the geopolitical economy of social polic y in the
TRANSCRIPT
DRO Deakin Research Online, Deakin University’s Research Repository Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B
The geopolitical economy of social policy in the Philippines: securitisation, emerging powers and multilateral policies
Citation of the final article: Reid, Ben 2016, The geopolitical economy of social policy in the Philippines: securitisation, emerging powers and multilateral policies, Third world quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 96-118.
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Third world quarterly on 23 Dec 2015, available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2015.1089165
© 2016, Southseries Inc.
Downloaded from DRO: http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30077439
1
The Geopolitical Economy of Social Policy in the Philippines: Securitisation, emerging powers and multilateral policies
Recent geopolitical and economic changes have altered global social policy formation. Bretton Woods multilateral development agencies (MDAs) have selectively incorporated ideas that have emerged from developing country states and decision makers. Recent years have witnessed an increased acceptance of social transfers as part of renewed efforts at poverty alleviation policies based on social risk management. There has been an instance in the use and promotion of conditional cash transfer (CCT) policies by MDAs. One case is the Philippines. CCTs were a product of the emergence of a neostructuralist welfare regime (understood as an ideal type) in Latin America. There was an attempt to reconcile neoliberal strategies of development with aspirations for guaranteed minimum incomes. The Bretton Woods and regional development bank MDAs have facilitated the adoption of CCTs in other developing country contexts. In the Philippines, a combination of actions by national political actors and MDAs resulted in the implementation of a securitised and compliance-focused version of CCTs derived from the Colombian security state. Although poor households welcome income assistance, CCTs have acted to enforce further state monitoring without altering the national-based political and economic processes that replicate poverty.
Keywords: poverty, social policy, cash transfers; Latin America; Asia; Philippines
Dr Ben Reid is Senior Lecturer in International Development Studies, Deakin University, Australia. [email protected]
2
Introduction
There have been many recent attempts to create frameworks for social protection in
developing-country contexts. 1 The suggested policies forms reflect both alterations in the
relationships between developed and developing economies and the role of international
organisations. There has been a shift in global social policy (GSP) formation towards a new
geopolitical economy of social policy (GESP) making.2 Multilateral development agencies
(MDAs) have both helped facilitate these developments (especially United Nations MDAs) or
selectively incorporated (Bretton Woods MDAs) ideas that have emerged from developing
country states. There has been a de facto increased recognition by the latter of direct social
transfer payments for achieving poverty alleviation goals. One of the most widespread forms
of social transfer payments are cash transfer and conditional cash transfer (CCT) projects that
now operate in over thirty countries and cover millions of beneficiaries. CCTs were pioneered
by some middle-income countries in Latin America - in the late-1990s and early-2000s. They
entailed targeted cash grants for impoverished households in return for meeting mandatory
requirements concerning children’s (and parental [mostly mother’s]) attendance at educational
and health services.3
These initiatives in Latin America took place in the context of a modest shift in economic
development policy towards neostructuralism. The term neostructuralism is defined here as
“the prevailing narrative that has sought to replace “market fundamentalism” and humanise the
“savage capitalism” imposed by neoliberal dogmatism.” 4 It was one reflection of alterations
in the global geopolitical economy that led to higher rates of growth for some Latin American
economies. The partial nature of the shift was reflected in the limited policy changes that
neostructuralism entailed. The market-based approaches to economic development contained
in the Washington consensus (WC) remained hegemonic. Neostructuralism endeavoured to
selectively re-incorporate some of older industrial structuralist policy themes into the WC. The
3
scope of neostructuralism mostly concerned issues of economic growth and industry policy:
seeking a “high road to globalisation”. Classical structuralism, however, had entailed particular
approaches to social policy: a “Latin American welfare regime.” The transition from
structuralism to the high –point of the WC and back again to neostructuralism entailed changes
to the Latin American welfare regime. After an initial shift towards abandonment due to the
WC and its associated conservative fiscal policies, there was a subsequent shift back towards
limited forms of social provision, including social transfers. There was, however, considerable
variation in their occurrence with different types of programs being established. CCTs have
been a major part of these newer initiatives, although not all of the programs are the same.
Moreover, the shift towards limited social protection led to “feedbacks” into international
development policy making via MDAs. The spread of CCTs has emerged as a major facet of
developing social protection regimes supported by the World Bank (WB) and other MDAs.
One example is the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines. It
commenced operation in 2007 and covered up to three million households by the end of 2013.
The Philippines provides a vantage point from which to assess why CCT programs were
adopted. It has been characterised by high levels of poverty and inequality, despite its nominal
status as a middle-income country. The implementation of 4Ps was one way to redress these
issues. The form of CCT that was adopted, however, was heavily supported and funded by
MDAs. It also reflected powerful political pressures and existential threats upon the
government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2008).
Moreover, the spread of CCTs demonstrates an alteration in the GSP process towards GESP.
There are instances, on the one hand, of policy experimentation emerging in some developing
country contexts. The influence of MDAs, however, mediated the diffusion of similar policies
in other developing country contexts. The MDA-sponsored approaches have been
accompanied by a focus on ensuring poor people's compliance and increasing the security of
4
the state through a greater presence in and surveillance of the population. CCTs have become
components of an increased securitisation of development policy.5 One facet of their operation
was their use of women as vital conduits for the distribution of funds as the micro-scale.
Effectively a form of “governance feminism” has combined legitimate concerns for women’s
empowerment and independence with explicit goals of monitoring household compliance to
meet funding conditionalities.6 The human-capital forming, gender empowering and poverty
alleviation focus of CCTs blended with goals of the containment of the existential threats.
The methods involved range across three spheres. First, a conceptual model is developed that
combines an analysis of GSP with geopolitical economy. These are combined with a
comparative historical approach to conceptualising the neostructuralist welfare regime. Second,
the themes these provide are integrated into the analysis of key policy documents, combined
with insights from focus groups conducted in Mindanao in 2014. The study outlines how the
securitisation of social protection policy occurred through the selective diffusion of Latin
American approaches to social welfare. It uses the case of 4Ps in the Philippines as a case study.
The hegemony of MDAs, however, has meant that particular forms of CCTs have been adopted
that emphasise high conditionality and reliance on external finance. This is especially the case
in the Philippines. Section one examines the evolution of GSP and the emergence of GESP.
The second section outlines both the Latin American origins and international diffusion of
CCTs. The third part assesses the experience of the Philippines.
From Global to Geopolitical Economic Social Policy
The trends towards the adoption of social transfer payments reflect an evolution in the process
of GSP making. A tempering of the GSP’s focus on “globalisation” is needed that recognises
the enduring role of nation states and partial changes in international political power.
5
The GSP approach emerged during the peak influence of globalisation centred discourses that
emphasised the uniformity of neoliberal policymaking. 7 The resulting agency, structure,
institution and discourse method focused on the main features of the early to mid-2000s. There
was the continuing hegemony of the WC (augmented by limited governance and social
protection measures); the competing priorities of different MDAs and donor states; and the
emergence of transnational social movements and international non-government organisations
(NGOs).8 Recent reflections by GSP researchers has re-emphasised the impacts of colonialism
and the role of political actors from within the developing world. 9 Developing-country
governments played a significant role in creating policy innovations. This included CCTs and
other facets of social policy in Brazil, for instance.
One question that emerges is to what degree have established patterns of policy making altered.
Changes in the geopolitical economy and the impact of so-called “rising developing powers”
had material and ideational components to consider. The material factors consist, for the most
part, of an uneven political and economic strengthening of some late industrialising
economies.10 One facet of the process has been a reiteration the “materiality of the state” in the
process of uneven and combined development on a global scale. In contrast to some of the
more exaggerated claims of early 2000s globalisation literature, the capability of the state has
been central for engendering successful economic development outcomes. The consolidation
of China as an export market since 2000 has resulted in some positive flow-on of effects for
many developing economies.11 One has been the emergence of a global commodity price cycle
that has been advantageous for resource exporting economies.12 Although the resilience of this
economic expansion is questionable, one medium-term consequence has been the emergence
of a more stable fiscal environment for some developing states. The resulting economic
situation allowed for some expansion in investments in social policy measures. Again Brazil is
a case in point, with revenues from mineral exports allowing for the expansion of social
6
expenditures (see below). Of course, there is considerable unevenness in the extent of the
weight of the developing country powers and the developed economies remaining dominant.
There were additional factors. One was the cumulative effects within developing countries of
class, gender and ethnic-based political mobilisation across the 1990s. Social-movement
mobilisation produced either pressure upon or new governments committed to implementing
more extensive social policies. There were different expressions of these processes, ranging
from the emergence of both left-of-centre or technocratic reforming governments in Latin
America.13 Second, both United Nations and Bretton Woods MDAs themselves had begun to
debate ways that the WC could be altered to include “social protection” measures, especially
in the wake of economic crises in the 1990s.14
GESP also reflected an uneven shift in the ideational dimensions of power that matched the
material change. The GSP literature tended to emphasise the competing roles of national
governments, MDAs and international non-government organisations in setting policy
agendas, while recognising the overall hegemony of neoliberal policy. There was a
comparative “BRICisation” of policymaking personnel, evident within the Bretton Woods
MDAs and perhaps most notably the WB.15 These appointments did not comprise substantive
challenges to the hegemony of the established developed powers over policy-making.
Developed economy donors, however, were willing to accept personnel and ideas from
developing country contexts: provided they did not stray too outside ideational limits of what
Cammack referred to as “global liberalism.” 16 Recent analyses have also identified the
existence of influential layers of policy makers from the developing world in concerned with
sectors such as international trade.17 Of course, the perspectives of these experts vary. Some
are closer to the established WC than others. One emerging facet of policy analysis has
therefore become detecting the ways international organisations selectively incorporate the
ideas of developing country policy making experiments. Particular experiences from
7
developing economies tended to get greater influence and promotion over others. In other
words, the WC remained hegemonic, albeit with selective and ad-hoc adaptation to emerging
policies of some developing countries.
Therefore, GSP has evolved towards a GESP process. First, the old institutions (global finance;
developed country donors; developed-country dominated Bretton Woods MDAs) remain
dominant. They ultimately allocate resources for programs and have effective veto rights over
policy-making through both formal control (voting quotas, for example). There is also their
continued role as the principal donors. Second, developing countries have gathered
considerable experiences in policy innovation and development. These have been promoted by
an emerging cadre of development and social policy experts from developing states. One
source for the dissemination of these policies has been “South-South aid”, although the quantity
of this remains small in comparison to official bilateral and multilateral flows.18 The social
policy consequences of China’s aid in Africa, for instance, are unclear.19 Third, the other source
of dissemination has been through the selective incorporation of both policies and decision
makers into existing MDAs.
Indeed, the adoption of CCTs as a mechanism of direct social transfers is very illustrative of
the GESP process. The dominant MDAs, however, largely determined the interpretation and
implementation of these experiences were elsewhere.
Latin American Policies and Internationalisation
The introduction of social protection systems over the past decade has reflected these newer
patterns of the GESP. An interaction existed between national-based social reform innovations
and selected adoption by MDAs. One significant trend was the emergence in Latin America of
what can arguably be termed a neostructuralist welfare regime.
8
Social Policy: A Neostructuralist Welfare Regime?
One way of understanding the appearance of CCTs and other similar social protection and
policy measures is through the concept of the welfare regime. The welfare regime allocates
different national and regional welfare states into ideal-type categories to describe historical
experiences.20
Figure 1 demonstrates a schematic overview of the history of welfare regimes in Latin America.
A schematic indication is given of the periods of economic development and their associated
social policies. First, there was a classic “Latin American welfare regime” that emerged in the
early twentieth century.21 It was the redistributive component of the hegemonic structuralist
and import-substituting policies of industrialisation and development. Classic structuralism
reflected the reconciliation of nationalist political and development aspirations with insertion
within the international division of labour.22 Elites within developing Latin American nation-
states maintained power in part through hegemonic alliances with sections of middle and
working classes. The resulting welfare regime entailed a predominantly conservative and
informal policy-mix that emphasised: health and education expenditures; employment
protection; price controls; and contributory social insurance. Direct social transfer payments
were rare and high levels of labour market informality effectively limited the coverage of
contributory schemes.23
Figure 1: Latin American Welfare Regime: Stages of Transition
Period Development Strategy Redistributive Strategy Characteristics
1900-1980s
Structuralism/ Import Substitution (Protected national industry and oligarchic governing blocs)
Conservative-Informal mix Contributory social insurance; price controls; subsidies
1980-late 1990s
High-point of the WC (Crisis, stabilisation, restructuring and export-oriented industrialisation)
Retreat and dismantling of measures
Privatisation and wind-back of state- based measures; marketisation.
9
Late 1990s Neo-structuralism (A limited break from the WC: ‘High road to globalisation’)
Notional commitment to universal social rights combined with varying degrees of targeted social transfer payments
Social transfer payments; poverty expenditures; contributory social insurance.
Second, even these conservative-informal measures were eventually curtailed in the aftermath
of the economic crises of the early 1980s and the dominance of the WC. As the second row
indicates, the existing welfare policy-mix was attacked for allegedly having “distortionary”
effects on markets.24 Simultaneously many of the governing regimes in Latin American states
faced increased political pressures for democratisation and social reform.25 There was - as a
result – generally considerable conflict between substantial fiscal constraints imposed by the
WC and demands for greater social protection.
Third and accordingly, the high phase of WC dominance eventually gave way to some modest
and incremental changes in policies. At the international scale, there were piecemeal
modifications, with an increasing focus on institutions, governance and poverty alleviation.26
Within Latin America, neostructuralism emerged as a policy model. Another synonymous term
in Latin America was neo-developmentalism, although neostructuralism had a stronger
association with the explicit positions of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean.27 These regional-body sponsored policy proposals attempted to reconcile a limited
revival of traditional structuralist themes with the WC and its associated focus on the
disciplinary constraints of international capital.28 The WC, therefore, continued as a hegemonic
project, although now accompanied by limited interventionist themes of human capital
development and industrial policy. The social policy innovations that emerged around the same
time have received less attention. These tried to resurrect and surpass some of the themes of
the older Latin American welfare regimes within a context of the substantial fiscal constraints.
One innovation was the greater use of targeted and direct social transfer payments.
10
Therefore, there was a gradual evolution from the WC towards limited acceptance of
neostructuralist themes. One component of this was arguably the emergence of a
neostructuralist welfare regime that corresponded with the limited re-introduction of broader
economic interventionism. This entailed increased acceptance of direct social transfer
payments such as CCTs.
Variations in Policy
Brazil and Colombia are two national case studies that effectively illustrate these differences
across the general influence of neostructuralism and associated welfare measures. CCTs
emerged as keystone social policies in both instances.
First, neostructuralism in Brazil was embedded in a form of cross social class based “coalition
for economic growth”. The Bolsa Família program is probably the most well-known example
of a CCT program that became a central policy-reducing measure. It is the program that has
the least stringent conditionalities and sanctions. The raised expectations generated by labour
and social movement mobilisations helped drive the process of democratisation and social
policy reforms. The re-democratising constitution, adopted in 1988, had nominally guaranteed
social rights to citizens. The predominant focus on fiscal consolidation and adjustment by
governments before 2002, however, meant few significant new social expenditures occurred.
However, the constitution’s decentralisation provisions granted more autonomy to sub-national
state and municipal-level governments to experiment with policies. 29 Such experimentation
occurred - especially with administrations led by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) which
adopted the first limited programs.30 The election of the PT’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as
President in 2002 resulted in the national consolidation of the existing limited and fragmented
set of payment programs. These were amalgamated into the Bolsa Família in 2003 and 2004
11
under the control of a new Ministry of Social Development. By 2012, Bolsa Família’s coverage
had extended to 12 million households.
Bolsa Família’s emergence in Brazil was an explicit expression of a social policy of the
neostructuralist welfare regime. In the broader economic development sphere, the Lula
government was somewhat influenced by the “high road to globalisation” and other themes of
neostructuralism. There was no significant disruption of the previous administrations’
emphasis on compliance to global market forces, although a limited revival occurred of
intervention in industry policy and other areas. 31 Social protection policy, accordingly,
operated within accepted tight fiscal constraints and with a somewhat targeted set of
beneficiaries.32
However, Brazil designed and implemented its policies with considerable autonomy from the
Bretton Woods MDAs. There was, on the one hand, political pressure from mass social
movements and the experiences of the sub-national governments. Brazil also experienced
higher levels of economic growth between 2002 and 2010 than in previous decades. 33 The
economic expansion was in large part due to the impact of the global commodities price cycle
and the resulting boom in mineral exports. Government and social expenditures could,
therefore, expand without affecting capital and higher-income earners. Bolsa Família’s
coverage could also increase without significant fiscal implications and with minimal financing
from donors. Brazil’s overall public spending remained steady at around 20.3 percent of GDP
between 2002 and 2010. 34 The amounts consumed by Bolsa Família were comparatively
modest. Its annual expenditure of $8 billion in 2010, for instance, was equivalent to 0.6 percent
of GDP and was financed by domestic taxation revenue. The WB’s total contribution was only
$500 million in 2004.35
12
The small level of Bretton Woods MDA support had important implications for Bolsa
Família’s operation. There were significant differences between it and other CCT programs.
First, there was the much lighter use of conditionalities (as Brazil used self-declared income
rather than much-promoted proxy means tests). Local municipal bodies did implementation
and evaluation. As Soures and Silva note:
The response to any lack of compliance with conditionalities is another feature that distances Bolsa Família from a typical CCT. The programme incorporates a system of repercusão gradativa (gradual repercussion), (this) is used because the objective of the programme is not to punish families but to help them to comply with the conditionalities. In fact, the design allows for the waiver of conditionalities in the case where this can be justified (e.g. illness of a child, threat of violence at school, etc). Social services at municipal level are responsible for the case management of non-compliance episodes.36
Second and accordingly, the comparative priorities within CCT programs between the longer-
term objectives of human resource development and the immediate issue of poverty alleviation
was resolved in favour the latter.37 Bolsa Família also had other adverse effects, such as
purportedly reducing political and social mobilisations in favour of redistributive land
reform.38 There was, however, a high-level of “country-ownership” of the program. Although
it is uncertain how much is attributable to CCTs, it is clear that poverty levels declined, and
there was a marginal decrease in income inequality.39 The role of minimum wage standards,
pension reforms and other labour market measures, complementary to Bolsa Família, were
clearly also important.
Colombia’s experience, on the other hand, with its CCT program contrasted significantly with
Brazil’s use lighter conditionality-based approach with high country ownership. In terms of
broader economic development policy, the influence of neostructuralism on Colombia was
remarkably similar to Brazil’s.40 Overall, however, there were notable differences with Brazil,
such as a highly militarised and conflict-prone society and high levels of MDA intervention.
There were, as a result, big differences in social policy. The focus of poverty reduction emerged
13
as a response to “existential” threat to the state and elites’ security, and there was an integration
of the resulting CCT program into counter-insurgency measures. 41 In many ways, Colombia’s
Familias en Acción emerged as the most “securitised” form of CCT with high levels of MDA
and foreign support.
The historical, political and economic context of Colombia consisted of limited democratic
reforms in the 1990s and fleeting attempts to end several decades of civil conflict. The inclusion
of nominal social rights in the new 1991 constitution intended to entail an eventual guaranteed
minimum income for citizens.42 The new constitution’s emphasis on social reform and ending
the political conflict, however, failed as the political system continued to be exclusionary and
marked by endemic violence.43 There remained at least two major insurgencies and ongoing
conflicts over narcotics production.44 The formal political system remained dominated by elite-
driven and ideologically conservative political parties. Colombia’s rate of economic growth
was also lower than Brazil’s: the average annual growth of GDP per-capita was only one
percent between 1990 and 2001 and 2.5 percent between 2002 and 2010. Annual government
expenditures represented just 16 percent of GDP since the late 1990s.45 It was, therefore, a
poorer economy with more limited fiscal capacity.
Most significantly, there were much larger-scale armed conflicts in Colombia. Its military
expenditures averaged 17 percent of central government outlays, compared to just 6.5 percent
in Brazil throughout the 2000s. The formal statistics on battle deaths averaged 737 per year
between 1989 and 2009 in Colombia. Brazil, in contrast, had no deaths registered.46 While the
immediate pretext for the implementation of Familias en Acción was an economic crisis in
1999, it was also aimed at undermining the basis of armed insurgencies’ support amongst
sections of the population. The CCT program was, therefore, initiated by Andrés Pastrana
Arango’s conservative government as part of attempts to create a political settlement with rebel
groups. These conciliatory policies gave way to the heavily militarised approach of the Plano
14
Colômbia policy (adopted after 2000). The subsequent Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s administration
extended Plano Colômbia’s operation, and with Familias en Acción integrated within it. 47
Also, Familias en Acción was almost entirely funded by Bretton Woods MDAs. Colombia’s
overall official development assistance reliance was higher in comparison to the other two
cases, with net per capita inflows averaging $16 between 1990 and 2010, compared to just
$1.45 in Brazil.48 Familias en Acción’s total annual budget of approximately $1 billion had
resulted in the program’s coverage extending to 1.7 million households by 2007. External
financing, therefore, comprised 85 percent of overall funding. The Familias en Acción program,
therefore, involved even heavier intervention by MDAs. 49 The program was subject to
intensive monitoring and evaluation.
The use of proxy means tests and similar punitive measures indicated there was substantial
intervention by program personnel in beneficiaries’ lives. Familias en Acción relied upon a
rigorous screening process for identifying beneficiaries that and was integrated with
Colombia’s identity card system. 50 Then there was intensive intervention by program
personnel in recipient households with community workers monitoring and implementing the
program. On the whole, there was greater direct involvement by state personnel with
beneficiaries associated with securitisation of the program. The high levels of militarisation in
Colombia were, therefore, matched by a social component based on monitoring of poor
households.
These two cases in Latin America suggest the emergence of CCTs reflected inter-linked
processes within the GESP. There was an ideational shift towards the adoption of forms of
social protection that consisted of (understood as an ideal type) neostructuralist welfare regime.
The restructuring of many economies after the crises of the 1980s constrained the ability of
states to expand social expenditures. The eventual way institutions placated demands for
15
greater social protection was through the introduction of heavily targeted programs such as
CCTs. There was, as with the broader neostructuralist turn in economic development policy,
considerable variation in these processes. In Brazil, CCTs were pioneered and expanded upon
by a centre-left political party as a mass system of payments with light conditionalities. The
Colombian approach reflected conditions of an exclusionary polity and highly militarised civil
conflict. Colombia’s program was more heavily securitised and supported by the Bretton
Woods MDAs. There was, therefore, even considerable variation in policy design within the
overall framework that emphasised the adoption of heavily targeted payments.
CCTs and the Internationalisation of Social Transfer Payments
The Bretton Woods MDAs – especially the WB – subsequently played a considerable role in
promoting CCT programs on an international scale. They now operate in over thirty countries.
Significant changes to WB policy on social protection underpinned the spread of CCT
programs. Previously, the WB’s primary approach was embodied in its Social Risk
Management (SRM) policy framework. The emergence of SRM reflected a broader
reorientation of WB policy rhetoric towards “poverty reduction” while maintaining the
principal components of the WC framework.51 There was accumulating evidence of failures to
reduce income poverty or protect against the impacts of economic crises. A search for suitable
social “safety net” mechanisms had begun in the 1990s.52 The WB subsequently adopted its
SRM framework and codified it in the 2000-1 Attacking Poverty World Development Report.53
SRM placed primary emphasis on contributory social insurance with little role reserved for
direct social transfer payments. The social policy boundaries of SRM, therefore, reflected
continuity with the market-oriented WC.
However, eventually a greater acceptance of social transfer payments emerged that helped to
facilitate the promotion of CCTs (albeit remaining subsidiary to contributory programs). The
16
WB and other donors became aware of shortfalls in meeting Millennium Development Goal
(MDG) targets in many countries. CCTs became particularly appealing as they notionally
addressed different “dimensions” of poverty such as income, education and health while
retaining strict beneficiary targeting.54 One focus became selectively incorporating the minor
reforms implicit in the neostructuralist welfare regime into systems that were as compatible
with the WC as possible.
Donors were willing to fund forms of social transfer payments, such as CCTs (and also some
non-conditional cash transfer programs), providing they adhered to policy boundaries. Most
notably, the emerging plans entailed very limited expenditures. The WB’s position was later
expressed in policy documents such as the “joint communiqué” with the IMF in 2012. The
document explicitly endorsed the Mexican CCT program (Oportunidades) as the most efficient
approach to minimum social protection. The scale of social transfers should comprise no more
than 0.5 percent of GDP. 55
Taken together, the international emergence of CCTs reflected modest changes in GSP towards
a GESP-based processes. They reflected the material and ideational interaction between
emerging developing powers, United Nations and Bretton Woods MDAs and donors. First, the
overall directionality of hegemonic power and interests remained: the WC continued to frame
strategy and policy. Second, the implementation of the WC had come into conflict, however,
aspirations for social protection. One consequence was the emergence neostructuralism as a
slightly altered version of the WC with its associated welfare regime. The chief outcomes were
targeted payment systems to assumed slightly different forms. There was, for example, Brazil’s
low-conditionality based CCT system and Colombia’s higher-conditionality and MDA-
supported approach. Third, these policy experiments were fed back into the Bretton Woods
MDAs. These assimilated aspects of the CCT experience and promoted their interpretations.
17
Fourth and finally, the Bretton Woods MDAs sponsored similar programs in other national
contexts from the mid-2000s.
CCTs: Security, Poverty and Political Crisis in the Philippines
Indeed, in the Philippines both the influence of MDAs and the government of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo’s attempts to contain existential threats were the main elements that shaped
the adoption of CCTs. CCTS became as a key plank in an evolving social protection framework
and broader social policy. The process of GESP formation, therefore, appeared in the context
of national-based political crises and Bretton Woods and regional development bank MDA
policy hegemony. 4Ps’ local-level implementation experiences also reflect this.
Poverty, Politics and MDA hegemony
There were four main historical factors that contributed to the political crisis that led to the
adoption of CCT adoption in the Philippines. These combined with the GESP processes to
create 4Ps.
On the one hand, the first historical factor was colonial history and the subsequent United States
hegemony over the state and policy making. These ensured “Western-inspired” ideas and
approaches framed development strategies.56 One implication was the early abandonment by
the Philippines of any residual import-substitution based and limited version of structuralist
development policies in favour of export production in the early-1960s. The oligopolistic
structure of land ownership, however, resulted in low rates of capital accumulation and
economic growth. 57 The failures to implement substantive land reform measures further
consolidated the socially exclusionary pattern of development. From the 1970s, in particular,
there was an expansion of MDA-sanctioned borrowing and hegemony. The resulting sovereign
debt defaults – associated with dollar appreciation and an economic recession - and political
upheavals of the early 1980s intensified these exclusionary processes. All subsequent
18
governments (beginning with Cory Aquino in 1987), moreover, have complied with MDA-
imposed conditions and reliance on external finance. There were, therefore, some parallels with
the political environments that allowed for the emergence of neostructuralism in Latin America.
The Philippines had similar experiences with a post-authoritarian polity and an extended period
of MDA hegemony. Was less able to adopt policies that made any substantive adaptations to
the WC.
Second and accordingly, the low levels of economic growth and resulting high inequality had
considerable implications. The deep contraction in the economy in the early 1980s – associated
with the end of the boom in external financing - meant that per capita income did not recover
to its 1982 level until 2004. The average annual per capita income growth was consistently low,
averaging 1.5 percent between 1960 and 2010.58 GINI index measures suggest inequality
remained high, reaching a peak of 46.3 in 1997 and 43 in 2009. The proportion of the
population experiencing income poverty fell during the 1990s from 40.6 percent in 1994 to a
low point of 25 percent in 2003. It then increased again to 26.4 and 26.9 percent in 2006 and
2009.59 There were similar indicators for non-income poverty measures of poverty. 60
Third, these trends in poverty and development were reflected in the Philippine polity and the
ideational basis of institutions. The Philippines had notionally-democratic and republican
institutions introduced by its former colonial power and these operated after the end of the
Pacific war (except for Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorship between 1972 and 1986).61 In some
ways the Philippines, however, represented a notable instance of superficially “electoral
democracy”: elite clan interests monopolised state institutional power. 62 There was the
widespread operation of clan-based political mechanisms that are exclusionary and entail the
considerable use of violence.63 There was, therefore, a combination of unequal income and
asset distribution; political institutions mostly controlled by these wealth appropriating elites.
19
Combined with long-term reliance upon MDAs, one consequence was a permanent fiscal crisis
in the Philippine state that restricted new spending. 64
Fourth and finally, there were at least two main long-running armed insurgencies. There was
the Communist Party of the Philippines-aligned New People’s Army. This insurgency
remained an ongoing source of conflict for the state, despite declining in recent decades. There
are also separatist movements (mostly in Mindanao). Added to this is ongoing violence and
disappearances in many localities linked to elite-based political conflict.65
On the other hand, the immediate context was a profound political crisis whereby poverty
alleviation policies became even more heavily securitised. The Philippines had begun to
develop an anti-poverty strategy late in the term of Fidel Ramos’ administration (1993-1998)
as a complement to its technocratic “Philippines 2000” program of achieving newly
industrialised country status. These measures were followed by an expansion in clientelist
expenditures during Joseph Estrada’s short time as President. Estrada traded on his reputation
as a former movie star and developed a semi-populist pro-poor rhetoric to attract a base of
support amongst the countries poorer population and as an alternative to Ramos’ technocratic
discourse. His government quickly became embroiled in series of controversies, and there was
an acceleration of the conflict in Mindanao with Bangsamoro separatist groups.66 The issues
of poverty became a central part of political discourse. There remained lingering sympathy for
the Estrada’s government’s pro-poor (rhetoric rather than real policy) stance amongst poorer
constituencies. Any subsequent political regime’s viability – all based elite clan alliances -
would need to take measures to placate them.
While Arroyo’s government had come into office as a result of a popular uprising against
Estrada, her government lacked a base of support amongst the countries’ urban and rural poor.67
The security and survival of the government, therefore, was always faced with countering the
20
existential threat posed by indifference/ opposition of the country’s impoverished population,
armed insurgencies and elite-based opposition groups. Arroyo had already implemented some
MDA-sponsored social programs in the areas of poverty and participation, although not on a
scale that would make substantial inroads into these problems.68 The increased level of income
poverty recorded in 2006 made it clear that additional poverty-alleviation measures were
needed. The Philippines’ performance in millennium development goal targets, such as primary
education and maternal health, was also failing. 69 Other factors would also make the
introduction of CCTs more urgent.
Indeed, the Arroyo regime became increasingly embroiled in various controversies over
electoral irregularities, corruption and violence. These added a sense of panic in the
administration and predilection for taking any measures necessary for survival. 70 In 2005
revelations emerged of Arroyo’s large-scale cheating in the 2004 Presidential election. Many
of the reformers within the government responsible for social policy development resigned.
The government survived threats from mass political protests and military rebellion. A cascade
of further crises also occurred over economic cooperation projects with China.71 The regime
hung on to power, however, despite record negative approval ratings for Arroyo.72
The deepening political crises (and related pressure to address stagnating levels of poverty and
human development) provided the context for the influence of the newer GESP. The WB and
other MDAs had played already played a central part in the design and operation of community-
driven development projects in the Philippines. These also exhibited some evidence of selective
incorporation of ideas from Latin American contexts.73 In the case of CCTs, MDA support
resulted in leading staff from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
attending the WB’s Istanbul conference on CCTs in 2006. 74 These key personnel then
formulated a proposal that went to Arroyo’s cabinet in March 2007. Arroyo became
enthusiastic about the program, especially given the political pressure the regime faced. Her
21
economics training also purportedly made her enthusiastic about the human resource
development component of the CCTs. The result was the implementation of a pilot program
for 6000 beneficiary households in two provinces in 2007. Coverage expanded to 320000
households in 2008. Bilateral and Bretton Woods MDA donors increased support providing
evaluation and technical feasibility assistance to expand 4Ps to one million households starting
from 2009.75
In the meantime, Arroyo’s presidential term ended after the election of Benigno Aquino in
2010. While he was the son of former President Corazon Aquino and part of an established
political clan, his campaign nevertheless presented a moderate program of political and social
reform. An important section of non-government organisation (NGO) activists and Akbayan
(a left-of-centre political party) supported his presidential campaign. It was organised
according to both conventional Liberal party (LP) and non-conventional (non-LP)
components. 76 Aquino’s manifesto – the Contract with the Filipino People – primarily
emphasised governance and anti-corruption measures. There was very brief mention of poverty
and the need for “well-considered programs that build capacity and create opportunity among
the poor and the marginalised…”77 Aquino appointed some activists both from Akbayan and
development NGOs to his cabinet after the election, including Corazon Solomon as Secretary
of the DSWD. Soliman had previously been head of DSWD in the early part of the Arroyo
administration.78
“Well-considered” or not, the Aquino administration inherited Arroyo’s poverty alleviation
policies. The already established infrastructure of 4Ps largely ensured that it became the
centrepiece program. Tatsulo became an overall poverty reduction framework. It encompassed
4Ps and two other livelihood and community-driven development programs.79 The largest
component, however, was 4Ps. It continued to expand the number of recipients to one million,
22
and subsequently a third phase of expansion was established. It was, notably, the “reformers”
within the government that would take on the implementation of the program.
At this point, Bretton Woods MDA mediation again occurred within the process of GSP/ GESP
development. The Arroyo government and the main 4Ps MDA donors had already chosen
Colombia’s Familias en Acción program as the model for 4Ps. Neither Aquino nor his cabinet
altered this fundamental decision. The DSWD staff had previously mainly studied Mexico’s
Oportunidades as the chief example of CCT operation - through the WB-sponsored National
Sector Support for Social Welfare and Development Project.80 The central mechanism for the
promotion of Familias en Acción was the recruitment of a Colombian consultant - Tarsicio
Castañeda - as the DSWD’s primary advisor. The WB and the Australian Agency for
International Development funded the consultancy. 81 The central ideational influences,
therefore, reflected the interests of major donors and the key personnel that they would favour.
Amongst the various national approaches of the Latin America neostructuralist welfare regime,
the donors (along with Arroyo and later Aquino) supported the program with higher
conditionalities and level of securitisation.
From Colombia to the Philippines
The selection of the Colombian consultant and Familias en Acción as a model had three
important implications for 4P’s implementation. These were readily apparent both in focus
groups of beneficiaries conducted in Mindanao during 2004 and from examining of the scale
of social expenditures in the Philippines.
First, it cemented the ideational hold of SRM on poverty alleviation policy making in the
Philippines. Castañeda had been a promoter of Chile’s Pinochet-era contributory social
insurance programs as a model for social safety-nets. These policies were an instance of the
original (informal-conservative) Latin American welfare regime, but which operated with
23
comparative success in coverage and outcomes.82 In keeping with the evolution of SRM,
however, Castañeda and other WB-linked policy specialists developed a greater acceptance of
direct social transfer payments. In keeping with SRM, however, these remain strictly residual
to contributory social insurance (this is the case with Colombia’s programs). 83 In the
Philippines, both 4Ps and the broader Tatsulo programs were designed to be residual to
contributory social insurance schemes. The latter mainly included: the Social Security System;
Government Service Insurance System; and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth). Their coverage, however, has been and remains limited, extending to only 22
percent of the population.84 Even with over one million households included in 4Ps (which
included access to subsidised PhilHealth benefits since 2012), over half of the population was
not covered by either a transfer payments or contributory programs.
Comments of beneficiaries in Mindanao reflect these trends . Most of the focus group
participants (FGP) in Mindanao were beneficiaries who were either single parents or their
husbands were unreliable or unemployed. The overwhelming response was that while the
payments were welcome, the small amounts provided only limited relief from income poverty.
Limits on the months with payments compounded the sense of how small the amount were.
They only covered ten months of the year. To make matters worse, some payments were said
to be missing which was distressing in the lead up to Christmas new year. Other FGRs
emphasised that it was the PhilHealth benefits that were most valuable as these made medicines
much cheaper.
Second and accordingly, the emphasis was placed on the strict targeting of payments and
enforcement of conditionalities. There was a considerable expansion in the numbers of DSWD
staff and operations for administering the 4Ps program. 85 These DSWD field personnel
implement an elaborate procedure of targeting and identifying recipient households in eligible
localities. There is a complex process of targeting and administering the grants, despite the
24
relatively small amounts being dispersed to each household. A household with three qualified
children receives a subsidy of 1400 pesos ($ 33) a month during the school year or 15000 pesos
($355) annually as long as they comply with the conditionalities. The process comprises eight
steps for appraising the potential beneficiaries. The primary factor was the application of
Colombia’s proxy means test system to the Philippine.86 The identification occurred off the
poorest households in the selected municipalities through the development of a National
Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTSPR) system. The first implication
of the NHTSPR is that there are questions about the desirability of the details of Colombian
test in the Philippine context. There are different patterns and preferences of consumption in
the Philippines. While notionally aimed at identifying the presence of household items of
consumption, the proxy means test also entails surveillance. The use of the evaluation tool
meshes with an overall approach geared towards bringing more involvement by DSWD staff
in poor households.
Moreover, an elaborate set of processes is undertaken by DSWD staff at the local scale aimed
at eliminating any potentially ineligible village members. The culmination is a community
assembly where “shame” is frequently used to discourage ineligible salaried households from
pursuing payments. Following further identity checks, a recipient household representative
agrees to sign a paternalist “oath of commitment”. Amounts are dispersed every two months
after around processing. The main conditionalities involve: ensuring school attendance;
undergoing frequent maternal health checks; and attendance at “family” training sessions. The
implementers concede that the bulk of responsibilities in these areas fall upon mothers and
female household members. The sanctions for non-compliance are similar to Colombia’s and
contrast with the lighter conditions imposed by Bolsa Família.
There was a certain amount of "sideways" glances by the FGP when the issues of selection and
processes were raised. The main issue was the DSWD staff and their perceived lack of
25
knowledge. This made it easier for local authorities to distort the allocation process in favour
of clients. The process was not, therefore, immune from local elite manipulation. In one
instance the process was handed over to a local NGO to administer due to complaints. The
heavy focus on DSWD staff did not seem to reflect a concern for quality. In fact, they were
often seen as in league with political and security elites and sometimes engaged in corruption.
Third, possibly the main aspect of the influence of the Colombian approach – already alluded
to above in the discussion of proxy means tests - is the degree of everyday intervention in poor
household’s lives that was involved in 4Ps. This was a facet of securitisation via increasing the
presence of the state – in the form of DSWD staff - in the everyday lives of the impoverished
population. The Colombian model is unique in comparison to others in the way that social and
community workers intervene in households to negotiate and enforce health and education
targets. Although no association is explicitly made, there is a plausible connection between the
Colombian security state and the role of staff in regulating poor communities’ access to the
program. One of the implicit functions of Familias en Acción was to play a de facto role of
surveillance and provide services and funds to disincentive support or involvement in
insurgencies. There are similar facets to this in the Philippines. There is a strong focus on
making the presence of state agencies apparent in marginal and poorer communities. The
targeting of particular communities coincides with the presence and activity of the two main
insurgencies, especially in Mindanao in the country’s south. There is an ongoing role for
DSWD staff within communities where they conduct family-development seminars and other
programs and monitoring tasks. All of these increase the presence of the state in affected
communities.
FGP regarded the family seminars as somewhat useful but lacking a depth of understanding of
household difficulties. One participant commented that the lessons did not actually offer
26
solutions and instead re-enforced a sense that it was up to beneficiaries to take measures to
escape policy. Nobody particularly like signing the paternalistic "pledge" statements.
The FGPs were reluctant to speak on issues of safety and security at first. It was whispered,
however, that one of the effects of payments was restrictions on movements. It was not possible
to reside in rebel-controlled areas and receive the payments. The municipality was on the
outskirts of a medium-sized urban settlement and had a strong security presence (although they
complained it not enough to deter crime).
More broadly, the modelling of 4Ps on Colombia’s approach reflected the extent of MDA
support for and resulted in influence over the design of the program. As outlined above,
Colombia’s program was also the most heavily reliant on MDA support. The Philippine state
had nominally limited fiscal capacity to implement a direct social transfer payments system.
There have historically been chronic problems of low taxation compliance and revenue
collection by the Philippine state. In part, this is a reflection of the exclusionary polity described
in above. The primary approach taken by various governments was, as a result, continual
increases in indirect taxation. One of the main consequences has been that taxation revenue
averaged just 12.6 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2010. Government expenditures
(excluding interest payments) averaged 9.9 percent of GDP in the same period.87
However, the arbitrary nature of many existing social spending complicated matters further.
The recent controversy of misuse of Priority Development Assistance Funds (PDAFs) has
resulted in increased attention to these issues. Philippine Congress members acquired
considerable discretionary power on (PDAF) expenditures, which became popularly referred
to as the central “pork barrel”. Although intended to support local infrastructure and relief
efforts, they have widely become the primary source of clientelist payments.88 A scandal over
allocations resulted in the Philippine Supreme Court declared the entire PDAF process
27
unconstitutional in November 2013.89 One issue of debate is to the extent that these allocations
are convertible into more non-discriminatory payments.
However, the low-level and arbitrary distribution of social expenditures of the Philippines,
meant that the 4Ps program relied on extensive donor contributions. These came from regional
development bank and Bretton Woods MDAs over its initial five-year period of operation. The
degree of this support was outlined by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The total cost of
the program (including the targeting system and payments) was $1.2 billion: of which $737.8
million (63 percent) was sourced from the ADB and the WB. 90 Overall social protection
(including social insurance) grew significantly – between 2005 and 2010 – from a base of 1.6
to 2.6 percent of GDP. Within this, social assistance increased rapidly from 0.2 to 1.2 percent
of GDP. Some two-thirds of this expansion, however, was provided by external financing. The
ADB argued the Philippine government would be able to sustain this level of expenditure at
around 2.6 percent of GDP in the longer-term. Overall this level of social spending was still
small comparison to other states – Vietnam’s spending is 4.3 percent, and the average for Latin
America is 5.1 percent of GDP.91 The program, therefore, remained based on a residual model
of social protection based on low levels of public expenditure.
There was an awareness of these issues and their implications amongst some government
figures within the Philippines. They gave an indication of the “thinking” within the
administration and the House of Representatives. The former Secretary of Economic and Social
Planning - Cayetano Paderanga - suggested there were two views. The predominant view was
that the 4Ps project had a strict five-year lifespan in line with external funding. The less
prevalent view – that Paderanga held – was that some level of social transfers would need to
be ongoing for sustained reductions in income poverty to occur. There were, therefore, two
barriers to establishing ongoing system of payments: one was the expiry of the “catalyst”
28
external financing. The other was the apparent uncertain political commitment to – or even
comprehension of the need for – an ongoing system of social transfer payments.
In sum, the Philippine government and its main MDA and bilateral donors opted for an
approach that derived from and was heavily influenced by Colombia’s CCT program. Both the
original decision to implement CCTs and the programs design was shaped by the existential
crisis facing the Arroyo government. The moderately reformist Aquino governments took no
drastic steps to alter the design. As a result 4Ps has remained a social transfer payment system
consistent with SRM. There is high-level interventionism in local communities that centred on
the implementation of proxy means tests and use of state personnel to target and monitor
beneficiaries.
The Philippines and the Geopolitical Economy of Social Policy
In conclusion, the adoption of CCTs in the Philippines provides insight into the ways GSP has
evolved towards GESP. The change has impacted on the implementation of social protection
policies. Across the 2000s, there was an emergence of higher levels of economic growth and
political aspirations for social inclusion in some middle-income economies (rising developing
powers). One result was an increased space for social policy development. The diffusion of
these policy innovations to other developing country contexts remained heavily circumscribed
by the Bretton Woods MDAs.
The emergence and dissemination of CCTs reflected these processes in five ways. First, there
was the appearance of what was arguably a neostructuralist welfare regime in Latin America.
The structuralist approach to development and associated Latin American welfare system
declined in the 1980s. These changes came increasingly into conflict with aspirations for
poverty reduction and guaranteed minimum income policies. The somewhat favourable global
economic conditions of the 2000s provided a context for the limited implementation attempts
29
to overcome these contradictions. There was the emergence of a general neostructuralist policy
turn or sensibility in some Latin American nation-states. There had also been the inclusion of
social rights within the new constitutions adopted in democratisation processes or attempts in
places such as Brazil and Colombia. Neostructuralism selectively incorporated older
structuralist themes within a development strategy that remained based broadly on the WC.
Targeted social transfer payments emerged as an important social welfare complement to these
broader economic development policies.
Second and accordingly, CCTs were one of most widely adopted social transfer payment
systems entailed by the neostructuralist regime. The design of CCTs reflected the recognition
of linkages between inter-generational human capital deficits and poverty levels as a source of
market failure. These programs sought to address these shortcomings by providing conditional
payments for children’s school and health service attendance to disincentive the employment
of child labour. The payments would be heavily targeted and constrained by conditions
ensuring compliance by poor households. There were, however, differences in the extent of
coverage, the requirements and their enforcement: with Brazil’s program being much lower
than Colombia’s.
Third, the GESP had a considerable impact on the promotion of these policies elsewhere. On
the one hand, the fragmented attempts to create a safety net in the 1990s eventually coalesced
into a loose international effort to build “national social protection floors”. MDAs such as the
WB adapted their existing SRM framework to incorporate a greater role for direct social
transfers. The considerable shortfalls in many states in meeting poverty-reduction targets
increased pressure for financing of direct social transfers. CCTs were attractive as they
addressed three areas of income poverty, education and health. They were increasingly
promoted from the mid-2000s, although as a residual component subordinated to an emphasis
on contributory social insurance. The examples of MDA-supported and financed CCT
30
programs tended to accentuate the higher levels of conditionality already contained in
Colombia’s program. In the case of Colombia, the targeting and compliance regimes entailed
high levels of intervention and surveillance of poor households.
On the other hand, national governments (such as the Philippines) that faced real or perceived
existential threats came to view social transfer payment programs favourably. CCT programs,
in particular, attempted to engender consent amongst and placate political demands from poor
populations. The emphases of the CCT program in Colombia, however, were integrated into
the processes of the security state and counter-insurgency efforts. It became the case in the
Philippines. The establishment of 4Ps was as a response to the Arroyo government's
unpopularity amongst the country’s poor in 2007. The pattern of targeting and enforcement
were modelled on Colombia’s approach. The Philippine program has expanded rapidly after
2009. However, the geographical and social targeting of the program was heavily centred on
areas that viewed as security threats, especially the southern region of the Philippines. The
targeting and administration of the program focused on increasing the presence of state
agencies in poorer communities through village assemblies and family development programs.
Overall the Philippine example suggests, therefore, that the forms of social programs that have
emerged in many developing countries are being adopted and promoted in particular ways by
MDAs. They retain a focus on social transfers that are residual. There is a focus on targeting
and enforcing conditions of poorer communities that focused on security concerns. They are
often poorly integrated within broader frameworks that exist in places such as Brazil that focus
on more general aspects of vulnerability and poverty. Policy-makers concerned with the
implementation of social protection measures could perhaps be more mindful of the negative
features of MDA measures and the adverse impacts they can have on poor populations and
broader processes of political and economic change.
31
References 1 These attempts at policy consolidation were recently endorsed by the high-level meetings of the IMF and the
WB. See Development Committee. Safety Nets Work. 2 On geopolitical economy see Desai. “Introduction,” 1-44. 3 Hall, “Brazil's Bolsa Família,” 799-822. 4 The definition of neostructuralism used here is derived from Leiva, Latin American Neostructuralism and;
ECLAC. Changing Production Patterns. 5 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde. Security. 6 Halley. Split Decisions, and; Holmes and Jones. Gender and Social Protection. 7 Yeates. Globalization and Social Policy. 8 The Nordic-country donors played a critical role in advancing the GSP agenda. See Deacon et al. Global Social Policy. 9 Deacon and Stubbs. “Global Social Policy Studies,” 20. 10 Desai. “Introduction,” 1-44. 11 Reid. “China's ‘South-South’ Trade”. 12 Erton and Ocampo. Super-Cycles. 13 Petras. Social Movements in Latin America. 14 Tanzi. Globalization . 15 Zoellick. Democratizing Development Economics. 16 Cammack. “The G20, the Crisis,”1-16. 17 Scott. “Role of Southern Intellectuals,” 633-652. 18 Mawdsley. From Recipients to Donors. 19 Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender. “Social policy in the context.” 20 Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds. The welfare regime ideal involves categorising elements of a given phenomena that do not apply to all of the features of any one particular case. 21 Barrientos. “Latin America,” 121-168. 22 Leiva. Latin American Neostructuralism, 45. 23 Barrientos. “Latin America”, 121-168. 24 Ibid., 125 25 Morales and McMahon. Economic Policy. 26 World Bank. World Development Report 2000/2001. 27 Rojas. “Understanding Neo-Developmentalism,” 65-113. 28 Leiva. Latin American Neostructuralism. 29 There is debate about the “paternity” of CCTs. One account links them to a series of articles by economist José
Márcio Camargo that emphasised the human resource development component of conditional transfers. See Lindert et al. The Nuts and Bolts. Others focus more on the role of leaders - such as Cristovam Buarque - from the PT.
30 Britto. “Brazil’s Bolsa Família,” 6-7. 31 Ban. “Brazil's Liberal Neodevelopmentalism,’ 298-331.; Leiva, Latin American Neostructuralism. 32 Burton. Lula and Economic Development. 33 World Bank, World Development Indicators. 34 Ibid. 35 World Bank. Project Information Document. 36 Soares and Silva. Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes. 37 The focus on spending on the poor has been at the centre of considerable political criticism with Bolsa Familia
being represented as a mechanism for consolidating the PT’s electoral base. Regression analyses, however, suggests the correlation between volume CCT coverage and electoral support for the PT is rather weak. See Bohn. “Social Policy,” 54-79.
38 See Lacerda. Stédile admite. CCT recipients have reported to have been less likely to enagage in land occupations as remaining in the current location is required to meet conditions of school attendance.
39 Lavinas. “21st Century Welfare.” 40 Rojas. “Understanding Neo-Developmentalism,” 65-113. 41 Buzan et al., Security.
32
42 Eslava. “The Constitutionalization of Rights,” 183-229. 43 Moreno. “Whither the Colombian,” 485-509. 44 Leech. The FARC. 45 World Bank, World Development Indicators. 46 Ibid. 47 IEG. Project Performance Assessment Report. 48 World Bank, World Development Indicators. 49 IADB. “CO-L1021 : Multiphase Program,” Overseas Development Institute “Familias en Acción”, World Bank.
“Social Safety Net Project.” 50 DPS. “Ingreso Social.” 51 Fine. “Neither the Washington Consensus,” 1-27. 52 Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler. “Editorial Introduction,” 1-7. 53 World Bank, World Development Report. 54 World Bank. Third International Conference. 55 Development Committee. Safety Nets. 56 Montes and Lim. “Macroeconomic Volatility,” 345. 57 Bello, at al. The Anti-Development State; and Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society. 58 World Bank. World Development Indicators. 59 NSCB. Philippine Poverty Statistics. 60 NEDA. Philippines 2010. 61 Reid. “Historical Blocs,” 1003-20. 62 North, Wallis, and Weingast. Violence and Social Orders. 63 Quimpo. “The Presidency, Political Parties,” 47-72. 64 Bello et al., The Anti-Development State. 65 Reid. “Securitising Participation,” 47-74. 66 Bautista. Readings in Governance, 158-64. 67 Social Weather Station Polls all suggest that Arroyo was deeply unpopular amongst the countries’ “C” and “D” category population in comparison to the “A” and “B” (middle and upper income) segments. See SWS, Satisfaction. 68 Reid, “Securitising Participation.” 69 Cabral. “Keynote Speech.” 70 Reid. "Development NGOs," 4-42. 71 China became a notable source of foreign aid (economic cooperation), becoming the countries’ second largest donor during the Arroyo government. China’s projects bcame mired in crisis, however, and had little evident policy influence. See Reid, New Donors. 72 SWS, Net Satisfaction. 73 The Kalahi community-driven project was mostly derived from an Indonesian example, although some influence of Brazilian participatory budgeting was evident. See Reid, “Securitising Participation.” 74 Cabral. “Keynote Speech.” 75 DSWD. About 4Ps. 76 Villacorta. NoyNoy. 77 Aquino. “ Social Contract.” 78 Reid. “Development NGOs,” 2-39. 79 DSWD, About 4Ps. 80 Ibid. 81 See World Bank. Implementation Status and Results, and AusAID. Philippine Country Program Report. 82 Castaneda. Combating Poverty. 83 Castaneda. The Design. 84 Manasan. Reforming Social Protection Policy. 85 DSWD. DSWD Convergence Strategy. 86 Fernandez. Design and Implementation Features. 87 World Bank. World Development Indicators. 88 Coronel et al. The Rulemakers. 89 RPSC. Decision GR No 208566. 90 ADB. 43263-012: Support. 91 Ibid.
33
Bibliography Abinales, Patricio N and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, Anvil: Pasig. 2005 Aquino, Benigno. “ Social Contract with the Filipino People.” Accessed April 24, 2012. http://www.gov.ph/the-
republic/the-president/benigno-simeon-cojuangco-aquino-iii/platform-of-government/. Asian Development Bank. 43263-012: Support for Social Protection Reform (formerly MDG Acceleration and
Poverty Reduction). Accessed October 22, 2014. http://www.adb.org/projects/43263-012/main. Ban, Cornel. “Brazil's Liberal Neodevelopmentalism: New paradigm or edited orthodoxy?” Review of
International Political Economy, 20 no. 2 (2012): 298-331, doi: 10.1080/09692290.2012.660183. Barrientos, Alex. “Latin America: towards a liberal-informal welfare regime.” In Insecurity and Welfare Regimes
in Asia, Africa and Latin America: Social policy in development contexts, Ian Gough and Geoffey Wood. eds. 121-168.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Bohn, Simone. “Social Policy and Vote in Brazil: Bolsa Família and the Shifts in Lula's Electoral Base.” Latin American Research Review. 46 no. 1 (2011), 54-79.
Bello, Walden, Herbert Docena, Marissa de Guzman and Mary Lou Malig. The Anti-Development State: The political economy of permanent crisis in the Philippines, Zed Books: London and New York. 2004.
Britto, Tatiana. “Brazil’s Bolsa Família: Understanding its Origins and Challenges.” Poverty in Focus. 15(2008): 6-7.
Burton, Geoffrey. Lula and Economic Development. Accessed May 18, 2012.http://www.globalaffairs.es/en/lula-and-economic-development/.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New framework for analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
Cabral, Esperanza. “Keynote Speech, Secretary Esperanza Cabral, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Philippines.” in Social Assistance and Conditional Cash Transfers: The Proceedings of the Regional Workshop. Edited by Sri Wening Handayani and Clifford Burkley. 7-11. Asian Development Bank: Manila. 2010.
Cammack, Paul. “The G20, the Crisis, and the Rise of Global Developmental Liberalism.” Third World Quarterly. 33, no.1 (2012): 1-16. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2012.628110.
Castaneda, Tarsicio. Combating Poverty: Innovative social reforms in Chile during the 1980s. San Francisco: ICS Press. 1992.
------ “The Design and Implementation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs).” in Social Assistance and Conditional Cash Transfers: The Proceedings of the Regional Workshop. Edited by Sri Wening Handayani and Clifford Burkley. 185-203. Asian Development Bank: Manila. 2010.
Coronel, Sheila S., Coronel, Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban, Booma B. Cruz. The Rulemakers: How the wealthy and well-born dominate Congress, Quezon City: Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism. 2004.
Deacon, Bob and Paul Stubbs. “Global Social Policy Studies: Conceptual and analytical reflections,” Global Social Policy, 13: no. 1 (2013), 5-32. doi: 10.1177/1468018112469798.
Department of Social Welfare and Development. About 4Ps. Accessed May 1 2012. http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/about-us.
------ DSWD Convergence Strategy is Alive in CAR. Accessed July 17, 2012. http://www.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/component/content/article/1-latest-news/2610-dswd-convergence-strategy-is-alive-in-car.
Departamento para la Prosperidad Social. Ingreso Social: Familias en Acción, Accessed May 28, 2014. www.dps.gov.co/Ingreso_Social/FamiliasenAccion.aspx.
Desai, Radhika. “From Neo-Classical Diversion to Geopolitical Economy.” Research in Political Economy 30A (2015): 1-44. doi:10.1108/S0161-72302015000030A009.
34
Development Committee (Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries). Safety Nets Work: During Crisis and Prosperity Accessed August 22 2012. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23170403/DC2012-0003(E)SafetyNets.pdf.
Devereux, Stephen and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler. “Editorial Introduction: Debating Social Protection.” IDS Bulletin. 38 no. 3(2007): 1-7.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity: The prime task of Latin American and Caribbean development in the 1990s, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: Santiago, 1990.
Erton, Bilge and Jose A Ocampo. Super-Cycles of Commodity Prices Since the Mid-Nineteenth Century, DESA Working Paper, No. 110 (2012). Accessed November 13, 2014. http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2012/wp110_2012.pdf.
Eslava, Luis. “The Constitutionalization of Rights in Colombia: Establishing a ground for meaningful comparisons.” Revista Derecho de Estado. 22 (2009): 183-229.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1990. Fernandez, Luisa. Design and Implementation Features of the National Household Targeting System in the
Philippines. Accessed August 18, 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16400825/design-implementation-features-national-household-targeting-system-philippines
Fine, Ben, “Neither the Washington Consensus or the Post-Washington Consensus: An Introduction.” in Development Policy in the 21st Century: Beyond the post-Washington consensus. Edited by Fine, Ben, James Pincus and Costa Lapavitsas. 1-27. London and New York: Routledge. 2001,
Hall, Anthony. “Brazil's Bolsa Família: a double-edged sword?” Development and Change 39, no.5 (2008): 799-822. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2008.00506.x
Halley, Janet. Split Decisions: How and why to take a break from feminism, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2006. (Kindle Edition).
Holmes, Rebecca and Nicola Jones. Gender and Social Protection in the Developing World: Beyond Mothers and Safety Nets Zed Books: London and New York, 2013 (Kindle Edition).
Independent Evaluation Group. Project Performance Assessment Report Colombia, Colombia Social Safety Net Project (LN. 73370 & LN.74330). World Bank: Washington. 2011.
Inter-American Development Bank. CO-L1021 : Multiphase Program to Support Second Stage of Familias en Acción - Phase I, Accessed May 28, 2012 www.iadb.org/en/projects/project,1303.html?id=CO-L1021.
Lacerda, Angela. Stédile admite que Bolsa Família ajudou a reduzir acampamentos. Accessed October 21, 2014. //politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,stedile-admite-que-bolsa-familia-ajudou-a-reduzir-acampamentos,703058.
Lavinas, Lena (2012) “21st Century Welfare,” New Left Review, 84, Accessed Jan 15 2014, http://newleftreview.org/II/84/lena-lavinas-21st-century-welfare.
Leech, Guy. The FARC: The longest insurgency. Zed Books: London. 2011. Leiva, Fernando Ignacio. Latin American Neostructuralism: the Contradictions of post-neoliberal development.
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Lindert, Kathy, Anja Linder, Jason Hobbs and Bénédicte de la Brière. The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família
Program: Implementing Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized Context, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 0709. Washington: World Bank, 2007.
Manasan, Rosario G. Reforming Social Protection Policy: Responding to the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond, PIDS Discussion Paper 2009-22. Pasig: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 2009.
Mawdsley, Emma. From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape, Lond: Zed Books, 2013.
Montes, Manuel F. and Jospeh Y. Lim. “Macroeconomic Volatility, Investment Anemia and Environmental Struggles in the Philippines.” World Development. 24 no. 2 (1996): 341-57, doi:10.1016/0305-750X(95)00138-3.
Morales, Juan A. and Gary McMahon. Economic Policy and the Transition to Democracy: the Latin American experience. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1995.
Moreno, Erika. “Whither the Colombian Two-party System? An assessment of political reforms and their limits.” Electoral Studies. 24, no.3 (2004): 485-509, doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2004.08.001.
35
National Economic Development Agency. Philippines 2010: Progress against millennium development goals, Pasig: National Economic Development Agency. 2010
National Statistical Coordination Board. Philippine Poverty Statistics. Accessed April 18 2012. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2009/default.asp.
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Leiden: Cambridge University Press. 2009.
Overseas Development Institute. “Familias en Acción: Colombia, Policy Brief 2: Inter-Regional Inequality Facility,” Accessed May 30, 2012. www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/1690.pdf.
Petras, James. Social Movements in Latin America Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Quimpo, Nathan G. “The Presidency, Political Parties and Predatory Politics in the Philippines.” In The Politics of Change in the Philippines. Edited by Yuko Kasuya and Nathan Quimpo. 47-72. Pasig: Anvil. 2010.
Reid, Ben. “Historical Blocs and Democratic Impasse in the Philippines: 20 years after 'people power’.” Third World Quarterly. 27 no. 6 (2006). 1003-20. doi: 10.1080/01436590600850426.
------ "Development NGOs, Semiclientelism, and the State in the Philippines: From “crossover” to double-crossed." Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 23: no.1 (2008): 4-42.
------ Reid, B. (2011). “New Openings and Old Problems: China, public investment and infrastructure failure in the Philippines. Rethinking Development in an Age of Scarcity and Uncertainty: New values, voices and alliances for increased resilience, Proceedings of the UK Development Studies Association and European association of Development Studies and Training Institutes Triennial Conference, September 20-23. York. Accessed August 18, 2015. http://eadi.org/gc2011/default_128.html.
----- “Securitising Participation in the Philippines: KALAHI and Community-driven participation.” Journal of Contemporary Asia. 41 no. 1 (2011). 47-74. doi:10.1080/00472336.2011.530036.
------ “China's "South-South" Trade with Southeast Asia: Unequal exchange and combined and uneven development,” Research in Political Economy, 30B (forthcoming).
Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court. Decision GR No 208566. Accessed January 5, 2014. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/pdaf/.
Rojas, Shunko. “Understanding Neo-Developmentalism in Latin America: New industrial policies in Brazil and Colombia,” in Law and the New Developmental State: The Brazilian Experience in Latin America. Edited by David M. Trubek, Helena Alviar Garcia, Diogo R. Coutinho, Alvaro Santos, 65-113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Social Weather Stations. Satisfaction with the President. (Various years). Accessed August 8, 2015. www.sws.org.ph.
Scott, James. “The Role of Southern Intellectuals in Contemporary Trade Governance,” New Political Economy 20, no. 5 (2015), 633-652. doi: 10.1080/13563467.2014.951615.
Soares, Fábio Veras and Elydia Silva. Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Gender Vulnerabilities: Case Studies of Brazil, Chile and Colombia. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth: Brasilia, 2010.
Tanzi, Vito. Globalization and the Future of Social Protection, International Monetary Fund Working paper 00/12. (2000). Accessed August 14, 2015. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0012.pdf.
Urbina-Ferretjans, M. and Rebeca. Surender. "Social Policy in the Context of New Global Actors: How far is China’s developmental model in Africa impacting traditional donors?" Global Social Policy 13, no. 3 (2013), 261-279. doi: 10.1177/1468018113505021.
World Bank. World Development Report 2000/2001 Attacking Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
------ World Development Indicators, Accessed 17 August 2015. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/. ------ Project Information Document,Appraisal Stage, Report No.: AB797:BR Bolsa Família 1st APL. Accessed
May 18, 2012. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/05/11/000104615_20040513125107/Rendered/PDF/BF0PID0100MAY02004.pdf.
------ “Social Safety Net Project,” Accessed May 28, 2014. web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P089443&theSitePK=40941&piPK=64302772&pagePK=64330670&menuPK=64282135&Type=Financial>
36
------ Third International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfers. Istanbul, Turkey, June 26-30, 2006. Accessed April 28, 2014. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SPLP/Resources/461653-1151082099426/CCT_Conference_Agenda_June23.pdf.
Yeates, Nicola. Globalization and Social Policy. London: Sage Publications, 2001. Zoellick, Robert B. Democratizing Development Economics, Address to Georgetown University, September 29,
(2009). Accessed 25 May 2013. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22716997~pagePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html.