Standards of Review 125

(1) The rul e aga inst exce ssive restrict ion 125

(2) The Prin ciple again st ar bi tr ar in ess 126

(3) The prin ci pl e of cl ar it y of law 126

(4) Prohi bi ti on of bl anket deleg at ion 127

(5) Th e p ri nc i p le of s t a t u t ory t a xa t i on a nd eq u a l t a xa t i on

128

(6 ) P rot ecti on of exp ectati on i nterest( pr otecti on of

confidence in law) 129

(7) Due Process of Law 129

D. Perspectives in evaluation of the Court's cases 130

. Decisions on Freedom of Press and other

Intellectual Freedoms 132

1. Forests Survey Inspection Request case,

1 KCCR 176, 88Hun-Ma22, September 4, 1989 132


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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

v

2.

Pr ai sin g a nd Enc our agi ng under Na tion al Sec ur ity Act

case, 2 KCCR 49, 89Hun-Ka113, April 2, 1990 134

3.

Not ic e of Apol ogy

case,

3 KCCR 149 , 89Hu n-Ka 160 , Apri l 1, 1991 138

4. Request f or a Corrective Report case,


5.

Military Secret Leakage

case,

4 KCCR 64, 89Hun-Ka104, February 25, 1992 142

6.

Periodicals Registration

case,

4 KCCR 300 , 90Hu n-Ka 23, Jun e 26, 1992 145

7. Election Campaign Participants Limitation case,

6-2 KCCR 15, 93Hun-Ka4, etc., July 29, 1994 147

8.

Motion Pictures Pre-Inspection

case,

8-2 KCCR 212, 93Hun-Ka13, etc., October 4, 1996 150

9. Case on

Registration Revocation of Obscenity Publishers

,

10-1 KCCR 327, 95Hun-Ka16, April 30, 1998 154

10. Solicitation Ban case,

10-1 KCCR 541 , 96Hun-Ka5, May 28, 199 8 156

. Decisions Concerning Politics and Elections 158

1.

Local Government Election Postponement

case,

6-2 KCCR 176, 92Hun-Ma126, August 31, 1994 158

2.

Dec ember 12 Inc ident Non-inst it ut ion of Prosecution

case, 7-1 KCCR 15, 94Hun-Ma246, January 20, 1995 161

3.

May 1 8 In ciden t Non -in st it ut ion o f Pro sec ut ion Dec is ion

case, 7-2 KCCR 697, 95Hu n-Ma 221, etc. , Dec ember 15,

1995 164

4.

The Special Act on the May Democratization

Movement, etc. case,

8-1 KCCR 51, 96Hun-Ka2, etc., February 16, 1996 168

5.

National Assembly Candidacy Deposit

case,

1 KCCR 199, 88Hun- Ka6, Septe mber 8, 1989 172

6.

National Seat Succession

case,

6-1 KCCR 415, 92Hun- Ma153, April 28, 1994 174

7.

Excessive Electoral District Population Disparity

case,

7-2 KC CR 76 0, 95 Hun- Ma 22 4, etc ., Dece mber 27 , 19 95 1 76

8.

Legislative Railroading

case,

9-2 KCCR 154, 96Hun-Ra2, Jul y 16, 1997 179


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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

vi

9.

Ap poin tmen t of Ac ti ng Pri me Mi nis

ter ca se,

29 KCCR 583, 98Hun -Ra1, July 14, 1998 183

. Cases Concerni ng Economic and Pr operty rights

and Taxation 186

1.

The Act on Special Cases concerning Expedition, etc. of

Legal Proceedings

case,

1 KCCR 1, 88Hun-Ka7, Jan uar y 25, 198 9 186

2.

Deeming Title Trust as Gi ft

case,

1 KCCR 131, 88Hun- Ka7, Janua ry 25, 1989 189

3.

Land Transaction Licensing

case,

1 KCCR 357, 88Hun-Ka13, December 22, 1989 191

4.

Rules implementing the Certified Judicial Scriveners Act

case, 2 KCCR 365, 89Hun-Ma178, October 15, 1990 194

5.

Prescriptive Acquisition of Miscellaneous St at e Propert y

case, 3 KCCR 202, 89Hun-Ka97, May 13, 1991 198

6.

Mandatory Fire Insurance

case,

3 KCCR 268 , 89Hu n-Ma 204, Jun e 3, 199 1 200

7.

Billiard Hall Ent ry Rest rict ion

case,

5-1 KCCR 365, 92Hun- Ma80, May 13, 1993 202

8.

Kukje Group Dissolution

case,

5-2 KCCR 87, 89Hun-Ma31, Jul y 29, 1993 205

9.

Repurchase Period Limitation

case,

6-1 KCCR 38, 92Hun-Ka15, etc., February 24, 1994 208

10.

Land Excess-Profits Tax

case,

6-2 KCCR 64, 92Hun-Ba49, etc., July 29, 1994 211

11. Chosun Railroad Stock case,

6-2 KCCR 395, 89Hun-Ma2, December 29, 1994 216

12. S tanda rd Publ ic La nd Pr ic e-b as ed Tra ns fer Pro fit s Tax

case, 7-2 KCCR 562, 91Hun-Ba1, etc., November 30,

1995 219

13. Ac t ual Tr an s ac t io n P r ic e-bas ed Tr an s f er P r o f it s Tax c a s e,

7 -2 KCCR 61 6, 9 4Hun-Ba40 , etc., November 3 0, 1 99 5 222

14.

Mandatory Filing Stamp

case,

8-2 KCCR 46, 93Hun-Ba57, August 29, 1996 225

15. Local Soj u Compulsory Purchase Syst em case,

8-2 KCCR 680, 96Hun-Ka18, December 26, 1996 228


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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

vii

16.

Automobile Driver's No-Fault Liability

case,

10-1 KCCR 522, 96Hun-Ka4, etc., May 28, 1998 230

17.

Inheritance by Default

case,

10-2 KCCR 339, 96Hun-Ka22, etc., August 27, 1998 232

. Cases Concerni ng Soci al Relations such as Famil y,

Industrial Relations 235

1.

Adultery

case,


2.

Statute of Limitation for Suits to Dispute One's Own

Paternity

case,

9-1 KCCR 193, 95Hun-Ka14, etc., March 27, 1997 237

3.

Livelihood Protection Standard

case,

9-1 KCCR 543, 94Hun- Ma33, May 29, 1997 239

4.

Same-Surname-Same-Origin Marriage Ban

case,

9-2 KCCR 1, 95Hun-Ka6, etc., Jul y 16, 199 7 242

5.

Gif t Tax o n Matr imon ial Pr oper ty Dis tri but ion

case,

9-2 KCCR 454, 96Hun-Ba14, October 30, 1997 245

6. P r o h ibit io n o f Th ir d-P ar t y I n t er ven t io n in L abo r D is p ut es

case, 2 KCCR 4, 89Hun-Ka103, January 15, 1990 248

7.

Kor ean Teac her s a nd Educ ati onal Wor kers Unio n

case,

3 KCCR 387 , 89Hu n-Ka 106 , July 22, 1991 250

8.

P r o h ibit io n o f L abo r D is p ut e by t h e P ubl ic S ec t o r L abo r er s

case, 5-1 KCCR 59, 88Hun-Ma5, March 11, 1993 252

9.

Redr es s f or i lleg all y-f ired Ci vi l Ser vant s cas e

,

5-1 KCCR 253, 90Hun-Ba22, etc., May 13, 1993 254

10. Viol ation of the Remedial Order of the Labor Relations

Commission

case,

7-1 KCCR 307, 92Hun- Ka14, March 23, 1995 256

11.

Priorit y of Employees' Retirement Allowanc es

case,

9-2 KCCR 243, 94Hun-Ba19, etc., August 21, 1997 258

12.

Violat ion of Collect ive Bargaining Agreement

case,

10-1 KCCR 213, 96Hun-Ka20, March 26, 1998 261

13.

Preferential Hiring of Teachers

case,

2 KCCR 332, 89Hun- Ma89, October 8, 1990 263

14. Seoul National University's Entrance Examination Plan

case , 4 KC CR 659, 92 Hun- Ma68 , e tc., Oct obe r 1, 19 92 2 65


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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

viii

15.

Rehiring of Privat e Universit y Professors

case,

10-2 KCCR 116, 96Hun-Ba33, etc., July 16, 1998 267

. Cases Concerning Procedural Rights and Criminal

Justice 270

1.

Preventive Detention

case,

1 KCCR 69, 88Hun-Ka5, etc., July 14, 1989 270

2.

Military Discipline Maintenance Exercise

case,

1 KCCR 309, 89Hun- Ma56, October 27, 1989 273

3.

Driver's Duty to Report Car Accident to Police

case,

2 KCCR 222, 89Hun-Ka118, August 27, 1990 276

4.

Blanket Delegation of Punishment for Spec ulat ive

Activities

case, 3 KCCR 336, 91Hun-Ka4, July 8, 1

99 1

279

5.

Int erference wit h At torney Visits

case,

4 KCCR 51, 91Hun- Ma111, Jan uary 28, 1992 282

6.

Rest riction on Judge's Discret ion in Releasing

Defendant s of Serious Crimes

case,

4 KCCR 853, 92Hun- Ka8, Decembe r 24, 1992 285

7.

Retr oac ti ve Ef fec t of t he Deci sion of Un cons ti tut ion ali ty

case, 5 -1 KCCR 2 26 , 92 Hun-Ka10 , etc., May 1 3, 19 93 2 87

8.

Censor ship of Let ter s of Deta inees Pendi ng App eals

case,

7-2 KCCR 94, 92Hun -Ma144, July 21, 1995 290

9.

Patent Litigation Procedure

case,

7-2 KC CR 26 4, 92 Hun- Ka 11 , et c. , S ept ember 28 , 199 5 2 93

10.

Act on the Special Measures for the Punishment of

Persons Invalved in Ant i-State Ac tivities

case,

8-1 KCCR 1, 95Hun-Ka5, Jan uary 25, 1996 296

11.

Capital Punishment

case,

8 -2 KCCR 53 7, 9 5Hun-Ba1, etc., N ovember 2 8, 19 96 299

12.

Pret rial Examination of Witnesses

case,

8-2 KCCR 808, 94Hun-Ba1, December 26, 1996 303

13.

Change in Use of Building

case,

9-1 KCCR 529, 94Hun-Ba22, etc., May 29, 1997 308

14.

Limitation on the Scope of Request f or the Institution

of Prosecution by the Court

case,

9-2 KCCR 223, 94Hun-Ba2, August 21, 1997 309

15.

Defendant 's Acc ess t o Criminal Investigation Records

case,

9 - 2 K C C R 6 7 5 , 9 4 H u n - M a 6 0 , N o v e m b e r 2 7 , 1 9 9 7

312


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TABLE OF C ONTENTS

ix

16.

Constitutional Review of Judgments

case,

9 - 2 K C C R 8 4 2 , 9 6 H u n - M a 1 7 2 , e t c . , D e c e m b e r 2 4 , 1 9 9 7

315

17.

Constitutional Complaint against Original Administrative

Action

case,

10-1 KCCR 660, 91Hun-Ma98, etc., May 28, 1998 319

Appendixes

. The Constitution 327

. The Constitutional Court Act 357

. Caseload of the Consti tutional Court 381


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1

Chapter 1



. Significance of Constitutional Adjudication

. The Ori gins and Types of Constituti onal Adjudi cati on

. The Development of the Korean System of Constitutional

Adjudication

The Fountain(Sounds-Meeting) in front of the Constitutional Court House

(Chun-joon 1,400200)


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3

Chapter 1



. Significance of Constitutional Adjudication

T he C on st itu tio n is t he f un da me nta l l aw th at r eg ul at es t he

structure, organization and function of a state to protect people's

liberties and rights and to check and control its power with reason.

S i n c e t h e l a t e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m h a s b e g u n

to take written forms in most countries and has successfully insti-

t u t i o n a l i z e d t h o s e d e m o c r a t i c v a l u e s l o n g s o u g h t f o r b y t h e m a n k i n d :

l ibert y an d eq ual it y.

However, in the past h istory of co nstitutio nal ism, protectio n for

peo pl e's c ons titutio nal l iberti es an d h uman rig hts wa s no t suffici en t,

and neither was a system of preventing the state's arbitrary and

un just e n cr o achme n t upo n the m. W he n po litical po w e r se lf-pr o claimin g

to be representative of the people became tyranny or despotism and

e nc roach ed upo n peopl e' s c ons ti tut io nal r ight s, po li ti cal a nd ad mi n-

istrative bodies remained subservient to such state actions and did

n o t p r ov i d e e n o u g h s e l f- c h e c k t o r e s t o r e t h e r ig h t s . H e n c e w a s r a is e d

the need for securing the normative force of the constitution as the

supreme law and guarding basic rights under it, and it is constitu-

tion al adj udica tion that ans wered the cal l.

Con sti tuti ona l adj udica tio n is a leg al practice of restoring un der

t h e n a m e o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n i t s b a s i c v a l u e - o r d e r w h e n t h o s e v a l u e s

are impaired, and of giving normative and practical force to the su-

p r e m e l a w t h e r e b y s a f e g u a r d i n g p e o p l e ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . P r a c -

tically speaking, constitutional adjudication is a trial conducted by

a n o r d i n a r y c o u r t o r a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o u r t i n w h i c h t h e

issue is infringement of basic rights, and the governing law is the

constitution.

N o w a d a y s , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n i n f r e e d e m o c r a c i e s d e f e n d s

the constitution by subjugating political power relations to consti-

tutional norms. Due to its strong control of the state power, it is

considered a n indispensable el ement of a government, together with

r epresen tat ive g over nmen t, s epara ti on o f pow er s, el ect ion, an d l oc al

autonomy. It also holds the state power accountable to basic rights

and demands procedural legitimacy from its action, protecting ba sic


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TH E F IR ST TE N Y EA R S OF TH E K OR E A N C ONSTITUTIONA L COUR T

4

rights and realizing the ideals of the principle of rule of law.

. The Origins and Types of Constitutional Adjudication

C on s ti tu ti o na l a dj u di ca ti on p r es up po se s t he s u pr em ac y o f t he

constitution . Its underl yin g premis e is that, sin ce the constitution is

the supreme law as the fundamental law governing the organization

of the state and its organizing principle, subordinate state actions

c o n t r a v e n i n g i t m u s t b e s a n i t i z e d o f t h e i r ' u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' e l e m e n t s .

The idea of subjugating the act of a state to a higher law has

a l on g tr ad iti on th ro ug hou t th e h is to ry of ma nk in d. A do pti on of a

written co nstit ution a nd recogni tio n o f its supremacy p rovided a

t heo re ti cal ba se f or con st it ut iona l adj udi ca ti on w hi ch d is po ses o f any

con tr aven in g subor di nate act ion of govern ment .

It was the Supreme Court of the United States of America that

f irst put thi s idea into pract ice. In t he 18 03 ca se of Marbury v.

Madison

(1 Cranc h 137), the Americ an Supreme Court dec lared that

the go ver nmen ta l ac ti vi ties in co mpa tib le wi th t he C on stit utio n, the

supreme law of the land, are void. The Court moved on, with the

power bestowed upon it to interpret the Constitution, to hold that a

statute ena cted by the legislature is unconstitutiona l. This wa s the

first attempt to annul a statute based on review of its constitu-

t i on alit y, and t he Ameri can system of con st i tut ion al ad jud icati on

took roots since then.

However, in Euro pean coun tries where the tra dition s o f peop le' s

sovereignty and repres entation were strong, it has been seen inap-

propriate for a mere court to review con stitutionality o f a statute

en act ed by t he legi slat ur e. The 1 9 th cent ury German system of

Staatsgerichtsbarkeit

did not amount to review of the contents of

l aws. A Portuguese attempt to introduce an Americ an styl e judicial

review in 1911 proved to be a failure. The first continental system

o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n b e g a n w i t h e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e A u s t r i a n

Constitutional Court under the 1919 Federal Constitution, in which

Hans Kel sen ha d gr ea t i nf luen ce. This Aus tri an system introduced

n ot on ly co ns ti tut ion al re vi ew o f l egi sl atio n b ut a ls o c on sti tu tion al

complaints on which administrative violation s of ba sic rights could

be challenged.

Con st i tuti onal adjudi cat i on became common place only aft er t he

Secon d World War. After experiencin g the total itarian vio lation s of

human rights, the countries in Europe began to establish an inde-

p en de nt c on sti tu ti on al c ou rt f or p ro te ct io n o f h um an r igh ts . T he

Basic Law of Germany explicitly made basic rights the norms that


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Ch.1 INTRODUCTION

5

governmental activities are accountable to. It also introduced the

F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t w i t h a c o m p r e h e n s i v e p o w e r , i n d e p e n d e n t

of ordinary courts. Since its establishment, this Court has operated

a s t h e i m m a c u l a t e p r o t e c t o r o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d , w i t h i t s c o m p r e -

hen sive sys tem, became known as the final rescuer for basic rights.

An i nd epend ent con st it uti ona l co ur t, succes sf ul ly est abl ished i n

protection of human rights and defending the normative force of the

C o n s t i t u t i o n , w a s s o o n a d o p t e d w o r ld - w i d e . I t a l y ( 1 9 5 6 ), S p a i n ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

Portugal (1982) an d Pol an d (1982) bu ilt independent co urts, and most

eastern Europe cou ntries adopting their new constitutions after the

f

a l l o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a l s o a d o p t e d i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o u r t s .

They are Hungar y (1 98 8), R umani a ( 19 91 ), B ulgar ia (1 99 1), Sloven ia

( 199 1), L it hu an ia ( 19 92) , S lov aki a (19 92) , A lba ni a (1 992 ), C z ec h

Republic (1992), and Russia (1993). In Asia, the Republic of Korea,

the members of the former Soviet Union such as Uzbekistan (1992),

Ka za kh stan (19 93), an d Kyr gyzs tan ( 19 93) , Mo ngo li a ( 19 92) , Ta ip ei

( 1992, con sti tu tio nal review of pol itical parties), and Thail and (1992,

constitution al review of the bil ls before en actment) fol lowed su it. In

A f r i c a , S o u t h A f r i c a t h a t r e c e n t l y a m e n d e d h e r C o n s t i t u t i o n i n s t a l l e d

a

constitution al cou rt. The pattern o f ado ption of co nstitutio nal co urts

also seems to symbolize the transition from an old regime to a new

democratic regime.

T o d a y ' s s y s t e m o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n i s c a t e g o r i z e d i n t o

two in light of its historical development. Firstly, the American

system diffuses the power of constitutional review among ordinary

co ur ts. Se co n d ly, the E ur o pe an mo d e l co n ce n tr ate s it in an in d e pe n d e n t

constitution al co urt. The Frenc h

Conseil Constitutionelle

is often

c at eg ori zed se pa ra tely becaus e i t i s hi ghl y po li ti ci zed .

The American system was adopted by countries with the same

basis of jurisprudence as that of the U.S. such as Canada, Australia,

India, and Japan. In Korea, the Constitution of the Third Republic

adopted this system. Its strength is unity in which ordinary courts

c o n d u c t c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r e v i e w i n a v ar i e t y o f s p e c i f i c c a s e s . H o w e v e r ,

it i s pr emised upon i ndepend ence of the j udiciar y f ro m ot her po-

litical forces and people's respect for the courts. In the American

system, ordinary court reviews a statute only when the constitu-

t i o n a l i t y o f a s t a t u t e i s a p r e c o n d i t i o n t o a s p e c i f i c

ci vi l, cri mi nal , and

administrative cas e, and therefore i ts decisio n of unc ons titutional ity

applies in principle only to that case.

The European sys tem o f concentratio n designa tes a special ized,

in depende nt body to han dle o nly c ons titut iona l i ss ues a nd e xa mine

the m o n a ll si des, fa cili tatin g en fo rce men t of t he Consti tuti on and


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6

s tr en gth en in g co ns ti tu tio nal a w are ne ss on th e p ar t of o th er i ns ti-

tut ions. Mo st co ntin ental law countri es with experience of grave

huma n righ ts viol ations adop ted an independent system to emphasize

t he f un cti on alit y and p rof essi on alism of con st ituti on al adjud icat ion .

We had va rious systems of cons titutional adj udication since the

First Repu blic but never became active. The p resent C on stitu tio nal

Court was born under the Ninth Revised Constitution that resulted

from the 1987 movement for democracy, and adopted the European

concentrated system.

. Th e Devel opment of the Korean System of Constitutio nal

Adjudication

Con sti tuti ona l adj udica tion is premised up on existence of a con-

sti tuti on . A history of Korean co nstitution al a dju dicatio n sho ul d be

preceded by that of our Constitution. Conception of a constitution

as a guarantee of basic rights and an organizing rule of state around

separation of powers is a historical product of the modern age.

N o t w i t h o u t a c o n t r o v e r s y , t h e f i r s t m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n o f K o r e a

can be said to be the Hong-Bum Fourteen Articles promulgated by

the Chosun dynasty in January 1885 that reflected the spirit of de-

m o c r a c y a f t e r

G a p - O h R e f o r m .

I t w a s f o l l o w e d b y t h e

N i n e A r t i c l e s

o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a e h a n j e g u k a w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n i n i t i a t e d

by

the crown, which upheld monarchy and changed the country's name

from Chosun to the Korean Empire or

Daehanjeguk

. In the wake of

t he M a rc h Fi rs t M ov e me nt i n 19 19 , a p ub l ic u pr is in g de ma n di ng

i ndependence of Korea fro m the Jap anese col oni al ru le, a provisio nal

government of the Republic of Korea was established in Shanghai,

Ch ina and it adopted a constitution. The Shangha i

c o n s t i t u t i o n w e n t

t h r o u g h f i v e r e v i s i o n s a n d s u c h n a m e c h a n g e s f r o m

Con sti tuti on t o

Compact and to Charter subsequently but maintained its basic prin-

c ip les su ch a s p eo pl e's sov er ei gnt y, p ar lia men ta ry de moc ra cy, s ep -

a ra ti on o f po we rs , pr ote cti on of ba si c ri gh ts, r ul e o f la w, a nd a

wr it ten con st it ut ion.

However, in these past constitutions such as t

he Hon g-Bum

Fourteen Articl es, the Charter of the Provisi onal Government of the

Republic of Korea

, there was no concept of constitutional adjudi-

c a t i o n . T h e K o r e a n h i s to r y o f c o n s t i t u t i o na l a d j u d ic a t i o n , t h e p r a c t ic e

of professing the normative force of a constitution and materializing

it in real life, began only when the government of the Republic of

Korea was established in the era of the Founding Constitution. The

history of con stitutiona l a djudication since th e time of the Founding


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Ch.1 INTRODUCTION

7

Constitution can be divided according to changes in rulers or con-

stitutional politics into five republ ics from the First to the Fifth.

1. Constitutional Ad judi cation i n the First Republi c

T he Fo u nd in g C o ns ti tu ti on o f t he n ew R ep ub l ic p ro vi de d t he

pro tot ype of c onst it ut ion al a dju di cat io n i n t he co unt ry 's hi sto ry.

The Fi rst Republ ic' s C on sti tu ti on est abl ished the Con st it ut iona l

Co mmittee in depen dent fro m ordi nary c ourts and provided that wh en

a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n b y a s t a t u t e u n d e r l i e s a t r i a l , t h e c o u r t

sha ll request the Constitutional Committee to review the statute and

p r o c e e d t h e r e f o r e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e C o m m i t t e e ' s d e c i s i o n ( A r t . 8 1 ( 2 ) ) .

It was a concrete norms c ontrol

1)

whereby a court request a deci-

sion from the Committee only when an issue of unconstitutionality

o f l a w a r i s e s o u t o f a c o n c r e t e c a s e , a s o p p o s e d t o a n a b s t r a c t n o r m s

c on trol . The Co ns tit ution l imited t he Commi ttee 's re vie w onl y to

statutes, and left the conformity of executive orders, rules and reg-

u lati on s, a dmi nistr ativ e ac tions to the Cons ti tuti on an d s tat ute s t o

the final review of the Supreme Court.

T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e w a s h e a d e d b y t h e V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ,

a n d c o n s i s t e d o f f i v e J u s t i c e s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a n d f i v e m e m b e r s

of the National Assembly (Art. 81 (3)).

The First Constitution separated out the authority over a djudi-

c ati on o f i mp ea ch me nt a nd v es te d i t wi th th e I mp ea ch me nt C ou rt

( Art . 47 ).

For a newly independent country that recovered its sovereignty

a ft er a l on g c olo nia l r ul e o f J apa ne se E mpi re , i t w as n ot ew or th y

that she instituted a con stituti ona l adjudication system to real ize the

rule of law. In this period, the Constitutional Committee reviewed

six statutes and held two of them unconstitutional. Given the ir-

r eg ul ar po li ti ca l en vi ron me nt ar oun d t he Co nst it uti on in t he F ir st

R epubli c, such achi evement showed a p ossi bili ty t hat t he syst em

may firmly take roots in the future.

2. Constitutional Adjudication in the Second Republic

The Constitution of the Second Republic adopted an European

system i n whi ch an i ndependent court was designated as the final

a rbi ter o f t he C onstit utio n wi th the ju ris dict ion o ver c on sti tuti on al

1 .

Norms control means the practice of controlling the statutes, regulations,

r ule s, a nd othe r no rm s o f a s oc iet y.


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8

r evi ew of st at ut e, compet en ce d isput es bet we en st at e a genci es, pa rt y

d i s s o l u t i o n , i m p e a c h m e n t , a n d d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g e l e c t i o n o f t h e P r e s -

i d e n t , t h e C h i e f J u s t i c e a n d J u s t i c e s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ( A r t . 8 3 - 3 ) .

The Constitutional Court were to consist of nine justices to which

President, the Supreme Court and the Upper House each designated

three. They were to serve for six years and three of them were to

be replaced every two years. A supermajority of six justices was

r e q u i r e d f o r i n v a l i d a t i o n o f a s t a t u t e o r a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f i m p e a c h -

ment ( Art. 83- 4).

A l t h o u g h t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t A c t , e n a c t e d o n A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 6 1

to implement the new system, did not come into effect due to the

May 16 Mil itary Coup d'tat, the sy stem had the follo win g signi-

f icance as a model: Firstl y, it would have strengthened the inde-

pendence of the ordinary courts by taking the role of constitutional

r e v i e w o f s t a t u t e s a w a y f r o m o r d i n a r y c o u r t s s o t h a t t h e l a t t e r c o u l d

b e f re e f ro m t he po li ti ca l i nf lu enc es of t he l aw mak er s. S ec on dly ,

the court's efficiency and expediency would have secured effective

protection of human rights and the Constitution because the power

of constitutional review was concentrated to an independent court

and was exercised under a unitary procedure.

The Second Republic's system became an important model for

t he pres en t sy st em.

3. Constitutional Ad judi cation i n the Third Republ ic

Art. 102 (1) of the Constitution of the Third Republic provided

that when an issue of whether or not a statute is in contravention

of the Constitution is a precondition of a trial

2)

, the Supreme Court

shall have th e power to make th e final review of the c on stitu-

tionality of that statute. The power of constitutional review was

given to the Supreme Court which also had the power to determine

whether or not a political party should be dissolved (Art. 103).

T h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r i m p e a c h m e n t w a s g i v e n t o t h e I m p e a c h m e n t

2 .

T he me an i ng of pr ec o nd it io n o f a t r ia l c an be b es t g r as p ed by e nv i-

s io ni ng a s ta tu te u po n w hi ch t he j udi ci al p roc ee di ng r el ie s fo r d is po si tio n of t he

m er it s. F or in s ta nc e , t h e S he rm an A ct w il l b e s ai d t o h av e b ec om e a p r e-

c on di ti on of a n y t r i a l i n w h i c h a b u s i n e s s i s p r o s e c u t e d c i v i l l y o r c r i m i n a l l y f o r i t s

v i o l a t i o n o f t he Sh er ma n A ct . Du e to t he br ea dt h o f the de fi nit ion , v ar io us al te r-

n at iv e ex pr es s io ns a re u se d i n th is v ol um e fo r t he s in gu l ar K or ea n p hr as e t ha t

l i t e r a ll y c o r r e sp o n d s t o p r e c o n d i ti o n o f a t r i a l. M o s t f r e q u e n t l y u s e d a re f o r m i n g

t he p rem is e o f a tr ial , be in g a t i ss ue at th e un der ly in g t ri al , et c. wh er e t he

a dj ec tiv e u nde rl yi ng is to dist in gu ish t he pr oc ee din g a t t he n on -con st it ut ional co ur t

out of whi ch t he i ssue of constitut ionali ty of the statute arose and was presented t o

the constitutional court for a constitutional review proceeding.


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Ch.1 INTRODUCTION

9

Committee while the process of impeachment was to be initiated by

m o r e t h a n t h i r t y m e m b e r s a n d a p p r o v e d b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e N a t i o n a l

Assembly. The Committee was chaired by the Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court, and impaneled with three Justices of the Supreme

Court and five members of the National Assembly. When the Chief

Justice of the Supreme Court faced impeachment, the Speaker of the

Na ti on al Asse mbl y repl ac ed a s t he ch ai rperso n.

Ther e w as a deba te ab out whe ther or not the in feri or court s

below the Supreme Court could review constitutionality of statutes.

T h i s d e b a t e e n d e d i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 6 w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e S u p r e m e

Court , whi ch r uled that the in f eri or court s also had the p ower of

constitutional review. It was a notable event in the history of con-

sti tuti on al devel opmen t bec ause it a ctivated con sti tuti ona l review in

all levels of the judiciary, resulting in many decisions of uncons t i -

t u t i o n a l i t y . H o w e v e r , t h e y m o s t l y c o n c e r n e d p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . A l s o ,

the courts could not perform independent review in those cases with

clear political implications.

T h e T h i r d R e p u b l i c w a s a p e r i o d o f h a r d s h i p a n d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t

f or t he S up rem e- Co ur t- ce nt er ed c on st it ut io na l a dj ud ic at io n sy st em .

T h e m i l i t a r y - d o m i n a t e d , A d m i n i s t r a t i o n - l e d r e g i m e o f t h a t p e r i o d m o -

b il iz ed a ll r eso ur ces a nd a tt en ti on a rou nd e co no mic g row th . T he

focus of government was efficiency and unity. As economic growth

assumed the supreme importance and anti-communism became the

f i r s t p r i n c i p l e o f g o v e r n m e n t , p o w e r s w e r e i n e v i t a b l y c o n c e n t r a t e d a n d

b a s i c r ig h t s o f t h e p e o p l e n e g l e c t e d . T h e r e f o r e , t h e p e r io d w i t n e s s e d

d i r e n e e d f o r a c t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n t o p r o t e c t b a s i c r i g h t s

a n d t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t w a s j u s t n o t s t r o n g e n o u g h

to respond to the need.

4. Constitutional Ad judi cation i n the Fourth Republi c

T h e s o - c a l l e d

Y u s h i n

C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e F o u r t h R e p u b l i c f o r m e d

t he C o ns ti t ut io n al C o mm it t ee w it h j u r is di ct io n o ve r c o n st it u ti o na l

review o f statutes, i mpeachmen t, and p ol iti cal party disso lution (Art.

109 (1)). This Committee was composed of nine members appointed

by the President. Three of them were appointed on nomination of

the National Assembly and the other three on nomination of the

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Chairperson of the Com-

m ittee was ap po in ted by th e P reside nt (Art . 109 (2) - (4) ). Th e

term of office of the members was six years, and their status was

to be prescribed by statute (Art. 110 (1), (4)). A supermajority of

six justices was required for a decision to invalidate a statute, im-

pe ach an of fi ce r o r di ss ol ve a p ol iti ca l p ar ty . T he o rg an iz ati on,


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10

operation and other necessary matters of the Committee were pre-

scribed by statute (Art. 111).

The Yushin Const it uti on ad op t ed a system of con cr et e n orms

c on tro l w her e a c ou rt p re si di ng a tr ia l co ul d re qu es t c on stit uti on al

review of a statute only when it formed the premise of the trial, an

i nd ep en de nt e nti ty co ndu ct ed t he r ev ie w, a nd th e t ri al p ro ce ede d

pursuant to the review (Art. 105 (1)).

When constitutionality of a statute was at issue in a trial, the

p res id in g c ou rt

sua sp on te

or upon mot ion r equested consti tuti onal

r e v i e w t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e ( T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e

Act Art. 12 (1)). A request by an inferior court was first reviewed

by the Supreme Court which could attach its own opinion when it

forwarded the request to the Constitutional Committee (Id., Art. 15

(1) and (2)). The Supreme Court could cancel the inferior court's

r e q u e s t o n a n e n b a n c d e c i s i o n w h i c h w a s t o b e i m m e d i a t e l y n o t i f i e d

to the requesting court (Id., Art. 15 (3) and (4)).

T h e s y s t e m o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n i n t h e F o u r t h R e p u b l i c

was merely nominal both in principle and in practice. It took three

proceedings to strike down a statute. The court presiding the un-

d e r l y i n g t r i a l f i r s t h a d t o d e c i d e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e w a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .

Then, the Supreme Court had to agree. Then, six out of nine mem-

bers o f the Cons titutio nal Co mmi ttee h ad to ag ree. Furthermo re, the

sup pl ementary provisio ns of the Co nstitution excl uded the so-cal led

emergency p resi dent ial decr ees enti rely f rom judi ci al r eview.

L e t a l o n e t h e f o r m a l o b s t a c l e s , t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n

did not allow the Supreme Court to request constitutional review of

even one statute.

Because there was no i mpeach ment or pol itical party diss ol uti on

i n i t i a t e d , t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e d i d n o t c o n d u c t a n y p r o c e e d i n g

at all . In short, under the

Yushin

Constitution, the Constitutional

Committee was a nominal institution that left no precedent.

5. Constitutional Ad judi cation i n the Fifth Republi c

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic retained the constitu-

tion al adjudi catio n sys tem under th e

Yushin

Consti tuti on by f or mi ng

t he Co nst it ut ion al Commi tte e (Ar t. 1 08 ( 1) ).

A court's request of constitutional review now had to be ap-

proved by majority of the panel composed of more than two thirds

of the Supreme Court justices (Id., Art. 15 (3)). Basically, the Fifth

Republic left in tact the substance of the system under the Yushin


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Ch.1 INTRODUCTION

11

Constitution after changing only its phras eology. Because the Su-

preme Court still had the power of preliminary review and therefore

forwarded the request only when it also found the statute uncon-

s ti tuti ona l, t he f unctio n of t he Con st itut iona l Co mmitt ee wa s ver y

limited.

The cons tit utio na l envi ron ment of the Fift h Re public prov ided

an equally hostile political soil for any system of constitutional ad-

judi cati on . The Consti tut ional Commi ttee, i ndependent only i n p ap er ,

remain ed a no minal body.

Th e s upp leme nt ar y pro vi si on s (A rt . 6 (3) ) o f th e Co ns tit utio n

excluded those laws enacted by the National Security Emergency

Legislative Council from judicial review for con stitutional or any

other ground. Requests for constitutional review from all levels of

the judiciary were screened by the Supreme Court. Again , during

t he F if th Re pu bl ic , th e C on st it ut io nal C om mi tt ee n ei th er r ev iew ed

any cas e nor produced any precedent.


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Chapter 2


. Creati on of the Constitutional Court

. Organ ization of the Con stitution al Court an d its Chan ge s

. Adjudication Procedures

. Administrative Affairs

The Wall Painting(Ten Steps of Light) at the back side of the Grand Court Room

(Ha Dong-chul 280560)


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15

Chapter 2


. Creation of the Constitutional Court

1.

The 9th Constitution al Amendment and the

Constitutional-

Political E n viron me n t

I n t h e 1 2 t h N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n h e l d o n F e b r u a r y

12, 1985, three minority parties, the New Democratic Party of Korea

(NDPK), the Democratic Korea Party (DKP), and the National Party

(NP), ran on the platform of amending the Constitution to institute

direct presidential election and received in aggregate 58.10% of the

total votes, exceeding 35.25% of the incumbent Democratic Justice

Party (DJP) by wide margins. Despite the result, President Chun

Doo-h wan ign ored th e p eopl e's demon strated wish es and a nnounced

o n A p r i l 1 3 , 1 9 8 7 t h a t a n y d i s c u s s i o n o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t b e

p o s t p o n e d t o a f t e r t h e 1 9 8 8 O l y m p i c G a m e s a n d t h e 1 3 t h P r e s i d e n t i a l

Election be held indirectly under the present Constitution. On the

same day, the opposit ion parties and the Ko rean Bar Asso ci ation

immediately is sued a public condemnation of Chun's announc ement.

The dissident groups and university professors followed with their

own condemnations, demanding cancellation of the April 13 Consti-

tution Retentio n Anno unc ement. Aroun d the sa me time, th e tortured

death of a Seoul National University student, Park Jong-chul, and

the subsequent cover-up, f urther ignited the public rage. Also, the

death of a Yonsei University student, Lee Han-yeol after being hit

by a tear gas bomb during demonstrations, accelerated the June De-

m o

cratization movement. When the incumbent DJP held a national

c on ve nti on o n Ju ne 10 a nd n omi nat ed a no th er r etir ed g en er al , Ro h

Tae-woo, as its presidential ca ndidate, ordinary citizens joined the

s tud ent s on st ree t.

Finally, Presidential Candidate Roh Tae-woo responded to the

massive protest by making the June 29 Declaration on that day,

w hi ch p ro mi sed d ir ec t p res ide nt ia l el ec ti on , t he r el ea se o f p ol it ic al

pri soners, the immediate s to ppag e o f huma n rig hts vi ol ation s, media

l ibe ra li za ti on , l oc al s el f- go ver na nc e, l oc al g ove rn an ce o f ed uca ti on ,

a u t o n o m y o f s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , f r e e d o m o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t y a c t i v i t i e s ,

etc. On Jul y 1, President Chu n con sented to Ro h's Decl arati on.

A f t e r w a r d s , t h e p a r t i e s b e g a n n e g o t i a t i o n o n J u l y 2 4 a n d p r o d u c e d


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a bipartisan bill for constitutional amendment, the main content of

wh ich concern ed in sti tuti on of direct presidential el ectio n. I t passed

through approval of the National Assembly on October 12. It was

put on a referendum on October 27 and was supported by 93.1% of

the total votes cast by 78.2% of all the eligible voters. The amend-

ment went into effect on October 29.

T he 9 th C on s ti tu ti o na l A me nd me nt w as t he f ir s t d em o cr at i c

c onst it ut ion al a mend me nt t ha t t oo k pl ac e t hr oug h mea ni ngf ul neg ot i-

a t i o n s a m o n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , u n d e r t h e s c r u t i n y o f t h e m a t u r e p u b l i c ,

and in the spirit of meeting the popular demand for a right to freely

choose a gover n men t thr ough di r ect p resid en ti al elect i on an d t he

strengthenin g of the guarantee o f basi c ri ghts. Nevertheless, t he

9th Co nstitutio nal Amen dmen t, which chan ged the sweep ing 37% of

the previou s Con stitution, was not given sufficient time for full dis-

c u s s i o n s . A n d a l s o du e t o t h e p o l it i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h e p o l i t i c a l

p ar ti es, i t car ri ed some p roblems.

On December 16, 1987, the DJP's candidate Roh defeated Kim

Yeong-sam of the Unification Democratic Party and Kim Dae-jung

o f t h e D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y f o r P e a c e b y w i n n i n g 3 7 % o f t h e t o t a l v o t e s

a n d b e ca me t he 1 3t h P re s id en t w hi le , th ro ug h t he A p ri l 2 6, 1 98 8

Nation al Assembly Election, the opposition parties for the first time

took the majority of the seats.

2. Creation of the Constitutional Court

Durin g th e neg otiati on on co nstitution al amen dment, the p arties

differed on which en tity s hould ha ve the power of constitutional ad-

judication.

Early in July, 1987, the parties had agreed on placing with the

Supreme Court the power of const itutional review of statutes but

disagreed on where to put the power of party dissolution, impeach-

ment, and competence dispute review. The rul ing party argued tha t

it is improper for the Supreme Court to intervene in the matters of

poli tics a nd p roposed th e es tabl ishme nt of a n indepen den t con st i-

tution al committee whereas the opposi tion parties arg ued for l eaving

a l l t h e p o w e r s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n w i t h t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t .

The Supreme Court sided against the ruling party.

Contrary to their initial dispositions, the parties ended up es-

tablishing the independent Constitutional Court that has the power

of constitutional review of statutes, a serendipity falling out of the

p rocess of i nt rod ucin g

constitutional complaints

.

The r eas on s for new ly adopti ng c on st itut ion al co mpl ai nts and


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TH E CO NS TI TUTI ONAL COU RT A ND IT S FI RS T TEN YEA RS

17

t h e W es t G erma n s y s t em of c ons t i t u t i ona l a dj u di c a t i on a re exp la i ned,

by Lim Doo-bin, former Representative and Kim San g-chul, an at-

torney, as follows:

Acc ording to L im, a t a n i nter na tion al a ca demic s emin ar a t t he

Law Resea rch Institute of Seoul Nationa l University held on August

26, 1988, the ruling party proposed to leave political matters, if at

all, wi t hi n t he N at ion al Assembly an d argued t hat t he legislatur e

s h o u l d n o t b e h e l d a c c o u n t a b l e t o t h e j u d i c i a r y ' s d e c i s i o n s o n p o l i t i c a l

m a t t e r s . I t a r g u e d , t h e r e f o r e , fo r c r e a t i on o f a n in d e p e n d e n t i n s t i tu t i o n

f o r th e p u r p o s e o f a d j u d i c a t i n g p o li t i c a l i s s u e s . T h e o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s

did not see the need for a separate constitutional committee. Now,

the opposition party proposed a compromise: if the system of con-

stitutional complaint is introduced, it would agree to the proposal of

t h e r u l in g p a r t y . A s t h e re s u l t o f t h i s co m p r o m i s e , t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l

Court was established and the system of constitutional complain t

introduced.

Kim explains the late attention on constitutional complain t as

f oll ow s: The polit icia ns did not se e th e co nstit ution al compla int

process as an important issue. It was the Headquarters of People's

M o v e m e n t f o r t h e D e m o c r a c y ( h e r e i n a f t e r H P M D ) t h a t r e c o m m e n d e d

to the opposition parties that the rul ing party's proposal to create

an independent institution should be accepted but in the form of a

West German system. The reasoning was that, under such system,

t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m p l a i n t p r o c e s s c o u l d b e i n t r o d u c e d a n d i t w o u l d

improve the protection of basic rights. The opposition parties ac-

cepted the HPMD's proposal without much thought, and the ruling

party also agreed readily. Hence the present system of consti-

tutional adjudication. Kim thinks that the ruling party at the time

believed that the new constitutional court could be managed easily

l ike the con sti tu tio nal committees o f the past.

3. Legislation of the Constitutional Court Act

A rti cl e 1 13 (3 ) o f th e C on sti tu ti on p ro vid ed th at th e o rg an i-

z at io n, o pe ra ti on , a nd o th er n e ce ss ary m a tt er s s ha ll b e d et erm in ed

b y s t a t u t e . A l m o s t a y e a r a ft e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t w a s c r e a t e d

by the 9th Co nstitution al Amen dmen t, the C on sti tu tio nal Cou rt Act

w a s e n a c t e d b y A c t N o . 4 0 1 7 o n A u g u s t 5 , 1 9 8 8 , a n d w e n t i n t o e f f e c t

on September 1.

O n N o v e m b e r 5 , 1 9 8 7 , t h e M i n i s t r y o f J u s t i c e f o r m e d a 5 m e m b e r

task force composed of working staffs from the Court, the Ministry

o f L e g i s l a t i o n , t h e f o r m e r C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e , e t c . , a n d i n i t i a t e d


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18

the drafting of the Constitutional Court Act. After examining many

issues, incl uding whether the s ubject matter of constitutional c om-

pl ain t sho ul d in cl ude ordinary court's judgments, the task force de-

cided to exclude ordinary court's judgments in its proposal on De-

cember 18, 1987, and completed the first draft around early January

of 1988.

On January 15, 1988, the Ministry of Justice held a seminar on

'the Legislation of the Constitutional Court Act' in order to survey

the public opinion. The central issue was whether ordinary court's

j udgmen ts shou ld be cha ll engea ble o n c onst it ut ion al c ompl ai nts . At -

torneys Choe Kwang-ryool, Lee Sang-kyu, Kim-sun, and scholars

Lee Kan g-hyuk, Gye Hee-yul, Kim Na m-j in, etc ., acknowl edged the

nec essity to i ncl ude whil e the ordi nary co urts op posed the incl usi on.

A task force committee member Judge Lee Kang-kuk argued

against the inclusion fo r the following two reaso ns: Firstly, the

West German model of con stitu tio nal court, especial ly, the sys tem of

constitution al co mpl aint, is extremel y rare wo rldwide. To in troduce

it into Korea, a country with completely different social and political

b ac kg roun ds, ca rr ie s a risk. Se condl y, the West Germa n Fed er al

Con stitut ional Court is an integral part of the judiciary al ong with

the S upreme Court, a nd is a ge nuin e judi cia l i ns tit ution composed

only of federal judges. In Korea, the judicial power belongs to the

ordinary courts headed up by the Supreme Court, and the Consti-

tutional Court sta nds independentl y of these courts and its members

are merely required to have the qualification of a judge but not to

be a career judge. Subjecting judgments of ordinary courts to the

cha ll en ges on con stitu tional compl ai nt means that the Con stitutiona l

Court exercises the judicial power, and results the creation of the

fourth court higher than the Supreme Court.

Ju dge L ee H on g- ho on co nc urr ed : R evi ew of j udg me nts i s n o

better done by the Constitutional Court than the Supreme Court. If

a t a l l , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s m o r e n e u t r a l a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l m a k e - u p

than the Constitutional Court. Also, the Constitution al Court or the

Constitutional Committee comes and goes with every constitutional

a m e n d m e n t . T h e o r di n a r y co u r t s h a v e m a i n t a i n e d t h e po w e r re g a r d -

l ess of con stitutional amendments. It is inappropriate to subj ect the

d e c i s i o n s o f s u c h p o w e r f u l e n t i t y t o r e v i e w o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t .

Attorney Lee Sang-kyu pointed to the aim of the constitu-

t i o n a l c o m p l a i n t p r o c e s s : t o p r e v e n t a n d r e m e d y i n f r i n g e m e n t o f b a s i c

rights by

all

unco nstitution al ex erci ses of govern mental p ower and

in doing so protect the constitutional guarantees of the basic rights.

Therefore, he argued that all the acts of all the three branches must


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Ch.2


19

be subject to review through the constituti onal complaint process.

I f o r d i n a r y c o u r t s ' j u d g m e n t s a r e c o m p l e t e l y e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e j u r i s -

d i c t i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m p l a i n t p r o c e s s , t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a s a n c -

tuary free from the checks of the principle of separation of powers.

He proposed that they be reviewed even if partially. Professor Gye

Hee-yul al so emphasi zed th e impo rta nce o f understanding the inten t

behi nd the en tire con stitutiona l amendment, an d es pecial ly th e intent

b e h i n d i t s p ro v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t . A c c o r d i n g

t o h im , t he C on st it ut io n c le ar ly in co rp or at ed t he w il l t o s tr en gt hen

and expand the powers of the Constitutional Court and the judiciary

wa s being too passive.

P r o f e s s o r H u h - y o u n g a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e s c o p e a n d s u b j e c t m a t t e r

of constitutional complaint must be established in the perspective of

obtaining the effectiveness of the protection of basic rights. He

a rgu ed , al l c on sti tu ti on al i ns tit utio ns a re u ltima tel y e sta bl is he d f or

the purpose of realizing the values of the basic rights and therefore

h a v e n o p o w e r to j u s t i f y t h e i r ac t s v io l a t i n g th e s e v a l u e s . T h e r e f o r e ,

e ve n j ud gm en ts o f th e o rdi na ry c ourt m us t r ec ei ve c on st itu ti ona l

evaluation through the constitutiona l compla int process lest they go

against the correc t interpretation of the Cons titution or are based on

an in correc t i nterp reta tion vi ola ti ve o f th e s pirit of the Con stitution.

Based on these discussions, the Ministry of Justice drafted the

b il l a nd an no un ce d i ts i nt en t t o le gi sl ate in ear ly Ma y, 198 8. I t

e x c l u d e d o r d i n a r y c o u r t s ' j u d g m e n t s f r o m t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m p l a i n t

process but al lowed a constitutio nal complaint against t he court's

denial of a party's motion for constitutional review of a statute.

The Korean Public Law Assoc iation an d the Korean Bar Association

maintained that ordinary courts' judgments themselves must be in-

cluded.

In the mean time, the Administration and the incumbent party

decided that it would be more desirable for the new bill to be sub-

m i tt ed i n f or m of a p ar li am en ta r y le gi sl a ti on b y a p ol it ic a l p ar ty

since it was aimed at protection of basic rights. Therefore, the

incumbent party took over the draft of the Ministry of Justice and

after several revisions submitted it to the National Assembly on July

4. Three opposition parties also submitted their own bill on J u l y 1 8 ,

i nc orpo rating substantial ly from th e Ko rean Bar Association 's p ro-

posal. The DJP plan provided for only four full-time Justices

i n -

c l u d i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t a n d e x c l u d e d o r d i -

na ry courts' j udgments from th e subject matter of the constitutional

complai nt p rocess but i n st ead allowed a const it uti on al comp lai n t

a g a i n s t t h e c o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f a p a r t y ' s m o t i o n f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i e w

of a statute. The joint plan of the opposition parties provided that


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al l nin e Justices be ful l-time, incl uded ordinary co urts' judgments in

the c ons titutio nal c ompl ain t proc ess, and even al lowed direct peti ti on

f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n i f e x h a u s t i o n o f a l l a p p e l l a t e p r o c e s s e s

were to res ult in irreparable injury.

The 3rd meeting of the Judiciary Committee of the 143rd Ex-

t ra or di na ry S es si on o f th e N at io na l As se mb ly o n Ju ly 2 1, 19 88

r e v i e w e d t h e t w o p r o p o s a l s a n d d e c i d e d t o f o r m a f i v e - m e m b e r r e v i e w

sub-committee for m ore effective review of t he proposals. The

s ub- com mi tt ee w as c om pos ed of t wo r ul ing pa rty m emb ers a nd

three opposition party members . The sub-committee reviewed the

two proposals un til July 22 an d rejected both in favor of a new

p r o p o s a l , w h i c h w a s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e P l e n a r y S e s s i o n a s t h e J u d i c i a r y

C omm itte e' s p ro po sa l. It i nc orp or ate d mai nl y th e el eme nts o f th e

ruling party's proposal. As a result, six out of nine justices were

full -time, and ordinary courts' j udgments were excluded from the

c on st it uti ona l c om pl ai nt p roc ess . T he n ew pro po sal w as pa ss ed

without any objection at the 5th meeting of the Judiciary Committee

on July 23 and then at the Second Plenary Session of the 143rd

Session of the National Assembly. The bill was sent to the Admin-

i str ati on on July 27 , 19 8 8, was p romulgat ed as Act N o. 4 0 17 on

August 5, and went into effect on September 1.

4. Powers of the Constitutional Court

According to Article 111 (1) of the Constitution, the Constitu-

tional Court has jurisdiction over constitutional review of a statute;

i mpeac hment; party dissol utio n; competence disp utes between state

a g e n c i e s , b e t w e e n a s t a t e a g e n c y a n d a l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t , o r b e t w e e n

l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s ; a n d f i n a l l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m p l a i n t s a s p r e s c r i b e d

by statute. In addition, Article 113 (2) au thorizes the Constitutional

Court to make neces sary rules.

A. Adjudicative Powers

(1) Consti tutional revie w of st atutes upon reque st

Pursuant to Article 111 (1)

of the Constitution and Article

4 1 of th e Co nst it uti ona l C ou rt Ac t, th e C on st it ut ion al Co ur t ca n

a dj udi ca te o n t he c on sti tu ti on al it y o f a l aw u po n t he r eq ue st of

o rdina ry c ourts. Un der this system of con crete no rms co ntro l, when

the constitutionality of a statute or statutory provision forms the

premise of a case pending in an ordinary court, the court presiding

that case can request the Constitutional Court to adjudicate on the


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21

c onst it ut ion al it y o f t ha t st at ut e o r t ha t st at ut ory pro vi si on.

S u c h p o w e r o f n o r m s c o n t r o l c a n , h o w e v e r , b e c o m e m e a n i n g l e s s

b e c a u s e i t s e x e r c i s e is p r e m i s e d o n a n o r d i n a r y c o u r t ' s r e q u e s t . O u r

constitutional history already witnessed the near demise of consti-

tutional adjudication systems in the past due to the inactivity of or-

dinary courts in exercising their request powers. Article 68 (2) of

t he C o ns ti tu ti on a l C o ur t A ct is a n i ns ti t ut io n al re s po ns e t o t ha t

weakness: a party to a trial can obtain constitutional review of the

statute at issue without the presiding court's approval, by filing a

constitution al compl ain t when its motio n for co nstitutio nal revi ew is

denied by the presiding court.

(2) Impeachment

The institution of impeachment is aimed at protecting the Con-

sti tuti on by hol ding Presi den t an d other high o fficial s accountabl e to

their legal duties through a special process of indictment. The cur-

rent Constitution gives the National Assembly the power to initiate

the impeachment process through indictment in Article 65 (1) and

g ran ts the C on sti tu tio nal Cou rt the po wer to adju di ca te on th e

merits of the impeachment in Article 111 (1) [2].

S i n c e t h e i n c e p t i o n o f a n i n d e p e n d e n t I m p e a c h m e n t C o u r t d u r i n g

the 1st Republic, impea chment, though changing in forms, has made

it possible to discipline high officials and others whose status are

constitutionally protected and are outside the reach of an ordinary

l egal or person nel proceeding when they violate the Constitution and

statutes. The 9th Amended Constitution divided the impeachmen t

power, and granted that of prosecution and indictment to the Na-

tional Assembly and that of adj udica tion to the Constitutional Court.

Impeachment is by nature not a criminal proceeding but a disci-

p li nary one.

(3) Dissolution of Political Parties

T h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f d i s s o l v i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s f u n c t i o n s a s a m e a n s

to defend or struggle

3)

for the basic order of free democracy. In-

troduced first by the 2nd Republic Constitution (Art. 13 (2) and Art.

83-3), it has been maintained till now though governed by different

entities.

3 .

The choice of the word i s intentional and is relat ed to the concept of defensive

democracy or mi litant democracy, the idea that even democr acy can persecute i deas

o r p eo pl e i f t he y p os e t hr eat s t o i ts in te gr it y a nd se cu ri ty , o r t ha t i t c an pr ot ec t

its el f fro m s uc h ideas or p eo ple .


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22

Article 8 (4) of the 9th Amended Constitution provides that if

the purposes or activi ties of a political party are contrary to the

fundamen ta l democratic order, the Government may bring an action

for its dissolution in the Con stitutiona l Court, and the political party

sha ll be dissolved in acc ordance to the dec ision of the Constitutional

Court. The power to bring the dissolution action is granted to the

Administration while the ultimate decision is made by the Consti-

tutional Court. Since a political party serves an important political

role in a democratic state, it is protected by a procedural and sub-

stantive privilege not granted to other organizations, and it can be

dissolved only by the decision of the Constitutional Court.

(4) Competence Dispute

C o m p e t e n c e d i s p u t e i s a i m e d a t f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n o f s t a t e

agencies by clarifying the scope and nature of powers allocated to

t h e m a n d p r o t e c t i n g t h e n o r m a t i v e f o r c e o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n b y m a i n -

tainin g the checks an d bal an ces.

The 9th Amended Constitution grants the Constitutiona l Court

the power to adjudicate competence dispute between state agencies,

between a state agency and a local govern ment, or between local

governments. The Constitutional Court Act allows th e petition for a

c o m p e t e n c e d i s p u t e p r o c e e d i n g t o b e b r o u g h t o n l y w h e n t h e r e s p o n d e n t

entity's action or non-action violates or has a clear danger of vio-

l ating the rights of the petitioning entity.

(5) Constitutional Complaint

Consti tuti ona l complaint is a ime d at pr ote ctin g peo pl e's basi c

rights from exercises of governmental power and allows them to

petition for consti tutio nal review o f thos e exerci ses o f governmen ta l

power. It is recognized in various forms in Germany and other

c o u n t r i e s w i t h i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o u r t s . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m -

plaint serves both a subjective function of providing relief to indi-

vidua ls whose rights are infrin ge d and an objective function of

chec king unc ons ti tutio nal exerci ses of go vernmental po wer and th us

upholdi ng t he con st it ut ion al order.

Aside from the ordinary, remedial form of constitutional com-

plaint, the Constitutional Court Act adds the element of

objective

4)

4 .

It i s obj ecti ve only in that a statute itself is reviewed not its manifestations in

sp eci fi c sta t e act ion s wh i ch a re rou t in e ly ch allen g ea b le on n orma l con st i t ut i on a l

c o mp la in t s. A g ai n , t hi s s o- ca ll e d A rt ic l e 6 8 ( 2 ) c o ns t it u ti on al c o mp l ai n t c an be


38/389

Ch.2


23

n or ms contr ol ( a c on st itut iona l co mpl ai nt b rough t un der Art icl e 68

(2) of the Constitutional Court Act to request review of a statute),

unique only to the Korean system.

B. Rule-Making Powers

T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t c a n e s t a b l i s h r u l e s o n a d j u d i c a t i o n p r o -

cedure, internal disc ipline, and managemen t of gen eral affairs. The

rule-making power sec ures independence and a utonomy to the Con-

stitutional Court under the separation-of-power system and al lows

the Co urt to conduct profes sion al an d independent sel f-g overna nce,

ma in ta ini ng a t ech ni ca l and pra gma ti c p er spe ct ive.

A s t o t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e r u l e s , ' i n t e r n a l d i s c i p l i n e ' m e a n s

the matters conc erning organization of the Constitutional Court and

' m a n a g e m e n t o f g e n e r a l a f f a i r s ' m e a n s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a t t e r s n e c e s -

sary for the conducting of the trials.

However, when the rules of the Constitutional Court regulate

adjudication procedure, it can affect the rights and duties of people

a n d m a y c on f li ct wi th th e s ta tu te s e na c te d b y t he N at io n al A s-

sembl y by binding on the petitioners or their counsels.

T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t A c t s p e c i f i e s t h e m a t t e r s t o b e r e g u l a t e d

b y t h e R u l e s o f t h e C o u r t : t h e o r d e r i n w h i c h t h e J u s t i c e s t a k e p l a c e

of the President of the constitutional court in case of his or her

absence (Article 12 (4)), management of the Council of the Justices

( A r t i c l e 1 6 ( 5 ) ) , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , d u t i e s , a n d e m p l o y e e s o f t h e D e p a r t -

ment of Court Administration (Article 17 (8)), the organization and

management of the aide office of the President of the Constitutional

C ou rt (A rti cl e 2 0 (3 )) , e xp en se s f or th e in sp ec tio n s o f e vi de nc es

(Article 37), payment and forfeiture of deposits (Article 37), salary

o f c o u r t - a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l ( A r t i c l e 7 0 ) , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d m a n a g e -

ment of the Panels (Article 72 (6)), etc.

Since the establishment of the Rules on the Council of Justices

on September 24, 1988, the Cons titutional Court continued to prom-

ul ga te o ther rul es th roug h th e Coun cil .

The promul ga tio n a nd revis ion of the Cons titutio nal Court Rul es

m us t be a dop ted t hr ou gh r es olu ti on a t t he Co un cil o f J us ti ce s

(Article 16 (4)), which require attendance of seven or more justices

and the affirmative vote of a majority of the Justices present

f il ed by a pa rt y t o a jud ic ia l pr oc ee di ng a t a n o rd in ar y co ur t, wh o m ad e a m ot io n

for referring the case to the Constitutional Court for review of the statute at issue

b ut w as d en ie d.


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(Article 16 (2)). Then, the Secretary Genera

the first ten years of the korean constitutional court

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