the frontrunners: foreign policy and the democratic … · the frontrunners: foreign policy and the...

THE FRONTRUNNERS: FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN 2020Dougal RobinsonSeptember 2019

The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney is a university-based research centre, dedicated to the rigorous analysis of American foreign policy, economics, politics and culture. The Centre is a national resource, that builds Australia’s awareness of the dynamics shaping America — and critically — their implications for Australia.

United States Studies Centre

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This report may be cited as:Dougal Robinson, “The frontrunners: Foreign policy and the Democratic Party in 2020,” United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, September 2019.

Reports published by the United States Studies Centre are anonymously peer-reviewed by both internal and external experts. Cover photo: (L-R) Former Vice President Joe Biden, Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Kamala Harris during the second night of the first Democratic presidential debate, June 2019 (Getty)

Table of contents

Executive summary 01

Introduction 02

Foreign policy: Rarely the dominant issue in US presidential elections

04

The candidates 06

The key issues for Australia 13

Foreign policy in the general election 17

Endnotes 18

About the author 25

UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRETHE FRONTRUNNERS: FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN 2020

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Executive summary

The Democratic Party’s foreign policy platform is getting tougher on China and simultaneously growing more sceptical of the utility of free trade, high defence spending, and US leadership in the Middle East.

Consequently, Australia will likely face more difficult decisions hedging between Washington and Beijing, regardless of which candidate wins the 2020 election.

Although Democratic primaries always feature a pull to the left, the trend is more pronounced now than in recent cycles due to the strength of the party’s progressive wing.

The leading progressives, Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, propose significant changes to President Obama’s foreign policy platform.

President Trump is unlikely to achieve major domestic successes before the election, so many of his most notable actions in the lead up to the general election in November 2020 — and what he will see as an electoral strength — will likely be foreign policy.


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Introduction

The Democratic Party is adopting a tougher approach to China and moving left on many issues of great consequence to Australia, including trade and defence spending. Since the end of the Cold War, foreign policy centrists have led a party committed to liberal internationalism, alliances, and to some degree, free trade. In this presidential election cycle, more left-leaning ‘progressives’ such as Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders enjoy enthusiastic support and are pulling the party’s platform to the left on domestic and foreign policy.

Unlike more centrist Democrats such as Joe Biden, progressives are sceptical or even hostile towards free trade agreements and vocal in their calls to cut

the defence budget. In this election cycle, centrists and progressives agree on foreign policy positions such as opposing authoritarianism, reducing support for non-democratic allies, and raising the prominence of human rights and climate change in foreign policy.1 The key question for allies like Australia is whether the current move to the left

on foreign policy translates into a new and lasting Democratic Party foreign policy consensus, and perhaps a president whose foreign policy is to the left of the Obama and Clinton administrations.

Concurrently, the shift to a more confrontational tone towards China is highly noteworthy and driven by concerns over economic issues, human rights and to a lesser extent, geopolitics. Democrats lament job losses due to Beijing’s economic policies and criticise China’s record on intellectual property. The increasingly authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party, especially its influence operations overseas and conduct in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, are animating issues for Democratic candidates who speak about China in strong, often ideological terms. The China hardening is not a Trump-specific or a Republican-only phenomenon. Rather, getting tough on China is a rare

example of bipartisan consensus between President Trump and Democrats in highly polarised Washington. Democrats broadly support President Trump’s confrontational approach towards Beijing, though not all of his methods. Moreover, Democrats use tough talk on China to build a greater sense of domestic unity in a fractured polity. Yet there are striking inconsistencies in Democrats’ approach to China, particularly that they are calling for a tougher approach to China while remaining hesitant, at best, about supporting high defence spending and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

If a Democratic president is sworn in on 20 January 2021, they will likely have won the Oval Office on a platform that is far more assertive towards China than the Obama administration’s, and to the left of the last two Democratic presidents on most foreign policy issues. Joe Biden, President Obama’s vice president, is adopting a more competitive tone towards China and seeking to mollify criticism from progressives on issues such as the TPP. The leading progressives, Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, propose major changes to President Obama’s foreign policy platform. For this wing of the Democratic Party, the 44th president tolerated a rigged global economy and authoritarian regimes, and spent far too much on defence.2 The other major candidates at this point — California Senator Kamala Harris and South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg — are responding to the prevalent political winds by talking tough on China, but seeking to distance themselves from the Obama administration’s role in the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and trade agreements that are perceived as overly favourable towards big business. With a field that at one point numbered 25 candidates, and the vast majority of Democratic voters yet to decide on their preferred candidate, the outcome of the Democratic primary is highly uncertain.3 But the foreign policy contours are becoming clear, and they will help shape the 2020 election, the Democratic Party and US foreign policy.

Australia, and other US allies and partners, must start considering the implications of these shifts. First, as the needle on China policy swings in a more competitive direction across the American body politic, Australia and indeed most countries in the Indo-Pacific will

There are striking inconsistencies in Democrats’ approach to China, particularly that they are calling for a tougher approach to China while remaining hesitant, at best, about supporting high defence spending and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.


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likely face more difficult decisions hedging between Washington and Beijing. The increasingly ideological and adversarial tone towards China means Washington will put more pressure on Canberra to stand shoulder to shoulder on issues that are highly sensitive for the Chinese Communist Party, including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

Second, the foreign policy platform of the Democratic Party is no longer dominated by centrist figures who are well known to Australia, such as Barack Obama, Bill and Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden and John Kerry. There is the very real prospect that a Democratic candidate relatively unknown to allies and partners, with limited experience in foreign policy, or promising wholesale changes to foreign policy, triumphs in the general election. Indeed, this is the norm in recent presidential politics. All four US presidents elected after the Cold War — Presidents Donald Trump, Barack Obama, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton — won their first presidential term with a very thin foreign policy resume.

Third, as Democrats move to the left and Donald Trump continues to remake the Republican platform, the gap between the United States’ two political parties is widening on all major foreign policy issues except China and trade policy.4 In turn, the United States will be a less consistent ally, with bigger shifts between administrations of different political persuasions and lower prospects that foreign policy initiatives from one administration will carry over, just as President Trump walked away from the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate accords and the TPP.

President Barack Obama speaks about the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan as Vice President Joe Biden looks on, October 2015

Photo: Getty


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Foreign policy rarely determines who wins the Democratic or Republican Party nomination or the general election because it is far less important to American voters than more immediate concerns such as healthcare, the state of the economy, taxes or immigration. Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump all campaigned for their first term in the Oval Office by promising to focus on nation building at home and do less in the world, regardless of how they governed. Public opinion surveys, Democratic candidates’

stump speeches and party debates all suggest this trend is continuing in the 2020 election cycle.5 A May 2019 survey by the Center for American Progress (CAP), a progressive think tank in Washington, found that American voters across both parties want US foreign policy to focus on two key objectives: firstly, protecting the homeland and American people from

external threats (particularly terrorism), and secondly, protecting jobs for American workers.6 Perhaps the most significant finding of this poll and several others is that a majority of Americans see China as the United States’ main competitor, ahead of other countries such as Russia, Iran or North Korea. Moreover, many of the key phrases used by foreign policy experts — the ‘liberal international order’, ‘fighting authoritarianism’, ‘working with allies and the international community’, and ‘promoting democracy’ — all fell flat among a representative sample of voters, who “simply did not understand what any of these phrases and ideas meant or implied”.7

Unsurprisingly, the Democratic candidates are at this point devoting relatively limited speaking time to complex foreign policy matters. At this point of the cycle, they are jostling with each other, trying to make an impression with the electorate on the most important domestic issues. When Democrats

do speak directly about foreign policy, they tend to pivot back to their domestic platform,8 or craft soundbite-length interjections to land blows on fellow candidates or President Trump.9 For foreign policy to be a major issue in primaries or the general election, it generally needs to be a single, relatively clear-cut issue such as whether a candidate supported the Iraq War.10 More broadly, foreign policy plays a role insofar as all frontline candidates face the ‘Commander-in-Chief’ test: whether Americans would trust the candidate to be the commander in chief of the US military. However, in the 2016 election, polls showed voters trusted Hillary Clinton more than Donald Trump to be commander in chief, yet Trump was effective in neutralising this gap by using Clinton’s extensive record against her, painting her as the latest incarnation of a foreign policy establishment that had plunged the United States into endless wars and unpopular trade deals.11

There are significant differences on foreign policy in the Democratic field, and a wide gulf between the worldview of major contenders Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders. Yet, absent a war or major international crisis in the next year, Democrats’ intra-party differences and their debates with President Trump are likely to focus on domestic issues.

Democrats are currently spending most of their time and energy debating a suite of major domestic policy changes, including universal healthcare, the ‘green new deal’, and major immigration reform. Although Democratic primaries always feature a pull to the left (and Republican primaries to the right), the trend is more pronounced now than in recent cycles due to the strength of the party’s progressive wing. Some but not all Democratic presidential candidates are embracing previously untouchable positions such as abolishing private health insurance, far higher taxes for the rich and softening immigration policies.

The lack of focus on foreign policy relative to domestic policy is anything but commensurate with the fact that foreign policy is the area in which the US president has greatest capacity to implement their vision. In all likelihood, the winner of the 2020 presidential election

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Foreign policy: Rarely the dominant issue in US presidential elections

American voters across both parties want US foreign policy to focus on two key objectives: firstly, protecting the homeland and American people from external threats (particularly terrorism), and secondly, protecting jobs for American workers.


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will be elected on a domestic platform that will be partially or mostly stalled in Congress and perhaps the courts. President Trump’s record on domestic and foreign policy implementation is instructive. With some notable exceptions, the Trump administration’s domestic agenda and key campaign promises have so far been partially or entirely frustrated.12 By contrast, President Trump has a strong record of implementing his central foreign policy pledges from the 2016 election campaign, including putting tariffs on China, withdrawing from the Iran and Paris agreements, and recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

One major difference in the Democratic Party on foreign policy this election, relative to previous cycles, is the influence of outside groups, particularly National Security Action (NSA). Founded in 2018 by Ben Rhodes, former Deputy National Security Adviser to President Obama, and Jake Sullivan, former National Security Adviser to Vice President Biden, NSA provides Democratic candidates with talking points and policy expertise to oppose President Trump. It sits at the centrist end of the Democratic Party, dedicated to “advancing American global leadership”.13 Rhodes has said its objective is to disband in 2021 if the Democratic nominee wins the election.14 If a centrist wins the election, it is likely that NSA’s network of more than 60 former senior officials from the Obama and Clinton administrations, academic experts and think tank leaders such as Tom Donilon, Susan Rice, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dennis McDonough and Samantha Power, will comprise much of the key foreign policy team of the incoming administration. Similarly, groups such as CAP and Middle East-focused J Street are also providing intellectual energy and talking points to Democrats.

The presidential election cycleThe presidential election cycle can be conceptualised in four phases. First, Democrats will be positioning until the Iowa caucus (3 February 2020), with the remaining candidates competing for attention and the field narrowing as candidates drop out. Second, the primary phase will winnow the field to one nominee. The primaries commence with the first vote in Iowa and last several months as all states hold staggered votes including 15 states on Super Tuesday (3 March 2020), and the candidate to be formally nominated at the Democratic Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (13-16 July 2020). Third, the Democratic nominee will directly compete with President Trump in the general election phase from the convention until election day (3 November 2020). Fourth, if a Democrat wins the election, they will be in transition phase until they take the oath of office on 20 January 2021. As we get further into the election cycle, the remaining Democratic candidates and then the single nominee will likely offer more fleshed-out foreign policy proposals.


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At this stage, the five major candidates, from centre to left on foreign policy, are Joe Biden, Pete Buttigieg, Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. These candidates are well ahead of their fellow aspirants on all the key metrics, including polling, fundraising and name recognition. Each has a growing bench of foreign policy advisers. Moreover, all bar Harris have thus far issued at least one major foreign policy speech to bolster their commander in chief credentials, and Warren and Sanders have complemented their speeches with detailed essays and policy proposals. It is unlikely but not impossible that another candidate such as Amy Klobuchar, Cory Booker or Beto O’Rourke captures the nomination, though at this stage these three and their fellow

‘outsider’ candidates each consistently receive less than 5 per cent support in polls of Democratic voters and trail far behind the frontrunners on fundraising.15

There is a wide array of similarities in Democrats’ approach to foreign policy. If elected, a Democratic president

would immediately alter the style and much of the substance of President Trump’s foreign policy. To varying degrees, all candidates mention the need to rebuild strained ties with US allies and partners. Given President Trump’s affinity for generals, and the state of civil-military relations, Democrats are in favour of using the military as the tool of last resort, instead emphasising the non-military tools of US international engagement, including diplomacy, trade, aid and people-to-people links. Where President Trump often admires authoritarian leaders, the Democratic candidates are critical of authoritarian regimes. All candidates champion re-entry to the Paris climate agreement. Similarly, Democrats widely support re-entry to the Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran, though there would be significant hurdles involved in bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and winning renewed buy-in from the other parties to the deal.

The differences between the candidates’ foreign policy positions are subtle but significant and will shape the Democratic Party’s debates over coming months. Although there is growing consensus on a tougher China policy — despite candidates also acknowledging the importance of co-operation with Beijing on shared challenges such as climate change and nuclear proliferation — Democrats diverge in their relative emphasis on various aspects of the Chinese Communist Party’s behaviour and key focus for US policy towards China. Aside from the need to wind down the ‘forever wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are notable differences in their approach to Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia. There is a spectrum on defence spending, from a flat budget top-line with greater focus on modernisation, to calls for lower or far lower spending. On trade agreements, some progressives exhibit outright hostility, whereas centrists call for trade agreements such as the TPP to pay greater attention to environmental and labour provisions.

Joe BidenJoe Biden has an extensive foreign policy record from his 44-year career in government, including as vice president during the Obama administration for eight years, and three separate stints as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.16 The Democratic frontrunner is seeking to portray himself as an elder statesman; a reliable and experienced choice for commander in chief. In July 2019, Biden’s campaign posted a 90-second video lambasting Trump’s admiration for autocrats, warmongering towards Iran, withdrawal from the Iran and Paris accords, and trade wars.17 The advertisement coincided with Biden’s first significant foreign policy speech of the campaign, at the City University of New York, where he told the audience, “the world sees [President] Trump for what he is: insincere, ill-informed, and impulsive. Sometimes corrupt. Dangerously incompetent, and incapable, in my view, of world leadership and leadership at home”.18 If elected, Biden would revert to many Obama-era policies, pledges to renegotiate TPP to include stronger environmental and labour protections, and

The frontrunners

The differences between the candidates’ foreign policy positions are subtle but significant and will shape the Democratic Party’s debates over coming months.


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views it as a key plank of US leadership in Asia.19 However, re-entering the TPP would require the agreement of the 11 other signatory nations (including Australia) and passage of the bill through Congress would depend largely on Republican votes due to the weak pro-trade constituency in the Democratic Party.20

As a major foreign policy figure in the Obama administration, Biden has little capacity to make a significant break from its policies. The two key differences between Biden’s comments in this campaign thus far and his record as vice president are his pledge to get tough on China and endorsement of a ‘global summit for democracy’. The goal of the summit would be to inspire a “renewal. . . of shared purpose” among the world’s democracies at a time when autocracy seems on the march.21 Relatedly, he views greater unity of action among democracies as helpful for competing with China and his key advisers believe that multilateral rather than unilateral pressure is the way to shape and change Beijing’s behaviour.22 During the speech, Biden explicitly declared that “we need to get tough with China”, with the unsubtle suggestion that the United States build a “united front” of “friends and partners to challenge China’s abusive behaviour”.23

Allies, partners and adversaries alike would view Biden as a stable and reliable foreign policy president. Part of Biden’s pitch is that he personally knows most

foreign leaders and can restore a global system that President Trump has attacked. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2019, Biden promised, “this too shall pass. We will be back”.24 He is also the candidate who knows Australia best, having visited Melbourne and Sydney and addressed the United States Studies Centre and Lowy Institute in 2016, and developed relationships with many former Australian prime ministers and foreign ministers.25 Relative to the other candidates, Biden enjoys a deep bench of foreign policy advisers and has many of President Obama’s foreign policy team behind him. Consequently, Biden’s key advisers are well known to Australian officials. Ely Ratner, a leading Democrat Asia hand, China hawk and former adviser to the vice president, would likely be a key figure on Asia policy in a Biden administration. Moreover, Biden’s campaign will also receive advice from staff at the think tank established in his name after he left the office: the Penn Biden Center at the University of Pennsylvania.26

However, Biden’s extensive public record from a lifetime of public service is also shaping as a vulnerability in a Democratic Party. Rivals seek to portray Biden as old and out of touch with America in 2019. On foreign policy, he faces the formidable challenge of defending his long record and simultaneously showing that he understands today’s realities.27 Biden’s vulnerabilities with the Democratic base include his support for TPP in the Obama administration, and votes as a senator in favour of the Iraq War, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and to establish permanent normal trade relations with China. In coming months, Biden will invariably seek to mollify these concerns from the left.

Pete Buttigieg‘Mayor Pete’ Buttigieg of South Bend, Indiana, is an unlikely top-tier candidate in the Democratic primary. His political identity is very different to the other frontrunners: he governs a town of 100,000 people in the Midwest, is just 37 years old, gay, a veteran from the war in Afghanistan and a Rhodes Scholar.28 Strong fundraising and decent polling have attracted

Vice President Joe Biden on board the HMAS Adelaide in Sydney, July 2016

Photo: Getty


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a number of high-profile foreign policy advisers to the Buttigieg campaign, led by Doug Wilson, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration and the first openly gay Pentagon official confirmed by the US Senate.

Buttigieg’s practical experience of international affairs is limited, but he has started to thoughtfully engage in foreign policy. In a June 2019 speech at Indiana University, ‘National Security for a New Era’, Buttigieg sought to allay fears that a young midwestern mayor was unfit to serve as commander in chief. He started with a thinly veiled criticism of Biden and the Democratic foreign policy establishment: “For the better part of my lifetime, it has been difficult to identify a consistent foreign policy in the Democratic Party.”29 Buttigieg is also unsparing in his words on President Trump’s foreign policy, but contends, “much was already broken when this president arrived”. Where policy has erred, Buttigieg argued in a long-form interview, is that “everything we have to say about foreign policy has to be tied back to what it means at home”.30 This sort of rhetoric, adopted by Buttigieg and his more progressive counterparts, is increasingly in vogue because many voters hold the Washington foreign policy establishment responsible for long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, trade agreements identified with job losses, and rising nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran.

Buttigieg frames the China challenge as a battle of competing ideologies.31 His proposals rest not on a geopolitical ambition to remain the pre-eminent

power in the Western Pacific, but rather on the basis of a values-based scepticism of the Chinese Communist Party.32 He has called out China’s “techno-authoritarianism”, which is “being held up as an alternative to ours [democracy] because ours looks so chaotic compared to theirs right now because of our internal divisions”. Consequently, he says, the United States must invest in its own domestic competitiveness and revitalise its democracy to improve its position relative to China.33 He views allies and partners like Australia as central to conducting this emerging ideological struggle with China.

On other foreign policy issues, Buttigieg is firmly in line with the prevalent political winds in the party. He plays up his opposition to the Iraq War while he was a student at Harvard, drawing an implicit contrast with Joe Biden,34 and promises to block American funding for Israeli annexation of the West Bank, an increasingly common stance among Democrats who are likely to face criticism from Republicans for being insufficiently supportive of Israel. Moreover, Buttigieg frequently mentions his service in uniform in Afghanistan in 2014 as a sign that he has “seen first-hand the costs of our long conflict[s]” and argue that it is time to end endless wars.35

Kamala HarrisSenator Kamala Harris has the most limited foreign policy record of the major candidates. She was elected to the Senate in 2016 and her prior career was as the District Attorney of San Francisco and Attorney General of California. In Washington, Harris’ involvement in international issues has been on the Senate Intelligence Committee, and as an outspoken voice on trade and intellectual property issues, typically adopting a narrow law-based approach. Unlike the other frontline candidates, Harris has not yet made a major foreign policy speech or published an essay. From a political perspective, Harris’ limited foreign policy record is to some extent a strength, because she is at liberty to choose her positions.

Harris’ most notable comments on foreign policy issues centre on criticism of China’s economic

South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg addresses the crowd at the South Carolina Democratic Party State Convention, June 2019

Photo: Getty


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practices and her frequent calls to protect American democracy. As a senator from California, the home to many of America’s tech giants, Harris has urged the Trump administration to protect American technology from China.36 She has accused China of engaging in “unfair industrial policies and outright theft of American intellectual property”, and said America should address “the threat [China] presents to our economy, the threat it presents to American workers”.37 During the 2016 election, Harris argued against the TPP on the basis that it would invalidate California’s progressive climate change and environmental laws.38 Much of her criticism of the Trump administration has focused on its insufficient defence of democracy and inappropriate links to authoritarian regimes: “We have foreign powers infecting the White House like malware.”39

Should Harris continue to be among the Democratic frontrunners, she will likely publish an essay or make a speech laying out her foreign policy platform. At that point, outsiders will gain a far better sense of how she would govern if elected President.

Elizabeth WarrenAs a former Harvard Law professor, Massachusetts senator and presidential candidate, Elizabeth Warren has built a reputation as a progressive policy wonk who champions fundamental changes to American society

and foreign policy. The central thrust of Warren’s domestic message is that corporate power plays too large a role in public policy. This has important ramifications for her approach to trade policy, defence spending and management of the Pentagon.40 Warren has a very extensive record of speeches, essays and policy proposals, calling for a more progressive, less interventionist foreign policy with a reduced role for the private sector. If she wins the nomination, Warren would represent a wholesale break from Democratic Party foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

Warren’s message rests on a rejection of the Washington foreign policy establishment, support for democracy and opposition to authoritarians, and very explicitly connects international issues with pocket-book issues for American voters. These themes permeate Warren’s November 2018 Foreign Affairs essay, “A Foreign Policy For All”, which opens with an overt attack on recent decades of foreign policy: “From endless wars that strain military families to trade policies that crush our middle class, Washington’s foreign policy today serves the wealthy and well-connected at the expense of everyone else.”41 If she is elected president, Warren would, like President Trump, enter office with a very clear set of foreign policy priorities and a worldview unlikely to shift.

Economic policy is the key focus for Warren’s domestic platform and her vision of America’s role in the world. She would pursue “an agenda of economic patriotism, using new and existing tools to defend and create quality American jobs and promote American industry”.42 She envisages a bigger role for the US government in the economy, championing an industrial policy to invest in key technologies where Chinese system may have an edge.43 American trade policy, Warren charges, has “worked gloriously well for elites around the world”, but it has “left working people discouraged and disaffected”.44 Warren opposed the TPP in 2015, calling it “a rigged process” producing “a rigged outcome” and suggesting it would “tilt the playing field even more in favour of big multinational corporations and against working families”. More recently, she voted against President Trump’s renegotiated trade deal with Mexico and

Senator Kamala Harris speaks during her presidential campaign launch rally in California, January 2019

Photo: Getty


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Canada (the United States Mexico Canada Trade Agreement), calling it “NAFTA 2.0”.45

At this stage, it is unclear how, exactly, Warren would implement her vision of “trade on our terms and only when it benefits American families”, which has been likened to President Trump’s approach.46 The plan would apply nine very strict criteria to both new and existing trade deals, including “upholding and enforcing the labor rights laid out by the International Labour Organization, eliminating all domestic fossil fuel subsidies, fulfilling commitments from the Paris Climate Agreement, not running afoul of the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights, and not being on the Treasury Department’s monitoring list for manipulative currency practices”.47 As Warren has conceded, the United States does not currently meet these criteria, and nor do many US allies.48 If Warren is elected president, there is likely to be a major overhaul of US trade policy, a grinding slowdown to existing free trade agreements, few or no new trade agreements, and increased protectionism.49

Additionally, Warren is vocal on defence issues, and endorses a significantly smaller budget and an overhaul to how the Pentagon does business. A few years ago, Warren joined the Senate Armed Services Committee, which bolsters her credentials to serve as commander in chief. She has argued that “the Pentagon’s budget has been too large for too long” and proposes an audit of the Pentagon to try to separate effective defence acquisitions from those “which

merely line the pockets of defense contractors”.50 It is less clear how Warren would approach defence policy on issues ranging from deterrence to support for NATO. That said, Warren has been an outspoken proponent of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons, a position that would represent a major change in US defence policy and arguably weaken American extended deterrence for allies, including Australia.51

Bernie SandersAn independent senator from Vermont, Bernie Sanders is setting the goalposts at the progressive end of the Democratic field by proposing radical changes to domestic and foreign policy. Since his 2016 Democratic primary loss to Hillary Clinton, Sanders has started to lay out a more comprehensive foreign policy vision that he has espoused in a range of essays and speeches starting in 2017. Although he has engaged on issues such as the Chinese Communist Party’s human rights record, unlike fellow Democratic candidates Sanders has largely avoided discussing China policy and US-China competition.52

Sanders proposes a fundamental restructuring of US foreign policy. He has called for a worldwide struggle against oligarchy and corporate power — a “global progressive movement” for economic equality, democratic rights and environmental sustainability.53 Moreover, Sanders says he will be both “commander in chief and organizer in chief”,54

Senator Elizabeth Warren addresses a crowd at a town hall event in South Carolina, August 2019

Photo: Getty

Senator Bernie Sanders addresses a rally in New York City, March 2016

Photo: Getty


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who will “reconceptualize a global order based on human solidarity”.55 This language is somewhat tempered by his belief that the United States should “lead the struggle to defend and expand a rules-based international order in which law, not might, makes right”.56 Sanders explicitly rejects isolationism — yet his conception of the international order is nonetheless very different to the Obama and Clinton administrations’.57

Sanders has been outspoken in his opposition to authoritarian regimes and has consistently championed greater emphasis on climate change in foreign policy. He laments the “rise of a new authoritarian axis” in the world, arguing that it is interwoven with income inequality.58 His major foreign policy initiative since the last presidential election was championing a congressional resolution invoking the War Powers Act of 1973 to suspend the Trump administration’s support of Saudi Arabia’s military campaign in Yemen. The bill passed the House and Senate in the aftermath of the Saudi Arabian government’s murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, but was vetoed by President Trump.59 And, among the major Democratic candidates, Sanders vows to give climate change the most prominent role in foreign policy.60

Like President Trump, Sanders has the politically potent ability to frame issues in simple, short soundbites to criticise rivals. He has particularly lambasted Joe Biden on foreign policy: “I helped lead the opposition to what turned out to be the worst foreign policy disaster in the modern history of America. Joe voted for it [the Iraq War]” and “Joe voted for NAFTA and permanent trade relations, trade agreements with China. I led the effort against that. Joe voted for the deregulation of Wall Street, I voted against that”.61 But Sanders’ diagnosis of the issues afflicting the United States do not necessarily translate into easily deliverable foreign policy governance.


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Table 1: Where the candidates currently stand on foreign policy issues

CANDIDATE CHINA TRADE DEFENCE SPENDING IRAN MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS/ESSAY

JOE BIDEN “We are in a competition with China. We need to get tough with China. They are a serious challenge to us, and in some areas a real threat.”

“The United States should push back on China’s deepening authoritarianism, even as we seek to cooperate on issues where our interests are aligned.“62

“I would not rejoin the TPP as it was initially put forward. I would insist that we renegotiate ... Either China’s going to write the rules of the road for the 21st century on trade or we are. We have to join with the 40 per cent of the world that we had with us and this time make sure that there’s no one sitting at that table doing the deal unless environmentalists are there and labor is there.”

“President Trump may think he’s being tough on China. All that he’s delivered as a consequence of that is American farmers, manufacturers and consumers losing and paying more.”63

“Our military is one tool in our toolbox — along with diplomacy, economic power, education, science and technology. We must invest in and strengthen all elements of our power. And, we must modernize our military to prepare for the wars of tomorrow, while ensuring that we only deploy American troops into harm’s way when it is in our vital national security interest.”64

“Two of America’s vital interests in the Middle East are preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and securing a stable energy supply through the Strait of Hormuz … Trump is failing on both counts.”

“If Tehran returns to compliance with the [JCPOA] deal, I would rejoin the agreement, and work with our allies to strengthen and extend it, while more effectively pushing back against Iran’s destabilizing activities.”65

Speech, 11 July 2019: “The Power of America’s Example: The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century”

Speech, 1 November 2017: “Global Engagement in an Age of Uncertainty”66

PETE BUTTIGIEG

“I’m not among the Democrats who think that China’s nothing to worry about ... There’s something about the orientation on China [under Trump] that I think is not completely wrong.”

“The challenge of China presents perhaps the most pressing example anywhere of the need to stand for American values amid the rise of a potent alternative.”67

“Quick reminder: a tariff is a tax. On Americans.”

“It’s also a fool’s errand to think you will be able to get China to change the fundamentals of their economic model by poking them in the eye with some tariffs.”68

“To shape this young century to our advantage, we must renew our national security architecture — our military, certainly, but also our intelligence, communications, diplomatic, and development institutions ... It begins with taking a hard look at our defense. To adequately prepare for our evolving security challenges, we need to look not only at how much we’re spending on our military but what we’re prioritizing.”69

“I will rejoin our international partners and recommit the United States to the Iran nuclear deal. Whatever its imperfections, this was perhaps as close to a true “art of the deal” as it gets.”70

Speech, 11 June 2019: “America and the World: National Security for a New Era”71

KAMALA HARRIS

“China’s abysmal human rights record must feature prominently in our policy toward the country … Under my administration, we will cooperate with China on global issues like climate change, but we won’t allow human rights abuses to go unchecked.”72

“Because of the so-called trade policy this president has, that has been nothing more than the Trump trade tax, that has resulted in American families spending as much as $1.4 billion more a month on everything from shampoo to washing machines.”73

“As a senator from the state with the largest number of military personnel in the country, I support providing them with the necessary tools to keep our country safe in a world of growing national security threats … They deserve to be outfitted with tools that offer protection to all of us. They deserve research that will allow them to provide a safe and secure nation for decades into the future. It is deeply unfortunate that we cannot vote on a clean bill to reauthorize all of those programs and more, and that reflects our shared support for our Armed Forces.”74

“I would plan to rejoin the JCPOA so long as Iran also returned to verifiable compliance. At the same time, I would seek negotiations with Iran to extend and supplement some of the nuclear deal’s existing provisions, and work with our partners to counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region, including with regard to its ballistic missile program.”75

None to date.

ELIZABETH WARREN

“China is on the rise, using its economic might to bludgeon its way onto the world stage and offering a model in which economic gains legitimize oppression.”76

“I think that our trade deals have been negotiated for a very, very long time now to benefit large, multinational corporations, not to benefit the American worker.”

“What I’d like to see us do is rethink all of our trade policy. And, I have to say, when President Trump says he’s putting tariffs on the table, I think tariffs are one part of reworking our trade policy overall.”77

“If more money for the Pentagon could solve our security challenges, we would have solved them by now. It is time to identify which programs actually benefit American security in the 21st century, and which programs merely line the pockets of defense contractors — then pull out a sharp knife and make some cuts.”78

“Our intelligence community told us again and again: The Iran deal was working to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. If Iran continues to abide by the terms of the deal, you bet I will support returning to it.”79

Essay, January 2019: “A Foreign Policy for All: Strengthening Democracy — at Home and Abroad”

Speech, 28 November 2018: “A Foreign Policy that Works for All Americans”80

BERNIE SANDERS

“My administration will work with allies to strengthen global human rights standards and make every effort to let Beijing know that its behavior is damaging its international standing and undermining relations with the United States.”

“But what we have to say about China in fairness to China and its leadership is if I’m not mistaken they have made more progress in addressing extreme poverty than any country in the history of civilization, so they’ve done a lot of things for their people.”81

“Yeah of course [I would use tariffs], it is used in a rational way within the context of a broad, sensible trade policy. It is one tool that is available.”82

“So what I would be prepared to do is to understand that we are now spending more than the next 10 countries combined — we are spending over $700 billion a year. At the same time, you have veterans sleeping out on the streets, major crisis after major crisis in affordable housing, infrastructure. I think we have to get our priorities right, and our priorities should include not spending more than the 10 next nations on earth. As president, I would certainly look at a very different military budget.”83

“By withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement, a move opposed by his own top security officials, Trump has isolated the US from its closest allies and put us on a dangerous path to conflict. We should rejoin the deal and work with allies to effectively enforce it.”84

Essay, 24 June 2019: “Ending America’s Endless War: We Must Stop Giving Terrorists Exactly What They Want”

Speech, 9 October 2018: “Building A Global Democratic Movement to Counter Authoritarianism“

Speech, 21 September 2017: “John Findley Green Foundation lecture”85


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Australia should be paying close attention to the shifts in the Democratic Party’s debate on China and the related questions of trade policy and Asia policy, as well as the Middle East and defence spending.

China, trade and Asia policyThe extent of China hardening in the Democratic Party, and across the United States, towards a less co-operative and more competitive policy is highly significant.86 US voters across the political spectrum overwhelmingly view China as America’s top competitor.87 According to recent polling by Pew Research Center, just 26 per cent of Americans have a favourable view of China, compared to 60 per cent with an unfavourable view, the highest level since Pew began asking the question in 2005.88 As Thomas Wright has written, unlike every other country or foreign policy issue, China and the US-China relationship “directly affects the economy, the financial system, technological innovation, values, and national security”.89 Notably, outside Washington, Democrats’ tough language on China is not especially motivated by Asia-focused geopolitical concerns such as China’s rapid military modernisation, island-building in the South China Sea or potential threats to US allies. Rather, whether a candidate cares about labour, trade, currency manipulation, technological competition, intellectual property, human rights, Beijing’s influence operations overseas, or democracy versus authoritarianism, Democrats see the Communist Party as presenting an ‘embarrassment of riches’ for criticism.

The refrain that the United States should get tough on China will be a mainstay of the primary and the general election campaign. The Democratic frontrunners all adopt tough language, with subtle differences between the relative importance of different aspects of the China relationship. However, they vary in their emphasis on the right balance between competition and cooperation in the relationship with Beijing, the right domains of competition, and how sharply the United States should compete. The major candidates all suggest that the best way to compete with China is

by investing in the United States’ domestic strength, code for investing in infrastructure, research and development, and greater economic resilience.90

Economic threat and Trump’s tariffsThe perceived threat to American jobs posed by the Chinese economy and Beijing’s trade practices is the China issue that resonates most with voters, especially in ‘Rust Belt’ states such as Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania that will be key battlegrounds in 2020. Democrats tend to support President Trump’s tougher approach to China on trade and economic policy, even if they do not necessarily support the style or some of the substance of his policies. The state of the Democratic Party, writ large, and emerging bipartisan consensus on China economic issues is best summarised by Senator Chuck Schumer. Where the leader of the Senate Democrats constantly lambasts President Trump on a wide array of domestic and foreign policy issues, Schumer supports Trump’s China hardening: “We have to be really tough on China. They’ve taken advantage of us… America has lost trillions of dollars and millions of jobs because China has not played fair. And being tough on China is the right way to be.”91 These views are broadly shared by the field of Democratic candidates.

The Democratic frontrunners have a mixed approach to President Trump’s tariffs on China. They call his trade war reckless, but, when asked, none of the leading contenders said they would immediately drop the tariffs if elected president.92 Progressives are most favourably disposed to Trump’s tariffs: Sanders says he “strongly supports” tariffs against China but thinks “Trump gets it wrong in terms of implementation”, and Warren says that “tariffs are one part of reworking our trade policy”.93 However, more centrist candidates view Trump’s tariffs as a “fool’s errand”, a tax on American consumers, who are paying hundreds of dollars more per year for ordinary products like “washing machines and shampoos”.94 Buttigieg, Harris and Biden argue and vow to put far more emphasis on different tools in the

The key issues for Australia


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trade relationship. There is widespread agreement among Democrats that President Trump’s approach to China is counterproductive because it has alienated US allies and partners who could help build a wider coalition to try to shape Chinese behaviour. A Democratic administration will want Australia’s support for its trade policy towards China.

A centrist Democratic administration would likely enter office focused on making substantive wins on intellectual property and technology transfer, as well as potentially re-joining an amended TPP. Technology would also be a key focus for Democrats, who have criticised President Trump for focusing on the industries of the past — such as steel and autos — without sufficiently engaging with future technologies. A Democratic administration would also focus more bandwidth on building up cyber defences and making government investments in technologies that will be critical in the ongoing technological competition with China.

Ideology and values

Democratic candidates are also adopting an increasingly ideological and values-based tone towards the Chinese Communist Party. Earlier this year, Biden said that the United States finds itself in “an ideological struggle… a competition of systems [and] a competition of values” with Beijing.95 Buttigieg’s language is stronger, singling out “The Chinese Communist Party’s shocking treatment of the Uighurs and other minorities and growing pressure on Hong Kong” as “symptomatic of a broader, and intensifying” ideological competition in which “Beijing seems committed to consolidating and legitimating authoritarian capitalism as an alternative to the democratic capitalism embraced by the United States and its closest allies and partners”.96 For all the Democratic candidates, criticising the Communist Party’s behaviour in Xinjiang simultaneously serves many beneficial political objectives. It plays to the narrative that a candidate is tough on Beijing,

US President Donald Trump and Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison hold a meeting in the sidelines of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Buenos Aires, November 2018

Photo: Getty


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compassionate towards minorities, and carries implicit criticism of President Trump’s approach to minorities, immigration policies (especially towards the border with Mexico), admiration for authoritarians and reluctance to speak about human rights. Given Democrats’ focus on the role of allies and partners vis-à-vis China, Canberra can expect Washington to ask Australia to take a stronger unilateral stance towards Beijing and join multilateral statements that criticise the Chinese Communist Party’s approach to Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

All criticism no strategyAt this early stage in the campaign, Democrats’ tough talk on China has not translated to a coherent China policy or Asia strategy. The candidates lack an overall framework for whether they view China as a rival, a partner, or both.97 All candidates pay some lip service to the need to cooperate with Beijing on shared global priorities such as climate change, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and peacekeeping, but these comments are overshadowed by their loud criticisms of the Communist Party. The emerging bipartisan consensus on China, Democrats’ language on the campaign trail, and the increasingly authoritarian and uncompromising nature of Xi Jinping’s regime all suggest the US-China relationship will continue to move in a more competitive direction no matter who wins the election.

Finally, from the perspective of allies and partners, the absence of discussion of broader Asia policy is notable but not surprising at this early stage of the campaign. There is little indication so far of how tough talk on China would translate into the projection of US military power across the Pacific. Many Democrats hold the contradictory preferences for competing with China while cutting the defence budget. Even if a candidate such as Joe Biden wants to re-invigorate US force posture in the region, it is unlikely that he would ask Congress to significantly increase defence spending in a difficult political and budgetary environment or meaningfully shift military assets out of the Middle East. Regardless, any Democratic

administration would likely ask Australia and other allies to do more to complement US force posture and help counterbalance China’s growing power and assertiveness in the region. China aside, the candidates have spent little attention discussing how they would approach other issues in Asia, not least North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, competition in Southeast Asia and alliances.

The Middle EastThere are deep, emotional, intra-party divides on Middle East policy. Progressives are coalescing around a very different approach to those taken by the Obama or Clinton administrations.

Iran policy is shaping as a significant foreign policy issue in this election. The major candidates all suggest re-joining the Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran, but often with different conditions. Their language features variations of the theme that the deal is imperfect, but better than the alternatives. For example, Biden has promised to “strengthen and extend it [the Iran nuclear deal]”.98 Harris “would also look toward expanding [the deal]” and “would like to see it also cover ballistic missile testing”.99 Unlike her more centrist colleagues, Warren’s statement indicates less concern about other aspects of Iran’s behaviour, promising that if Iran abides by the terms, her administration would support returning to it.100 Re-negotiating the deal will be highly complex, requiring buy-in from the regime in Tehran and other parties to the deal, amidst likely opposition from Republicans, some powerful Democrats and Israel. Whether President Trump is re-elected or defeated by a Democrat, Washington will want to enlist Australian support for an Iran policy that will feature military pressure, sanctions, or both.

Democratic candidates are also re-evaluating long-standing US policy towards Israel and Saudi Arabia. Israel has become a divisive issue within parts of the party, defined by the differences between older, powerful pro-Israel members of Congress and those who argue that the United States should reduce its


16

military and political support for Jerusalem. In the presidential race, for example, Buttigieg has taken a firm line against Israeli annexation of the West Bank,101 and Sanders has said US policy “cannot just be pro-Israel, pro-Israel, pro-Israel”.102 Similarly, following the Saudi Arabian government’s murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, Sanders and Warren called for the United States to “thoroughly re-evaluate” the United States’ relationship with the Saudis.103 Biden and Buttigieg have been critical of the Saudis’ behaviour but have not gone as far in proposing changes to the long-standing alliance.

Defence spendingThe Democratic frontrunners exhibit significant differences in their approach to defence spending, an increasingly important issue given the eroding balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The size and relative allocation within the US defence budget has major implications for Australian interests. As argued in a recent United States Studies Centre report, ‘Averting Crisis’, “America no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific and its capacity to uphold a favourable balance of power is increasingly uncertain”.104 Even sustained increases to defence spending — which are unlikely in a highly polarised Congress — would not preserve the current balance of power with China amidst a range of budgetary pressures such as spiralling operations and maintenance costs and a military modernisation backlog. Put another way, a major cut in the defence budget would crowd out the space available for investments required to compete with China.

Many of the Democratic frontrunners propose a re-evaluation of the Pentagon’s budget. Sanders and Warren favour cuts to the US defence budget and hew towards proposing military sufficiency rather than superiority.105 Sanders lambasts the US$700 billion defence budget “when our infrastructure is collapsing and kids can’t afford to go to college”,106 and Warren has argued “the Pentagon’s budget has been too large for too long”, proposed to invest money saved for other forms of international engagement

and domestic programs, including a detailed plan to ‘Rebuild the State Department’.107 Neither Buttigieg nor Biden calls for higher defence spending despite the deteriorating global security outlook, but instead make the case to modernise the US military to deal with future threats. However, top-line defence spending is determined by Congress, following a request from the president, and defence has a strong political constituency across the United States that makes major cuts or reallocations of funds politically challenging.

Regardless, if a Democrat wins, they will invariably continue President Obama and President Trump’s calls for allies to do more burden-sharing because of the United States’s political and budgetary constraints. Australia and other US allies and partners in Asia will face calls to increase defence expenditure and do more to complement US forward deployed forces.

Other issuesFinally, US policy towards Europe and Russia, immigration and climate change are set to feature in a predictable way in the Democratic foreign policy debate. Democrats are making a lot of noise about the Trump administration’s links with Russia, the oligarchic nature of Vladimir Putin’s regime, and threat of Russian interference in the 2020 election. Moreover, given Russia’s role in the 2016 election and President Trump’s vacillations on NATO, Democrats are adopting a tougher position towards Russia, including calls for more extensive sanctions, and greater support for European allies. All candidates can be expected to support NATO, while repeating the regular bipartisan refrain that European NATO allies need to spend more on defence. Climate change will receive plenty of attention, particularly from progressives such as Sanders. Moreover, young people and the Democratic base show widespread support for the federal government doing more on climate change, and the Pentagon is also focused on the risks climate change poses to low-lying military bases and global security.


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Absent a new war or international crisis, foreign policy is unlikely to be a key issue in the 2020 election. However, it will play a role, and President Trump will see it as an electoral strength: he will argue that he has been successful where Obama was not. This narrative might be surprising to foreign policy professionals in Canberra, but it enjoys support from a majority of the American electorate. National Security Action released a survey late last month that found voters had a net positive view of Trump on national security: 55 per cent approval compared to 45 per cent disapproval, far higher than President Trump’s historically low overall approval rating.108

During his campaign to ‘Keep America Great’, President Trump will argue that he has reasserted America’s military strength, forced allies to spend more on defence, that North Korea is no longer a threat, Iran is under pressure, he has been the most pro-Israel president in recent memory, withdrawn from Afghanistan and “100 percent” defeated ISIS.109 Trade will also play a prominent role in his pitch for another four years: he will ask voters to give him more time to reach major trade deals with China and renegotiate other agreements to benefit American workers. Moreover, with a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives until the 2020 election, President Trump is unlikely to achieve domestic successes before the election, so many of his most notable actions in the two years leading up to November 2020 will likely be in foreign policy.

ConclusionAt this stage, Australian political leaders and officials need to understand these trends, consider their implications, and meet the candidates and key advisers who would staff a Democratic administration. The China hardening in the Democratic Party is now and will likely continue to embolden President Trump in his approach to Beijing up to the 2020 election and perhaps beyond. Moreover, the contours of China policy in a potential Democratic administration are becoming clear. Regardless of who wins the election, Canberra will need to prepare to be called on by the United States for a tougher approach to China. On defence spending, Democrats’ positions presage a plateau or cut to top-line spending. If nothing else, Australia must build sufficiently deep connections to the Democratic campaigns so that, if a Democrat wins, the Australian prime minister will not be relying on golfer Greg Norman to tee up a congratulatory phone call with the president-elect.

Foreign policy in the general election


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Endnotes

1. Van Jackson, ‘Wagering on a Progressive Versus Liberal Theory of National Security’, Texas National Security Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 14 January 2019, accessed via: https://tnsr.org/roundtable/wagering-on-a-progressive-versus-liberal-theory-of-national-security/

2. Thomas Wright, ‘Buttigieg Splits From the Progressives on Foreign Policy’, The Atlantic, 12 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/what-buttigieg-left-out-his-foreign-policy-speech/591502/

3. Eighty-four percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents have not made up their mind about which candidate to support in 2020, according to a poll by PBS NewsHour-NPR-Marist. Gretchen Frazee, ‘Do Democrats want a candidate who shares their values or can beat Trump? Voters are split’, PBS, 7 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/do-democrats-want-a-candidate-who-shares-their-values-or-can-beat-trump-voters-are-split

4. Congressional Republicans have split with President Trump and joined bipartisan congressional initiatives on issues such as sanctions on Russia, weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and support for NATO.

5. For example, in one of the two Democratic Party debates in July, just five minutes in the two-and-a-half-hour debate were devoted to foreign policy. Fred Kaplan, ‘Five Minutes to Explain the World’, Slate, 1 August 2019, accessed via: https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/democratic-debates-foreign-policy.html

6. The survey was conducted with public opinion research firm GBAO. John Halpin, Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, Karl Agne, Jim Gerstein, and Nisha Jain, ‘America Adrift: How the US Foreign Policy Debate Misses What Voters Really Want’, Center for American Progress, 5 May 2019, accessed via: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/05/05/469218/america-adrift/

7. John Halpin, Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, Karl Agne, Jim Gerstein, and Nisha Jain, ‘America Adrift: How the US Foreign Policy Debate Misses What Voters Really Want’, Center for American Progress, 5 May 2019, accessed via: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/05/05/469218/america-adrift/

8. For example, Joe Biden: “IF we stand up for American interests, IF we invest in our people, live our values, and work with our partners — We can out-compete anyone.” From Ursula Perano,

‘Biden changes tone on China: “They are a serious challenge to us”’, Axios, 11 June 2019, accessed via https://www.axios.com/joe-biden-china-competition-c58cff27-0386-4602-a380-c398e0f86a7e.html.

9. For example, Biden ““The world sees [President Donald] Trump for what he is: insincere, ill-informed, and impulsive. Sometimes corrupt” and Harris: “we have foreign powers infecting the White House like malware,” Sources: Jen Kirby, ‘Joe Biden wants to restore the pre-Trump world order’, Vox, 11 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/11/20690243/joe-biden-foreign-policy-speech-new-york-trump and James Lindsay, ‘Election 2020: Kamala Harris, Democratic Presidential Candidate’, Council on Foreign Relations, 11 February 2019, accessed via: https://www.cfr.org/blog/campaign-2020-kamala-harris-democratic-presidential-candidate

10. For example, Barack Obama’s anti-Iraq War credentials were helpful in the 2008 Democratic primary against Hillary Clinton and general election against John McCain.

11. Josh Rogin, ‘2020 Democrats must run on foreign policy, not away from it’, Washington Post, 23 May 2019, accessed via: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/2020-democrats-must-run-on-foreign-policy-not-away-from-it/2019/05/23/e08775cc-7d88-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html

12. Though Congress passed a major tax cut and President Trump has appointed two conservative justices to the Supreme Court, he has thus far failed to implement key election promises such as the repeal of Obamacare and constructing the border wall with Mexico. See Kathryn Watson, ‘How Trump is doing on his campaign promises as he launches his reelection bid’, CBS News, 18 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-trump-is-doing-on-his-campaign-promises-as-he-launches-his-reelection-bid/

13. Wording taken from the landing page of the National Security Action website, accessed via: https://nationalsecurityaction.org/

14. “We’re a temporary organization. Our hope is to be out of business in three years,” Rhodes said in an interview. From Anne Gearan, ‘Democrats marshal strike force to counter Trump on national security in 2018, 2020 elections’, Washington Post, 27 February 2018, accessed via: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-marshal-a-strike-force-to-counter-trump-on-national-security-in-2018-2020-elections/2018/02/26/6b08540a-1b5b-11e8-b2d9-


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08e748f892c0_story.html?utm_term=.b9b7529facdb

15. Polls: Fivethirtyeight, ‘National 2020 Democratic Presidential Primary Polls’, accessed via: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020-primaries/democratic/national/, and polling and fundraising from Jasmine C. Lee, Annie Daniel, Rebecca Lieberman, Blacki Migliozzi and Alexander Burns, ‘Which Democrats Are Leading the 2020 Presidential Race?’, New York Times, Updated 30 August 2019, accessed via: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/elections/democratic-polls.html?module=inline; More information on fundraising: For the most recent quarter for which data is available (up to 30 June 2019), the top 5 candidates all raised between Kamala Harris’ $11.8 million and Bernie Sanders $25.7 million. The sixth performance was by wealth former Congressman John Delaney ($8.0 million) and all other candidates had a haul of less than $4.5 million. See Beatrice Jin and Maggie Severns, ‘The Money’, Politico, Updated 15 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.politico.com/2020-election/president/democratic-primary/candidates/fundraising-and-campaign-finance-tracker/

16. He was on SFRC for decades, and had three separate stints as chairman, totalling over 4 years. From Alex Ward, ‘Why Joe Biden’s foreign policy experience is both a weakness and a strength in 2020’, Vox, 26 April 2019, accessed via: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/4/26/18515680/joe-biden-2020-foreign-policy-record-iraq

17. See Joe Biden, ‘The Trump Doctrine’, 11 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbc9Kp3lIG8

18. Jen Kirby, ‘Joe Biden wants to restore the pre-Trump world order’, Vox, 11 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/11/20690243/joe-biden-foreign-policy-speech-new-york-trump

19. Adam Behsudi and Doug Palmer, ‘Biden says he would renegotiate TPP’, Politico, 1 August 2019, accessed via: https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-trade/2019/08/01/biden-says-he-would-renegotiate-tpp-464000

20. For example, the successful vote in the House for Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in June 2015 — which in effect served as a proxy vote for the TPP — passed by the narrow margin of 218-208. Only 28 of 186 House Democrats voted in favour of TPA, despite the fact that it was championed by then-President Obama. See Dougal Robinson and Matilda Steward, ‘Australia and the 2018 US Midterm Elections: A Primer’, United States Studies Centre at

the University of Sydney, 23 March 2018, accessed via: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-and-the-2018-us-midterm-elections-a-primer

21. Greg Jaffe and Cleve R. Wootson Jr. ‘Biden attacks Trump’s foreign policy as an embarrassment’, Washington Post, 11 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-attacks-trump-doctrine-on-foreign-policy-as-an-embarrassment/2019/07/11/985febb4-a347-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html?utm_term=.fb643c92cf2f

22. Biden: “On our own, we represent about one-quarter of global GDP. When we join together with fellow democracies, that number doubles.” From Axios, ‘Top 2020 Democrats on U.S. policy toward China’, 28 July 2019, accessed via: https://graphics.axios.com/2019-07-28-dem-china-responses/index.html?subset=china&directLink=true#_ga=2.105090051.1083380823.1564682567-1066467934.1560529251

23. Sydney Ember and Katie Glueck, ‘Biden, in Foreign Policy Speech, Castigates Trump and Urges Global Diplomacy’, New York Times, 11 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/us/politics/joe-biden-foreign-policy.html

24. Griff Witte and Michael Birnbaum, ‘Democrats offer European allies the promise of a post-Trump future. But can they deliver?’, Washington Post, 17 February 2019, accessed via: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/democrats-offer-european-allies-the-promise-of-a-post-trump-future-but-can-they-deliver/2019/02/17/35717ce2-2fad-11e9-8781-763619f12cb4_story.html?utm_term=.a9e87d0af779

25. See Joe Biden, ‘Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on the Future of the U.S.-Australian Relationship in Asia’, The White House of President Barack Obama, 20 July 2016, accessed via: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/20/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-future-us-australian-relationship-asia

26. The staff at the Center include former Deputy Secretary of State and senior advisor to the Biden campaign Anthony Blinken. Nahal Toosi, ‘Democrats challenging Trump scramble to hire foreign policy aides’, Politico, 3 May 2019, accessed via: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/03/2020-foreign-policy-advisers-1301083

27. Josh Rogin, ‘Joe Biden tries to adapt his traditional foreign policy to a new era’, Washington Post, 11 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/11/


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joe-biden-tries-adapt-his-traditional-foreign-policy-new-era/?utm_term=.38a4c02dcd19

28. Buttigieg spent seven months as a Navy intelligence officer in Kabul in 2014. Among other candidates, Tulsi Gabbard is also a veteran, and Cory Booker also held a Rhodes Scholarship.

29. Pete Buttigieg, ‘National Security For a New Era’, 11 June 2019, accessed via: https://peteforamerica.com/national-security-for-a-new-era/#transcript

30. George Packer, ‘Buttigieg Looks to Truman, Not Obama, on Foreign Policy’, The Atlantic, 11 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/buttigieg-foreign-policy-speech/591436/



33. Eleanor Albert, ‘What Do the US Democratic Presidential Contenders Think About China?’, The Diplomat, 6 July 2019, accessed via: https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/what-do-the-us-democratic-presidential-contenders-think-about-china/


35. Jeff Zeleny, ‘Buttigieg wields his military credentials: ‘It’s not like I killed Bin Laden,’ but it was dangerous’, CNN, 17 May 2019, accessed via: https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/17/politics/buttigieg-military-service-2020/index.html and CFR, ‘Candidates Answer CFR’s Questions: Pete Buttigieg’, 30 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.cfr.org/article/pete-buttigieg

36. Alex Fang, ‘Democratic US presidential front-runners split on China tariffs’, Nikkei Asian Review, 3 March 2019, accessed via: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Democratic-US-presidential-front-runners-split-on-China-tariffs

37. SupChina, ‘2020 U.S. presidential election China tracker’, updated 4 September 2019,

accessed via: https://supchina.com/2020-president-election-china-tracker/

38. Claire Landsbaum, ‘California’s First New Senator in 24 Years Will Be a Woman, But Which One?’, 1 November 2016, accessed via: https://www.thecut.com/2016/11/where-loretta-sanchez-and-kamala-harris-stand-on-the-issues.html

39. James M. Lindsay, ‘Election 2020: Kamala Harris, Democratic Presidential Candidate’, CFR, 11 February 2019, accessed via: https://www.cfr.org/blog/campaign-2020-kamala-harris-democratic-presidential-candidate

40. Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Elizabeth Warren’s trade plan is bad politics and worse policy’, Washington Post, 30 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/30/elizabeth-warrens-trade-plan-is-bad-politics-worse-policy/?utm_term=.7ce78722fac7

41. Elizabeth Warren, ‘A Foreign Policy for All, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, accessed via: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-11-29/foreign-policy-all

42. Team Warren, ‘A Plan For Economic Patriotism’, 4 June 2019, accessed via: https://medium.com/@teamwarren/a-plan-for-economic-patriotism-13b879f4cfc7


44. Elizabeth Warren, ‘A Foreign Policy for All’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, accessed via: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-11-29/foreign-policy-all

45. Brianna Stewart and Sasha Pezenik, ‘2020 Democrats split in growing divide on US trade policy’, ABC News, 25 May 2019, accessed via: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/2020-democrats-split-growing-divide-us-trade-policy/story?id=63217252

46. Elizabeth Warren, Tweet, 29 July 2019, accessed via: https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1155870615800352770?s=20 and “Elizabeth Warren released a trade plan Monday that’s closer to Donald Trump’s agenda than Barack Obama’s”, from Alex Thompson and Adam Behsudi, ‘Warren moves to outflank Trump on trade’, Politico, 29 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/29/elizabeth-warren-trump-trade-2020-1439186


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47. Alex Thompson and Adam Behsudi, ‘Warren moves to outflank Trump on trade’, Politico, 29 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/29/elizabeth-warren-trump-trade-2020-1439186

48. Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Elizabeth Warren’s trade plan is bad politics and worse policy’, Washington Post, 30 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/30/elizabeth-warrens-trade-plan-is-bad-politics-worse-policy/?utm_term=.7ce78722fac7

49. According to Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow Edward Alden, Warren’s trade plan is an “unwieldy mess that will leave the U.S. with few, if any, new trading partners, and do little to persuade Americans sceptical on trade that the Democrats are doing anything to look after their interests.” See Edward Alden, ‘Elizabeth Warren’s “New Approach to Trade” Looks Awfully Dated’, CFR, 30 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.cfr.org/blog/elizabeth-warrens-new-approach-trade-looks-awfully-dated

50. Elizabeth Warren, ‘A Foreign Policy for All, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, accessed via: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-11-29/foreign-policy-all

51. In January 2019, Warren introduced the No First Use Act, which seeks to establish in law that it is the policy of the United States not to use nuclear weapons first. See Elizabeth Warren, ‘Senator Warren, Chairman Smith Unveil Legislation to Establish “No-First-Use” Nuclear Weapons Policy’, 30 January 2019, accessed via: https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-chairman-smith-unveil-legislation-to-establish-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-policy

52. As Peter Beinart has pointed out, in his two major foreign policy speeches since the 2016 election, Sanders “mentioned China only three times: twice as a potential partner in fighting climate change and once as a potential partner in denuclearizing North Korea.” Peter Beinart, ‘Elizabeth Warren Illuminates the Left’s Foreign-Policy Divide’, The Atlantic, 29 November 2018, accessed via: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/what-elizabeth-warrens-foreign-policy-speech-means/576928/

53. Peter Beinart, ‘Elizabeth Warren Illuminates the Left’s Foreign-Policy Divide’, The Atlantic, 29 November 2018, accessed via: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/what-elizabeth-warrens-foreign-policy-speech-means/576928/

54. Bernie Sanders, Tweet, 1 August 2019, accessed via: https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1156920512179818502?s=20

55. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, ‘Bernie Sanders Imagines a Progressive New Approach to Foreign Policy, The New Yorker, 13 April 2019, accessed via: https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-scene/bernie-sanders-imagines-a-progressive-new-approach-to-foreign-policy




59. Patrick Goodenough, ‘Update: After Sanders Urges Trump to Sign Resolution on Yemen War, He Vetoes It’, CNS News, 16 April 2019 https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/sen-sanders-urges-trump-sign-resolution-ending-support-saudi-war

60. “I look at climate change as a very, very serious threat—to the entire planet, to every country on earth.” From Benjamin Wallace-Wells, ‘Bernie Sanders Imagines a Progressive New Approach to Foreign Policy, The New Yorker, 13 April 2019, accessed via: https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-scene/bernie-sanders-imagines-a-progressive-new-approach-to-foreign-policy

61. Brianna Stewart and Sasha Pezenik, ‘2020 Democrats split in growing divide on US trade policy’, ABC News, 25 May 2019, accessed via: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/2020-democrats-split-growing-divide-us-trade-policy/story?id=63217252

62. Joe Biden quoted in: Rebecca Klar, “Biden now labeling China a ‘serious challenge’ to US,” The Hill, 11 August 2019. Accessed online: https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/447954-biden-


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now-labeling-china-a-serious-challenge-to-us; Council on Foreign Relations, “The Democratic Candidates on China and Human Rights,” 30 July 2019. Accessed online: https://www.cfr.org/article/democratic-candidates-china-and-human-rights

63. Joe Biden quoted in: Adam Behsudi and Doug Palmer, “Biden says he would renegotiate TPP,” Politico, 1 August 2019. Accessed online: https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-trade/2019/08/01/biden-says-he-would-renegotiate-tpp-464000; Joe Biden, “American Leadership.” Speech delivered at City University, New York, 11 July 2019. Accessed Online: https://joebiden.com/AmericanLeadership/

64. Joe Biden, “Joe’s vision for America,” campaign website. Accessed Online: https://joebiden.com/joes-vision/

65. Joe Biden, Twitter, 21 June 2019. Accessed Online: https://twitter.com/JoeBiden/status/1141722705038905348?s=20; Joe Biden “American Leadership.” Speech delivered at City University, New York, 11 July 2019. Accessed Online: https://joebiden.com/AmericanLeadership/

66. Joe Biden “American Leadership.” Speech delivered at City University, New York, 11 July 2019. Accessed Online: https://joebiden.com/AmericanLeadership/; The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Joe Biden: Global Engagement in an Age of Uncertainty,” 1 November 2017. Accessed online: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/file/joe-biden-global-engagement-age-uncertainty

67. Pete Buttigieg quoted in: George Packer, “Buttigieg Looks to Truman, Not Obama, on Foreign Policy,” The Atlantic, 11 June 2019. Accessed online: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/buttigieg-foreign-policy-speech/591436/; Pete Buttigieg, “America and the World: National Security for a New Era,” campaign website, 11 June 2019. Accessed online: https://peteforamerica.com/national-security-for-a-new-era/

68. Pete Buttigieg, Twitter, 14 May 2019. Accessed online: https://twitter.com/PeteButtigieg/status/1128118908899287041?s=20 ; Pete Buttigieg quoted in: Devan Cole, “Buttigieg: Trump administration’s China tariffs ‘a fool’s errand,’” CNN, 18 August 2019. Accessed online: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/18/politics/pete-buttigieg-donald-trump-china-trade-war-cnntv/index.html

69. Pete Buttigieg, “America and the World: National Security for a New Era,” campaign website, 11 June 2019. Accessed online: https://peteforamerica.

com/national-security-for-a-new-era/

70. Pete Buttigieg, “America and the World: National Security for a New Era,” campaign website, 11 June 2019. Accessed online: https://peteforamerica.com/national-security-for-a-new-era/

71. Pete Buttigieg, “America and the World: National Security for a New Era,” campaign website, 11 June 2019. Accessed online: https://peteforamerica.com/national-security-for-a-new-era/

72. Kamala Harris quoted in: Council on Foreign Relations, “The Democratic Candidates on China and Human Rights,” 30 July 2019. Accessed online: https://www.cfr.org/article/democratic-candidates-china-and-human-rights

73. Kamala Harris quoted in: Rebecca Ballhaus, “Kamala Harris Hits ‘Trump Trade Tax” on American Families,” The Wall Street Journal, 31 July 2019. Accessed online: https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/democratic-debates-round-two-night-two/card/1564625137

74. Kamala Harris, “Harris Statement on Vote Against NDAA,” Kamala D. Harris U.S. Senator for California (website), 18 June 2018. Accessed online: https://www.harris.senate.gov/news/press-releases/harris-statement-on-vote-against-ndaa

75. Kamala Harris quoted in: Council on Foreign Relations, “Candidates Answer CFR’s Questions: Kamala Harris,” 21 August 2019. Accessed online: https://www.cfr.org/article/kamala-harris

76. Elizabeth Warren, “A Foreign Policy for All: Strengthening Democracy- at Home and Abroad,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019. Accessed online: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-11-29/foreign-policy-all

77. Elizabeth Warren quoted in: Pete Schroeder, “Tariffs should be part of U.S. trade policy, Trump foe Warren says,” Reuters, 12 March 2018. Accessed online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-warren/tariffs-should-be-part-of-u-s-trade-policy-trump-foe-warren-says-idUSKCN1GN0LB

78. Elizabeth Warren, “It’s Time to Reduce Corporate Influence at the Pentagon,” Medium, 16 May 2019. Accessed online: https://medium.com/@teamwarren/its-time-to-reduce-corporate-influence-at-the-pentagon-98f52ee0fcf1

79. Elizabeth Warren, Twitter, 24 February 2019, accessed online: https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1099432996099231751

80. Elizabeth Warren, “A Foreign Policy for All,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019. Accessed online:


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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-11-29/foreign-policy-all; Elizabeth Warren, “A foreign policy that works for all Americans,” speech delivered at American University, Washington DC., 29 November 2018. Accessed online: https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-outlines-vision-for-a-foreign-policy-that-works-for-all-americans

81. Bernie Sanders quoted in: Council on Foreign Relations, “The Democratic Candidates on China and Human Rights,” 30 July 2019. Accessed online: https://www.cfr.org/article/democratic-candidates-china-and-human-rights ; Bernie Sanders quoted in: The Hill, “Sanders: China has done more to address extreme poverty ‘than any other country in the history of civilization,” 28 August 2019. Accessed online: https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/458976-sanders-china-had-done-more-to-address-extreme-poverty-than-any-country-in-the

82. Bernie Sanders quoted in: Jamie Ehrilch, “Bernie Sanders: ‘Of course’ I would use tariffs as President,” CNN, 25 August 2019. Accessed online: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/25/politics/bernie-sanders-tariffs-trade-war-sotu-cnntv/index.html

83. Bernie Sanders quoted in: Tara Golshan, “Exclusive: Bernie Sanders explains his plan to cut military spending,” Vox, 2 May 2019. Accessed online: https://www.vox.com/2019/5/2/18525580/bernie-sanders-plan-cut-military-spending

84. Bernie Sanders, Twitter, 9 May 2019. Accessed online: https://twitter.com/SenSanders/status/1126186296794390530?s=20

85. Bernie Sanders, “Ending America’s Endless War: We Must Stop Giving Terrorists Exactly What They Want,” Foreign Affairs, 24 June 2019. Accessed online: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-24/ending-americas-endless-war; Bernie Sanders, “A Global Democratic Movement to Counter Authoritarianism,” speech delivered at John Hopkins University, Washington, DC., 9 October 2018. Accessed online: https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sanders-speech-at-sais-building-a-global-democratic-movement-to-counter-authoritarianism

86. John Lee and Charles Edel, ‘Negotiating a tricky diplomatic tightrope’, The Australian, 15 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/negotiating-a-tricky-diplomatic-tightrope/news-story/fa5db0d6a063d3944f59abf628cd3766

87. John Halpin, Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, Karl Agne, Jim Gerstein, and Nisha Jain, ‘America Adrift:

How the US Foreign Policy Debate Misses What Voters Really Want’, Center for American Progress, 5 May 2019, accessed via: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/05/05/469218/america-adrift/

88. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, ‘U.S. Views of China Turn Sharply Negative Amid Trade Tensions’, Pew Research Center, 13 August 2019, accessed via: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/08/13/u-s-views-of-china-turn-sharply-negative-amid-trade-tensions/

89. Thomas Wright, ‘Democrats Need to Place China at the Center of Their Foreign Policy’, The Atlantic, 14 May 2019, accessed via: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/how-democrats-can-beat-trump-foreign-policy-2020/589360/

90. For example, Joe Biden: “The reason I’m optimistic, and the point I’ve been making for years is— IF we do what we need to do here at home, IF we stand up for American interests, IF we invest in our people, live our values, and work with our partners — We can out-compete anyone.” From Ursula Perano, ‘Biden changes tone on China: “They are a serious challenge to us”’, Axios, 11 June 2019, accessed via https://www.axios.com/joe-biden-china-competition-c58cff27-0386-4602-a380-c398e0f86a7e.html

91. Bob Fredericks, ‘Schumer: We have to be tough on China’, New York Post, 1 August 2019, accessed via: https://nypost.com/2019/08/01/chuck-schumer-backs-trump-on-new-china-tariffs/

92. Jonathan Swan, ‘2020 Dems punt on Trump’s China tariffs’, Axios, 28 July 2018, accessed via: https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-sneak-peek-4869737c-b693-4ee2-bbcc-272000284831.html?chunk=2&utm_term=emshare#story2

93. Peter Beinart, ‘Democrats Are Avoiding the China Question’, The Atlantic, 10 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/democratic-2020-candidates-arent-talking-about-china/591295/

94. Peter Beinart, ‘Democrats Are Avoiding the China Question’, The Atlantic, 10 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/democratic-2020-candidates-arent-talking-about-china/591295/

95. Gretchen Frazee, ‘Do Democrats want a candidate who shares their values or can beat Trump? Voters are split’, PBS, 7 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/do-democrats-want-a-candidate-who-shares-


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their-values-or-can-beat-trump-voters-are-split

96. From Axios, ‘Top 2020 Democrats on U.S. policy toward China’, 28 July 2019, accessed via: https://graphics.axios.com/2019-07-28-dem-china-responses/index.html?subset=china&directLink=true#_ga=2.105090051.1083380823.1564682567-1066467934.1560529251

97. Alex Ward, ‘The key foreign policy questions 2020 Democrats must answer, according to 9 experts’, Vox, 30 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/7/30/20707525/2019-cnn-debate-foreign-policy-questions

98. Nahal Toosi, ‘Democrats want to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal. It’s not that simple.’, Politico, 20 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/20/iran-nuclear-deal-democrats-1424113

99. Chelsea Mes, ‘Kamala Harris Says She’d Rejoin Iran Agreement If She’s Elected’, Bloomberg, 18 June 2019, accessed via: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-19/kamala-harris-says-she-d-rejoin-iran-agreement-if-she-s-elected

100. Elizabeth Warren, Tweet, 23 February 2019, accessed via: https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1099432996099231751?lang=en


102. Danielle Wallace, ‘Bernie Sanders: US policy in Mideast can’t be ‘pro-Israel, pro-Israel, pro-Israel’’, Fox News, 27 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.foxnews.com/politics/bernie-sanders-pro-israel-us-foreign-policy-benjamin-netanyahu-palestine

103. Mike Watson, ‘Why the Middle East Policies Favored by Sanders and Warren Would Be Counterproductive’, National Review, 30 July 2019, accessed via: https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/middle-east-policies-bernie-sanders-elizabeth-warren-would-be-disastrous/

104. Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone with Matilda Steward, ‘Averting crisis: American strategy, military spending and collective defence in the Indo-Pacific,’ United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, August 2019, accessed via: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific

105. Van Jackson, ‘Wagering on a Progressive Versus Liberal Theory of National Security’, Texas National Security Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 14 January 2019, accessed via: https://tnsr.org/roundtable/wagering-on-a-progressive-versus-liberal-theory-of-national-security/


107. Elizabeth Warren, ‘A Foreign Policy for All, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, accessed via: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-11-29/foreign-policy-all and Elizabeth Warren, ‘Revitalizing Diplomacy: A 21st Century Foreign Service’, 28 June 2019, accessed via: https://medium.com/@teamwarren/revitalizing-diplomacy-a-21st-century-foreign-service-2d9d195698f

108. Jordan Cairney, ‘Democrats push to make national security a 2020 wedge issue’, The Hill, 9 June 2019, accessed via: https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/447545-democrats-push-to-make-national-security-a-2020-wedge-issue

109. For the Trump ISIS quote, see Katie Rogers, Rukmini Callimachi and Helene Cooper, ‘Trump Declares ISIS ‘100%’ Defeated in Syria. ‘100% Not True,’ Ground Reports Say’, New York Times, 28 February 2019, accessed via: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/middleeast/trump-isis-territory.html, For President Trump’s broader re-election pitch on foreign policy, see comments by Erin Perrine, a spokeswoman for Trump’s re-election campaign: “He defeated the ISIS caliphate, brought North Korea to negotiating table, placed some of the toughest sanctions on rogue nations, and has NATO on the right path… Democrats can continue to try and spread their pathetic delusions but the American people see right through it.” See Burgess Everett and Andrew Desiderio, ‘Democrats could blow election to Trump, Chris Murphy warns’, Politico, 8 April 2019, accessed via: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/08/dems-fopo-murphy-1259699


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About the author

Dougal RobinsonNon-Resident Fellow, United States Studies Centre

Dougal Robinson is a Non-Resident Fellow in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program at the United States Studies Centre, based in Washington DC. He is concurrently a Fulbright Scholar in Strategic Studies and International Economics at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

As a Research Fellow at the Centre in 2017-18, Dougal wrote several research publications on US foreign and defence policy, the US-Australia relationship and US Congress. His writing has been printed in publications including Security Challenges, The American Interest, Australian Financial Review, The Australian and Sydney Morning Herald. A regular commentator on Australian television and radio, his analysis has been quoted by international outlets including the Financial Times and New York Times.

Dougal has previously served in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, where he worked on Australia’s relationship with both the United States and China. He holds a BA with First Class Honours from the University of Sydney.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank many people who generously lent their time and insights to this report. A major debt is owed to over a dozen individuals in Washington DC who spoke to the author anonymously. These individuals, from the Democratic and Republican parties, think tanks, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Australian Embassy all volunteered candid and valuable judgements. Bruce Wolpe and two anonymous peer reviewers provided helpful feedback that sharpened the report. Thank you to Jared Mondschein for his perceptive edits, management of a flawless review process and above all being a pleasure to work with. Elliott Brennan provided excellent input, and Susan Beale and Drew Sheldrick are always instrumental in turning reports into publications. Finally, the author is very grateful to Lindsey Ford — who has now moved to the Brookings Institution — for hosting him at the Asia Society Policy Institute in Washington from June to August.

United States Studies Centre

Institute Building (H03) The University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia

Phone: +61 2 9351 7249Email: [email protected] Twitter: @usscWebsite: ussc.edu.au

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