the general - volume 16, issue 5

7/23/2019 The General - Volume 16, Issue 5

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2/58

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Continued on Page

year due

to

the silver content t here in . I kno

don't have

to

tell you what's happened

to

price of gold and silver

3

By Gene Bogg

1

By Dave Hab

2

By

Joe Pellic

2

By Vern Pax

By

Steve L

By Paul James

By EarlyThom

By Alan R. Mo

By

Rev. SamCa

By

Gary Charbonne

The bottom line is that 1980 has brough

creased operating

costs which

we must pass

to

our

customers

in

the form

of

higher prices

the case of THE GENER L we

were

able to sof

the blow with a 33% i nc rease in size for on

17% increase in price.

We were

able

to

man

this by going to a less expensive

non-gloss

pa

stock

and taking advantage of a recently acqu

collating machine which doubles

our previous

lating

capac i ty to

a

maximum

of

72pp.

Furt

more,

because

THE GENER L

is

printed

in

page sheets, an addition of 12 pages enabled

to

fill

the

third 16 page multiple and

thus

incre

our size with a minimum increase of press ti

MONTGOMERYATSEA

Allied Strategyin WAR AT SEA

MOREBANGS PERBVCK

PANZER

BLITZ

and PANZERLEADERUnit Effectiveness

TACTICALALTERNATIVES IN 1941

Analysis of Russian Strategyin

THE

RUSSIAN

CAMPAIGN

V-50s ODYSSEYOFASUBMARINE

Another

SUBMARINEVariant

BLOOD

&

GUTSSTARSHIPTROOPERS

How

to Skin thoseNasty Bugs

RAILBARON

ShortGame &

Two

Man

Variants

For those of you who haven't figured it outyet

f rom the heft

of

the

magazine as you lifted i t ou to f

the mailbox, or grasped the meaning

of

the layout

changes on this page

I've

go t big

news.

THE

GENER L has expanded to 48 pages

of

full color

ecstasy. So

much

for the good

news.

Our long

awaited expansion did not come

without

a price,

I'm sure none of you need

to

be informed of the

existence

of

double digit inflation in this country,

I t has been steadily eating

into your pockets

and

ours throughout the past decade, 1979 was no

exception as the government announced an o f

ficial inflation rate of 12

%%, Unoff icial ly ,

it

seems even worse, bu t then you go to gas

stations

and

grocery

stores

too,

don't

you

7

In

the

printing business, however, it not only

seems

worse-i t is worse.

We

face an across-the-board

price increase of 30% fo r paper alone. The cost

of

film

used in

the

printing

industry

for

typesetting

and plate making has nearly doubled in

the

past

DESIGNANALYSIS

Resolving Fractional

Combat

Odds

A P ~ O N F R E N C H S T R A T E G Y

Basic Strategy for NAPOLEON

BLITZKmlliGPROPAGANDA

A Humorous

Look at

Wargames

STAFFBRIEFING

An

Interviewwith Richard Hamblen

The

Game

Players

Magazine

T h e co:yri

9

ht 19BO

~

l

AJ

41 2\

l l l ~ l

allUl

ompany ~

4517

Harford

Road

I f \ ~ O

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EDITOR: Donald J. Greenwood

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3/58

CRESCENDO

OF

DOOM

TACTICAL COMBAT ON THE WESTERN

FRONT

1939 1941

CRESCENDO OFDOOM is

available by ma

order from Avalon Hill for $15.00 plus

postage charge or a postage coupon from TH

GENERAL

Maryland residents please add 5

State sales tax.

Ownership of

SQUAD

LEADER and CRO

OF IRON is

necessary to play this game.

From the Nazi invasion of Poland, through the

heroic defense

of

tiny Finland against the Russian

behemoth, the blitzkrieg conquest

of

Norway and

the Low Countries, the Battle

of

France, and the

seizure

of

Greece the player

is

struck

by

the despair

of

men and nations alike as seen by the soldiers who

vainly sacrificed their lives against a more powerful

aggressor. This

is CRESCENDO OFDOOM

. .

a

gripping game

of

tactical combat set against the

seemingly invincible juggernauts

of

war-torn

Europe. Setting the scene for the colossal struggle

of

the titans which will follow, CRESCENDO OF

DOOM is, nonetheless, far more than a simple

prelude to Barbarossa. While further refining the

innovations brought forth in its highly successful

predecessors

SQUAD

LEADER and CROSS OF

IRON CRESCENDO

breaks yet even more

ground in the realm

of

realistic tactical combat

without disturbing the underlying basic simplicty of

a universally acclaimed game system.

CRE-

SCENDO is

a welcome extension for the

SQUAD

LEADER enthusiast even before he contemplates a

single new counter.

But

CRESCENDO

OFDOOMoffers far more

than that. Complete armor, ordnance, and infantry

units are provided for Poland, Belgium, Finland,

and a host of other minor neutrals including Elite,

Line, and Reservist formations for all nationalities.

In graphic detail far superior to any narrative ac

count, you will see for yourself how the out

numbered German panzers defeated the superior

armor

of

the French tanks. Experience personally

the French frustrations brought on by radioless

AFVs and one man turrets. There are no Panthers

or T-34s

here it

is

the Mk III vs. the

Char B

Somua,

or

Matilda.

And CRESCENDO need not end in 94 with

our

32nd scenario. The entire British Order

of

Bat

tle

is

presented for the whole

of

WWII enabling

fans of the Western Desert, Italian, or Normandy

campaigns to design their own scenarios for those

periods.

CRESCENDO OF DOOM is

more than

just a game. When combined with

SQUAD

LEADER

and

CROSS OF IRON

it provides the

ultimate in a tactical gaming system which can be

used to portray any company or battalion level ac

tion.

Be

forwarned

CRESCENDO

is

not an easy

game. Do not attempt it unless you have first

mastered

SQUAD LEADER

and

CROSS OF

IRON

In

each game you get:

520 double-pr inted

1 2

die-cut counters

representing the men and weapons that com

prised the combatants

of

the Western Front;

1939-1942.

804 double-printed 5 8 die-cut counters

representing the complete vehicular and ord

nance Order of Battle for the British, French,

Polish and Belgian Armies.

Two addi tional 8 x 22 geomorphic map

board sections increasing the possible terrain

configurations.

Comprehensive, illustrated

36

page P ro

grammed Instruction rule book.

Illustrated scenario cards for situations 21-32.

Two expanded Quick Reference Data Cards.

New Features Include:

Obstacle Bypass Movement

Advanced Bombardment Rules

Complete Weather Rules

Advanced Berserk Rules

Wagons Sleighs

Ski Units

Motorcycles Bicycles

Bridges

Demolition

Assault Boats

Fighters

Gliders

Trenches

Scouts

Booby Traps

AT Mines

Field Promotions

Interrogation

HE

Critical Hits

Ghurkas

Partial Armor Penetration

Rivers, Orchards, Mudflats

Wounded Leaders

and much, much more.

0

57L

. . ~ . . 1 6

. 0

z

.

lS 5PP

4'

3

4

88

4


4/58

STATUS: Possibly the all-time best

heavyweight champion from 1937

1949

RECORD: 68 wins / 3 losses

o draws / 54 KO

The Brown Bomber

1934-1950

Louis, called the perfect fighting

machine, ruled the heavyweight

division for a record

straight years

and defended his title 25 times, also a

record, before retiring as undefeated

heavyweight champion. Joe lost to

Ezzard Charles and Rocky Marciano

when he attempted a comeback but

by then he was a shell of his former

self. Louis probably had more pure

killer instinct than any other fighter.

He

was the best finisher of them

all

once he had his opponent hurt.

Louis, during his career, faced eight

o ther champions . Floored 8 times

during

his

career, and

by

some less

than great fighters. Louis always got

up and took his revenge.

11 \ I l i e

Uv ~ v u

2

20-24

34-35

45-46

65-69

79-80

1-46

47-60

61-67

68-78

A j

3

1-19

25-33

36-44

47-64

70-78

o

MUHAMMAD

ALi- i2 B

1960-1975 Heavyweight

AVALON HILL/TITLE BOUT

1979

CFB/S: 12/12 CO/CH: 7/1

HP/KI:

7/6

TKO: 2

KDR : 1 AGG: 6

KDR : 0 END: 110

KOR: 1 DEF: -6

FI: 1 FO: 4 CU: 2 KO: 2

ACTION

Punches Landed:

Punches Missed:

Clinching:

Ring Movement:

Foul Rating:

HITTING VALUE

Jab:

Hook:

Cross:

Combination:

Uppercut:

In

Corner/On Ropes:

TITLE

OUTis

a great game for

just

playing, ~ ~ i i i ~ ; ; ; ; : : ~ ~ ; ; e ~ ~

your favorite against your friend's.

But ,

also

great

to test history. What would have hap

if Rocky Marciano had met John

L.

Ori fGentleman

Jim

Corbett had been

e

same

ring with Muhammad Ali? In TITLE

UT you can f ind out for yourself, as all of the

old-time fighters

are

here, along with the box

stars

of today.

And since

we

will be

updating

the

boxers

every

year,

you'll

always be able to

in any

new

stars that appear over the years.

TITLE U ~ i s

one

of

those

great

rarities in the

ing world . . '. a game which is great fun in

competition while not los ing a bit of

citing play val'ue when played solitaire. TITLE

UT

was s i g n ~ primarily as a solitaire game

our

incorporatil?n of strategy cards employing

classic

o u t t h i n ~ d o u b l e t h i n k

matrix of our

series has a lso made it an exciting

of wits while temai ni ng t rue to the ac tual

of the fighters.

TITLE

OUT

is 4vailable directly from the

a lon Hi ll Game

Cb.,

for

15.00

plus 7

or

a GENER L postage coupon. Send

check

or

money order to our Parts Depart

at

4517

Harford

Rd., Baltimore, Maryland

Maryland residents please add

5

state sales

T TL

UT

Scoring in

TITLE OUTis done

just l ikeit is in

life, with

judges

that vote on each

round

ac

t o the points

that

each of the fighters have

Different

scoring systems

are provided

so

f

can have your f ighters go by the rules of any of

major systems used in the world today.

The basic rules to TITLE BOUT while covering

entire range of possibilities in boxing, are quite

and

can be l ear ned in a

matter

of

minutes.

unique

structure of

the

game

allows

you

to play

game solitaire

and

have just as exciting a match

you were facing another player. Special op

rules allow for various strategies such as the

r -up, f ighting inside, f ighting outside, and

g for the knockout. Different fighters can use

strategies with different frequencies, depend

upon their historical use of them. There's also

opt ion for r ing position, which allows for the

of the fighters in the ring to affect the out

of the bout.

TITLE OUT is the b rand new Sports Il

game that puts you right in the ring with

greatest boxers of today and the past.

Open the s turdy game box, and inside you'll

a colorful mounted playing boa rd and in

dual boxer cards for over

4

boxers in seven

weight classes,

from

the

hard-hitting

right down

to

th e feisty

herweights. Each f ighter in

TITLE OUT

is

d for his performance in over 5 different

ries, such as killer instinct,

knockout

ability,

defense

and

much more.

e Game of hampionship oxing

Card illustrations are actual size.


5/58

TACTICAL ALTERNATIVES

9

By

Paul

Jameson

The 41 moves in RUSSI N C MP IGN turns

one through four, determine which sidewill win the

game.

Th e

play and counterplay by each side is very

complex and the strategies available manyfold.

This article will attempt to discuss those strategies

through the ebb and flow of the

1941

turns, for this

is when victory

or

defeat is determined.

My main theme in this article is to demonstrate

the different strategies available to either player so

that they can react before a strategycan be

pu t

into

effect. In other words , a player should move with

the idea of countering all possible strategies his op

ponent may adopt . Whether your opponent uses

the strategy

or

not , you will have prepared to the

best of your ability.

TH E

FINNISH

FRONT

Against a determined opponent, Leningrad can

not be held past

1941

(unless you are willing to take

excessive losses to

do

so). A gloomy prediction, but

the Russian has four factors in his favor.

German panzers can t reach Leningrad until

at least the second impulse

of

the second turn.

2. German infantry arrive at the earliest on the

first impulse-third turn.

3.

Leningrad

can t

be attacked by stukas until

the third turn (unless the Russian opening setup in

the West was very weak and the German has

achieved a significant breakthrough).

4. The Finns

do

not have second impulse move

ment.

The defense of Leningrad will be divided into

two phases.

Th e

immediate Finnish threat which I

will call Phase I and the German-Finn ish threa t

which I will label Phase 2.

The Finnish Front-Phase 1

The immediate threat to Leningrad obviously

comes from the Finns. Keeping the four above facts

in mind, let s look

at

the advantages and disadvan

tages

of

three different defenses of the Finnish

border and see how each responds to the Finnish

threat.

The 23rd

in f

in

B9

and the 7th

in f

at CIO;

2. The 23rd inf a t C9 and the 7th

in f at cia;

3. Both infantries

at

D

10.

The supposed advantage

of

the first defense oc

curs if the Finns mistakenly make a 2: I first turn at

tack against the 23rd instead

of

against the 7th

(because it

is

a larger uni t and would get

IT ore

for

his money if the a tt ack

is

successful). Unless the

Axis player is careful, the Russian can spring the

Viipuri Trap (introduced by Mr. Jarvinen in Vol.

13, No.6 . In order to avoid the

poor

odds soakoff

against the 7th, the 23rd must be attacked from A9.

This leaves theFinnish 2ndguardingthe home front

at either A l l o r B12. Assuming theAxis succeeds in

either destroying or retreating the 23rd, the Ru

has two options for his I: I first

turn

attack

stack at A9 has

no

retreat route if attacked fro

and BIO, so there is a 39 chance of total ann

tion (see figure

F-I.

Note: if the 23rd is killed o

German turn, it enters as a Leningrad replace

for this option). The other alternative, optio

in the figure, moves the 7th

in f

and 9th

armo

hex BII . the Finnish 2nd is eliminated, the

a

can move to B13 on the second impulse w

forces Finland to surrender. If it is retreated to

the Russian can ei ther move to B13 or B12

former hex threatens to capture Helsinki an

lat ter almost guarantees that the Finnish sta

hex A9 starves to death , because now both

BI I

and

BI 2

must be cleared of enemy units.

Is

the Viipuri Trap reallya threat? Regardl

which option the Russian chooses for his I: I at

he needs four

or

five units to attempt them. O

two of those units are needed as cannon fo

south of Leningrad so

that

German panzers

make a second turn second impulse attack on

ingrad; three more are required for the I: I at

Can the Russian

afford

to deplete his f

elsewhere

on

the board in order tomake a I:I a

that

has only a 40 chance

of

success?

If

the

man player has very

poor

luck

on

his first tur

rol ls and the ent ire Russian condi tion

is

no

bad, maybe the answer

is

yes. This

is

highly un

ly, however, and it

is

more prudent in the lon

not to give the German this option.

A

no t

too obvious weak spot

in

the first de

is hex cia the German can gain control of

hex, the 23rd becomes a useless piece for one

Instead

of

assisting in Leningrad s defense, it

t ramp through northern Russia to a rai l hex n

of Leningrad from whence it can join the batt


6/58

slight disadvantage of the defense is that whate

occupies CIO can be retreated to B9 (see Figure F

on a DR result. Since neither infantry unit can m

through Leningrad because of the swamp hex

EIO, more uni ts

than

necessary may be needed

defend thecity because

of

the inability

of

either u

to assist in the defense of the southern approach

Leningrad (from the German army).

The

thi rd defense, placing both infantr ies

010, also eliminates the possibility of springing

Viipuri

Trap

and getting the 23rd isolated in Nor

ern Finland. The biggest advantage is that the F

nish first

turn

attack

is

only a I: I inst ead of a

2

which means that the Russian expects to loseone

his Finnish front infantry units

half

as many tim

as if he employed either of the first two defense

The Finnish Front-Phase II

Phase II of the Finnish

Front

begins when G

man

uni ts can assist the Finns in captur ing L

ingrad. The question before the Russian playe

that time is the length of t ime he wants to hold L

ingrad since the Axis can

capture

the city almos

will because of his early superior forces. The bigg

advantage in holding the city is that the Finns

kept penned up in Finland. This is especia

beneficial during the snow turns becausethey m

excellent defensive stalwarts since their com

strength is not halved if away from a city. Hold

Leningrad also prevents the German from exte

ing his rail net northward towards hexes

K2

and A

The

disadvantage in staying in Leningrad as long

possible is

that

with the defensive terrain so po

the

German

will a lways be making high odds

tacks in the a rea and the Russian must lose m

combat

factors while attempting to slow the G

man

down.

As I have shown under my discussion of Ph

I, the Russian can hold Leningrad through

turn

with as few as th re e units.

Turns

two and thr

however, before the Russian Sept/Oct r

forcements can be put to good use, are extrem

critical. Since they occur before the Russian can

pect to

turn

the tables in his favor in the Lening

area, he must f ind something to t ide him over.

options are opposing ones. He can either conc

the city

or

attempt

to keep it as long as possible

At first thought, giving Leningrad up witho

fight sounds very radical, but I hope to demonstr

The DR

result also

doesn t hurt

because any

retreated to

is

a rail hex next to Leningrad. The

and 23rd now

may

defend either in front

of

or

Leningrad itself,

or

they may move by rail

another position

on

the board. Assuming that

infantry uni ts do suffer a

DR

to hex FlO, the R

sian could (by bringing in another 5 3 inf into L

ingrad which in this example

is

the 3rd) adopt

defense shown in Figure F-6 . As you can see,

Finns can t

attack

Leningrad

at

1:2 and if the G

mans send panzers to Ell (which they can t re

on the first impulse) to attempt a high odds att

against the 7th and a low odds soakoff against L

ingrad, at least three panzers must be used.

unlikely that the German would a tt empt this

panzer attack

on

the second

turn

because of

probability

of

complete failure and because th

panzers will be much better utilized strik

towards Moscow.

The

biggest disadvantage

of

t

defense is that it too allows the Finns quick pene

tion into northern Russia.

The fourth

method

is to make the first impulse

attack

as shown in Figure F-4.

the Russian 7th is

removed by the

2:

I a tt ack, the 23rd is attacked in

the second impulse

at

1:2 by either the Finns ' 2nd,

4th and 7 th, or by the 4th and 7th. The odds

on

isolating or eliminating the 23rd are now 94 (fail

ing only on back to back AE or Al and AE

combat

results).

As yet, I

haven t

deal t with the best

combat

result of all: elimination of the 7th Inf by the first

turn

2: I attack.

If

this

is

combinedwith the options

available against the 23rd, four

combat

units must

be usedto defend Leningrad the first two turns, and

this is only the

threat

from the Finnish army.

The

second defense leaves the 7th in CIO but

moves the 23rd to hex C9. This eliminates the op

tions of being able to put the23rd

on

ice by occupy

ing CIO and the ability

of

springing the Viipuri Trap

if the

opportunity

arises. Also, since the Russian

will still control CIO, hehas the option

of

occupying

hex

01 0

with the 23rd or not. While this prevents

the Finns from mounting a 1:2 second

turn

attack

against Leningrad, it permits them a 2:1 shot

against that unit.

Because this option will always be available

on

the first Russian turn, this defense

is

more flexible

than

the first. does allow the Germans quick

penetration into Northern Russia along the west

board edge. (This part will be covered in depth in

my section

on

the Finnish Front-Phase IL) A

\ : ~ f e

Since neither means of capturing hex CIO ex

cludes the other, it would seem logical that the best

s trategy would be to attempt each

on

the first im

pulse. the 1:2 attack on the23rd is combinedwith

the sea move of the 52nd, the probability

of

getting

3 or more

combat

factors into CIO rises to nearly

80 -and the odds of 6 factors the re

is

almost

30 . the 52nd can be spared from

Army Group

South, this is obviously the path to follow.

third turn. Looking

at

the combat strengths of

Finnish units, another reason for isolating the

d for one

turn

becomes readily apparent.

The most the Finns can stack into one hex is II

factors . Therefore , the only way the Rus

can prevent a Finnish second

turn

1:2 attack

inst Leningrad is to s tack 12

combat

factors

the 23rd is

out

of the picture, two 5 3 inf

s t be brought in instead

of

one. Don t be com

cent, thinking your opponent surelywon t risk a

against Leningrad because of the dreaded AE

t result.

a couple of panzers can attack

ngrad on the second impulse (second turn),

the odds in favor of the German player are not

bad (25070-16.7070

of

an EX resul t on the first

lse plus

8.3

of ei ther a C, EX, or

DR

result

the second impulse I: I a tt ack by the F inns and

German panzers.) and

the Finnish 1:2 attack is a

gamble. Even if the Finnish

combat

results in

AE, F in land is well protected with the Finnish

behind the river

at

either Allor B12.

The

Rus

can t really spare two or three units to attack it

the second turn because they are more useful

where this early in the game. Furthermore, the

ogical implication of such a 1:2 a tt ack so

ly in the game would be qui te unnerving to the

ssian. After all , if the German is crazy enough to

such earlygambles, who knows what else he will

Having shown the value of capturing hex CIO

the first turn, there are several ways for the Axis

yer to go

about

it assuming the 7th inf is suc

sfully moved from CIO.

The

first

method

is

onstrated by Figure F-2 where the Finnish 2nd

tacking the 23rd from hex BIO

at

I:2. On an AR

lt (39

chance-V,

chance

of

a first impulse

plus 1/18 chance of an AR

on

the second im

e 1:4 attack

if

the first impulse was a contact),

2nd can retreat to CIO. Since our main plan

of

ting the 23rd is also accomplished with an EX

ck to back contact results, the total success

of

or eliminating the 23rd becomes

59 .

A second way to captu re CIO

is

to move the

panzer group to Helsinki on the first impulse

of

making the 1:2 attack by the Finnish 2nd.

the second impulse , it can enter hex CIO. With

odds of a successful sea move a t 67 , it is a

htly betterrisk than the first option. Butbecause

a re foregoing any chance

of

eliminating the

, I would nevertheless choose the first method.

Unfortunately, having three

combat

factors in

is only an annoyance since the Russian can

terat tack e ither the F innish 2nd or the 52

group

at

4:1

(see Figure F-3). This is not as

as it sounds. A contact resul t prevents the 9th

from retreatinginto Leningrad on the second

lse . An EX eliminates the 7th inf and a

DR

es the defender. Even a defender e liminated

is

not that bad since the German second turn

at to Leningrad is from thesouth and neither in

is

able to assist in defending aga inst tha t

because

of

their positions. Again, other units

s t take up the s lack, uni ts that are really needed


7/58

ial defensive setup of t he 7 th a nd 2 3r d I nf an tr ie s

a t I ha ve j us t e xpl or ed. Si nc e t he R us si an h as n o

of making a fig ht for Lening rad , there is

rea son to initially set a Russia n u ni t on B9.

e sn t m at te r i f t he F in ns r un north to F8 on

turn

e and attempt to encircle any Russian defenders

the Len in grad area b ecau se there won t be a ny

ssian u nits there to surround. Thu s, o n e adv an

of surrendering Leningrad in

1941

is that Rus

an losses o n t he F in ni sh f ro nt will be e xt re me ly

ht l ig hter th an

if

he

had

fought to hold Len

gr ad ) be ca us e t he R us si an n ei th er h as t o t hr ow

i ts in t he p at h of the advancing German coming

o m th e so uth n or initially setup the 2 3rd and 7th

tries so that t he F in ns h av e a 2: I s ho t

at

one

of

e m. I t m a y a p pe ar t ha t it

wouldn t

cost that many

at unitsto delaythe Germanscoming from the

u th b ecau se b o th of t he tw o c or ri dor s to Len

o ne t hr ou gh Ta lli nn a nd t he o ne be

een Lakes Peipus and Ilmen-are narrow enough

t ha t o nl y a s in gle u ni t is n eeded to d efen d each.

wever, if the Russian does block the corridors in

is m an ne r, the G er ma n simply ups t he a nt e a nd

erts more u nits toward s Len in grad . In the lon g

n , Russian losses will be h ig her, an d the German

still p ro ba bl y be able to m ak e a I: 1 F innish

rman attack

on

Leningrad

on turn

f ou r even i f

weather is snow. Furthermore, conceding high

sses south

of

Leningrad to slow the German down

still a long way from guaranteeing that Leningrad

be secured

through

1941. On the secon d

turn,

e G er ma n c an easily m ov e a

HQ

close enough to

ngrad so that it will b e within ran ge

of

a stuka

tack fro m the Fin ns on turn three. Since the Finns

n st ac k up t o eleven

combat

f ac to rs in a s ing le

, the Axis p layer will alway s be able to make

at

ast a 2: I stuka attack

on

Leningrad from hex DIO

turn three-an

attack that has a 5 7 chance of

turing the city.

I f the

German

d iv erts eno ug h p ower towards

ingrad in 1941, he can capture it.

might seem,

that i f t he R us si an i nt en ds t o abandon

ingrad, he would be wise

to

d o it

on turn

o n eso

t his lo sses will b e k ep t to an absolute min imum.

ver, such is not the case. Suppose the Russian

p ts the d efen se sho wn in fig ure F-7. If,

on turn

o, the G er ma n can move a panzer t o hex GIO,

is cut of f f ro m r ec ei ving a ny o ut si de

Then, on tur n

t hr ee , t he G er ma n c an

her make a surrounded attack

on

the city or move

hex 19 Either move is d etrimen tal for the Rus

regardless

of

the weath er o n turn fou r. Even if

is s no w, t he G er ma n c an e it he r m ak e a no th er I : I

ounded attack

on

Lening rad if the

turn

three

failed) or he can tak e u p win ter q uarters in

e mountainous hex of 110. Even though any non

nish units in 110 have their

combat

value halved

r ing the s now t ur ns , the y still r epr es ent a for

able force because of the doubling value

of

the

1942, these forces provide a serious flanking threat

to any Russian units defending behindthe river run

ning between hexes MIO and 09 .

Another

p ro blem with allowin g the German to

b reak the riv er lin e ru nn ing b etween Lak es Lado g a

and Ilmen, is th at h ecan then exten d his rail h ead to

hex G8 o nc e L en in gr ad is captured). This exten

sion is extremely

important

f or i f t he R us si an h as a

u nit in G8, any German u nits assau ltin g Archang el

must trace sup ply to the rail lin e ru nn ing west from

Kalinin into Leningrad. Although ending his turn

in

either hexes D3, E2,

or

F2 wou ld p lace the German

in excellent position for attacking Archangel

on

the

f ol low ing t ur n, it w ou ld a ls o pl ac e hi m m or e than

eight hexes f rom this sup pl y line and starvation

w oul d follow. T hu s, unt il t he

German

c an t ra ce

supply from the Archangel area to h ex G8, he really

cannot get serious about capturing Archangel.

.:.

- . - - , , ~ : - ~

: ; - ; ~

A ::

is quite evident that the Russian must prevent

the German from p en etratin g the riv er ru nn in g be

t we en L ak es L ad og a a nd I lm en in 1941. T he re a re

two ways t o ac com pli sh this. F ir st , t he Ru ssi an

could

adopt th e d efen se sho wn in fig ure F-8 . With

this defense,

German

p an ze rs c an n ei th er a tt ac k

Leningrad

nor

m ove t o G

1 on turn

two because of

the 9 th armor

at

F12. Having six combat factors

at

Len in grad forces th e Fin ns in to a 1:2 attack on that

city if they attack itat all. Alternatively, the Russian

cou ld mov eth e 9 th armor from

FI2

to h ex 19 If the

Fin ns d o

not

attack Leningrad

on turn

two or

if

they

do and

the result

is

n ot a n E X) , t he 7t h

Inf

ca n

escape

on

t he next t ur n.

The

armor

prevents the

German from b reak in g

through

and s et ti ng up a n

outpost

on

110 in 1941.

In conclusion,

if

the Russian wan ts to try to h old

L en in gr ad as l on g as p os si bl e, he m us t a nt ic ip at e

receiving heavy losses. If,

on

the ot her ha nd, he

abandons

L en in gr ad e ar ly in t he g am e, he m us t be

aware of the significance

of

the

German

breaking

the riv er lin e run ning b etween Lak es

Ladoga

and

Ilmen.

THE LTIC FRONT

The

Russian player s goals

on

the Baltic

Front

are many fo ld . First, h e wan ts to p revent a first turn

s ec on d i mp ul se a tt ac k a ga in st R ig a. T hi s w ou ld

allow that g ar ri so n t o use r ail m ov em en t

on turn

o ne s hou ld t he Russi an w an t t o d o so. S ec on d, he

would like to allow the German as little penetration

into the h eart of

Mother

Russia as possible. Third,

he wan ts to p ro vide some flank in g

support

f or t he

Western Military District s forces. Lastly, he would

like

on

his first turn to extract to defendable terrain

as

many

of this District s units as possible.

In planning his ope ning setup for t he Baltic

District, there are several key points for the Russian

to remember:

I . O ne he x, H 20 , c on tr ol s a cc ess t o t he B al ti c s

secondary line of def ense hexes G18, H19, a nd

119).

2. Army Group North only consists of

35

com

bat factors.

3. Only 29 of those

combat

facto rs can stack in

two hexes.

Hex H20, the first line

of

defense, can be

d ef en de d t o t he h il t, it c an be d ef en de d w ea kl y, or

somewhere in between. Let s investigate each alter

and 121 are overrun, highly unlikely consideri

large portion

of

the

German

Armythat

is

usele

second impulse, H20can only be attacked from

hexes, G20 and H21.

c an be d ef en de d by t h

armor alon e sin ce it can t be o ve rr un w it ho

assistance

of

a stuk a. The p ro blem in d oing

that

if

the German allocates two stukas to the

District, h ecan AV the 7 th an d attack hex

119

see figure B-1). On the second impulse, panze

either run far enough

north

so as to be ableto a

Moscow

on

t he second im pulse se cond t ur

complete the encirclement

of

the Western Dis

forces.

At the o ther end

of

thespectrum, hex H20 c

be d ef en de d b y t he 8t h a nd 1 It h i nf an tr ie s. W

s tu ka , a 5: I can be

mounted

a ga in st t he m. O

s ec on d i mp ul se , t he G er ma n c an A V e it he r o

armor

uni ts c om pr isi ng t he s eco nda ry lin

defense and do all sorts of d am ag e; i .e ., a

Riga,

surround

the o th er Baltic armor unit,

he x K I9 t he re by c ut ti ng of f the Western Mi

District, and/or sen d a p an zer an d

HQ

unit tow

Moscow.

As y ou wou ld h av e d ed uced by n ow, the p

defense

of

H20 falls somewhere between these

extremes and it really boils down to the questio

I want to

make

the

German

use a stuka in

Baltic?

If

n ot , t he n five

combat

f ac to rs a re

quate

for hex H20; i f s o, t hen e ight a re r equ

Let s

examine the two situations.

U si ng five

combat

factors in H20 req

d ef en di ng wit h b ot h a rm or s or with t he 8th

Defendingwith both armors see figure B-2) ag

the ensuing

5:

I a tt ac k o ff er s a sli ght a dv an ta

that one piece survives

on

e ithe r a D I or EX r

This

advantage

is, however, but an illusion

German is careful about retreating the survivo

the attack. For example, if the retreat is to e

HI8 or 120, the a rm or s will be more t ha n s

hexes away from o btaining the d ou ble d efen s

Leningrad or t he S mo le ns k r ive r line. The

could either move into Riga

or

behind the Dvin

whether this is good

or

bad for the Russian dep

on

h ow h e us ua ll y sets his d ef en se

in

the we

turn

o ne. More

on

this subject under my sectio

the Western

Front-Phase

Two.

The real disadvantage is that the in fantry

that

occupies I I 9 does n ot have to be a tt ac ke


8/58

The

expected Russian loss is

a lmos t the same

combat factors in the split defense vs. 3.67 in

other),

but the

odds

of both units surviving

mor e than

fivefold.

Furthermore, the

lit defense only works

if

the armor in F20 lives,

if

opponent

foresees the

inherent

weakness

of

acing infantries in G 18

and

119,

and i f

he chooses

attempt to exploit that weakness (by making the

e indicated in figure B-3). This is a lot

of

ifs.

both

armors

in H20 , the re fo re ,

is

more

than defending the first line of defensewith

it units.

The other method

of defending H20 is with the

h Inf.

The

best line

of secondary

defense with this

nt line

is

the

t

Inf in G 18 and both armors in

19. This defense has several

advantages

ove r the

one

(putting

both armors

in H20). F irst ,

the armors

can move seven hexes, they

can

ly be

attacked

by panzers

on

the second impulse;

119 mus t be

attacked on the

second im

se. Second,

if

the

attack on 119

results in either

Ex,

DR, or

D I result, thesubsequent retreat

is

all

ppiness for the Russian. A retreat to either

the

I,

, o r K hexrows allows

the

survivor(s)

to

reach hex

could be the correct s trategy

if

the Russian B

setup

is

weak and the German can use the

AR

c

bat result to his advantage.

ns

Qneun t lutn

1 4

Having decided to place eight

combat

factor

hex H20,

something

should be said on the unit m

The

eight combat factors in H20

could

be eith

combination of the II th Infand the 1st armor

or

8th inf and the 7 th armor . Two decisions mus

made: which unit mix is

to

defend H20 and wh

the best s econd l ine of defense. To determine

better choice, consider the

German

player's sec

impulse alternatives.

The

armor can be AV

whether it is placed in GI8

or

in 119. First ass

the worst,

that both

Russian defenders

of

hex

were eliminated (the resulting German attacks

the same if the result on H20 was e ithe r a DR,

or

EX)

and that the 10th

in f is attacked

at

5:

Germans

not shown in f igure B-5. As you can

from

B-5, once the

7th

is

overrun

on the second

pulse, t he 8 th c an be

surrounded and

the Ger

can breach

the

Dvina River by moving into H

Since

moving

into 118

and

H

17

will have to be d

by

Army Group North s panzers, units necessar

complete the overrun

of

the 7th armor and assi

the

attack

on the 8th will have to

come

from A

Group

Center.

Obviously, this will lessen thesev

ty of the

attacks

against other Russian units in

Western District.

Furthermore,

notice in figure

that the lef t f lank of the Western District

is

from

being

surrounded,

that the 6th Cav is doub

on

defense,

and

while the

path

to Riga is open,

German canno t a ttack

it on t he second imp

because of the g re at er need for t he 41st and 5

panze rs in H

17

and 118.

~

\

_

- ~ ~

n [ffil e : _ 7 ~ J I r ~ ~ ~ __

~ : i I 8 7

. 8- 7

tn fl ,

fCjl :

~ ~ 4 2 .

~ ,

------__=_, 5- 4 ~ ~

4 4 ~ 4 K

,

The

alternative to having the 7th

armor

in G

placing it in I19.

After overrunning

the7th, the

man

can

attain

the pos it ion shown in figure

Comparing figures B 5 and B-6 you can see tha

affording the German the opportunity of ope

up

the middle, he min im izes German movem

northward at the sacrifice of losing all units in

Western and BalticMilitary Districts.

In

figures

and B-6,

if

the 1st Armor

is traded

for the 7th

the 11th Inf for

the 8th,

the position for the Rus

is

more

perilous because as the

German

needs

fe

combat

factors

to overrun

the 1st

than

the 7th

has

more

units available to

concentrate

on the o

tasks indicated in the figures . In conclus ion, i f

H20

is

defended

with eight combat factors, the

counter

mix is the I I t h Inf

and

the Ist Armor .

Something should

be said about two other a

native

methods

of defending H20; with only

FI2

where they can only be panzer

attacked on

the

second impulse thereby prevent ing those panzers

from attacking

Leningrad until

turn

three. Lastly,

since

119

must be

attacked,

the

attack

against G

18

is

small if made at all. Thus, the

II

th inf can be

railroaded

to safety on

the

first

turn

and becomes a

very valuable

addition

to the Russian defenses

elsewhere.

becomes evident

that

defending with

the

8th

inf

in H20 instead of with

both

armors

pro

duces a

good

chance

that

two Baltic District units

will reach defendable terra in on the first

turn.

The best alternative to defending H20 with five

combat

factors

is

to defend it with eight.

Without

using a stuka,

the maximum

possible

attack

on

H20

is 3: I because the

German

can t stack

more than

29

factors into G20 and H2I .

Can

the

German

afford

either the

AR or Contact

result

inherent

in such

an

attack?

Whether the result

is

an AR or a Contact, and

whether the option is

made

to retreat

forward

(to

hex E19) or

backward

(to G21 say), the

end

product

is

the

same; resources must be provided

from Army

Group Center t o

e limina te uni ts in

the

Baltic

Military District.

the German retreats forward to EI9 (figure

B-4), said units

are

temporarily out

of

supply, but

by mov ing to F18, they can exploit the basic

weakness of the Baltic District

mentioned

before,

cutting

the rai l l ine to Riga. If all Russian units

ad

jacen t to Kaunas are

eliminated,

and

if t he 3: I a t

tack against the 8th

Inf

moves it

from

G

18

(higher

odds are

impossible against the 8th because

at

most

only nineteen combat factors can s tack in G20 and

subsequently be

retreated to EI9) ,

the

Germans

in

hex FI8 can t race supply to Kaunas. The risk of

neither eliminating or retreating

the

8th is

too

great

a

chance

to

take

(33.3

)

by itself because

if

the 8th

remains in GI8 at

the end

of the

German player s

turn,

all units retreated

forward

starve

to

death. To

be sure

that

any uni ts so ret reated

forward

(as in

figure B-4) do not expire because of lack of supply,

the

German

must attack hex H20at least at 4: I odds

on the second impulse. This is quite a bit of pressure

that

can t

be applied against the Western District 's

second line of defense.

If

the

positions of

the

8th In f

and the

7th Armor

are

swit ched in figure B-4, a dvanci ng

forward

becomes

the

correct move. Since

the German has

a

sure thing

on

moving

the

7th ou t

of

G

18

(as the at

tack

against

the

hex

is

now 5:1) , he

can

ignore the

defenders of

H20 and 119 and concentrate on

the

Western Dis tr ic t because , as shown before, the in

fantry cannot reach any type of doubling terrain on

turn one.

With the

massive firepower of

Army

Group Center

blowing away the Kaunas defenders,

the German should

eas ily be able

to put the 8th,

11th, and 1st ou t of supply and create a supply line

to Kaunas for the 56th, 41 st, and 38th. In conclu

sion, switching the positions of the 8th infand the

7th armor makes the 3: I first impulse attack against

hex H20 a bet ter a lternative for the Axis.

If

the German has an AR

result

on

the 3: I

attack

and

retreats

backward

(instead of

forward

to

EI9),

the

effectis the

same

as if

the

first impulse

attack on

H20 had been a Contact. Neither uni t on the

Baltic's second line

of

defense can be

attacked and

they

can

consequently be rai lroaded to safety

on

turn

one.

Thus, attacking

H20

without

a stuka

Ist

and

7th

together

66

17

17

rain during this time.

Suppose the

56th

and

41st

and the 38th inf

attack

H20

from

G20 in

ition with

infantry

in H21 and obtain a

DR.

On

second impulse,

the

German can make

themove

icated in figure B-3. Since the

German

is firmly

planted in hex F18, nei ther the 8th or II th

infan

ies can move by rai l

nor

can they move into Riga.

e 11th can

move behind

the Dvina River

if

the

result against itis a Contact , but on a DR, it

be

retreated to

119. 119 is a very poor hex for

ntry. From

119 they can nei ther

move

by rai l,

into

Riga,

nor move behind the Dvina

River.

nce they must be

out

in the

open at

the conclusion

turn

one, they

could

play right into the

Russian s

Front strategy. Again, I

defer

more on this

nt il my secti on on the Western Front-Phase

I t would appear

that

the way

to

prevent the in

n tr ie s in G

18

and 119 from getting cutoff would

e to split t he

armors-place one

in H20

and the

in F20.

If

the

armor

in F20 survives, its subse

retreat would

put it

either in,

or

in a

suppor

ve role of, G18. A look at the combat results table

ows why this

is

not such a good idea. Assuming

the German allocates 29 combat factors against

e

armors

(the results

ar e the s ame i f b oth a re

at

at

5: I t h e difference being that the

prob

German

losses will be higher),

the Istis attack

d at 7: I

and

the

7 th a t

5:

1

With

these

odds,

the

combat results are:

Ist

and 7th

split

69

28

7

h killed

killed

survive

h killed

killed

h survive


9/58

I I t h i nf six combat factors)

or

with a combination

of

the 8th

in f

a nd t he 1st

armor

seven

combat

fac

tors). Since only 29

of

Army

Group North s combat

factors can be placed in two hexes, the highest odds

hievable against H20

is

4: I. In these cases,

knowledge of your

opponent s

style

is

necessary. If

is th e type

of

pe rso n who hesitates to mak e

cial attacks

at

less

than

5: I odds, then either six

seven f ac to rs in th e f ir st line of defense would

f in it el y b e t he b es t o pe ni ng d ep lo ym en t. N ow

ou have m ad e th e German use a st uk a plus you

ve a stronger second line

of

defense in the Baltic.

T W ST RN FRONT PH SE I

Without

q ue st io n, it wo uld t ak e a miracle for

any unit in the Western District to survive the first

t ur n. T he re ar e so

many

different ways to attack,

random choice in placing the Russian units would

seem to m ak e as m uc h sen se as h ou rs of planning.

However, considering this district s traps, advan

tages, and disadvantages, it is b ett er n ot t o t ru st

Lady Luck entirely.

The

greatest

trap

is allo win g w ha t I te rm t he

Kaunas stampede. The Kaunas stampede results

f ro m t he R us si an m ak in g t he a re a around Kaunas

so weak t ha t th e G er ma n c an o ve rr un all W es te rn

District defenders

on

the first impulseand penetrate

deeply into the Russian interior

on

t he fir st t ur n.

Figure W-I demonstrates how this can bedone.

The

8th

armor

is o ve rr un by the 8 th , 5 th , 5 3r d, 4 2n d,

46th, and a stu ka; the 10th inf

is

o ve rr un by t he

24th , 3 9th , 12th, 9 th , 4 3r d, 7 th , a nd a s tu ka ;

and

th e 4 th i nf is overrun by the Italian 3rd, 20th, 13th,

47th , 5 7th , a nd a s tu ka . Wit h t he hole no w o pe n,

th e 3 rd , 1 4t h,

and

52nd pour i nt o t he R us si an in

terior. On thesecond impulse theGerman moves in

to the positions indicated in figure W-2. The Ger

man

should combine this move with theattack

of

as

many units

on

rail hexes as possible in order to pre

v en t t ho se u ni ts f ro m r ai lr oa di ng Moscow

on

turn one. Assuming

that

is d on e, t he R us si an c an

only use the eleven

combat

factors of replacements

plus the Kiev, Tula, Kalinin,

and

Moscow garrisons

as defenders in front

of

Moscow approximately 32

combat factors, of which,

at

most, five a re ar

mored). This

is

sufficient to save Moscow

on turn

t wo , b ut n ot

on turn

three. At the end

of

his second

turn, the German will either occupy

or

have a

ZOC

in t he key hexes P 9, QIO, a nd

RI I

so

that

they will

be denied the Russian as defensive points. Also, by

placing a unit

at

TIO, the Russian will not be able to

railroad any existing unit into Moscow. Thus, the

only u nits t he R ussian has t o d ef en d Moscow

on

turn

three are whatever is left of the 32

combat

fac

tors from turn two, plus eleven replacement points

plus the three reinforcements 16th, 24th, and 49th

Infantries).

The

a tt ac ki ng G er ma ns will b e m uc h

stronger this time and it is on ly a q ue st io n

of

w he th er Mo sc ow falls o n t he f ir st

or

second im

pulse. Once Moscow falls, the

Sept/Oct

1941 rein

forcements from Moscow must enter from the east

board edge. Since none of these units have second

impulse movement, they

can t

make any counterat

tacks

on

turn three, a very

important

point because

with these reinforcements, the Russian has a good

chance of pushing the German away from Moscow

on turn

three.

the

German

is

repulsed

and

i f t he

weather on turn f ou r t ur ns to sn ow, the Ge

m us t fall b ac k t ow ar ds S mo le ns k a nd Vi teb

have his t ro op s face th e Russian o ff en siv e i

open with halved

combat

strengths.

Besides the great opportunity that the K

stampede gives the German to capture Mosco

turn three, there are three other advantages th

German

obtains. Notice in figure W-2 that the

p an ze r b lo ck s t he R iga g ar ri so n f ro m ass ist i

the defense of Leningrad and that Leningrad

range

of

a stuka attack. Because of this, the Ru

must decide

if

he is to

abandon

Leningrad an

the Finnish

Front

forces to defend Moscow

strip forces from Moscow to save Leningrad. E

choice is a German plus.

Secondly, notice that by carefully movin

panzers, the

German

has established a rail net

behind Russian lines. That network stretches

Smolensk because it is Axis controlled) thr

Vi tebsk m ov ed a dj ac en t to by t he 3 rd p an ze

HI6

moved through by the 14th panzer) and

The

infantry units occupying KI8 and L20 ca

rail movement to hexes

PI4 and

014 on

turn

thereby allowing them to playa critical role i

fall of Moscow

on turn

three.

To

deter this Ge

rail movement, the Russian can either move

into

114

attacking the 52nd

pz

Gr)

or

into

This really does not

stop

the rail m ov em

however, because if the German so desires, h

overrun those hexes

on

the first impulse to re

th e rail lines a nd th en mo ve t he i nf an tr y u ni

rail.

The

third advantage is not as significant

pr evi ou s two because the o dd s ar e mu ch m

favor

of

the Russian. Notice in figure W-2 th

forces remaining in the Baltic Military Distri

out of supply. Nevertheless, the Russian can a

both

the 14th and 41st panzers at

1:1

from FI

G

17

respectively see figure W-3),

and

retrea

Riga

on

e it he r a n A I

or

AR

combat

result. I

only

on

b ac k t o b ac k C on ta ct r es ul ts d o t he

troops starve. Most likely, one

or

two of the B

four units will survive turn one. Naturally, th

.the 16 7 7 chance

of

an EX against the 41st p

but something must plug the hole between th

and

47th panzers

and

unfortunately it too mus

p an ze r. As y ou c an see, t his G er ma n advant

is

almost a Russian advantage.

The apparent negative aspect of the K

stampede is t ha t by a tt ac ki ng so few

of

the

Russian units

on turn

one, the Russian forces w

much stronger

than

otherwise expected. Since

were probably no

turn

one attacks in theUkra


10/58

wo uld a pp ea r, a t f irst gl anc e, t ha t the a re a

is

very

secure through 1941. This is very deceptive. On turn

two, the German captures Bryansk and moves the

56th panzer from N

18

to X18. Since thiscutsthe rail

line thru Kiev, only cavalry and

armor

units along

the Rumanian border have the speed to get to

Kharkov

and

points east to assist

in

those cities

defense. Faced with weak defenses

in

the

major

Ukraine

cities of

Kharkov

Stalino

an d

Dnepropetrovsk, the German can sweep east from

S mo len sk o n t ur n th ree

an d

capture those cities

without too much effort. The Russian infantries

in

th e U kr ai ne a re c au gh t be twee n t he for ces f ro m

Rumania going north and the forces turning south

at Kiev and are crushed. Thus, the Kaunas

stampede

is

but a slight deterrent to German prog

ress

in

the Ukraine.

Having shown the problems the Kaunas

stampede brings the Russian, the next question is

how to prevent it . There are two ways. First, since

the German can only field 81

combat

factors in Ar

my

G ro up C en te r, i f t he R us si an b lo ck s t he a re a

near Kaunas with twelve combat factors, the Ger

man

can t AV

his way t hr ou gh K au na s b eca us e a

minimum

of

84

combat

factors are necessary to

complete the overruns. Figure W-4 shows a typical

defense with twelve combat factors.

The second defense utilizes the terrain benefits

of

K20. the flanks

of

K20 are sufficiently sup

ported so

that

no German units can enter either

L21

or J20, placing as

few

as six combat factors

in

K20

will prevent the Kaunas stampede see figure W-5).

This

is

because K20 can only be attacked from two

hexes and it

is

i mp oss ib le f or t he G er ma n c om

mander to stack more than forty Army Group

Center combat factors into two hexes.

In conclusion, adopting the Kaunas stampede,

if the Russian setup allows

that

option,

mayor

may

not be the best strateg y. As I h ave s how n, m an y

more Russian units survive the first

turn

than

if

a

more conventional attacking posture

is

used; but

because a much higher concentration

of

force can

be brought against Moscow much sooner given the

same weather conditions),

an d

because it

is

easy to

prevent those Ukrainian forces from assisting

in

the

Moscow defense, by allowing the Kaunas stampede

to occur the Russian position

is

considerably more

perilous.

my Group

Center has more than a

3:

I

superiority over the Western Military District, a

fact which allows the German to attack that District

in

almost any way he chooses. My favorite tactic

is

to overrun the Brest defender, attack the flanks

of

the District, an d make all retreats towards L23 see

figure W-6). This way, if the German has very poor

die rolls

on

his first turn, any Russian survivors can

be ignored on the second impulse

combat

because

t he y a re o ut

of

supply and will kill themselves on

turn oneattacking German units at very poor odds.

Consequently, the German can concentrate

on

the

Russian second line

of

defense G18, 119,

and

K20)

with almost all

of

his Western front forces. The ob

vious advantage this has over a direct frontal

assault

is that

here, ifthe German has

poor

die rolls,

units mu st be r et re ate d n or th where they c ou ld

possibly join the Russian second line

of

defense

or

even escape completely.

There are two other points that should be

covered at this time regarding attacking and

defending strategies

in

the Western District; should

t he G er ma n m ak e a t ur n o ne a ssa ul t o n Mi nsk

and

how sh ou ld th e def end er s in f ro nt

of

Min sk be

handled.

Point

one raised the question

of

whether

or

n ot t o a tt ac k Minsk o n the second imp ulse o f

t ur n one). Th er e ar e f our reason s to d o so. First,

assuming the combat result against Minsk

is either

AI

AR,

or

C on ta ct , the 13th I nf an tr y c an no t

r ai lr oa d o ut to a b et te r d ef ensi ve p os it io n o n t ur n

one because

of

the presence

of

German units adja

cent to Minsk.

Th e

best Russian strategy now

is

to

use the 13th

In f

between Vitebsk an d Minsk ascan

non fodder to slow the German blitzkrieg to

Moscow.

For

some players, this

is

the normal move

as I will show

in

my section o n the Western

Front-Phase

II) on turn one.

t he R us si an

strategy

is

to railroad the 13th away, then the Ger

m an h as p re ve nt ed h im f ro m a tt ai ni ng th is g oa l.

The second advantage assuming either a DR, EX,

or

DI combat result against Minsk)

is that

the units

can be r etr eat ed east i nt o the swamps. N ot only

does this m ak e them u nab le to c on tr ib ut e t o t he

overall Russian defenses until at least turn three,

but it also denies the Russian the option

of

railroading the units away

or

using them

as

canon

f od de r bet ween Vi teb sk a nd Mi nsk . T hi rd ly , a t

t ac ki ng Mi nsk all ows t he G er ma n t o m ov e a

HQ

unit into hex row 0,

an

excellent position for in

itiating stuka attacks as 1will show later in my sec

t io n o n S tu ka s

an d

Paratroopers. Lastly, placing

German infantries at N20 means

that

they will be

two hexes closer to Moscow than any other German

infantry at the end

of turn

one. Depending on what

type

of

defense the Russian constructs on

turn

one

on the Western Front, this could be very disadvan

tageous.

Attacking Minsk, nevertheless,

is

not without

its di sadv an ta ges, on e being

that

t he R us si an

defender

around

Brest would have to beoverrun on

the first impulse. Completing this overrun all but

precludes the German from making any other first

impulse overruns

in

the Western District because

of

the

amount

of

manpower such would remove from

second impulse attacks. Another disadvantage

is

that since the attack on Minsk would be at low od

either I:

lo r 2:

I), there

is

a good possibility

that

Ge rm an wo uld lose a unit a nd p lay righ t int o

Russian s hands should the latter have planned

a lo ng o n usi ng t he 13th

In f as

cannon fodder

tween Vitebsk and Minsk. If, on the other hand,

German should tryto raise theodds of the Minsk

tack by using panzers, the Russian can counter

moving a unit to hex 01 7 on turn one. Whether

p an ze rs g o t hr ou gh Min sk

o r a ro un d

the woo

hexes west

of

Minsk on turn two, their movem

towards Moscow is very restricted.

the Russian strategy is to move theMinsk g

rison some distance away from its initial positio

t he n it

is

to his advantage to discourage theGerm

from attacking Minsk on turn one. The first defen

of

Minsk 1 will consider

is

shown

in

figure

W

This defense does n ot pr ev ent the a tt ac k per

because by overrunning the cavalry, attacking M

at

5:

I

Minsk can be attacked on turn o

However, it

is

unlikely

that

theGerman would ov

run the6th cavalry because

of

the 30combat facto

he would

no t

have available for second impulse

tacks. The second defense, figure W-8, prevents

attack unless

both

the 3rd and 5th areoverrun. T

is

also highly improbable because

of

the la

number

of

fo rces t ha t m us t be r em ov ed fr om

area

around

Kaunas to accomplish these AV s. T

latter area is much more important to the over

German success.

Related to the Russian s decision to either p

vent

or

p er mi t a t ur n o ne a ss au lt o n Mi nsk ,

is

German s

ability to use hex L23 as a springboar

hex L20. R et ur ni ng t o Fi gu re W-7, a ft er t he

A

overruns the defender

in 023

and makes at lea

5:

I attack against M21, he reduces the odds on

a tt ac k o n hex L23 fr om

3:1

to 1:1. the resu

either

Al or

AR, the German can retreat into

M

a nd t he n move i nt o L20 on th e second impu

t he re by s ur ro un di ng t he d ef en de r

of

K20.

retreating two units into M20 at least one being

i nf ), o ne

in f

could assist

in

the a tt ac k on

Mi

from N19, an d the German would not only nul

the second disadvantage

of

attacking Minsk on t

one,

bu t

he would also prevent the Minsk defen

from being of anyvalue until at least turn three.

G er ma n h as available the p erf ect u ni t for

c

pleting this

strategy-the

Italian 3rd. Because of


11/58

As the odds indicate, splitting the armored units

is an expensive way to insure

that

the German can

not enter either L20 or

NI 9

on t urn one-something

he may no t have realized anyway if faced with the

defense shown in figure W-7 or may n ot a tt e mp t

because he does

not

see it

or

because

of

the cost 30

combat

factors used

to

AV

the6th

cavin

order t o

be

able to make an

attack

that has a

33070

chance of

failure

on

e it her a DR

or

Contact .

My last two points have shown the importance

of split ting the 5th an d 8th armors between M21

an d N22 in order to prevent the German spring

into

M20

and

the attack on Minsk . Thi s

arrangement

also does one

other

thing; it prevents the

German

from making the flank attack shown in figure W-6.

Th e alternative to splitting t he a rm or s

that

most

players adopt is placing them together at K20 an d

defending M21 with either the 3rd or 10th Inf. Th e

rat ionale for doing this is that on a conventional

German Western Distr ict assault f igure W-9 for

the first impulse an d W-IO for the second , some

of

the armor f rom the stacks

at

119 an d K20 have

an

excellent chance

of

surviving

turn

one since neither

can be surrounded. I will show that this is not

speed of the German blitzkrieg, an d i ts own lack of

second impulse movement, the Italian 3rd is hard

pressed to be in attacking posit ion on the firs t im

pulse

of

an y turn. Thus the odds

of

having an

Ital ian unit available as a 1942 spring replacement

are n ot t oo high.

By

making this low odds at tack

against L23, the

German

has everything to gain

an d

very little to lose.

By

splitting the armor uni ts as shown in f igure

W-8, the Russian will prevent the spring into M20 I

just descr ibed. It can stil l be d one i f the German

overruns both the 3rd caval ry

an d

5th Armor in

order

t o at tack

L23 from M22, bu t as this prevents

qui te a few uni ts f rom attacking on the second im

pulse,

doubt

if the German would attempt such a

tactic . In adopting the defense of figure W-8,

however, the Russian makes his Wes tern Front

defense susceptible to a frontal assault that makes it

less likely

that

any

of

his Western Front units will

survive. Fo r

example,

if

the

4 th i nf

is overrun, the

armored units ar e susceptible to a

5:1

attack. As I

showed in my table in thesection on the Baltic Front

repeated here for convenience , if the armored

units are separated, the probabil ity of both units

surviving

separate

5: attacks is drastically lower

t ha n i f

the units are stacked together when

attacked

at 5:1.

16 7

16 7

66 6

Four units surviving

Three units surviving

Two units surviving

On e unit surviving

All

four

units dying

T W ST RN FRONT PH SE

On the first turn the Russian must decide

he will make his stand. There are three altern

open to h im. F ir st, the extensive defense o

Dvina River line with a lighter defense o

Smolensk area. Second, theextensive defense

Smolensk area while ignoring everything w

that

city. Lastly, the placement of units in the

ground sout h of a line running between Rig

Smolensk. Let s investigate the pluses an d mi

of

each course

of

action.

Th e fi rs t choice was const ruct ing the ty

defense shown in

WF-l.

There are several a

tages in choosing this defense, the greatest

that it limits the German s progress towards

ingrad. If the German attacks the line, he wi

be diver ting uni ts f rom his attack on Moscow

any infantry

unit so used will no t be able to as

the Moscow

attack

until the second impulse

Nov/Dec 1941

turn at t he earliest. Las tl y,

German has mistakenly moved two

HQ

unit

the Ukraine he will find this position very di

to break because only panzers an d a few inf

units can completely attack it on the first im

an d

most

likely several units will escape. If, o

other hand the German can bring two stuka a

against the Dvina River defense he can easily

all the Russian pieces by creating a hole aroun

pouring through it, an d moving behind the Ru

units on the second impulse. With the Smo

area lightly defended two options be

available

to

the Axis player which could also

very dangerous for the Russian. First , hecan a

P 15 with the intent of eliminating the defender

capturing Bryansk. This is accompl ished by

ning the panzers from 01 4 to QI I a nd S I3 .

In comparison if separate 5: I attacks ag

119 an d K20 are made as indicated in figure W

the probability

of

survival through turn one i

Four units surviving 2 80

Three units surviving

11 20

Tw o

units surviving 27 70

One unit surviving 33 30

All units dying

25 00

As the tables indicate, the weakness

of

h

only on e unit at M21 ca n be verycostly for the

sian. Furthermore even if thirty combat facto

used to overrun the Brest defender, the Germa

has enough combat f ac tor s left over to a

Minsk at I: I

if

he should so desire.

In conc lusion, even though the Ge rman

almost a 4: I initial superiority in the We

District, attacking

an d

defending this area

from simple.

If

the Russian sets up right,

Iverage die rolls, one or two of his Western Mi

District units will survive turn one.

16 7070

33.3

50.0

Both surviving

One unit surviving

Both units dying

If the German makes a successful

springboard

attack against L23, he can surround K20

on

the sec

ond impulse. T he o dd s of successfully killing both

armors then rises to 75070 the armor escapes only

if

the attack on L23 is either a C DR or EX n the

second 5: I attack against K20 is either a DR D I or

EX. Th e probability

of

both these events happening

is 50070 times 50070 or

25070

Thus the

odds of

killing

both

armors is 100070 minus

25070 or 75070

Since hex

K20 can now be surrounded the German can

reduce the odds of that a tt ac k t o 4: I an d raise the

odds

of

t he a tt ac k o n hex 119 to 7 :1 . With these

parameters, the probabil ity

of

survival through

t ur n o ne

of

the four armors is:

necessarily true. As figures W-9 an d W-IO indicate,

on the subsequent 5:1 attack against K20, the

odds

are:

units

together

16 7070

33.3

50.0

units

separated

2 8070

27.8

69.4

Both surviving

On e surviving

Both dying

lit turn


12/58

spot

in the defense, the German real ly cannot ju

go charging forward int o it wi thout getting h

panzers caught in surroundedcounterattacks.

t

Russian adopts this defense, he must prevent Ax

units from retreating from

combat

to either R16

RI7

from the a tta ck on P IS.

If

the German c

break the Smolensk River defense by retreating

this manner, the German breakthrough attempt

the defense

is

greatly facilitated.

The

6th Armor

RI6 eliminates this potential problem. The re

disadvantage of this defense is that it leaves the pa

to Leningrad wide open, making it very difficult

keep control of t ha t city. I covered the merits

giving Leningrad up

on turn

two in my section

Phase II of the Finnish f ront . In conclus ion, th

defense is also very sound

and

offers interesti

tradeoffs to either player.

The

third strategy uses units

block the op

terrain south of a l ine running between Riga a

Smolensk as shown in figure WF-4). Since the Ru

sian will be trying to

stop

almost the entireweight

Army Groups North and Center, he must expect

lose

around

30

combat

factors

on

the Weste

are removed from the Russian border, the German

may find himself unable to attack a single unit

011

the Western

Front on

the first impulse

on turn

two.

Only panzers have large enough movement

allowances to reach any Russian unit in this defense

and

unless the German has positioned them

wisely

on

turn

one; he may be unabl e to make even a 4: I

stuka

attack against

PIS the

only available target

he can reach

on

the first impulse. If,

on turn

two,

the

German

hesitates to make an all panzer 3: I or

4: I attack on PIS orthat attack is repulsed, the Rus

sian can reinforce the position

around PIS

Now

if

the Russian gets a l it tle help f rom the weather , he

may still retain control of Smolensk on the Jan/Feb

1942 turn. Now, the German must fall back to

Vitebsk and consequently , will be no closer to

Moscow beginn ing the 1942 c lear wea ther turns

than he was

on

the second turn of the game. Fur

thermore, if the German has s ta tioned two head

quarters units

on

the Western Front, one has

nothing to attack on

turn

two.

Although there is a corridor to Moscow between

the 22nd

and

19th Inf, an

apparent

glaring weak

A second method

of

constructing the Western

Front defense is pictured in WF-3. This defense is a

very radica l change from those shown in figures

WF-I and WF-4.

The

idea behind it is to trade ter

ritory for units because the former is easily

recoverable dur ing the Russian winter offensive

whereas the lat ter is not. Because of the great

dis tance that Russian units on the Western

Front

The second option

is

to use the attack

on PIS

as

a springboard towards Moscow.

If

the conclusion

of turn one finds Moscow weakly def ended, the

German can make a first impulse

turn

two attack as

indicated in figure WF-2.

The German

lowers the

odds of thea t tack to I: I and on eitheran AI or AR

result, retreats the panzers to 012 On the second

impulse , the German can attack Moscow from Q9

at 2: an

a ttack tha t has a

500 0

chance

of

ending

the game

on

the second turn

The

defense depicted

by WF-I is very sound if the

German

is ou t of posi

tion and thus unable to attack it effectively

on

turn

two, but if he can divert his panzers to attacking the

Smolensk area and still attack the Dvina line effec

tively with infantry

and

stukas, the Russian posi

tion is worse than if he adopted either

of

the other

two defenses.

German has been careful

about

the final positions

of his infantry attacking the Dvina River defense,

having them end turn two on rail hexes, he can

railroad them to Q II and Q

12

on turn three this is a

position they would have attained anyway if either

of the other defenses described

in

this section had

been adopted). Thus, theGerman, by attacking the

Dvina River defenses, is not really

out

of position

for attacking Moscow

on

turn three.


13/58

. . . eJ_

oeJ .

iI :

Having demonstrated the weakness

of

eastern

flank and the importance

of

keep in

strong

presence in the center, the

question

beco

one of balance. To

what

extent can forces be m

from the

center

of the District

to the

flanks

wit

creating weaknesses elsewhere? Because of

swamp hexes west of hex row T, the bes t def

seems to be a compromise between hav ing

layers

of defenders on

the western edge of the

Distr ic t as the II

th Armor and

5th In f

perfor

in figure

K-I)

and having

none at

al l

the general - volume 16, issue 5

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