TheGreekPhilosophers

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W.K.C.Guthrie

TheGreekPhilosophers

FromThalestoAristotle

WithanewforewordbyJamesWarren

Firstpublishedin1950byMethuen&Co.Reprinted1989,1991,1993and1997byRoutledge

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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataGuthrie,W.K.C.(WilliamKeithChambers),1906-1981.TheGreekphilosophersfromThalestoAristotle/W.K.C.Guthrie;withanewforewordbyJamesWarren.p.cm.--(Routledgeclassics)Includesindex.1.Philosophy,Ancient.2.Philosophers,Ancient.I.Title.B171.G82013180--dc23

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CONTENTS

FOREWORDTOTHEROUTLEDGECLASSICS

EDITIONBYJAMESWARREN

1Greekwaysofthinking

2Matterandform(IoniansandPythagoreans)

3Theproblemofmotion(Heraclitus,Parmenidesandthepluralists)

4Thereactiontowardshumanism(theSophistsandSocrates)

5Plato(i)TheDoctrineofIdeas

6Plato(ii)EthicalandtheologicalanswerstotheSophists

7Aristotle(i)TheAristotelianuniverse

8Aristotle(ii)Humanbeings

SUGGESTIONSFORFURTHERREADING

INDEX

FOREWORD

JamesWarren

TheGreekPhilosopherswaspublishedin1950,twoyearsbeforeitsauthor,W.K.C.Guthrie,waselectedthethirdLaurenceProfessorofAncientPhilosophyintheUniversityofCambridge.Itpredateshismonumental(andsadlyunfinished)six-volume A History of Greek Philosophy by more than a decade (thosevolumeswerepublishedbetween1962and1981)butisalwayslikelytobethemorewidelyreadofthetwo.Fewsuchbooksbearreadingmorethansixtyyearsafter their publication, particularly those that deal with so wide a topic andmanage to cover it with style and in not many more than 150 pages.Nevertheless,despitethegreatflourishingofscholarshipandtheappearanceofmanysimilarvolumesonancientphilosophysinceitwaswritten,thepaceandtoneofthisbookguaranteeitscontinuedinterest.Asitsauthorpointsoutattheoutset, the intendedaudienceare ‘undergraduates…readinganysubjectotherthanclassics’.AndGuthriewritesthroughoutwithcareandattentiontosuchanaudience,explainingtonon-specialistswhatthereistobefoundintheseancientauthorsandthinkers.Thetextskipsalongatapaceandneverletsthecomplexityof the ideasbeingdiscussedobstruct theprincipal aimof informing interestedreadersofwhattheGreekphilosopherswereupto,inamannerwhichGuthriethinksisfreefromthepotentiallydistortingeffectsoftheinterveningcenturiesofreceptionanddiscussionoftheirideas.Theaimistoinstructandinformandtheprimarymethodofinstructionisexpositionviaastoryofdevelopmentand,forthemostpart,progressovertheperiodbetweenThalesandAristotle.Althoughhehasinmindanaudienceunfamiliarwiththetextsintheiroriginal

language, Guthrie explains clearly and succinctly where necessary theimportanceofunderstandingtheprecisenuancesandconnotationsof thetermsand concepts under scrutiny. Indeed, he is insistent throughout on differencesbetweenhisworldandthatoftheGreekphilosophersandontheimportanceof

understanding what he calls the ‘cultural soil’ of their ideas. His Greekphilosophers, particularly the early Greek philosophers, are a peculiar andunusual bunch. He sees them as great pioneers in questions of science andphilosophy but pioneers whose faltering steps should be understood in theirpropercontext.Wemight,withsomecaveats,describeGuthrie’sapproachasacombination

of twoprincipalmethodsofphilosophicalhistoriography.On theonehand,hetakes fromAristotle the outlines of the history of Greek philosophy, buildingfrom Ionian natural philosophy through Socratic and sophistic approaches tohumanity andmorals to the great systems of Plato and thenAristotle himself.(Guthrie’sconfidence in theAristotelianaccountwasnot shakenby theattacklaunched on Aristotle’s value as a witness to his predecessors by HaroldChernissintwovolumespublishedin1935and1944.Guthrie’selegantretortin1957 is a useful statementof his overall attitude to thequestion.)Thegeneralstory is one of gradual progress and improvement, with Aristotle finallyharnessingthebestofnaturalphilosophywiththeimportanceofthemetaphysicsofformandteleologythatwasfirstseenbyPythagorasandthenrefinedbyPlatohimself,andcombiningthiswithadevelopedformofSocrates’interestinethicsandPlato’semphasisontheimportanceofpoliticalharmony.Theothersignificantmodeofanalysiscomesmorefromtheanthropological

approachestotheancientworldthathadmadeanimpactatthetimeGuthriewaswriting. (E. R. Dodds’ influential The Greeks and the Irrational was firstpublishedoneyearlater in1951.)Alargeproportionof thebookisdevotedtothephilosophersbeforethegreattrioofSocrates,Plato,andAristotle,andmuchofthatsectionisinterestedinshowinghowthecosmologicalspeculationsoftheearly philosophers can be understood in relation to the pre-philosophical past.While there is evidentmerit in insisting that the early stages of philosophicalinquiry tookplace inaworld thatwasculturallyand intellectuallyveryunlikeourown, thisapproachalsoallowsGuthriea ready-madeexplanationforwhathe found to be the otherwise peculiar and disappointing aspects of thephilosophers he presents. For example, Anaximander wins plaudits for hisspeculativecosmologyandscientificadvances–Guthrie isquitehappy tocallAnaximander a scientist – but is nevertheless still unfortunately bound to a‘primitive’ notion of the universe as being a livingwhole, a notion ‘towhichanthropologists have found parallels among savage people all over theworld’(29).Sometimes,hisattitudetotheseGreekphilosophersisacuriousmixtureofadmiration and condescension.They are regularly applauded formaking earlystepsawayfromanaïveor‘primitive’outlookbutthenmarkeddownforbeingunable entirely to shake off the shackles of their intellectual inheritance.

Elsewhere, Guthrie is too quick to find fault and his judgement is surelyquestionable. For example, he diagnoses what he thinks are the ‘tiresome’arguments of the Eleatic philosopher Parmenides as stemming from anunfortunate logicalnaivety towhicheven‘the leastphilosophicalofus’wouldnotbeprone:‘OneideawhichtheGreeksatthisstagefounditdifficulttoabsorbwas thatawordmighthavemore thanonemeaning.Theirdifficultynodoubthadsomethingtodowiththeproximityoftheprimitivemagicalstageatwhichawordanditsobjectformedasingleunity’(44).CurrentunderstandingsofearlyGreekpoetryandevenphilosophers suchasHeraclitus showquiteclearly thatGuthrie’sdiagnosisisatbestamisunderstanding.Modernreaderswouldperhapsdo well to read such comments with a very critical eye. In short, we shouldcertainlyrecognisetheimportanceofGuthrie’sclearandconfidentinsistenceontheimportanceofculturalcontext,evenifwemightnotaccepthistendencytoattribute anything he finds mistaken or foolish to a legacy from ‘primitive’thought, nor the manner in which he is inclined to describe those traditionalsocieties.There are some heroes in Guthrie’s story. Pythagoras looms larger than he

mightinamoremodernaccountofthedevelopmentofGreekphilosophy,inpartbecauseGuthrie is relatively optimistic about the amount that can securely beattributed to theearliestphasesof thePythagoreanmovement.Pythagoras is achampion of order and of form, a distinctive voice in the otherwiseoverwhelminglymaterialisticoutlookofthePresocraticphilosophers.Socratesisa humanist ahead of his time and a defender of good sense in the face of ‘anatmosphere of scepticism’ encouraged by Presocratic natural philosophy andpeddledbythesophistswhoflockedtoAthensandbenefittedfromthelicencegenerated by a buoyant and democratic Athens. And Plato – perhaps mostsurprisingofall– isadefenderof‘theideaof thecity-stateasanindependentpolitical,economic,andsocialunit’(75)inthefaceofMacedonianconquestandimperialism.Aristotle is, forGuthrie, ‘anIonianwith thebloodofscientists inhisveins’(113),amanofrobustcommonsenseandthereforeaversetoPlato’sflights away from the everyday to a mysterious transcendent reality, but whonevertheless remained committed to some of the central tenets of Platonism,principallyteleologyandthepriorityofform.GuthrieeventakeshispictureofAristotle the scientist so far as to claim that Aristotle turned to practicalphilosophyintheEthicsandPoliticsonlyoutofasenseofduty;hewould,weare told,much rather have remainedwith ‘the delights of the laboratory’, buteven philosophers find their lives affected by the governance of the societyaroundthem(142).Thisunusualemphasisaside,it isworthremarkingthattheaccount of Aristotle in the final three chapters is a magnificent example of

clarityandconcision;Guthriemanagesinjustoverfortypagestocoverall themajor areas of Aristotle’s thought with a confident authority. (Consider, forexample, the accountofAristotle’s theoryofperception at 136–9: a topic thatcontinues togenerateagreatdealof interpretativecontroversy.)Therearealsosome important omissions from the story. In a text of this kind it is perhapsunderstandablethattherearerelativelyfewreferencestootherscholars,besidescourteous nods to his senior Cambridge colleagues F. M. Cornford and R.Hackforth(bothalsoLaurenceProfessors)andrelativelylittlesenseofscholarlydisagreement. But there are other choices worth emphasising. There is littleinterest in the methodological questions that arise from the difficulties ofinterpreting texts written in often oblique forms – verse, for example, ordialogues–orwhichsurviveonlyinfragmentsorlaterreports.Thereisabriefnote about the literary richness of the Platonic dialogues (111–12) but for themost part these concerns are set aside in favour of the pace of exposition.Guthrie also decides not to pursue the story of ancient philosophybeyond thetimeofAristotle,onthequestionablegroundsthattheHellenisticworldwasnot,afterall,purelyGreekanymore.Instead,andperhapsreflectingconcernsabouthisownage,Guthriesawitasaworldofindividualismanddespairinthefaceofincreasinglydominantinternationalpowers.AvolumeonHellenisticphilosophywasapparentlyplannedforinclusioninhislaterAHistoryofGreekPhilosophybuthewasunabletobeginworkonitbeforehisdeath.GuthrieconceivedofthestudyofancientphilosophyasabranchofClassics

andthere is littleevidence in thisbookthatamodernphilosophershouldhaveanymoreinterestinhisGreekpredecessorsthanamodernbiologistwouldintheearlypioneers inhisparticular field.Certainly, there ismuch lessemphasisontheintricaciesofargumentandthecutandthrustofdialecticalthinkingthancanbe found inmodern books and journal articles on ancient philosophical texts.And we might also note little interest on Guthrie’s part in certain Platonicdialogues–Parmenides,Sophist,Theaetetus–thatlendthemselvesmorereadilyto suchanalytical stylesofphilosophical engagement.TheGreekphilosophersare to hismind not somuch philosopherswithwhomwemight now begin afruitful conversation but are rather important historical figureswhosewritingsare to be understood and placed each in their proper place in relation to oneanother.ThejobathandistounderstandandappreciatetheGreekphilosophers’viewsintheirownhistoricalandculturalcontext.

Somefurtherreading:

H.Cherniss,Aristotle’sCriticism ofPresocraticPhilosophy (1935);Aristotle’sCriticismofPlatoandtheAcademy(1944),JohnsHopkinsPress.

E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (1951), University of CaliforniaPress.

W.K.C.Guthrie,‘AristotleasaHistorianofPhilosophy:SomePreliminaries’,JournalofHellenicStudies77(1957),35–41.

——AHistoryofGreekPhilosophyVolumeI:TheEarlierPresocraticsandthePythagoreans(1962);VolumeII:ThePresocraticTraditionfromParmenidestoDemocritus(1965);VolumeIII:TheFifth-CenturyEnlightenment–Part1:TheSophists;Part2:Socrates(1971);AHistoryofGreekPhilosophyVolumeIV:Plato–theManandhisDialogues:EarlierPeriod(1975);AHistoryofGreek Philosophy Volume V: The Later Plato and the Academy (1978); AHistory of Greek Philosophy Volume VI: Aristotle: An Encounter (1981),CambridgeUniversityPress.

G.E.R.Lloyd,‘WilliamKeithChambersGuthrie,1906–1981’,ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy68(1983),561–77.

JamesWarrenisaSeniorLecturerinClassicsattheUniversityofCambridgeandFellowandDirectorofStudiesinPhilosophyatCorpusChristiCollege.

1GREEKWAYSOFTHINKING

Toindicatethescopeandaimofthefollowingpagesitwillbebesttosayatoncethat they are based on a short course of lectures designed for an audience ofundergraduates who were reading any subject other than Classics. It wasassumed that thosewhowere listening knewnoGreek, but that an interest insomeother subject, such asEnglish,HistoryorMathematics (for therewas atleast one mathematician among them), or perhaps nothing more than generalreading,hadgiventhemtheimpressionthatGreekideaswereat thebottomofmuchinlaterEuropeanthoughtandconsequentlyadesiretoknowmoreexactlywhattheseGreekideashadbeeninthefirstplace.Theyhad,onemightsuppose,encounteredthemalready,butinaseriesofdistortingmirrors,accordingasthisor that writer in England, Germany or elsewhere had used them for his ownpurposesandtingedthemwiththequalityofhisownmindandage,or, itmaybe,wasunconsciouslyinfluencedbythemintheformulationofhisviews.SomehadreadworksofPlatoandAristotleintranslation,andmusthavefoundpartsofthempuzzlingbecausetheyaroseoutoftheintellectualclimateofthefourthcenturyB.C.inGreece,whereastheirreadershadbeenledbacktothemfromtheclimateofalaterageandadifferentcountry.Acting on these assumptions I tried, and shall now try for any readerswho

maybeinasimilarposition,togivesomeaccountofGreekphilosophyfromitsbeginnings,toexplainPlatoandAristotleinthelightoftheirpredecessorsratherthan theirsuccessors,and toconveysome ideaof thecharacteristic featuresoftheGreekwayof thinkingandoutlookon theworld.1 I shallmake littleornoreference to their influenceon thinkersof laterEuropeorofourowncountry.Thisisnotdueonlytothelimitationsimposedbymyownignorance,butalsotoabeliefthatitwillbemoreenjoyableandprofitableforareadertodetectsuchinfluenceanddrawcomparisonsforhimself,outofhisownreadingandsphereofinterests.Myobjectwillbe,bytalkingabouttheGreeksforthemselvesandfortheirownsake,togivethematerialforsuchcomparisonandasolidbasisonwhich itmay rest. A certainwork on Existentialism shows, so I have read, a

‘genealogicaltree’oftheexistentialistphilosophy.AtitsrootisplacedSocrates,apparentlyon theground thathewas theauthorof thesaying ‘Know thyself’.Apart from thequestionwhetherSocratesmeantby thesewords anything likewhat the twentieth-century Existentialist means, this ignores the fact that thesayingwasnottheinventionofSocratesbutaproverbialpieceofGreekwisdomwhoseauthor,ifonemustattributeittosomeone,canonlybesaidtohavebeenthegodApollo.AtanyrateitwasknowntoSocrates,andeveryotherGreek,asoneoftheage-oldpreceptswhichwereinscribedonthewallsofApollo’stempleat Delphi. That it belonged to the teaching of Apolline religion is notunimportant, and theexample, thoughsmall,will serve to illustrate the sortofdistortionwhichevenabriefoutlineofancientthoughtmayhelptoprevent.TheapproachwhichIhavesuggestedshouldhavetheadvantageofshowing

up certain important differences between the Greek ways of thought and ourown,which tend to be obscuredwhen (for example)Greek atomic science orPlato’stheoryoftheStateareuprootedfromtheirnaturalsoilintheearlierandcontemporary Greek world and regarded in isolation as the forerunners ofmodern atomic physics or political theory. For all the immense debt whichEurope,andwithEuropeEngland,owetoGreekculture, theGreeksremain inmany respects a remarkably foreign people, and to get inside their mindsrequires a real effort, for itmeans unthinkingmuch that has become part andparcelofourmentalequipmentsothatwecarryitaboutwithusunquestioninglyandforthemostpartunconsciously.InthegreatdaysofVictorianscholarship,whentheClassicswereregardedasfurnishingmodels,notonlyintellectualbutmoral, for the English gentleman to follow, there was perhaps a tendency tooveremphasizesimilaritiesandlosesightofdifferences.Thescholarshipofourownday,inmanyrespectsinferior,hasthisadvantage,thatitisbasedbothonamore intensive studyofGreekhabitsof thought and linguisticusageandonamoreextensiveacquaintancewiththementalequipmentofearlierpeoplesbothinGreeceandelsewhere.Thanksinparttotheprogressofanthropology,andtotheworkofclassicalscholarsacuteenoughtoseetherelevancetotheirstudiesofsomeoftheanthropologists’results,wecanclaimwithoutarrogancetobeinabetter position to appreciate the hidden foundations of Greek thought, thepresuppositionswhich theyaccepted tacitlyaswe todayaccept theestablishedrulesoflogicorthefactoftheearth’srotation.Andhereitmustbesaidfrankly,thoughwithnowishtodwellonadifficulty

attheoutset,thattounderstandGreekwaysofthinkingwithoutsomeknowledgeof the Greek language is not easy. Language and thought are inextricablyinterwoven,andinteractononeanother.Wordshaveahistoryandassociations,whichforthosewhousethemcontributeanimportantpartofthemeaning,not

least because their effect is unconsciously felt rather than intellectuallyapprehended.Evenincontemporarylanguages,beyondafewwordsformaterialobjects,it ispracticallyimpossibletotranslateawordsoastogiveexactlythesameimpressiontoaforeignerasisgivenbytheoriginaltothosewhohearitintheirowncountry.WiththeGreeks,thesedifficultiesaregreatlyincreasedbythelapseof timeanddifferenceofcultural environment,whichwhen twomodernEuropeannationsare inquestion is so largelysharedbetween them.Whenwehavetorelyonsingle-wordEnglishequivalentslike‘justice’or‘virtue’withoutanacquaintancewiththevarioususagesoftheirGreekcounterpartsindifferentcontexts,we not only lose a great deal of the content of theGreek words butimport our own English associations which are often quite foreign to theintention of the Greek. It will therefore be necessary sometimes to introduceGreek terms, and explain as clearly as possible how they were used. If thisshouldhave theeffectofenticingsometo learnGreek,orrefurbishanyGreekwhichmayhavebeen learnedat schoolanddropped in favourofother things,that will be all to the good. But the present account will continue on theassumptionthatanyGreekwordusedneedstobeexplained.Beforegoing further,a fewexampleswouldperhapsbehelpful tobringout

mymeaningwhenIsaythatifwewanttounderstandanancientGreekthinkerlikePlatoitisimportanttoknowsomethingofthehistory,affinitiesandusageofatanyratethemostimportantofthetermswhichheemploys,ratherthanrestingcontentwith looseEnglishequivalents like‘justice’, ‘virtue’,and‘god’,whichareallthatwefindinmosttranslations.IcannotbeginbetterthanbyaquotationfromCornford’sprefacetohisowntranslationoftheRepublic:

Manykey-words,suchas‘music’,‘gymnastic’,‘virtue’,‘philosophy’,haveshiftedtheirmeaningoracquiredfalseassociationsforEnglishears.OnewhoopenedJowett’sversionatrandomandlightedonthestatement(at549b)thatthebestguardianforaman’s‘virtue’is‘philosophytemperedwithmusic’,mightrunawaywiththeideathat,inordertoavoidirregularrelationswithwomen,hehadbetterplaytheviolinintheintervalsofstudyingmetaphysics.Theremaybesometruthinthis;butonlyafterreadingwidelyinotherpartsofthebookwouldhediscoverthatitwasnotquitewhatPlatomeantbydescribinglogos,combinedwithmusike,astheonlysuresafeguardofarete.

Letus take three termswhichwillbegenerallyagreed tostandforconceptsfundamentalinthewritingsofanymoralormetaphysicalphilosopherinwhichtheyoccur–thewordswhichwetranslaterespectivelyas‘justice’,‘virtue’,and‘god’.Thewordtranslated‘justice’isdike,fromwhichcomesanadjectivedikaios,

‘just’, and from that againa longer formof thenoun,dikaiosyne, ‘the stateofbeingdikaios’ .ThelastwordistheonegenerallyusedbyPlatointhefamousdiscussionofthenatureof‘justice’intheRepublic.

Now the original meaning of dike may have been literally a way or path.Whetherornot that is itsetymologicalorigin, itsearliestsignificanceinGreekliterature is certainlynomore than theway inwhich a certain classof peopleusuallybehaves,orthenormalcourseofnature.Thereisnoimplicationthatitisthe rightway, nor does theword contain any suggestion of obligation. In theOdyssey,whenPenelopeisremindingtheservantswhatagoodmasterOdysseuswas,shesaysthatheneverdidorsaidanythingthatwascrueloroverweening,nordidhehavefavourites, ‘as is thedikeof lords’– i.e. it is theway theyarewont tobehave.WhenEumaeus theswineherdentertainshismasterunawares,he apologizes for the simplicity of his fare by saying: ‘What I offer is little,thoughwillinglygiven,forthatisthedikeofserfslikemyself,whogoeverinfear.’ It is, he means, the normal thing, what is to be expected. Describing adisease, the medical writer Hippocrates says, ‘Death does not follow thesesymptomsinthecourseofdike’,meaningsimply,‘doesnotnormallyfollow’.1Itwaseasyforsuchawordtoslipfromthispurelynon-moralsenseofwhat

wastobeexpectedinthenormalcourseofevents,andtotakeonsomethingoftheflavourwhichweimplywhenwespeakof‘whatisexpectedofaman’,i.e.thathewillactdecently,payhisdebtsandsoforth.Thistransitioncameaboutearly, and in the poetry ofAeschylus, a century before Plato,Dike is alreadypersonifiedasthemajesticspiritofrighteousnessseatedonathronebythesideofZeus.Yet it is impossible that the earliermeaningof theword shouldhaveceased to colour theminds of themenwho used it, andwho as children hadlearned to read from the pages of Homer. Indeed a kind of petrified relicremainedthroughoutintheuseoftheaccusative,diken,asaprepositiontomean‘like’or‘afterthemannerof’.At the conclusion of the attempts to define ‘justice’ in the Republic, after

several definitions have been rejected which more or less correspond to ournotionsofwhatwemeanbytheword,theonewhichisfinallyacceptedisthis:justice, dikaiosyne, the state of the man who follows dike, is no more than‘minding your ownbusiness’, doing the thing, or following theway,which isproperlyyourown,andnotmixingyourselfupinthewaysofotherpeopleandtryingtodotheirjobsforthem.Doesitsometimesseemtousratheramouselikeresulttobebornofsuchmountainsofdiscussion?Ifso,itmaymakeitalittlemoreinterestingtoreflectthatwhatPlatohasdoneistorejectthemeaningsofthewordwhichwerecurrent inhisownday, andwithapossiblyunconscioushistoricalsensetogobacktotheoriginalmeaningoftheword.Itwasrootedinthe class-distinctions of the old Homeric aristocracy, where right action wassummedupinaman’sknowinghisproperplaceandstickingtoit,andtoPlato,whowas founding a new aristocracy, class-distinctions – based this time on a

clearly thought-out division of functions determined by psychologicalconsiderations, but class-distinctions nevertheless – were the mainstay of thestate.Oursecondexampleisthewordgenerallyrendered‘virtue’.Thisisarete.Itis

usedinthepluralaswellasthesingular,andthefirstthingtograspaboutitisthat,asAristotlesaid,itisarelativeterm,notoneusedabsolutelyastheEnglish‘virtue’is.Aretemeantbeinggoodatsomething,anditwasnaturalforaGreekon hearing the word to ask: ‘The arete of what or whom?’ It is commonlyfollowedbyadependentgenitiveoralimitingadjective.(Imakenoapologyforintroducingthesegrammaticalterms,forthepointIwanttobringhomeisthatgrammar and thought, language and philosophy, are inextricably intertwined,and that,while it is only too easy todismiss something as ‘apurely linguisticmatter’,therecaninfactbenosuchthingasadivorcebetweentheexpressionofa thought and its content.)Arete then is awordwhichby itself is incomplete.There is the arete of wrestlers, riders, generals, shoemakers, slaves. There ispoliticalarete,domesticarete,militaryarete.Itmeantinfact‘efficiency’.InthefifthcenturyB.C.aclassofitinerantteachersarose,theSophists,whoclaimedtoimpartarete,especiallythatofthepoliticianandthepublicspeaker.Thisdidnotmeanthattheirteachingwasprimarilyethical,thoughthemoreconservativeofthem certainly included morality in their conception of political virtue.Whattheywishedtoemphasizewasitspracticalandimmediatelyusefulnature.Aretewas vocational, and the correspondence course in business efficiency, had itexisted in ancient Greece, would undoubtedly have had the word areteprominentlydisplayedinitsadvertisements.Itcouldofcoursebeusedbyitselfwhentherewasnodoubtofthemeaning.

Souseditwouldbeunderstoodtostandforthekindofexcellencemostprizedby a particular community. Thus among Homer’s warrior-chiefs it stood forvalour.ItsusebySocrates,Plato,andAristotlehadanelementofnovelty.Theyqualifieditbytheadjectiveanthropine,‘human’,thusgivingitageneralsense–theexcellenceofamanassuch,efficiencyinliving–andsurprisedpeoplebysuggestingthattheydidnotknowwhatthiswas,butthatitwassomethingwhichmustbesearchedfor.Thesearchmeant–notethelegacyofareteasawordofpractical import– thediscoveryof the function–ergon, theworkor job–ofman.Justasasoldier,apoliticianandashoemakerhaveacertainfunction,so,theyargued, theremustbeageneral functionwhichweallhave toperform invirtueofourcommonhumanity.Findthatout,andyouwillknowinwhathumanexcellenceorareteconsists.Thisgeneralization,whichalonebringsthemeaningofthewordanywhereneartothatof‘virtue’,wastosomeextentaninnovationofthephilosophers,andevenwiththemtheinfluenceofitsessentiallypractical

importneverdisappeared.Aretethenmeantfirstofallskillorefficiencyataparticularjob,anditwillbe

agreedthatsuchefficiencydependsonaproperunderstandingorknowledgeofthe job in hand. It is not therefore surprising that when the philosophersgeneralizedthenotiontoincludetheproperperformanceofhisfunctionbyanyhuman being as such, its connexion with knowledge should have persisted.Everyone has heard of the ‘Socratic paradox’, his statement that ‘virtue isknowledge’.Perhapsitbeginstolookalittlelessparadoxicalwhenweseethatwhat itwouldnaturallymean toa contemporarywasmore like: ‘Youcan’tbeefficientunlessyoutakethetroubletolearnthejob.’ThethirdexampleistheGreekwordforgod–theos.Whenwearetryingto

understand Plato’s religious views, we as students of religion or philosophyattachimportancetothequestionofwhetherhewasapolytheistoramonotheist–twowordsinvented,fromGreekrootsindeed,butinmoderntimes,tocoveramodern, non-Greek classification. We compare the words of Plato (often intranslation)withthoseofChristian,Indianorothertheologians.Butperhapsitisevenmore important to takeaccountofhisnative language,bearing inmindagoodpointmadebytheGermanscholarWilamowitzthattheos,theGreekwordwhich we have in mind when we speak of Plato’s god, has primarily apredicative force.That is to say, theGreeksdidnot, asChristiansor Jewsdo,first assert the existence ofGod and then proceed to enumerate his attributes,saying‘Godisgood’,‘Godislove’andsoforth.Rathertheyweresoimpressedorawedbythethingsinlifeornatureremarkableeitherforjoyorfearthattheysaid‘thisisagod’or‘thatisagod’.TheChristiansays‘Godislove’,theGreek‘Loveistheos’,or‘agod’.Asanotherwriterhasexplainedit:‘Bysayingthatlove, or victory, is god, or, to be more accurate, a god, was meant first andforemost that it ismore than human, not subject to death, everlasting…Anypower,anyforceweseeatworkintheworld,whichisnotbornwithusandwillcontinueafterwearegonecouldthusbecalledagod,andmostofthemwere.’1Inthisstateofmind,andwiththissensitivenesstothesuperhumancharacter

ofmanythingswhichhappentous,andwhichgiveus,itmaybe,suddenstabsofjoyorpainwhichwedonotunderstand,aGreekpoetcouldwritelineslike:‘Recognitionbetweenfriendsistheos’.Itisastateofmindwhichobviouslyhasnosmallbearingonthemuch-discussedquestionofmonotheismorpolytheisminPlato,ifindeeditdoesnotrobthequestionofmeaningaltogether.CornfordinhisinaugurallectureatCambridgeremarkedthatphilosophicaldiscussioninanygivenepochisgovernedtoasurprisingextentbyasetofassumptionswhichareseldomornevermentioned.Theseassumptionsare‘thatgroundworkofcurrentconceptionssharedbyallmenofanygivencultureandnevermentionedbecause

itistakenforgrantedasobvious’.HequotesWhiteheadaswriting:‘Whenyouarecriticizingthephilosophyofanepoch,donotchieflydirectyourattentiontothose intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly todefend.Therewillbesomefundamentalassumptionswhichadherentsofallthevariantsystemswithintheepochunconsciouslypresuppose.’Thatiswhereaknowledgeofthelanguagecomesin.Bystudyingthewaysin

which theGreeks used theirwords – not only the philosophers, but poets andoratorsandhistoriansinavarietyofcontextsandsituations–weareabletogetacertaininsightintotheunconsciouspresuppositionsoftheepochinwhichtheylived.Asanotherexampleoftheunconsciouspresuppositionsoftheepoch,wemay

remind ourselves how closewere theGreeks in early times, andmany of thecommonpeoplethroughouttheclassicalperiod,tothemagicalstageofthought.Magicisaprimitiveformofappliedscience.Whetherornotspiritsorgodsarethought toenterat somestage into theprocess, their actionsarecompelledbythemaninpossessionofthepropermagicaltechniquenolessthaniftheywereinanimate objects. The sorcerer sets in train a certain sequence of events, andcauseandeffectthenfollowwiththesamecertaintyasifonetookgoodaimwitharifleandpulledthetrigger.Appliedscienceisbasedonlawsofnature.Sowasmagic,thoughitslawsweresuchaswehaveceasedtobelievein.Fundamentalwas the law of sympathy, which posited a natural connexion between certainthingswhich to us seem to have no such connexion at all. Its effectwas thatwheretwothingsarethusconnected,thenwhateveroneofthemdoesorsufferstheotherwillinevitablydoorsuffertoo.Thissortofconnexionexistsbetweenamanandhisimageorportrait.Itexistsalsobetweenthemanandanythingwhichoncewaspartofhimlikehair-trimmingsornail-parings,orevenclotheswhichthroughclosecontacthavebecomechargedwithhispersonality.Hencethewell-known practices of ill-treating a doll which has been given the name of anenemy,orburning(withtheproperincantations)hishairorathreadofhiscoat.Sympathy existsmoreover between things or people and their names.Even towrite the name of an enemy on a lead plate, transfix it and bury it (thusconsigningittothepowersoftheunderworld),couldinjureorkillhim.Thisisapracticewhich,thoughprimitiveintheextreme,wasrifeintheneighbourhoodofAthens itself in the fourthcenturyB.C., that is, in the lifetimesofPlato andAristotle.To peoplewho think like this, the name is clearly as real as the thing, and

belongsverycloselytoit.‘Aname’,assomebodyhassaid,‘isasmuchapartofa person as a limb.’ Now Plato’s dialogue Cratylus deals with the origin oflanguage,andislargelyconcernedwiththequestionwhetherthenamesofthings

belong to them ‘by nature’ or ‘by convention’,whether they are attached as anaturalpartofthethingoronlyarbitrarilyimposedbyman.Thequestionsoundsnonsensical, and there seems to be a thick screenbetweenus andpeoplewhocouldspendhoursdiscussingit.Butitbecomesmoreinterestinginthelightofwhat Ihavebeensaying,andof theworksofanthropologists like thoseof theFrenchschoolrepresentedbyLévy-Bruhl,whoarguesforwhathecallsthepre-logical mentality of primitive man, a stage of human development when theactualprocessesofthoughtaredifferentfromoursandwhatwecalllogichasnoplace.Hehasbeencriticizedforthis,andIthinkrightly.Itisnotthatthehumanmindeverworkedonentirelydifferentlines,butsimplythatinthethenstateofknowledge the premises fromwhichmen reasonedwere so different that theyinevitablycametowhatareinoureyesveryoddconclusions.Theresultsarethesame in either case. Certain things are connected or even identified in theirmindsinwhatweregardasanunreasonableway.ThepointofviewofCratylusinPlato’sdialoguebetraysjustthestateofmindinwhichmagicalassociationispossiblewhenhesays: ‘It seems tomequitesimple.Themanwhoknows thenames knows the things.’ Socrates asks him if he is to understand him asmeaning that themanwhohasdiscovered anamehasdiscovered the thingofwhichitisthename,andheagreesthatthatisexactlywhathewantstoconvey.Itisinterestinghow,whenheisdrivenbackbytheargument,hefinallyresortstoasupernaturalexplanationoftheoriginofwords:‘Ithinkthetruestaccountofthesematters is this,Socrates, that somepowergreater thanhuman laiddownthefirstnamesforthings,sothattheymustinevitablybetherightones.’Similarconceptionsmayhelpwhenwecomelatertoconsidertheconception

of logos inHeraclitus, which seems so puzzlingly to be at the same time theword he utters, the truth which it contains, and the external reality which heconceiveshimselftobedescribing,andtowhichhegavethenameoffire.ThePythagoreans, being a religiousbrotherhoodaswell as aphilosophical school,show many traces of it. The earlier of them maintained that ‘things werenumbers’.Todemonstrateittheysaid:‘Look!1isapoint(•),2aline( ),3a surface ( ), and 4 a solid ( ). Thus you have solid bodies generated fromnumbers.’Wemaycallthisanunwarrantableandindeedincomprehensibleleapfromtheabstractintellectualconceptionsofmathematicstothesolidrealitiesofnature.Thepyramidwhichtheyhavemadeofthenumber4isnotapyramidofstone or wood, but non-material, a mere concept of the mind. Aristotle wasalready too far removed from theirmentality tounderstand it, andcomplainedthat they ‘madeweightlessentities theelementsofentitieswhichhadweight’.But the anthropologist tells us again: ‘Pre-logical mentality, which has noabstractconceptsatcommand…doesnotdistinctlyseparate thenumber from

theobjectsnumbered.’Numbersinfact,likeeverythingelse–whetherobjectsorwhatweshoulddistinguishfromobjectsasmereconventionalsymbols,wordsor names – are endowed with magical properties and affinities of their own.Some knowledge of these facts should help us to approach these earlyPythagoreansalittlemoresympathetically.Beforeleavingthissubjectawarningmustbeuttered(strangeasitmayseem)

againstgivingtoomuchweighttowhatIhavebeensaying.Pythagoraswasnotaprimitive.Theanalogywiththeprimitivemindtakesusacertainwayandnofurther.Hewasamathematicalgenius.Hediscoveredamongother things thatthe concordant notes in the musical octave correspond to fixed mathematicalratios,andwhattheratioswere.Hismathematicalbenthadaprofoundinfluenceonallhis thought.Yethisunconsciousassumptionsweremoulding it too,andthesortofconsiderationshereputforward,ifcautiouslyandcriticallyappliedtowhatwe know of his doctrines,may help to let us into the secret of some ofthem.Theymust, however, bekept strictly in their place.The anthropologicalapproach to the Greeks is so fascinating that it has led many a good scholarastray. Itmaybe thatmagicandwitchcraftwere,asIhavesaid, rife inPlato’stime. It is equally important that he condemned them roundly. Ifwhat I havebeen saying leaves the impression that the Greek thinkers were a kind ofsuperiormedicine-menwith a dash of rational thought thrown in, itwill havebeen worse than useless. What it should do is to give some idea of thedifficulties with which they had to contend, and so if anything heighten ourappreciationoftheirachievementswhenwecometothem.MoreoverthehistoryofGreekthoughtisinoneofitsaspectstheprocessofemancipationfromsuchpopular preconceptions, many of which can be studied to-day among thepeasants of modern Greece, and this in itself made some reference to themadvisableasanintroduction.Inmakinganhistoricalstudyofthephilosophyofacertainepoch,wemustof

course adopt a definition of thewordwhichwill apply to the thought of thattime.Letusdescribeitthereforeinawaywhichmightnotbeagreeduponbyallwhocallthemselvesphilosophersto-day,butwhichissuitableinconsideringthephilosophers of Greece. I myself should claim nevertheless, even thoughpreparedfordisagreement, that thedivisionsof itssubject-matterwhichIshalladoptforourpresentpurposesareasrelevanttotheintellectualproblemsofto-dayastheyweretothoseoftheancients.Ithastwomainsides,andasitreachesmaturitydevelopsathird.1.Speculativeorscientific.This isman’s attempt to explain the universe in

whichhe lives, themacrocosm.Nowadays the special sciencesof naturehavedevelopedsofarthattheyaredistinguishedfromphilosophy,andthelatterterm

is reserved, in thisaspectof it, formetaphysics.Butweshallbespeakingofatimewhen science andphilosophywere both in their infancy andno linewasdrawnbetweenthem.2.Practical (including ethical and political). The study ofman himself, the

microcosm,hisnatureandplaceintheworld,hisrelationswithhisfellows.Themotive for this is not usually, as with speculation about the nature of theuniverse,purecuriosity,butthepracticaloneoffindingouthowhumanlifeandconductcanbeimproved.Chronologically we shall find that in Greece the first appeared before the

second, thoughherewemustdistinguishbetweencasual reflectionsonhumanlife and conduct, on the one hand, andmoral philosophyon the other. ‘Moralreflection, in consequence of the demands of life lived in common, precededreflectionaboutnature,whereascriticalreflectionontheprinciplesofconduct,onaccountofthesesamedemands,onlybeginslate.’ThatremarkofHenriBerr,inhisprefacetoRobin’sGreekThought,wasmadewithageneralapplication.ApplyittoGreece,andweseethatthegnomicanddidacticpoetryofaHesiod,Solon orTheognis – full of saws and aphorisms – precedes the beginnings ofnaturalphilosophyinIoniainthesixthcentury.Ontheotherhand,foranythingthat can be called a philosophy of human conduct – an attempt to base ouractionsonasystematicco-ordinationofknowledgeandtheory–wemustwaituntilthecloseofthefifthcentury.ItcomeswiththeSophistsandSocrates,whenthe firstwave of enthusiasm over natural philosophy had spent itself, and theconfidenceofitsadherentswasbeingshakenbyscepticism.3.Isaidthatasphilosophygrowsupitdevelopsathirdside.Thisiscritical

philosophy,includinglogicandepistemologyortheoryofknowledge.Itisonlyat a comparatively advanced stage of thought that people begin to askthemselves about the efficiency of the instrumentswithwhich they have beenprovided by nature for getting into touchwith theworld outside.What is ourknowledgeultimatelybasedon?Isittheevidenceofthesenses?Weknowthatthesensesmaysometimesdelude.Haveweanyproofthattheyeverbringusintocontactwithreality?Areourmentalprocessessound?Wehadbettergettoworkontheseprocessesthemselves,analyseandtestthem,beforeweallowourselvestothinkanymoreabouttheworldoutside.Thesearethequestionsthatbelongtocriticalphilosophy.Ittakesthoughtitselfforitssubject-matter.Itisphilosophybecomeself-conscious.Thewayispavedforitassoonasaphilosopherbeginstodoubt the evidenceof the senses, asHeraclitus andParmenidesdid in theirdifferentwaysinGreeceoftheearlyfifthcentury.Itdidnotmakemuchprogressuntil the later years ofPlato, but itwill be interesting aswegoon, to see theneedforsuchasciencegraduallymakingitselffelt.

Returningtothefirsttwobranchesofphilosophy–themetaphysicalandtheethical – some philosopherswill be equally interested in both and succeed incombining them in one single, integrated system. That was the aim of Plato,whosephilosophicpurposewastocombattwocomplementarytendenciesofhisage:(i)intellectualscepticism,whichdeniedthepossibilityofknowledgeontheground that therewereno lastingrealities tobeknown: (ii)moralanarchy, theviewthattherewerenopermanentanduniversalstandardsofconduct,nohighercriteria of action than what happened to seem best to a particular man at aparticular moment. As a comprehensive solution to the double problem heofferedhisdoctrineofForms,towhichweshallcomeinitsdueplace.More commonly, different thinkers are attracted to one or other of the two

sides,asSocratestothesphereofconductorAnaxagorastocosmicspeculations.Usuallyalsothewholethoughtofaparticularagewillinclinemoretoonethantotheother,foritdependsinpartatleastonthestateofsociety.Philosophersdonotthinkinavoid,andtheirresultsmaybedescribedasaproductof

temperament×experience×previousphilosophies.

In other words they are the reaction of a certain temperament to the externalworldasitpresentsitselftothatparticularman,influenced,inthecaseofmostphilosophers,byreflectionontheremainsofpreviousthinkers.Andwemaybesurethat,justasnotwomen’stemperamentsareexactlyalike,sonotwomen’sexternalworlds–i.e.experience–areexactlyalike.Thatiswhytheanswerstotheultimatequestionsofphilosophyhavebeenso

widely different. Two men of contrasting temperament are bound to givedifferent answers to philosophical questions. Indeed it is probable that theanswers will not even be contradictory; they will simply be impossible tocorrelateatall.Theywillnotonlydifferincontent,theywillbedifferentkindsof answer. An examplemaymake this clearer. Suppose twomen are arguingaboutwhattheworldismadeof.Onesaysitisallwater,theotherthatitisallair.Thentheyarebothansweringthesamequestioninthesameway,andsimplygivingcontradictoryanswers.Theyhaveabasisforargument,eachmayadducefactsoftheircommonobservationinsupportofhisview,andthereisachancethatonemayendbyconvincingtheother,Butsupposethequestion–Whatafterallistheworld?–isbeingdebatedonalesscrudelymaterial,morephilosophiclevel,andonemanassertsthatitispositiveandnegativechargesofelectricity,theotherthatitisathoughtinthemindofGod.Itisunlikelythatthetwocouldspendaprofitablehourofargumentormakemuchprogresstogether.Theyaredifferentsortsofmen.Thesecondisprobablyquitereadytoadmitwhatthefirst

says about electricity, but will not allow it to affect his answer. Similarly thefirst,thoughmorelikelytodenythetruthofwhattheothersays,willprobablyreplythatitmayormaynotbetrue,butinanycaseisirrelevant.Thetwoanswersbelongtothetwoeverlastinglyopposedphilosophicaltypes,

which betray themselves by their replies to what Aristotle called the eternalquestion:‘Whatisreality?’Thisisnotsuchanimpossiblequestionasitsounds.Itsimplymeans:inconsideringanything,whetheritbethewholeUniverseoraparticular object in it,what do you regard as essential to it,which youwouldmentionatonce if asked thequestion ‘What is it?’andwhatdoyou regardassecondary and unimportant? Anyone can easily find out to which of the twotypeshebelongs.Supposethequestiontobe‘Whatisthisdesk?’andconsiderwhich of the two following answers appeals to you as the most immediatelyrelevant:(a)wood,(b)somethingtoputbooksandpaperson.Thetwoanswers,it will be seen, are not contradictory. They are of different kinds. And theimmediateandinstinctivechoiceofoneratherthantheothershowsonetobebytemperamentinclinedtomaterialismortoteleology.The two types may be clearly discerned among the ancient Greeks. Some

definedthingswithreferencetotheirmatter,orastheGreeksalsocalledit,‘theout-of-which’.Otherssawtheessentialinpurposeorfunction,withwhichtheyincluded form, for (as is pointed out e.g. by Plato in theCratylus) structuresubservesfunctionandisdependentonit.Thedeskhastheshapeithasbecauseofthepurposeithastoserve.Ashuttleissoshapedbecauseithastoperformacertainfunctionfortheweaver.Andsotheprimaryoppositionwhichpresenteditself to the Greek mind was that between matter and form, always with thenotion of function included in that of form. And in answering the eternalquestion, theIonianthinkersandlater theatomistsgavetheirreplyin termsofmatter,thePythagoreans,Socrates,PlatoandAristotleintermsofform.This division of philosophers into materialists and ideologists – matter-

philosophersandform-philosophers–isperhapsthemostfundamentalthatcanbemade inanyage,ourownincluded.Since,moreover,bothsidesareclearlyandvigorouslyrepresentedintheGreektraditionfromthestart,weshalldowelltokeepthedistinctionintheforefrontofourminds.

Notes

1Itshouldbesaidatoncethatthishasbeendone,aswellasitiseverlikelytobe,byF.M.Cornford

inBeforeandAfterSocrates (CambridgeUniversityPress,1932).The fact that thisbook isoutofprint,andunderpresentconditionslikelytoremainsoforsometime,isthebestjustificationforthepresentwork.Readerswhoareluckyenoughtoobtainit,however,willfindthatCornford’sapproachisdifferent,andalsothatthisbook,beingslightlylonger,containsrathermoreinactualmaterial.

1Odyssey,iv,689ff.,xiv,58ff.;Hippocrates,devolneribuscapitis3.1G.M.A.Grube,Plato’sThought(Methuen,1935),p.150.

2MATTERANDFORM(IoniansandPythagoreans)

Wesawinthelastchapterthatphilosophyasweshallbeconcernedwithithastwo main sides, dealing on the one hand with the nature and origins of theUniverseat largeandon theotherwithhuman lifeandconduct;and IwarnedanywhomightbeprimarilyinterestedinethicalandpoliticalthoughtthatwhenwegobacktothebeginningsofEuropeanphilosophyinGreeceitisspeculationabout theUniverse that we shall encounter first. Thewhole periodwhichweshallhaveunder review isusuallydivided into twoby thenameofSocrates–withwhatjustificationweshallseeasweproceed–andthecharacteristicmarkofpre-Socraticthoughtisaconsumingcuriosityaboutthecosmos.Thelifetimeof Socrates saw a reaction against physical speculation and a shifting ofphilosophicalinteresttohumanaffairs.Likealllargegeneralizations,thisisonlyapproximately true.While in the Eastern part of theGreekworld the IonianswereabsorbedinthefirstattemptsatascientificexplanationoftheUniverse,intheWest thePythagoreansweresettingup the idealofphilosophyasawayoflife,andthephilosophicbrotherhoodasakindofreligiousorder;andthegreatsuccessorsofSocrates,PlatoandAristotle,whilenotneglectingtheproblemsofhumanlife,werebothinterestedalsoinspeculationabouttheworldinwhichwelive.ForPlatoindeedthehumansoulwasatthecentre;butinAristotlethetastefor thedisinterested investigationofnaturefor itsownsakereacheditsheight.MorethananyotherGreekdidhepossessthescientifictemperament.Moreoverthe interest of the Pythagoreans in the human soul was rather religious andmystical than philosophical. We may say, however, that such an exclusivedevotion to external nature as was exhibited by the Ionians became for everimpossible after the apparent breakdown of natural philosophy in the fifthcentury,andtheimportunatequestioningsofSocrateswhichbroughthumanlifeintotheverycentreofthepicture.Howallthishappenedweshallnowproceedtoinquire.

Europeanphilosophy,inthesenseofanattempttosolvetheproblemsoftheUniverse by reason only, as opposed to the acceptance of purely magical ortheologicalexplanations,beganintheprosperouscommercialcitiesofIonia,onthecoastofAsiaMinor,intheearlysixthcenturyB.C.Itwas,asAristotlesaid,the product of an age already providedwith the necessities for physicalwell-beingand leisure, and itsmotivewas simplecuriosity.The IonianorMilesianSchool is representedby thenamesofThales,Anaximander andAnaximenes,and there is thismuch justification for calling it a school, that all three werenativesofthesameprosperousIoniancityofMiletus,theirlifetimesoverlapped,andtraditionatleastdescribedtheirrelationsasthoseofmasterandpupil.The object of their searchmay be described in twoways. They looked for

somethingpermanent,persistingthroughthechaosofapparentchange;andtheythoughtthattheywouldfinditbyaskingthequestion:‘Whatistheworldmadeof?’Theworldasoursensesperceiveitseemsrestlessandunstable.Itexhibitscontinualandapparentlyhaphazardchange.Naturalgrowthmayproceedormaybe thwarted by blind external forces. In any case it is followed by decay andnothing lasts for ever.Moreoverweobserve an apparently infinite pluralityofunrelatedobjects.Philosophystartedinthefaiththatbeneaththisapparentchaosthereexistsahiddenpermanenceandunity,discernible,ifnotbysense,thenbythemind.Thisstatementappliesofcoursetoallphilosophy.Asamodernwriteronphilosophicalmethodhasputit:‘Thereseemstobeadeep-rootedtendencyin the human mind to seek … something that persists through change.Consequently the desire for explanation seems to be satisfied only by thediscoverythatwhatappearstobenewanddifferentwasthereallthetime.Hencethe search for an underlying identity, a persistent stuff, a substance that isconserved in spite of qualitative changes and in termsofwhich these changescanbeexplained.’1Thatdescriptionofthephilosophicmindmighthavebeenwrittenspeciallyfor

the Milesians. They were already philosophers, and the basic problems ofphilosophy change little through the ages.Central is the faith that beneath theapparent multiplicity and confusion of the universe around us there exists afundamentalsimplicityandstabilitywhichreasonmaydiscover.Secondly, it seemed to the earliest speculators that this stability must be

sought in the substance of which the world was made. This is not the onlypossibleanswer.Itmayequallybesupposedthatthematerialcomponentsoftheworld are in a constant flux of decay and renewal, are manifold andincomprehensible,butthatthepermanentandcomprehensibleelementliesinitsstructureorform.Ifnewmatterasitcomesalongfitsitselfalwaystothesamestructure, it is thestructure thatwemust try tounderstand.InGreeceitself the

champions of form against matter were to have their turn. At the beginning,however,thequestionaskedwas,initssimplestterms:‘Whatistheworldmadeof?’ThalesofMiletussaidthatitwaswater,ormoisture,ananswerwhichmightopenupall sortsof interestingpossibilities,were itnot thatweknowscarcelyanythingmore about his views and can only conjecturewhatwas the train ofthoughtwhichledhimtohisconclusion.Themostobviousexplanationseemstobe that water exhibits itself naturally to the senses, without any apparatus ofscientific experiment such aswas not then available, in the three forms solid,liquidandgaseous,asice,waterandsteam.Thisisaccordinglytheexplanationwhichoccursmostreadilytomodernscholars,butitisinterestingthatAristotlehasaquitedifferentsuggestion.He, too,wasguessing–whateverThalesmayhavewrittenwasalreadylostinhisday–buthewasatleastaGreekandnearertoThalesthanourselves.Iwanttosuggestsomereasonswhyhemayhavebeenright,butthisisatopictowhichwehadbetterreturnwhenwehavelookedattheviewsoftheothertwoMilesians.BeyondhisstatementthattheunderlyingsubstanceoftheUniverseiswater,

weknowlittleofThales’sphilosophicalviews.Thereareoneortwoaphorisms,difficult to interpret without a context, and several anecdotes. The story inHerodotusthathepredictedasolareclipse,whichcanbedatedtotheyear585B.C.,maybetakentobesufficientlybientrouvétogiveushisapproximatedate.ThepredictionisbynomeansimpossiblewiththeaidoftheBabylonianrecordsofwhichheissaidtohavebeenastudent.Weknowmoreofhisyoungerfellow-citizen Anaximander, who left writings which were certainly available toAristotleandTheophrastus,andtheworkofTheophrastusontheOpinionsoftheNaturalPhilosophers was the basis of theGraeco-Roman compilationswhichhavecomedowntous.The thought of Anaximander was already of some subtlety. He saw this

presentworldasawarringconcourseofoppositequalities,ofwhichfourwereprimary – hot and cold, wet and dry. Theworld-process is a cyclic one. Thesun’sheatdriesupwater,waterputsoutfire.Onaworld-scaleitisobservableinthecycleoftheseasons,andthoughoneorotheroftheoppositesmayprevailfora time, the balance is constantly being restored.Now since the essential thingabout these qualities is their mutual opposition, it follows that the primarysubstanceoftheUniversecannotbecharacterizedbyanyoneofthem–cannot,Anaximanderwouldhavesaid,beanyoneofthem,foritismostunlikelythatatthis early stage of thought quality and substance were differentiated. HadAnaximanderbeenaskedwhether,whenhespokeashedidof‘thehot’or‘thecold’,hemeantasubstanceoraquality,hewouldprobablynothaveunderstoodthequestion.If then,asThaleshadsupposed,allwereoriginallywater,or‘the

moist’,therecouldneverbeheatorfire,sincewaterdoesnotgeneratefire,butdestroysit.Henceheimaginedthefirststateofmattertobeanundifferentiatedmassofenormousextent,inwhichtheantagonisticelementsortheirpropertieswerenotyetdistinct,thoughitcontainedthemasitwereinalatentorpotentialform,acompletefusion.Hecalledittheapeiron,awordwhichmeans‘withoutboundaries’, and in laterGreekwasused in twomainsenses: (a) not boundedexternally,i.e.spatiallyinfinite,and(b)withoutinternalboundaries,i.e.inwhichnodistinctionsofseparatecomponentparts,orelements,couldbeobserved.ItisunlikelythatAnaximanderhadarrivedatthenotionofstrictspatialinfinity,andalthough he certainly conceived his matrix to be of vast and indeterminateextent, the thought uppermost in his mind was probably the lack of internaldistinctions, since this is the conceptwhichwould solve theproblem thatwasobviouslyonhismind,thatoftheoriginalconditionoftheopposites.This primal mass was pictured by Anaximander as being in everlasting

motion,asaresultofwhichithappened,atsometimeinsomepartofit,thattheoppositequalities,orsubstancescontainingthem,begantoseparatethemselvesout.HencearosewhatAnaximandercalledaseedorgermofaworld,afertilenucleus–forheborrowedthattermfromtherealmoforganicnature.Atfirstitmust have been something like the whirling nebulas known to modernastronomy.Gradually the cold andwet element condensed into awetmass ofearth at the centre,wrapped round in cloud ormist. The hot and dry showeditselfasasphereofflameenclosingthewhole,whichasitrevolvedburstapartintoringsorwheelsoffirearoundwhichsurgedthedarkmistfromwithinthesphere.Thisishisexplanationofsun,moon,andstars,eachofwhichisreallyaringof fire right round theearth, thoughonlyvisible tousatonepointwherethereisaholeintheencirclingvapoursthroughwhichthefirestreamslikeairthrough a puncture in a bicycle tyre. Under the influence of the fire at thecircumference,parts of the earthwere dried out and separated from thewaterthat surrounded them.Life first arose during this process in thewarmmudorslime, for the origin of life was inmoisture acted upon bywarmth. The firstanimalswerethereforefishlike,andenclosedinpricklyorscalycoverings.Fromthese developed all land-animals, including man, who has evolved ultimatelyfromasortoffish.Theearthinthisaccountiscylindrical likeadrum,andrestsunsupportedat

thecentreofasphericaluniverse.HereAnaximandergave,toaquestionwhichhadlongpuzzledtheGreeks,ananswerwhichforsubtletyofthoughtwasaheadofmanyofhissuccessors.Whatdidtheearthreston?Ifonwater,asThaleshadsaid, then what did the water rest on, and so forth? It rests on nothing, saidAnaximander,andthereasonitdoesnotfallissimplythat,beingatthecentreof

asphericaluniverse,andhenceequidistantfromall itspoints, itcouldhavenoreasonforfallinginonedirectionratherthaninanother.Itisinthepositionofthedonkeyplacedexactlyhalfwaybetween twobundlesofhay,whichdiesofstarvationbecauseitcannotdecidewhichwaytoturn.ThiscosmogonyofAnaximander’s,inspiteofcertainfantasticelements,was

aremarkableachievementforthedawnofrationalthought.Hemadesomeuseof observation, supporting his notion of the drying-out of the earth by thepresenceof fossilizedshells in inlanddistricts,andhisargument thatmanhadevolved froma lower formof lifeby theobservation that, inhispresent state,man is helpless and dependent for a considerable time after birth. Theremusthave been a time when the young were carried about for protection by theparent,andthis,heobserves,isdonebycertainspeciesoflargefish.Toassesshisquality,wemustnotonlylookbackonhimfromourowntime,butseehimin relation to previous and contemporary Greece. His was an age when thesupernatural was still taken for granted, when the forces of nature wereattributedtotheactionsofanthropomorphicgods,aZeusoraPoseidon,andtheorigin of the Universe had hitherto been sought in grotesque stories about asexualunionofheavenandearth,conceivedasvastprimevaldeities,andtheirforcing-apart by another gigantic spirit. With Anaximander human reasonasserted itself and produced what, right or wrong, was for the most part anaccountinpurelynaturaltermsoftheoriginoftheworldandlife.FromAnaximenes,theremainingmemberoftheMilesianSchool,wehaveno

connected account of cosmogony, but a new claimant for the title of primarysubstance. This is air (Greekaer, which in ordinary speech – and there is noquestionatthisstageofatechnicalscientificterminology–meantbothairandmist or fog). In its natural, or what Anaximenes called its most evenlydistributed state, it is the invisible atmosphere, but it is capable of beingcondensed into mist and water, and so, he claimed, still further into solidsubstances like earth and stones.When it becomes still rarer, it also becomeshotterandturnsintofire.Hischiefinterestseemstohavelainindiscoveringanaturalprocessbywhich itmightbesupposed that thechanges in theprimarysubstance take place, whereby our manifold world comes into being.Anaximander’s word for the process which gave rise to our world had been‘separating-out’,butitcouldfairlybesaidthatthiswasnomorethanabrilliantconjecturewhich couldnot beverified in anyknownprocessof nature.For itAnaximenes substituted the observed fact of condensation and rarefaction,whereby we see air reduced to moisture and vice versa. To illustrate theconnexion of rarefactionwith heat and condensationwith cold he pointed outthatifwebreathewithourlipsnearlyclosedthebreathemergescold,whereasif

weopenourmouthstogiveitmoreroomitiswarmer.OneparticulartenetofAnaximenesthrowslightontheoutlookofthewhole

school. He said that in its purest and rarest form of all, the air which is theultimateworld-substance is also the stuff of life.A small portion of this soul-stuff, which properly belongs by its nature to the outermost reaches of theUniversebeyondtheadulteratedatmospherewhichwebreathe,isimprisonedinthebodyofeachanimalorhumanbeing,andformsitssoul.‘Oursoul’,saidoneofhisfollowers,‘isair,hotterthantheairoutsideus,thoughmuchcolderthantheairatthesun.’Thismanalsoexpressedthesamethingbysayingthatman’ssoulis‘asmallpartofthegod’,thegodbeingtheUniverse,whichwethuslearnisstillthoughtofbythesemenasbeingalive.Foralltheirastonishingfreedomfromtheologicalpreconceptions,thisoneidearemained.Itwasindeedalegacyfrompre-rationalthought,forthismaterialconceptionofthesoulasairorbreathisofcourseaprimitiveonetowhichanthropologistshavefoundparallelsamongsavagepeoplesallovertheworld,anditwascertainlycoupledamongtheearlierGreekswiththeideathattheworldasawholewasalivingcreature.Neverthelessfortheseearlyscientiststherewasaspecialreasonwhyitshould

stillhaveseemednecessary.Besidestheonequestionthattheyasked–Whatistheworldmadeof?–thereseemstoustobeanotherwhichneedsansweringaswell,namely:iftheworldisatbottom,andwasoriginally,onesubstance,whydiditnotremainso,adead,staticmassofwaterorwhateveritwas?Whatwasthe motive cause which first started it changing? This question occurs to usbecause fromrecentsciencewehave inherited thenotionofmatteras in itselfsomething dead or inert, which needs to be called intomotion by an outsideforce.Perhapsthedistinctionbetweenmatterandforceisnotsoobviousinthiscenturyasitwasinthelast,nordoesthenaturalscientistnowadaysregarditaswithin his province to deal with the problem of a first cause. But philosophycannotignoreit,andwearespeakingofmentowhomscienceandphilosophywereoneindivisiblefieldofknowledge.Howdidtheydealwiththisquestionofthecauseofmotion?AsCornfordput it, ‘Ifwewouldunderstand the sixth-centuryphilosophers,

we must disabuse our minds of the atomistic conception of dead matter inmechanicalmotion and of the…dualismofmatter andmind.’Aristotle,whowasalreadycriticizing the Ionians for (as it appeared tohim) ‘lazily shelving’thequestionof themotivecause, remarks inoneplace,withoutcomment, thatnoneofthemmadeearththeprimarysubstance.Therewassurelyagoodreasonforthis.Theywantedasubstancewhichwouldexplainitsownmovement,asinthose early days it was still possible to imagine it doing. One thought of theceaseless tossing of the sea, another of the rushing of the wind, and on the

threshold of rational thought the natural explanation of their apparently self-causedmovementwas that theywere eternally alive. Thuswe find that all ofthem,while inotherrespectsavoiding the languageofreligionandcompletelydiscardingtheanthropomorphismoftheirtime,yetappliedthenameGodor‘thedivine’ to their primary substance. So Anaximander called his apeiron andAnaximenes the air. Thales is creditedwith the dictum: ‘Everything is full ofgods’,whichAristotleinterpretedasmeaningthat‘soulismingledinthewhole’.Thestuffoftheworldmustbethestuffoflife,andthatiswhyIthinkthereismoretobesaidforAristotle’sconjecturesaboutthereasonforThales’schoiceofwaterthanmoderncommentatorsareinclinedtoallow.Hiswordsare:‘Hegotthenotionprobablyfromseeingthatthenutrimentofallthingsismoist,andthatheatitselfisgeneratedbythemoistandkeptalivebyit…andthatthesemenofall creatureshas amoist nature, andwater is theoriginof thenatureofmoistthings.’ThelinesofthoughtsuggestedbyAristotlearethosewhichlinkupwaterwith

theideaof life: themoisturewhichisanecessarypartoffoodandsemen,andthefact thatvitalheat, thewarmthofa livingbody, isalwaysadampwarmth.(The connexion between heat and life, an obvious fact of experience, wasinsistedonby theGreeks as essential and causativemore than it is to-day.) Ifthat was Thales’s idea, we find it explicitly paralleled by Anaximander whoaccountsfortheoriginoflifebytheactionofheatonwateryorslimymatter.Seeingthatthesethinkersonlyaskedtheirsinglequestion:‘Whatistheworld

made of?’ it is tempting to label them materialists. This, however, would bemisleading, since that term inordinarymodern speech stands foronewhohasmade a choice between the known alternatives of matter and spirit as theultimatecausesof things, andconsciouslydeniesanyoriginatingpower to thespiritual.Whatwemust try tounderstand isa stateofmindbeforematterandspirithadbeendistinguished,sothatthematterwhichwasthesoleanduniquefount of all existence was itself regarded as endowed with spirit or life. Asphilosophyprogresses,itfindsitmoreandmoredifficulttomaintainthistwo-in-oneconception,andnottheleastinterestingaspectofthedevelopmentofGreekthoughtisthatwhichshowsmatterandspiritstrainingincreasinglyatthebondswhichunitethem.Matterhastobecreditedwithmoreandmoreoftheattributesof spirit, including mind, until the question comes to a head and a break isinevitable.For the rest of this chapter let us turn to the Pythagoreans. The two main

streamsoftraditioninearlyGreekthoughtwerespokenofinlaterantiquityasthe Ionianand the Italian.The latterbeginswithPythagoras,whoalthoughanEasternGreekbybirthlefthisnativeislandofSamosearlyinlifeandmigrated

to South Italy round about 530 B.C., where he settled and founded hisbrotherhood in the townofCroton.For political reasons theywere persecutedanddispersed,andbythefifthcenturyscatteredPythagoreancommunitieswereto be found in various parts ofGreece.To say nothing about the Pythagoreantraditionwould be to give a very one-sided view ofGreek philosophy and toomitsomething thatwasapotent influenceon themindofPlato.Yet itwouldperhapsdefeatourpresentpurposetodevotemuchspacetothemhere,owingtotheobscuritywhichenvelopsmuchoftheirdoctrineandtheirhistory.For this obscurity there are good reasons. Among the Pythagoreans, the

motiveforphilosophywasnotwhatithadbeenfortheIonians,simplescientificcuriosity.Theywereareligiousbrotherhood,andthishadcertainconsequences.Someatleastoftheirdoctrineswereheldtobesecret,andnottobedivulgedtothe profane. The founder himself was canonized, or regarded as semi-divine.Thismeant in the first place that a haze ofmiraculous legend gathered abouthim, from which it is difficult to disentangle the life and teaching of thehistorical Pythagoras. In the second place it was considered a pious duty toascribeanynewdoctrinetothefounderhimself,andconsideringthattheschoolhad a long history, including a particularly flourishing revival among theRomansinthetimeofCicero,itisobviouslydifficulttofindoutjustwhatwerePythagoras’sownbeliefsorthoseoftheschoolinitsearlydays.On its religious side, the core of Pythagoreanism was a belief in the

immortalityofthehumansoul,anditsprogressthroughaseriesofincarnationsnotonlyasmanbutalsointhebodiesofothercreatures.Withthisisconnectedthemost important of Pythagorean taboos, their abstention from animal flesh.Forthebeastorbirdwhichyoueatmayhaplybeinhabitedbythesoulofyourgrandmother.Ifthatisso,ifthetransmigrationofsoulsispossibleandusual,thenalllifeis

akin,andthekinshipofnatureisanotherPythagoreantenet.Itwentfurtherthanwemightthink,fortheanimateworldextendedfurtherforthemthanitdoesforus.TheybelievedindeedthattheUniverseasawholewasalivingcreature.Inthis they agreedwith the Ionians, but they saw implications in it whichwereforeigntoAnaximanderorAnaximenesandcameratherfrommysticalreligiousthan from rational sources. The cosmos, they held, is surrounded with aboundlessquantityofairorbreath,whichpermeatesandgiveslifetothewhole.Itisthesamethingwhichgiveslifetoindividuallivingcreatures.Fromthisrelicofpopularbelief,rationalizedaswesawbyAnaximenes,areligiouslessonwasnowdrawn.Thebreathor lifeofmanand thebreathor lifeof the infiniteanddivineUniversewere essentially the same.TheUniversewasone, eternal anddivine.Menweremanyanddivided,andweremortal.Buttheessentialpartof

man,hissoul,wasnotmortal,andoweditsimmortalitytothisfact,thatitwasafragmentorsparkofthedivinesoul,cutoffandimprisonedinamortalbody.Manhadthusanaiminlife,toshakeoffthetaintofthebodyand,becoming

purespirit,rejointheuniversalspirittowhichheessentiallybelonged.Untilthesoul could purify itself completely, it must continue to undergo a series oftransmigrations, exchangingonebody for another.Thismeant the retentionofindividualitysolongastheallottedcycleofbirthswasincomplete,buttherecanbelittledoubtthattheultimateaimwastheannihilationofselfinreunionwiththedivine.ThesebeliefsthePythagoreanssharedwithothermysticalsects,notablywith

thosewho taught in the name of themythicalOrpheus. But the originality ofPythagoras is seen when we ask what are the means whereby the aim ofpurificationandunionwiththedivinemaybeattained.Hithertopurityhadbeensoughtbyritual,andtheobservanceofmechanicaltaboossuchastheavoidanceofcorpses.Pythagoras retainedmuchof this,butaddedawayofhisown, thewayofthephilosopher.The doctrine of the kinship of nature, which may be said to be the first

principleofPythagoreanism,isarelicofancientbelief,havingmuchincommonwiththenotionofmagicalsympathy.Itssecondprincipleissomethingrationaland typically Greek. That is, the emphasis laid by Pythagoras on form orstructureastheproperobjectofstudy,togetherwithanexaltationoftheideaoflimit. If, as a classical professor recently stated in his inaugural lecture, acharacteristic mark of the Greeks is their preference for ‘the intelligible,determinate,mensurable,asopposedtothefantastic,vagueandshapeless’,thenPythagoraswastheforemostapostleoftheHellenicspirit.ThePythagoreans,asconvinced moral dualists, drew up two columns under the headings of goodthingsandbadthings.Inthegoodcolumn,alongwithlight,unityandthemale,camelimit;inthebadcolumn,withdarkness,pluralityandthefemale,isplacedtheunlimited.ThereligionofPythagorasembodied,aswehaveseen,akindofpantheism.

Theworldisdivine,itisthereforegood,andisasinglewhole.Ifitisgood,aliveandawhole,thatisbecause,saidPythagoras,itislimited,anddisplaysanorderin the relations of its various parts. Full and efficient life depends onorganization.Weseethisinindividuallivingcreatures,whichwecallorganismstoindicatethattheyhavealltheirpartsarrangedandsubordinatedtotheendofkeeping the whole alive (Greek organon = tool or instrument). So with theworld.Theonlysenseinwhichitcanbecalledasinglewhole,aswellasgoodandliving,isthatithasfixedlimitsandisthereforecapableoforganization.Theregularityofworld-phenomenawasthoughttosupportthis.Dayssucceednights

andseasonsseasonsindueandinvariableorder.Thewheelingstarsexhibit(aswas thought) eternal and perfectly circularmotion. In short theworldmay becalled akosmos, an untranslatablewordwhich combined the notions of order,fitness, and beauty. Pythagoras is said to have been the first to call it by thisname.Pythagoras,beingbynatureaphilosopher,arguedthatifwewanttoidentify

ourselveswiththelivingcosmos,towhichwebelieveourselvestobeessentiallyakin, then while not neglecting the old religious rules, we must first andforemoststudyitswaysandfindoutwhatit is like.Thisinitselfwillbringusclosertoit,aswellasenablingustoconductourlivesincloserconformitytotheprincipleswhichitreveals.JustastheUniverseisakosmos,ororderedwhole,so Pythagoras believed that each one of us is a kosmos inminiature.We areorganismswhichreproducethestructuralprinciplesofthemacrocosm.Andbystudying thesestructuralprinciples,wedevelopandencourage theelementsofformandorder inourselves.Thephilosopherwhostudiesthekosmosbecomeskosmios–orderly–inhisownsoul.Pythagoras’s own interestswere first and foremostmathematical. Itmay be

takenasestablishedthatthisdoesnotmeansimplyasuperstitiousplayingwithnumbers,butthathemaderealandconsiderableadvancesinmathematics.Thediscoveries which he made were totally and astonishingly new. If we do notrealizehowexcitingandfreshtheymusthaveseemed,weshallnotbeinastateofmindtosympathizewiththeextraordinarilywideapplicationwhichitseemedrighttohimtogivethem.Wemustallowforaremnantofprimitivethinkingtoo:we remember what has been said about the savage’s irrational confusionbetweennumbersandtheobjectsnumbered.Buthisownremarkablediscoveriesmusthaveseemed togive irrefutableconfirmation,onpurelyrationalgrounds,totheseearlierwaysofthought.Hismoststrikingdiscovery,and theonewhich issaid tohaveexercised the

widest influence over his thought and to have been the foundation of hismathematical philosophy, was in the field of music. He found out that thoseintervals of the musical scale which are still (I believe) called the perfectconsonancescanbeexpressedarithmeticallyasratiosbetweenthenumbers1,2,3and4.Thesearethenumberswhich,addedtogether,make10,andthenumber10,inthecuriousPythagoreancombinationofmathematicsandmysticism,wascalledtheperfectnumber.Itwasillustratedgraphicallybythefigurecalledthetetraktys,i.e. .Theoctaveisproducedbytheratio2:1,thefifth3:2,andthefourth4:3.Nowifonedidnotknowthis,itisnotthesortofthingthatwouldoccur to onewhile playing the lyre, and perhaps picking out the noteswith acertain amount of trial and error. The discovery lay in the existence of an

inherentorder,anumericalorganizationwithinthenatureofsounditself,anditappearedasakindofrevelationconcerningthenatureoftheUniverse.The general principle which it was taken to illustrate was that of the

imposition of limit (peras) on the unlimited (apeiron) to make the limited(peperasmenon).Thiswas the general Pythagorean formula for themaking oftheworldandallthatitcontains,anditwascoupledwiththemoralandaestheticcorollary that limitwas good and the unlimited evil, so that the imposition oflimitandtheformationofakosmos,whichtheyclaimedtoseeintheworldasawhole,wasevidenceofthegoodnessandbeautyoftheworldandanexampletobe followedbymen.Owing toPythagoras’sdiscovery,musicprovided forhisfollowersthebestinstanceofthisprincipleatwork.Itssuitabilitywasenhancedbythebeautyofmusic,towhichPythagoraslikemostGreekswassensitive,forthewordkosmoscarriedtoaGreekthesuggestionofbeautyaswellasorder.Itwas thus further evidence for the equation of limit with goodness that itsimpositionon thefieldofsoundbroughtbeautyoutofdisharmony.Thewholefieldofsound,then,rangingindefinitelyinoppositedirections–highandlow–isaninstanceoftheunlimited.Limitisrepresentedbythenumericalsystemofratiosbetweenconcordantnoteswhichreducesthewholetoorder.Itismarkedoutaccordingtoanintelligibleplan.Thisplanisnotimposedonitbyman,buthas been there all the time awaiting his discovery. In Cornford’swords: ‘Theinfinitevarietyofquality insound is reduced toorderby theexactandsimplelaw of ratio in quantity. The system so defined still contains the unlimitedelementintheblankintervalsbetweenthenotes;buttheunlimitedisnolongeran orderless continuum: it is confined within an order, a kosmos, by theimpositionoflimitormeasure.’This process, grasped here in a single striking instance, the Pythagoreans

supposedtobetherulingprincipleatworkintheUniverseasawhole.ItisherethattheircosmologydiffersessentiallyfromtheIoniantype,givingonetherighttocallitaphilosophyofformandtheirsaphilosophyofmatter.Theyspokeofamixtureofoppositesand left itat that.ThePythagoreansadded thenotionsoforder, proportion, and measure, i.e. they laid the stress on quantitativedifferences. Each separate thing was what it was not because of its materialelements (whichwerecommon toall), butbecauseof theproportion inwhichthoseelementsweremixed;andsinceitisinthiselementofproportionthatoneclass of things differs from another, so they argued that this, the law of itsstructure,wastheessentialthingtodiscoverifonewantedtounderstandit.Theemphasisisshiftedfromthemattertotheform.Structureistheessentialthing,andthisstructurecouldbeexpressednumerically,intermsofquantity.Isitnowsurprising, considering the inchoate state of philosophy at the time, and the

absenceofanysystematicstudyoflogicorevenofgrammar,thattheyexpressedtheirnew-foundconvictionbysayingthat‘thingswerenumbers’?Thatgivestheirgenerallineofthought,andwecannotheregointoitsmany

individualapplications.One,however,maybementionedasanillustration,andfor the powerful influencewhich it exercised over a very important branch ofGreek science, a branch of science in which Greek, and hence ultimatelyPythagorean,ideaswerestillregardedascanonicalthroughouttheMiddleAgesandbeyond, in theMoslemEast aswell as in theChristianWest.That is, thestudyofmedicine.Limitandorderaregood,andthewell-beingoftheworldandof every creature in it dependson a rightmingling (krasis)of theelementsofwhichitiscomposed.Itistheninastateofharmonia,thewordwhich(inGreekasinEnglish)primarilyappliedtomusicbeingextendedtocoverthewholefieldofnature.Tothemicrocosmthisdoctrinewasappliedinthetheorythatbodilyhealth was dependent on the rightly proportioned mixture of the physicalopposites: hot and cold,wet anddry. If they are in a stateofharmonia in thebody,then,asthedoctorinPlato’sSymposiumputsit,themostmutuallyhostileelementsinitarereconciledandtaughttoliveinamity:‘andbythemosthostileImeanthemostsharplyopposed,ashottocold,bittertosweet,drytowet’.Thisdogmaoftheimportanceofmaintaining–orrestoringinthecaseofsickness–therightquantitativerelationshipsbetweenoppositequalitiesbecamethecorner-stone ofGreekmedicine,which started in a Pythagorean atmospherewith theworkofAlcmaeonofCroton.Pythagoreannotionshavehadsuchalonghistoryinphilosophyandliterature

that other illustrationswill easily suggest themselves. I cannot for examplegointo the doctrine of the harmony of the spheres, against whose appealing butfragilebeautytheprosaicmindofAristotledirectedsomeofitsheaviestlogicalbatteries.Butat leastwehaveseensomethingof thefieldof thought inwhichsuchastrangeideawasborn,andhaveaglimpseoftheworldwhichlaybehindthewordsofLorenzotoJessicaas theyrestedonthemoonlitbankoutsidethehouseofPortia:

Sit,Jessica.LookhowthefloorofheavenIsthickinlaidwithpatinesofbrightgold.There’snotthesmallestorbwhichthoubehold’stButinhismotionlikeanangelsings,Stillquiringtotheyoung-eyedcherubins.Suchharmonyisinimmortalsouls;ButwhilstthismuddyvestureofdecayDothgrosslycloseitin,wecannothearit.

Notes

1L.S.Stebbing,AModernIntroductiontoLogic(Methuen,2nded.1933),p.404.

3THEPROBLEMOFMOTION(Heraclitus,Parmenidesandthepluralists)

ThenextphilosopherinthesuccessionistheenigmaticHeraclitus,whoearnedeveninantiquitythenicknamesof‘Thedarkone’and‘TheRiddler’.Althoughtheexactdatesofhislifeareunknown,hispositioninthehistoryofphilosophyis fixedwell enough by the fact that he criticized Pythagoras by name and ishimselffairlyobviouslyalludedtobyParmenides.HemusthavebeenatworkjustabouttheturnofthesixthandfifthcenturiesB.C.Ifwefindhimdifficulttounderstand,thisisnotonlybecausewepossessno

morethanafewfragmentsofwhatheactuallywrote.Hehadclearlyahaughtyandcontemptuousmind,anddelightedinthrowingoutisolatedoracularsayingsratherthandevelopingapatientandcontinuouslineofargument.HismethodofcommunicationislikethatoftheDelphicoracle,which,hesays,‘neitheruttersnorhidesitsmeaning,butshowsitbyasign’.Neverthelessitisworthtryingtogetatsomeoftheideasunderlyinghisdisjointedpronouncements.Theyrevealaninterestingstageinthehistoryofthought.The target of his criticism in Pythagoras and others was their investigation

into external nature, their search for facts. ‘Polymathy– the learning ofmanythings – does not teach understanding,’ he wrote. ‘Otherwise it would havetaughtHesiodandPythagoras,XenophanesandHecataeus.’Suchlearningisgotthrough thesenses,but ‘Eyesandearsarebadwitnesses if thesoul iswithoutunderstanding’. The senses show a different world to eachman. Lookwithinyourself–i.e.toyourownmind–andyouwilldiscoverthelogoswhichisthetruth,andiscommontoallthings.Itisthefirstexplicitstepintheunderminingofthesensesasguidestotruth.Thehiddenlawofnaturewhichheclaimedtohavediscoveredseemstohave

beenthatallthingslivebyconflict,whichisthereforeessentialtolifeandthusgood.ThePythagoreanidealofapeacefulandharmoniousworldherejectedasanidealofdeath.‘Waristhefatherofall’,hesaid,and‘Strifeisjustice’.This

was probably aimed at Anaximander, who had described the continualencroachmentoftheoppositesononeanotherasinjustice,forwhichinturntheyhave topay thepenalty.Hithertophilosophershad sought forpermanenceandstability.Thereisnone,saidHeraclitus,norshouldonedesireastagnantworld.Whateverlives,livesbythedestructionofsomethingelse.‘Firelivesthedeathof air, and air of fire;water lives the death of earth, earth that ofwater.’ ThePythagoreans spoke of a harmony of opposites, but how can opposites be inharmony except unwillingly? It is only, he said, an attunement of oppositetensions,likethatinabow.Wemustpicture,Itakeit,abowreadystrungbutnotinuse.Asitleansagainstthewall,oneseesnomovement,andthinksofitasastaticobject,completelyatrest.Butinfactacontinuoustug-of-warisgoingonwithin it, as will become evident if the string perishes. The bow willimmediately take advantage, snap it and leap to stretch itself. The basis ofequilibriumisstruggle,whichisthereforegoodinitself,sinceitisthesourceoflife.Itisabsurdtocalloneaspectorstageofitgoodandanotherbad.‘Theworld’,saidHeraclitus,‘isanever-livingfire,kindledinmeasuresandin

measuresgoingout.’Ifwesupposedhim,liketheIonians,tohavebelievedinasingleprimarystuffoutofwhichtheworldhadevolved,thenfirewouldbehisprimarysubstance.ButHeraclituswasnotliketheIonians.Hedidnotbelieveina cosmogony like Anaximander, an evolution of the world out of a primarysimplestate.It‘is,was,andeverwillbe’whatitisnow,andfireprovidesratherakindof symbolof itsnature. It is thebestmaterial expression (andnoothersortofexpressionwasthenpossible)ofhistwocentralprinciples:(i)everythingisbornofstrife,and(ii)everythingisinconstantflux.Forfireinthefirstplaceonlylivesbyconsuminganddestroying,andsecondlyitisconstantlychangingin its material, even though it may, like a candle-flame, look steady andpermanent enough for a while. If the whole world lives like that, it is aptlydescribedasasortoffire.Heraclitus’sconceptionofthelogosiscuriousanddifficult.‘Listennottome,

buttothelogos’hesays,wherelogosseemstohaveoneofitsusualmeaningsof‘account’or‘description’,yetisalreadygivenakindofexistenceindependentofitsteller,sothatthetwocanbecontrasted.Thelogosistrueforever,allthingscome topass inaccordancewith it, it is common toall, and ‘onemust followwhat is common’. It is presumably identical with the ‘thought’ (gnome) bywhich,hesays, ‘all thingsaresteered throughall things’.A latercommentatorsaysthataccordingtoHeraclitus‘wedrawinthedivinelogosbybreathing’,i.e.thedivinemind thatsteers theuniverse is (a) identicalwith themind inus,aswiththePythagoreans,(b)stillsomethingmaterial.Itisinfactthesameasthecosmic fire, for according to another ancient expositor ofHeraclitus, ‘He says

thatthisfireisintelligent,andisthecauseofthearrangementofthewhole.’Thenotion of rational fire shows how hard it is becoming to explain everythingwithoutadvancingbeyondthenotionofthematerial.Heraclitusspokeinriddles,saidtheGreeks,andthereweretwomainreasons

for this. First, his own temperament made him delight in spectacular andparadoxicallanguage.Hemaygiveusstraightforwardparadox,like‘Goodandevil are one’, or again a fascinatingbut tantalizing image, such as: ‘Time is achildplayingdraughts;thekingdomisachild’s.’Secondlyheisdifficultbecausethoughtwith him had reached a peculiarly difficult stage.He could no longeracceptthesimpleIoniancosmogonies,norfinditeasyandnaturaltoconfinelifeandthought in thestrait-jacketofmaterialsubstance.Theywereclearlyduetoburstitverysoon.Thebreakcameaboutinastrangeway.Itwasultimatelyduetotheworkofa

thinkerbothpowerfulandlimited,whosepowerandlimitationsalikeformedawatershedinGreekthought.ThisthinkerwasParmenides,whoselifefellinthefirsthalfof the fifthcentury.According toPlato’sdialogueabouthim,hewassixty-five about the year 450.After himGreek philosophy could never be thesame,foreveryone,evenPlatoandAristotle,feltthattheyhadtotakeaccountofhimand,asitwere,layhisghost.HewastheexactreverseofHeraclitus.ForHeraclitus,movementandchange

were the only realities; for Parmenides, movement was impossible, and thewhole of reality consisted of a single, motionless and unchanging substance.This extraordinary conclusion he reached by a train of thought no lessextraordinary.There is a sentence, the authorship ofwhich I cannot remember,which has

severaltimesbeensetforcommentintheClassicalTriposatCambridge.ItistotheeffectthatmanyproblemsinGreekphilosophyresultedfromaconfusionofgrammar,logic,andmetaphysics.Thethreewereconfusedbecause,asseparatesubjectsofstudy,noneofthemcouldyetbesaidtoexist;andthisissomethingwhich it is particularly important to remember in trying to understandParmenides.Theordinarytoolsof logic,andevenofgrammar,whichwehaveinherited so that theyarenowpartof theunconsciousmentalprocessesof theleastphilosophicalofus,werenotavailabletohim.Itrequiresanefforttothinkoneselfbackintotheskinofsuchapioneer.OneideawhichtheGreeksatthisstagefounditdifficulttoabsorbwasthata

word might have more than one meaning. Their difficulty no doubt hadsomething to dowith the proximity of the primitivemagical stage atwhich awordanditsobjectformedasingleunity.Nowtheverb‘tobe’inGreekmeant‘toexist’–liketheEnglishwordintheBiblicalsentence:‘BeforeAbrahamwas,

I am.’Of course in ordinary speech itwas used in its quite different sense ofhaving a certain quality, as to be black, cold etc., but thiswas a difference towhichnoonehadasyetdevotedanyconscious thought. Inmodern terms, thedifferencebetweentheexistentialandthepredicativeuseoftheverbhadnotyetbeenelucidated.ToParmenides, the first to reflect consciouslyon the logicofwords, it seemed that tosay thata thing is couldandshouldmeanonly that itexists, and this thought came to himwith the force of a revelation about thenatureofreality.Hiswholeconceptionofthenatureofrealityspringsfromtheattribution of this single, metaphysical force to the Verb ‘to be’. The Ionianphilosophershadsaidthattheworldwasonething,butbecamemany.But,saidParmenides,hasthisword‘become’anyrealmeaning?Howcanathingbesaidtochange,asyousaye.g.thatairchangedintowaterandfire?Tochangemeans‘tobecomewhat it isnot’,but tosayofwhat is that it isnot issimplyuntrue.Whatiscannotnotbeanything,for‘nottobe’meanstovanishoutofexistence.Thenitwouldnolongerbewhatis,but that issomethingwhichwasassumed,andhadtobeassumed,fromthebeginning.TheoneandonlyinitialpostulateofParmenideswasthat‘itis’,i.e.onesinglethingexists.Therestfollowed.It may sound like nonsensical playing with words, but it was taken very

seriously at the time, and it was only Plato in his full maturity who, in thedialogue calledThe Sophist, cleared up the point that although they used thesameword‘is’,Parmenidesandthepeopleagainstwhomhewasarguingmeanttwodifferentthings.Atthetimehisdoctrineseemedunanswerable,andstrangeconsequences followed. All change and movement were unreal, because theywouldinvolvewhatisbecomingwhatitisnotorwhereitisnot,andtosayofwhat is ‘It isnot’ isnonsense.Movementwas impossible fora second reason,also,thattherewasnosuchthingasemptyspace.Spacecouldonlybedescribedas‘wheretherealthing,thatwhichis,wasnot.’Butwhereyouhavenotgotthatwhichis,youobviouslyonlyhavethatwhichisnot,i.e.whatdoesnotexist.Therealworld,then,allthatis,mustbeachangeless,immovablemassofone

kindofsubstance,andineternalandchangelessstillnessitmustalwaysremain.One need hardly say that it does not appear to be that, but this did not dauntParmenides.AllthatmenimagineabouttheUniverse,hesaid,allthattheythinktheyseeandhearandfeel, ispure illusion.Only themindcanreach the truth,and themind – so he proclaimedwith the simple arrogance of the first of allabstractthinkers–provesincontrovertiblythatrealityisutterlydifferent.The significance of Parmenides is that he started theGreeks on the path of

abstract thought, set themindworkingwithout reference toexternal facts, andexalted its resultsabove thoseofsense-perception. In this theGreekswereaptpupils,somuchsothataccordingtosometheirgeniusforabstractthoughtand

forneglectingtheworldofexternalfactsetEuropeanscienceonthewrongtrackforathousandyearsorso.Whetherforgoodorevil,hereweseetheprocessatitsbeginning.SomehaveclassedParmenidesasamaterialist,arguing thatashemakesno

distinction between the material and the non-material, his single unchangedreality must have been conceived as material. That particular question isunimportant and indeed unanswerable, seeing that we are still dealing with aperiodbeforethematerialandthenon-materialhadbeendistinguished.Whatisimportantisthathisrealitywasnonsensible,onlytobereachedbythought.ToPlatothedistinctionbetweenmaterialandspiritualwasplain.Yetheexpressesitfarmoreoftenbythewords‘sensible’and‘intelligible’.Parmenideswasthefirsttoexalt the intelligibleat theexpenseof thesensible,andconsequently tocallhim–ashehasbeencalled–thefatherofmaterialismisaboutasmisleadingasitcouldbe.Fromnowon,anyphilosophywhichmaintainedthatthemanifoldworldhad

evolved from a primitive unity would no longer hold water. Parmenides haddealtadeath-blowtomaterialmonismoftheIoniantype.Thefirstreactionwasthat theworldofappearancesmustatallcostsbesaved.Men’scommonsenserevoltedandsaid that the familiar thingswhichwecanseeand touchmustbereal.Sincethiscouldnolongerbecombinedwithabeliefinaprimalunity,theydenied that part of Parmenides’s premise which said that reality wassubstantially one. The immediately following philosophers are pluralists. NotuntilthegreatestofallGreekthinkers,Plato,dowefindonewhoagreedthatnomore than a quasi-existence could be ascribed to the changingworld of rocksand plants and animals, and sought reality and unity alike in aworld beyondspace and time. And though Plato was much influenced by Parmenides, andwrote of him with the greatest respect, there were by that time many otherinfluencesaswellthathelpedtomouldhisthought.The pluralists are represented by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomic

philosophyofDemocritus.Empedoclesisanintriguingfigure,acombinationofphilosopher, religious mystic on Pythagorean lines, and magician or wonder-worker. The Western Greek world, the home of Pythagoreanism, tended toproduce such combinations, andEmpedocles’s homewas atAcragas inSicily.Nootherageorcountrycouldhave thrownupsuchaphenomenon.Heclaimsthathisknowledgeisthekeytopowerovertheforcesofnature,thatbyitmencanarrest thewinds,makerain,andevenbringbackthedeadfromHades.Hewasafirmbelieverinthetransmigrationofsouls.Allthiswasanessentialpartof him and cannot be separated fromhis philosophy,which yetwas a seriouscontribution to thought and the first attempt to escape the logical net of

Parmenides,whosepupilheissaidtohavebeen.Sincetheultimateunityofmattermustbegivenupifthephenomenaaretobe

accountedfor,Empedoclesstated thatall the fourelements (hiswordfor themmeans‘roots’)–i.e.earth,water,airandfire–wererealandultimate.Theworldofphenomenaheexplainedasconsistingofavarietyofcombinationsof thesefour root-substances in varying proportions. Like a true Pythagorean he laidgreatstressonproportionasadeterminingfactor,andwasevenpreparedtosay–thoughonwhatgroundsitisdifficulttoimagine–whattheproportionswereinsomeparticularcases.Boneforexamplehedeclaredtobecomposedoftwopartsofearth,twoofwaterandfouroffire.Onthislineofthoughtthereisnoneed to assume the change – the actual coming-into-being or destruction – ofanything real. The only ‘realities’ are the four root-substances, and they haveexistedfromalltimeandalwayswillexist.Naturalcreaturesarenot‘real’,butonly chance combinations of these elements.Motion of course theremust be,andthisheapparentlythoughtcouldtakeplacewithouttheassumptionofemptyspace,whichParmenidesseemedtohaveprovedtobenonexistent.Heimaginedit as the motion of a fish through water, where as it progresses the waterimmediatelyclosesrounditandisalwaysincontactwithitatallpoints.AfterParmenides,thenaiveIoniannotionofmaterialsubstancewhichmoved

itself as a living thing seemed no longer tenable, and it became necessary toposita separatemotivecause.Empedoclesposited two,whichhenamedLoveandStrife.Inhisphysicalwork,theyappearasnaturalforcesexercisingapurelyphysicalattractionandrepulsion.Strife,bywhoseinfluenceeachelementtendstodissociateitselffromtheothers,isatthesametimeatendencyofliketolike,wherebyeveryparticleseekstoattachitselftoothersofthesameelement.Loveis the force which mingles one element with another to create compositecreatures. Now the one, now the other gains the upper hand in turn, and theevolutionofworlds isacircularprocess.WhenLove issupreme, theelementsarefusedtogetherinamass.WhenStrifehasthevictory,theyexistinseparateconcentric layers– for thewhole is conceived as spherical –with earth at thecentre and fire at the circumference. A world like our own exists in theintermediatestages,exhibitingasitdoesgreatmassesofearthdrawnapartintocontinents and of water collected as seas, and at the same time all sorts ofcombinationsofdifferentelementswhicharesuchthingsasplantsandanimals.While capable of speaking of these forces like a physicist, Empedoclesobviously regarded them as also possessing the psychological and moralcharacter which was associated with their names. Here the religious teachercomesin.Loveisthatwhichbringsthesexestogether,andwhichcausesmentothinkkindly thoughts anddogooddeeds.Strife on the other handbrings hurt

andsinintotheworld.Strangerstill,wehavenotevenyetreachedthestageatwhichsuchforcescanbethoughtofasnon-material.Theconceptionsimplydidnotexist.Onewouldhavethoughtthatwhenmotivecauseshadbeenseparatedfrom thematter moved, the trick was done. But the language of Empedoclesshowsthatitwasnotso.Loveis‘equalinlengthandbreadth’totheworld.SheandStrife‘runthroughallthings’,likeakindofquicksilver.Ingeneral, it isobviouslynecessary todealwith thesesystems in thebarest

outline. We cannot for instance go into Empedocles’s explanation of themechanismof sensation, interesting though it is.But it is tempting tomentionone of the stranger results of Empedocles’s system on account of its intrinsicinterest, namely that when he came to details it involved him, as it were byaccident (for there was no question of scientific observation), in an almostDarwiniantheoryofnaturalselection.Heisanaturalphilosopherinthis,thatinhisworld there is no creative god, nomind adapting organisms to a purpose.Living creatures, like other natural bodies, have originated in purely chancecombinations of the elements.He had to explain thereforewhy their structureandorganssimulatedsowelltheappearanceofpurpose.Eyesandears,feetandhands,digestiveorgansandsoforthseemsoadmirablyadaptedforthefunctionswhich they have to perform that it is difficult not to believe that they weredesigned with these in view. But, said Empedocles, it was not always so.Originallytheremusthavebeenthestrangestcreatures–menwiththeheadsofcattle,animalswithbranchesliketreesinsteadoflimbs.Butinthestruggleforexistencethoselessfittedforsurvivalperished,andonlythosewhosemembershappenedtohavecometogetherinpracticalwayshavesurvived.With Anaxagoras we return to the Ionian tradition; not of course to naive

monism,buttothetraditionofphilosophyasascientificactivitypursuedfrommotivesofcuriosity,notmixedupinthecuriousPythagoreanwaywithmysticalreligious ideas. He came from Clazomenae near Smyrna, from the cradle ofrationalthought,andlivedinAthens,wherehewasamemberoftheenlightenedandscepticalcirclewhichgatheredaroundPericlesandAspasiainthemiddleofthefifthcentury.Hewasinfactprosecutedforimpietyandforcedtoleavethecity.Themotivewasdoubtlesspolitical,andaimedathimasafriendofPericles,butthechargeisinterestingnevertheless.Hewasindictedforsayingthatthesunwasnotadivinity,butonlyawhite-hotstoneratherlargerthanthePeloponnese.Heevolvedahighlycomplicatedtheoryofthenatureofmatter,intowhichit

isunnecessary toventurehere.Notonly ishisexactmeaningstillasubjectofdisputeamongthelearned,sothatitwouldbeextremelydifficulttoexplainitatall clearlywithout takinga long timeabout it,but itwasnot in itselfa theorywithwhichphilosophycouldrestcontent. Itwasakindofhalfwayhouse,and

interestingchieflyaspointingthewaytothethoroughgoingatomictheorywhichfollowedit.Theimportantthingforustonoticehereisthatwithhimforthefirsttime a clear distinction was explicitly drawn between matter and mind. Heboldlysaid,notonly,likeEmpedocles,thattheremustbeamovingcauseapartfrom thematterwhichwasmoved, but thatwhateverwas notmattermust bemind.1Mindrulestheworldandhasbroughtorderintoitoutofconfusion.WemaynoticebythewaythatnoGreekeverspokeofcreationinanabsolutesense,of a god who brought something out of nothing. The creation of a world isalways the imposition of order – kosmos – on an already existing chaos ofmatter.WiththeconceptionofamindbehindtheUniverse,whichgovernsandorders

itschanges,weseemtobegettingbacktoatheisticoutlook,butthistimebythepathofrationalthought,notbyamereacquiescenceinreligioustradition.HowfarAnaxagoraswasfromthatmaybejudgednotonlyfromhisprosecutionbytheState as anatheist, but also from theopinionofSocrates andPlato.Thesephilosophers,themselvespassionatebelieversintherationalgovernmentoftheUniverse,censuredhimbecause,theydeclared,althoughhestartsoutbysayingthatmindistheultimatecauseofeverything,hemakesnouseofthisassumptionunlessheisatalosstoexplainsomethinginanyotherway.Thenhe‘dragsin’mind,butotherwisehetriestoexplaineverythinglikeanatheisticalscientistbyphysical,material causes.Wemust not thereforemake toomuch of the noveldoctrineofAnaxagoras,whichwasclearlynotputforwardinawaythatofferedanypossibilitiesofdevelopmentonthespiritualside.Wegetaconsistentpictureof his character, exemplified in the story of the soothsayer,who,when a ramwith one hornwas given to Pericles, interpreted the phenomenon asmeaningthat of the two political rivals – Pericles and Thucydides – the one whopossessed the ramwould be victorious.Anaxagoras however had the animal’sskull dissected and demonstrated the natural cause of the abnormality, that itsbrain did not fill the cavity as usual, but was small and egg-shaped andconnectedwiththerootofthesinglehorn.PlutarchaddsthatthepeopleadmiredAnaxagoras much, but the soothsayer still more when Thucydides wasostracized.Theatomictheoryis jointlyattributedtoLeucippusandDemocritus,but the

former is a shadowy figure,whose very existencewas doubted by their greatfollowerEpicurusandhasbeendeniedbysomemodernscholars.OfDemocritusandhiswritingsweknowmuchmore.HewasanorthernGreek,fromAbderainThrace,andwasbornabout460B.C. ,ayoungercontemporaryofAnaxagoras.His works do not seem to have been well known at Athens, but his fellow-northernerAristotleadmiredhimgreatlyandhasmuchtosayabouthim.

Atomism of course gains a special interest from its anticipation of modernviews.ItishardlyanexaggerationtosaythatthetheoryofDemocritusremainedinessentialsunchangeduntilthenineteenthcentury.Itisneverthelessimportantto remember the complete absence in classical Greece of the apparatus ofscientific experiment which has led to the discoveries of modern times, andenabled each one to be tested. Why the Greeks, for all their brilliance ofintellect,madeatthistimesolittleuseofexperimentalmethods,andnoprogressat all in the inventionofapparatus forcontrolledexperiment, is acomplicatedquestion. Aristocratic tradition and the presence of slaves no doubt hadsomethingtodowithit,butarescarcelyinthemselvesasufficientexplanation.TosomesmallextentthoseintheIoniansuccessionmadeuseofobservation,butonlyspasmodicallyuntilthetimeofAristotle,andofcontrolledexperimenttheyhad no idea. Their legacy lies elsewhere, in their astonishing powers ofdeductivereasoning.Aswitheveryoneelseatthatperiod,thethinkingoftheatomistswascarried

outwithoneeyeonthetiresomelogicofParmenidesandhissuccessorsintheEleaticschool,asitwascalled,evenifitwasonlytodenyapartofwhattheyhadsaid.Always theywereconsciousofhis shadow in thebackground.Theirbasic idea, like thoseofEmpedoclesandAnaxagoras,arosedirectlyoutofhiscontention that therecouldbenocoming-into-beingordestructionofanythingreal.Consequently the apparent birth and perishing of natural objectsmust beexplained, as Empedocles had also said, by regarding them as no more thanchancecombinationsofamultiplicityofelementswhichalonecanbesupposedtodeserve thenameofexistents.Toexplain themthus, theyhitupon the trulybrilliantconjecture(forassuchitmustbedescribed)thattheelements,oronlytruerealities,weretinysolidbodies,fartoosmalltobeperceivedbyoursenses,clashing and recoiling in endless motion through a boundless space. Theseatomoi–ironicallyenough,asitseemsto-day,thewordmeans‘unsplittable’–werethesmallestextantparticlesofmatter,solid,hardandindestructible.Theyweresubstantiallyidentical,anddifferedinsizeandshapeonly.Thesepropertiesalone,togetherwithdifferencesintheirrelativepositions,motions,anddistancesfromeachother,weresufficient toaccountforall thedifferencesofwhichoursensesmakeusawareinperceptibleobjects.Whatwefeelashardhasitsatomsclosely packed. Soft things aremade of atomswider apart, they containmoreemptyspaceandsoarecapableofcompressionandoffer lessresistanceto thetouch.Theother sensesareexplainedon the same lines. In taste, sweet thingsare made of smooth atoms, whereas harsh or bitter flavours are caused byhooked or sharp-pointed atoms which tear their way into the body makingminute excoriations on the tongue. As late as 1675, we find this notion

persisting.AFrenchchemist,Lémery,wroteatthatdate1:‘Thehiddennatureofa thing cannot be better explained than by attributing to its parts shapescorrespondingtoalltheeffectsitproduces.Noonewilldenythattheacidityofaliquidconsistsinpointedparticles.Allexperienceconfirmsthis.Youhaveonlytotasteittofeelaprickingofthetonguelikethatcausedbysomematerialcutintoveryfinepoints.’Colours were explained by the various positions of the atoms forming the

surfaceofobjects,whichcausedthemtothrowbackorreflectindifferentwaysthelightwhichfallsuponthem,andwhichis itselfofcourseacorporeal thingmadeofparticularlysmallfineatomsmovingquicklybecauseoftheirsmallnessand roundness. The finest and most perfectly spherical, and hence the mostmobile and volatile, of all the atoms form the souls of animals and men; sothoroughgoingwasthematerialismofDemocritus.Thus all substance is reduced to material substance, and all sensation

ultimatelytothesensationoftouch.Evensightisexplainedinthisway,bythecuriousandnotverysatisfactorysuppositionthatobjectsareconstantlythrowingofffromtheirsurfacesfinefilmsorskinsofatomswhichretainmoreorlesstheshape of the object as they drift through the air all theway to the eye. Thusalthough sight is a matter of direct contact between atoms and atoms, it ispossibletobedeceivedaboutthenatureofanobjectseenatadistance,becausethe material image which passes from it to the eye may become distorted ordamagedontheway.Themechanicsofsensationwerepursuedintoconsiderabledetail, and an extraordinary ingenuity was shown in trying to explain all itsvarieties without recourse to any other hypothesis than that of directmaterialcontact.One thingof coursewas a fundamental necessity to the atomicworld-view.

Theremust be empty space for the atoms tomove about in. The hallmark ofDemocritus’s thought, as Aristotle noted approvingly, was a determination toaccountforapparentfactandnotbeledastraybyabstractargument.HencehesaidthatParmenides’sdenialoftheexistenceofvoidcouldnotbeupheld.Itwascontrarytocommonsense.Awarehoweverthathewasflyinginthefaceofthatgreat authority, he made his denial with a kind of schoolboy daring, foraccordingtoAristotleheputitintheform:‘Whatisnotdoesexist,nolessthanwhat is.’Ifmaterialatomsweretheonlyrealsubstance, thenemptyspacewasnot real in the samesense.Dimlyaware that theremustbe somewayout, theatomistsdidnotyetcommandalanguagecapableofsuchaphraseas‘notinthesamesense’,andparadoxwastheironlyresource.They seem tohave thought that, given infinite empty spacewith an infinite

numberofmicroscopicbodieslooseinit,thebodieswouldinevitablymove,and

move aimlessly in any direction. This would naturally lead to collisions, andthese to entanglements and combinations, since the atomswere of all sorts ofshapes,includinghookedandbranched.Thusagglomerationsofperceptiblesizeweregraduallybuiltup,andaworldbegan.WhenEpicurus tookupanddeveloped the theorynearly twocenturies later,

heimaginedtheatomsasmovinginthefirstplacestraightdownwardsbecauseofgravity,orasheexpressedit,byreasonoftheirweight.Herealizedhowever–andit isaremarkableillustrationof theacutenessof theGreekmind–thatallbodies, thoughvarying in size andhence, if theywere solid atoms, inweight,wouldfallthroughavacuumatauniformspeed.Thisisapointwhichwasonlyre-establishedwith somedifficulty in the sixteenth century.Epicurus thereforehad to think of something else to account for the first collisions. Hence heassumed that at some indeterminate point of time and space, and for noascertainable reason, an atomwas liable tomake a tiny imperceptible swervefrom its straight downward path. This deviation from the strict determinismwhichwasof theessenceof theoriginalatomictheoryhadacurioussequel inthat itwas held to allow for free-will in a universewhere otherwiseman likeeverythingelsewouldhavehadtoberegardedasentirelysubjecttoablindandinexorable destiny. Scientifically speaking it was a retrograde step, andDemocritus was thinkingmore clearly when he saw that in infinite space theconceptionofupordownhadnomeaning,andtherecouldbenoreasonfortheatomstomoveinonedirectionratherthananother.The atomists posited no separate moving cause like the attractive and

repulsive forces of Empedocles or theMind ofAnaxagoras.Aristotle accusedthemof‘lazilyshelving’thequestionoftheoriginofmotion.Butifonerealizes–anditisnotaveryeasythingtodo–whataboldandnovelstepitwas,afterwhathadseemedtheinescapableargumentsofParmenides,toassertpositivelyanddefinitely theexistenceofvoid,onecanseehowthis itselfmightseemtothemasufficientanswer to theproblem.Parmenideshadactuallysaid that thereasonwhymotionwas impossiblewas that therewas no space for things tomovein.Withthisrestrictionremoved,andtheatomsletloose,asitwere,inthevastemptiness,itmightwellhaveseemedaspertinenttoask‘Whyshouldtheystand still?’ as ‘Why should they move about?’ The illustration which theatomists used, as a visible example of a kind ofmotion similar to that of theatoms,wasthesortofthingoneseeswhenanarrowshaftofsunlightisallowedto penetrate into a darkened room by a hole or crack in a shutter. Themoteswhichappearinthesunbeamexecutingacontinuousdanceinalldirectionsarenotofcourseatoms,whicharefarbelowthelevelofvisibility,butthemotionoftheatomsthemselvesmust,theysaid,beimaginedassimilar.

Notes

1SomehaveseentheshredsofamaterialisticconceptionstillclinginginoneortwooftheepithetsappliedtomindbyAnaxagoras,e.g.katharos(‘pure’),leptos(‘thin’,‘fine’,‘small’,appliedtofinelygroundgrainor to fineand lightmaterials). Inreply to this it issurelypertinent toaskwhatotherepithetswereavailabletothepoorman?Itisaclearcaseofthoughthavingoutruntheresourcesoflanguage. No one would accuse Plato of a materialistic outlook, yet he too speaks of ‘thinkingfinely’,usingtheadverbfromleptos.Amoment’sreflectionwouldshowthatourownspeechisstillfull of suchmetaphorical uses of terms properly applying to physical objects. They are, andwillremain,indispensable.1QuotedbyCornford,BeforeandAfterSocrates,p.26.

4THEREACTIONTOWARDSHUMANISM(TheSophistsandSocrates)

We have now reached the second half of the fifth century B.C. Socrates is inmiddlelife,Platoisbornorabouttobeborn.(Hewasbornin427.)Itisthetimewhenthereactionagainstphysicalspeculationsetinandphilosophersbegantodirect their thoughts towards human life, the second of the two divisions ofphilosophythatImentionedatthebeginning.Onereasonforthechangeisnotfar to seek. It was a revolt of common sense against the remoteness andincomprehensibilityoftheworldasthephysicistspresentedit.TheordinarymanwasconfrontedwiththechoiceofbelievingwithParmenidesthatallmotionwasillusionandrealityanimmovableplenum,orelse‘savingthephenomena’(astheothershad the impudence to call it) by acceptingas theonly realities atoms–invisible,colourless,scentless,soundlessatoms–andvoid.Neitherpicturewaseithercomfortingorparticularlycredible.Atanyrate, if thephysicistswere tobe believed, then what they called the physis or real nature of things wassomethingutterlyremotefromtheworldinwhichweseemtolive.Iftheywereright,thenthenatureoftherealworldturnedouttobeofverylittleconsequencetoman,whohadtodealeverydaywithaworldwhichwasquitedifferent.Tounderstandthisattitude,wemustofcourseremindourselvesagainofthe

completeabsenceofanyexperimentalproofoftheirassertions,andalsoofanyformofapplied science.Thephysicistof to-day tellsmeequally that thedeskwhich seems so solid under my typewriter is in fact a whirling maelstromcontaining more empty space than solid matter. I may retort that I do notexperienceitinthatway,yetIcannotturnmybackonhimorconcludethathisview of reality is therefore of no consequence to me. We are all only toodismallyawareofthepracticalimpactwhichatomicsciencemayhaveuponourlives.TheGreekwasluckier.Hecouldanddidturnhisback,anditispartlyatleasttothiscircumstancethatweowesomeofthemostprofoundreflectionsonthenatureandpurposeofhumanlife.

Thereasonsforthechangewereboundtobecomplex.Athenshadbecometheacknowledged leader of Greece in intellectual as in other matters, so thatthinkers from other parts of the Greek world, like Anaxagoras or Protagoras,tendedtobeattractedintoherorbitandtomaketheirhomesthere.ButAthensfromtheyear431wasengagedinthelongandterriblewarwhichwastoleadtoherdownfallthirtyyearslater,andsoonafteritsoutbreaksufferedallthehorrorsof the plague. If disinterested scientific inquiry demands, as Aristotle rightlysaid,atleastaminimumofleisureandcomfortablematerialcircumstances,thenAthenswasnolongertheplaceinwhichitwaseasy,butratheracitywheretheproblemsofhumanlifeandconductwereobtrudingthemselvesmoreandmore.Moreover,Athenswas ademocracy, a democracy small enough to ensure thatthe participation of all free citizens in her political life was a reality and notmerelyaquestionofvotingforapoliticalrepresentativeeveryfewyears.Someofficeswerefilledbylot,andeverycitizencouldfeelthathehadagoodchanceofplayinganactivepartintheconductofthestate’saffairs.Thisagainfosteredanambition to learnmoreabout theprinciplesunderlyingpolitical lifeand theartswhichwouldensuresuccessinit.Herehowever there isno roomtobeanythingbutstrictlyselective, soafter

that brief reminder that important social and political factorswere atwork aswell,Iproposetoconcentrateonthemorephilosophicalreasonsforthechange,thusensuringatleasttheadvantageofamorecontinuousthreadofargumenttofollow. The reaction away from the investigation of physis is sometimesattributedamongotherthingstowhathasbeencalledthebankruptcyofphysicalscience,andwehavealreadyhadahintofwhatthatphrasemeans.Thebasisofphysical science in Greece, as we said at the beginning, was the search forpermanenceorstability,andforanunderlyingunity, inauniversesuperficiallymutableandunstable,andconsistingonlyofamostconfusingplurality.Totheordinarymanitmusthaveseemedthatthephysicistshadfailedconspicuously.They offered him the choice between Parmenides and the atomists. Either hecouldacceptunity in theworldat thepriceof renouncingbelief ineverythingthat seemed tohim real and admitting that all his sensationswere false; or hecould follow thosewho had given up all idea of a one behind themany andproduced a world of nothing but infinite plurality; and not even they wouldallowthenameofrealitytothesecondaryqualitieswhichmadeupmostoftheworldofhisexperience, theworld thatcouldbeseenandheardandsmeltandtasted.Thereactiontowardshumanismisassociatedwiththeriseofanewclass,the

Sophists. It is often pointed out that the Sophists were not a particularphilosophicalschool,butratheraprofession.Theywereitinerantteachers,who

madealivingoutofthenewhungerforguidanceinpracticalaffairswhicharoseat this time from the causes I havementioned: the increasing opportunities oftaking part in practical politics, the growing impatience with the naturalphilosophers,and(onemayadd)an increasingscepticismabout thevalidityoftraditional religious teachingwith its crudely anthropomorphic pictures of thegods.Thewordsophistes(‘practitionerofwisdom’)hadnothithertocarriedanyderogatory implication. It was in fact the word applied to the seven sages oftradition.Itwastheunpopularityofthefifth-centurySophistswhichgaveitthecolouringthatithasborneeversince.Yet thoughone cannot call themaparticular philosophical school, theyhad

certain definite points in common.Onewas the essentially practical nature oftheirteaching,whichtheydescribedastheinculcationofarete.Wehavealreadydiscussedthemeaningofthisword,whosepracticalimportisillustratedbythestory of the Sophist Hippias, who, as a sort of living advertisement of hispowers, appeared at the Olympic Games wearing nothing which he had notmadehimself,downtotheringonhisfinger.Secondly,theSophistssharedsomethingwhichmaymoreproperlybecalleda

philosophicalattitude,namelyacommonscepticism,amistrustofthepossibilityof absolute knowledge. This was a natural result of the impasse to which, itseemed, natural philosophyhad come.Knowledge depends on two things: thepossession of faculties capable of bringing us into touchwith reality, and theexistence of a stable reality to be known. As instruments of knowledge, thesenseshadnowbeenseverely treated,andsofarnothinghadbeenput in theirplace;andfaithintheunityandstabilityoftheUniversehadbeen,underminedwithout,asyet, theemergenceof theideathat theremightbeapermanentandknowablerealityoutsideandbeyondthephysicalworld.Thelifebloodofphilosophyiscontroversy.Onceitsfirstbeginningsarepast,

anynewdevelopmentusuallyrepresentsareactionfrompreviousthought.ThisistrueofthegreatestoftheGreeks–Socrates,PlatoandAristotle.Thatiswhyitisworthspendingsometime,aswearedoing,ontheirimmediatepredecessorsinordertounderstandthespringsoftheirownthought,andforthesamepurposeit is particularly important to grasp the point that we have come to now, thatmoral and political philosophy first arose inGreece (whichmeans that it firstarose inEurope) in an atmosphereof scepticism. Itwas this scepticismwhichSocrates and his successorsmade it their life-work to combat. In the physicalfieldDemocritushadsaid that thesensationsofsweetandbitter,hotandcold,wereonlyconventionalterms.Theydidnotcorrespondtoanythingreal.Forthisreasonwhatseemedsweettomemightseembittertoyou,ortomyselfifIwereunwell,andthesamewatermightseemwarmtooneofmyhandsandcoldtothe

other.Itwasallamatterofthetemporaryarrangementoftheatomsinourbodiesandtheirreactiontotheequallytemporarycombinationintheso-calledsensibleobject.Thetransferenceto thefieldofmoralswasonlytooeasy,andwasfirstmadeabout this time, indeed, if later tradition is tobe trusted,byanAtheniannamedArchelaus,apupilofAnaxagoras.Ifhotandcold,sweetandbitter,havenoexistenceinnaturebutaresimplyamatterofhowwefeelatthetime,then,itwas argued, must we not suppose that justice and injustice, right and wrong,have an equally subjective and unreal existence? There can be in nature noabsolute principles governing the relations between man and man. It is all aquestionofhowyoulookatit.ThescepticalstandpointoftheSophistsmaybeillustratedbyquotationsfrom

the two best-known and most influential of their number, Gorgias andProtagoras.Thefavouritetitleforanaturalphilosophertogivetohisworkhadbeen ‘On Nature (physis) or the Existent’. In deliberate parody of the manyworks with this title, Gorgias wrote a book to which he gave the name ‘OnNature, or theNonexistent’, and in it he set out toprove three things: (a) thatnothingexists;(b)thatifanythingdidexist,wecouldnotknowit;(c)thatifwecouldknowanything,wecouldnotcommunicateittoourneighbour.Protagorasexpressedhisviewsonreligionthus:‘Concerningthegods,Ihave

nomeansofknowingwhethertheyexistornot,norofwhatformtheyare;forthere are many obstacles to such knowledge, including the obscurity of thesubjectandtheshortnessofhumanlife.’Hewasalsotheauthorof thefamousdictum: ‘Man is themeasureofall things’, themeaningofwhichwas– ifwemay trustPlato’s interpretation– that theway thingsappear tooneman is thetruthforhim,andthewaytheyappeartoanotheristhetruthforhim.Neithercanconvicttheotheroferror,forifoneseesthingsinoneway,thenthatisthewaytheyareforhim,thoughtheymaybedifferentforhisneighbour.Truthispurelyrelative.Protagoras,however,allowedroomforconventionalviewsoftruthandmoralsbyaddingthatalthoughnooneopinionistruerthananother,oneopinionmaybebetterthananother.Iftotheeyeofamanwithjaundiceallthingsappearyellow,theyreallyareyellowforhim,andnomanhastherighttotellhimtheyarenot.Butitisworthwhileforadoctortochangethatman’sworldbyalteringthestateofhisbodysothatthingswillceasetobeyellowforhim.Similarlyifanymansincerelybelievesthatitisgoodtosteal,thenthatstatementistrueforhimsolongashebelievesit.Butthegreatmajorityforwhomitbothseemsandisbad,oughttoendeavourtochangethestateofhismindandleadittobeliefswhich are not indeed truer, but better. The test by truth or falsehood isabandoned,andreplacedbythepragmatictest.The irreverent scepticism of the Sophists affected the hitherto unchallenged

sanction of law,whichwas based on a belief in its divine origin. The earliestmakers of constitutions, like Lycurgus the legendary founder of Sparta, werebelieved to have been inspired byApollo, and itwas still customary for law-givers to apply tohisoracle atDelphi andobtain, ifnot its advice, at least itssanction for theirownplans.This religious foundation for lawwasnowbeingundermined not only by the atheistical trend of natural philosophy,which theSophiststookupwithsuchzest,butalsobyexternalcircumstancessuchastheincreasing contact of theGreekswith foreign countries and the great body ofcontemporary law-making connected with the foundation of colonies. TheSophistswere the childrenof their age.The first taught them the fundamentaldifferenceswhichmightexistbetweenthelawsandcustomsofpeopleslivingindifferentclimes.Asfor thesecond, itwasdifficult tobelievethatconstitutionscame from heaven when one’s own friends (or still worse, one’s politicalenemies)wereonthecommissionwhichdrewthemup.Protagorashimselfwason the commission sent out in 443 B.C. to draft a constitution for the newAtheniancolonyofThuriiinSouthItaly.Itisnotsurprisingthathebecamethefirstpromulgatorofthattheoryoftheoriginoflawwhichwenowknowasthesocialcontract.Hesaidthatfortheirownprotectionfromwildcreaturesandforthe advancement of their standard of living men had at an early stage beenobliged to band themselves together into communities. Hitherto they had hadneithermoralstandardsnorlaws,butlifeinsocietieswasfoundtobeimpossibleifthestandardsofthejungleprevailed,andso,byslowandpainfuldegrees,theylearned the necessity of laws and conventions whereby the stronger pledgethemselvesnottoattackandrobtheweaksimplybecausetheyarethestronger.1Giventhisinitialpremise,thatlawsandmoralcodeswerenotdivineinorigin

butman-madeandimperfect,itwaspossibletodrawwidelydifferingpracticalconclusions.Protagorashimselfsaidthattheyhadcomeintobeingbecausetheywere necessary. He championed the social contract therefore and urgedsubmission to the laws. Other more radical Sophists repudiated it, andmaintained the natural right of the stronger to have his way. Differentconclusionsmightbedrawn,butthepremisewasthesameforall.Allaliketooktheir standon the complete absenceof absolutevalues and standards,whetherbasedon theological considerations or not.All human actionwas regardedbythe Sophists as based on experience alone and dictated by nothing butexpediency.Rightandwrong,wisdom, justiceandgoodness,werenothingbutnames,eventhoughitmightbearguedthatitwassometimesprudenttoactasiftheyweremore.Into this world of thought came SOCRATES. This is the outlook which

seemed tohimatonce intellectuallymistakenandmorallyharmful,andwhich

hemadeithislife-worktocombat.1Socrates is probably best known for the famous dictum which is usually

translated‘Virtueisknowledge’,andtofindoutwhatthismeansmakesasgoodanapproachasanytothecentreofhisteaching.Itisbestunderstoodhistorically,thatis,byrelatingittotheproblemswhichpreviousandcontemporarythought,andthecircumstancesofhistime,hadforcedonhisattention,andwhichhewasdoinghisbesttosolve.Weknownowthattheword‘Virtue’attachesfalseassociationstotheGreek

arete,whichmeantprimarilyefficiencyataparticular task.Wehavealsoseenthat the opponents against whom Socrates’s teaching was aimed claimed twothings:(a)thattheythemselvescouldteachorimpartarete,(b)thatknowledge,at least knowledgewhich could be shared,was a chimera.Therewasno suchthing.Byequatingaretewith knowledge, therefore,Socrates’s statement takesontheaspectofadeliberatechallenge,whichwecanonlyrecapturebythinkingourselvesbacktothetimesinwhichhelived.One of the things about Socrates which irritated the sensible, practical

Athenian was that he would insist on turning the talk to such humble andapparently irrelevant people as shoemakers and carpenters, when what theywantedtolearnaboutwaswhatconstitutedpoliticalabilityorwhethertherewassuchathingasmoralobligation.Ifyouwanttobeagoodshoemaker,hesaid,thefirstthingnecessaryistoknowwhatashoeisandwhatitismeantfor.Itisnousetryingtodecideonthebestsortoftoolsandmaterialtouseandthebestmethodsofusing themunlessyouhave first formed inyourmind a clear anddetailedideaofwhatitisyouaresettingouttoproduceandwhatfunctionitwillhavetoperform.TousetheGreekword,theareteofashoemakerdependedfirstand foremost on the possession of this knowledge. He ought to be able todescribe in clear terms the nature of the thing he intended to make, and hisdefinitionshouldincludeastatementoftheusetowhichitwastobeput.Itwasquitenaturaltospeakoftheareteofashoemaker,justasonecouldalsospeakofthe arete of a general or statesman. In no such case did the word have anynecessaryconnexionwiththemoralaspectoftheiractivitiesasourword‘virtue’wouldsuggest.Itmeantthat inthemwhichmadethemgoodat theirparticularjob, and by taking first the humble examples of the useful crafts, it was notdifficult forSocrates to show that in eachcase the acquisitionof this capacitydepended on knowledge and that the first andmost necessary knowledgewasknowledgeineachcaseoftheendinview–whatthemanwassettingouttodo.Givenaproperunderstandingoftheend,theunderstandingofthemeanstobeadopted could follow, but not otherwise. In every instance, therefore, aretedepended first on having a definite job to do, and secondly on a thorough

knowledge of what the job was and what it aimed at effecting. If then (heproceeded) there is any legitimate sense in which we can talk about areteunqualified, as theSophistswere professing to teach it – that is, efficiency inliving for anyman as such – it follows that theremust be an end or functionwhichallalike,ashumanbeings,havetoperform.Thefirsttasktherefore,ifweare to acquire this universal humanvirtue, is to discoverwhat the function ofmanis.NowIwouldnotsay that fromthe recordsofSocrates’s teachingwhichwe

have in thewritingsofhispupils (forhehimselfwrotenothing,believing thatthe only thing of value was the living interchange of ideas by question andanswer between two people in personal contact) we find the answer to thisprimaryquestionoftheuniversalendoraimofhumanlife.Itsabsencefromhisteachingwas,Ishouldsay,onereasonwhichmadethemorepositivePlatofeelithis duty not only to reproduce his master’s teaching but to carry it a stagefurther.It is inkeepingwithSocrates’scharacter that theanswershouldnotbethere.Hewasaccustomedtosaythathedidnothimselfknowanything,andthattheonlywayinwhichhewaswiserthanothermenwasthathewasconsciousofhisownignorance,whiletheywerenot.TheessenceoftheSocraticmethodistoconvincetheinterlocutorthatwhereashethoughtheknewsomething,infacthedoesnot.Theconvictionofignoranceisanecessaryfirststeptotheacquisitionof knowledge, for no one is going to seek knowledge on any subject if he isunder the delusion that he already possesses it. People complained that hisconversationhadthenumbingeffectofanelectricshock.1Sinceheregardeditashismissioninlifetogoaroundconvincingpeopleoftheirignorance,itisnotsurprising that he was unpopular, nor can we wholly blame the Athenians –tragic though their mistake was – for confusing him with the Sophists andventing on him the odium which the Sophists had aroused. They held thatknowledge was impossible; he demonstrated to everybody that they knewnothing. In fact the difference was profound; for the action of Socrates wasbasedonapassionatebeliefthatknowledgewaspossible,butthatthedebrisofhalf-thought-out andmisleading ideaswhich filledmostmen’smindsmust becleared awaybefore the search for it couldbegin.Whathe set beforemen, instrong opposition to sophistic scepticism, was ‘an ideal of knowledgeunattained’.1Oncetheyhadperceivedthewaytothegoal,hewasreadytoseekit with them, and all philosophy was summed up for him in this idea of the‘commonsearch’.Neitherhiscompanion,norhehimselfknewthetruthyet,butifonlytheothercouldbepersuadedthatthiswasso,theymightsetouttogetherwithgoodhopeoffindingit.TrueSocraticismrepresentsfirstandforemostan

attitudeofmind,anintellectualhumilityeasilymistakenforarrogance,sincethetrue Socratic is convinced of the ignorance not only of himself but of allmankind.This rather than any body of positive doctrine is the contribution ofSocrates.Toreturn,then,tohisinsistencethatifwewishtoacquirearete,anessential

preliminary is to discover and define the aimor function ofman:wewill notnowexpecttofindthatendorfunctionneatlydefinedinanycut-and-driedwaybySocrateshimself.Hismissionwastomakemenawareofthenecessity,andtosuggestamethodbywhich the requireddefinitionmightbesought, so thathehimselfaswellashisfellow-seekersmightsetaboutfindingit.In the confusion of ethical thoughtwhichwas amark of his time, one fact

stoodoutforhimasparticularlymischievous.Men’stalkwasinterlardedwithagreat variety of general terms, especially terms intended to be descriptive ofethical notions – justice, temperance, courage and so forth. I started, saysSocrates, in my innocence, by supposing that they knew what these wordsmeant,sincetheyusedthemsofreely,andIsetoutfullofhopethattheywouldtellme,whodidnotknow.Whenhequestioned them,however,he found thatnoneof themcouldgivehimaproper explanation.Perhaps in the light of theSophists’ teaching it ought to be supposed that these terms had indeed nomeaning; but if so,menought tobe stopped fromusing them. If on theotherhandtheyhaveanypermanentsignificance,thenthemenwhousethemoughttobe able to say what it is. You cannot talk about acting wisely, justly or wellunless you know what wisdom, justice and goodness are. If, as Socratessuspected,differentpeopleusingthesamewordsmeandifferentthingsbythem,theyaretalkingatcross-purposesandonlyconfusioncanresult.Theconfusionwillbeatonceintellectualandmoral.Intellectually,discussionwithamanwhois using his terms in a different sense from you can lead nowhere – exceptpossiblytoaquarrel;andmorally,whenthetermsinquestionstandforethicalnotions,nothingbutanarchycanresult.Thisdoublesideoftheproblem,moraland intellectual,waswhat Socrateswished to express by saying that virtue isknowledge.Soclearmoreoverwashisownmindandsteadfasthischaracterthatitseemedtohimself-evidentthatifmencouldbebroughttoseethistruththeywouldautomaticallychoosetheright.Allthatwasnecessarywastomakethemtakethetroubletofindoutwhat theright is.Hencehissecondfamoussaying,that no one doeswrongwillingly. If virtue is knowledge, vice is only due toignorance.Howthenarewetosetaboutacquiringthisknowledgeofwhatvirtue,justice,

etc., are?Socrates, as Ihave said,wasprepared to suggest amethod,both forothers and himself. The knowledge is obtained in two stages, referred to by

Aristotlewhenhesays thatSocratescan justlyclaim thecredit for two things,inductive argument and general definition. These somewhat dry logical terms,whichwouldcertainlyhavesurprisedSocrateshimself,donotsoundasiftheyhadmuchconnexionwithmorals,butforSocratestheconnexionwasvital.Thefirststageistocollectinstancestowhichitisagreedbybothfellow-seekersthatthe name ‘justice’ (if justice is the quarry) can be applied. Then the collectedexamplesofjustactionsareexaminedtodiscoverinthemsomecommonqualitybyvirtueofwhichtheybearthatname.Thiscommonquality,ormorelikelyagroupornexusofcommonqualities,constitutestheiressenceasjustacts.Itisinfact, abstracted from the accidental propertiesof timeandcircumstancewhichbelong to each of the just acts individually, the definition of justice. Thus theinductive argument is, as itsGreek name signifies, a ‘leading-on’ of themindfrom individual instances, assembled and regarded collectively, to acomprehensionoftheircommondefinition.The fault which Socrates foundwith the victims of his tireless questioning

wasthattheythoughtitsufficienttoperformthefirststageonly,i.e.tomentionafewscatteredinstancesandsay‘Thisandthatarejustice.’Thetypeissummedup in Euthyphro, who in Plato’s dialogue of that name is represented asconversingwithSocratesabout themeaningofpiety, the topichavingcroppedup in connexion with the fact that Euthyphro has been moved by what heconsidersa senseofduty toprosecutehisown father formanslaughter.Askedwhatmeaning he attaches to theword ‘piety’, he replies, ‘Piety iswhat I amdoingnow.’TohiscompanioninanotherdialogueSocratessays,‘Ionlyaskedyouforonething,virtue,butyouhavegivenmeawholeswarmofvirtues.’Hewastryingtomakethemseethateveniftherearemanyandvariousexamplesofrightaction,yettheymustallhaveonecommonqualityorcharacterbyreasonofwhichtheyarecalledright.Ifnot,thewordismeaningless.Thatwastheaimoftheimportunatequestionswhichmadehimsounpopular

– toget from theswarmofvirtues to thedefinitionof theone thing,virtue. Itsoundslikeanexerciseinlogic,butwasinfacttheonlywayinwhichitseemedpossible to Socrates to combat the subversive moral effects of Sophisticteaching.Thosemenwho,inanswertosuchquestionsas‘Whatispiety?’reply‘What I amdoing now’ are just themenwhowould say that the only rule ofconductistodecideonthespurofthemomentwhatismostadvantageous.Ofrulesintheacceptedsense,universallyapplicableprinciples,therearenone.Thelogicalfallacyleddirectlytomoralanarchy.Socrates paid the penalty of being ahead of his time. His clear and direct

thinkingwasclassedwiththatoftheverySophistsagainstwhomhisironyhadbeen aimed, and he was charged by two reactionary citizens with corrupting

youngmenandnotbelievinginthecity’sgods.Itmustbeadmittedthatthemostfamous of his pupils and associates had not done him credit. One wasAlcibiades, aboutwhomnomoreneedbe said.AnotherwasCritias, thebitterandrevengefuloligarchwhocamebackfromexile intopowerafter the fallofAthens in 404, and was largely responsible for the bloody purge which tookplaceundertheso-calledThirtyTyrants,ofwhomhewasthemostviolentandextreme. Socrates’s accusers demanded the death-penalty. According toAthenian custom, itwas open to him to suggest a lighter sentence, the judgesbeinglefttochoosebetweenthetwo.Hisownsuggestion,however,wasthatheshouldbegiventhefreedomof thecityasapublicbenefactor. Inanycase,hesaid,hehadnomoneytopayanadequatefine.AttheearnestinstigationofPlatoandothersofhisfriendsheofferedafinewhichtheywouldpay,butwouldgiveno undertaking to cease his ‘corrupting’ activities, on the grounds that to himtheyweremoreimportantthanlifeitself.Thisleftthejudgeslittlechoice,andhewassenttoprisontoawaitexecution.Oncemorehisfriendsappeared,thistimewithaplanwhichwouldhavemadehisescapeeasy.Itisprobablethatmany,ifnot most, of those who disapproved of him had no wish to see him die, andwould have beenmore than content if he could have been persuaded to leaveAthensandlivequietlysomewhereelse.HerepliedhoweverthathehadallhislifeenjoyedthebenefitswhichthelawsofAthensconferredonhercitizens,andnowthatthosesamelawssawfitthatheshoulddie,itwouldbebothunjustandungrateful forhimtoevade theirdecision.Besides,whocould tell thathewasnotgoingtoafarbetterexistencethanthatwhichhehadknownhitherto?Inthisserene frameofmindhedrank thehemlock in theyear399B.C., at theageofseventy.TheendofSocratesmadesuchadeepimpressionononeofhisyoungfriends

thatitsetthesealonhisreluctancetoengageinthepoliticallifeforwhichhisbirthand talentsseemedtohavemarkedhimout.Disillusionedinanycasebytheconditiontowhichhiscitywasreducedandtheexcessesofitslatestrulers,Platodecidedthatthestatewhichcouldputsuchamantodeathwasnotoneinwhichhecouldplayanyactivepart.Instead,hedevotedhimselftothewritingofthoseamazingdialogues inwhichhegivesa lifelikepictureofhismaster,anddevelops,confirms,andenlargeshisteachinginwordsputintothemouthofthatgreat-souledmanhimself.ThereismuchmorethatcouldbesaidaboutSocrates,but his thought is so closely connected with Plato’s, and the dividing linebetweenthemsohardtodiscernwithanyclearness,thatIshallstopatthispointtalkingaboutSocratesaloneandforhimself.AswegoontodiscussPlato,itisinevitablethatweshouldfromtimetotimebebroughtbacktovariousaspectsofthemessage of Socrates, and I think it is thus, in connexionwith the further

fruitsofPlato’smeditationuponthem,thattheycanbestbeintroduced.

Notes

1IamassumingthatthemythtoldbyProtagorasinPlato’sdialogueofthatnameistrulymythicalinthe sense that the divine apparatus can be stripped awaywithout any loss to the seriousmessagewhichheintendstoconvey.Nosignificanceistobeattachedtothefactthatconscienceandasenseof justice are there said tohavebeen implanted inmenat theordersofZeus.This is perhapsnotuniversallyagreed,butnotonlyisthemythicalnatureoftheexpositioninsistedupon(andreflectedinthefairy-talebeginning:‘Onceuponatime’),butanyother interpretationwouldbeinconsistentwithProtagoras’sviewsonreligionasstatedelsewhere.1ForanunderstandingofSocrates,theexcellentarticleofProfessorR.HackforthinPhilosophy,vol.VIII(1933)isespeciallytoberecommended.1Lest any reader be taken aback by this simile, on the grounds that theGreeks knewnothing ofelectricity,Ihadbetterexplainthattheobjectofcomparisonwasthestingray(Greeknarké),a fishwhichparalysesitsvictimsbyanelectricaldischarge.Thehomelyflat-nosedfaceofthephilosopheraddedpointtothelikeness.1Hackforth,l.c.

5PLATO(i)TheDoctrineofIdeas

We shall probably understand Plato’s philosophy best if we regard him asworkinginthefirstplaceundertheinfluenceoftworelatedmotives.HewishedfirstofalltotakeupSocrates’staskatthepointwhereSocrateshadhadtoleaveit, to consolidate his master’s teaching and defend it against inevitablequestioning. But in this he was not acting solely from motives of personalaffectionorrespect.Itfittedinwithhissecondmotive,whichwastodefend,andtorenderworthdefending,theideaofthecity-stateasanindependentpolitical,economic, and social unit. For it was by accepting and developing Socrates’schallenge to the Sophists that Plato thought this wider aim could be mostsuccessfullyaccomplished.The doom of the free city-state was sealed by the conquests of Philip and

Alexander.ItwasthesewhichassuredthatthatcompactunitofclassicalGreeklife should be swamped by the growth of huge kingdoms on a semi-Orientalmodel. But they did no more than complete in drastic fashion a process ofdeclinewhichhadbeengoingonforsometime.Thecauseswere,ofcourse,inpart political. There were the disruptive effects of inter-state warfare, and thedisastrous effect onAthens –where the city state organization of society hadachieved its finest flower – of defeat and the moral collapse and internaltyrannies which followed defeat. Feeding on these discontents, the prevailingcurrentsofphilosophicalthought–withwhichweareatthemomentconcerned–hadplayedtheirpartinunderminingthetraditions,theacceptedconventionsifyou like, onwhich the smooth continuance of life in the little city-state to solargeanextentdepended.Toappreciate the situation,wemust realizehowcompletely identifiedwere

thestateanditsreligion.ItwasnotacaseofmakingtheChurchsubordinatetotheState.Therewasnowordforchurchatall,nordidsuchathingexistapartfrom the state itself. The godswereworshipped at festivals whichwere state

occasions,andparticipationinthemwaspartoftheordinarydutiesandactivitiesofacitizenassuch.AlthoughmanygodswereworshippedatAthens,thepatronofthecity,andthedeitynearesttoeveryAthenian’sheart,wasofcourseAthena,and the coincidence of name is significant. Religion and patriotism were thesamething.ItisasifthereligionofBritainweretheworshipofBritannia.TheAcropolisofAthenswasAthena’sown rock, andcrownedbyher temple.Herfestival was the most important in the Athenian calendar. We may remindourselves also of something already mentioned, that the sanction of law wasrooted in the traditionalbelief in itsdivineorigin.Lawshadbeengiven to thefirst law-makers, as the tablets to Moses in Jewish belief, by the god of thepeople,ortobemorespecific,byApollo,actingasthemouthpieceorprophetoftheFatherofallthegods,Zeus.Suchathingaspersonalandindividualreligionwas unknown to the great majority of citizens. The sects which attempted tointroduce it never achieved much influence so long as the city-state heldtogether,andinsofarastheyhadanysuccess,weredefinitelysubversiveoftheestablishedorder.Itfollowsthattoquestiontheestablishedreligionwastoquestionthebasisof

thewholeestablishedorderofsociety,andthatnodefenceofthecity-statecouldbe adequate if it remained onwhatwe should regard as the political level.Areasoneddefenceofitslawsandinstitutionsmustprovidethemwithanabsoluteor transcendent validity which could hardly be divorced from a theisticconceptionofthegovernmentoftheUniverse.ItmightindeedbeimpossibletoreinstatetheoldHomericpantheoninallitsglory.Theseall-too-humanfigureshadhad theirday, andevenapart from theattacksof atheisticphilosophersorSophists could not indefinitely retain the allegiance of an intelligent andincreasingly enlightened community. But if gods in the old anthropomorphicformweredoomedinanycase,somethingmustbeputintheirplacetorestoretheelementoforderandpermanencewhichinthelatefifthcenturywasrapidlyvanishingalikefromthesphereofconductandfromthatofnature.In the field of thought, the attack on the traditional bases of established

institutions was threefold: from natural philosophy, from the sophisticmovement, and from mysticism. With the last named we shall not be muchconcernedhere,butmaynoteinpassingtheexistenceof independentreligiousteachers,ofwhomthosewhoused thewritingsattributed toOrpheuswere themost important, whose doctrine was subversive in that it taught that a man’sreligionmightconcernhisownindividualsoulandnothisdutytotheState.Thedangerofnaturalphilosophy lay in its lesson that thegods couldnotpossiblyexistintheforminwhichthecityhadinheritedthemfromHomer;andthatoftheSophists intheirsuggestionthat thelawsof thecityhadafterallnodivine

sanction:theyhadbeenmadebymanandmightaseasilybeunmade.These various currents of thought had already been having their effect for

some time when Plato wrote. Since he was among other things a practicalpoliticalthinker,whohadrenouncedanactivepoliticalcareeronlytodevotehislife to the consideration of political ideas, he was committed to one of twocourses.Eitherhemustrecognize(asheissometimesnowadaysblamedfornotrecognizing)thatthecity-statewithallitsinstitutionsandconvictionsbelongedtothepast,joinwiththedisruptiveforces,andoutofthedifferentelementsthathadbroughtaboutitsdownfallbuildupanewsocietyandanewreligiontotakeitsplace;orelsehemustuseallhispowerstoupholdthecity-state,refutingitsopponentswheretheyseemedwrong,andusingthemonlytoaddstrengthtoitsframeworkwheretheywererightandrepresentedanelementthelackofwhichwas aweakness in the existing order. In any case the two sides, political andreligious (or metaphysical), must go together. No real reform of thefundamentals of political thought could take place without a correspondingreform ofmen’s ideas about thewhole nature of reality.All thiswas clear toPlato,andhethrewthewholeofhisforcesonthesideofHellenismandthecity-state.Thewritingof theRepublic in theprimeofhis life,andhisreturntothesamesubjectat theendofitwiththeLaws,showthathewastruetothesameideal throughout, the idealofa reformedsocietybasedon thepurificationandstrengthening,notontheabolition,ofthecity-state.AmongtherulingclassesinPlato’sRepublic the individual is tobesubordinated to thecommonwealwithwhat appears to our eyes an excessive relentlessness. The taking away fromthese, themost valuable citizens of the state, of property and family life, thecommunalsupervisionoftheirchildren,thedistributionofdutiesandprivilegesaccording to analmost inexorable systemof class-distinctions– all this seemsshocking to our eyes. One of the listeners in the dialogue itself is moved toremarkthatthosewhointheneworderaretobethemastersofthestatedonotseem destined for a particularly happy life, since theywill have no houses orlandsorotherpossessionsbut liveas if theywereagarrisonofmercenaries–without even drawing a mercenary’s pay, as Socrates points out to make hisfriend’scriticismevenstrongerthanitwas.Theonlyreplygivenis:Ouraiminfounding thecitywasnot togiveespecialhappiness tooneclass,butasfaraspossibletothecityasawhole.’Themeasuresproposedwerethelogicalconclusionofthecity-state,andPlato

saw that it had no chance of survival unless it were pushed to its logicalconclusionanddeprivedof theindividualvagarieswhich, inthecircumstancesofthetime,onlygaveroomfortheoperationofthedestructiveforcesalreadyatworkwithinit.Onlyifitpreservedahomogeneity,orratheraharmonyasPlato

wouldhavepreferredtoexpressit,basedontheacceptancebyeachcitizenofanallocation of function according to character and capacity, could it hope forsalvation.Nowonder that thesaintofPlatonismisSocrates,whosat inprisonawaiting death while his friends planned his escape, and replied to theirsuggestions inwords like these: ‘Do you think a city can go on existing, andavoidbeingturnedupside-down,ifitsjudgmentsaretohavenoforcebutaretobemadenullandvoidbyprivateindividuals?’ThemostpressingquestionarosedirectlyoutofSocrates’sownteaching.In

hissimpleendeavourtomakemenbetter,andpersuadethem,ashehimselfputit,to‘carefortheirownsouls’,hehadtriedtomakethemseethattheyoughtnottobecontentwithnotingindividualactsofvirtue–just,brave,kindlyactsandsoforth–butshoulddoallthattheycouldtounderstandanddefinethenatureofthejustice,courageorkindness,whichlaybehindthem.ItisnotlikelythatthedifficultywhichthisinvolveswasfirstraisedbyPlatohimself.Itwasinevitablethatthesingle-mindedzealofSocrates,whoasAristotlesaid,concernedhimselfexclusivelywithquestionsofconductandnotatallwiththenatureofthingsasawhole,shouldarousequestionsandcriticisminthelivelyandscepticalintellectsofcontemporaryGreece.Thequestionisthis.Yourexhortation,Socrates,involvesalargeassumption,

theassumptionthatsuchathingasjusticeorvirtuedoesexistapartfromtheactsinwhich it ismanifested.Butdoesabsolute justiceorvirtue infactexist?Thetruthisthatanumberofpeoplehaveactedindifferenttimesandcircumstancesinawaywhichwecalljust.Butnoneoftheseseparateactionsisclaimedtobeidenticalwith theperfect justicewhosedefinition isbeingsought.Theyareallthoughttobeonlyveryimperfectapproximationstoit.Yetafterall,whatcanbesaid toexistexcept the individual justacts?And ifyouruniversal justicedoesnotexist,whatistobegainedbypursuingsuchawill-o’-the-wisp?Asecondobjectofcriticismwastheexhortationto‘tendone’ssoul’,andtodo

it by the verymethod of self-questioning onwhich Socrates insisted: for thissuggestiontoowasoneofextremenovelty.MostGreekswerematter-of-factinoutlook, with both feet firmly planted on the ground. The psyche was notsomethinginwhichtheyweregreatlyinterested.Theywerecontentwithvaguenotions, inherited from primitive belief and canonized by their acceptance inHomer, that itwasakindofbreathorvapourwhichanimated thebodybut inturnwasdependentonthebodyforitsefficacy.Atdeaththebodyperished,andthe psyche, left as it were homeless, slipped out into a pale and shadowyexistencewithoutmindor strength.Even for thosewho through themysterieshopedforsomethingbetterafterdeath,itwasanewandastonishingthingtobetoldthatthepsychewastheseatofthemoralandintellectualfacultiesandoffar

greaterimportancethanthebody.To uphold these novel views in the face of criticism, the two sides of

philosophy with which we started, metaphysical and moral, had got to bebroughttogether.ItwasataskforwhichPlatowassupremelyfitted,forunlikeSocrateshehadakeeninterestintheproblemsofthenatureofrealityfortheirownsake,aswellasinthoseofethics.Incomingtoadecisiononthecentralquestionofwhatwasrealandwhatwas

not,Platowasdeeply influencedby twoearlier thinkerswhoseviewswehavealreadyconsidered,HeraclitusandParmenides.TheHeracliteansmaintainedthateverythingintheworldofspaceandtimewascontinuallyflowing,astheyputit.Changeneverceasedtooperateforamomentandnothingwasthesamefortwoinstants together. The consequence of this doctrine appeared to be that therecould be no knowledge of this world, since one cannot be said to haveknowledgeof somethingwhich isdifferentat thismoment fromwhat itwasamomentago.Knowledgedemandsastableobject tobeknown.Parmenidesonthe other hand had said that there is such a stable reality, which can bediscoveredonlythroughtheactivityofthemindworkingaltogetherapartfromthe senses. The object of knowledge must be immutable and eternal, exemptfrom time and change,whereas the senses only bring us into contactwith themutableandperishable.These reflections, togetherwithadeep interest inPythagoreanmathematics,

werebroughtbyPlatotobearonthequestionsofdefinitionwhichSocrateshadraisedintheethicalfield.Forhimtwothingsweresimultaneouslyatstake,notonlytheexistenceofabsolutemoralstandardswhichwasthelegacyofSocrates,but also thewhole possibility of scientific knowledge,whichon aHeracliteantheoryoftheworldwasachimera.Platohadapassionatefaithinboth,andsincethereforeascepticalanswerwasforhimunthinkable,hedidtheonlyotherthingpossible.Hemaintainedthattheobjectsofknowledge,thethingswhichcouldbedefined,didexist,butwerenottobeidentifiedwithanythingintheperceptibleworld.Theirexistencewasinanidealworldoutsidespaceandtime.ThesearethefamousPlatonic‘Ideas’,socalledbyatransliterationoftheGreekwordideawhichPlatoappliedtothem,andwhichmeantformorpattern.InonewaythentheEnglishword‘idea’isaboutasunsuitablearenderingascouldbefound,fortousitsuggestswhathasnoexistenceoutsideourownminds,whereastoPlatotheideaialonehadfull,complete,andindependentexistence.Inanotherway,however,theEnglishwordwillhelpustounderstandwhatit

was towhichheattributed thisperfectand independentexistence.Wesay thatwehavean‘idea’ofgoodnessorequality,whichenablesus tomean thesamethingwhenwetalkofgoodwineoragoodcricketer,equaltrianglesandequal

chances,althoughtheremayseemtobelittlesharedincommonbetweenwineand cricketers, triangles and chances. If there is not some common ground ofmeaning when the same epithet is applied to different objects, thencommunication between man and man must be given up as impossible. Thiscommongroundwe call the idea or conception of goodness or equality.Mostpeoplewould fighthard for their right to continueusing theword ‘good’, andwould claim that it has a meaning of its own. Yet its use involves a realintellectualproblem,andinfactsomephilosophersto-day,whenPlatonicbeliefsare rather out of fashion among our schoolmen, are very much inclined toquestion the claim that the use of general terms is legitimate at all. Certainlysome of us who use them might be hard put to it to say what there was incommonbetweenthebodilyskillrequiredtobowlastraightballorhitadifficultone,andtheflavourofawine.Platowouldmaintainthattheyhadsomethingincommon,andthatthiscouldonlybeaccountedforbytheassumptionthatbothalikepartakeintheIdeaoftheGood.Youarerighttospeakasyoudooftheideaofgoodnessorequality,hewouldsay,butitisjustthesethingswhichyoucallmerely ideas, or concepts in themind, which wemust believe to be absoluteentitieswithanexistenceindependentofourmindsandoutofreachoftimeorchange.Otherwiseknowledgeisanidledreamanditsobjectfantasy.Withthisfaithonemayreasonablygoontoseekforadefinitionofthegood,andonewillthenunderstand twodifferentphenomenaofourworld– the cricketer and thewine, say – in their common character as good, by referring them to it as acommonstandard.We must suppose then an ideal world containing eternal and perfect

prototypesofthenaturalworld.Whateverofquasi-existenceourchangingworldpossesses,itowestoanimperfectparticipationinthefullandperfectexistenceof the other. Since this is an attitude which has something in it of an almostreligiousfaith,evenofmysticalexperience,andcannotbeentirelyexplainedbyrational argument (though Plato would have maintained very strongly thatrational argument proves that we cannot do without it), Plato has recourse tometaphor toexplain therelationbetween the twoworlds.Aristotle fastenedonthis as a weakness, but it could hardly have been otherwise. Sometimes hespeaksoftheidealworldasthemodelorpatternoftheother,whichimitatesitasfarasmaterialthingscan,sometimesofasharingorparticipationoftheoneintheexistenceoftheother.Hisfavouritewordtodescribetherelationshipisonewhichsuggeststhatbetweenanactor’sinterpretationofapartandthepartasitwasconceivedbytheauthoroftheplay.Wehavecometothedoctrine,asPlatodid,bywayofSocrates.Consequently

wehavemetfirsttheIdeasofmoralandintellectualconcepts.ButPlatowidened

ittoincludeallnaturalspecies.Weonlyrecognizeindividualhorsesasmembersofasinglespecies,andhaveaconceptwhichenablesus touseanddefine thegeneral term ‘horse’, because in the non-material world there is laid up anabsolute ideal of horse, of whose being the individual horses in this worldimperfectlyandtransitorilypartake.WhenSocratesinthePhaedoismadetosay,withapparenttautology,‘Thisis

whatIclingtoinmyheart,simplyandplainlyandperhapsfoolishly…thatitisby the beautiful that beautiful things become beautiful’,1 he means, if wetranslatehiswordsintoamoremodernterminology,‘Wecannotgiveascientificexplanationofathing(i.e.anindividualinstance)unlesswecanrelateittotheclasstowhichitbelongs,andthatimpliesknowledgeoftheclass-concept.’Thatlaststatementisonewithwhichagreatmanypeopleto-daywouldhave

no quarrel, yet they would not agree with Plato in attributing to that class-concept an individual existenceof its own, independent of themembers of itsclass, or the constant and unvarying character which is the consequence ofindependent existence. If to Plato all this seemed to follow, then that wasdoubtlessduetocertainphilosophicalpredilectionsofhisown.Inthefirstplace,he shared with Socrates those two fundamental characteristics, a faith in thepossibility of knowledge and a conviction of the need for absolute moralstandards.And though itmay seem to us that it is possible to share this faithwithoutmakingtheassumptionthatthereareeternalentitiesoutsidetheworldoftimeandspace,itwasmuchmoredifficulttodothisattheparticularpointinthehistoryofphilosophywhenPlatowasdoinghis thinking.WeneedonlyreflectforamomentontheprevioushistoryofGreekphilosophywhichwehavenowfollowed – the ceaseless flux which the Heracliteans attributed to the naturalworld, the insistence of Parmenides that what is real should be eternal andunmoved. There are in fact in the ordinary thought of modern days closercounterpartstothePlatonicIdeasthanonemightthink.Ifchallenged,theiruserswould deny that they had any such concepts inmind, but in fact a surprisingamount of everyday thinking is conducted as if therewere real andunvaryingentities corresponding to thegeneral termswhichweuse. In science,wehavetheLaws ofNature. Each of these, if not somuch to-day at least in the veryrecentpast,istreatedverymuchasifithadanexistenceapartfromtheeventsinwhichitismanifested,andwhichare,ofcourse,nevercompletelyuniform,nordotheyeverrepeat themselvesexactly.Challenged, thescientist replies thatofcourse these are only practical conveniences and no more than roughapproximations to the truth. They represent strong probabilities but no more.Nevertheless, imposing edifices of scientific theory have been built on theassumption of their invariable truth. Without the faith that the same laws of

naturewouldoperateto-morrowasoperatedyesterday,sciencewouldmakenoprogress. Yet it is no more than faith, unless we give a transcendental andabsolutevalidity to them.We treat themas if theyhad this absolutecharacter,whileatthesametimedenyingthattheyhaveit.Anevenbetterexampleof theobjectifying,at least inordinaryspeech,ofa

general term is one which is commented on in an appendix to Ogden andRichards’ book, The Meaning of Meaning. It is written by a doctor, and hisexampleis theuseofnamesfordifferentdiseases.Awordlike‘influenza’isaperfect example of a general term covering a set of particular cases none ofwhich are exactly alike.Yet it is commonly spoken of as an absolute, a thingwhichexistsinitsownright.Evenifthepointwereputdirectlytothem,agreatmanypeoplewould still fail to see that it had not a separate existence of thissort.Yetas thewriterpointsout, thereare inourexperiencenodiseases,onlysickpeople,notwoofwhomhaveexactlythesamesymptoms.Thegeneraltermdoes not stand for anything real which exists over and above the individualcases. The point here is a practical one, since the careless objectifying of thediseasecanleadtoarigidandunimaginativeapproachbythephysicianwhichwillbethereverseofbeneficialtothepatient.WemaysaythenthatinonewayPlatoelevatedtothestatusofphilosophical

doctrine,anddefendedassuch,whatmanyofusinourconversationandwritingunconsciously assume; that is, the existence of something invariablecorresponding to the general terms that we use, over and above the varyingindividualinstanceswhichareallthattheterminfactcovers.Thedifferenceisthat whereas the ordinary man is still in very much the position in whichSocrates foundhim,of throwinggeneral termsabout freelywithoutpausing tothink whether he knows what they mean, Plato’s consciously held belief thatthey stood for a metaphysical reality was intended to endorse the lesson ofSocratesthatwewouldnevergetanywhereunlesswedidthatverything–i.e.takethetroubletofindoutexactlywhattheymean.Given, then, theexistenceofaperfectandtimelesspattern-world,andgiven

thatwhateverrealitywemayattributetothephenomenaoftheworldinwhichweliveisduetotheirsharingtoalimitedextentintherealityofthetranscendentForms:howandwhen(itmaybeasked)didwemaketheacquaintanceofthoseeternal Forms so thatwe can as itwere refer to them in order to identify thecreatures thatwesee,or to recognizeaspartakingof thegoodor thebeautifulanyaction thatweseeperformed?HerePlatodevelopedandconfirmed, in thelightofthereligiousteachingoftheOrphicsandPythagoreans,anothersideofSocrates.IsaidthatanotherSocraticexhortationwhichneededamplificationanddefencewastheexhortationto‘tendone’ssoul’,anditwas in thedoctrinesof

thereligiousreformersaboutthenatureofthepsyche thatPlatosawthebridgebetweentheearth-boundhumanmindandthetranscendentworldoftheIdeas.InordinaryGreekbelief,asIhavesaid,whenthebodyperishedthepsyche,nowamerehomelesswraith,slippedout(‘likesmoke’,asHomerdescribedit) intoapaleandshadowyexistencewithoutmindorstrengthbothofwhichalikeweregivenitastheresultofitsinvestitureinbodilyorgans.Perhaps(asSocratesonthe day of his death mischievously accuses his friends of believing) it wasparticularlydangeroustodiewhenahighwindwasblowing,foritmightcatchupthepsycheandscatterittothefourcornersoftheearth!ItwasnotsurprisingthatintheatmosphereofsuchbeliefstheaffirmationofSocratesthatthepsychewasfarmoreimportantthanthebody,andoughteventobelookedafteratthebody’sexpense,metwithagooddealofincredulity.In support of this convictionof hismaster,Plato reaffirmed the truthof the

Pythagorean religious doctrine that the soul belongs in essence to the eternalworld and not the transitory. It has had many earthly lives, and before andbetween them,when out of the body, has had glimpses of the reality beyond.Bodilydeath isnotanevil for it,butratherarenewalof true life.Thebodyiscomparedbothtoaprisonandatomb,fromwhichthesoullongstobereleasedinorder that itmay flyback to theworldof Ideaswithwhich ithadconversebefore its life on earth.The doctrine of Ideas stands or falls togetherwith thebeliefintheimmortality–oratleastthepreexistence–ofthesoul.Itexplainslearning–theacquisitionofknowledgeinthislife–asaprocessofrecollection.Thethingsthatweperceivearounduscouldnotimplantinusforthefirsttimeaknowledge of the notions of the universal and the perfect which we believeourselvestopossess.Butbecausewehavealreadyhadadirectvisionofthetruerealities,itispossibleforthefeebleandimperfectreflectionsofthemonearthtoremind us of what we have once known, but forgotten owing to the soul’scontaminationwiththematerialdrossofthebody.Thebasicassumptionofthedoctrineisthattheimperfectbyitselfcouldnever

lead us to knowledge of the perfect. No two things in thisworld are exactly,mathematicallyequal.Ifthenwehaveadefinableideainourmindsofthetruemeaningoftheword‘equal’,wecannothavegotitmerelyfromanexaminationandcomparisonofstickswhichweseeorlineswhichwedraw.Thesephysicalapproximationshavetobestudied,butonlybecausetheycanassistthemindinitsbusinessofwinningbacktheperfectknowledgewhichitoncehadandwhichthereforeisnowlatentwithinit.Thatistheroleofsensationintheacquisitionofknowledge.Itcannotbedispensedwith,butsinceallknowledgeacquiredinthisworld is in fact recollection, once he has been set on the way by sense-perceptionthephilosopherwillignorethebodyasfaraspossibleandsubdueits

desires,inordertosetfreethesoul(thatis,forPlato,themind)andallowittorise above the world of sense and regain its awareness of the perfect forms.Philosophyis,inthewordsofthePlatonicSocrates,‘apreparationfordeath’,inthat itsbusiness is tofit thesoul tostaypermanently in theworldof theIdeasinsteadofbeingcondemned to returnoncemore to the limitationsofamortalframe.Thisviewofthesoul’snature,astheultimateexplanationofthepossibilityof

knowledge, permeates the whole of the Phaedo, where it is expounded indialecticalformaswellasinthesymboliclanguageofthefinalmyth.Inanotherdialogue, theMeno, an attempt is made to treat the theory of recollection assomethingsusceptibleoflogicalproof,althoughthecombinationofreligionandphilosophywhichitimpliesissuggestedattheoutsetwhenSocratesreferstoitas adoctrineheldby ‘priests andpriestesseswhomake it theirbusiness tobeable to give an account of their actions’. Elsewhere, however, this side ofPlatonism ismostly tobe found in thegreatmythswhich formakindof finalset-piecetosomanyofthedialogues.ThegreatestisthemythofErattheendoftheRepublic,whereacompleteaccountisgivenofthewholehistoryofthesoul,itsseriesof incarnations,whathappenstoitbetweenitsearthlylives,andhowwhenfinallypurifieditescapesthewheelofbirthforever.Thefactthatwedonotrememberthetruthswhichwehaveseenintheotherworldisaccountedforin the myth by saying that when they are ready for rebirth the souls arecompelled to drink of the water of Lethe. As they have just been made totraverseascorchingandwaterlessplain,thereisatemptationtodrinkdeep,andsouls betray the degree to which they have advanced in philosophy by thestrengthwhich they show in resisting the temptation.All howevermust drinksome, unless they are already destined for escape from the body into eternalcommunionwith the truth.Thismotif of thewater ofLethe can be paralleledelsewhere in Greece, both in myth and cult, and illustrates Plato’s use oftraditionalmaterial for his own purposes. In his ownmind it was perhaps nomorethananallegoricalexpressionoftheactualeffectofcontaminationbythecloggingmatterofthebody.AgaininthePhaedruswehavethemoredefinitelyallegoricalmythinwhich

thecompositenatureof thehumansoul issymbolizedby thepictureof itasawinged chariot inwhich a human charioteer, representing the reason, drives apairofhorses,onehigh-spiritedandnaturallyinclinedtoobeythecharioteer,theother bad and disobedient. These represent the brave, heroic side of humannature, including strength of will, and the bodily appetites respectively. Oncelongagothechariotmadeitswayroundtheveryrimof theUniversewhereitcouldcontemplatetheeternalverities,buttherestiveplungingofthebadhorse

hasbroughtitdownandimmerseditintheworldofmatterandchange.Thefactthatsomuchisexpoundedinmythicalformhasmadeitdifficultfor

somepeopletobesurehowfarPlatointendedittobetakenseriously.Perhapsthe best answer that can be given is that which Plato himself gives in thePhaedo.There,asIhavesaid,theimmortalityofthesoulismadethesubjectofdialecticalproof,andthedialoguethencloseswithalongmythinwhichmuchdetailisgivenaboutthelifeofthesoulafterdeath.Atitsclose,Socratessumsup as follows: ‘Now to maintain that these things are exactly as I have saidwouldillbefitamanofcommonsense;butthateitherthisorsomethingsimilaris the truth about our souls and their dwelling-places, this (since the soul hasbeenprovedtobeimmortal)doesseemtometobefitting,andIthinkitisariskworthtakingforthemanwhothinksaswedo.’WemaytakeitthattheexistenceoftheIdeas,theimmortalityofthesoul,and

the view of knowledge as recollection were all seriously held philosophicdoctrines.BeyondthatpointPlatothoughtthehumanmindcouldnotgobyitsparticular instrumentsofdialectical thinking.But theseconclusions themselvesnecessitated a belief in regions of truth into which themethods of dialecticalreasoningcouldnotfollow.Thevalueofmythisthatitprovidesawayintotheseregions, opened for us by poets and other men of religious genius. We takeaccountofmythnotbecausewebelieveittobeliterallytrue,butasameansofpresenting a possible account of truths which we must admit to be toomysteriousforexactdemonstration.InsuchbriefreflectionsonPlato’sphilosophyasarebeinggivenhere,itwasa

problemtoknowwhattoputinandwhattoleaveout.Whateverthechoice,itispracticallyimpossibletoavoidaone-sidedpictureofthemanandhismind.SofarIhavechosentospeakofafundamentaldoctrinelikethetheoryofIdeasandto allow it to leadon, as it naturallydoes, to themoremetaphysical andevenmystical side.Sincemoreover theworksmostcommonly readby thosewithageneral interest in Plato are the Republic and the Laws, and in them mostattentionislikelytobepaidtothedetailsofhispoliticaltheory,thisisperhapsjustified.Itisessentialtounderstandthespiritinwhichheapproachedhistask,and for theRepublic at least, a knowledge of all themain doctrines that havehere been outlined, and of the spiritual outlook which they represent, is anindispensablepreliminary.Lest,however,whatIhavesaidsofarshouldsuggestapictureofhimassittingwithhiseyesforeverfixedonanotherworld,wemayremindourselvesbeforewestopofthesenseofdutywhichheinculcates,e.g.intheallegoryoftheCaveintheRepublic.Thephilosopherwhohassucceededinleaving the shadow-play in the cavern of earthly life for the realworld in thesunlight outside, will, he says, inevitably be impelled to return and tell his

formerfellow-prisonersofthetruthwhichhehaslearned.Suchmeninfactmustform the ruling class of the Platonic Republic. ‘Unless political power andphilosophy meet together, there can be no rest from troubles.’ To governadequately,itsrulersmustattainawisdomthatisalmostdivine,foriftheyaretodirect theState towards thegood theymustknow the truth andnotmerely itsshadow.That is tosay, theymustrecover theknowledgeof theperfectIdeaofwhichallthegoodnessinthisworldisbutapale,unsteadyreflection.Hencethelong and rigorous discipline which they have to undergo before they areadjudgedfittorule.Apreliminaryeducationuptoseventeenoreighteenistobefollowedbythreeyearsofphysicalandmilitarytraining.Therefollowtenyearsof advanced mathematics, leading to five more years of study in the highestbranchesofphilosophy.Someelimination takesplaceat each stage, and thosefinallyselectedarereadyforsubordinatepostsattheageofthirty-five.Politicalpowerwillthenbeforthesephilosophersaburdenratherthanatemptation,buttheywillshoulderitforthegoodofthecommunity.Itisanotherindicationthatthe ruling class in the Platonic state will be by nomeans themost fortunate,althoughinvirtueoftheirenlightenmenttheyareinPlato’sviewthemosttrulyhappy.

Notes

1 The word kalon, for which there is no exact English equivalent, is by no means adequatelyrepresentedbyitstraditionaltranslationas‘beautiful’.Sincehoweverthisdoesnotaffectthepresentargument,itisaquestionthatmustbeleftforanothertime.

6PLATO(ii)EthicalandtheologicalanswerstotheSophists

I should like now to develop Plato’s ethical doctrine further by describinganotherofitsfundamentalconceptions.Thedoctrineoftranscendentformswasnottheonlyanswer,asitwasnotinitselfacompleteanswer,totheanti-socialideasofsomeoftheSophists.AnotherlineofattackwhichPlatodevelopedwastoraisethequestionofthebestandhealthiestconditionofthesoul,andtoinsistthat this depended on the presence of order, forwhich he uses both thewordkosmos,withwhichwearefamiliar,andtaxis,awordmorenarrowlyconfinedtothe meaning of ‘orderly arrangement’. I want therefore to inquire what wasmeantby thisconceptionoforder in thesoul,andhowitmaybesaid tohaverebutted the sophistic arguments. It will be necessary first to discuss somepreliminary matter, and in particular – as I gave warning we should findourselvesdoing– to turnback foramoment to the thoughtofSocrates.But Imention the theme at the outset, so that itmay be kept inmind as the end towhichourtrainofthoughtisleading.In early societies, where communities are small and cultural conditions

simple,noconflict isobservedbetweenmoraldutyand self-interest.AsRitterremarks1:‘Hewhoinhisrelationshiptohisfellowmenandthegodsobservestheexistingcustomsispraised,respectedandconsideredgood;whereashewhobreaks them is despised, disciplined and considered bad. In these conditionsobediencetolawbringsgaintotheindividual,whereastransgressionbringshimharm.Theindividualwhoobeyscustomsandlawishappyandcontented.’Unfortunatelythissimplestateofaffairscannotlast.TheGreekshadreached

themorecomplexstateofcivilizationwhereitwasforcedontheirattentionthatactsofbanditry,especiallyonalargescale–thebanditryoftheconqueringhero–whichsuccessfullydefiedlawandcustom,alsobroughtgain;andthatthelaw-abidingmightbecompelledtoliveinverymodestcircumstancesorevenunderoppressionandpersecution.Outofthisarosethesophisticoppositionof‘nature’

to ‘law’, and the conception of ‘nature’s justice’ as not only different fromman’s, but something greater and finer. This is upheld in Plato’sGorgias byCallicles, who although he professes contempt for the Sophists represents thesophisticviewatitsmostextreme.HeexemplifiesitbytheexploitsofXerxes.Acorollaryofthisistheequationofthegoodwiththepleasant,wherebythe

ideaofdutyisexplicitlydenied.Thestrongman,whoisnature’sjustman,hasno duty except to act according to his own pleasure. Hedonism as aphilosophicaldoctrineisborn.Both Socrates and Plato were concerned to deny this equation of the good

with the pleasant. It must be true to say, for example, that the orator who inaddressing the demos seeks only to please themmay do them a great deal ofharm;andthattheoratorwhoisaimingattheirgoodmayfinditnecessarytosaysomeextremelyunpalatablethings.Butifpleasureis thegood, it is impossibletomakestatements like these.Howthendid theysetaboutshowingthat thosewhoidentifiedthepleasantandthegoodwerewrong?Socrates countered them in the first place by his insistence on the need of

knowledgetounderstandwhatwasgood–evenselfishlygood.Ifwemusthaveself-interest,letitatleastbeenlightenedself-interest.Anunreflectingpursuitofpleasuremayonlyleadtofuturemisery.Butfromthis–whicheveryoneadmits–itfollowsthatsomeactionspleasantinthemselvesmaycausegreatharmtoaman,evenifwestillrestrictthemeaningofharmtothatwhichispainful.Thiscould not happen if pleasurewere identicalwith the good, i.e. were itself theultimategoaloflife.Itcannotitselfbetheend,thoughitmayoftenconducetoit. We need another word to equate with ‘the good’ and explain it. Socrateshimselfsuggestsawordwhichmeans theuseful,orbeneficial.Thegoodmustbesomethingwhichalwaysbenefits,neverharms.Ifwedefineitthus,thenactswhich in themselves give pleasure can be referred to the question of ultimatebenefitastoahigherstandard,whilestillmaintainingtheattitudeofpureself-interest.In all probability the intensely practical Socrates got no further than this

meetingoftheSophistsontheirown,ground.Itfitshischaractertosupposethatthe ultimate standardwhich he formulated had a pragmatical ring.But on thepragmaticalbasisonecan,ifSocratesistheleader,goalongway.Onceadmitthe need for calculation, as opposed to an unreflecting acceptance of thepleasuresofthemoment,andyouarecommittedtohisfavouritethesis,whichheplayedforallitwasworth,ofthenecessityforknowledgein,theconductofourlives.Hemaintainedthatnonebuttheexpertcantellwhatwillbebeneficialineach kind of action. Hence his reiterated analogy from the crafts. The rightconductoflifecallsforthesameskill inlivingastheshoemakermusthavein

cobbling. In the Protagoras he is actually represented as defending, in anargumentwithSophists, theequivalenceofpleasureandgood,butheuses theword‘pleasant’inthislargersense.Hepointsoutthatthepleasureonwhichwebaseourcalculationsmustbeinthefutureaswellasinthepresent,andbeforehehasdone,hehassucceededinincludingeverythingunderthisheadwhichinother dialogues he describes as beneficial, andwhich is deliberately excludedfrom pleasure when in theGorgias he is arguing against the equivalence ofpleasantandgood.InfactSocrates’sideaofpleasureastheequivalentofgoodincludes all that inmodern speech comes under the heading of ‘values’,with,indeed,moreemphasisonspiritualvaluesthanonanyothers.Thepossibilityofdistinguishing between good and bad pleasures, while nominally adopting adoctrine of consistent hedonism, is achieved by admitting the principle ofcalculation.Noneofthechampionsofpleasurewerepreparedtodenythis,yetwith it, the so-called hedonismmay be refined almost indefinitely into a highmoralcode.1Itwas thus that Socrates in his inquiries reduced all the virtues to one and

describedthatoneaswisdomorknowledge–theknowledgeofgoodandevil.Havingenumerated thecommonlyacceptedvirtues in theMeno, he continues:‘Nowtakethosewhichdonotseemtobeknowledge,andconsiderwhethertheyarenotharmfulsometimesaswellasbeneficial.Courageforinstance.Supposecourageisnotwisdombutakindofrecklessness.Isitnottruethatwhenamanisconfidentwithoutreasonhecomes toharm,butwhenwithreason, togood?Allthesequalitieswhenpractisedanddisciplinedinassociationwithreasonarebeneficial,butwithoutreasonhurtful.Inshort,allundertakingsofthespirit,andallthatitendures,leadtohappinesswhenguidedbywisdom,butwhenbyfolly,to the opposite. If therefore virtue is an attribute of the spirit and one whichcannotfailtobebeneficial,itmustbewisdom.Forallspiritualqualitiesinandbythemselvesareneitherbeneficialnorhurtful,butbecomesobythepresencewiththemofwisdomorfolly.’JudgedbythepragmaticalstandardwhichSocratesisadvocating,itisnotthe

courageor justiceofanactwhichmakes thedifference. Ineverycase it is theadmixtureofnous,thepurposeofwhichistodistinguishthetrulyandlastinglybeneficial from thatwhich is spuriousbecausesuperficially pleasant and right.ThatIbelievewastheculminatingpointofhisteaching.Weshallonlyfailtodohim justice ifwe refuse to recognize the heights towhich such an apparentlyhard-headedandselfishdoctrinemayattain.Whatthoseheightsare,hasIhopebeensufficientlyclearlysuggested.Forthe

presentpurpose,whichistoleaduptoPlato,Iwishrathertoshowwhereitfellshort.Asamoraldoctrineinitsownright,thereismuchtobesaidforit,butit

was not a complete answer to the Sophists. Socrates himself, the reverse of ahedonistbynature,hadusedthehedonisticargumentsofhisopponents to turnthetablesonthem.Butthisexpedienthaditslimitations.Itforcedfromthemtheadmissionthatpleasurewasnottheultimateendorgoodinhumanlife.Butthesubstitutionof ‘the beneficial’ still left undecided the questionof this ultimateend.Itstillpromptedthequestion:‘Beneficialforwhat?’Itwasindeedstillopenfor a man to take even physical pleasure as his goal, provided he proceededcautiouslysothatthepleasuresofto-daydidnotinterferewiththepleasuresofto-morrow.Againitmightbemaintainedthatpoweroverone’sfellowswastheend.Theattainmentofthismightindeedentailcurtailmentofordinarypleasures,a life of asceticism such as Hitler is said to have lived. However differentlySocrates might think, on the basis of the hedonic calculus there could be nologicalanswertothis.Socrateshimselfmightreply,ashedoesinthemythsattheendofthePlatonicdialogues,thatsuchschemesfailbecausetheyonlytakeintoaccountthepresentlife,whereasinfactdeathisnottheendofenjoymentorsuffering.Butthatinitselfisanactoffaithofwhosecogencyit isnoteasytoconvince the unbeliever. Thus the hedonic calculus is by itself insufficient tosecureagreementaboutrightandwrong.Twomenmayfollowitalikeandyetembarkoncoursesofconductdiametricallyopposed,becausetheirideasofthewhole purpose of life are opposed. On this question of purpose the hedoniccalculuscannothavethefinalword.IhavesaidthatitisdifficulttobesurewherethethoughtofSocratesendsand

thatofPlatobegins. In trying todescribe themore fundamental answerwhichpointed the way out of the deadlock, and which, like the earlier and lesssatisfactoryattempt,wefindputforwardunderSocrates’snameinthedialoguesofPlato,IproposetodropthenameofSocratesandbeginusingthatofPlato.But not everybody would agree. This second answer is first hinted at in theGorgiasandmorefullydevelopedintheRepublic,anditshowsthatsympathywith Pythagorean conceptions which there is more reason to ascribe to Platohimselfthantothemasterwhomhewasdefending.IntheGorgiashedoesnomorethantentativelyfeelhiswaytowardsit.When

amanmakesorbuildsanything,hesays–ahouse,say,oraship–amorestrictdescription of his actions is that he takes a givenmatter and imposes on it acertainform.Heshapesandputsittogethertobeagoodthingofitskindanddowhathewantsittodo.‘Everycraftsmanbringseachpartintoitsproperplaceinthe arrangement, compelling one part to fit in suitablywith another, until thewholestandsforthasathingoforderedbeauty.’Trainersanddoctorswhoworkonthehumanbodyhavethesameendinview,tobringaboutarightrelationshipbetween its parts. This truth may be given a universal application, that it is

kosmosandtaxiswhichmakeathinggoodofitskind.Thusitmaybesaidofthesoulaswell that tobegood itmustexhibit ahealthyorder in itsparts, i.e. itsfaculties;andinthespiritualspheretheelementofkosmosandtaxisisprovidedbyobediencetolaw,byjusticeandself-control.Thatisthefirstroughsketchoftheidea.Ingeneralterms,Plato’spointisthat

everythinghasacertainfunctiontoperform,andthatthevirtue,orrightstate,ofthatthingistheconditioninwhichitisbestfittedtoperformthatfunction.Andall analogy tends to show that theproperperformanceof functiondepends, touseamoreimmediatelycomprehensible term,onorganization.IntheCratylusPlato describes a manmaking a wooden shuttle. He takes his given piece ofmaterial,andallthetimethatheiscarvingandputtingittogether,whathehastokeep his mind fixed on is the work of the weaver. He does not fashion itaccordingtohisownwhims,butinsubordinationtoapredeterminedendwhichcontrols the structure it is to have. Taking it from the other side, the weavercannot do his work properly except by means of a shuttle properly built andfittedtogether.ItistheRepublicwhichcompletesthetransferencetothehumanbeingofthis

doctrinethattheproperperformanceoffunctiondependsonstructure,conceivedastheduesubordinationofpartstowhole.Theusualsophisticviewsofhumanconduct are put forward, and it is suggested that the only valid reason forabstainingfromwrongdoingisthedangerofsufferingwrongoneselfinreturn.Itisarguedthatnoneofthosewhoexhortmentoactjustlyareconcernedwiththeinherent rightnessof the act itself.Onemight gather from thepoets andothermoral teachers that all that matters is to give the appearance of having actedrightly,sincealltheycanurgeinfavouroftheirviewsisthatblessingwillattendthegoodandtheunjustwill receivehisdeserts inHades.Thiscriticismservesalsotorevealtheinadequacy,asadefenceofrighteousness,ofthebeneficialasthemeasure of right conduct, even if itwere to take into account the benefitsaccruing ina future life. It failsbecause,owing to its individualism, it impliesthat if itwere possible for aman to deceive everyone – even the gods – intothinking that he had lived righteously when he had not, there would be noargumentbywhichjusticecouldbecommendedtohim.Inotherwords,itisnotadefenceof justice for itsownsake.ThisdefencePlato isanxious toprovide,consideringonly thenatureof justice itself,andshowing it tobesuch that thejust man must be immediately happy because he is just and virtuous. Thequestionofhisreputation,andofwhatrewardsorpunishmentsawaithiminthefuture,mustbesetasideasirrelevant.He begins by repeating the point that everything has its proper ergon.

Examples taken are tools, eyes, and ears. Therefore everything has its proper

arete,definedastheconditioninwhichitcanbestperformitsergon.Thespiritof man is no exception. It has its ergon, which you may call government ordeliberation or anything else, or describe more simply and indisputably asrational living.Whatever the function be, its existence cannot be questioned.Theremust thereforebe anarete or best state of the soul, givenwhich itwillperform that function successfully. It is this arete which wemean by justice.Hence the justman is living in the fullest andbestway, and cannot fail to behappyaswellasgood.AtthispointtheSophistThrasymachusironicallyexpresseshimselfsatisfied.

Socrates,however,resumestheargumentbyremarkingthattheyhavenotafterallgotfaryet,fortheyhavenotinfactdecidedwhatthis‘beststate’ofthesoulis,towhichthenamesofjusticeandvirtuearetobeapplied.Itisofcoursethisfurthersearchwhichleadsdirectlytothedescriptionoftheidealpolity,foritisnextagreed that itmaybeeasier tosee justice firstwrit large in thecity,afterwhichtheycanreturntolookforitinthespiritoftheindividualwhentheyhaveamorepreciseideaofitsnature.Justiceofcourse,orinGreekdikaiosyne,isinordinaryspeechprimarilyamatteroftherelationsbetweenmanandman.Hencethereasonablenessofseekingitfirstinacommunity.Todeterminewhataretherightandjustrelationsbetweenmenlivinginthesamecommunitywillputoneinabetterpositiontodeterminewhatismeantbyajustman:forbythatphraseonemeansaboveallamanofsuchacharacterthathewillnaturallytendtokeeptherightrelationsbetweenhimselfandhisneighbour.Thatiswhatismeantbyjusticeintheindividual.In the building up of the polity which follows, it emerges that it is like

everythingelseinthis,thatitmust,ifitistobeacommunityinwhichmencanlive lives as full and happy as possible, be anorganism.All its partsmust beadaptedtoperformingtheirownproperfunction,makingtheirowncontributionto the order andwell-being of thewhole. These parts are envisaged as three.There is the governing class, whose outstanding characteristic must needs beintellectualpower.Their function is togovern, and theymust above all thingsuse their specially trainedminds,planninganddirecting thepolicyof thecity.Secondlythereisthesoldierclass,whosebusinessisthedefenceofthecityandwhose dominant characteristic must be courage. They will act under thedirectionoftherulers,whowillcanalizetheirnaturalardourandfierceness,sothat instead of breaking out in acts of lawlessness it will serve to uphold theintegrityandstabilityoftheircountry.Thesetwoclassesofrulersanddefenderswillformanaturalélite.Thethird

classwill bemuch themost numerous, andwill have the obvious function ofprovidingforeconomicneeds.Everythingthatconcernsthematerialsideoflife

–agriculture,manufacture,andtrade–willbeleftintheirhands,andtheywillbe thosemarked, as the greatmass of people are, by their preference for thethingsofsense.ThusthePlatonicRepublicmaybedescribedasinoriginanaturalaristocracy.

As time goes on it will be largely an aristocracy of birth, for Plato thinks itoverwhelminglylikelythatthechildrenofeachclasswillbothbyheredityandenvironmentinclinetoresembletheirparentsanddevelopintosuitablemembersofthesameclass.Headdshoweverthatmachinerymustbeprovidedwherebyifanexceptionallygiftedchildshouldappearamongthelowestclass,oroneofthehighest show himself unworthy to be trained as a ruler, transfers between theclassesmaybeeffected.To avoid misunderstanding, certain points in this organization should be

emphasized.ThelowestclassinPlato’sstateissometimesspokenofbymodernwritersas the ‘masses’, andcertainly inpointofnumbers itwillbeby far thelargest. But it differs remarkably from the proletariat of which the Marxistspeaks,beinginfacttheonlyclasspermittedtoholdprivatewealth.Oneoftheworst evils of political life, in Plato’s opinion, was the material greed ofpoliticians.Itwasanevilcertainlynotabsentfromthedebaseddemocracyofhisday. His aim therefore was the complete divorce of political from economicpower.Bythismeanshehopedtogetaclassofstatesmenwhosesoleambitionwas to govern well. Those who were more interested in getting rich werewelcome to do so – by leaving the ranks of government and confining theiractivitiestotrade.TherulerslivealiterallySpartanexistence,fortheirsystemofcommonmesses and commonownership of the necessities of life ismodelledcloselyonSpartaitself.WeseeatoncethatofthefourcardinalvirtuesrecognizedbytheGreeksthe

wisdomoftheidealstateliesinitsrulingclass,anditscourageinthesecond.Itstemperanceorself-controlconsistsinagreementbetweenthecitizensastowhoistorule.Anditsjusticeorvirtueasawhole,thataretewhichwillenableittoperform its proper function as a healthy organism, consists in each classacquiescing contentedly in the duties and pleasures proper to its own positionandnottryingtousurpthepositionorfunctionsofanotherclass.Wethenreturntotheindividualman,theoriginalobjectoftheinquiry.Inhim

too threepartsmaybeobserved.Unlike thebeasts, hehasnous, the power tothinkanddeliberate.Secondlyhemayexhibitcourage,andit isfromthesamespiritualsourcethathefeelsrighteousangerwhenheseeswhatappearstohimawrong.TheGreeks called it thymos, and itmay be described generally as thespirited part of human character. Thirdly he has a natural desire for materialwelfare and physical satisfactions. In any conflict between the reason and the

desires, the function of the thymos is to side with the reason, and it is thenequivalent to strength of will.Wemay say therefore that in the healthy soul,organizedforthebestpossibleperformanceofthefunctionofliving,thereasonmustbeincommand,guidinganddirectingthepolicyofthewhole.Thethymoswillgiveamancouragetofollowoutinactionwhatreasontellshimisthebestcourse. Likewise the physical desires have their function to perform in thenourishment of the body and the perpetuation of the race, but must be keptsubjecttothedirectionoftheintellect.Thatistheanswertoourquestion:‘Whatisjustice?’initsapplicationtothe

individual.Itisastateofinnerharmony,ofthebalanceandorganizationofthedifferentelementsofcharacter.Suchabalancedandorganizedcharactercannotfail toshowitselfoutwardly in theperformanceof thekindofactionwhich isordinarily considered just. On this view, justice is a healthy condition of thespirit,andinjusticeakindofdisease.Withthemindrunningonalineofthoughtlike this,which is totallydifferent from theonepursuedby theSophists, theirquestionsfadeintosheerirrelevance.Ifjusticeisthishealthyorganizationofthesoul, admitting even of such a precise description as Plato has given, thequestionwhetherjusticeorinjusticebringsmorebenefittothemanwhopursuesthemcanscarcelyanylongerberaised.WeoweittoPlatotopointoutthatthesuppositionofthreepartsofthesoul,

orelements in thehumancharacter, isnotbasedmerely,asmightappear fromwhathassofarbeensaid,onthecrudeanalogywiththeorganizationofhisstate.The influence of each on the other is reciprocal. The possibility of the threeclassesinthestatedependsindeedonourbeingabletocountonthetriplenatureof individual character, which was, after all, the original subject of thediscussion.Allsoulsarenotinthebestorhealthieststate.Giventheirthreefoldcharacter, we go on to observe that, naturally enough, in some men onecharacteristic is more prominent, in others another. Were it not for thisphenomenon,thestateasPlatodescribesitwouldbeunthinkable.Thepeacefulcoexistenceofthethreeclasses,eachcontributingtothejusticeofthewholebyperforming its proper function and not another’s, is only conceivable on theassumptionthattheycorrespondtonaturalpsychologicaldivisionsbetweenmanandman.IfPlatobasedthetripartitecharacteroftheindividualontheexistenceofthree

classesinthestate,hisargumentwouldofcoursebehopelesslycircular.ButthatisnotwhattheRepublicsuggests.Hebasesitonobservation,plusthepremiseofhis own that two contradictory impulses, existing contemporaneously in themind, cannot proceed from the same source. Such contradictory impulses, hesays, are a matter of common experience. A man is desperately thirsty, but

suspects that the only available water is infected. There is something in himurging him to drink, and something else urging him to refrain. Here are twowarringelements,whichhecallsdesireandreasonrespectively.Buttheremustbeathird.Whenfacedwithaconflictbetweenreasonanddesire,somefallandsomeresist.Itispossible(thoughthatastonishingmanSocratesdidnotknowit)tosay‘Videomelioraproboque,deteriorasequor’.Thereasonneedsasitwerean executive arm to enforce its decisions, and this is provided by the thirdelement,thethymos,thatelementofwill-powerwhichSocratessostrangelyleftoutofaccount.Withthisconceptionofahealthofthesoul,basedontherightorganizationof

its parts, the Sophists receive their final answer in the ethical field. Thecontroversy between nature and law is brought to an end, for the healthy andnaturalsoulwillcontainnoconflictwithinit,butwillinevitablyexpressitselfinactswhicharelawfulandjust.IhopeIhavesucceededinmyattempttoshowhow far this doctrine exceeds the simple ‘Virtue is knowledge’ of Socrateswithoutat thesame timebelittling theachievementofSocrateshimself.Asanindependent doctrine, his may theoretically lead to a life of unimpeachablemorality, though itspsychology isperhapsdefectiveand it isnodoubt right tosaythatPlato’sexplicitrecognitionofthepossibilityofinternalconflictmarksadistinct advance. As an attempt tomeet the hedonists on their own ground itwentalongway.Butitwasnotacompleteanswertothequestionsoftheday.Thesecouldonlybeanswered,notbymeetingopponentsontheirownground,but by denying their whole conception of human purpose and building upanother from surer foundations. They were answered by founding, in arudimentarywayitmaybesaid,butcertainlyfounding,thestudyofpsychology.TheSophists,however,aswesaw,wereacquaintedalsowiththeresultsofthe

naturalphilosophers,andbasedtheirviewsontheconstitutionoftheUniverseasawhole.Here too they professed to see their favourite antithesis between lawandnature.Cosmologiesof the typeof atomism left no room for any force innaturebutchance.Tocomplete therefutation,ametaphysicandtheologywerenecessary aswell as an ethic. Iwish to summarize, though very briefly,whatPlatosaysaboutthis,partlybecauseIhavechosentomaketheconflictwiththeSophists the thread of my discourse, and partly because it will assume freshimportance when we pass on to Aristotle. His theology started where Plato’sstopped,anditisimportanttobeinapositiontocomparethetwo.The theological defence of law is in the tenth book of the Laws. First the

argumentoftheattackersissummedupasfollows.Themostimportantthingsintheworldaretheproductsofnature,whichonemightalsocallchance,sinceitisa purely inanimate, unreasoning force. The world itself, the course of the

seasons,animals,plantsandinanimatenatureareinthefirstplacetheresultoffortuitouscombinationsofmatter.Latercameartordesign,amoreinsignificantforce of purely humanorigin, and created a few shadowswith little of realityaboutthem.Law,andthebeliefswhichgowithit,areproductsofthissecondaryforce,andopposenaturewithunnaturalconceptionsofrightandwrong.Justiceis purely a creation of human law and has no existence in nature. The godsthemselves are a product of human artifice, created according to conventionswhich differ from place to place. The ‘life according to nature’, which thisdoctrineupheld,consistsingettingthebetterofothersandowningnoobediencetoanylaworconvention.Plato’sansweristhatfarfromtherebeinganycontrastbetweennatureandart

ordesign,natureandartare thesame thing.Art is theproductof intelligence,and intelligence is the highest manifestation of nature, prior not only inimportance but in time to chance, in fact the first cause of all. Clearly ametaphysicwhich, if itcanbeproved,willhavefar-reachingeffectsonethicaltheoriesaswell.The sophistic doctrines, Plato argues, have inverted the proper order of

causation by their supposition that the first causewas a randommovement ofmatterwithoutlife,outofwhichlifearoseasasecondarymanifestation.Infactlifemust have been there first, and is the primary cause of themovements ofmatter. The proof starts from an analysis ofmotion, in thewide sense of theGreekwordkinesis,which includeschangeof everykind. It is finallybroughtunder two main heads, spontaneous and communicated. That which causesmotioninthelatterway,becauseitselfmovedfromoutside,cannotbethefirstoriginator of motion, though it is the cause of all subsequent motion. Theoriginatormustbesomethingwhichcancommunicatemotiontoeverythingelsebyvirtueofhavingthesourceofmotioninitself.Whethermotioniseternal,orassomewouldhaveit,startedatapointintime,theprimaryandoriginalmotionmust be self-motion.Doweknowof anything in our experience towhich thedefinition‘self-mover’canbeapplied?Yes,saysPlato,onethingandonethingonly,namelypsyche, thelife-principle.Thisthereforeistheoldestofall thingsandtheprimaryefficientcauseofeverything.Thisconclusion isbrought tobearon the immoral sophistic teachingby the

further inference that if soul comesbefore body, then its attributesmust comebeforematerialattributes,whichmeansthatmindandwillcomebeforesizeandstrength.Intelligentdesignandnotblindforceisthefirstcause.Touniteintheone thing, psyche, the attributes of life as self-mover and as intellectual andmoral power was for Plato a legacy from Socrates. Yet it did no more thanclarify and develop a tendency that had been in Greek philosophy from the

beginning. The Ionians were so far from being the materialists that they aresometimes called, that they solved the problem of the origin of motion byassumingtheirprimaryworld-stuff tomoveitself, i.e. tobealive.Andthere isnodoubtthatAnaximanderandAnaximenesthoughtitrighttocallthestuffoftheworldtheos,‘God’,awordwhoseassociationswouldcarryeveryGreekfarbeyondmeremechanicalquestionsofmotionandchange.InthisargumentPlatoisonlyconcernedwiththepointthatthefirstcauseof

theworkingsof theUniverse is intelligent andmoral.He showsno interest indecidingwhethertherebeonegodormany,norbywhatmeansthesupremesoulinitiatesinmatterthemotionofwhichitisthecause.Theexistenceontheonehand ofmoral evil and on the other of irregularmotionmeans no doubt thattherearedepravedsoulsatworkintheUniverseaswellasagoodone.Butthegood and rational soul is in control. This is argued from the fact that theprincipalmotions,thosewhichtakeplaceonacosmicscaleliketherevolutionsofthestarsandsun,theproductionofnightanddayandtheseasons,exhibitanorderandregularitywhichsuggestthattheyaregovernedbyintelligenceandnotbymadness.Thegoodsoulthenisinsupremecontrol,andthatisallthatmattersfor Plato. He shows a typically Hellenic indifference to the question ofmonotheismorpolytheisminsofaras itmerelyconcerns theexistenceofonegodormany.He showsa similar lackofdogmatismabout theworkingofhisfirst cause, suggesting several possible methods whereby soul might initiatemovementinmatterandendingwiththeconclusion:‘Thisatanyrateiscertain,thatbyoneorotherofthesemeansitissoulthatcontrolsallthings.’Insomewaysitwillbearelief,asfarasthepresentaccountisconcerned,to

turnfromPlatotoAristotle.Ineithercasetheamountofcondensationinvolvedputsaheavyresponsibilityonanyonewhoisboldenoughtomakethechoiceofwhatistobeincludedandwhat leftout,andtodecideonaparticularorderofexpositionandlinkingtogetherofthedifferentsidesofthephilosophyofeach.Whenonehassaidthat,however,thensofarasAristotleisconcernedthechiefdifficulties have been stated. They are the difficulties of explaining in briefcompassahighlycomplexphilosophicalsystem,butoneneverthelesswhichispresented as a philosophical system in straightforward, sometimes dry, butalwaysrationalandliteralprose.ThedialoguesofPlatoaresodifferentfromthisthatanyonewhoturnsbacktothemaftermyexpositionmayperhapswonderatfirst, according to which one he lights on, whether this is indeed the writerwhosethoughthasbeenheredescribed.Ihavetriedtoexplainsomeofthemainphilosophicalideaswhichtheycontain.Butthedialoguesareasmuchliteratureas philosophy, and asmuchdrama as literature.The subtle characterizationofthe speakers is sometimes not the least of the author’s aims.Nor can anyone

understandPlatoifhedoesnotappreciatetheelementsofpoetryandreligion,aswell as of philosophy, which the dialogues contain. The value of suchproductionscannotbetransmitted.Itliesinthedirecteffectwhichtheymakeonthereader.Boundupwiththisissomethingelse.ItopensupanotherwholesideofPlato’sthought,intowhichitwouldbeverydesirabletohavepenetratedmoredeeply;thatis,theaestheticapproachtophilosophy.IhavesaidthatforPlatoitissense-perceptionthatrecallstoustheeternalideas.Thisdoesnotonlymeanthat by looking at two approximately equal sticks we are put in mind of thegeometricalnotionofequality.Itmeansaboveallthingsthatthephilosopherissensitivetobeauty,andfromhissusceptibilitytobeautyinthisworldisledontothesupernalbeautyof theworldabove.Notonlyreasonbut thespiritofEros,the love of all things beautiful, is a necessary part of his equipment, as is setforth in unforgettable prose in the Symposium and Phaedrus. Platonism isundoubtedlya two-worldphilosophy,andanyonewhose thoughtsareconfinedtothisworldcanneverhopetounderstandit.Yetequallyitisaclosedbooktohimwhoisnotalivetoearthlybeauty,whichmustbetothephilosopher(Iquotethewords of Diotima to Socrates in the Symposium) as the first rungs of theladderwhichwill finally takehimall thewayfrombodilybeauty tobeauty inhis ways, from there to the beauty of scholarship, and from there to thewondrousvisionofbeauty itself,neverchangingnorgrowingnordiminishing,noryetbeautifulinonepartandnotinanother,butbeautyitself,strippedofallfleshly colour and mortal dross and standing out in the immortal radiance inwhichbeautyandtruthbecomeone.

Notes

1TheEssenceofPlato’sPhilosophy,Eng.trans.byR.A.Alles(AllenandUnwin,1933),p.67.1ThemorecautiousreadershouldbewarnedthattheviewheretakenofSocrates’sargumentsintheProtagorasisnotundisputed.

7ARISTOTLE(i)TheAristotelianuniverse

Aristotle suffers less than Plato if treated on the principles of theOutlines ofKnowledgesomuchinfavourto-day,andsuchatreatmentIproposetoattempt.Ishalltrytoexplainthefundamentalprincipleswhichunderlayeverybranchofhisphilosophyratherthanthedetailsofanyoneofthem.First,however,itwillbewelltogiveanoutlineofhislife.Hewasbornin384B.C.atStagirainNorthGreece,anIonianwiththeblood

ofscientistsinhisveins,forhisfatherwasamemberofthemedicalguildoftheAsclepiads and physician to the father of Philip II ofMacedon.At the age ofseventeenhecametoAthenstostudyintheAcademyofPlato.AtthetimePlatowasawayinSicily,whichhealsovisitedseveraltimesduringthenexttenyears,butthereisnodoubtoftheenormousinfluenceoftheheadoftheschoolonitsmostfamouspupil.AristotleremainedintheAcademyuntilPlato’sdeathtwentyyears later. He was an assiduous student of the dialogues, of which themostimportanthadalreadybeenwritten,andmadethePhaedothemodelforhisownfirstphilosophicalessay.WhenafterPlato’sdeathheleftAthens,hecouldhavehadinmindnobreakwith thePlatonic tradition, forhewentwithXenocrates,oneof themost conservativeofPlatonists,who later returned to takeover theheadshipoftheschool,andtheirnewhomewasinanotherPlatoniccircle.Therewas little inducement for Aristotle to stay in Athens. The new head of theAcademy was Plato’s nephew Speusippus, with whose philosophical viewsneitherhenorXenocrateswasinsympathy,andmoreoverthecityhadjustbeenshockedbythenewsofthefallofOlynthustoPhilip.FriendsofMacedonwerenotpopularinAthens,andAristotlewaswelldisposedtoMacedonbothbyhisfather’sconnexionandbynaturalinclination.ThenewhomewasatAssos,atownonthecoastofAsiaMinoroppositethe

islandofLesbos.Herewasaninterestingandsympatheticcommunity.ThelocaldespotHermeias,rulerofasmallclient-stateundertheGreatKingofPersia,had

shownakeeninterestinPlato’spoliticalphilosophy,andhadinvitedtohiscourtaspermanentguests twomembersof theAcademy,ErastusandCoriscos,whohadbeenrecommendedtohimbyPlatohimself.Heseemstohavebeeninhissmallwaythephilosopher-kingwhomPlatohadvainlysoughtinSicily.Atanyratehemodifiedhisconstitutionbytheadviceofthetwophilosophers,andafterPlato’sdeathgaveanequallywarmwelcometoAristotleandXenocrates.TherewasatAssosaregularschoolwhereAristotlelecturedduringthethreeyearsofhis stay there.He next, being now forty, spent twoyears on the neighbouringislandofLesbos,wherewasthehomeofhisfriendandpupilTheophrastus,andfromthe internalevidenceofhisbiologicalworks itwouldseemthatmuchofhis scientificmaterial was gathered in this neighbourhood. FromMitylene onLesboshewentin342toPellaattheinvitationofKingPhiliptotakeupthepostof tutor to the young Alexander, then aged fifteen or sixteen. Another bondbetweenAristotleandHermeiasmusthavebeen theirMacedoniansympathies.Noonewhowasnotconsideredpoliticallysoundcouldhavebeenchosenastheprince’stutor,andasforHermeias,inthefollowingyearhewascapturedbythePersians,accusedofplottingwithMacedonagainst theGreatKing,andput todeathwithtorture.AristotlehadamonumenterectedtohimatDelphi,and,mostinterestingof all, composedapoem inhishonour in the formofacult-hymn,whichhascomedowntous.The opportunities offered by the appointment at Pella must have seemed

limitless,forAristotlesharedtothefullthePlatonicambitiontobeeducatortoaprince, and united the tradition of the philosopher-king with a passionateconvictionofthesuperiorityoftheHellenicraceoverallothers.Itcouldruletheworld,hesaidinthePolitics,ifonlyitwerepoliticallyunited.HestayedintheNorth until Philip’s death and Alexander’s accession in 336. Then whenAlexander crossed over toAsia as a secondAchilles, the champion ofHellasagainstthebarbarians,hereturnedtoAthens.Therewerenolongeranyreasons,politicalorotherwise,whyheshouldnotcarryouthisplanofestablishingtherea school of his own. Speusippus had died in 339 and been succeeded in theheadshipoftheAcademybyXenocrates.AtthisstagethereforehefoundedtheLyceum,socalledfromitsproximitytotheprecinctofApolloLykeios.Herewastheperipatos,orcoveredwalk,whichgavehisfollowerstheirname,andinhisown buildings he fitted up a library (the first in history, Strabo says) andarrangedfacilitiesforthescientificresearchtowhichhewasdevoted.Thewholeatmosphere of the Lyceum seems to have been much more scientific thanphilosophicalinthemodernsense.Itwasthesciencesofobservationwhichwereencouraged, and pupils were set to work preparing collections of material toformthebasisofsuchsciences,andaddtotheenormousamountwhichAristotle

hadalreadyamassedhimself.This peaceful existence was shattered when in the summer of 323 the

incredible news ofAlexander’s death reachedAthens.TheAthenian assemblyimmediately decided on the liberation of Greek cities from Macedoniangarrisons. In thewaveofanti-Macedonian feelingwhichensued,achargewastrumpedupagainstAristotle,theoldchargeofimpietywhichhadbeenlevelledat Anaxagoras and Socrates. With Socrates in mind Aristotle is said to haveremarked, as he retired to voluntary banishment atChalkis inEuboea, that hewished to ‘prevent the Athenians from committing a second sin againstphilosophy’.AtChalkishehadlivedonlyayearwhenhediedin322,attheageofsixty-two.ThehallmarkofAristotleasaphilosopher isarobustcommonsense,which

refused tobelieve that thisworldwasanythingbut fully real.Philosophy,as itappearedtohim,wasanattempttoexplainthenaturalworld,andifitcouldnotdo so, or could explain it only by the introduction of a mysterious,transcendentalpattern-world,devoidofthecharacteristicallynaturalpropertyofmotion,thenitmustbeconsideredtohavefailed.HiscommentonthePlatonicIdeasistypical:‘Buttocallthempatterns,orspeakoftheotherthingsassharinginthem,istotalkinemptywordsandpoeticmetaphors.’Inevitablythereforethedominantnoteofhisphilosophyisconflict.Forthis,

aswehave seen, is themanwhowas thepupil and friendofPlato for twentyyears from the age of seventeen. As a young man he accepted the whole ofPlato’s two-world philosophy – the doctrine of Ideas, the immortality andtransmigration of the soul, and the view of earthly knowledge as a gradualrecollectionofknowledgefromanotherworld.Ifhelaterfeltcompelled,asanindependent thinker, to give up the mystical doctrines of the Ideas and thekinship of the soul with things beyond, there were parts of the legacy whichneverlefthim.FundamentallyheremainedonthesideofPlatoandSocrates.AsCornfordput it: ‘Forall this reaction towards thestandpointofcommonsenseandempiricalfact,AristotlecouldneverceasetobeaPlatonist.Histhought,noless thanPlato’s, isgovernedby the ideaofaspiration, inheritedbyhismasterfrom Socrates – the idea that the true cause or explanation of things is to besought,notinthebeginning,butintheend.’1In other words, the question that both can and must be answered by

philosophyisthequestion‘Why?’Toanswerthequestion‘How?’isnotenough.To speakmore strictly,wemay say that thepermanent legacyofPlatonism toAristotlewastwofold,thoughitstwosideswereintimatelyconnected.Whathetookoverandretainedwas:

(i)theteleologicalpointofview;(ii)theconvictionthatrealityliesinform.

Hecouldnotgiveuphissenseofthesupremeimportanceofform,withwhich,aswehavenowseen,itwasnaturalfortheGreekstoincludefunction.Toknowthe matter out of which a thing had come to be was only a secondaryconsideration, since the originalmatterwas something shared by itwith otherthingswhich had developed differently,whereas to understand itmeant to laybarethecharacteristicswhichdistinguisheditfromotherthings.Thedefinitionthenmustdescribetheformintowhichithadgrown.Inthat,accordingtoPlatoandAristotle,layitsessence.Thisquestionoflookingfortheessenceofthingsinthe‘out-of-which’orthe‘into-which’introducesustoafundamentalcleavageofoutlookwhichexistsinthepresentworldasintheancient,amonglaymenaswellasphilosophers.Knowingaswedothatmanhasevolvedfromlowertypesof life, it isnatural for some tosay thathe is ‘afterallnothingbut’anape,orevenapieceofprotoplasm,whichhashappenedtotakeacertaindirection.Toothershisessenceliesinthequalitieswhichnowdistinguishhimfromthelowerformsoflifetowhichhisancestorsbelonged.Theyseeitnotinwhathehasleftbehind,butinhiscapabilities,bothpresentandevenfuture.Whathecannowdoistheimportantthing–hisfunction,dependentonhisform.Theultimatereasonfor thechoice isprobablynot rational, and it isnotoriously impossible for theonesidetoconvincetheotherbyargument.Here then was a man with a conviction as strong as Plato’s both that

knowledge was possible, and that it must be knowledge of form and not ofmatter. Yet from these premises Plato, as we know, deduced that the onlypossible explanation lay in the assumption of a world of transcendent andabsoluteformspartiallyandtransientlyrealizedintheworldofnature.FromthisAristotle’s common sense revolted, because the relationship between the twoworlds, the causality of the Ideas, remained unaccounted for. Above all theyofferednohelpinexplainingwhathadbeenthecruxofearlyGreekphilosophyandseemedtoAristotletheonethingaboveallthatneededexplanation;thatis,the phenomena of motion and change. He therefore renounced them, but thedifficulty which they were designed to obviate may be presumed to haveremained.Howbringwithinthecompassofphilosophicknowledgeaworldofunstablephenomena,alwayschanging,comingintoexistenceandpassingawayagain,neverthesamefortwoinstantstogether?Whereisthatstabilitywhich,aswesawatthebeginning,thehumanminddemands?Aristotle’sanswerliesintworelatedconceptsfundamentaltohisphilosophy:

(a)theconceptionofimmanentform;(b)theconceptionofpotentiality(dynamis).

(a)Immanentform.Ingeneralterms,theviewofAristotleisthatalthoughatfirstsighttheworldseemstobeinconstantmovementandoffernofixedtruthssuchasalonecanbetheobjectsofscientificthought,yetthephilosophercan,bya mental process, analyse this continual flux and will find that there areunderlyingitcertainbasicprinciplesorelementswhichdonotchange.Thesearenotasetofsubstancesexistingapartfromthesensibleworld,buttheydoexistand are capable of being thought of separately. They are not changeable, andprovidetheobjectsoftruephilosophy.Aswegoontoaskwhattheseprinciplesare,wemustrememberAristotle’s

initial commonsense postulate that only the individual sensible object hasseparateexistence–thisman,thishorse,asheputsit.Thewholeinvestigationisforthesakeofunderstandingthisindividualobject.Todoso,wehavetograspcertainthingsaboutit,wemustdefinetheclasstowhichitbelongs,analysetheinternalstructurewhich logically itmustbesupposed tohave.Picture then thephilosopher examining the things around him in an endeavour to abstract, bymeans in the first place of an inductive analysis, certain common principleswhichexist(theyarenotmerementalabstractions),butexistonlycombinedintheconcreteobjects.Theycanneverthelessberegardedseparatelybyamentalprocess,and,soseen,willexplainthenatureoftheconcreteobjectitself.Seen thus, each separate object of the natural world is discovered to be a

compound. Indeed we still call it a concrete object, using the Latin wordmeaning‘stuck together’which is the translationof theGreekwordapplied tosuchanobjectbyAristotle.Itconsistsatanygivenmomentofasubstratum,alsocalled itsmatter, informed by, or possessed of, a certain formal nature. Sinceperceptible things change, and change was conceived of by the ancients astakingplace between twoopposites or extremes– fromblack towhite, hot tocold,smalltolargeandsoon–Aristotlemadeuseofthetermwhichhadbeenemployed by the earliest Greek philosophers and called the forms also the‘opposites’.Thereasonwhyhispredecessorshadfoundtheproblemofchangeso difficult of logical explanation, he said, was that they had argued as if itdemanded assent to the proposition that these opposite qualities could changeintooneanother.Theyconfusedthestatement‘thiscoldthinghasbecomehot’withthestatement‘heathasbecomecoldness’.Thelatterstatementisaviolationof the law of contradiction and is impossible, as Parmenides had been acuteenoughtoperceive.Hencetheneedtopostulatethesubstratum,whichisinitself(thoughofcourse itneverexistsnakedandalone)quitequalitiless.Given this

substratum–given,thatis,whatseemstoustheelementarydistinctionbetweensubstance and attribute – one can explain a process of change – e.g. cooling,fading or death – by saying, not that heat, darkness in colour, or life havechangedintotheiropposites,cold,lightness,death,butthattheheat,darknessorlifehavelefttheconcreteobjectandbeenreplacedinitbysomethingelse.Thedistinction had been pointed out by Plato, who speaks in the Phaedo of theconfusion of thought resulting from mistaking ‘the things which possess theopposites’for theopposites themselves.ButAristotle’ssolutiondifferedinthisessentialrespect,thatwhereasforPlatoitseemedvitaltoasserttheexistenceoftheformsapartandbythemselves,atthesametimeastheyinsomemysteriousway ‘entered into’ the concrete things which were called by their names, forAristotletheywerealwaysinsomephysicalbody.(b)Potentiality (dynamis). In introducing thisconception,onemust say first

of all that teleology as Plato andAristotle understood it demanded the actualexistenceofthe telosorend, that is,ofaperfectionunderwhoseinfluencetheactivityofthenaturalworldtakesplace.Thisisnotanecessarypresuppositionof the idea of ordered progress. Ordered progress is a perfectly possibleconception without the assumption that the perfection, or goal, to which it istendingalreadyexistsanywhere.This is indeedtheideafavouredbyamodernevolutionarybiologistlikeJulianHuxley:butthePlatonistdoesnotthinkinthatway.InAristotle’swords:‘Wherethereisabettertheremustbeabest’,oraswemightputit,comparisonsaremeaninglessunlessthereisanabsolutestandardtowhichtheymaybereferred.Youcannotwellspeakofprogress,orindeedknowwhetherthingsaregoingforwardsorbackwards,unlessyourscaleofvaluesisotherthanpurelyrelative;anditmustberelativeunlessthereexistssomewhereaperfectionbywhich theycanbe judged,accordingas they fall shortof itbyless or more. So at least Aristotle thought. This perfection is provided inAristotle’s world by its god, who is the only pure form existing apart frommatter.Heisnottheformofanythingintheworld,sowearenotbroughtbacktotheseparatespecificformsofPlato,whichtoAristotleseemedakindofuselessreplicaofperceptiblethings.To thenatureof this supremebeingwemust return later, continuing for the

presentintheworldofsense.Inthisworldeverynewlyconceivedcreaturemusthaveaparent,whichisintwosensesitscause:firstashavingperformedtheactofbegetting,andsecondlyasbeinganexampleofthespecificformtowhichthenewcreaturewillgrowup.InAristotle’sterms, theparent isnecessarybothasefficientandasformal-finalcause.Itisthe‘nature’oftheinfantanimalorplantto strive to realize its own specific form, as exemplified in the parent, whichmust preexist. Had the world been created in time, the hen, in Aristotle’s

philosophy, would have come before the egg. He held, however, that it hasexisted eternally, and its existence as a whole is ensured by the eternal andabsoluteperfectionofthepureform,God.Itisofcourseonlyinaloose,becauserelativesensethattheindividualparentrepresentsperfection.Theentomologistspeaks of the ‘perfect insect’ to contrast it with the larva, but it displays noabsolute perfection. If to produce an individual creature requires a previouslyextantperfectioninthepartialandrelativesphereofthespecies,theexistenceofthewholeworldcollectivelydemandstheexistenceofanabsoluteperfection.Byrealizing as adequately as it can its own specific form, every creaturemaybesaidtobe imitating, in itsownlimitedway, theeternalperfectionofGod.Theinward urge to do this is what is meant by the ‘nature’ (physis) of a naturalobject. So impressed was Aristotle with the necessity to explain motion – anecessitywhich the previous history ofGreek thought had, in awaywhich IhopeIhavemadeclear,renderedparamount–thathemadeitthedefinitionofnatural objects that they ‘containwithin themselves a principle ofmotion andrest’.Some,aswehaveseen,hadbeensoovercomebythedifficultyofaccounting

for motion that they had been led to the desperate expedient of denying itsexistence.Platohimself(thoughtherearepassagesinhislaterdialogueswhichsuggestthathewasuneasyaboutit)hadbeenforcedbythefactofitsmotiontodeclarethat theworldwasonlyquasi-real,andthatrealitymustbesoughtinatranscendent sphere divorced from physical movement and change. By thewholehearted acceptance of motion then, to which his more scientific (andspecifically biological) temperament led him, Aristotle was laid under theobligation of answering those who, like Parmenides, had declared it to beimpossible.ThedilemmaofParmenideswasasmuchasanything theresultofthe immaturity of logic and language in his day, and the way to escape hadalreadybeenpointedoutbyPlato.Aristotleparaphrasedthedilemmaasfollows:Thereisnosuchthingasbecoming,sinceneitherwillthatwhichisbecome(foritalreadyis),norcananythingcometobeoutofwhatisnot.Platohadshownthat thisdilemmadepended for its effectivenesson inability to realize that theverb‘tobe’isusedwithtwoquitedifferentmeanings,(a)toexistand(b)tohaveacertainpredicate(tobeaman,tobehot,etc.).Withthisbehindhim,Aristotleintroduced as his solution the twofold concept of being as either potential oractual,adistinctionsoconstantlyusedto-daythatitisdifficulttorememberhowmuchthoughtwasneededtopavethewayforit.The old antithesis between ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ does not, he said,

representthetrueposition.Certainlywherenothingatallexists,therenevercanbeanything.NoGreekwoulddenythedictumexnihilonihil,andthatwasone

of the reasonswhy he held theworld to be eternal. That, however, is not thesituationwehavetodealwith.Anembryo‘isnot’aman.Thestatementdoesnotimplynonexistence,butratherthepositivefactthathereisapieceofmatterofsuch a nature that it is possible for it to become aman. In otherwords, it ispotentiallyaman.Givenhisanalysisofconcreteobjectsintosubstrateandform,hecouldsaythatitconsistedofasubstratepossessedatthemomentofwhathecalled the ‘privation’ of the form ofman. This again is not a purely negativestatement, but implies thepotentialityof realizing the form.All nature is seenwith theeyesofa teleologist,andtheconceptionoffunctionishere tooin theforefront.Thefunctionofaneye,forexample,istosee.InAristotelianterms,ithasnotfullyrealizeditsformandactualityunlessitisseeing.Ifthenaneyeisblind, it is characterized by the ‘privation’ of sight. The statement cannotproperlybeappliedtotheleafofaplant,thoughthatdoesnotseeanymorethantheblindeyeofanew-bornkitten,because it isnot itsnature tosee. Ifon theotherhandaplant isgrown in thedark so that its leavesarewhitish, theyarerightly said tobe characterizedby theprivationofgreenness,which it is theirnature to attain. Form is essence, or the true nature of a thing, and the fullpossessionofformisequivalenttotheproperperformanceoffunction.Thetwoconceptionsheredescribed(a)immanentform,and(b)thenotionof

potential and actual being – are thus closely interrelated. The view of naturalcreaturesasprogressing fromthepotential to theactualbyvirtueof theirowndynamicnaturecannotbeseparatedinthemindfromtheanalysisofthingstakenas they stand which reveals the necessity for an indeterminate substratumcapableofbeinginformedtodifferentdegreesbyqualitieswhichinthemselvesare untransformable. The one might be compared to an instantaneous X-rayphotograph; the other is an explanation of the process. Since, however, toAristotle’smind thephenomenaprimarilydemandingexplanationwerechangeandmotion,it isthedynamicviewofnaturegivenbytheconceptsofdynamisandenergeiawhichdominates thesystemand isofmostuse to its inventor informulatingtheoriesineverybranchofknowledge.WecannowapproachthequestionoftheAristotelianGodandhisrelationto

theworld.Platoinhisoldagehad,aswesaw,definedGodassoulandsoulasself-mover.Aristotle started from thatpoint,butcouldnot rest there, since theconception did not satisfy his conscientious rationalism. His god was not aninitialpostulate,butthefinalstepinachainofreasoningwhichledhimtotheconclusion that the concept of anything self-movedwas an impossibility.Thisargument from motion may seem remote from anything which we areaccustomed to regard as theology, but is nevertheless essential to anunderstandingofthepeculiarnatureoftheAristoteliandeity.

For every act of change theremust be an external cause.Weknow that thenature of everything consists of an innate tendency to, or capacity for, changeanddevelopmentinacertaindirection,andisthereforealsocalleddynamis.Itisapowerofresponsetotherightstimulus,butnotthecompleteexplanationofthechangewhich takesplace.Thisdemandsanexternalcauseorstimuluswithoutwhichtheinternalpotencywillremaindormant.Somethingelsemustactinthethreefoldcapacityofefficientcause(asinitiatingthemotion),formalcause(forinnaturalgeneration thestartmustcomefromamemberof thesamespecies)and final cause (as representing the goal to which the development will bedirected).Youcannothaveachildwithouthumanparents,oraseedthathasnotdroppedfromamatureplant.Theimpossibilityofself-causedchangeresultsfromthejuxtapositionoftwo

statements.First,changeormotionisaprocess,orinAristotle’sterms,solongasitcontinues,thepotencyinquestionisincompletelyactualized.Secondly,theagentofchangemustbealreadyinpossessionoftheformoractualitytowardswhichtheobjectofthechangeismoving.Foramantobeborn,theremustexistanadultman;foraliquidtobeheatedtoacertaintemperaturetheremustbeanagent already existing at or beyond that temperature. The statement thatsomethingisthecauseofitsownmotion,then,translatedintoAristotelianterms,wouldmean that itwasbothactual andpotential in respect to the sameactofchange;whichisabsurd.Thisdemandforanexternalmoverissatisfiedineachseparateactofchange

within the physical world. But itmust be satisfied also for theUniverse as awhole. There must be a cause external to it, and since its framework iseverlastingthecausemustbeeternal.Aperfectbeingisdemanded,the‘best’bywhichall the ‘better’ and ‘worse’ in thisworldofmatter and imperfection areassessed,afirstcause towhichall thecausesofmotionandchangewithin theworldultimatelyowetheirbeing.Suchacauseitmustbewhichkeepsinmotionthewheelingheavenlybodies,onwhoseregularitydepends theduesuccessionof night and day, summer and winter, and therefore ultimately the life of allthingsonearth.Beingeternalandperfect, itcontainsnoelementofunrealizedpotentiality,andhencecannot suffermotion in thephilosophic sense,which istheprogressfrompotencytoactuality.WethusarriveattheconceptofGodastheUnmovedMover.Beforeweconsiderthenatureofthisdivinebeing,itwillperhapsmakethings

clearertogiveabriefdescriptionoftheoutlinesoftheAristotelianuniverse.Itisspherical,havingthesphereofthefixedstarsasitscircumferenceandtheearth,alsospherical,lyingmotionlessatitscentre.Withintheoutermostspherelie,onewithin the other, the spheres which carry the planets, sun and moon. These

spheresarecomposedof thefifthelement (orquintessence),namelyaether,aninvisiblesubstancepurer thanfire.Thestarsandplanetsarefixedatapoint intheirrespectivespheres,andcarriedroundbytherevolutionofthewholesphere.Eachofthespheresrevolvesaboutanaxis,andtheapparentirregularmotionoftheplanetswasexplainedbysupposingthat theirspheresdonotrevolveaboutthesameaxesorat thesamespeedsas theoutermostsphereof thefixedstars,and that each sphere imparts itsmotion to the sphere nextwithin it. Thus themotionofallspheresexcepttheoutermostisacombinationofitsownrevolutionwiththemotionsofthespheresaboveit,andingeniousmathematicalsolutionswere proposedby ancient astronomers to account for the apparentmotions onthishypothesis.Thisreductionoftheapparentlyirregularmotionsoftheplanetstoacombinationofcircularmotions,suchasmightbeobtainedontheinnermostof a nest of spheres revolving in different directions,was retainedbyWesternastronomersuntilthetimeofKepler.Below the heavenly spheres of aether come the sublunary regions of the

inferiorelements,earth,water,air,andfire.Eachelementhasanaturalmotion,of which that of aether is circular, and those of the pairs earth-water, air-firedownwardsandupwards respectively.Thusweightand lightnessareexplainedasaninternaldynamisintheelementsthemselves.It only remains to add that aether, as in age-old Greek belief, is alive and

sentient, in fact divine, and so therefore are the spheres and heavenly bodiesmadeofit,orofanadmixtureofitwithfire.To return to the supreme god, we have shown that he must be unmoved,

eternal, and perfect. It follows that hemust be incorporeal.Moreover, if he isfree from motion, and none of him is potential, he must be pure actuality(energeiainGreek).WemustrememberthatinthephilosophyofAristotle,withits emphasis on function, the acquisition of form, as a static condition orstructure,isnotyetthehigheststageofbeingforanything.Thisconsistsnotinthepossessionoffacultiesbutintheexerciseofthem.Thatisenergeia.Whereaskinesisisthearduousprocessof‘growingup’,oracquiringactuality,energeiaistheunimpededflowofactivitymadepossibleonceactualityhasbeenacquired.Thus the conception of God as unmoved – or unchanging – and pure form,unsatisfactory as it remains, for several reasons, to the religious mind, is notquitesocoldandstaticasitappearsatfirstsight.Aspureactualityheis,thoughexemptfromkinesis,eternallyactivewithanactivitywhichbringsnofatiguebutisforeverenjoyable.Hisessentialqualityislife.Ofwhat thendoeshis activityconsist?He is engaged ineternal thought. In

oneofthelapidaryphraseswhichareourrarecompensationforpossessingonlythe notebooks of Aristotle and not his published works, he sums up the

philosopher’s creed: ‘The activity of mind is life.’Nous is life in its highestmanifestation.Itisnotthesameassyllogismos, theprocessofreasoningthingsoutstepbystep.Thatisakinesis,aprogressfrompotentialitytoactualitywhichis necessary for the imperfect minds of human beings if they are ever to berewarded, as they may be after sufficient well-directed effort, by the suddenflashing glimpse of the whole truth which is attained by unadulterated nous.God, as we know, goes through no processes. He is pure mind, which cancontemplate in a single instant, anddoes so eternally, thewhole realmof truebeing.It is a splendid thought, but unfortunately we have not finished with the

philosophicconscience.‘Thewholerealmoftruebeing’–yes,butofwhatdoesthisrealmconsist?TheconclusionisthattheonlypossibleobjectoftheeternalthoughtofGod ishimself, theone full andperfectbeing.There isnowaybywhich he could include in his thought the creatures of the physical world,without abandoning the initial postulate on which all his nature depends. Hecouldnotbefreefrommovement(kinesis)himself ifheappliedhis thought toobjectswhich are themselves subject to kinesis. Thus all possibility of divineprovidenceisexcluded.Godcannotcarefortheworld:heisnotevenawareofit.St.ThomastriedtosoftenthisconclusionbyarguingthatGod’sknowledgeofhimselfmustincludeknowledgeoftheworld,whichowesitsbeingtohim,butasSirDavidRosssays:‘Thisisapossibleandafruitfullineofthought,butitisnotthatwhichAristotleadopts.’What then is the relation of God to the world, and in what sense is he its

cause? He is the necessary external goal of perfection without which all thedynamis in nature would remain sunk in inactivity. Wrapped in eternal self-contemplation,hecalls forthbyhismerepresence the latentpowersofnature,which strive in their variousways to achieve form and carry out their properactivities, thus imitating in theirownparticular spheres theonepure formandeternallyactivebeing.Goddoesnotgoout to theworld,but theworldcannothelpgoingouttohim.Thatistheirrelationship,summedupinanotherpregnantphrase:‘Hemovesastheobjectofdesire.’Insentientcreaturesthedesireistoagreateror lessextentconsciousand literal. In the lowerordersofnature itcanonly, perhaps, be called desire by analogy. But it is everywhere the samefundamentalforce,thedynamisorurgeofnaturetogrowtomaturity,torealizeform, and to perform the due function. AndAristotle’s biological studies hadtaughthimthat there isnohardandfast linebetween thefacultiesofdifferentordersofnature,asthereisnohardandfastlinebetweenthegenera.Althoughnot an evolutionist, he notes as a result of his observationsofmarine life thatthereisobviouslynodetectablelineofcleavagebetweenplantsandanimals;of

somecreatures it ishard to say towhichclass theybelong.Suchobservationsmust havemade it easier for him to postulate a single internal force, or élan,pervadingallnature,sentientandnon-sentientalike.WemaydisliketheconclusionstowhichAristotlewasled,butwecanhardly

help admiring the consistency of his thought. The theological climax of hissystem is reached by applying the same fundamental principles as hold goodthroughout. In natural generation, aswe saw, themost important aspects of aparent’s causation are the formal and final. He is necessary above all asproviding an example of the fully formed creature towhich the offspringwillconform. Since the offspring is created in time, hemust act as efficient causetoo;theremustbeaninitialactofbegetting.Butafterthat,heneedtheoreticallytake no further notice of the young, whose internal dynamis will ensure theircontinueddevelopmentprovidedtheperfectmembersofthespeciesonlyexisttofurnish the model. The relation of God to the world is the same, with thenecessarydifference that since theworldwasnever createdbut is coevalwithtime itself, no initial act of creation in time is called for, and the lastconsiderationisremovedwhichcouldcauseGodtodisplayevenamomentaryinterest in theworld.He is none the less necessary to its existence, in awaywhich is nowclear.To recallCornford’s dictum,wemay say that inAristotle‘thephilosophyofaspiration’reachesitsfinalculmination.

Notes

1BeforeandAfterSocrates,pp.89f.

8ARISTOTLE(ii)Humanbeings

IhavegivensomeaccountinoutlineofAristotle’sviewsontheworkingsoftheUniverse as a whole. To conclude this brief survey, the most fitting subjectseems to be his views onman, his nature and position in the world, and hisproperoccupationor function.What I shall have to say falls roughly into twohalves,psychologyandethics.I use psychology of course in the Greek sense of the study of the psyche,

whichistheelementoflifeinlivingcreaturesfromplantsupwards,andincludesas a minimum the faculties of nutrition and reproduction, and also, in thosecreatures which possess them, the desires and emotions, the senses, and thereason.Aswitheveryothersubject,Aristotlestartsfromadiscussionoftheopinions

ofhispredecessors.Fromthisdiscussion twomainpointsofcriticismemerge,illustrating in particular how his common sense reacted against the semi-religious beliefs of the Pythagoreans and Plato, though at the same time histreatment of them shows that he was equally anxious to avoid the purelymaterialistexplanationsofsensationandthoughtwhichhadbeenpropoundedbyEmpedoclesandtheAtomists.Thetwochiefpointswhichhepicksoutforcriticismarethese:(a)Failureto

grasp with sufficient clearness that the psyche must be conceived as a unity,althoughpossessingperhapsdifferentfaculties(dynameis).Platohadspokenofdifferent ‘parts’ of the soul. In Aristotle’s work this word ‘parts’ is usuallyreplacedbytheworddynameis–facultiesorpowers.(b) Failure to grasp its relation to the body. The others speak of it as

something separate,which perhaps can be detached from the body and live aseparatelifebyitself.Infactnotonlyissoul itselfaunity,butsois thewholelivingcreature,soulandbodytogether.Hencetheoriesofthetransmigrationofasoulintodifferentbodiesareabsurd.Thetwoarelogicallydistinguishable–soul

isnotbydefinitionthesamethingasbody,orlifethesameasmatter–but,saysAristotle,itisasifthebodyweretheinstrumentthroughwhichaparticularlifeorsoulexpressesitself.Heillustratesthisbyaratherquaintsimile,thattotalkofthetransmigrationofsoulsis‘liketalkingofatransmigrationofcarpentryintoflutes;forjustasthecraftmustemploytherighttools,sothesoulmustemploytherightbody’.Thisisahintthatasatisfactorystudyoflifemustbebasedonastudyofthe

livingbody, thatpsychologymustbebasedonbiology, aprecept towhich, aseveryone knows, Aristotle did not fail to conform. Even now the wealth andacumenofhiscontributionstobiologicalandzoologicalsciencearecapableofexcitingadmirationamongexperts.Whatthenisthesoul,orinotherwordswhatisthecorrectdescriptionoflife?

TodecidethisAristotlehasrecoursetohisfundamentalprinciplesofexistence.Living creatures, like all separately existing substances, are concrete, that is,theyarecompoundedofmatteror substrate and form.Thebody is thematter,andtheformoractualityofthatbodyisitslifeorpsyche.Ifthen,hesays,onemustattemptadefinitiontocoverpsycheasawhole,wecansaynomorethanthis,thatitistheactualityofanorganicbody.Inconsideringtheimplicationsofthisdoctrineofsoulastheactualityofthe

livingcreature,wemustnotbemisledbywhatat first sightmight seem tobemodernanalogies. Itmightsuggest themodernmaterialistorepiphenomenalistview,accordingtowhichlifeiswhatiscalledan‘emergentcharacteristic’ofthebody–simply,thatistosay,anaturalresultantorafter-productofallthepartsofthebodybeingjustso.Thismakeslifebothsecondaryintimeandsubordinateinimportancetothebody.Asimilarviewwasheldinancienttimes,andisrebuttedby Aristotle no less vigorously than by Plato. To see a resemblance to it inAristotlehimselfistoforgethisPlatoniclegacy,theexaltedpositionoccupiedbyform in his philosophy. Both alike insist that the perfect comes before theimperfect, both chronologically and in the scale of value. Hence Aristotle’semphasis,notedinthelastchapter,onthenecessityforthepriorexistenceofafully developed member of a species before a new one could be created. OfDarwinianevolutionAristotlehadnotanotion,andhestronglydisapprovedofits ancient counterpart in Empedocles. The chicken comes before the egg andalwayshas.Sowith thesoul: itshighestandonlyperfectmanifestation–puremind–existseternally.The individualmayhave torecreatehisownimperfectinstanceof it,andso in the individual theprogress is fromthepotential to theactual.ButspeakinguniversallywhetheritbeofasinglespeciesorofthewholeUniverse,theactualityoflifeispriorevenintimetomatter(itspotentiality)aswellassuperiorinimportanceorvalue.

Nevertheless one momentous consequence would seem to follow from thedoctrineofsoulastheformofthebodyifinterpretedinallitsstrictness.Itisadeath-blow to any kind of personal immortality. Living creatures like othernaturalobjectsformeachoneaunity,andtheircomponentsofformandmatterare not separable except in thought. In his ownwords: ‘The questionwhethersoulandbodyareoneisnomorelegitimatethanthequestionwhetherthewaxandtheimpressionofthesealuponitareone,oringeneralwhetherthematterof a thing is onewith the thing ofwhich it is thematter.’On the question ofhuman survival he says little, and the natural inference would be that, unlikePlato,hewasnotgreatly interested in it.Hiscuriosityabout thepresentworldwas too consuming to leave room for a desire to speculate about another.Neverthelesshedoesseemtohaveleftaloophole,holdingthatnous,thehighestmanifestation of the reasoning faculty,was of a different order from the othervitalprinciples,andmightinfactbeaseparatesubstanceinitsownrightwhichcouldsurvivethedissolutionofthebody.Heseveraltimesmentionsthequestionandshelvesit,asinthispassagefromtheDeanima:‘Concerningthemind,thepowerofactivethought,wehaveasyetnoevidence.Itappearstobeadifferentgenus of soul, and to be alone capable of separate existence, as the eternal isindependent of the perishable.But all the other parts of soul, as is clear fromwhathasbeen said, are incapableof separate existence, in spiteofwhat somehaveclaimed.Theyare,ofcourse,distinguishableindefinition.’InapurelyscientificpassageofhistreatiseontheGenerationofAnimals,he

actually concludes that reason, of all the manifestations of life, ‘alone entersfrom outside and is divine’, because all the others can be shown to beinseparablefromsomeactivityof thebody.Wemayalso take intoaccounthisexhortationsattheendoftheEthicstothelifeofpurethoughtasbeingnotonlythe exerciseof ourownhighest faculty, but also the cultivationof that part inwhichweresembleGod.Inthepossessionofnousheundoubtedlybelievedthatmanhassomethingwhichisnotsharedbyotherformsoflife,andwhichhedoessharewith the eternal unmoved cause of theUniverse. Probably therefore therewardofthephilosopherafterdeathwastheabsorptionofhismindintotheoneeternal incorporealMind.Wecannotsaymorewherehehassaidnothing.Thetenorofhisthoughtisbetterseeninthosethingswhichhisphilosophyexcludes.The description of the thinking part of us in the third book of theDe animamakesitclearthattherecanbenosurvivalofindividualpersonality,noroomforanOrphicorPlatonic eschatologyof rewardsandpunishments,nor a cycleofincarnations.Thedoctrineofformandmatterhasthelastword.Statedbaldly, thedoctrineofsoulastheformofthebodysoundssomewhat

abstractandunreal.Aristotlehimself,however,warnsusseveral times that the

general definition cannot get usvery far, and that themeaning emerges in theworking out of the details. Being primarily a biologist, he plunges into thesedetailswith zest.We cannot at present followhim, but, still keeping rather togeneralities,maylookbywayofexampleathistheoriesofsensation.The senses cannot be considered as completely isolated, but simply as

differentdynameis or faculties ofpsychemanifested through different parts ofthebody.Tounderstandthem,hesays,wemustgraspthefactthattherelationofafaculty,e.g.sight, toitsorgantheeyeisthesameastherelationofsoulasawhole to body as a whole. This theory gives to his views on sensation twoadvantagesoverthoseofhispredecessorswhichbecomeapparentinthedetailsofhiswork.(a)We know that one effect of his general doctrinewas to draw the bonds

between soul and body much tighter than previous accounts had done. Wecannot understand the soul ifwe neglect the body throughwhich itmanifestsitself.Sowithaparticularsense;wecannotunderstandsightunlessweexaminethestructureandworkingsoftheeye.Sightandtheeyearenotthesame–theyarelogicallydistinguishable–buttogethertheyformbutoneliving,activeorganandmustbestudiedassuch.ThisgivestoAristotle’sworkonsensationamuchmoremodern tone than anything saidbyhispredecessors. It is nearerbiologyandfartherfrommetaphysics,orguessing.(b)Atthesametimehisgeneralpresuppositionssavedhimfromgoingtoofar

intheotherdirection.Previousaccountsofsensation,althoughasIsaybasedonguesses or arbitrarymetaphysical assumptions,were uniformlymaterialistic intone. Even Plato, in spite of an isolated hint, was unable to offer any betterexplanationofanactofdirectsensation than theactionofbodyonbody.Thiswasonereasonwhyhecouldnotallowthatsensationgaveknowledgeofreality.EmpedoclesandtheAtomists,withtheirratherfantasticassumptionsoftenuousfilmsgivenoffbyobjects, andpores inourownbodies to receive them,wereentirely materialistic. Aristotle on the other hand, with his belief in real andsubstantive form–as realas formwas toPlato,but in thecreature,notaboveandoutsideit–canforthefirsttimedrawadistinctiononthelevelofsensationbetweenphysicalandpsychicalevents.Whateverwe thinkof theoriginof thelatter,wemustagreethatthereisadistinctionbetweenthematerialactionofonebodyonanother–aswhenlightfallsonphotographicprintingpaperandturnsitdark – and the sort of result that superveneswhen light falls on our eye, andwhichwedescribeasthesensationofsight.Hereagainaphysicalchangeoccurs– the contraction of the iris at least – and this supports us in maintaining adistinctionbetweentwoordersofevents–thepurelyphysicaleffectoflightonthematerialorganandthepsychicalphenomenonofsensationwhichinthecase

oflivingcreaturessupervenes.OfthisdistinctionAristotlewasthefirsttomakeuse.Democritushadcrudely

explainedsight,withreferencetotheimageappearinginthepupil,assimplyaprocessofreflectionsuchasoccursinwateroranyotherpolishedsurface.Arewetosupposethen,Aristotleasks,thatbowlsofwaterandmirrorsarecapableof seeing? It is just the difference between the two events which constitutessensation. His own explanation in general terms is that the sense-organ iscapable,becausethisisacharacteristicofalllivingmatter(matter-plus-psyche),ofreceivingtheformofsensibleobjectswithouttheirmatter.Thereismaterialaffection: the flesh becomes warmwhenwe perceive warmth, the eye (so hebelieved) coloured when we perceive a colour. The soul works through thebodilyorgan.Butotherthingsbesideslivingbodiescantakeonthesequalitiesofheatandcolour.Thepeculiarityoflifeisthatwhenthebodilyorganismateriallyaltered by an external object, then another, totally different result supervenes,which we call the sensation. The distinction could hardly be more clearlyexpressed.Aristotle therefore calls sensation a judgment, ranking it nearer to reason

among the faculties and farther from themerely bodily than Plato did. Thereremains,however,thisdistinctionbetweensensationandthought,thatsensationisdirectlydependentfor itsdataonthebodilyorgans,andsoismoreliable tohaveitscommunicationsinterruptedordistorted.That iswhysensacanbetoointense;abrilliantlightmaytemporarilyblind,aloudsoundmaydeafen.Thesearetoostrong,notforthesoul’sperception,butforthephysicalorgan’scapacityforreceiving.Thetroubleisnotmetwithintherealmofpurethought,whenthebodilyorgansaredispensedwith.IconcludewithafewremarksonAristotle’sethicalviews.What,letusask,

was his approach to the central question, raised by Plato and Socrates beforehim, of the ergon, or function of man? The key to the place of ethics in hisphilosophyliesinhisrenunciationofthePlatonicIdeas.Thisturning-pointinhisphilosophicallifehadevenmorerevolutionaryeffectsonhistheoriesofconductthan on his metaphysics, as seems only natural when we remember that thedoctrine of Ideas arose in the first place out of ethical discussions, and thatethicalconceptslikevirtue,justiceandthegoodalwaysstoodfirstonthelistofthetranscendentforms.Thedifferencelieshere.Solongasyoubelievethatanunderstandingofright

and wrong depends on the recognition of a single good-in-itself, which is atranscendentsubstancewithanexistenceunaffectedbythelimitationsofspatialandtemporalevents,youcannotregardethicsasanythingelsebutanoffshootofmetaphysics.Onlythetruephilosophercanknowthewhyandwhereforeofright

conduct.Experiencecannotteachit,sincethefactsofexperiencecontainnotthetruthitselfbutonlyadistortedimageofit.ThiswasthebeliefthatPlatowasledinto,saidAristotle,bytheemphasiswhichSocrateshadlaidontheimportanceofdefinitioninthefieldofethicalconcepts.Hewishedtobelieveintherealityof theobjectof thedefinitions,but sawnothing stableenough in theworldofactionandsensation,andsowasmovedtobelieveintheexistenceofimmutablesubstancesexistingapartfromthatworld.AndsowithAristotleethicswasbroughtoutofthecloudsandanchoredinthe

factsofeverydaylife.InthefirstbookofhisEthicsheattacksthePlatonicIdeas(although, he says, ‘it is uphill work to do so, seeing that the authors of thedoctrine are our friends’). There is not just one thing, ‘the good’. There is adifferentgoodfordifferentclasses,adifferentaimfordifferenttypesofaction.Moreovertheaimofethicalstudyispractical,notscientific:andifouraiminitis tomakemen and their actions better, then exhypothesi thematerial of ourstudy is that which can be changed. But where the object of study is notimmutable,thephilosophicaimoftruthorknowledgeisunattainable.Truthandknowledgearestrangerstotherealmofthecontingent.Againandagainheisatpainstopointoutthatethicsisnotreallyapartofphilosophyatall.Allthatcanbedoneistogivesomepracticalruleswhich,havingbeenarrivedatempirically,will probablywork. ‘The present inquiry does not aim at knowledge like ourothers. Its object is not that we may know what virtue is, but that we maybecomevirtuous.’ThewordsseemdeliberatelychosentomakeSocratesturninhis grave. We must not therefore expect the same certainty to attach to ourresults in ethical questions, nor demand the same rigorousness of proof as inscientificsubjects.‘Itisthedutyofaneducatedmantoaimataccuracyineachseparatecaseonlyasfarasthenatureofthesubjectallowsit:todemandlogicaldemonstration from an orator, for example, would be as absurd as to allow amathematiciantousetheartsofpersuasion.’Theaimsandmethodsofethicshavingthus,bytheabandonmentofbeliefin

theuniversalIdeas,beenseparatedfromthoseofscientificphilosophy,therewasobviouslyadangerthatoneoftwothingsmighthappen.Solongasmetaphysicsand ethics were part of the same field of knowledge, neither could well beexalted,atleastconsciously,attheexpenseoftheother.ThedangerconfrontingAristotlewas that either the practical lifemight come tomean everything forhim,orelse,takingthesideofpurephilosophy,hemightconsiderithisfunctionto cut himself off entirely from the practical side and lose himself incontemplationorinunfruitful,becausedisinterested,scientificinvestigation.TheEthics isourevidence thatneitherof these thingshappened. In thefirst

place,heclearlydidnotdenytheimportanceofdisinterestedphilosophicaland

scientific speculation, though it had become less directly useful in the lowersphere.Indeedwhatit lostinmerepracticalutilityitgainedindignity,andthelastfewchaptersofthework,whicharedevotedtothegloriesofmentalactivityasthehighestofallandthesummitofhumanhappiness,leavenodoubtthatiftheideallifewerepossibleitwouldconsistentirelyofthat.He does not on the other hand feel justified in leaving everything else and

following only this high philosophical ideal, because in fact such a life is notpossibleforman.Ifitwere,hewouldbeGod.Infactheisconcrete,ofbodyaswellasmind,andthisimmediatelyintroducescomplications.Iffornothingmorethantheirmaterialneeds,mencannotwellgetonwithouteachother.Somesortofcommunityorganizationisnecessary,andthisimmediatelyinvolvesthemoralvirtues. ‘Man’, he says, ‘is by nature a political animal.’ Self-sufficiency(autarkeia)istobeaimedatasfarasitisattainable,butthepracticalgoodsenseofAristotleisbroughtoutwhenhespeaksofthis.‘Byself-sufficientwedonotmeanthatwhichissufficientforasinglemanleadingasolitarylife.Weincludeparents,children,wife,andingeneral friendsandfellow-citizens,sincemanisbornforcitizenship.’Aristotle set out towrite theEthics, then (and the samemay be said of the

Politics), fromasenseofduty.Sciencewashispassion,andtherecouldbenoscience,inthepropersense,ofhumanconduct.Yeteventhephilosopherfindsitdifficult to pursue his speculations if his bodily existence is passed in a badlygoverned community of ill-disciplined individuals. For the general good, hemustleaveforawhilethedelightsofthelaboratoryorthestudyandshowhowreasoncanbeappliedtopracticalquestions.Aristotlethereforedividesareteintotwo, intellectual and moral, and devotes the greater part of the treatise to adetaileddiscussionofthelatter.All men, he says, seek happiness. It is the goal of human life. Correctly

defined–weseehowmuchofthePlatoniststillremainsinAristotle–itis‘anactivityaccordingtoarete’.Ifweareefficientashumanbeings,possessingtheareteofman,thentheactivitywhichweshallperforminvirtueofthataretewillbe happiness. We have noted already that there is this slight but definitedifferencebetweenformandactivity(eidosandenergeia):whenacreaturehasattained its rightful form, or is in its complete state, the performance of itsactivity naturally follows. That is the culminating stage of development, forwhich the attainment of the form or state was the preparation. KnowingAristotle’s consistency in the application of his fundamental principles to allsubjects alike,we shall not be surprised to learn thatarete is regarded as theproperstateorrightconditionforamatureman.Itisthepreconditionrequisiteforhappiness,whichisanactivity,theenergeiaofamanassuch.

Inthistalkaboutvirtuebeingtherightconditionofthesoul,wemightalmostbe listening toPlato.Butwhenweask for thedefinitionof this condition, theways part. There can no longer be a complete and ultimate definition in thePlatonicsense.Yetaworkingdefinitionmustbeattempted,ifwearetogetanyfurther from the practical point of view.We notice when we read it how, inconformitywithAristotle’s conception of the subject-matter of ethics, it is noexactscientificstatementbutjustakindofprovisional,rough-and-readyruling.Its implications can only be made clear by working them out in detail. Thedefinitionisasfollows.

Virtueisastateofcharacterconcernedwithchoice,lyinginameanrelativetoourselves,determinedbyarationalprincipleandinthewayinwhichthemanofpracticalwisdomwoulddetermineit.

Areteisastate.Wehaveseenwhatthatmeans.Thespherewhichitaffectsisthesphereofrationalchoicebetweenthisactionorthat.ThewordusedbyAristotle(prohairesis)isonewhichsignifieschoicemadebyrationalbeings,asopposedto irrational, animal desire. It lies in a mean, or middle point between twoextremes.Herewehave, reduced to thecompassof thedefinition, the famousdoctrineofvirtueasthemean,whichtosomeseemssopedestrian,toothersanexciting discovery. To Jane Harrison, for instance, brought up in somewhatcrampingsurroundingsofVictorianevangelicalism,whereeverythingconnectedwith virtuous living seemed to be an extreme, it came with the force of arevelation,andshedescribesinhermemoirshowshewalkedupanddownthecollegegardenatNewnham,wonderingcoulditpossiblybetrue.Accordingtothisdoctrineallfaultsconsistinexcessordefectofaqualitywhichifpresenttotheright,thatistoamoderate,degreewillbeavirtue.Thuscourageisameanbetween cowardice and foolhardiness, temperance amean between abstinenceand self-indulgence, generosity between meanness and extravagance, properpridebetweenabjectnessandarrogance.But this mean is not a rigid arithmetical middle. It is ‘a mean relative to

ourselves’, differing for people of different temperaments and under differentconditions.Goodnessisdifficultbecauseitcannotbereducedtoamatterofrule-of-thumbknowledge.But itcanbedeterminedby theuseof reason,and thereare certain men gifted with practical wisdom who are natural legislators andwhose rulings the weaker will do best to follow – ‘as the man of practicalwisdomwoulddetermineit’.InfactAristotlespendsseveralbooksofhistreatisein discussing the application of this general definition of virtue to the variousvirtuesseverally.Amanisnotvirtuousbecausehehappenstodocertainisolatedvirtuousacts.

Virtueisastate,andtheactsmustflowfromthatstate,oraswemightsay,must

comenaturallytohim.Thewaytoattainthisstateisbyforminghabits.Wefirstof all discipline ourselves to act rightly, following the counsel of the ‘man ofpractical wisdom’, and in the end become virtuous because the repeatedperformanceofrightactswillinducethehabitorvirtuousstateinthesoul.Theoutcomeofourrightlivingwillthenbehappiness–provided,headds,thatwearenotcursedwithanynotablebodilydefectnoracompletelackofthisworld’sgoods;forinthesemattershehasabluntrealismwhichisinstrongcontrasttothemoreascetictraditionofSocratesandPlato.ThuswehaveAristotle’sanswertotheoldfifth-centuryquestionofwhether

virtue is natural or contrary to nature. The seeming paradox that it is byperformingvirtuous acts thatwe acquire virtue (for surely, onemight say, theperformanceofvirtuousacts is theresultofbeingvirtuous,not itscause:howcanweactvirtuouslyifwehavenotyetvirtueinoursouls?)–tothisparadoxAristotle finds a reply in another of his fundamental concepts, that ofpotentiality.Isvirtuenaturalorcontrarytonature?Neithersideisquiteright.Inhis ownwords: ‘Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtuesariseinus;butbynatureweareadaptedtoreceivethem,andaremadeperfectbyhabit.’Wearepotentiallygood,with thedynamis ofvirtue inuswhichwemaydevelopintotheeidosbyformingrighthabits.Buteverythingwhichisonlysomething potentially is capable of developing in the opposite direction. Itsmatterorsubstratemayreceiveeithertheformoritscontrary.Beingpotentiallygoodwearealsopotentiallybad.But asmenwehave the facultyof reasonedchoice,anditisuptoustodeterminewhichwaywego.Thevirtuewhichwehavesobrieflyconsideredismoralvirtue,thebeststate

ofordinarymenlivingordinarylivesas‘politicalanimals’.ButAristotle,aswehave seen, also recognized, and indeed exalted above the practical virtues ofsociallife,theintellectualvirtueofthephilosopher.Ishouldliketoendbytryingtoexplaintherelationsbetweenthetwo,andtoshowwhatitwasinAristotle’sphilosophicalpositionwhich ledhimtoadmit thisdoublestandard,as itwere,anddoubleconceptionofhumanvirtue.Wehave seenhowgivingup thebelief inPlato’s transcendent formsmeant

the abandonment of absolutes in the ethical field and a separation betweendisinterestedspeculationandethical inquiry. InPlato thestatesmanmust studypurephilosophybecausefromithewilldeducetherulestohelphiminpoliticallife.InAristotle’sEthics ithasbecomeuseless tohim.Inevitably therefore thechoice presents itself: which shall we follow? Do we do best to retire intophilosophic isolation, or to plunge into practical matters and learn fromexperience(whichhasnowbecomeouronlyguide)howtodealwithourfellow-men?

The answer is determined, like everything else for this most consistent ofphilosophers,byreferencetothefundamentalsofhistheoryofnature,andwilltherefore be in termswithwhichwe are familiar. For the answer is this, thatman, like every other separately existing natural creature, is concrete, acompoundofmatterandform,andhisergonissimilarlycomplex.Itishisdutytoliveaccordingtothehighestthatisinhim,andthisisthepowerofthought.Butheisnotagodandcannotdothatwithoutintermission.Hence,aswesaw,the need for the lower virtues aswell. This dual conception of human natureleadsAristotlesometimestoanapparent,orverbal,inconsistency.Forinstance,whenman is being contrastedwith the lower orders of nature, it is of coursenous which is the distinguishing characteristic; and so the proper, becausepeculiarfunctionofmanisseentolieintheexerciseofnous.Whenontheotherhandmanisbeingcontrastedwithhigherbeings,towitwithGod,thenitishisimperfectionsandhisassociationswithmatterwhichnaturallycometothefore.AndsoevenAristotle’sfinalandalmostlyricalaccountofthetruehappinessforman,inthelastbookofthetreatisedoesnotescapegivingtheimpressionofatleastsuperficialcontradiction.ThistrueandhighesthappinessliesforAristotleintheoreticalscienceandphilosophy,theunfetteredexerciseoftheintellectforits own sake. Since it is nous which distinguishes man from the beasts, theexerciseofnousmustclearlybehisproperactivityquaman.Yet immediatelyafterexplainingallthishegoeson:‘Butsuchalifewouldbesuperhuman.Foritisnotinsofarasheishumanthatamanwilllivelikethis,butinsofarasthereissomethingofdivinityinhim;andjustasthatdivinitydiffersfromtheconcretewhole, even so will its activity differ from the activity of ordinary virtue. Ifreason isdivine, then, incomparisonwithman, the lifeaccording to itwillbedivineincomparisonwithhumanlife.’At the same time he follows this up with the exhortation to disregard the

advice of prudent poets (it was a commonplace of Greek literature) that it isfoolishtoemulatethegods.Weshouldaimatdivinityasfarasliesinourpower.Andalittlefartheronhesays:‘Thispartmaybeconsideredtobeeachoneofus,sinceitisthehighestandbest.Itwouldthenbeabsurdforamantochoosenothisownlifebutthelifeofsomethingelse.’Thatishowitis.Almostinthesamebreathhecanspeakofthelifeofreason

asbeingtoohighformortalsandexhortustopursueitasbeingthelifethatismosttrulyourown.Nowonecertainresultoftheseapparentcontradictionsseemstometobethat

thoughman, like every other creature of nature, is a compound ofmatter andform, he is a unique sort of compound. We shall never understand the fullimplications of Aristotle’s thoughts about the nature of nous, for he seems to

havebeenshyofthesubject.Severaltimes,indifferentworks,hementionsthepossibility that it might be something separate from the rest of the humanfacultiesandanexceptiontotherulethatsoul,beingtheformofthebody,mustperishwiththebody.Butalwayshepostponesthefulldiscussionwhichsovitalatopicwouldseemtomerit.Perhapshewasawarethatitwasforhimakindofreligiousconception,anddifficulttokeepwithintheboundsofaphilosophythatwas intended to be purely rational. But I thinkwe shouldmisunderstand himmore than we need if we failed to recognize this distinction between thecompositenatureofmanandthecompositenatureofthelowerordersofbeing.Thedifferenceliesinthis,thatthebestinhim–thatwhichisinthefullestsensehisowntruenature–isidenticalwiththenatureofthatwhichisabovehim,withthenatureofGod.WehaveseenhowtheonlyadequatedescriptionthatAristotlecould find of the eternal and blessed life which the highest divinity must besupposedtoleadwasthatitconsistedinuninterruptedthought.‘Fortheactivityofmindislife.’TodenywhatIhavesaidabouthumannaturewouldbetodenyboththeletter

and the spirit ofAristotle’swords.Theergon of every creature is to attain itsown form and perform its proper activity. It cannot and should not do more.Aristotle would say of a horse, as he says ofman, that its ergon was to liveaccordingtothehighestthatisinit.Buthedoesnotsay,norshouldweexpecthimto,thatthismeans‘toaimathumanityasfarasliesinitspower’–totrytoattaintothelifeoftheclassaboveit.Ithasfunctionswhichitshareswithman–growth,reproduction,sensation–yetthebestandmostcharacteristicfunctionofman is lacking. Itshighest activity isyet inadifferentworld from thehighestactivityofman.TherelationsbetweenmanandGodaredifferent.Mannodoubtiscloggedwithmatter;hehasimperfectionsandhindranceswhicharelackingtotheuntroubledperfectionofGod.Thereforehecannotexercisewithoutconstantinterruptionthehighestthatisinhim.ButnoteventhesupremeBeingpossessesafacultywhichislackinginman,asmanpossessesafacultywhichislackinginother creatures.We have a privilege and a responsibility.We shall not indeedmake the most of these by trying to ignore the body and its needs, nor thecommunitylifetowhichtheylogicallypoint.Forthebodyisasmuchapartofusasthemind.Eachofusisaunity,asthestudyofthepsyche,thescienceoflife,has taught.Therefore inacomplete life themoralvirtuesmusthave theirplace. But the moral virtues (and here I quote Aristotle’s own words) aresecondary. It is thecreedof theunrepentant intellectualist. ‘Theactivityof themindislife.’Aristotle’s philosophy represents the final flowering ofGreek thought in its

natural setting, the city-state. Hewas the teacher of Alexander, themanwho

finally swept away that compact unit inwhich everyone could play an activepart,andsubstitutedforittheideaofagreatkingdomwhichshouldembracetheworld.Alexanderdiedbeforehis idealwas realized,andhissuccessorscarvedtheknownworldupintothreeorfourdespoticallyruledempires.TobeacitizenofAthensorCorinthwasnolongersufficient,fortheautonomyofthecitieswasgone for ever. Looking back, it seems to us that it had already lost its realitybeforeAlexander,yetwhenweread thePoliticswesee that it still formed theframework of Aristotle’s mind. After him this was no longer possible. Thehelplessness of man before great powers brought philosophies of a differenttype.Itbrought intenseindividualism,andtheconceptionofphilosophynotasanintellectualidealbutasarefugefromimpotenceanddespair.ItmightbethequietismofEpicurusorthefatalismoftheStoa.TheoldGreekspiritoffreeandfearless inquirywas gone, andAristotle’s orderwas inverted. Some theory ofconduct,somethingtoliveby,camefirst,andthesatisfactionoftheintellectwasasecondaryconsideration.TheHellenisticworldhasitsownachievements,buttheyarelargelytheoutcomeofanincreasedminglingofGreekwithforeign,andparticularlywithOrientalelements.IfwhatwewanttodiscoveristhemindofGreece,thereisperhapssomeexcuseforstoppinghere.

SUGGESTIONSFORFURTHERREADING

1.General

F.M.CORNFORD BeforeandAfterSocrates(Cambridge,1932)A.H.ARMSTRONG

IntroductiontoAncientPhilosophy(Methuen,3rded.1957)

L.ROBIN GreekThought(KeganPaul,1928)C.BAILEY TheGreekAtomistsandEpicurus(Oxford,1928)

ThechaptersonphilosophyintheCambridgeAncientHistorymakeausefulintroduction.Themostimportantare:

Invol.IV

‘Mystery-religionsandPresocraticPhilosophy’(Cornford)

Invol.V

‘TheAgeofIllumination’(Bury)

Invol.VI

‘TheAthenianPhilosophicalSchools’(Cornford)and‘GreekPoliticalThoughtinthe4thCentury’(Barker)

Invol.VII

‘Athens(StoicsandEpicureans)’(Angus)and‘HellenisticScienceandMathematics’(Jones)

2.Presocratics

J.BURNET EarlyGreekPhilosophy(Black,4thed.1930:thestandardwork)W.JAEGER TheTheologyoftheEarlyGreekPhilosophers(Oxford,1947)162

3.Plato

G.M.A.GRUBE Plato’sThought(Methuen,1935)R.L.NETTLESHIP LecturesontheRepublicofPlato(Macmillan,1898)G.C.FIELD PlatoandhisContemporaries(Methuen,2nded.1948)

ThePhilosophyofPlato(HomeUniversityLibrary,1949)

4.Aristotle

W.D.ROSS Aristotle(Methuen,5thed.1949)J.L.STOCKS Aristotelianism(Harrap,n.d.)Post-AristoteliansE.BEVAN StoicsandSceptics(Oxford,1913)R.D.HICKS StoicandEpicurean(Cambridge,1910)A.E.TAYLOR Epicurus(Philosophies,AncientandModern,Constable,

1911)

Thefewbooksmentionedhereareofcourseonlyintendedtogivethereaderastart.Forafuller,andmostuseful,bibliographyseetheendofArmstrong’sbookreferredtounder(1)above.AboutthisbookitshouldbeaddedthatitdealsverybrieflywiththeperiodthatIhavetreatedhere,sincetheauthor’saimistotracethetransitionfrompaganHellenicphilosophytotheChristianphilosophywhich,as he says, on one side derives from it.Nootherwork, so far as I am aware,attempts toperformthisvaluableanddifficultservice,at least inanything likethecompassofMr.Armstrong’sbook.

INDEX

Academy,113Aer,28f.Aeschylus,7Aether,127f.Agnosticism(Protagoras),63Air,28ff.,33Alcibiades,72Alexander,76,115,116,149Anaxagoras,17,50ff.Anaximander,25ff.,31,41Anaximenes,28ff.Anthropology,limitsof,14f.Anthropomorphism,28,77Apeiron,26,36Apollo,3,64,77,115Aquinas,Thomas,129Archelaus,63Arete,7ff,66ff.,142ff.Aristotle,chh.7and8;also8,14,19,22f.,57,59,110;criticismofPlato,seeIdeas;onDemocritus,53,

55;onSocrates,71,80;onThales,24,30;wroteapoem,115;Works:DeAnima,135,136;Ethics,136,140ff.;GenerationofAnimals,136;Politics,115,142,149

Assos,114Astronomy,Anaximander’s,26;Aristotle’s,126Atheism,108Athena,76Athens,59,76f.Atomism,52ff.,137Autarkeia,141

Babylonia,25Beauty,111Berr,Henri,16Body,the,inAristotle,133;inPythagoreanandPlatonicdoctrine,88

Callicles,95CausationinAristotle,122,125Cave,allegoryof,92Chanceasfirstcause,50,108Change,deniedbyParmenides,45;explainedbyAristotle,120City-states,76ff.;upheldbyPlato,78ff.Colonies,64

Coriscus,114Cornford,F.M.,2,5,10,30,37,54,117Cosmogonies,mythical,28Critias,72CriticalPhilosophy,16f.

Darwin,50Definition,70DelphicOracle,41,64Democracy,Athenian60Democritus,52ff.,62,138Dike,6f.Diken,7Dynamis,121ff.,145

EducationofPlato’srulers,92Eidos,142,145Eleatics,53Empedocles,47ff.,134,137Energeia,125,128,142Epicurus,56f.,149Erastus,114Ergon,9,102,139,146,148Eros,111Ethics,16,21;Aristotelian,139ff.;Socratic,66ff;Sophistic,63f.,65Euthyphro,71Evolutionarytheories:inAnaximander,27;inEmpedocles,50f.;modern,121;noneinAristotle,130,134Experimentalmethods,53

Fifthelement,127Fire,42f.ForeignnessoftheGreeks,3Form,contrastedwithmatter,19,24;inAristotle,117ff.;inPlato,seeIdeas;inPythagoreanism,34,37FreewillinEpicurus,56

God(seealsoTheos),inAristotle,125ff.;howrelatedtoman,146ff.;Humansoulidentifiedwith,29,43;inMilesiansystems,30,110;inPlato,110f.;Sophisticdenialof,108

Gorgias,63Grube,G.M.A.,10

Harmonia,38Harrison,Jane,143Hedonism,96ff.HellenisticPhilosophy,149Heraclitus,13,17,40ff.,81Hermeias,114,115Herodotus,25Hesiod,16Hippias,61Hippocrates,6Hitler,99

Homer,7,9,78,81,87Huxley,J.,121

Ideas,Plato’sdoctrineof,82ff.;renouncedbyAristotle,116,118f.,121,139,140Immortality,inAristotle,135f.;inPlato,88,91;inPythagoreanism,33ff.Impiety,prosecutionsfor:Anaxagoras50f.;Aristotle116;Socrates72f.Induction,71Ionians,19,22ff.;contrastedwithPythagoreans,37;withHeraclitus,42;withParmenides,45

Jowett’sPlato,5Justice(seealsoDike),102f.,105;cosmic,41

Kepler,127Kinesis,Aristotle’sconceptionof,128f.;inPlato,109Knowledge,theoryof,16;asrecollection,89f.Kosmos,35,37,51,94,100

Language,importanceforphilosophyof,4ff.Law,divineoriginof,64,77;opposedto‘nature’bySophists,95,108;reconciledwithitbyPlato,107,109LawsofNature,85Lémery,54Lesbos,115Lethe,waterof,90Leucippus,52Lévy-Bruhl,12Life-force,Milesianconceptionof,30f.Limit,importanceofinPythagoreanism,34f.Logos,inHeraclitus,13,41f.Lyceum,115f.Lycurgus,64

Magic,11Man,asmicrocosm,35f.;positioninAristotelianuniverse,141,146ff.Materialism,19,135,138;Anaxagorasnotamaterialist,51;ofDemocritus,55;Milesiansnotmaterialists,

31;Parmenidesnotamaterialist,46Mathematics,14,35ff.Matter,29;Aristotelian,119f.;contrastedwithform,19,24Medicine,38Metaphysics,15Milesianschool,22ff.Mind(seealsoNous),separatedfrommatterbyAnaxagoras,51Monism,Milesian,22ff.;refutedbyParmenides,47Monotheism,9,110Motion (see also Kinesis), Aristotle’s theory of, 122ff.; denied by Parmenides, 45; how explained by

Atomists,56f.;howexplainedbyMilesians,30f.;Plato’stheoryof,109;reintroducedbyEmpedocles,48

MotiveCause,separatedfromobjectmoved,48,51Music,14,36ff.Mysticism,77Myth,Plato’suseof,90ff.

Names,statusofinprimitivethought,12f.Narké,68Nous,(seealsoMind),98,105,128,157f.

Odyssey,6Ogden,C.K.,86Opposites,The,inAnaximander,25;inAristotle,119f.;inHeraclitus,41;inPythagoreanism,38Organon,35Orpheus,34,78Orphics,87

Parmenides,17,43ff.,48,53,55,57,58,60,123Pericles,50,52Peripatos,115PhilipII,113,114Philosophy,differswithtemperament,18f.;subdivisionsof,15ff.Physis,59,63Planets,motionof,127Plato,chh.5and6passim,8,9,22,47,58,68,71,73,111, 113, 122, 139; character of dialogues, 111;

combinedmetaphysicsandethics,17;condemnedbeliefinwitchcraft,14;opinionofAnaxagoras,52f.Works:Cratylus,12f.,19,101;Euthyphro,71;Gorgias, 95, 97, 100;Laws, 78, 108ff.;Meno, 89, 98;Parmenides,43;Phaedo,84,89,91,114,121;Phaedrus,90f.,112;Protagoras,65,97;Republic,6,7f.,78,90,92,100,101ff.;Sophist,45;Symposium,39,112

PluralistPhilosophers,47ff.Potentiality,121ff.Pragmatism,ancient,64,97Pre-logicalmentality,14ff.Predication,44f.Privation,124f.Progress,evolutionaryandemergent,121f.Prohairesis,143Protagoras,59,63f.,64f.Psyche,seeSoulPsychology,Plato’s,105ff.Purity,ritual,34Pythagoras,14,32ff.;criticizedbyHeraclitus,40Pythagoreans,13f.,22f.,32ff.;criticizedbyHeraclitus,41;influenceofonPlato,87,88

Reincarnation,33f.,88,90;deniedbyAristotle,133RelativityinDemocritus,62;inotherSophists,66;inProtagoras,63f.ReligionandtheState,76f.Richards,I.A.,86Ritter,C.,95Ross,W.D.,129

Scepticism,17,61,62f.Sensation, Aristotle’s, 136ff.; atomic theory of, 55; authority of challenged by Heraclitus, 41; by

Parmenides,46;Plato’s,137Shakespeare,quoted,39Sicily,47,113

Socrates,2,8,13,17,21,58,62,66ff.,79f.,96ff,107SocraticParadox,9Solon,16Sophistes,61Sophists,8,61ff.,69,70,72,78,94,95,97f.,99,105,107ff.Soul(seealsoImmortality,Reincarnation),asairorbreath,29f.,33;Aristotelian,132ff.;inatomism55;in

Homer,81,87;Platonic88ff.,94ff.,105ff.;asself-mover,30,109;Socraticdoctrineof,80;ofUniverse,33

Space,deniedbyParmenides,45;restoredbyAtomists,55Sparta,104Speusippus,114,115Stars,divinityof,128Stebbing,L.S.,23Stoa,149Strabo,116Sun,Anaxagoras’sopinionconcerning,50Syllogismos,128Sympathy,11f.,34

Taboos,Pythagorean,33,34Taxis,94,100Teleology,19;Aristotelian,117,121f.;Socratic,66f.Tetraktys,36Thales,24f.,30Theognis,16Theophrastus,25,115Theos,9f.Thomas,Saint,129Thrasymachus,102Thucydides,52Thurii,65Thymos,105f.Transmigrationofsouls,seeReincarnation

Unconsciousassumptions,4,10f.Universals,natureof,80,83ff.

Vacuum,motionin,55f.

Water,connexionwithlife,30;asprimarysubstance,24Whitehead,A.N.,11Wilamowitz,10Witchcraft,11f.Wordssupernaturallyexplained,13

Xenocrates,114,115

Zeus,28,65,77

TableofContentsCoverTitleCopyrightContentsFOREWORDTOTHEROUTLEDGECLASSICS1Greekwaysofthinking2Matterandform(IoniansandPythagoreans)3Theproblemofmotion(Heraclitus,Parmenidesandthepluralists)4Thereactiontowardshumanism(theSophistsandSocrates)5Plato(i)TheDoctrineofIdeas6Plato(ii)EthicalandtheologicalanswerstotheSophists7Aristotle(i)TheAristotelianuniverse8Aristotle(ii)HumanbeingsSUGGESTIONSFORFURTHERREADINGINDEX