the french military mutinies

34 MODERN WAR 21 | JAN–FEB 2016 MODERN WAR 21 | JAN–FEB 2016 35

I n 1958 the French Army did something which might have seemed unthinkable in a

modern Western democracy: It rose up and changed the government in Paris. A similar mutiny followed three years later, but this time it was crushed—and this failure led to the rise of a new, secret army.

Insurgency in Algeria

An insurgency began in Algeria on 1 November 1954 with a series of attacks against French and pied noir

("black foot," a term for Algerian-born persons of European ancestry) colonial targets. These attacks were carried out by guerrilla groups belonging to the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN).

The FLN had been created by Muslim nationalists who wanted independence for the colony. It fol-lowed a similar pattern of insurgent organization and strategy for the Cold War. The FLN consisted of a political organization which operated both an underground infrastructure and parallel regular and irregular units

for military operations. The FLN employed a full range of tactics—pro-paganda, economic strikes, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and attempts at conventional warfare. The goal was to attrit French strength and morale, forcing Paris to grant independence.

In 1954, the French Army was recovering from the catastrophic defeat in the colonial war in Indochina. It entered this new confl ict in Algeria determined to win. This refl ected a new type of military leadership. Offi cers who had served time in Viet Minh prison camps learned lessons

The French Military Mutinies: Algeria and the Secret Army 1958-1962By Tom Cooper

34 MODERN WAR 21 | JAN–FEB 2016

French troops confront Algerian insurgents in the Battle of Algiers.


Algerie Francaise

France ruled Algeria from 1830, when its troops landed at Sidi Ferruch, until 1962, when the tricolour ceased to fl y over the country. The colony was dominated by European settlers known as colons or, more graphically, pied noirs. Settlers farmed the best land, enjoyed a virtual monopoly of political power, and imposed their own educational, economic and administrative systems upon the country. However, Algeria was neither a colony nor even a protectorate. Since the mid-19th Century, it was considered France Overseas, a status offi cially confi rmed by the French constitution of December 1948. This was a technicality in which many Frenchmen believed passionately, legally justifi ed by the parliamentary representation of her three departments (Algiers, Constantine, and Oran).

Algeria’s population was primarily Muslim, and it exploded to eight million by the early 1950s. Only a small minority held French citizenship rights or signifi cant property. Along the coast, rural villagers accepted the authority of traditional community elders, whose obedi-ence to the French administration was rewarded by various privileges. Age-old suspicions persisted between the highland Berbers of the Aurés and Kabylia and the lowland Arabs.

The Muslim leadership class generally sided with the French, but during the insurgency rarely signed up with French armed forces—even when they became a primary targets of nationalist terrorism. Most of the native urban population was more restive, especially trade unions. While the French generally considered the insurgents to be left-wing, the FLN was primarily nationalist and demanded rights of self-determination—either in the form of self-government, independence, or even complete integration with France. A vast and largely unexploited hinterland was dominated by local tribes left to their own devices.

The confl ict in Algeria developed into a three-cornered contest between the Algerian nationalists, the French government, and the European colonists. Each pursued different aims. Caught in the middle was the French military. This explosive mixture led to savage fi ghting, mutiny in the army and the political crisis which brought down the Fourth Republic in 1958 and challenged de Gaulle in 1961.

from the communist way of war. They analyzed reasons for their defeat and were determined to emerge victorious in the future. This led to a new theory on how to defeat insurgents, becom-ing known as guerre revolutionaire (revolutionary war). The dilemma was that the new doctrine was based upon the strategy propounded by Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh—and bore little relation to the situation in Algeria.

The Communist Party of Algeria was rather weak and not particularly popular among the native populace. The FLN was an umbrella organization which brought under control various nationalist movements whose goal was to end French rule in Algeria. While gaining support from the communist world, the FLN was not planning to build a communist state. From the standpoint of French military theorists, the war in Algeria was not just a colonial confl ict but the latest in a long line of radical revolutions that were sweeping the world since Mao’s victory in the Chinese Civil War. They viewed the new war in Algerie francaise(French Algeria) as a last-ditch stand against communism. Consequently,

any negotiations with the FLN were understood as a sign of weakness. Total victory was the only option.

Since the military was believed to be a bastion of Western civilization in France, it took on the role of political watchdog. It wanted to maintain the status quo, buying time until the native Algerian population would be re-educated to Western standards.

The French Army became a highly politicized force, standing fi rm against Algerian insurgents even if that entailed opposing civil-ian authorities in Paris. As the war progressed, these attitudes would harden—and turn into a military

rebellion against what was considered to be a sellout on the home front.

Military Victory and Political Disaster

The fi rst wave of FLN attacks drew a ruthless military response from the French. By February 1955, many nationalist leaders were dead or in prison and their organization in tatters. The FLN survived as recruits fl ocked to join the movement. When Paris tried to integrate the native and European population at the local level, insur-gents deliberately massacred 123 pied noirs around the town of Philippeville

(now Skikda) on 20 August 1955. This prompted the French to abandon political reforms. The army ruth-lessly restored order in Philippeville, while vigilante groups of pied noir retaliated with a shocking ferocity.

French military victories continued to grow in the following years, but they alone could not restore the political situation. The FLN reformed their organization and replaced moderate leaders with a new generation of extremists. Morocco and Tunisia were granted independence by France in March 1956, who promptly opened up sanctuary areas for the FLN. This move forced the French military to divert troops away from internal security toward frontier protection.

In November 1956, the French mili-tary, including units based in Algeria, participated in Operation Musketeer, a joint airborne-amphibious operation alongside the British and Israelis. Musketeer’s objective was to seize the Suez Canal, recently nationalized by Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser. Nasser was a major supporter of the FLN, and Paris saw the invasion as a way to overthrow his government and undercut the insurgents in Algeria.

Musketeer started out well. Allied air raids destroyed much of the Egyptian Air Force, while the Israeli Army swept across the Sinai. On 5 November, Anglo-French forces captured Port Said and seemed to be securing the canal. The invasion led to an international uproar which pitted Moscow, Washington, and the United Nations against Britain, France, and Israel. London and Paris were pressured into withdrawing their expeditionary forces. To many in the French military, this was another betrayal by the home government.

Gen. Massu reviews French paratroopers in Algeria.


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French Mechanized Division 1950s

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Battle of Algiers

The FLN’s military wing—the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale, ALN) –opened a campaign of attacks in the city of

Algiers in mid-1956. The objective was to provoke massive French repression of the native populace which the FLN could exploit via propaganda on the international stage as well as at home. In the short run, this strategy backfi red.

The exchange of attacks—often involv-ing terrorism—between the ALN and pied noir threw the city into anarchy. The civilian administration took the unprecedented step of handing over complete authority to the French Army.

In January 1957, the 10th Parachute Division moved into Algiers. Under the command of Gen. Jacques Massu, the Paras launched a series of raids into the Casbah (the city’s older district, a FLN stronghold), rounding up suspects and breaking up an attempted general strike. Exploiting intelligence col-lected through the torture of arrested insurgents, the French destroyed the ALN’s underground network. Over 3,000 insurgents died or disappeared under army interrogation in what became known as the Battle of Algiers.

This was followed by further French victories along the Tunisian border. The French Army built an elaborate barrier called the Morice Line, cutting off the ALN from its external bases. By the spring of 1958, the French Army was winning

The French Military in Algeria

In the 1950s, Algeria was offi cially France’s 10th Military Region and a base for 75,000 troops. It was organized into three corps commands—Algiers, Constantine, and Oran—each that maintained three divisions on average. Ground forces consisted of two types of units: mobile (airborne and motorized) and static (sector). The mobile units were built around the 5th Armored, and the 10th and 25th Airborne Divisions. These units had the best men and equipment. In comparison, sector units tended to be lower quality. Only 15 percent of French forces in Algeria were professional soldiers: The rest were recruited through the military draft and recall of reservists.

There were also 20,000 Muslim career soldiers in the French army, with 20,000 conscripts serving in Tirailleur (light infantry)

battalions and Spahi (indigenous light cavalry) mechanized cavalry regiments. In 1956, a new policy of mixing races within units was introduced, and by 1959, most Tirailleur units were composed of 50 percent Muslim and 50 percent colon (settler) troops. Similarly, metropolitan units consisted up to 25 percent of native conscripts, reservists and volunteers. The total strength of the French Army in Algeria rose to 400,000, and this fi gure was maintained until 1962.

French divisions were the size of reinforced brigades. This was to enhance mobility, with French Armor doctrine calling for rapid deployment and maneuver on the battlefi eld. The AMX series light tanks were designed for this role. Airborne regiments had fi ve manuever companies, a reinforced battalion in strength. The companies

could be organized into two task groups for independent action. The organization proved its worth in the 1956 Anglo-French Suez invasion, Operation Musketeer. French forces deployed across the Mediterranean to seize Port Said and occupy the northern end of the Suez Canal—though the operation was ended by a UN-brokered ceasefi re.

There was also the Foreign Legion (Legion Etrangere in French). This was made up of a number of units, with volunteers enlisting from countries around the world, though the cadre was made up of French citizens. The Foreign Legion had some of the most professional as well as ruthless troops—and in Algeria, some of the most politicized. 1st REP (Legion Parachute Regiment) led the April 1961 coup attempt in Algiers and was later disbanded for its efforts. Other Legion regiments continue to soldier on into the 21st century.

the war against the FLN/ALN. However, this military success

provoked a major political backlash. When substantiated reports of torture were published in France, public opinion recoiled in horror, while

native support for French attempts at integration collapsed. The govern-ment began wavering, and senior offi cers suspected Paris was going to throw out their victory. The stage was being set for the army to move.

1958: The Army Moves

The loss of political support from Paris after the victory in the Battle of Algiers produced deep dissatisfaction for the army in Algeria, particularly

French troops of the 4th Zouave Regiment in Algeria.

the french military mutinies

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