the french campaign against the fln

8/14/2019 The French Campaign Against the FLN

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MEMORANDUMRM-5449-ISASEPTEMBER 1987

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGNAGAINST THE FLN

010 Constantin Melnik

STAL#2 USIFI)W d Ctimenat is subject to spci 11 e;pt~rt controls a eaco

ttll to foreign govC'rr~we-t or rtefgnO-A MBe(~~ it ~i~i 60proval or AV2c-2

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MEMORANDUMRM-5449-ISASEPTEMBER 1967

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGNAGAINST THE FLNConstantin Melnik

4:0158, monitored hy the Asmstant Secetary of Defense (International Security Affairs).Views or conclusions contained in the Memorandum should not be interpreted as repre.I:: senting the official opinion or poliry of the Department of Defense.H.. D...

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is one of a series of studies onproblems of counterinsurgency undertaken by The RANDCorporation for the Office of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (International Security Affairs). The consultantwho undertook this work is a French citizen, was highlyplaced in the French Government during the crucial yearsleading up to France's disengagement from Algeria, andstill resides in France.

The pressure of other work has prevented the authorfrom undertaking the full study he had originally planned,but the information he has made available on the militaryoffensive against the National Liberation Front (FLN)makes possible a separate publication at this time. Inthe interest of retaining the author's special perspectiveon events in Algeria, editing has been kept at a minimum.

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SUmMARY

The overall strategy of General de Gaulle's opera-tions againsL Lhe Moslem insurgents (FLN) in Algeriabetween May 1958 and November 1960 had a twofold purpose.Its rLlitary goal was first to neutralize and then todestroy the insurrectional apparatus: guerrilla bands,terrorist cells, administrative organizations. Itspolitical goal was to gain the support of the Moslem popu-lace through considerations of economic, political, andsocial rehabilitation.The French Army, though still smarting from itshumiliations in Indochina and obsessively believing thatit had been betrayed in Paris,.yet had good reasons to beconfident. Its contingent in Africa had already done wellin the three earlier "battles" -- of Algiers, of theFrontiers, of the Sahara. By May 1958 it was well-equipped, brilliantly officered, and again under theleadership of General de Gaulle.

Contrary to some opinions, the Army had not deviseda new an d radical theory for fighting revolutionary wars.The unconventional tactics that General Challe used sosuccessfully were often due to on-the-spot improvisationsand to some of the lessons learned in Indochina. Ofspecial note are the following: 1) Quadrillage -- amethod of deploying troops on a grid-like pattern through-out a populated area. 2) Specialized assault forces thatcould be called in to wipe out the insurrectionists oncethey had been sealed off. 3) Specialized commando troops(often largely Moslem) using against the FLN the latter's

t,


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own strategems. 4) Such special forces as the DOP's fordetecting and destroying insurgent networks -- policeaction of a sort but unhampcrcd by lcgal niceties.

That the population was sown with dissident elementsposed special difficulties in conducting the counterin-surgency. However much the French command wanted, notjust to neutralize the populace, but even to win itssupport, the methods employed had to be swift and terribleenough to uproot and demoralize the enemy, but not at thecost of driving the civilian population further into theguerrilla camp.


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CONTENTS

PREFACE ................ . . . . . . . . . . . .. iSUMMARY ... vSection

I. INTRODUCTION ............. . ......... 1II. TH E STRATEGIC CONCEPT ...................... 5

III. THE FRENCH ARMY ................... 11IV. NEUTRALIZING THE INSURGENT FORCES .......... 25

V. DESTROYING THE INSURGENT FORCES ............ 39

II.


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I. INTRODUCTION

General de Gaulle's operation in Algeria had tw ophases: During a period of about tw o and a half years(from de Gaulle's return to power, resulting from thecoup d'ktat of 13 May 1958, until the end of 1960) Franceled a large-scale politico-military offensive against theFLN Moslem insurgency. Towards the end of 1960, Generalde Gaulle strongly modified his strategic objectives andinstituted a policy of French disengagement from Algeria,which lasted about 15 months and ended with the signingof the Evian agreements with the FLN on 19 March 1962.During this second phase, France had to carry on threestruggles simultaneously: the effort toward disengagementand the combat against the Moslem insurgents had to becombined with the fight against various attempts at insur-rection by the European population of Algeria -- inparticular, the OAS uprising -- provoked by the policy ofentente with the Moslem rebels.

The study of the offensive launched against the FLNafter 13 May 1958 (which attained its full importancewith the seating of the Debr& government on 9 January1959) has a threefold interest.

The military operations of this offensive were carriedout by an army which believed, after its defeat inIndochina, that it had found in the theory of "revolu-tionary warfare" certain methods and techniques capableof putting down an insurrection. The successes andlimitations of the action undertaken, the consequencesof and reasons for these successes and these limits should


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then be weighed with care by all those interested in theworth of this theory.

The overall concept of this campaign, as well as th eexecution of its political counterpart, are attributableto General de Gaulle himself. This fact gives France'scounterinsurgency operation in Algeria a certain singu-larity. An analysis of the operation is not absolutelynecessary for a theoretical knowledge of the counterinsur-gency phenomenon, but it is useful for an understandingof what happened in Algeria and for a better appreciationfor the personal political style of the French Chief ofit State.

Finally, the French offensive -- its unfolding, itssuccesses and its limitations -- constituted the take-offr point from which General de Gaulle believed it necessaryto embark on (and was able to carry out) his policy ofdisengagement.

Although the French offensive in Algeria from May1958 to November 1960 is a historical fact, its realsignificance is still much debated in France. The extreme-right opponents of General de Gaulle) in particular, hismilitary opponents, go so far as to state that the Armycould have gained or was on the point of gaining a kindof military victory. The adherents of this thesis accuseGeneral de Gaulle of having sabotaged this victory by apolicy of weakness, either because he lacked comprehensionof the basic principles of "revolutionary warfare," orbecause he deliberately willed to "abandon" Algeria.

On the other hand, the supporters of a rapid negotia-tion with the FLN proclaim that General de Gaulle wasted


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his time for more than two years, principally in deference

SO fr- that.rri'd him tn nower on 13 May1958.

Inhis perspective, the French counterinsurgency inAlgeria bore no fruit -- except that of complicating theproblem still. further and exacerbating the feelings of theMoslems as well as those of the Europeans.

However radically they differed in their evaluationof the results obtained from the campaign against the FLN,the two groups agreed in their evaluation of the motiva-tion of General de Gaulle: the Chief of State had desiredto neutralize opposition to his policy by hiding his trueintentions and by engagitg the Army in operational taskswhich would cut it off from European activism.

If historical perspective shows that the truth liesbetween these two categorical and simplified views, itstill remains that the disparity which they evidence inregard to the Algerian war calls for a very careful analysis.Consequently, le t us first attempt to reconstruct theoffensive against the FLN as it was or at least as theauthor saw it as a staff officer of Michel Debr&.

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I


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Il. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Although it has never been officially formulaLed inthis way, the strategic concept of th e French offensivelaunched against the Moslem uprising after General deGaulle's return to power was to seize the Moslem insurgentsin a politico-military pincer action.

The military branch of the pincer movement had as itsmission to render the existence of an armed insurgency onAlgerian soil an impossibility. On the defensive side,this involved preventing armed insurgent groups fromcarrying on paramilitary operations. On the offensiveside, it involved destroying every insurrectional organi-zation, whether guerrilla bands in the countryside, groupsof terrorists in the urban areas, or support organizations("OPA": Politico-administrative organizations). Thisdestruction of insurgent organizations was not considered

an end in itself but was intended to exert a tripleterrent force: (1) to convince the fighters on Algeriansoil that their struggle was impossible and that they hadno other alternative than to lay down their arms; (2) todemonstrate to the Moslem population that despite theclaims of the insurgents, recourse to violence was realis-tically infeasible because of the efficiency of the FrenchArmy; and (3) to convince the political leaders of therebellion stationed on foreign territory that it wasimpossible to pursue an armed revolt against France.

The political branch of the pincer movement wasintended to demonstrate that insurrection against France,rendered impossible by the success of the French Army,


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was useless as well. To that end, three steps were takento satisfy the hopes of the people. First, France pledgeda vast plon for the economic and social transformation ofAlgeria. Secondly, France planned to revitalize Algerianpolitical life by holding a series of elections designedto make a free expression of the people's will increasinglypossible. Finally, to crown this edifice, General de Gaullesolemnly guaranteed that the Algerians would be givenself-deLermination and that the future of their countrylay in an "Algerian" Algeria and in cooperation withFrance.

The working of this double pincers (the militaryproving the impossibility of insurrection, the politicaldemonstrating its uselessness) presents dual characteris-tics. In the first place, its effects were aimed simul-taneously at the general population and the insurgents.In the second place, it is clear that th e principal effortwas directed against the insurrection i tself (its domesticfighters and its foreign leaders). On the one hand, itwas the insurgents who felt most of the effects of theFrench offensive: they were subjected directly to

* military attack, while the general population felt onlyindirect psychological repercussions. Under the politicalplan, it was certainly the populace which became thedirect object of the French effort, but only with th edemocratic means of persuasion, which were devoid of anysense of personal coercion. On the other hand, and aboveall, General de Gaulle stated publicly that it was on th eside of the insurgents that his politico-military offen-sive should bear fruit. To the Algerian fighters, he


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e (ranhpr than continue an imvossible and uselessbattle) the "peace of the brave," in which the layingdown of arms would be matched by a total amnesty. To theleaders outside of Algeria, he repeatedly renewed hisproposal to discuss details of a military settlement atthe cessation of hostilities. To both he guaranteed, inexchange fo r the halt of armed conflict, a share in th eAlgerian future which he had promised to build.

To achieve this politico-military encirclement ofthe rebellion, the French government relied upon threeprincipal trump cards:

First, the coup d.tat of 13 May had endowedGeneral de Gaulle with the two fundamental virtues which,in his eyes, were indispensible for carrying through --and imposing -- a policy: authority and a sense ofcontinuity. Authority, because General de Gaulle wasgiven carte blanche by the population of metropolitanFrance to settle the Algerian problem, and he did no tforesee that his policy might be seriously harmed by theEuropean activists for Algeria, and even less so by theArmy. Continuity, because the new constitution of theFifth Republic guaranteed the stability of the government.

In the second place, the French government believeditself able to rely on the paramount argument of force.Moreover, in the French view it was not a matter of bruteforce, but an "enlightened" force capable of putting anend to the problem of insurgency. The French Army con-sidered, in fact, that it had at its disposal both the


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tact=cal C aluillLi u udeztroy the rLa ana erficientmethods of "psychological warfare" for use against theMoslem population. The proximity to the scene of opera-"tions, the numerical weakness of the opponent, techniquesO.C guerrilla warfare, the experience gained in Indochinaand Algeria -- such were the elements which convinced theArmy that the FLN insurgency was doomed. According to themilitary men, only the political chaos of the FourthRepublic could prevent the triumph of the French Army.For this reason, the Army took part in the coup d'&tat of13 May and worked for General de Gaulle's return to power.Encouraged by the results, the Army seemed ready to giveits best.

The last French trump card was the personal prestigeof General de Gaulle. The new Chief of State attributedgreat tactical value to what he himself called "theGaullist phenomenon." His status as "savior of France"gave "the man of June 18" the impression that his per-sonal influence was able to gain the trust and adherenceof the masses. The Gaullists -- headed by the General --did not confine the effects of this magical power tometropolitan France: fo r them, de Gaulle was also "theman of Brazzaville," the sincerity of whose liberal andanticolonial views would be felt by the peoples of theformer French colonial possessions. From this point ofview, General de Gaulle's prestige among the Moslempopulation was an important factor in the Algeriansituation.

Certain comments should be made at this point,however, since they will permit a better understanding ofthe development of the French offensive in 1959 and 1960.


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In the first place, one should point out that thestrategic concept which we are trying to schematizecovered a far more simple reality. Basically, the Frenchgovernment decided, in carrying out its offensive againstthe FLN, to put to work all the means of action at itscommand. The Army would carry on the war. The civiladministration would launch social, economic, and politi-cal reforms. General de Gaulle would employ his prestigeas much to define the purposes of the French war in Algeriaas to put an end to the conflict. The manner in which theChief of State went about this task is, moreover, typicalof the French determination to seize all the possibilitieswhich are offered: General de Gaulle would, at the sametime, guarantee the course of action which he wanted forAlgeria, and send out appeals both to the Hoslem populationand to the local fighters and their overseas leaders.

One can meanwhile suppose that this French plan wasnot solely an attempt at rationalizing the use (a normalone despite its doubtfulness from a strategic viewpoint)of all the means at one's command. In fact, this decisionto put everything into operation effected a compromisebetween the only two forces which existed in France, theArmy and General de Gaulle. The Army accepted the missionwhich the Chief of State had given it, and hoped that itsground operations would have a decisive value. Throughthe destruction of the insurgent organizations but alsothrough direct action against the population at large,the Army, as we shall see in detail, hoped to controlthe political branch of the pincers encircling the insur-rection. General de Gaulle, on the contrary, thought


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that the success achieved by the Army would augment hisown freedom of action in regard to the insurrection, whilediminishing the risks of a new military coup which thistime might be directed against himself.

If the grand design of the French offensive was thusbased on hidden motives (the only authority which attemptedto reconcile and coordinate the actions of the two forceswas the personal staff of the Prime Minister, MichelDebre), it is to be expected that it would also presentanalytical defects, theoretical contradictions, and some-what naive expectations. But it is not on these groundsthat such imperfections become obvious, since in insurgencyas well as in conventional warfare, it is not the inten-tions that count but the results obtained in the hardschool of reality.

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III. TH E FRENCH ARMY

To close th e military arm of th e counterinsurgencypincers, the French Army planned to take advantage asmuch of men and materiel as of experience and militarydoctrine.

Although the mountain community of Auies, where therebellion broke out in November 1954, had only six gendarmesfor 60,000 inhabitants, and although reinforcements arrivedin Algeria only progressively and by the disastrous methodof "small packages" (effective military strength went from50,000 men in November 1954 to 80,000 in February 1955 to120,000 in August 1955, but reached 400,000 only in M ay1956), the command had at its disposal, after 13 May 1958,a force of nearly a million men. If one considers thatthe insurgents never had an effective force of more than50,000, the balance of forces was then in favor of theFrench Army by more than 20 to 1. (This evaluation doesnot take into the account other aspects of the situation:(1) considering the area which had to be controlled(340,000 sq. km. in Algeria aside from 2,000,000 sq. km.in th e Sahara), one can calculate three men to each sq.km.; (2) in relation to the Moslem population (9,000,000)one can calculate one Frenchman to nine Algerians; (3) incomparing operational units one arrives at a figure of2 to 1, because the French Army, in addition to theirheavy maintenance service, were forced to assume a con-centrated, static posture and all of its units did nothave an adequate combat potential.)

In the same way, while the units stationed in Algeriain 1954 had only rudimentary and obsolete equipment, and

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wnlie the tirst reinforcements debarking in Algeria hadoverly heavy equipment (artillery, armored cars), theArmy now had at its disposal a modern guerrilla jarfarecapability: engineering methods for erecting electrifiedbarriers along the frontiers, a fleet of helicopters,light support aircraft, trucks, highly refined communica-tion techniques, equipment for sea and aerial reconnais-sance (the armored cars, heavy artillery, and the bomberswere used only on a small scale in defense of the frontiers).

Finally, in a qualitative sense, one could say thatthe Algerian war had attracted the best elements of th eFrench Army. The war in Indochina had been given over"essentially to mercenaries at the enlisted level and oftento marginal elements at the command level. Considered asa "lost war," it attracted many adventurers -- and anumber of heros among the young officers -- but it inspireda certain reserve on the part of the senior regularofficers who did not belong to the colonial branch of theservice (to take a single example, the very promisingcolonel of engineers, Antoine Argoud, preferred to testthe "Javelot" brigade in Germany). The distance from th etheatre of operations did not permit the Parisian GeneralStaff to assume actual control of the action. So , havinghad their deficiencies brutally revealed by defeat, theentire corps of French officers and the command apparatuswished to cake their revenge.

Thus, throughout all the echelons in Algeria onecould find the flower of the French Army. The exceptionaltraining officers, such as Colonel Jeanpierre (for th eForeign Legion) and Colonel Bigeard (for the parachute


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trops muI.jada their~~LLgJ. 1 t D- 1. n W 7.L~LA r a0 rdA. ALL y -0 U-uA' -6troops, imbued with a veritable mystique of power andalmost obsessed by the desire to erase the Indochinadefeat. For example, the is t Foreign Paratroop Regiment,during four months of 1959, disabled 1500 of the rebels,and seized 1200 weapons, of which 100 were automatic. Outof a force of 900 men, their losses were 100 dead and 300wounded. Other outstanding soldiers took command of"sectors" where they dedicated themselves to destroyingbands of insurgents and winning over the population.Officers known fur their capabilities as theoreticians.and organizers attacked the problem of "revolutionarywar;" for example, Colonel Argoud became chief of stafffor General Massu. In short, commands were given to thebest and most experienced generals, the Army Corps of ' ;Algeria to General Massu, and the Army Corps of Constan-tine to General Olif, the future Chief of General Staffof the Army. In fact, a constant Interaction took placebetween the Algerian command and the high command inParis: the Chief of the General Staff, General Ely (later,General Oli' and General Puget) personally followed theoperational developments.

General de Gaulle confirmed this work in November1958 by replacing General Salan, notable for his colonialorigins and Indochinese experience, with General Challe.The choice of this dynamic, impetuous aviator as the leaderof the French offensive symbolizes well the auspicioussigns of renewal. More important than the quantitativeand qualitative questions of effectiveness and methodswas the morale problem. The Army considered that it


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and that it could do it.It is impossible" to analyze here the causes of th e

trauma left by the Indochina war, but one should notethat before 13 May 1958, the Army felt it had alreadyachieved considerable results which proved its efficiency.

After the guerrilla uprising in the wild mountaincountry of Aur'es in November 1954, the Moslem insurgencyhad been able, until mid-1956, to extend the introductionof its paramilitary units and its politico-administrativeorganization throughout the country (the Constantineregion undertook the relief of Aur'es in the spring of 1955;the Kabylia mountains then became the focal point and azonal refuge for the FLN, while the Oran region wascontaminated from Morocco.) The arrival of French rein-forcements in May 1956 put a stop to the spread of themaquis. The crops of summer 1956 could be harvested, andthe safety of transportation routes was re-established.If the FLN could launch a "spring offensive" in 1957, theycould not renew it n the fall. The number of theirmilitary actions fall from 4,000 in January 1957 to 1500in December.

The insurgency was not, then, capable of spreading"corruption" and still less of passing to the stage foundin certain types of insurgent developments (such as theViet Minh in Indochina), which is the creation of aninterior "sanctuary" where the insurgents could exercisetheir power and from which they could mount a conventionaloffensive designed to overthrow the established order.

Nevertheless, in order to obtain a decisive result,the insurgents built up an external "sanctuary" in


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Tunisia and another in Morocco from which armaments andmen flowed into Algerian territory (5,000 men in February1957, 1200 weapons in March). In the "battie of thefrontiers" which then took place, the Army countered withtwo responses: while a barrier sealed up the frontiers(the Tunisian barrier was 80 percent completed by theautumn of 1957), the French assault troops had appliedthemselves to annihilating the guerrilla bands comingfrom Tunisia. In February 1958, the FLN left behind inthe frontier zone some 3,410 dead, 635 prisoners, 52machine guns, 28 automatic rifles, 286 machine pistols,and 885 shotguns. By 13 May 1958, it could be consideredthat the victory of the "battle of the frontiers" wasvirtually in sight.

Still more important and significant to the Army wasthe vict.ry which it believed it had gained in the "battleof Algiers." Not having been able to provoke a decisive"decoying" action by means of rural guerrillas, the FLNdecided to engage in a test of strength in the capitalof Aigevia itself. With the aim of demoralizing theEuropean population of Algiers and the Paris government,in order to impress both international opinion and theMoslem population, the insurgents planned to launch adecisive offensive by means of "blind terrorism" directedby their urban networks. From September 1956 to June 1957,bombs were exploded in public places: bars, stadiums,dance halls, motor coaches, and tram stops. The paniccreated on the part of the European population and theimpotence of the police were such that the public authori-ties called on the Army to restore order. In three weeks,


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the 10th Paratroop Division succeeded in dismantling the"bomb network" of the FLN, thanks to the boxing-off ofthe towns and the rapid use of information obtainedthrough all possible means. In one week, a second network,reconstituted after these operations, was demolished inturn, its leaders arrested, and the political directorsof the insurgency stationed in Algiers forced to flee toforeign countries.

Much less important, the "battle of the Sahara"permitted the paratroops, in the autumn of 1957, to putan end to the spreading insurrection in the desert.

Having then played a part in curbing the expansionof the insurgency and also of breaking three of itsoffensive efforts, the French Army consequeutly believeditself capable of mounting a counterattack. It believedin the possibility of regaining the terrain lost fromNovember 1954 to May 1956 by mopping up the areas whereconditions of terrain or ascendency over the populationhad created zones of refuge (the mountains of Kabylia andof Aur'es, the Hodna mountains, etc.) and by removing theinsurgents from the entire territory.

In order to win this counteroffensive, the Armythought it could rely on the experience acquired inIndochina and Algeria.

In the first place, the successes in the "battle ofthe frontiers" and the "battle of Algiers" demonstratedto the Army that their combat techniques were capable ofdestroying the guerrilla bands and that they had also thenecessary means of controlling (and subduing) the populace.From this last point of view, the attitude of the Moslem


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masses during the coup d';tat of 13 May seemed to confirmthe lasting nature or tne results gained duiL-J6 Lhe"battle of Algiers": hot only had the FLN been unable tocarry on any offensive operation in the capital, but theentire Moslem population had also participated -- underthe aegis of the Army -- in a widespread "fraternization"movement with the Europeans in order to celebrate theaccession to power of General de Gaulle.

In the second place, according to military estimates,the menace represented by the Moslem FLN insurgency wasnot at all comparable in its extent to the Viet-Minhinsurgency. On the one hand, the degree of "attrition"seemed, in May 1958, relatively reasonable. On the otherhand, in the military plan, the combat potential of the"fellaghas" did not equal that of the "'Viets." They were Inot masses on the move, but small groups of guerrillasand combat networks; not a product of Comnunist ideologyor exacerbated nationalism, but a hope fo r independenceand economic and social justice; not connected with arigid ideological structure, but with groups of politico-administrative cells; not fanatic Asiatics bu t Arab"brigands." Finally, and above all, according to th epolitical plan, it was a population which did not seempossessed by an inextinguishable hatred and one whoseaspirations it seemed possible to satisfy.

According to the most often-stated appraisal, "20percent of the population was on the side of the rebels,20 percent on the French side, and 60 percent undecided."Several reasons made one ready to believe that it wouldbe an easy task to win over the uncommitted group. Even

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beyond the underestimation of the deep-seated causes ofth e insurrection (which i CA'.. th.. count"r-insurgents who do not go to the heart of the matter out ofSfear of compromising their entire system of values) andof the overestimation of the impact of activist techniqueson the populace (found among certain theorists of "revo-lutionary warfare"), one should note that a total appraisalof the Moslem temperament was deeply hindered by theparticular situation in Algeria. For generations, theMoslems had lived in perfect harmony with the mostimportant European colony to enhance the value of thecountry. The lack of a state or even a national structureprior to French colonization; the administrative fictionof Algeria as a set of "French departments;" the longseries of frustrations encountered by Algerian nationalism(which had gone through nine postwar years of confusion,dissension, and impotence); the attachment of the rural

* masses to the traditional tribal system; the massiveemigration of workers to France; the fraternizationbetween the French and the Moslems during the two WorldWars; and the Arab respect fo r power -- all seemed, on theone hand, to indicate the existence of special ties withFrance and, on the other hand, to facilitate Frenchinfluence on the population.

Many commentators affirm, in this regard, that theconfidence of the French Army derived, moreover, fromthe fact that it had worked out a theory of "revolutionarywarfare." It is difficult to avoid the conclusion thatmost of the affirmations concerning the existence of sucha theory are exaggerated.


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Certainly a good number of officers had reflectedan the defeat in Indochina. on the methods peculiar toinsurgency, and thus on the possibilities of refashioningthe art of war as it was then known to the Western powers.Numerous articles appeared on the subject (particularlyin the Revue de la Defense Nationale) and courses ofinstruction had been taught (e.g., by Colonel Lacheroy).

Actually, it is premature to talk in terms of a truetheory (analyses of phenomena being often imperfect andcontradictory) and even less of an operational doctrine(in the sense in which the French military thinkers see acodification of principles as both inspiring the strategicconcepts of the General Staff and the tactical operationsof the ground forces). The only practical applicationsystematically introduced into the French Army was, ineffect, the creation of the "Fifth Bureaus," concerned onevery level of the military structure with mountingpropaganda actions against both the insurgent organiza-tions and the general public. Otherwise (and even inconnection with the precise mission of the Fifth Bureausand their integration into a strategic overall politico-military scheme), discussion remained free and open.Carrying almost to the absurd the precept that it isnecessary to confront the enemy with exactly the type ofwarfare which he himself is employing, certain militarymen, such as Colonel Gardes, saw a panacea in psychologicalwarfare and in the infinite possibilities it offered for"conquering" the masses. Others, like Colonel Broizat,envisaged an "ideological" purification or, like ColonelArgoud, a "political" action making itself felt through


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the entire nation. At any rate, these "doctrines" remainedcoherent only on paper, or in the minds of officers whowere otherwise considered insignificant by the militaryapparatus.

It is nonetheless true that this debate over the"revolutionary war" had tw o important effects on themajority of the officers. In the first place, severalprimary truths concerning the particularity of the counter-insurgency action impressed them deeply. From top tobottom of the military hierarchy, it was already felt thatthe population was an essential factor, and that all actionshould be evaluated in terms of its psychological reper-cussions on the populace, etc. Instead of denying th eproblem, as was the case in Indochina, by taking refugein staff planning, large-scale operations, or garrisonlife, the French military in Algeria at least facedreality. They attempted, each on his own level, to findpractical solutions to the truths thus perceived.

The second consequence of the "theory" was more1 evolutionary." In proportion to the lack of action onthe part of the Government and the General Staff, a move-ment emerged to demand the application of radical methodsof "conquest" against the populace (e.g., structuring,indoctrination, and breaking them up into cadres). Thisunsatisfied aspiration later gave birth to the belief in

*A good resume of these "methods" (Is structuration,l'endoctrinement, l'encadrement) is contained in the bookof former paratroop colonel, Roger Trinquier, La GuerreModerne, written after his resignation from the Army withthe aim of showing that it was possible to win theAlgerian war.


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a "betrayal" on the part of the political powers, and:L-".LLU IIIUbL u.f LUC= b -LUzUUItb .ULLU WILh1 V"LvLU-

tionary warfare" in the European insurgency action of theOA S -- an event which is inexplicable without faith inthe magical qualities of this theory.

The final element which influenced the morale of theArmy after 13 M ay 1958 was derived from the politicalsupport which the Army believed itself to have obtained,both from the entire nation, and from the politicalforces which it had helped to put in power.Among all the obsessions left by the Indochinese war(where mercenaries led by professional officers carriedon a lost war which was of no concern to the Frenchnation), the most powerful was that of being abandonedby the homeland. Now, the Algerian war seemed, to theArmy, to constitute a long-awaited and long-desired oppor-tunity to rebuild the heart of the French nation. Theproximity of the theatre of operations, located on thesouth coast of the Mediterranean, the general adherenceof the French population to the belief that "Algeria isFrance" (also publicly voiced by the officials of theFourth Republic) seemed to the Army a guarantee that theIndochinese drama would not be re-enacted. One factwhich was crucial in the eyes of the Army tended to con-firm this hope, and that was the military contingentalready stationed in Algeria. The conditions were particu-larly reassuring. On the one hand, a special effort was

This wish underlay the "sickness of the Army" in1957-1958. (Looking at the underground publicationMessage des Forces Armeas, one finds it to have been morepowerful than the need for a theory of "revolutionary warfare.")


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demanded from the draftees (in order to maintain theklC Ia.~~ 'LtkSL3 ~LJJLLULLSLL wcLv uALendcd~ Lu

thirty months). On the other hand, the French youthaccepted their military duty with enthusiasm (the manifes-tations of hostility of May 1956 did not have any reper-cussions and were never repeated. The Army felt aparticular satisfaction in seeing the young Communistsparticipate unreservedly.)

If the obsession over abandonment by the Frenchnation seemed almost obliterated, there remained the fearof being betrayed by the politicians, upon whom the Armyhad cast the responsibility fo r the Indochinese defeat.It was this fear of treason (before 13 May, there wasmuch talk of a "diplomatic Dien-Bien-Phu") which explainswhy the Army did not crush the European demonstrations ofMay 13, why it headed the movement to demand a "governmentfor public welfare," and finally prepared the invasion ofParis in order to bring about do Gaulle's return to power.

This last event gave immediate satisfaction to theArmy, which was stirred into action after May 13 by thepolitical victory which it had thus achieved. It countedon do Gaulle's gratitude and his upholding of the princi-ples by which it had aided his return. Finally, itaccorded to General de Gaulle the allegiance which it hadrefused to the leaders of the Fourth Republic. For theArmy, de Gaulle was not only a military man but also the"savior of his country," the man of whom it could be said(as he himself said to his young officers) that "he hadnever abandoned anything." The choice of a supporter ofMay 13, as fierce a partisan of "French Algeria" as


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Michel Debra fo r Prime Minister (responsible, as such,fo r the supreme command of military operations), and theimmediate instigation of a politico-military offensiveagainst the insurrection -- all seemed to indicate thatthe Army had grounds for confidence.

To be sure, feelings of anxiety persisted neverthe-less. Some of General de Gaulle's decisions causedastonishment, such as dismissing certain architects of theMay 13 policy, ordering the military to withdraw from th e"Committees of Public Welfare," and offering the "peaceof the brave" to the fellaghas. The political part ofthe counterinsurgency offensive gave particular rise tothese reservations, but three factors contributed tosustain the morale of the Army. In the first place, thepolitical orientation of the offensive was revealedprogressively, and every criticism came into conflictwith the personal prestige of General do Gaulle. In thesecond place, the Army admitted its political inexperience,and aside from certain marginal experts in "revolutionarywarfare," it was relieved of che responsibility of submit-t in& his aspect of the problem to the Chief of State.Finally, and above all, the Army hoped, as we have seen,to influence the decisions of General de Gaulle both bydestroying the insurgent organizations and bands, and bywinning over the Moslem population.

The "liberalism" imputed to General de Gaulle wasthen a kind of spur to morale, stirred up by the feelingthat the Army had at its command the necessary human,material, and intellectual means to put down the insurrection.


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IV . NEUTRALIZING THE INSURGENT FORCES

The manner in which the French Army approached its .mission of neutralization and destruction of the insurgentparamilitary forces steummed more from individual andcollective experience acquired on the spot than fromacademic principles of conventional warfare or from any"doctrine" of "revolutionary warfare."

It is, in particular, this constant adaptation to.the type of warfare carried on by the insurgents, thisneed to define, even to improvise, a response that takesaccount of the different aspects ofEa counterinsurgencyaction (whether they be technical or human, military orpolitico-psychological); it is this will to break throughroutines and to make all actions work toward a single goalthat explains the determining role played in counterinsur-gency by the personality, the dynamism, and the broad-mindedness of the leader -- and this is true for all theechelons of the armed forces and the civilian authorities.Thus the results obtained during the French offensivein Algeria should be credited to the personality of thecommand-in-chief, General Maurice Challe. After hisdischarge in March 1960, his more orthodox successors,like Generals Crepin, Gambler, and Ailleret, did no tachieve the same results, although they made properapplication of the military concepts which Challe hadoutlined. Not only did Challe make his mark on th eFrench offensive, but he was also able to select subordi-nates who carried through the maximum number of commandactions given to tbim. :he choice of subordinate


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commanders is more difficult than it seems, since, on theff one hand, qualities essential in a counterinsurgencyleader are not necessarily those of the orthodox military man, and, on the other hand, no criteria exist for

defining the type of personality and the requisiteabilities.

It is also this partially intuitive aspect of theFrench action which obliges us, in order to grasp theunderlying principles, to examine somewhat empirically th emanner in which these missions were conducted.The neutralization of the insurgent paramilitary'ilforces appears, from a military point of view, as follows:

Viewed from a strictly defense angle, the problemSwas insoluble in practice. The number of objectivescapable of being attacked by the insurgent forces (includ-ing assassinations, destruction of materiel, ambushes, orattacks on military detachments and installations) waspractically limitless. This was so because they wereselected not for strategic military reasons but to securethe maximum psychological effect with the minimum of risk.In principle, then, the insurgents would only attack --in the init ial phase of the insurrection -- when theycould pit strength against weakness and especially whentheir influence on the populace would have gained themenough support to mount and carry on their attack.

However, a boomerang effect was perhaps caused bythis selection of strong personalities: innovating, impas-sioned, and dynamic. Their efforts had a tendency to causerather disparate results. Above all, some of thom did nothesitate, later, to turn against the Fifth Republic whenthey were convinced that General de Gaulle was followinga policy which ignored their views.


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The defensive reply lay, then, in the introductionof military torces in sufficientL CUiUCLLi:L.ori to Contralthe entire territory (a method which the French militarymen called "quadrillage": a grid or checkering action).But this troop deployment could not limit itself to th econventional concept of occupation of fixed points orcommunications routes. The Indochinese experience hadshown that the insurgents could continue to operate withinthe framework of the grid until the time when they werein a position to capture the fixed positions, one by one.It was necessary that the troops be distributed evenlythroughout the population in order (for defensive pur-poses) both to lessen the impact of the insurgency on th epopulace and to detect any movements of the insurgentforces. But even by spreading the counterinsurgencyforces throughout the population, the quadrillage (iflookad at from a defensive perspective) could not be alasting solution. The insurgent bands would survive andmaintain their physical and psychological pressure on th eSpopulation. The "decay" would continual, and ambusheswould be aimed at disabling the counterinsurgents in theirfortified positions.

The single valid response lay, then, in the destruc-tion by offensive operations of the insurgent organiza-tions. Now this involved military difficulties becausethe insurgent forces had several trump cards: theirextreme fluidity and mobility, their knowledge of theterrain, and their support by the population, whichin ormed and hid them.

Two courses were then open. First, the operationaltechniques of the counterinsurgents should permit them to


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block th e dispersion of th e insurgent bands (the Frenchremembered the large scale operations in Indochina, whichyA-.l unly meagre results).In the second place, appropriate actions should becapable of depriving the insurgents of their support bythe population. Consequently the offensive could not belimited simply to armed bands, but should aim at the totaldestruction of all enemy politico-administrative organiza-tions which were exerting pressure on the population.One returns here again to the need for quadrillage.Looked at from the offensive standpoint, it would not onlyfurnish the basis on which offensive operations could bebuilt, but it would also strive for the destruction of theinsurgent support groups imbedded in the population.

Under these conditions -- and taking into accountthe criteria of military efficiency -- the French Armywas led to three conclusions:

1) If the defensive quadrillage superimposed onthe population could serve as an interim solu-tion, the only final solution to the problemposed by the insurgent paramilitary forces layin their destruction by offensive operations.

2) This offensive would aim at the total insurgentforce, both the armed bands and the politico-administrative support organizations.

3) This effort, to be successful, should combinetwo complimentary approaches: the originalS~concept of using offensive operations to destroythe armed bands, and a quadrillage with thesame offensive objective of rooting out all theinsurgent organizations dispersed throughout thepopulace.


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The picture which we are trying to outline is basedon a fa.,t- whit-h imnVaCaCA 4Pa.El nn au11 th nffinera in------------------------------------Algeria: the operational difficulties encountered by th ecounterinsurgency forces, and in contrast, the opportuni-ties which benefited the insurgents, proceeding largelyfrom the support given them by the populace.

The French Army envisoned the possibility of reversingthe situation. If one assumed that the population mightassist the counterinsurgents rather than the insurgents,such an offensive would present only minor technicalobstacles. If the OPA members were immediately denouncedto the quadrillage forces, their arrest would create noproblem. If the location of the armed bands were dis-closed to the Army command, and if the former were notwarned of the counterinsurgents' intentions but on thecontrary wore led toward them, their destruction wouldraise only relatively simple questions of military per-formance. The reversal of the operational situation wouldthen be such that the insurgent forces would encounteralmost insurmountable difficulties in taking the offensive.Suddenly isolated and denounced by the populace -- even"immobilized" while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements --the insurgents could only survive by digging themselvesin. For the counterinsurgents, the formerly insolubledefense problem would become basically easy.

From these findings, the French military men drewtwo types of conclusions. The first postulated, accordingto a very broad plan, the necessity of th e "conquest" ofthe populace and included "theoretical" reflections andhopes concerned with the idea of "revolutionary war."

. ......


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-30-The second recommended, on the basis of a more practicalplan, the study of various operational objectives.

On the ottensive side, the Army advocated thefollowing measures. The buildup of an information networkamong the population appeared indispensable for denouncingthe OPA members and communicating the movements of thearmed bands. Recourse was had to native soldiers (harkis)to test combat and operational methods adapted to enemyterritory.

On the defensive side, great hope was placed in the"self-defense" system, whereby each village was armed(and fortified) so that it could face alone, at least atfirst, an offensive operation by the insurgents. Forsome, this "self-defense" formula was only a militarypalliative, designed to increase the available strengthand augment the offensive forces by making the localvolunteers assume static defensive duties. For others,

J., self-protection was the logical extension of the militaryoffensive; once the armed bands had been hit severely

F and the OPA rooted out, action against the populace wouldbecome possible. After the military offensive (whoseprincipal effort was directed against the insurgentparamilitary forces) had consolidated its position, th ecounterinsurgency could move on to a political offensivewhich could "conquer" the populace.

In fact, the exponents of this method maintained thatin political action, as in military action, decisiveresults could be obtained only by an offensive campaign.To dissuade the populace from supporting the insurgents(and a fortiori from joining them) was, from this point


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of view, an essentially defensive position. The offensiveviewpoint consisted, then, in engaging the populace inthe counterinsurgency struggle on the side of the estab-lished authority. Self-protection, a defensive measureaccording to the military plan, would also become partof the offensive measures (in the political area) whichwere necessary for victory. Certain French specialistson the General Staff in Algeria counted, in fact, on thusinciting a "dialectical" movement which would insure adecisive crushing of the insurgency. Success in destruc-tion of the insurgent military forces would create thenecessary conditions to enter into a political offensiveagainst the populace. This political engagement wouldin turn facilitate military neutralization operationsagainst the insurgents; the new victories achieved wouldincrease the possibilities of "conquering" the populace,etc., etc.

In fact, the divergent points of view on self-protection (either as a military palliative or originalmethod to control the population) fit into the evenlarger problem of influence on the populace. As wehave seen, the Army did not have any actual doctrine,but it wished to put to work all the solutions whichseemed practicable. Self-protection would be judged,in the final analysis, by its results.

It is also significant that the French Army understoodthat its military operations were not an end in themselvesbut were valuable fo r their psychological repercussions,both on the local fighters and the political leaders ofthe insurgency.


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The matter of demoralizing the local insurgents addsvarious complications to the operational needs which wehave reviewed.

The first consists of giving a specific characterto the efficacy of the operations undertaken. Since thisis a matter of demonstrating to the insurgents the impos-sibility of their struggle, there could be no such thingas a "phony war," a "breather," or a "stabilized front."Tactically, any offensive operation which yielded onlymeagre results (as was often the case in Indochina or atthe beginning of the Algerian war) did not only wastetime, bu t also demoralized the offensive forces, whilereinforcing the morale of the insurgents and causingthem to feel invincible. Strategically, two conditionshad to be fulfilled. The insurgents had to be convincedthat the offensive operations were not simply an isolatedphenomenon but would continue until their final destruc-tion (an event from which it would be impossible to hideuntil after the storm had passed). They also had torealize that the counterinsurgents could deprive them ofthe two trump cards on which they depended: their mobilityand the support of the populace.

This feeling of an inexorable mesh of circumstancescould be brought to bear on the individual combatant.Cut off from the populace, pursued by hardened troops, th einsurgent would know that there was no possible loophole.To be interned as a prisoner fo r the rest of the war wasa luxury that he could not expect from counterinsurgents,who.were not confronted by large masses to be destroyedwith military power, but by individuals who had to be


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brought to terms. Despite all the hatreds aroused in thecounterinsurgents by the atrocities which were a regularaccompaniment of the insurrection, it was still not possi-ble to proceed to a systematic execution of prisonerssince then the enemy would have no alternative but adesperate struggle. The balance found by the French Armyin this area consisted of extremely brutal combat tactics(usually confined to commando units), followed by on-the-spot executions of overly fanatic leaders, but also byimmediate enlistment of any elements who were consideredrecoverable.In the third place, the impact of the offense couldbe expanded by "psychological" means, such as par ',.sor broadcasts giving results of military operations andannouncing the intent to continue the offensive, air dropsof photos of slaughtered leaders, statements (pamphletsand broadcasts) from won-over insurgents, and appeals tothe combatants addressed by name. These would haveappreciable consequences.If the demoralization of the local combatants con-stituted a direct and immediate objective of the counter-insurgents, it was not the same fo r the political leadersof the insurgency, for whom demoralization could only bea long-term and indirect objective.

Protected in their Tunisian sanctuary, the politicalleaders of the FLN did not, in fact, directly suffer th eresults of the French offensive. This only affected themindirectly, in depriving them of their freedom of movementin Algeria.

Even when the political leaders of the insurgencyhad found themselves in Algeria, they preferred (after

S. . . . . . .. . .. . ....


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-34-the disaster of the "battle of Algiers") to flee toforeign countries rather than to capitulate or to facethe death chosen by their followers. And even beyondthe possibilities of prosecuting an external war, thepolitical leaders possessed qualities which made themless vulnerable to a destruction of their morale than thelocal fighters. Having stronger passions, a more exten-sive range of action, and benefiting by the hospitalityaccorded to political emigries, the overseas politicalleaders could not logically submit except in the lastresort, and then only in the face of a demonstration ofthe absolute impossibility of all forms of insurgency.

On the other hand, from the French military view-point, the effects of the military counterinsurgencyactions on the populace were a determining factor. Sincethe destruction of the insurgents had as its goal th eraising of the general morale of the population, th eFrench terminology eschewed the terms "conventional" and"repressive" operations in favor of the term "pacification"operations.

In the first place, "conventional" operations thatwould have satisfied orthodox officers were eliminated infavor of methods, already reviewed, that could not onlydestroy the insurgents as such but could also exert pres-

k sure on the populace. As the destruction of the insur-gent forces tends to prove to the population that insurgencyis optional (far from being obligatory, as the terroristinsurgents sought to convey), the offensive forces on theone hand were brought to bear on the totality of bands,networks, and political organizations of the insurrection,

" - ........ " ,,'.. ,,... .. -


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and on the other hand had to prove their absolute efficacy.

populace from joining the insurgency and at demonstratingthat it was impossible, the same criteria of definitiveand total efficacy applied.

To ensure the protection of the population, th ecounterinsurgency forces should, in fact, completelyeliminate all insurgent instruments of persuasion throughviolence, indoctrination, and "encadrement." Tactically,if a given operation (as correct as possible in its con-ventional deployment) is "dismantled" after only partialresults, it will leave the population in the hands of theinsurgents and provide the insurgents with an aura ofinvincibility. Strategically, even if security werere-established following successful operations, the effectsof the renewed protection and the demonstration of theimpossibility of insurgency would be lessened if thepopulace felt that the insurrection could continue else-where, could recur, or express itself in new and unexpectedways.

Now, these considerations do not apply solely to theconduct of military operations but also, as the proponentsof "psychological warfare" discovered, to their use forpropaganda purposes. A propaganda effort based prematurelyon "re-established security," or "an overthrown rebellion,"at a time when the insurgents could still commit acts ofviolence (such as the massacre of an isolated village likethe Saharan town of Melouza in 1957) or military actions(such as the spectacular ambush of Palestro in 1958, where28 French infantrymen died) could have disastrous results.


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In the area of the insur2encv itself, and even more sowhere the protection of the population was concerned,only results mattered. Even though "psychological war-fare" could augment results, it could not be a substitutefor them.

In the second place, the so-called "repressive"operations were distinguished from the "conventional"operations so as to dissuade the populace from joiningthe insurrection and to enlist them on the offensive side.Under these conditions, violence could be carried outagainst the insurgent forces and against them alone. Inno case, should violence be applied against the entirepopulation, or even a part of it (except in isolatedcases where an entire group of population is an integralpart of the insurgent combat force).

For the same reasons, th e counterinsurgency opera-tions against the armed bands and the networks or controlgroups in the population could not be permitted to haveunfortunate side effects (extortion, brutality, etc.) onthe general public. Moreover, the Army had to provethrough positive actions (medical aid, social work, sup-plying food) that it was not the enemy of the people.

If this question of choosing between the insurgentsand the population raised serious operational questions(the troops often had a tendency to conduct themselvesas in conquered territory, and at worst would considerthe local population responsible for the often provocativeacts of the elusive insurgents), the fate reserved forfighters captured with arms gave rise to even more complexproblems. If it was a simple matter to recommend public


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execution fo r insurgents as an "example," it was moredifficult to regulate behaviuw 1tL iagard to priecners.An overly harsh policy would create martyrs; an overlyindulgent policy weaken the idea of the impossibility ofinsurgency; and public democratic processes would permitthe display of proclamations of faith. The 1956 captureof Ben Bella and four other "historic leaders" (after th einterception of the aircraft which was taking them toMorocco), and that of the terrorist leader, Yacef Saadi,at the conclusion of Algiers, causedFrance more psychological harm than the advantages accruingfrom these arrests. In the course of their offensive, th eArmy then adopted the solution which we have mentioned:no public executions, )= bodies were deliberately leftunburied to heighten their dissuasive effect, and aftervery brutal combat engagements or unwitnessed executionswhich simulated death in battle, no prisoners would betaken except those who had been "won over." On thecontrary, as we shall see, the problems of politicalleaders, or of insurgents arrested in large towns infront of witnesses, remained without a solution.


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V. DESTROYING THE INSURGENT FORCES

The "Challe Plan," named after the Commander in Chiefappointed in November 1958, and symbolizing the militaryoffensive launched by the French army, was known princi-pally for its large operations intended to clear themountainous zones where the insurrectional bands hadpreviously found shelter. I

In fact, this plan encompassed all the operationalprocedures aimed at fulfilling the "pacification" objec-tives just defined above. Challe's large operations wereonly one part of an ensemble. The two other parts were,on the military level, the isolation of the Algerianterritory by the tight sealing of the frontiers andcontrol of the territory by densely placed links ofquadrillage and, on the population level, arrival at asystem of "self-protection."

To destroy the insurrectional bands, which had theadvantage of being fluid and mobile, the French GeneralStaff relied on operational procedures intended to restrictthe bands to a territory where they could be destroyedwhile cutting them off from the population. To this end,it combined several aspects once considered contradictory:extreme mobility of forces with deep deployment of troops;great maneuveral flexibility with solid strength; con-tinuous adjustment to the incessant migration of the rebels,while maintaining constant respect for the pacificationobjectives; lightning operations against the bands within-depth influence on the population.


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The very originality of the Challe Plan thus lay inthe distribution or his torces into two large specializedmasses: the so-called quadrillage forces, specializingin deployment, and the so-called "intervention" forces,specializing in ultra-rapid and ultra-powerful action.General Challe designated the "General Reserves" for thispurpose. They were composed essentially of shock troopsof paratroopers and of the Foreign Legion. As ofDecember 31, 1960, the quadrillage forces consisted of213 battalions (three of which were deployed in the largecities), while the intervention forces consisted of 51battalions (two paratrooper divisions: the 10th and the25th DP formed by five regiments of paratroopers, onecavalry regiment, and one artillery group; one divisionof the Foreign Legion; the llth DI formed by three regi-ments of the Legion and one artillery group; two regimentsnf Algerian riflemen and 13 commandos). Moreover, 47battalions secured the protection of the frontier barrages.For maximum adaptation of these forces to the natureof the insurrectional threat, General Challe combined inone organization command a knowledge of local positionswith the general views necessary to the conduct of thewar. The basis of the system was the sector, based on thecivil district and generally entrusted to a superior offi-cer with the rank of colonel. The only person militarilyresponsible for his territory, the sector commander hadhis own means at his disposal (the "sector troops," prin-cipally in charge of quadrillage and of minor interven-tions) but he could also obtain the services of theintervention forces. This elementary unit, the sector,


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was inserted in a hierarchy including zones (based on thecivil county) which were themselves dependencies of th ethree large army corps that covered the three large keyregions of Algeria (Constantine, Algiers, and Oran).The conduct of the war was established and the use of th eintervention forces was decided at the level of thesecommands; the highest-level decisions concerning theimplementation of the doctrine and the use of the "GeneralReserves" were reserved for the Commander in Chief.

The sealing of the frontiers was the first militaryelement of the Challe Plan. It aimed at "restricting"the military insurrectional forces to Algerian territoryby preventing them from seeking shelter in the "externalsanctuaries" adjacent to Algeria. It also made it impos-sible for additional forces and new weapons to infiltrateinto Algeria.

The sealing of the frontiers was all the moreimportant since the FLN, owing to the difficultiesencountered since 1956 in enlarging its maquis, hadsucceeded in forming two actual armies in Tunisia and inMorocco (with strengths of 25,000 and 15,000 men, respec-Stively). Now the Indochina experience had proven that itwas practically impossible to fight an insurrection havingan open frontier and the support of the populace.

This problem, the stopping of the continuous renewalof the enemy comb :orce and its "restriction" to aterritory where it could be destroyed, was solved in a

satisfact,zy manner. Whereas in 1956, strongbands (several companies) were managing to enter Algeriaand required fierce fighting in order to be subdued,

..................... .


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after the completion of the barriers in 1956, and thenierf~ctIing eif thia4vt wa"rni4. -d d0-..IC--------------------.0agescale crossing occurred. Of the "katibas" that attemptedto cross in the first months of 1959, up to 95-100 percentwere destroyed. When the FLN launched a large-scaleoperation in November 1959 against the barrier to rescuethe inland "wilayas" at grips with the offensive opera-tions of the Challe Plan, 950 of the 1200 men involvedturned back before the first barrier and only 10 crossedthe rear barrier. In view of the fruitlessness of theirefforts and the demoralizing effects on the fighting menas well as on the population, the FLNsave up any furtherattempt, limiting frontier crossings to a trickle ofsmall groups or individuals. During the last semester of1960, only 40 men and 40 rifles managed to enter Algeria.

Actually, the system which permitted such resultswas based less on conventional techniques (a fortificationsystem would have been too costly in men and in equipmentand actually not very efficient against small group infil-trations) than on an adaptation to the nature of the enemyactions. The French "barrage" functioned both as anobstacle (mines, barbed wire, constant illumination,patrols between fixed points, etc.) and as a warningsystem (the gate being electrified) allowing the inter-vention troops stationed inland to step into action.Crossing the barrier was therefore possible, but it wasimmediately detected and an organized group had no chanceof escaping the troops specialized in the annihilationof armed bands.

Of course, such a barrier could not have seriouslyhindered a mass crossing of the entire enemy combat force.


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However, this eventuality did not seem very probable,bcca'ac the FLN ccu'ld rnt ru n the 1i-k Af nn annihi Itinnof its external combat force in a showdown, or verydangerous because of the French superiority in men andequipment. The very nature of the barrier was, on thecontrary, perfectly adapted to the most probable anddangerous nature of the enemy threat: the possibility ofa constant revitalizing of the maquis by the crossing ofstrong-armed bands into Algeria. Furthermore, the verysimplicity of the system employed made it possible tolay this type of barrier over long distances (320 km forthe eastern barrier) and over any terrain (even wooded ormountainous). However, 40,000 men were required to manthe Tunisian barrier (and 2500 to maintain it).

A last but important aspect of the tight sealing ofthe frontiers consisted of blocking the flow of weaponsfor the insurrection; thus the French navy exerted verystrict control over Algerian waters.

Without entering into details, we must note that 1)the volume of weapons seized by the navy was greater thanthat seized in combat in Algeria itself. In April of1959 the boarding of the Czechoslovakian cargo ship"Lidice," "officially" loaded with weapons for theMoroccan army, permitted the seizure of more than 2000machine guns and 12,000 rifles. 2) The Special Servicesplayed a decisive role in providing information anddiprupting the traffic. 3) The disruption of the weaponflow to the FLN in Western Europe was followed, however,by weapon supplies from satellite countries. The "escala-tion" was completed when, following several successful


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the war, secured the transportation herself. (Chinanever sent anything but medicine and food.)

Simultaneously, the police and the customs serviceswere monitoring the railways and roads leading to Algeria(the tight seal affected by the barriers forced the FLNto smuggle its weapons either in "small packages" hiddenin railroad cars or trucks, or by caravans in the SouthSahara where there was no barrier), and aerial surveil-lance of Algerian territory was carried out, althoughthe FLN never had any aircraft at its disposal, even atits rear bases in Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.

The second element of the Challe Plan -- thequadrillage -- from an "offense" point of view was nota simple mission which depended mostly on technical equip-ment, as in the protection of the frontier. Instead itfulfilled a multitude of functions whose successful per-formance depended largely upon the personal qualities ofthe responsible individuals charged with these functions.

As we have seen, the "pacification quadrillage" notonly must hold fixed points of strategic importance andcommunication lines, but it must also, as a primary mission,ensure the protection of the population. To this end, itis a matter -- on the defense level -- of preventing therebels from attacking inhabited points; however, as always,significant results can only be obtained by an offensive.

'Thus it was necessary to root out from the inhabited pointsthe insurrectional organizations engaged in violence,indoctrination, and serving as support for the bandsoperating outside the masses. It was also necessary to


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destroy these bands. This mission could be accomplishedby the quadrillage forces only if the insurrectionalforces were few and numerically weak.

Thus, the action of the quadrillage forces backs upthat of the intervention forces. On one hand, it becomeseffective only in regions in which the presence of insur-rectionists has been "trimmed." On the other hand, itcontributes to large offensive operations by driving backthe bands from inhabited zones (and thus restricting themto desert regions), by providing both the military frame-work in which the large operations are articulated and therequisite information regarding insurrectional deployments.

Finally, the quadrillage is one of the media forinfluencing the population, whether to social action,"psychological action," or active military involvement

on the side of the counterinsurrectional forces (in particu-lar, the implementation of the self-protection system isincumbent upon the quadrillage forces).

The number of missions, their interaction, the needfo r proper assessment of both the military and psychologi-cal ratios of strength in the zone to be controlled makequadrillage a difficult art. Whereas it is easy -- butdisastrous -- to keep one's troops buried behind fortifi-cations or barbed wire, it is more difficult to act withinthe population and to choose the right moment and propermeasure among the wide range available to the officers incharge of the quadrillage.

The personality of the "sector commander," his knowl-edge of the population he is in charge of, the imagina-tiveness of his intellect, and his personal prestige make


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him the keystone of the system. He must be simultaneously.. Mm 1aYL, policeman, judge, administrator, andpolitical leader. Experietce has shown marked variationsin the results obtained, dependiig upon the personalityof the officers in charge of the quadrillage. GeneralChalle attached particular importance to the selection ofyoung, dynamic leaders, chosen less for their conventionalmilitary qualities than for their aptitude to adjust tocomplex political-military situations, their sense ofhuman contact, and their will to succeed.

In fact, handled in a dynamic and creative manner,quadrillage makes possible satisfactory results. The mostfrequently used technique in Algeria consisted of progres-sive effort and its adaptation to the degree of corruptionof the zone to be controlled.

In very corrupt zones lhigh insurrectional densitywith a strong hold on the population), the quadrillagebegins by being static and militarily defensive. It aimsat the defense of fixed points and communication linesuntil the intervention forces in charge of the offensiveagainst the large insurrectional organizations have beenable to clear the region sufficiently.

In the moderately corrupt zones, the quadrillagebecomes dynamic and progressively offensive. In a firststage, its main aspect is always defensive but the matteris now one of securing the protection of the population.Moreover, milestones are established to allow offensivemeasures. Troops are deployed within the population,build defense systems at inhabited points, control itsaccess roads, learn to know the population, and watch its


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-47- .1movements (the census technique, in particular, by issuingnew identification papers to detect the elements foreignto the masses) .

At a second stage, the contact of the troops withthe population should allow them to influence it. Themilitary deployment and it s successes (even if they areonly defensive) make it possible to begin making thepopulation aware that supporting the rebels is not com-pulsory and that resorting to violence is not easy. Atthe same time, the social and economic effect of th esoldiers, and their human feelings allow the populationto foresee that involvement on their side can be possible.

Once the bases of the structure have thus been laid,contact with the inhabitants established and confidencepartially restored, the third stage can begin, the offen- 'sive against small insurrectional organizations. Thefirst branch of the offensive is directed against organiza-tions implanted within the inhabited points: politicalorganizations, propaganda cells, supporting networks,and terrorist groups. Units specializing in counter-espionage in an insurrectional milieu (in Algeria, theD.O.P.: Operational Detachments of Protection) questionsuspects in such a manner as to obtain maximum informationfrom them, and recruit agents whose protection they secureby resorting to strict secrecy. The command makes fulluse of it s contacts with the population (regular privateconversations with a large number of inhabitants createpersonal ties of confidence and induce denunciations thatwill not endanger their authors). Simultaneously, thesecond branch of the offensive attacks the small military

-- ,,.-


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-48-groups of the insurrection which are scattered over the

rnln-V4At Aea~n r nltlatia' Iu "uiu~LIUIW that;can serve as shelters, and operations based on completefactual knowledge are set up according to informationfrom channels established within the population.

At this stage, two directions make it possible toamplify the scope of the offensive against the smallinsurrectional organizations. On one hand, influence onthe population becomes more widespread. The militarysuccesses make it possible to increase the dissuasiveinfluence otn the inhabitants: the insurrection mustappear henceforth as optional and impossible. At thesame time, the involvement on the side of Lhe counterin-surrectLonal forces must seem possible (in particular,local auxiliaries can be recruited). On the other hand,the intervention forces, which are better informed an dguided by the quadrillage forces, can carry out a moresystematic "cleaning" of the region and proceed more

* easily to the destruction of the insurrectional forcesdriven back from the inhabited zones.When points or zones are thus rid of the insurrec-

tional influence, the population itself can then be engagedmilitarily against the insurrection so that it can ensureby itself both the defense of the inhabited points andthe offensive against the insurrectional organizations.There again a progressive sequence is sought. At theoutset, volunteers participate in the defense of an inhabitedpoint before the latter can be set up as a self-protectingsystem. Likewise, mercenaries are integrated in theassault forces before being set up as independent commandoswho must spread, Two mistakes must be avoided in this

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development: the first is to give weapons and responsi-bilities to a nnnpOpnt-o nr -n vnItnt-ira who Are inaAffi-ciently committed to the side of the counterinsurrectionalforces. (The commitment must have become progressivelyirreversible so that the volunteers and the entire popula-tion are not tempted, under pressure of the insurrection,to redeem themselves by changing sides once again). Inthe opposite direction, the second mistake consists ofrefusing weapons to men and to a population seriouslyinvolved, in which case they become a choice target forthe rebels who can, by slaughtering them, dissuade othersfrom following their example.

Moreover, the temporal progression is supplementedby a special progression. As they do not have sufficientmen, the "sector commanders" prefer to direct their mainefforts toward limited zones which they believe wouldprovide valuable examples. From the successes obtainedin these zones, they extend their action to the entiresector, just as the pacification of pilot sectors mustspread into larger regions. Whereas in the large offen-sive operations, the French General Staff assumed thatassigning priority to attacking the most corrupt zones(and thus progressing from the more corrupt to the lesscorrupt) would yield positive results, the officers incharge of the quadrillage preferred to start with zonesmoderately infiltrated by the insurrection (thus progres-sing from the less corrupt to the more corrupt whilesimultaneously cleaning up the easy zones in a timelyfashion). This different choice results from the factthat the quadrillage is a more difficult art than the

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lrge ^Ffwac4im nnmpatr inn . RAnt it seeks the same end:to obtain results that will have the greatest influenceon the morale of the fighting man and the population.

In addition, it is obvious that the following differ-ent phases are not actually so sharply distinguishable,and are not regularly linked to each other (they may evenoverlap): 1) static quadrillage for defense of militarytargets plus large offensive operations against the insur-rectional military organizations, 2) dynamic quadrillagefor population protection plus influence on the population,3) military offensive quadrillage by the neutralizationof support organizations and by the destruction of smallmilitary insurrectional organizations (plus large offen-sive operations plus influence on the population), and4) quadrillage of the political-military offensive forthe purpose of ultimate self-protection and offensiveinvolvement of the population. As a matter of fact, onthe level of quadrillage where contact with the popu-.jlation is made, the interaction between the morale Ofthe inhabitants and the military operations is particu-thlarly marked. Every military (or police) success mustbe immediately exploited with respect to the population.Every modification of its state of mind can allow a mili-tary (or police) success.

Here we must say a word about the so-called techniqueof "regrouping" presented by certain theoreticians asthe natural complement to the self-protection system.

In Algeria, "regrouping" of the population involvedmore than one million Moslems, but this overall figureactually reveals quite different facts.


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In certain cases, it might occur that the normalduvteiupuwzL of che quadriliage process chat we havedescribed above was hindered by the configuration of theterrain, which made it difficult to protect the inhabitedpoints (in Algeria certain mountains are very denselyoccupied) and completely impossible to achieve theirself-protection by inhabitants whose military qualitiescould never equal those of professional fighting men.Regrouping in points that would be easy to defend (inparticular, in valleys) could then appear as a necessarycondition for completing the "offensive quadrillage." Itis only in its final stage, at the time of the involvementof the population, that regrouping in self-defense was&rafted onto the destruction of small insurrectionalorganization6 and "cleaning" by the large offensiveoperations.

On the contrary, in contrast to the experts consider-ing rerouping as a finishing touch in setting up self-defense, certain specialists preached regrouping as astarting Point of offensive quadrillage in a highly cor-rupt zone. A veey hilly terrain, high population density,the extensive presence of insurrectionists, and a substan-tial hold on the population made troop implantation inthe population, in their view, inoperative as long as thelatter had not been regrouped. According to this view,therefore, regrouping must take place immediately afterthe first large offensive operations of "trimming" theregion, and must serve as a stepping stone to the offen-sive against the small insurrectional organizations andto regaining control of the population.


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Actually, two radically different concepts of counter-insurgency lie behind this disagreement about timin_.The first is quite aware that regrouping is a militarypalliaLive; (even if the population accepts and requestsit, the fact remains that the counterinsurrectionaloffensive did not completely attain its objectives since

7 it could not completely cleanse the region). The secondconcept has more complex motivations. On one hand, itapproaches the counterinsurrectional problem with thesimple views that are peculiar to conventional militaryoperations: "Since the insurrection must be cut off fromthe population, le t us isolate it; since the insurrec-tional organizations must be driven back from the inhabitedzones, le t us depopulate them." On the other hand, itplaces great confidence in the possibilities of control-ling the population and manipulating its feelings.

The Algerian territory having been hermetically cutoff from the "external sanctuaries" in adjacent countriesand hemr3d in by the links of the offensive quadrillage,General Challe launched the "general reserves" that hehad formed to oppose the large bands of the FLN. InFebruary and March of 1959, Operation "Couronne" proceededto clean up the Ouarsenis and Tlemcen mountains in Oranprovince. From April 18 to June 15, Operation "Courroile"attacked the Algiers county bands. From July 8 toJuly 19, "Extincelle" cleared the Hodna mountains whichconnect the Aures and Kabylia mountain groups. AfterJuly 22, the latter group of mountains became the targetof Operation "Jumelles." In September of 1959, the"Pierres Precieuses" operations -- "Tourquos,


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-53-"Emeraude," "Rubis" proceeded to clean up the north

-Fg_4un4fM0 An'1 4n Mwrr'h nf1960, "Matraque" returned to the Ouarsenis and after thedeparture of General Challe, his successor, General Crapin,launched "Prometheus I" and "Prometheus IT" in the Atlasmountains.

The tactical and technological procedures underlyingthese operations are now quite well known. Bands were"held" in a zone surrounded by a complete seal and

,destroyed by special assault troops injected into the netthus created. The systematic recourse to helicoptersto bring the units on site, the use of aerial observa-tion to detect the band movements, the abundance of radioequipment (every participant was able to follow th eprogression of the fighting), the resort to crack troopsusing ultra-rapid combat rhythm (in particular, in orderto achieve before nightfall the destruction of the enemyelements), and a command deploying its headquarters inthe combat zone and capable of instantly modifying itssystem -- all provided the necessary mobility. On th eother hand, the recourse to the sector troops (reinforcedat the last moment by elements of intervention forces)made possible a rapid and discrete implementation of atight and deep seal.

The extremely rapid large offensive operations ofthe "Challe Plan" were also different from the slow ,andheavy standard "raking" operations in that they weretotally devoid of rigidity. Launched sometimes a priorion irregular terrain which seemed propitious to th esheltering of the guerrillas, they also sought surprise

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effects by th e ultra-rapid exploitation of informationobtained from prisoners or from defectors. by aerialobservation, by "sector commanders" knowing their regionthuruughly, by interception of enemy radio messages, andby nomadization" of specialized units secretly infiltratedin corrupt zones to detect any undesirable presence.

In addition to these technical innovations, thesecond original aspect of the large offensive operationsof the Challe Plan lay in their integration into thegeneral strategic concept that we have described at length.The advanced technique of the intervention fo%:ces is nota simple demonstration of military mastery in order to"break some fellaghas" as a compensation for the hard-ships incurred in "breaking some Viets." On the one hand,the effectiveness of the large operations was availableto the officers in charge of the quadrillage; it was thelocal command that requested them and supervised them.j On the other hand, it aimed at impressing, as we know,boeh the population and the fighting men. In addition tothe tactical conclusions concerning the brutality of thecombet methods, the refusal to take prisoners, the absenceof exactiono, the policy of sympathy of the troops towardsthe population, this last imperative leads to tw o kindsof decisions on the strategic level.

General Challe laid down, as a first principle, thatan operation should be discontinued only when it hadachieved the total destruction of the insurrectionalorganizations. The "Etincelle"

the french campaign against the fln

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