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7104 2018
June 2018
The Hardships of Long Dis-tance Relationships: Time Zone Proximity and Knowledge Transmission within Multinational Firms Dany Bahar
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CESifo Working Papers ISSN 2364‐1428 (electronic version) Publisher and distributor: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research ‐ CESifo GmbH The international platform of Ludwigs‐Maximilians University’s Center for Economic Studies and the ifo Institute Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany Telephone +49 (0)89 2180‐2740, Telefax +49 (0)89 2180‐17845, email [email protected] Editors: Clemens Fuest, Oliver Falck, Jasmin Gröschl www.cesifo‐group.org/wp An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded ∙ from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com ∙ from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org ∙ from the CESifo website: www.CESifo‐group.org/wp
CESifo Working Paper No. 7104 Category 8: Trade Policy
The Hardships of Long Distance Relationships: Time Zone Proximity and Knowledge Transmission
Within Multinational Firms
Abstract Using a unique dataset on worldwide multinational corporations with precise location of headquarters and affiliates, I present evidence of a trade-off between distance to the headquarters and the knowledge intensity of the foreign subsidiary’s economic activity, emerging from dynamics related to the proximity-concentration hypothesis. This trade-off is strongly diminished the higher the overlap in working hours between the headquarters and its foreign subsidiary. In order to rule out biases arising from confounding factors, I implement a regression discontinuity framework to show that the economic activity of a foreign subsidiary located just across the time zone line that increases the overlap in working hours with its headquarters is, on average, about one percent higher in the knowledge intensity scale. I find no evidence of the knowledge intensity and distance trade-off weakening when a non-stop flight exists between the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary. The findings suggest that lower barriers to real-time communication within the multinational corporation play an important role in the location strategies of multinational corporations.
JEL-Codes: F230, L220, L250.
Keywords: multinational firms, multinational corporations, knowledge, location, proximity concentration hypothesis, FDI.
Dany Bahar
The Brookings Institution Harvard Center for International Development Harvard University / Cambridge / MA / USA
[email protected] http://www.danybahar.com
May 30, 2018 Previously circulated under the title “Heavier than air? Knowledge Diffusion within the Multinational Firm”. This paper benefited from helpful comments at various stages from Martin Abel, Laura Alfaro, Pol Antras, Sam Asher, Sebastian Bustos, Marcus Casey, Matias Cattaneo, Michele Coscia, Ricardo Hausmann, Elhanan Helpman, Bill Kerr, Marc Melitz, Paul Novosad, Nathan Nunn, Lant Pritchett, Krista Rasmussen, Brina Seidel, Ran Shorrer, Ernesto Stein, Stephen Yeaple, Muhammed Yildirim, Richard Zeckhauser, Oren Ziv and the participants of the XIX Dynamics in Economic Growth and International Trade conference, as well as attendants in different seminars at Harvard University, the NBER, the Inter-American Development Bank, Georgetown University and LACEA. Jean-Paul Leidenz Font and Samuel Rosenow provided excellent research assistance. I acknowledge financial support from Harvard Economics Department. All errors are my own. Download newest version: https://www.dropbox.com/s/06cdlvoh8bi2kv0/BAHAR_KnowledgeMNC.pdf?dl=0
1 IntroductionAbout fifty percent of cross-country income variation is explained by differencesin productivity.1 This begs the question: if productivity-inducing knowledgeis available in some places, why isn’t it easily transferable to others? Arrow(1969) suggests that the transmission of knowledge is difficult and costly. Thesedifficulties arise because effective knowledge transmission involves human inter-action, which cannot be fully replaced with written words, neither be embeddedin goods that can be shipped at low costs.2 A firm, as any other economicagent, faces difficulties when transferring knowledge among different divisionsand affiliates, as has been extensively explored in the literature (e.g., Oldenski,2012; Keller and Yeaple, 2013; Giroud, 2012). The ability of a multinationalfirm to transfer knowledge to its foreign affiliates, however, should depend onseveral dimensions that characterize the locations of the firm’s headquarters andits subsidiaries. This paper explores the role of time zones in reducing the costsof knowledge transmission within multinational corporations (MNCs).
This paper’s contribution to the literature is threefold. First, using a highlydetailed establishment-level worldwide dataset on MNCs I complement the ex-isting empirical evidence suggesting that costs of knowledge transmission facedby MNCs play a role in the proximity-concentration hypothesis, in particularby creating a trade-off between the level of knowledge intensity of a foreign sub-sidiary’s economic activity and the geographic distance between such subsidiaryand its global headquarters. Second, I show that this “knowledge and distancetrade-off” significantly weakens, and even disappears, the more overlap in work-ing hours there is between a foreign subsidiary and its global headquarters.Third, to rule out the role of other unobservables explaining my results, I usea regression discontinuity designed to exploit discrete spatial variation in timezones and show that foreign subsidiaries located at roughly the same distancefrom their headquarters are active in economic activities that significantly differin knowledge intensity depending on whether they are located in a time zonecloser to the headquarters or not.
The trade-off between distance and knowledge intensity cannot be explainedusing earlier frameworks that looked at the proximity-concentration hypothesisand the fragmentation of MNCs which, implicitly or explicitly, assumed zeromarginal cost or costs orthogonal to distance of transferring knowledge betweenheadquarters and subsidiaries (i.e., Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1984; Brainard,1993; Markusen et al., 1996; Markusen, 1997; Carr et al., 2001; Helpman et al.,2004; Markusen and Maskus, 2002).3 This trade-off, however, emerges in anymodel that incorporates the idea of marginal costs of transferring knowledgeincreasing in geographic distance. For example, Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare
1e.g., Hall and Jones (1999); Caselli (2005)2Knowledge that resides in human minds is usually referred to as tacit (Polanyi, 1966).
Tacit knowledge is information that cannot be easily explained, embedded or written down.3A number of empirical studies have tested the validity of these models’ predictions, but
there has been little or no emphasis on testing the assumption that knowledge transmissionis costless.
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(2013) study the gains from openness in a comprehensive model that includesboth multinational production and trade, and assume that all multinational pro-duction activity entails iceberg type efficiency losses that vary across countrypairs. This marginal cost, they assume, is an increasing function of geographicaland cultural distance. Ramondo (2014) models multinational production whereforeign subsidiaries face a combination of a variable and a fixed cost when relyingin technology or knowledge from their headquarters, capturing the idea of lim-ited span of control for the headquarters, thus generating a loss of productivityat the affiliate level. Arkolakis et al. (2013) model an economy in which coun-tries specialize either in innovation or in production. When a country specializesin innovation it implies that its firms open production subsidiaries abroad witha marginal cost that affects their productivity. These marginal costs are meantto capture various impediments that multinationals face when operating in adifferent economic, legal or social environment, as well as the various costs oftechnology transfer incurred by multinationals in different production locations.Tintelnot (2014) presents a model of multinational production in which foreignplants engage in variable costs that are determined, in part, by distance be-tween the headquarters and the location of the foreign subsidiary. Keller andYeaple (2013) provide an explanation to why the marginal cost of knowledgetransmission increases with distance by modeling such cost as shipping costs forintermediate goods embedding headquarters services.4 In their model, shippingof intermediate goods is more prevalent for subsidiaries active in knowledge in-tensive activities. My study builds on the research by Keller and Yeaple (2013),in further exploring the “distance and knowledge intensity” trade-off emergingfrom their setting studying the proximity-concentration hypothesis. In partic-ular, a contribution of this study is the finding that this “trade-off” cannot befully explained by trade costs of intermediate goods within the MNC, but alsoby a better ability of firms to communicate in real time, as measured by a head-quarters and its foreign subsidiary having more overlap in working hours (basedin their geographic location).
An interpretation of this finding is that not all knowledge can be fully em-bedded in intermediate goods. Examples of the type of knowledge that getstransferred from the headquarters to its foreign subsidiary are in the form ofmanagement, monitoring, coordination, troubleshooting, etc. which is a formof tacit knowledge: it lives on people brains and cannot be fully written downor embedded in a machine. This type of knowledge requires human interactionof some sort for its transmission, as suggested by Arrow (1969). Thus, the lossin efficiency that distant foreign affiliates face as evidenced in the literature islikely also related to the difficulties in transferring tacit knowledge (Polanyi,1962). In fact, the consensus in the existing literature on the economics ofknowledge is that the transmission of knowledge is not immediate, and thatknowledge diffusion strongly decays with distance. For instance, the paper byJaffe et al. (1993) was among the first to make this claim, showing that patent
4See Irarrazabal et al. (2013) for a similar setting which does not include the knowledgedimension.
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citations are more frequent within the same geographic area. Bottazzi and Peri(2003) followed up using European data. Along the same lines, Keller (2002)showed that knowledge spillovers decrease with distance by looking at produc-tivity changes as explained by foreign R&D investment. He documents that thehalf-life of such spillovers is 1200Km. More recently, Bahar et al. (2014) showthat a country is 65% more likely to add a new product to its export basketwhenever a geographic neighbor is a successful exporter of the same good, afinding that is attributed to the local character of knowledge diffusion. Ba-har and Rapoport (2018), consistently with the idea that the transmission oftacit knowledge requires human interaction,show that migrants are an impor-tant driver of knowledge diffusion across nations.5 In the context of MNCs, ithas also been shown that more complicated tasks require more time and effortfor coordination and monitoring, and this becomes much more difficult at longerdistances (e.g., Gumpert, 2015).
The empirical exercise in this paper is based on a sample of about 55000domestic and 25000 foreign horizontal subsidiaries belonging to over 2000 MNCsfrom the Worldbase dataset by Dun & Bradstreet.6 For the most part, I focusmy attention on MNCs active in the manufacturing sector that have horizontallyexpanded into foreign countries. For each one of the foreign subsidiaries in thesample I have information on their physical location and primary economicactivity, as defined by the 1987 Standard Industry Classification (SIC).
After computing precise distances between each foreign affiliate and its MNCglobal headquarters following a geocoding process using Google Maps, I docu-ment a negative partial correlation between knowledge intensity and the distancebetween a headquarters and its foreign subsidiaries (after including a number ofcontrols that would account for other possible explanations). For example, ev-erything else equals, the estimation in the paper implies that an American MNCheadquartered in Houston in Texas would locate a meat packing subsidiary –aneconomic activity with low knowledge intensity levels– in Kabul in Afghanistan(approximately 12000Km away from the headquarters) and a semiconductorplant –an economic activity with high levels of knowledge intensity– in Ireland(at approximately 7000Km of distance from the headquarters). A novel sourceof variation in this empirical exercise is a industry-level knowledge intensitymeasure that I construct based worker-level characteristics in each industry, asopposed traditional measures that rely on balance-sheet data. The measuresaim to capture the tacit knowledge intensity of an economic activity by averag-ing the accumulated experience and training of the workforce of such industry,using occupational characteristics defined in the O*NET project dataset.7
5See Keller (2004) for a review of this literature.6The dataset was privately acquired from D&B and is not publicly accessible. It has been
previously used in the literature by Lipsey (1978), and more recently by Black and Strahan(2002); Harrison et al. (2004); Acemoglu et al. (2009); Alfaro and Charlton (2009); Alfaro andChen (2012) and Alfaro et al. (2015).
7Previous studies have also used the O*NET database to construct industry level mea-sures. For example, Oldenski (2012) measures the importance of communication with theheadquarters and importance of the communication with the customer, for each industry.Costinot et al. (2011) uses O*NET to create an industry level measure of task routine-ness
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I then use a number of measures that ease the transmission of knowledge byenhancing communication and monitoring between a MNC’s headquarters andits foreign subsidiaries. First, the existence of a non-stop flight between airportslocated within 100Km of both the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary. Sec-ond, the number of overlapping working hours in a business day between thelocations of both the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary. I then show bothdescriptively and using a regression discontinuity design that the “knowledge-intensity and distance” trade-off is weakened when there is a larger overlap inworking hours between the foreign subsidiary and the headquarters. Thus, thecost of shipping intermediate goods, which would be just as relevant withinthe same time zone (because north-south shipping is equally as expensive aseast-west shipping), is not enough to explain the fact that MNCs tend to locatetheir foreign subsidiaries active in knowledge intensive geographically nearby,as suggested by Keller and Yeaple (2013).
Overall, the results in this paper suggests that tacit knowledge plays isan important determinant of the concentration-proximity hypothesis, and inparticular, the knowledge and distance trade-off that emerges from it. Thesefindings have larger implications for a number of yet-unanswered questions ineconomics. For instance, high barriers to knowledge transmission may explainpersistent differences in productivity levels between countries and the divergenceof their incomes over time (e.g., Pritchett 1997, Hall and Jones 1999), becauseproductivity-inducing knowledge does not diffuse easily.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 describes the datasetand the construction of relevant variables. Section 3 presents descriptive evi-dence documenting, among other results, the distance and knowledge intensitytrade-off that arises from the proximity-concentration hypothesis. Section 4explores how the variables measuring the ease of communication between a for-eign subsidiary and its headquarters (i.e., existence of a non-stop flight and theoverlap in working hours) affects the aforementioned trade-off. Section 4 alsoimplements a regression discontinuity design to estimate whether knowledgeintensity significantly differs with changes in time zones that facilitate commu-nication with the headquarters. Section 5 concludes and addresses areas forfuture research regarding the role of tacit knowledge in economic activity.
2 Data and Definitions of Variables
2.1 Worldbase dataset by Dun & BradstreetI use the Worldbase dataset by Dun & Bradstreet (acquired in May 2012) asthe main data source for the empirical exercise. The dataset has informationon more than one hundred million establishments worldwide with data fromyear 2012. Each establishment is uniquely identified and linked to its global
for 77 sectors. Keller and Yeaple (2013) also present results making use of knowledge inten-sity variables constructed with O*NET in their Appendix. Autor et al. (2003) use O*NETpredecessor, DOT, to construct measures for routine and non-routine tasks.
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headquarters (referred to as the “global ultimate”). For this study I focus onforeign plants engaged in manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000 to 3999)owned by MNCs. As suggested by Caves (1971), an MNC is “an enterprise thatcontrols and manages production establishments – plants – located in at leasttwo countries.”8
The sample obtained from the dataset includes about 55 thousand domesticand 25 thousand foreign horizontal subsidiaries of MNCs scattered active in themanufacturing sector in over 100 countries, which report to over 2000 MNCs.9For the analysis, I will use the reported main SIC code as the only indicatorof a plant’s economic activity. There are about 450 unique SIC 4-digit codes(in manufacturing) reported by subsidiaries as their main economic activity inthe dataset. The sample I use is significantly smaller than the overall Dun &Bradstreet dataset (which originally has over 124 million establishments) forseveral reasons. First, I only include subsidiaries of multinational corporations:that in itself reduces the sample to be about 9 percent of the original dataset.Second, I only use manufacturing subsidiaries, which is a much smaller share theuniverse of subsidiaries. I limit the sample to subsidiaries in the manufacturingsector, which significantly reduces the sample further, also to about 9 percentof the subsidiaries that are part of a MNC (as known, most of the MNCs are inthe service sector, as shown too by Alfaro and Charlton (2009)). Further, thesample has all the domestic subsidiaries but the foreign ones are limited to onlythose that can be classified as a foreign horizontal expansion (as I explain innext subsection). Also, from Alfaro and Charlton (2009) we know that this is asmall share of all subsidiaries. Hence, we end up with a relatively small samplegiven the initial size of the dataset.
In order to obtain the precise location of each plant I geocode the datasetusing Google Maps Geocoding API to find the exact latitude and longitude of itsheadquarters and each one of its foreign subsidiaries. With this I computed theexact distance between each headquarters and its foreign subsidiaries. Figure1 maps the unique locations of all foreign subsidiaries (dots) and headquarters(triangles) in the sample.
[Figure 1 about here.]
For instance, Figure 2 shows the headquarters and subsidiaries of an Amer-ican car manufacturing multinational firm. The firm, headquartered in the US,has a number of foreign subsidiaries on different continents. The lines originat-ing from the headquarters represent the geographic distance to each subsidiary.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Online Appendix Section B discusses this dataset more in detail.8I exclude MNCs for which 99% of their subsidiaries or employees are in the home country,
besides them having plants in two or more countries. This drops a small number of ChineseMNCs with one or two subsidiaries in Hong Kong and the rest in China.
9I performed on the dataset an algorithm that would group multinationals not only basedon their assigned number, but also on their names when the differences are small (e.g., SonyCorporation vs. Sony Corp).
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2.2 Main Variables Definitions2.2.1 Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary
For the plant-level dataset I define a foreign subsidiary as a horizontal expansionbased on its SIC code vis-à-vis all the SIC codes reported by the firm, in allof its domestic subsidiaries in the home country. This resolves the data issuesthat arise when the economic activity of the headquarters does not necessar-ily represent the main business of the firm. For instance, in the dataset, theheadquarters of a well known worldwide multinational in the cosmetic world isdefined under SIC code 6719 (“holding company”). However, many of its do-mestic subsidiaries are classified under SIC code 2844 (perfumes, cosmetics, andother toiletries), which would be a more natural classification for the firm as awhole. Hence, by limiting the definitions to the global ultimate’s SIC categoryonly, horizontal relationships would be underestimated.
In the sample, 32% of subsidiaries are foreign horizontal. Similarly to Alfaroand Charlton (2009), I find that some horizontal foreign affiliates also classifyas vertical (both downstream and upstream).10 I keep these observations in thesample, and allow in every empirical specification for a different constant forthese types of subsidiaries by adding the proper dummy variables.
2.2.2 Knowledge Intensity Measures
In order to estimate the knowledge intensity of industries I create a new mea-sure that aims to capture the tacit knowledge intensity for each industry. Themeasures use data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) fromthe Bureau of Labor Statistics,11 and occupational profiles compiled by theOccupational Information Network (O*NET) project.12 OES breaks down thecomposition of occupations for each industry code,13 based on a list of about 800occupations. These occupations can be linked to occupational profiles generatedby O*NET, which includes results from a large number of survey questions onthe characteristics of each occupation.
The relevant questions in the survey that capture the learning component ofthe workers, as mentioned above, are the ones related to experience and training.The exact form of the questions from O*NET are:
10I follow Alfaro and Charlton (2009) methodology of using the US input-output tables todefine vertical relations. Online Appendix Section B.3 expands on this discussion.
11Data from 2011, downloadable from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/oes/oesm11in4.zip12O*NET is the successor of the US Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occu-
pational Titles (DOT). I use the O*NET database version 17, downloadable fromhttp://www.onetcenter.org/download/database?d=db_17_0.zip. Costinot et al. (2011) alsouse O*NET to create an industry level measure of task routineness for 77 sectors. Keller andYeaple (2013) also present results making use of knowledge intensity variables constructedwith O*NET in the Appendix.
13I used Pierce and Schott (2012) concordance tables to convert industrycodes from NAICS to 1987 SIC. The concordance table is downloadable fromhttp://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/files/research/ data/appendix_files_20111004.zip.
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• How much related experience (in months) would be required to be hiredto perform this job?
• How much “on-site” or “in-plant” training (in months) would be requiredto be hired to perform this job?
• How much “on-the-job” training (in months) would be required to be hiredto perform this job?
Using these questions I generate the main knowledge intensity measure that Iwill be using in the empirical analysis section. The measure, which I refer to itas “Experience plus training” throughout the paper, is constructed by measuringthe (wage-weighted) average months of experience plus on-site and on-the-jobtraining required to work in each industry. In particular, for each sector sknowledge intensity is defined as:
KIi =∑o
ωo,icumexpo
Where cumexpo is the sum of experience and training associated to occupa-tion o, ωi,o is the weight of occupation o in industry i, measured by either shareof employment or wage. Naturally, we have that
∑o ωo,i = 1 for every i. While
I use within-sector wage share to define ωo,i, the results are robust to using thewithin-sector employment share instead.
Using this measures, manufacturing industries ranking highly are computerrelated (SIC 3573, 3571 and 3572), communications equipment (SIC 3669, 3663and 3661) and electronics and semiconductors (SIC 3672, 3674 and 3676). Sincethese measures are based on US data only, I will assume the US ranking in theknowledge intensity of industries proxies that of the rest of the world.
Online Appendix Section C provides a discussion on these measures andcompares them to other commonly used measures in the literature that proxyfor knowledge intensity at the firm level, such as R&D share of expenditures.The O*NET based measures overcome important shortcomings associated withother prevalent measures used in the literature. Their distribution is smoother,they do not rely on a sampling of firms, and they use the same standardizedinputs for all industries. Hence, I use these indicators as the main proxies forknowledge intensity throughout the paper.
2.2.3 Unit shipping costs
Unit shipping costs for SIC manufacturing industries are computed using datafrom Bernard et al. (2006).14 This industry-level measure aims to proxy theunit shipping cost variable (referred to as t in the theoretical framework inOnline Appendix Section A), which accounts for how costly it is to transportone unit of that good irrespective of industry. For instance, goods with the
14Downloadable from http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/files/research/data/xm_sic87_72_105_20120424.zip
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highest unit shipping costs in the dataset include ready-mixed concrete and ice,which require special forms of transportation.
The variable measures the amount of US dollars required to transport 1$worth of a good per every 100Km. It is computed by averaging the same measureper industry across all countries exporting to the US in year 2005. To deal withlong tails, this variable will be used in a logarithmic scale in all the differentempirical specifications.
Unit shipping cost figures correlate negatively with the knowledge intensitymeasures, with a correlation coefficient of about -0.6.
2.2.4 Country levels controls
In some specifications I use country level controls such as income per capitafrom the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. In addition, I also ofteninclude data on conventionally measured factors of production (stock of physicalcapital, human capital and land) from UNCTAD (Shirotori et al., 2010).
2.2.5 Ease of communication proxies
In order to proxy for the ease of communication between a subsidiary and itsheadquarters, I use two variables: non-stop flights and working hours overlap.
The first variable is used because the existence of non-stop flights wouldproxy for the ease of managers and workers to do more frequent business trips,given the convenience of a direct flight. Business trips, by allowing face-to-face interaction, would facilitate the transmission of tacit knowledge. However,it is important to note that business trips, even if convenient, happen muchless often than phone calls due to the elevated costs associated with them. Inorder to compute the existence of a non-stop air route between a headquartersand its subsidiary, I matched all the existing airports within a 100Km radius(conditional on being in the same country), using the geocoded latitude andlongitude. The data for airports (with their respective coordinates) and activeair routes come from the OAG Flights15 Through this matching I create adummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there is a non-stop flight betweenthe headquarters and its subsidiary.
The second variable, overlap in working hours, aims to capture the “real-time” communication ability between managers and workers in the two plants.Being in the same time zone allows workers to use phone or videoconferencecommunication more frequently (substituting partially for means such as fax oremail). This allows for better transmission of tacit knowledge, which is valuablefor troubleshooting or crisis solving. In order to compute the overlap in workinghours I use the geocoded longitude of each subsidiary to find its time zone, andcompare it to that of its headquarters. Assuming that working hours run from8:00am to 6:00pm (10 hours in total), the variable measures, for a single day, thenumber of hours that overlap in the working schedule of both the headquartersand its subsidiary.
15The dataset was privately acquired in January 2015.
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3 Descriptive evidenceIn this section I use the global character of the dataset and the "tacit" knowledgeintensity measures to estimate two results already established (either empiricallyor theoretically) in the literature based on the existence of marginal costs totransfer knowledge within the MNC (e.g., costs of monitoring, communicating,traveling, etc.). First, that a MNC is less likely to horizontally expand into aforeign destination the more knowledge intensive is the economic activity underconsideration (as shown by Keller and Yeaple (2013) using American MNCs).Second, that conditional on horizontal expansion, there is a trade-off betweenthe knowledge intensity level of the foreign subsidiaries’ economic activity andtheir geographical distance to the headquarters, consistently with what recentframeworks show (e.g., Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare, 2013; Arkolakis et al.,2013; Keller and Yeaple, 2013; Ramondo, 2014; Tintelnot, 2014).
Table 1 provides some descriptive details about the used sample, in terms ofthe distribution of foreign affiliates across regions of the world and developingvs. developed countries. This sample includes domestic subsidiaries and foreignsubsidiaries that replicate production abroad (i.e. an horizontal expansion). Inparticular, a foreign subsidiary is included when it reports being active in anindustry (a SIC 4 digit code) for which the MNC has one domestic subsidiaryalso active in.16 In total, the sample includes 84,881 subsidiaries that are owedby 2030 MNCs. About 32% of these subsidiaries are foreign. The table alsoincludes the knowledge intensity variable measured in standard deviations fromthe mean (denoted by KI), averaged over domestic and over foreign subsidiaries.The last column presents the difference, with stars denoting the correspondentp-value level.
[Table 1 about here.]
On average, industries of the foreign subsidiaries are less knowledge-intensivethan the industries manufactured by their domestic counterparts. The samepattern holds for all presented cuts of the data, besides for few firms based onnon-OECD countries, though the difference is not statistically significant. InWestern Europe, however, it seems like the pattern is inverted. Beyond thepurely descriptive statistics shown in 1 I use plant-level data to estimate thefollowing specification, in an effort to rule out possible confounding factors:
Foreignh,s = βk · log(ks) + βt · log(ts) + controlss + ϕh + eh,s (1)
Where s indexes a subsidiary and h its headquarters. The independent vari-able is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the subsidiary is a foreign horizontalaffiliate of the firm and 0 if it is a domestic one. ks is a measure of knowledgeintensity of the economic activity (i.e., the manufactured good or product) ofthe foreign subsidiary. ts is the unit shipping cost for the good manufacturedin the foreign subsidiary. controlss is a vector of variables that control for the
16See Appendix Section B.3 for further explanation on this definition
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size of the market and factor endowments of the country hosting the foreignsubsidiary which aims to controls for aggregate demand and cost of producing(understanding the limitation of this approach makes this exercise suggestive,rather than definitive).17 I also include terms to control for whether such foreignhorizontal subsidiary also classifies as vertical, either through a downstream orupstream linkage to one of the industries produced domestically by the MNC,allowing for a different constant term for those particular cases.18 eh,s is the er-ror term. In particular, the idea of this test is to find out whether MNC are lesslikely to expand internationally their knowledge intensive activities, as a proxyto for worse performance relative to exports (with the proper caveats discussedabove).
Using plant-level data provides an additional degree of identification. Thatis, by adding ϕh, which represents MNC fixed effects, we can control, for ex-ample, for the overall productivity level of the MNC. Thus, the results arewithin-MNC, implying that the partial correlation estimated in βk is indepen-dent of the aggregate productivity level of the MNCs, but only on the economicactivity the affiliate is engaged in. It also implies that the comparison is betweendifferent subsidiaries active in more or less knowledge intensity activities, withinthe same MNC. At this point it is worth mentioning that subsidiaries withina single MNC might differ in their economic activity, thus allowing for within-firm variation in the right hand side variables of the empirical specification (seeFigure B4 in the Appendix).
Some specifications will also include the term ηs which represents a hostcountry fixed effect (i.e. the country where the affiliate is located);19 and inseparate specifications, the term ηs× θP which represents a fixed effect for hostcountry and 2-digit SIC code (denoted by P ) combination. The ηs × θP set offixed effects will be included to control for issues such as intellectual propertyregulation, aggregate costs and aggregate demand to the extent they vary atthe 2-digit industry level. When both ϕh and ηs are used in the estimation, Iexclude the controls defined at the level of the countries of both the headquartersand foreign subsidiary, given multicollinearity.
Before presenting the results it is important to discuss the relevance andinterpretation of this particular estimation. In a sense, this estimation aims toestimate whether the level of knowledge intensity of an economic activity playsa role in the proximity-concentration hypothesis. In other words, if knowledgeintensive activities are less likely to be expanded horizontally, then this is sug-gestive evidence that costs associated with the transmission of knowledge are an
17These variables include measures of factor endowments between in the subsidiary countriesas well as income per capita.
18As explained in Section 2.2.1, about 32% of those subsidiaries classified as horizontalwould also clarify as vertical according to the Alfaro and Charlton (2009) "5-cents" rulein the input-output relationship. See Appendix Section B.3 for further explanation on thisdefinition. By adding these variables as dummies, we allow for a different constant for theseparticular subsidiaries.
19I slightly abuse from notation when using ηs, which refers to a fixed effect for the hostcountry of the subsidiary, and not for the subsidiary s. I believe this is less confusing thanusing a new index for the country of the subsidiary.
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element driving such trade-off, consistently with others studies –some of themmentioned above– which find a similar result in other contexts. Yet, we alsomust acknowledge the limitations of this estimation: first and foremost, the ab-sence of exports by each MNC-product combination to particular destinations.Without this, it is very difficult to say something precise about the proximity-concentration trade-off, because it is impossible to know whether the lack ofhorizontal expansion is happening in a place where the same product is beingexported to. Thus, given the limitations, I defer to this descriptive exercisewhich aims to shed light on whether there is a differential pattern in terms ofhorizontal foreign expansion with respect to knowledge intensity.20 The resultsare presented in Table 2. The table uses the experience plus training measurediscussed above as a proxy for k.
[Table 2 about here.]
Column 1 presents the preferred specification, which controls for trade unitcosts and all the country pair variables. The results suggest that, everything elseequal, industries for which their knowledge intensity is 10% higher are about 1.6percentage points less likely to be replicated abroad. For instance, according tothis estimation, semiconductors (SIC 3674), which is characterized by havingworkers with an average of over 80 months of required experience plus training,is about 12 percentage points -or 21%- less likely to be replicated abroad than ameat packing plant (SIC 2011), which its workers have, on average, 37 monthsof experience plus training.
The endowment controls suggest that international expansion is more likelyin countries that are richer but smaller. It also suggests that it is less likely incountries that are capital abundant and that have high levels of human capital,two variables that typically correlate with higher wages. The estimates for up-stream and downstream linkage industries are positive and significant, thoughbesides allowing for a different constant, their interpretation is not straightfor-ward. Finally, it is important to mention that the point estimate for the tradecost variable is negative, though not statistically significant. However, we wouldhave expected a positive estimate according to the proximity-concentration hy-pothesis. Yet, it is important to notice that this unexpected result is probablydue to the inclusion of multinational fixed effects, given that most of the vari-ation of the trade cost variable is across MNCs and not within. Thus, theinclusion of MNCs fixed effects comes at the price of losing the ability to ex-ploit the variation of this variable. Alternative standardizations of the tradecost variable often provide positive point estimates, though still statisticallyinsignificant. I discuss this particular result in detail later on.
Consistent with the idea that the transmission of knowledge plays a role inthe proximity-concentration hypothesis, the estimator for βk is negative and ro-bust across all specifications. The inclusion of host country fixed effects denoted
20An alternative approach would be to “fill” with zeros for each country-product combinationwhere there is no horizontal expansion, but this implies assuming that there is (equal) demandeverywhere, which is a very strong assumption.
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by ηs in Column 3 rules out other potential channels that could be driving theresults. For instance, poor intellectual property regulation in different coun-tries.21 Column 4 includes a more strict control: parent industry (2-digit),denoted by P , interacted with host country fixed effects, ηs × θP , to allow fordifferential policies at the country level for different types of industries. Notethat in columns 2 and 3 we exclude the country level controls due to high mul-ticollinearity. Overall, the estimate of βk is robust to the inclusion of theseadditional controls in terms of its magnitude, negative sign and its statisticalsignificance.22
The second implication of the existence of marginal costs of transferringknowledge within the MNC are that foreign affiliates locate in closer geographicproximity to the headquarters the more intensive in knowledge their main eco-nomic activity is (assuming these costs are increasing in distance). To answerthis question I restrict the dataset to only existing foreign subsidiaries, leavingabout 25 thousand subsidiaries in the sample (i.e. I exclude observations whichcorrespond to a domestic subsidiary of the MNC). Table 3 presents summarystatistics for this foreign subsidiaries, including the geographic distance in be-tween the headquarters and the subsidiary itself, the knowledge intensive andunit shipping cost values as well as other control variables. For instance, the av-erage distance between a headquarters and its foreign subsidiary in the sampleis about 8.2 in logs (in levels, it corresponds to about 5600 Km). The table alsopresents the average knowledge intensity for economic activity of the foreignsubsidiary, as well as the corresponding unit shipping cost (which distributesbetween 0 and 1, and thus its logarithmic transformation is always negative).As explained above, some of the foreign subsidiaries that classify as horizontal,also classify as vertical (both downstream and/or upstream), and thus in allthe specifications I allow for a different constant term by adding dummies forthese foreign subsidiaries. In particular 29% (15.3%) of the horizontal foreignsubsidiaries are in an economic activity that could be upstream (downstream)to the economic activities of the domestic subsidiaries. There is an overlap be-tween the two, so in total, about 30% of the foreign subsidiaries would classifyas horizontal and vertical (either upstream or downstream). The lower panelinclude summary statistics for variables that measure the ease of communica-tion between the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary, which will be used inthe next subsection. For instance, about 33% of the headquarters and foreignsubsidiary pairs have a non-stop route between their nearby airports.23 Thetable also shows that, on average, there are almost 7 working overlapping hoursbetween a headquarters and its subsidiary.
21Results are robust to excluding China from the sample, alleviatng possible concerns givenbiases its inclusion might generate in the estimations due lack of enforcement with respect tointellectual property rights.
22This exercise is similar to the one by Keller and Yeaple (2013), though not quite, as itdoes not control for local demand in the foreign location. In Online Appendix Section D,however, I estimate the same relationship as in Keller and Yeaple (2013) using aggregateddata on exports and sales of foreign affiliates of US companies by industry, making use of theknowledge intensity measures I constructed.
23Using 2012 data, the same year the Dun and Bradstreet data is representative of.
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[Table 3 about here.]
Figure 3 show graphic results suggesting the existence of a trade-off betweendistance to the headquarters and knowledge intensity of the economic activ-ity of the foreign subsidiary. It plots the estimation of βk using the followingspecification:
log(dh,s) = βk · log(ks) + βt · log(ts) + ϕh + eh,s (2)
Where s indexes a subsidiary and h its headquarters. The left hand sidevariable, log(dh,s) is the logarithmic transformation of the geographic distancebetween the location of the headquarters and that of the foreign subsidiary.The right hand side includes the log of knowledge intensity associated to theeconomic activity of the subsidiary (denoted by ks), the log unit shipping cost(ts), as well MNC fixed effects. We would expect βk < 0: foreign subsidiarieswill tend to be closer the more knowledge intensive they are (given that thetransmission of knowledge is increasing in distance). Note that the inclusion ofMNC fixed effects, imply that the exploited variation within firm.
The results are indicative of the trade-off between distance (d) and knowl-edge intensity (k). In fact, according to the estimation, for every 10% increase inthe knowledge intensity scale, a foreign subsidiary is about 5% closer in distanceto the headquarters.24 In practice, the results suggest that, roughly, an Ameri-can MNC headquartered in the Houston, Texas would locate its low knowledgeintensive activity, say a meat packing subsidiary, in Kabul, Afghanistan (ap-proximately, 12000Km), while a high knowledge intensive activity, for example,a semiconductor plant, would be located in a place that is about 40% closer, so,for instance, in Ireland (approximately 7000km distance), ceteris paribus.
[Figure 3 about here.]
To avoid any misunderstanding coming from using the term “knowledge anddistance trade-off”, an explanation is in place. The term refers to the findingthat –conditional on foreign expansion– MNCs tend to locate their foreign sub-sidiaries active in knowledge intensive activities closer to the headquarters thanthose active in less knowledge intensive activities. This result is an extension ofthe traditional proximity-concentration hypothesis in the presence of marginalcosts of transferring knowledge within the MNC that increase in distance. Thus,in a way, the result is could be interpreted as part of the proximity-concentrationhypothesis.
24Allowing for a more flexible fit, such as a quadratic one, suggests that the estimatedquadratic relationship does not seem to be monotonically decreasing for the lower values ofknowledge intensity (although a flat or even negative slope in that area cannot be rejectedin the data either). However, and perhaps more importantly, for higher levels of knowledgeintensity there is a clear negative relationship with distance. This result is qualitatively im-portant, given that it would be consistent with the idea that distance appears to matter muchmore for higher levels of knowledge intensity. Intuitively, this means that after certain levelof knowledge intensity, the more sophisticated products are the closer the foreign subsidiarieswill be located to the headquarters. Results of this exercise are available upon request.
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4 The distance-knowledge trade-off and the easeof communication
With this evidence in hand, it might be difficult to attribute the documentedtrade-off between k and d to the somewhat abstract idea of marginal costs oftransferring knowledge. The empirical results might be driven by factors otherthan knowledge not accounted for, in the presence of omitted variable bias.A conventional explanation in the literature would be that knowledge intensivesectors are associated with higher intra-firm trade of intermediate goods, makingit less profitable to locate those plants in far away locations (Keller and Yeaple,2013; Irarrazabal et al., 2013). Keller and Yeaple (2013), in particular, assumein their model that knowledge can be fully embedded in intermediate goods,that are in turn shipped to remote locations.
However, this assumption might not be proper for all type of knowledge.Tacit knowledge cannot be, by definition, embedded in intermediate goods. Forinstance, transmission of tacit knowledge within the firm could involve costs ofmonitoring by the management in the headquarters or also real-time problemsolving efforts by the chief engineering team dealing with the foreign team incertain manufacturing processes. Distance would play an important role in thismatter: business travel, for instance, or the ability to work in teams in realtime (through phone, video conferences, etc.) would be critical for industrieswhere monitoring and work across borders is prevalent. Thus, it could well bethat it is the cost of transmitting this type of knowledge which partly drives thedocumented relationship, and not the shipping of intermediate goods.
I perform a test that aims to disentangle between both explanations. If thecost of transferring knowledge is indeed an increasing function of distance -asargued- and thus, a determinant in the location decisions of firms, then easiercommunication between headquarters and subsidiaries would work as a cost-reducing mechanism for the purpose of transmitting knowledge. This would behard to explain with the intra-firm trade mechanism, given that arguably theease of communication is orthogonal to the transportation costs of intermediategoods.
I test for this hypothesis by re-estimating specification (2), this time includ-ing variables that proxy for the ease of communication within the firm, ofteninteracting them with the knowledge intensity covariate. These variables, allmeasured for each subsidiary and its headquarters, are (1) the existence of acommercial non-stop air route (between airports close to the headquarters andthe foreign subsidiary, measured as being within 100Km and within the countryborders), and (2) the number of overlapping working hours in a business day(see Section 2.2.5 above for more details on the construction of these variables).
The purpose of utilizing these variables is to proxy for forms of commu-nication that allow for the transmission of knowledge, though they are quitedifferent between themselves. As explained above, business travel provides theopportunity to work face-to-face, though it occurs with less frequency, given thehigh costs of traveling. In this context, Giroud (2012) has shown that the exis-
15
tence of commercial air routes between subsidiaries and headquarters positivelyaffects the profitability of the former. Being in the same time zone allows forconvenient real-time, day-to-day, communication, significantly reducing wait-ing time between the two ends for problem solving or consulting about specifictasks. Stein and Daude (2007), for instance, find that time zone is an importantdeterminant of aggregate FDI flows, which they attribute to better monitoring.
The results are presented in Table 4. All columns use the experience plustraining indicator to proxy for k. Columns 1 and 2 present result using the ex-istence of a non-stop flight between the headquarters and the foreign subsidiary,while Columns 3 and 4 present results using the overlap in working hours be-tween the foreign subsidiary and its global headquarters (the value goes from 0to 10).
[Table 4 about here.]
First, across all specifications, the estimates for βk are negative and statis-tically significant, signaling that the trade-off between distance and knowledgeintensity remains there, on average.25 Column 1 shows that neither the dummyvariable measuring the existence of a non-stop flight in between the headquar-ters and its foreign subsidiary, nor its interaction with the knowledge intensitymeasure are statistically different from zero. In fact, the estimate of βk is notvery different than the one estimated and plotted in Figure 3. Column 2 repeatsthe exercise including a fixed effect for the country of the foreign subsidiary, andthus the variables controlling for factor endowments in those countries are ex-cluded. The results, however, are robust to this inclusion, yet they are harderto interpret because of the variation left on the dependent variable after bothfixed effects being added simultaneously.26
Columns 3 and 4 show a different result when focusing on overlap in workinghours as a measure of ease in communication between the headquarters andthe foreign subsidiary. In fact, there the estimate for βk becomes significantlylarger maintaining its negative sign, implying that when there are no overlapin working hours, the distance and knowledge intensity trade-off becomes muchmore pronounced. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the interaction
25All specifications control for the trade unit costs, and the estimator for βt is not signifi-cantly different from zero. While we would have expected a positive point estimate, the resultsare not surprising as we only exploit the within MNC variation. The other controls implythat distance from headquarters to foreign affiliate correlates positively with both populationand human capital levels and negatively with capital per worker levels of the foreign affiliate’shost country. It is not straightforward to interpret these numbers beyond their role as con-trol, but one possible interpretation in this context is that higher level of human capital in theaffiliate’s country correlates with better local management, and thus the cost of transferringknowledge is reduced, allowing for more distant subsidiaries. Larger population and lowerlevels of capital per workers is correlated with lower wages, too, which might play a role inlocating subsidiaries in more distant locations. The estimate for upstream and downstreamlinkages dummy variables do not statistically differ from zero, and the results are robust totheir exclusion.
26In part this is the reason I don’t report results that include the ηs × θP fixed effects as inprevious tables. The results, however, are robust to the inclusion of this additional control.
16
term appears to be positive and statistically significant, implying that the trade-off weakens the more overlap in working hours. It is also worth noting thatacross all specifications the ease of communication coefficients are estimated tobe negative, and this is simply because the longer the distance between thesetwo countries, these variables tend to be smaller (i.e. less working hours overlap,less non-stop flights).
These findings are insightful on their own. The results suggest that being inthe same time zone seems to facilitate the transmission of knowledge. The abil-ity of managers in the headquarters to communicate with colleagues in foreignlocations, for troubleshooting or consulting on an open-ended range of issues,is more efficient when communication happens in real time, without long wait-ing times. This might be even more relevant for transmitting tacit knowledge,given that complicated problems would require real-time interaction, and notjust explanations being sent through fax or email. Furthermore, this logic couldalso serve as an example for arguing that the barriers of transmitting knowl-edge is increasing with distance: managers and workers in the headquartersmight require working extra hours to communicate with their peers in foreignsubsidiaries, incurring additional compensation and operational costs.
Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of the distance and knowledgeintensity trade-off for different the different possible values that define the over-lap in working hours between the foreign subsidiary and its headquarters. Theleft panel plots the estimated slope of such trade-off as a function of overlapin working hours. When the overlap is 0, the slope of the trade-off is highlynegative. As the overlap becomes larger, the trade-off weakens and even dis-appears. The right panel, plots the trade-off for different values of overlap inworking hours (normalizing the log(k) to be zero at its smallest value of the dis-tribution, for comparison purposes), showing that the trade-off is even slightlypositive when there are 10 hours of overlap between the two locations. Sim-ply put, this result implies that the cost of shipping intermediate goods, whichwould be just as relevant within the same time zone (because north-south ship-ping is equally as expensive as east-west shipping) is not enough to explain thefact that MNCs tend to locate their foreign subsidiaries active in knowledgeintensive geographically nearby.
[Figure 4 about here.]
A regression discontinuity design to study the role of timezonesIn order to rule out biases arising from confounding factors, I implement aregression discontinuity framework exploiting the fact that time zones vary dis-cretely with distance. By doing so, I effectively compare the knowledge intensityof foreign subsidiaries that belong to the same MNC but that are on differentsides of a time zone line.27 To the best of my knowledge, using a regression
27I refrain from presenting results using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design using theexistence of a non-stop flight based on the work by Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2016),
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discontinuity design exploiting time zone differences is novel in the context ofinternational economics, and in particular, when studying patterns of behaviorof multinational corporations.
As a first step it is important to define the running variable centered aroundeach time zone line: it corresponds to the distance (in kilometers) from everyforeign subsidiary to the nearest time zone line. A MNC will often have foreignsubsidiaries in located in time zones that are both eastwards and westwardsrelative to the headquarters location. Our "treatment" in this setting is beingin a time zone that allows for a higher overlap in working hours between theheadquarters and the subsidiary. Figure 5 clarifies how the running variable isdefined and normalized using an hypothetical example. For instance, foreignsubsidiaries 1 and 2 are located east of their headquarters’ location, while sub-sidiaries 3 and 4 are located west of it. The running variable is based on thedistance from each one of these subsidiaries to the nearest time zone line. Inthat sense, because foreign subsidiary 1 is located on the side of the line clos-est to the headquarters (e.g., higher overlap in working hours), its distance ismarked as positive. On the other hand, since foreign subsidiary 2 is located onother side of the line, then the running variable in that area is negative. Sameconcept applies to the running variable for foreign subsidiaries 3 and 4.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Each observation in the sample corresponds to a foreign subsidiary, and thusthe "treatment" can be defined as being in a closer time zone to its headquar-ters. Each headquarters, of course, has several foreign subsidiaries that are nearseveral distinct time zone lines. Thus, in this setting it is very important tomake sure that the regression discontinuity design it is indeed comparing for-eign subsidiaries that belong to the same MNC and at the same time, that arenear the same time zone line to one side or the other. Thus, I estimate thefollowing specification:
log(kh,s) = βTZcloserTZh,s,tz + distTZlineh,s,tz+ (3)closerTZh,s,tz × distTZlineh,s,tz + ϕh + τtz + eh,s
Where h is a subscript for each MNC, s represents a subsidiary and tzrepresents a time zone line which is the nearest one to subsidiary s. log(kh,s) isthe knowledge intensity of the economic activity of the foreign subsidiary. Thevariable is a dummy which is defined as closerTZh,s,tz = 1{distTZlineh,s,tz >
who show that the likelihood of having a non-stop flight is experiences a jump at the 6000miles (or 9600 kilometers) of distance. The reason not to present those results are twofold.First, the exercise shown in Table 4 finds no results when including a non-stop flight as an easeof communication variable. Second, while the reduced form (using the 6000 mile threshold)shows results consistent with what expected (e.g., observations just below the threshold aremore knowledge intensive than those just above it), the results are not robust when using thenon-stop flight in a fuzzy regression discontinuity setting. This is probably because the sampledoes not include all the existing flights, but rather only those flying to and from airports neara headquarters or foreign subsidiaries. Results of this, however, are available upon request.
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0}. distTZlineh,s,tz is the running variable, defined as distance from subsidiarys to its closest time zone line tz following the guidelines explained before andrepresented in Figure 5. The interaction closerTZh,s,tz×distTZlineh,s,tz allowsmore flexibility when estimating the slopes before and after the cutoff (e.g.,the time zone line). ϕh and τtz are MNC and time zone line fixed effects,respectively. By adding these fixed effects I make sure that we compare foreignsubsidiaries belonging to the same MNC and that are across the same time zoneline.
Figure 6 graphically represents the estimation of Specification (3) using thepackage rdplot (Calonico et al., 2014, 2017). It shows that, indeed, that foreignsubsidiaries located just across the time zone line that puts them in a closer timezone to their headquarters (above zero in the horizontal axis which measuresvalues of the running variable) are, on average, are active in economic activitieshigher in the knowledge intensity scale (measured in the vertical axis), as com-pared to those who are on the other side of the time zone (below zero in thehorizontal axis). This graph uses observations for which their distance to thetime zone line corresponds to the optimal running variable bandwidth whichis 299.157 kilometers, using the methodology by Cattaneo et al. (2018) whobuilds on the work by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Note that the verticalaxis has values below and above zero because for this plot I use the residual oflog(kh,s) after controlling for ϕh and τtz.
[Figure 6 about here.]
The actual estimation of Specification (3) using data on foreign subsidiariesare presented in Table 5. Each column in the table presents results using adifferent bandwidth definition which range from 150 to 350 kilometers as wellas the optimal bandwidth in the last column. The estimation uses a triangularweight scheme, giving higher weight to observations closer to the cutoff point.
[Table 5 about here.]
The results suggest that a foreign subsidiary just across (any) time zone linecloser to the headquarters –thus increasing the overlap in working hours– is in aneconomic activity that is, on average, 0.6 to 0.84 percent higher in the knowledgeintensity scale, depending on the bandwidth used. Note that the estimator forβTZ is statistically significant (the standard errors are clustered at the MNCand time zone line level). At first this might look like a very small number. Yet,keep in mind that the treatment itself is also quite small: this exercise comparesforeign subsidiaries very close to each other (certainly measured in terms relativeof distance to their headquarters), some of them (the treated) have an extrahour of overlap with the work day of their colleagues at the headquarters, orsometimes even less than that (some time zones change in increments of halfan hour). Also, this is an average treatment effects for all possible differenttreatments (e.g., increasing the overlap in working hours from 2 to 3, or from6 to 7, for example) and as such is a weighted average of different treatmenteffects which could be larger or smaller, depending on the relative improvement.
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Yet, at most we will always be limited by a “small” treatment. Thus, the resultsare qualitatively important taking into consideration that the only thing whichdiffers between subsidiaries located at either side of the time zone line is havingone more hour of overlap with their colleagues working at the headquarterslocation, even if their external validity cannot be proven beyond the estimationof presented in Table 4, with all the limitations such approach has.
However, a question remains: is it overlap in working hours the only thingthat varies substantially when comparing subsidiaries at either time of a timezone line? The evidence suggest that, in the context of what is relevant for thisexercise, it is. To show that I re-estimated Specification (3) replacing the de-pendent variable for other observable measures considered determinants of thelocation decision of foreign subsidiaries (used as controls in several specificationsabove). These are the trade unit cost and measures of factor endowments in thecountry where the subsidiary is located (income per capita, capital per workerand human capital). Since some of the horizontal foreign subsidiaries in thesample could also be classified as being upstream or downstream to the portfo-lio of economic activities produced at home by the MNC, I also test for those.The results can be found in Table 6 where each column uses a different depen-dent variable in the context of the regression discontinuity (using the optimalbandwidth and a triangular weighting scheme). As can be seen, the treatmenteffect is statistically not different from zero across all of those variables, reduc-ing remaining concerns of other confounding factors: time zone changes cannotexplain differential patterns in terms of trade costs (Column 1), nor whetherthe horizontal foreign subsidiary is being misclassified (Columns 2 and 3), andneither in the factor endowments of the country where the subsidiary is located(Columns 4, 5 and 6).
[Table 6 about here.]
5 Concluding RemarksIt is straightforward that, in order to operate smoothly, MNCs make investmentsso that their workers located both in the headquarters and in foreign subsidiariescan work together to maintain a smooth business operation. "Working together"could imply many things, such as managing, coordinating, monitoring, trou-bleshooting, etc. One broad way to denominate all these activities is under theumbrella of knowledge transmission. Knowledge transmission can certainly becostly and more intense for certain industries. These costs, of course, are animportant aspect determining location decisions of MNCs. This reasoning is,of course, the main explanation behind the existing trade-off between distanceto the headquarters and the knowledge intensity level of a foreign subsidiary, aresult consistent with the work of many others (e.g., Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare, 2013; Ramondo, 2014; Arkolakis et al., 2013; Tintelnot, 2014; Keller andYeaple, 2013).
The main contribution of this paper, however, is to show that this trade-offsignificantly weakens when time zones are taking into consideration: knowledge
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intensity is, on average, higher for roughly equidistant foreign subsidiaries thatare closer to the headquarters in terms of in time zones. This result is at oddswith suggesting that larger intra-firm trade costs (between the headquartersand its knowledge intensive subsidiaries) can fully explain the aforementionedtrade-off (e.g., Keller and Yeaple, 2013). Some other distance-varying costs mustbe playing a role in explaining this trade-off. In particular costs that can bereduced by engaging in real time communication between different locations. Apossible interpretation is the intra firm transmission of tacit knowledge.
This paper also contributes to the literature by adapting a regression discon-tinuity design that exploits multiple spatial differences across time zone lines inthe context of researching the behavior of MNCs. To the best of my knowledge,this is the first time this methodology has been used in this context.
Nonetheless, this paper has left open some other specific questions that willshed light on our general understanding of how the transmission of knowledgeplays a role in the location decisions and the performance of MNC. For instance,what other tools and means are at a firm’s disposal to enhance the processthrough which it transfers knowledge to its subsidiaries and workers?28 Howdoes the knowledge intensity of the good relate to the existence of regionalhubs, as opposed to different plants serving every foreign market? Is the costof knowledge transmission a relevant determinant for service provider firms, asit is for manufacturing firms? Given the difference in the nature of services vs.manufacturing industries in terms of their tradability, we can expect differentpatterns in the data.
Naturally, this research agenda also contains questions that have relevantpolicy implications. While governments intend to develop their private sectorsby attracting foreign investment, designing an effective policy should answerquestions such as: is there enough infrastructure in place to allow effectivecommunication for foreign firms? Should the focus be on specific types of firmsand specific industries for which knowledge transmission will be easier? Doall types of products have the potential to generate productivity spillovers todomestic firms, or only those for which the cost of knowledge transmission islow?
All in all, despite the fact that productivity outweighs factor accumulationin growth accounting exercises (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005), theprocess through which knowledge is accumulated by economic agents is stillan under-researched area. However, a better understanding of this process iscritical to answering open questions in economics. The difficulties associatedwith transferring and acquiring knowledge, which translates into productivityshifts, are not unique to MNCs. They can also relate to domestic firms (e.g.,Bloom et al., 2012; Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2013), investors (e.g., Coval andMoskowitz, 2001), innovation (e.g., Kerr, 2008) and even countries’ export bas-kets diversification (e.g., Bahar et al., 2014; Bahar and Rapoport, 2018). At alarger scale, the documented evidence reinforces the importance of knowledge
28Using German data Gumpert (2015) shows that MNCs active in knowledge-intensiveactivities "distribute the knowledge" by hiring more capable workers to foreign subsidiaries.
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transmission in overall economic activity. Thus, understanding the ways knowl-edge affects economic activity lies at the core of important and unansweredquestions on convergence, development and growth. Knowledge and its diffu-sion, after all, are significant phenomena that can alter global economic patternsin as-of-yet unexplored ways.
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26
Figure 1: Unique locations of headquarters and subsidiaries
The figure shows a World map with the geocoded location of all the headquarters (triangles) andforeign subsidiaries (dots) in the sample.
27
Figure 2: Headquarters and foreign subsidiaries of an American MNC
The figure is an example of the resolution of the data. It shows a World map with the geocodedlocation of the headquarters of an American car manufacturing firm and all of its subsidiaries.
28
Figure 3: Estimated relationship of k and d
−.3
−.2
−.1
0.1
.2lo
g(d
)
−.4 −.2 0 .2 .4log(k)
95% CI Fitted values
log(d)= 3.74e−07 − .486*log(k)
The figure presents the empirical fit for the relationship between log(d) and log(k) (the latterproxied by the experience plus training measure), after controlling for unit trade costs and MNCfixed effects. 95% confidence intervals marked in grey, based on robust standard errors clustered atthe MNC and industry level.
29
Figure 4: KI and distance trade-off by working hours overlap
−3
−2
−1
01
Tra
de
off
Estim
ato
r
0 2 4 6 8 10Working hours overlap
−1
.5−
1−
.50
Dis
tan
ce
Km
(lo
g)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1KI (log, min=0)
0 2 4
6 8 10+
The figure presents the empirical fit for the relationship between log(d) and log(k) (the latter proxiedby the experience plus training measure), after controls specified in Specification (\eqref{eq:dd-dk}), and adding different controls for the ease of communication between the headquarters andthe foreign affiliate.
30
Figure 5: Running variable definition
The figure presents a graphical representation to understand how the running variable (distance tothe nearest time zone line) is centered around the time zone line.
31
Figure 6: Regression discontinuity graphical representation
−.0
4−
.02
0.0
2.0
4K
I M
ea
su
re
−400 −200 0 200 400Distance from TZ Line
The figure presents a graphical representation of the regression discontinuity design in Specification3.
32
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Domestic Vs. Foreign Subsidiaries)MNC # Subs Foreign (%) KIForeign KIDomestic ∆
All Observations 2030 84881 .32 .27 .34 -.079∗∗∗
Non OECD 73 2445 .13 .39 .37 .027OECD 1957 82436 .32 .26 .34 -.079∗∗∗
East Asia & Pacific 396 20579 .13 .45 .44 .0023Latin America & Caribbean 30 2247 .56 -.36 -.34 -.017North America 714 33679 .24 .36 .38 -.016∗South Asia 43 1557 .13 .38 .45 -.067∗Western Europe 847 26819 .55 .23 .17 .064∗∗∗
The table presents descriptive statistics from the sample. It presents for different cuts of the sample,based on the home country of the MNC, the total number of MNC firms, the number of subsidiaries,the proportion of those subsidiaries that are foreign (horizontal) subsidiaries, the average knowledgeintensity of the foreign subsidiaries, the average knowledge intensity for the domestic subsidiaries,and the difference between these averages, denoted by ∆. Stars represent statistical significance ofthe difference: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
33
Table 2: Determinants of Foreign Replication of ProductionDependent Variable: Horizontal Foreign Subsidiary Binary Variable
(1) (2) (3)log(k) -0.1610 -0.1600 -0.3427
(0.096)* (0.079)** (0.090)***log(t) -0.0158 -0.0156 -0.0089
(0.028) (0.025) (0.020)GDpc (affiliate) 0.3271
(0.124)***Pop (affiliate) -0.0663
(0.018)***Cap per worker (subsidiary) -0.2772
(0.058)***HumCap per worker (subsidiary) -0.5447
(0.198)***Downstream Linkage 0.1905 0.1951 0.2366
(0.074)** (0.078)** (0.084)***Upstream Linkage 0.5607 0.5159 0.4744
(0.055)*** (0.055)*** (0.067)***
N 80542 80632 80487Adj. R2 0.59 0.62 0.67ϕh Y Y Yηs N Y -ηs × θP N - Y
The left hand side variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the subsidiaryis foreign. The variables in the right hand side include the unit shipping cost associatedwith the industry, knowledge intensity measures and other controls. All specificationsinclude MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry and MNClevel are presented in parentheses.∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
34
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Foreign SubsidiariesVariable N Mean sd Min MaxDistance, km (log) 25,166 8.201 1.15 1.1 9.9Knowledge Intensity (log) 25,166 4.112 0.13 3.6 4.4Unit Shipping Cost (log) 25,166 -1.894 0.76 -3.6 -0.1Ratio GDP per capita (log) 25,151 0.125 0.71 -2.7 3.8Ratio Population (log) 25,151 -0.423 1.71 -6.5 5.6Ratio Capital per Worker (log) 25,151 0.350 0.98 -2.9 4.9Ratio Human Capital (log) 25,151 0.118 0.33 -1.1 2.4Upstream Linkage 25,166 0.290 0.45 0.0 1.0Downstream Linkage 25,166 0.153 0.36 0.0 1.0Ease of Communication VariablesNon Stop Air Route 25,166 0.330 0.47 0.0 1.0Working Hours Overlap 25,166 6.960 2.47 0.0 10.0
The table presents descriptive statistics from the sample of foreign subsidiaries, for distance inbetween the headquarters and the subsidiary, the knowledge intensity of the foreign subsidiary andthe unit trade cost. The lower panel presents headquarters-subsidiary variables that measure theease of communication in between them.
35
Table 4: Distance, Knowledge Intensity and Ease of CommunicationDependent Variable: Log Distance to Headquarters
(1) (2) (3) (4)log(k) -0.5292 -0.3960 -1.4060 -1.2865
(0.268)** (0.230)* (0.515)*** (0.477)***log(k)XdirectFlightOAG -0.0955 0.0414
(0.200) (0.200)log(k)Xwhours_overlap 0.1520 0.1600
(0.071)** (0.071)**directFlightOAG -0.1020 -0.5741
(0.829) (0.835)whours_overlap -0.9359 -0.9742
(0.304)*** (0.305)***log(t) -0.1091 -0.0381 -0.0632 -0.0276
(0.079) (0.054) (0.052) (0.035)GDpc (affiliate) -0.1282 -0.1277
(0.267) (0.183)Pop (affiliate) 0.3237 0.1628
(0.043)*** (0.029)***Cap per worker (subsidiary) -0.4883 -0.6073
(0.110)*** (0.095)***HumCap per worker (subsidiary) 1.7045 1.4679
(0.503)*** (0.281)***Downstream Linkage 0.0489 0.0721 -0.0714 -0.0081
(0.099) (0.069) (0.076) (0.037)Upstream Linkage 0.0898 0.0740 0.0013 -0.0349
(0.117) (0.076) (0.076) (0.033)
N 25166 25237 25166 25237Adj. R2 0.60 0.67 0.81 0.87ϕh Y Y Y Yηs N Y N Y
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (2) using a sample of foreign subsidiariesof MNCs, including controls and interactions with between log(k) and ease of communication proxies.The left hand side variable is the distance from the foreign subsidiary to its global headquarters inlogs. The variables on the right hand side include knowledge intensity of the affiliate’s economicactivity (in logs), the unit shipping cost (in logs) and other controls. The right hand side also includesvariables measuring the ease of communication between a headquarters and its subsidiaries, both ontheir own and interacted with log(k). All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standarderrors clustered at the industry and MNC level are presented in parentheses.∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
36
Table 5: Regression discontinuity estimationDependent Variable: Foreign subsidiary’s knowledge intensity (log)
150 250 350 OptimalcloserTZ 0.0084 0.0060 0.0075 0.0066
(0.003)** (0.003)* (0.002)*** (0.002)***distTZzero -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***closerTZ × distTZzero -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 5232 9702 14179 12367Adj. R2 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3) using a sample of foreignsubsidiaries of MNCs estimated using several bandwidths for the running variable specified ineach column. The last column uses the optimal bandwidth computed using the methodologydescribed in Cattaneo et al. (2018) who build on the work by Imbens and Kalyanaraman(2012). The estimation uses a triangular weight scheme, giving higher weight to observationscloser to the cutoff point. All specifications include MNC fixed effects and time zone line fixedeffects. Robust standard errors clustered at the MNC and time zone line level are presentedin parentheses.∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
37
Table 6: Regression discontinuity estimation for control variablesDependent Variable: Control variables
log(ts) USs DSs log(GDPpcs) log(Kpws) log(Hpws)closerTZ -0.0240 0.0246 0.0186 0.0028 -0.0359 -0.0114
(0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.028) (0.052) (0.022)distTZzero 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)**closerTZ × distTZzero -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0000
(0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 12006 12367 12367 12309 12323 12323Adj. R2 0.92 0.58 0.74 0.91 0.93 0.92
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (2) using a sample of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs, includingcontrols and interactions with between log(k) and ease of communication proxies. The left hand side variable is the distancefrom the foreign subsidiary to its global headquarters in logs. The variables on the right hand side include knowledgeintensity of the affiliate’s economic activity (in logs), the unit shipping cost (in logs) and other controls. The right handside also includes variables measuring the ease of communication between a headquarters and its subsidiaries, both ontheir own and interacted with log(k). All specifications include MNC fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered atthe industry and MNC level are presented in parentheses.∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
38
Appendix forThe hardships of long distance
relationships: time zone proximity andknowledge transmission within
multinational firmsMay 30, 2018
A Conceptual FrameworkIn this section I augment the model by Helpman et al. (2004) – referred to asHMY hereafter – by including a new parameter capturing the intra-firm costof transmitting knowledge between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries. Thisextension allows us to understand how the cost of knowledge transmission facedby firms affects their decision to serve foreign markets. First the common set-upis described and then the proper adaptation is incorporated.
As in HMY, there are N countries producing H+1 sectors with labor as theonly input of production. H sectors (indexed 1, 2,...,H) produce a differentiatedgood, while the other sector (indexed 0) produces an homogenous good (whichserves as the numeraire). In any given country, individuals spend a share βh > 0of their income on sector h, such that
∑0≤h≤H
βh = 1. Country i is endowed with
Li units of labor and the wage rate in this country is denoted by wi.Consider now a particular differentiated sector, h. For simplicity of notation,
the index h is dropped in the next few paragraphs, but it is implicit that allsector specific variables may vary across sectors.29 In order to enter the industryin country i a firm bears a fixed and sunk cost fE denominated in units of labor.After bearing this cost, the potential entrant learns its labor-per-unit cost, a,drawn from a common and known distribution G (a). Upon observing this cost,the firm may choose not to enter, and thus bear no additional costs and receiveno revenues. If it chooses to produce, however, an additional cost of fD units oflabor is incurred. There are no other fixed costs if the firm chooses to produceand sell in the local market only.
The firm can choose to serve a foreign market either by exporting or creatinga foreign subsidiary. If the firm chooses to export, it bears an additional costof fX (per country it exports to). If it chooses to create a foreign affiliate, itincurs an additional cost of fI for every foreign market it chooses to serve thisway. Similar to HMY, fX can be interpreted as the cost of forming a localdistribution and service network in the foreign market, and fI includes all ofthese costs, as well as the cost of forming a subsidiary in the foreign countryand the overhead production costs embodied in fD. Hence, fI > fX > fD.
29Some sector-specific variables are explicitly kept in the notation, such as t and k, sincethese variables will be relevant in the empirical analysis.
1
The homogenous good is freely traded at no cost.30 Differentiated goodsthat are exported from country i to country j are subject to a “melting-iceberg”transport cost τ(t, dij) which is an increasing function of the per unit shippingcost of the good (denoted by t, and proxies for weight or other good specificcharacteristics) and the distance between countries i and j (denoted by dij). Itis assumed that that τ(t, dij) > 1. That is, a firm in country i has to ship τunits of a good for 1 unit to arrive in country j.
Analogously, serving a foreign market through an affiliate is subject to amarginal cost κ(k, dij) related to the transfer of knowledge. κ(k, dij) is as-sumed to be an increasing function of both the knowledge intensity of thegood (represented by k) and distance (dij). The cost of transferring knowl-edge includes resources and time used for communicating with foreign affiliatesto transmit proper knowledge required for efficient production. It is assumedthat τ(t, dij) > κ(k, dij) > 1 for all goods. The last inequality implies that for amultinational corporation, the cost of selling 1 unit of a good through a foreignaffiliate is κ(k, dij).
The cost of knowledge transmission in knowledge intensive sectors beinghigher is justified given that these sectors require higher interaction and com-munication among their workers. Thus, firms pay for business travel and com-munication services that occur more often within these sectors. In addition,and perhaps more importantly, knowledge intensive activities usually encom-pass tasks with higher probability of failure and thus requiring trained andexperienced workers. This too raises operational costs. Assuming that knowl-edge transmission costs are increasing in distance is consistent with empiricalevidence (e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993; Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; Keller, 2002, 2004;Bahar et al., 2014), and a standard way to model these costs in the literaturestudying MNCs (e.g., Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare, 2013; Ramondo, 2014;Arkolakis et al., 2013; Tintelnot, 2014; Keller and Yeaple, 2013; Gumpert, 2015).
All the producers which serve a market engage in monopolistic competition.Consumer preferences across varieties of a differentiated product h have thestandard CES form, with an elasticity of substitution ε = 1
1−α > 1. It iswell known that these preferences generate a demand function Aip−ε for eachproduct in the industry in country i, where Ai = β´
0
nipi(s)1−εds
Ei, ni is the
measure of firms active in the industry in country i, and pi(s) is the consumerprice for a product indexed s.
In this setting, an active producer with labor requirement of a optimally setsa price of wia
α . Consequently, the price of a locally produced good is wiaα , the
price of a good which is exported to country j is τ(t,dij)wjaα , and the price of a
good that is sold by a foreign affiliate in country j is κ(k,dij)wjaα , where a is the
labor required for the producer to manufacture one unit of the product.In what follows, it is shown that the balance of forces ruling the trade-off of
serving a foreign market through exports or FDI is influenced by the knowledge30Thus, as long as the numeraire good is produced in all countries the wage rate is equalized.
2
intensity of the product.The assumption that the numeraire good is produced in each country simpli-
fies the analysis, as it implies that the wage rate is equalized across all countriesand is equal to 1. Hence, the operating profit for a firm in country i witha labor coefficient of a from serving the domestic market maybe expressed asπiD = a1−εBi − fD, where Bi = (1− α) Ai
α1−ε . The additional profits from ex-porting to country j are πiX = (τ(t, dij) · a)
1−εBj − fX and those from selling
in country j through a foreign affiliate are πiI = (κ(k, dij) · a)1−ε
Bj − fI . Birepresents demand parameters for country i and are considered exogenous toeach individual firm.
Hence, in this setting, the productivity parameter a will be critical for afirm’s decision of whether to serve the local market only or to serve foreignmarkets, either through exports or FDI. The sorting pattern is similar to theone in HMY and is based in the following equations:
(aD)1−ε ·Bi = fD, ∀i (A1)
(τ(t, dij) · aX)1−ε ·Bj = fX , ∀i, ∀j 6= i (A2)[
κ(k, dij)1−ε − τ(t, dij)
1−ε] · a1−εI ·Bj = fI − fX , ∀i, ∀j 6= i (A3)
Similar to HMY, the first two equations define the productivity thresholdsafter which firms will sell domestically or export, respectively. The minimumproductivity threshold after which firms will engage in FDI is derived fromEquation (A3).31 This threshold is defined as:
a1−εI =
fI − fX[(κ(k, dij))
1−ε − (τ(t, dij))1−ε]Bj
,∀i, ∀j 6= i (A4)
Predictions derived from this model will serve as the basis for the empiricalanalysis. The implications of the original HMY model are straightforward. Anincrease in τ(t, dij), either through an increase in either t or dij , will result inlower πE making it more likely to substitute exports with FDI. This is partof the mechanism of the concentration-proximity trade-off. However, with theinclusion of κ(k, d) into the model, some new predictions arise, assuming fullsymmetry in fixed costs and demand variables for all sectors and countries. Thepropositions are presented in terms of φ(aI) = a1−ε
I .
Proposition 1. For a higher level of k fewer firms will substitute exports to-wards FDI.
Proposition (1) is a direct consequence of adding κ into the model. Allelse equal, for higher levels of k, the threshold a1−ε
I for which above it FDIis more profitable than exports is larger, implying FDI will be less likely for
31Condition (A3) will have a positive solution if we assume κ(k, dij)ε−1fI >
τ(t, dij)ε−1fX > fD, which is homologous to condition (1) in HMY (with equal wages across
countries), but including κ.
3
sectors with higher k. The graphical representation of the model in Figure A1shows the case for two sectors that differ in their knowledge intensity, k andk (where k > k). Notice that the profit functions for both sectors originatein the same fixed cost value fI , but the function is flatter for the sector k(dashed line). Hence, the productivity threshold required for a firm to substituteexports with FDI becomes higher for sectors with higher levels of k. That is,(aij,kI )1−ε > (a
ij,kI )1−ε.
[Figure A1 about here.]
Proposition 2. Conditional on expansion, firms face a trade-off between k andd
Proposition (2) follows from the assumptions that ∂κ/∂k > 0 ∂κ/∂d > 0.Figure A2 exemplifies this proposition.32 The figure represents the isoprofitcurves of a firm for both exports and FDI activities as a function of k and d. Afirm will choose to expand horizontally (over exporting) in every combinationof k and d where πD +πI > πD +πE , consistently with the equations describedabove. Notice that conditional on FDI, for a given level of profits πD + πI , themodel predicts a trade-off between k and d.
[Figure A2 about here.]
The predictions coming out of the model following the inclusion of an intra-firm cost of transferring knowledge (κ) have testable implications in the data.First, ceteris paribus, industries with higher levels of knowledge intensity will beless likely to expand horizontally to foreign destinations. Second, conditionalon horizontal expansion, firms will face a trade-off between distance to theheadquarters and knowledge intensity of the activity.
32The exact shape of the curves will depend on assumptions of κ(k, d). I assume a generalform for now.
4
Figure A1: Increase in k (knowledge intensity)
Graphical representation of the model, for a case considering two sectors with different levels of k,where k > k. The result suggests that the threshold aI is an increasing function of k. Thus, FDIwill be less likely for sectors with higher k.
5
Figure A2: Profit curves in k and d dimension
The figure is a graphical representation of a firm’s profit as a function of k and d. The curve πD+πE
represents total profits for an exporting firm, while the curve πD + πI represent total profits for afirm engaging in FDI instead.
6
B On the Dun & Bradstreet Dataset
B.1 ReliabilityThe Worldbase dataset collected by Dun & Bradstreet is sourced from a numberof reliable organizations all over the world, including public registries. Accord-ing to Dun & Bradstreet’s website, "the data undergoes a thorough qualityassurance process to ensure that our customers receive the most up-to-date andcomprehensive data available".33 However, it is important to acknowledge that,given the lack of access to public registries for every country, it is not possible toasses with full accuracy the representativeness of the data. Alfaro and Charlton(2009), however, compare the dataset with the US multinational firms sampleby the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and find consistencies between the twodatasets.
Some basic relationships drawn from the sample behave as expected. Forinstance, the number of countries in which an MNC has foreign affiliates isrelated to the overall size of the MNC, as can be seen in Figure B1. In particular,the figure shows the relationship between the size of MNC firms (in number ofestablishments in the left panel, and in total number of employees in the rightpanel34) against the number of foreign countries in which their subsidiaries arelocated (on the vertical axis). Each observation in the scatterplot is an MNClabeled with its headquarters’ country ISO3 code. The figure shows smallerMNCs are present in fewer countries, while larger MNCs tend to be more spreadout in terms of the number of countries they have a presence in.
[Figure B1 about here.]
Focusing the analysis on the within-MNC dimension, by adding MNC fixedeffects to all specifications, significantly diminishes the sampling concerns fur-ther. This is because, while methods for gathering information may not besymmetric across countries, they would not systematically differ by firm. Itis reasonable to assume that the per-country likelihood of missing data wouldbe the same for all firms, controlling for the location of the headquarters of theMNC. Thus, concerns regarding biases caused by possible sampling asymmetriesare not particularly large for the purpose of this empirical exercise.
B.2 IndustriesWhile the dataset has information on up to six industries per plant (a main oneplus five other) the number of establishments that report more than one activityvaries dramatically per country. The left panel of Figure B2 shows the averagenumber of reported industries across all subsidiaries per country, while the rightpanel shows, per country, the percentage of firms reporting one, two, three, four,five or six industries. In most countries, the average number of reported firms
33http://dnb.com.au/Credit_Reporting/The_quality_of_DandBs_data/index.aspx34Including their domestic plants for both.
7
is below two; and the majority of firms in more than half the countries reportonly one SIC code.
[Figure B2 about here.]
I also present results of the distribution of sectors among foreign affiliates,to understand whether in the sample there are some sectors that are morelikely to appear (i.e. be reported) than others. In terms of industries, thedistribution of different sectors in the sample is not homogenous, as can be seenin Figure B3. Some sectors are more prevalent than others in the data. Theindustries that appear the most in the data are Ready-Mixed Concrete (SIC3273), Pharmaceutical Preparations (SIC 2834) and Motor Vehicles Parts (SIC3714). To alleviate concerns on how this distribution could affect the results, allthe standard deviations calculations allow for clustering at the industry level.
[Figure B3 about here.]
In addition, it is worth emphasizing that each foreign subsidiary in the sam-ple manufactures a specific product. Hence, if a MNC has several foreign sub-sidiaries, then each one of those could be manufacturing a different product (inits 4 digit classification). The sample that a single MNC that has more thanone foreign subsidiary could be manufacturing more than one product. FigureB4 shows that larger MNCs (as measured by number of affiliates) tend to makea larger number of different products.
[Figure B4 about here.]
B.3 Using the input-output table to define vertical rela-tionships
In order to filter out from the definition of horizontal those links that couldalso be defined as vertical, either upstream or downstream, I use the US input-output provided by Fan and Lang (2000). I follow the methodology suggestedby Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2009) to define verticalrelationships.
More in general, the diagram in Figure B5 is useful to understand how hor-izontal and vertical links are defined in the dataset. Within a single MNC firm,an horizontal link is defined as a foreign subsidiary that is classified under thesame SIC code as any of its domestic subsidiaries. Then I use the US I/O tableby Fan & Lang (2000) to define vertical relationships, both downstream andupstream. A subsidiary is defined as upstream vertical if its main economicactivity is an input of $0.05 or more per each dollar of output of any of the do-mestic subsidiaries of the firm. Similarly, a subsidiary is defined as downstreamvertical if any of the domestic subsidiary provides an input to it of $0.05 or moreper each dollar of output.
After such classification, those subsidiaries that fall into both categories(horizontal and vertical) are filtered out from the horizontal classification. This
8
implies that the sample classifies as horizontal only final goods (which is thematter of study of the theoretical framework presented in Online AppendixSection A).
[Figure B5 about here.]
The use of $0.05 in the main body of the paper follows the precedent set byAlfaro & Charlton (2009), but its choice is not determinant for the results ofthe paper.
A limitation of this methodology is that technologies might vary across coun-tries, and hence, the US I/O table would loss some validity in defining upstreamor downstream relationships. While acknowledging this limitation I assume thatthe US I/O table is a good proxy for measuring vertical links, regardless of thecountry, in line with the previous literature.
9
Figure B1: MNC size vs. number of countries
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The figure shows the relationship between the size of MNC (horizontal axis) and the number offoreign countries they are active in (vertical axis). In the scatterplots, each observation is an MNC,labeled with the ISO3 code of the country where its headquarters is located. The left panel measuresthe firms’ size by the total number of subsidiaries it has (both domestic and foreign), while the rightpanel uses the total employees (both in domestic and foreign plants).
10
Figure B2: Distribution of reported SIC codes by plant, per country
01
23
4
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erin
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1 2 3 4 5 6
The figure describe the distribution of number of industries reported by establishment in the sample.The left panel shows the average number of reported industries across all subsidiaries per country,while the right panel shows, per country, the percentage of firms reporting one, two, three, four,five or six industries.
11
Figure B3: Histogram of SIC codes in the sample
0.0
02
.00
4.0
06
.00
8.0
1D
en
sity
2000 2500 3000 3500 4000sic1_est
The figure is an histogram of the SIC industries reported in the dataset. Each bin representsthe frequency of a particular SIC code within the manufacturing sector. Notice that the SICclassification is not fully continuos, what explains the zero values in the figure.
12
Figure B4: Number of different industries Vs. MNC size
20
40
60
80
Lo
g M
NC
diff.
in
du
str
ies
500010000Log MNC size (affiliates)
The figure plots the relationship between MNC size and total number of (different) industries theMNC is active in through its foreign affiliates. The figure reveals that larger MNCs (measured interms of number of subsidiaries) tend to make a larger number of different products.
13
Figure B5: Definition of Horizontal and Vertical
The diagram describes the methodology used to classify foreign subsidiaries as horizontal expansionsbased on their reported economic activity vis-a-vis the economic activity of the MNC in its homecountry.
14
C O*NET knowledge intensity measuresThis section describes characteristics of the knowledge intensity measures basedon Bahar (2018). Figure C1 presents the distribution of the knowledge intensitymeasure used in the paper: experience plus training (based on experience pluson-site and on-the-job training figures of workers in each industry). As opposedto the R&D investment based variables used in the literature, the distributionof the O*NET based variables is smoother, and behaves more like a normalprobability density function. Figure C2 presents the same graphs limiting thesample to manufacturing industries only.
[Figure C1 about here.]
[Figure C2 about here.]
Tables C1 presents the top and bottom ten products in the manufacturing di-vision (SIC codes 2000 to 3999) ranked by the knowledge intensity measure.
[Table C1 about here.]
C.1 Advantage over R&D MeasuresI find this measure correlates positively with other (proxies of) knowledge inten-sity measures used in the literature, such as the average R&D share of sales perindustry. Correlation coefficient is 0.13 with R&D intensity computed using theCompustat dataset and compiled by (Keller and Yeaple, 2013) and 0.20 withR&D intensity computed using the Orbis dataset and compiled by Nunn andTrefler (2008), using manufacturing NAICS 4-digit industries.35
The R&D based measures, however, have three main shortcomings that couldgenerate significant biases. First, these measures are concentrated in lower val-ues and have a long tail, as shown in Figure C3. This is because most firmswithin those industries have no R&D investment whatsoever. For these indus-tries in the lower end of the distribution, the intensity of their knowledge isalmost indistinguishable. Second, since these measures are computed by aver-aging across each industry the R&D share of sales reported by a (random ornot) sample of firms, they are likely to favor industries in which larger firms aremore prevalent. This might happen in industries for which the barriers to en-try are higher, and not necessarily knowledge intensive industries. Third, R&Dinvestment might not be equally accounted for across all industries.
[Figure C3 about here.]35It also correlate positively with other less popular measures that could proxy for knowledge
intensity or complexity. The correlation coefficient with the share of non-production workersin total employment, from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Becker el al.2013), is 0.68. Similarly, the correlation coefficient with the Product Complexity Index, de-veloped by Hausmann el al. (2011), is 0.49. These correlations were computed using SIC 4digits codes.
15
The O*NET based measures solve these issues. As shown in Figure C1,their distribution is smoother and closer to a two-tailed normal distribution.36Moreover, our measures do not rely on a sampling of particular firms, and theyuse the same standardized measure for all industries.
36According to the Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality, we cannot reject the hypothesisthat these measures are normally distributed.
16
Figure C1: Histogram O*NET-based KI (All Industries)
05
10
15
Pe
rce
nt
20 40 60 80 100KI (Experience+Training)
The figure shows the fitted distribution for the computed “experience plus training” O*NET-basedknowledge intensity measures for all industries. Industries are defined in SIC 1987 4-digit industries.
17
Figure C2: Histogram O*NET-based KI (Manufacturing Only)
05
10
15
Pe
rce
nt
40 50 60 70 80KI (Experioence+Training)
The figure shows the fitted distribution for the computed “experience plus training” O*NET-basedknowledge intensity measures for manufacturing industries only. Industries are defined in SIC 19874-digit industries.
18
Figure C3: Distribution R&D Measures
01
23
4D
en
sity o
f N
TR
DIn
t
0 .5 1 1.5 2Nunn & Trefler R&D Int
0.2
.4.6
.8D
en
sity o
f K
YR
DIn
t
0 2 4 6 8 10Keller & Yeaple R&D Int
The figure shows the fitted distribution for the R&D Intensity measures used in the literature.The left panel corresponds to the industry-specific R&D intensity computed using the Compustatdataset and compiled by Keller and Yeaple (2013) and the right panel corresponds to the samemeasure computed using the Orbis dataset and compiled by Nunn and Trefler (2008). Industriesare defined in NAICS 4-digit industries.
19
Tab
leC1:
Top
andbo
ttom
10man
ufacturing
prod
ucts,r
ankedby
KI
Ran
kSIC
Nam
eV
alue
Ran
king
byExp
erie
nce
+Tra
inin
g,Top
101
3669
Com
mun
ications
Equ
ipment,NEC
82.92
23663
Rad
ioan
dTelevisionBroad
castingan
dCom
mun
ications
Equ
ipment
82.92
33661
Telepho
nean
dTelegraph
App
aratus
(exceptconsum
erexternal
mod
ems)
81.45
43677
ElectronicCoils,T
ransform
ers,
andOther
Indu
ctors
79.97
53676
ElectronicResistors
79.97
63678
ElectronicCon
nectors
79.97
73675
ElectronicCap
acitors
79.97
83671
ElectronTub
es79.97
93672
Printed
Circu
itBoards
79.97
103674
Semicon
ductorsan
dRelated
Devices
79.97
Ran
king
byExp
erie
nce
+Tra
inin
g,B
otto
m10
459
2013
Sausages
andOther
Prepa
redMeatProdu
cts(excep
tlard
mad
efrom
purcha
sedmaterials)
36.89
458
2011
MeatPacking
Plants
36.89
457
2411
Logging
39.79
456
2077
Animal
andMarineFa
tsan
dOils
(animal
fats
andoils)
41.39
455
2053
Frozen
BakeryProdu
cts,
ExceptBread
41.53
454
2045
Prepa
redFlour
Mixes
andDou
ghs
41.53
453
2098
Macaron
i,Sp
aghetti,Vermicellian
dNoo
dles
41.53
452
2051
Bread
andOther
BakeryProdu
cts,
ExceptCoo
kies
andCrackers
41.53
451
2015
Pou
ltry
Slau
ghtering
andProcessing(pou
ltry
slau
ghtering
andprocessing
)42.72
450
2052
Coo
kies
andCrackers(unleavene
dbreadan
dsoft
pretzels)
45.04
The
tablepresents
thetopan
dbottom
10man
ufacturing
sectorsrank
edby
the“exp
erienc
eplus
training
”O*N
ET
basedkn
owledg
eintensitymeasure.
20
D Proxying for demand: knowledge transmissionin the proximity-concentration trade-off
The results on the determinants of horizontal expansion are not fully satisfactorysince they do not account for the demand factor (i.e. it is not possible to seethe all the locations where the MNCs faced a trade-off between exports andforeign affiliates and decided for the former). However, in order to explorefor the role of knowledge intensity in the likelihood of horizontal expansion wefollow the guidelines of Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) using BEA dataon American MNCs for years 1999-2011 to show that sales of foreign affiliatesdecreases with the knowledge intensity level of the industry (using my ownmeasures of knowledge intensity), after controlling for export volume for thoseindustries. That is, by including exports in the specification I aim to controlfor sector specific demand of American exporters in that location. Thus, thespecification I estimate is:
log(ForeignSaless,y) = βklog(ks)+βtlog(ts)+log(Exportss,y)+αy+εs,y (D1)
Where s indexes for industry and y for year. The dependent variable is thesales of foreign affiliates of US multinationals in the rest of the world for sectors, in millions of dollars. The right hand side includes the knowledge intensity(denoted by k) and the unit shipping cost (denoted by t) of sector s. It alsoincludes US export volumes of industry s to the world in millions of dollars.There are in total seven sectors, and each is defined as a 3-digit NAICS code.The specification also includes year dummies (denoted by αy). The results ofthis estimation are presented in Table D1.
[Table D1 about here.]
Column 1 estimates a linear regression where the dependent variable is thesales of foreign affiliates (in logs), controlling for total exports to the samedestination in the same industry code. Column 2 estimates a linear regressionwhere the dependent variable is the ratio of sales of foreign affiliates to exports,similarly to Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). Column 3 replicates column 2but excludes outliers in the sales to exports distribution. It can be seen that theestimator for βk is negative and statistically significant, regardless of whetherthe specification uses the total sales of foreign affiliates controlling for exports(column 1), or the ratio of foreign sales to exports (column 2 and 3). Similarly,βt is estimated to be positive and significant, as expected (i.e. industries withlarger trade cost will generate incentives for firms to create foreign affiliatesabroad to substitute for exports). Figure D1 plots the estimation of βk in thefirst column of Table D1.
[Figure D1 about here.]
21
Figure D1: Sales of Foreign Affiliates for American MNCs and Knowledge In-tensity
−.5
0.5
11
.5R
atio
Sa
les F
A t
o E
xp
ort
s
−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1Log Knowledge Intensity
Note: estimates control for trade costs and year fixed effects
BEA US Multinational Enterprises
The vertical axis is the log-sales of foreign affiliates and the horizontal axis is the log knowledgeintensity measure.
22
Table D1: Sales of Foreign Affiliates for American MNCs and Knowledge Inten-sity
Dependent Variable: Log Sales of Foreign Affiliateslog(SalesFA) Ratio Ratio (no outliers)
log(k) -1.2664 -1.5221 -1.0200(0.292)*** (0.650)** (0.298)***
log(t) 0.7290 1.6101 1.7935(0.104)*** (0.229)*** (0.095)***
log(exp) 1.1858(0.048)***
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (D1) usingthe Bureau of Economic Activity’s data on American MNCs for years1999-2011. The left hand side variable is the log of foreign sales ofAmerican MNCs in each 3-digit NAICS code (column 1) or the ratio offoreign sales to exports (columns 2 and 3). Column 3 exclude outlierobservations in terms of the ratio. The variables in the right hand sideinclude the unit shipping cost associated with the industry, a knowledgeintensity measure and the exports of the US to the rest of the world ineach 3-digits NAICS category (column 1 only). All specifications includeyear fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the year level arepresented in parentheses.∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
23
E Regression discontinuity uniform weighting schemeTable E1 repeats the estimation of Specification (3), using a uniform weight-ing scheme which provides equal weight to all observations within the selectedbandwidth. Results are robust to those presented in Table 5 in the main bodyof the paper.
[Table E1 about here.]
24
Table E1: Regression discontinuity estimation, uniform weighting schemeDependent Variable: Foreign subsidiary’s knowledge intensity (log)
150 250 350 OptimalcloserTZ 0.0084 0.0060 0.0075 0.0066
(0.003)** (0.003)* (0.002)*** (0.002)***distTZzero -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***closerTZ × distTZzero -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 5232 9702 14179 12367Adj. R2 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87
The table presents results for the estimation of Specification (3) using a sample of foreignsubsidiaries of MNCs estimated using several bandwidths for the running variable specified ineach column. The last column uses the optimal bandwidth computed using the methodologydescribed in Cattaneo et al. (2018) who build on the work by Imbens and Kalyanaraman(2012). The estimation uses a uniform weight scheme, giving same weight to all observationswithin the bandwidth. All specifications include MNC fixed effects and time zone line fixedeffects. Robust standard errors clustered at the MNC and time zone line level are presentedin parentheses.∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
25