the fukushima disaster: political reactions & consequences in europe
TRANSCRIPT
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The Fukushima disaster:
political reactions & consequences
in Europe
updated version, May 2012
Peter Bossew
Privatier, Vienna â Berlin
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content
⢠national & supranational reactions
⢠the âstress testsâ
⢠the âpolitical falloutâ
⢠general considerations on hazard, risk & human factor
from Confucius temple,
Naha (Okinawa, Japan)
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reactions on various levels
⢠Immediate questions: - Can it happen in Europe too? - Residual risk acceptable? - If it happens: disaster management? - Alternatives to nuclear? (current share 30-35% el.)
⢠EU reaction: - âstress testsâ - screening of food imported from Japan, implementation of limits
⢠IAEA reaction: - first reactions: slow, partly confusing, complacent - blaming Japan for not delivering data, but not taking action itself - âits performance was sluggish and sometimes confusingâŚâ - âThe IAEA ⌠simply repeated official statements from Japanese government authoritiesâ G. Brumfiel, Nature, 26.4.11, http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110426/full/472397a.html - later in 2011-2012: extensive reports, very informative
(which I cannot answer !)
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immediate national reactions, Europe
Public sensitive and sceptic to different degrees! - Several countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, Bulgaria) evacuated their embassy staff from Tokyo to other cities.
- Several countries advised their nationals to leave Tokyo: AT, CH, DE, FI, FR, IT, UK
- monitoring in Japan: FR
- to different degrees: intensified monitoring, establishing web-pages with results and interpretations (almost all countries);
very detailed: e.g. DE (BfS, GRS), FR (IRSN), IT (Isprambiente); others to different degrees; some with main emphasize on scientific accuracy (PL-Clor), others more qualitative)
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national reactions, Europe: nuclear policy
country nucl. share (2011) policy post-Fukushima
Austria 0 trade of nucl. electricity shall be made illegal
Belgium ~54% decision Oct. 2011: phase out 2015-2025
France ~78% Hollande: reduction to ca. 50%
Germany ~18% 30.6.11: â13. Gesetz zur Ănderung des
Atomgesetzesâ: phase-out until 2020 (*)
Italy 0 referendum 13.6.11: no new NPPs
Switzerland ~41% 25.5.11: Bundesrat decision for phase out
until ca. 2034
ES, HU, NL, RO,
SE, SI, UK
apparently no change
BG,BY,CZ,FI,LT,
RU,SK,TR,UA
plans for new NPPs confirmed
(*) a political 180° turn within a few days â regional elections were ahead!
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share of nuclear energy, Europe
source: NEI (USA), values for 2011, update March 2012.
www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/graphicsandcharts/generationstatistics/
also: www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html
www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/8752/Nuclear-Power-Reactors-in-the-World-2011-Edition
http://pris.iaea.org/public/
www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-europe.htm
2011
percentage of nuclear of generated
electricity; if considering import and
export the picture may be different!
E.g. Italy imports large quantities of
FR nuclear electricity.
Copyright @ European Commission. DG. JRC, REM 2009-2012
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national reactions, Europe:
reports & studies
⢠Comprehensive Fukushima reports:
ENSI (CH), www.ensi.ch/de/2011/08/29/analyse-fukushima-11032011/
BfS (DE), http://doris.bfs.de/jspui/bitstream/urn:nbn:de:0221-201203027611/3/BfS_2012-SK-18-12.pdf
IRSN (FR), www.irsn.fr/FR/expertise/rapports_expertise/surete/Pages/Rapport-Fukushima-1-an-apres_032012.aspx
AGES & ZAMG (AT), www.lebensministerium.at/umwelt/strahlen-atom/strahlenschutz/fukushima-bericht.html
RPII (IE), www.rpii.ie/site/Publications.aspx
Her Majestyâs Chief Inspector of Nucl. Installations (UK),
www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/fukushima/final-report.pdf
⢠Studies about consequences of similarly severe beyond
design accidents initiated: IRSN, BfS
Fukushima reports, IAEA:
2.report of Japanese government to IAEA: www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report2/
Fukushima status reports: www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/status-reports.html
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reactions: public, NGOs, www
⢠NGOs: serious to different degrees. Good examples: CRII-RAD (FR), Austrian Ecology Institute.
⢠Greenpeace: little helpful first, later useful contributions: summary of stress test results etc., interesting report (mis-management of evacuations, lack of liability and responsibility of TEPCO etc.) : www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/nuclear/2012/Fukushima/Lessons-from-Fukushima.pdf
⢠mainly US: quack doctors and panic makers; to lesser degree in Europe.
⢠Wikipedia: very useful and comprehensive Fukushima pages
⢠Media: mostly very badly informed, most only interested in alarmism ( money).
a promising recent development:
âcrowd sourcing / mappingâ e.g. Safecast, http://blog.safecast.org/maps/
https://sites.google.com/site/radmonitor311/top_english#11
social media, blogs:
immense variety between the good, the bad & the ugly
I have no overview! a science blog, among others: http://fukushima.physikblog.eu/discussion/41/sammlung-guter-dokumentationen/p1
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a short note on the role of NGOs
⢠typically: Greenpeace
⢠Often one may disagree with their conclusions;
⢠One may be sceptical about their business model (depending on contributions depending on the mood of the public bias)
⢠But: they stimulate & instigate discussions, are a challenge for lazy & complacent scientists and authorities
⢠Their role is âpolitical QAâ very important in an open society! As an overall effect contribute to safety culture.
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The stress tests, 1
rationale:
assess how European NPPs would perform
in âextraordinaryâ situations, i.e. beyond design events.
Two âtracksâ:
(1) âSafety trackâ: Technical safety reserves against extraordinary events;
Verification of preventive & mitigation measures chosen following
initial events loss of safety functions accident management.
- Initial events: Earthquakes, flooding
- Consequences: station black out, loss of heat sink
- Accident management: means to protect from and to manage loss of
-- core cooling;
-- fuel storage pool cooling;
-- containment integrity
- Not covered: statuses of the plants, licenses, off-site civil defence.
(2) âSecurity trackâ: Malevolent or terrorist acts
deterministic approach! (i.e. irrespective probability)
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The stress tests, 2
Procedure:
1) Self assessment by licensee / operator,
2) review by national regulators; country reports
3) European peer review by other regulators.
4) (hopefully) Public discussions incl. all stakeholders, also NGOs
To be reported:
- response of the plant, effectiveness of preventive measures;
- weak points, âcliff-edgeâ effects,
in order to evaluate:
- robustness of defense-in-depth;
- adequacy of accident management measures;
- identify potential for improvements:
country reports, all finished by 31.12.11, published 5.1.12 (CH: 10.1.), peer
review: end April 2012:
- EU countries & Switzerland + Ukraine
- some more, some less technically detailed, up to several 100 pages !
Documents: Background and country results:
www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests, www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests/Country-Specific-Reports
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/stress_tests_en.htm
⢠technical
⢠organisational
reports are
public !
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The stress tests, 3
⢠First results (based on country interim / progress reports) source: SEC(2011) 1395 final (Brussels, 24.11.2011); Commission Staff working paper: Technical Summary of the national progress reports on the implementation etc. <com_2011_0784.pdf, com_2011_0784_technical_summary.pdf> - âSome national regulators ⌠considered revising safety marginsâŚâ: Flooding, loss of power, loss of ultimate heat sink, heavy earthquakes. - Potential of improvement and âchallengesâ identified by some. - Differences between countries: e.g. how to assess earthquakes; - Some meet scope of stress tests more, some less closely; - Different levels of self-critique; - In several cases additional technical information given in the peer review stage.
⢠Compact summary on interactive map by Greenpeace: www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/stress-tests-map/
⢠Critique of stress tests (also by NGOs etc.): - pol. and admin. conditions not addressed (only on the level of accident management), e.g. independence of regulators, level of corruption, etc.; - in phase 2+3: will in-depth technical information be available? - implementation of results assured ??
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The stress tests, 4
Preliminary conclusions of the EC (early 2012): The EC sees scope for improving the legal framework at EU and national level in the following areas:
1) improving technical measures for safety, and improving the necessary oversight to ensure full implementation,
2) improving the governance as well as the legal framework of nuclear safety,
3) improving emergency preparedness and response,
4) reinforcing the EU nuclear liability regime and
5) enhancing scientific and technological competence.
0) However, the starting point is the full implementation of existing EU rules.
To be understood as implicit critique of the current statuses in these fields ?! In any case: reasonable conclusions, a good start I think!
does not exist so
far --- will there
ever be one ??
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stress tests 5: some results of peer review
⢠Exercise generally complied with ENSREG specifications
⢠External hazards: - assessment of margins diverse & inconsistent; - few countries assessed cliff-edges in a manner requested by ENSREG; - particularly unsatisfactory: extreme weather conditions.
⢠Cliff-edge effects, related to loss of power & heat sink: numerous improvements identified, some implemented, some planned.
⢠Robustness: all countries identified improvements that would enhance robustness. Provisions for improving containment integrity should be implemented urgently.
⢠Severe accident management: in general prevention better developed than mitigation. To do: in cases of extreme natural conditions; equipment, training, logistics to be improved.
⢠âHardened coreâ concept suggested (maintaining basic functionality in extreme conditions)
⢠Periodic safety review important! In particular for natural hazards (at least every 10 y.)
⢠Follow-up inspections, evaluations recommended.
source: <EU Stress Test Peer Review Final Report_0.pdf>
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stress tests 6, so far final
⢠Statement of ENSREG + EC: www.ensreg.eu/node/389
⢠report approved by EU council
⢠BUT: energy commissary Ăttinger (26.4.12): report not sufficient: - only a fraction of NPPs checked (1 of 9 in DE, 4 of 58 in FR) - particularly problematic ones not checked (Fessenheim) - stress test rationale not fulfilled. - therefore: considered only as interim report, tests to be continued.
⢠Decision (among others): - Additional visits of NPPs - Implementation of the recommendation of the ENSREG report - Information on every single NPP will be available on the website. (Press release, IP/12/429, 26.4.2012 )
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Screening of imported goods
⢠food; ship containers; cosmetics (!); etc. etc.
⢠only few findings - essentially a few green tea samples
documents: legal background, data lists, reports:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/radiation_protection/fukushima_en.htm overview on imports into EU until 31.12.2011:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/radiation_protection/doc/emergencypreparedness/overview_import_2011_12_31.pdf
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Hazard, risk, human factor
(A)
natural hazard
can initiate
detrimental event
(B)
technical system
has an inherent
risk potential
understanding A & B + sci. qualification, resources, institutional independence
- corruption, public disinterest, lack of public (non-industrial) funding
setting regulations
implementing & controlling regulations
+ political culture, critical public, NGOs, transparency
- corruption, nepotism, censorship
+ independent regulatory authorities
- corruption, nepotism, censorship
RISK
(C)
âhuman factorâ
sets the conditions,
how and to which degree
hazard & risk potential
become risk
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Fukushima as a tragic example (1)
⢠mostly based on:
- the Swiss ENSI report,
- conclusions by JAEC (Japan Atomic Energy Commission),
- article of Z. StoĹĄiÄ (AREVA): Nuclear fundamentals remain. Thermal Science 16, Suppl.1, 2012 (www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0354-9836/2012%20OnLine-First/0354-98361200059S.pdf )
which discuss political factors very critically
⢠(A, nat. hazard)
existing knowledge of frequency and height of tsunamis ignored
⢠(B, risk potential)
not accounting for known risk potential: e.g.
- no diversification of vital safety and backup systems,
- no hydrogen mitigation;
- blocks not sufficiently separated;
- common cause scenarios insufficiently considered;
- not sufficiently equipped with emergency âhardwareâ (e.g. missing
emergency water inlets);
- staff little prepared & trained to handle severe accidents;
- altogether âdefence-in-depthâ concept largely missing
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Fukushima as a tragic example (2) ⢠(C, human factor)
- âThe root cause ⌠seems to be operatorâs and regulatorâs weakness in the
establishment of safety cultureâ (StoĹĄiÄ)
- âflawed organisation and communication, while the site was inadequately prepared
and operators made mistakesâ (JAEC; after StoĹĄiÄ)
- bad communication with the public: âThe Japanese governmentâs failure to speculate
alarmingly didnât âprotectâ the public from alarming speculation.â (StoĹĄiÄ)
- regulatory authority not independent, clawless:
-- implementation of regulations left to deliberation of operators;
-- no compulsory regular emergency exercises;
-- no compulsory technical upgrades acc. state of knowledge;
-- NISA (regul. authority) < METI (Ministry of economy): violation of
international requirements of independence.
- corporate culture of TEPCO:
notorious for falsifications, obfuscation, cover-ups; âgroup-thinkâ
- scientific / technical community: ârationalizationâ of risk, âVerdrängungâ
(Freud; engl. repression) of problems; again âgroup-thinkâ;
- Echo chamber effect: âtendency for beliefs to be amplified ⌠in an environment
where âŚsimilarly interested actors fail to challenge each otherâs ideasâ(Greenpeace-report, p.38)
- amakudari
Purpose of this list: NOT blaming Japan, BUT: check what the conditions are in Europe!
Investigation of these factors is missing in the stress tests! âpolitical stress testsâ
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structure of nucl. responsibilities in Japan
source: Swiss ENSI report, part 2:
âVertiefende Analyseâ, p.9
Japan has announced re-structuring
acc. requirements of clear separation
of powers and independence of
regulatory authority
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Public attitude
It is hypocritical to blame the public for a sceptical, often irrational attitude, as long as
⢠Politics shies away from honest risk-benefit discussion on energy systems;
⢠Most politicians first & only think on their re-election and subsidies of theirs & their cronies;
⢠Corporate lobbying largely happens in the dark, lack of transparency about links industry-politics (German Filz Japanese Amakudari)
⢠Politics increasingly appears to be an inside-job of âThe Marketsâ (who??);
⢠EU has no original political ideas but instead appears a puppet of these obscure interests;
⢠Science is under-financed and rather considered an annoyance by politics & administrations;
⢠Scientists themselves are often lazy, complacent, unwilling to communicate;
⢠Most media are little informed and cynical, information to them means what earns money.
about Amakudari:
google âamakudari fukushimaâ
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Corruption, lack of transparency, loss of credibility of
political institutions inevitably leads to obscurantism,
quack science and de-legitimation of politics altogether.
Danger for democracy!
examples from the US
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What if⌠in Europe ??
⢠Monitoring will probably work; will it? next slide
(in some countries capacities may not yet be sufficient; systems still not sufficiently harmonized)
⢠Public reactions: probably chaos â people in Europe are not disciplined like in Japan!
⢠EU reactions: - efficient on political level ? doubts! (see current ⏠crisis!) - on technical level: probably ok, but: EU bureaucracy !!, often inefficient & clumsy information policy !!
⢠National reactions: Whether authorities will react in a coordinated and rational way as they should: ???? Current emergency plans and accident management plans sufficient: ????
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Will monitoring work?
⢠Automatic systems: (e.g. >4000 doserate monitors across Europe): - what in case of electricity black-out? - servicing monitors in contaminated areas?
⢠Laboratories: - sampling logistics? - sufficient number of sufficiently trained lab. staff available? - handling of large amounts of (possibly or really) contaminated samples? (receiving, storing, packing, measuring, disposing) - in emergency: enough qualified staff for fast evaluation, interpretation, transmission to authorities + public ? - working under stress conditions ?
DE: de-centralized: âLänderâ, but these appear not to have the capacities
FR: centralized (mostly Vesinet, Paris): big logistic problem
Discussions about these aspects in Germany indicate problems!
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a few results of BfS and IRSN studies
⢠âshelteringâ advice (stay at home, close windows) not realistic for scenario with releases longer than a few days
⢠radii for action bigger than previously thought
⢠iodine administration longer than previously assessed logistics?
⢠possibly capacities for evaluating monitoring results insufficient
⢠possibly logistic capacities for emergency response insufficient
A basic problem of disaster preparedness: extensive preparations required,
laboratory capacities, staff training, etc. --- all in idle, but expensive stand-by mode
for events which perhaps never occur.
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Some conclusions:
1. While it is necessary to analyze technical + human aspects of the
disaster: We should be very careful before criticizing Japan, where
the Fukushima accident was only small part of the disaster !
2. Taking the current technical stress test seriously ! Public pressure &
control to really implement the findings !
3. To do: Political stress tests: independence of authorities?
corruption? âFilzâ, âAmakudariâ ?
4. To do: More studies on beyond design accidents, accident
management capacities: on national + European level!
5. To do: More transparency about balance of risks & benefits of
energy supply systems!
6. Honest communication with the public: Appeasement & placation is
not only immoral, but also leads to the opposite effect!!
7. Prepare for chaos !!