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TheHashemiteKingdomofJordanTheDepositNumberattheNationalLibrary

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320AbuRumman,MohammadSulimanetal.MethodsofPreventingandCombattingTerrorismin

theMENARegionandtheWest/MohammadSuleimanAbuRumman et al.; translated by Banan Fathi Malkawi.–Amman:Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,2016

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محتوى مصنفھ وال یعبّر ھذا المصنف یتحمل المؤلف كامل المسؤولیة القانونیة عن عن رأي دائرة المكتبة الوطنیة أو أي جھة حكومیة أخرى.

Publishedin2016byFriedrich-Ebert-StiftungJordanandIraqFESJordan&IraqP.O.Box94187611194AmmanJordanEmail:fes@fes-jordan.orgWebsite:www.fes-jordan.org©FESJordan&IraqAllrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereprinted,reproduced,orutilizedinanyformorbyanymeanswithoutpriorwrittenpermissionfromthepublishers.Theviewsandopinionsexpressedinthispublicationaresolelythoseoftheoriginalauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresentthoseoftheFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftungortheeditors.Translation:BananMalkawi,SamiraKawarEditing:BananMalkawi,EVSTranslations,AnjaWehler-SchoeckCover:Mu'athIseidPrinting:EconomicPressISBN:978-9957-484-71-2

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MethodsofPreventingandCombattingTerrorism

intheMENARegionandintheWest

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TableofContentsAnjaWehler-SchoeckForeword: Agree to Disagree? International Efforts in Preventing andCombattingTerrorism....................................................................................................................7MohammadAbuRummanCounter-TerrorismEfforts:TheDialecticofInputsandOutputs................................9HassanAbuHaniehApproaches to the War on Terrorism: Examples of Efforts to EradicateExtremism.........................................................................................................................................21YassirAbdal-HusseinBreaking Terrorism: An Evaluation of Combatting the “Islamic State”OrganizationinIraq......................................................................................................................39Nabilal-BukairiDoesYemenHaveaCounter-TerrorismStrategy?.........................................................65AhmedZaghloulShalataTerrorisminEgyptandtheCrisisofCombattingIt........................................................79Hussainal-RawashdehJordan’sApproachtoCounter-Extremism..........................................................................93AwadhAl-BadiSaudiArabia’sNationalCounter-TerrorismStrategy:TheLegislativeApproach.........................................................................................................103KhalidChegraouiAnti-TerrorismPoliciesinMorocco:FromaSecurityApproachtoaHolisticApproach........................................................115SamiBrahemTunisia’sApproachtoFightingTerrorismthroughthe“NationalCounter-TerrorismStrategy”...................................................127EricRosandPursuingaMoreComprehensiveStrategytoCounter-Terrorism:TheChallengesofMovingfromTalktoWalk.TheExperienceoftheUnitedStates......................143NikolaySukhovTheNationwideCounter-TerrorismSystemintheRussianFederation.............163

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BelindaHoffmann WorkingTogetheragainstTerrorism–APerspectiveontheCollaborationoftheGermanAuthorities....................................................................................................................175MarcHeckerandElieTenenbaumFrancevs.Jihadism:TheRepublicinaNewAgeofTerror........................................179JonathanBirdwellBuildingLocalCapacityonaGlobalScale:CollaborationthroughtheStrongCitiesNetwork.........................................................191KristianBartholin CollaboratingagainstTerrorisminEurope.....................................................................201AbouttheAuthors.......................................................................................................................205

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ForewordAgreetoDisagree?InternationalEffortsinPreventing

andCombattingTerrorismAnjaWehler-Schoeck

ResidentDirector,Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES)Jordan&IraqTerrorismisbynomeansanewphenomenon.Historyshowsthatterrorismhaslongoccurredinanabundanceofpolitical,cultural,ethnicandreligiouscontexts.Inthepastfewyears,though,terroristattackswithanIslamistbackgroundhavesurged.Recentattacks,includingthoseinseveralWesterncapitals,havebroughtthe perceived threat levels in many countries to a new high. Quantitativeresearch on the subject, like the Global Terrorism Database1and the RANDDatabaseofWorldwideTerrorismIncidents2,documentsasteadyaccelerationofthe number of terrorist attacks since the 9/11 events in 2001 and moreparticularlysincethestartofthe2003IraqWar.Moreover,since9/11therehasbeen a noticeable shift in the location of terrorist attacks, with most nowoccurringincountrieswithaMuslimmajority.Whilethereisconvergenceontheseoveralltrends,thediscrepanciesinresearchonthedetailsofthematter,however,pointtoacaveatinthediscussionofthisissue:thechallengeofdefiningwhatpreciselyconstitutesanactofterrorismandwho is considered a terrorist.Anumberof countrieshave compiled their ownlists of terrorist organizations, many of which differ greatly from each other,indicating precisely the difficulty in achieving international consensus on this.Thefutileattemptsbytheinternationalcommunityinlate2015tocompilealistof terrorist groups active in Syria – which would determine if a group wereeither a target or a welcome guest at the negotiation table – can serve asillustration.3Anditisbynomeansaminorobstacle.Doesitnotratherraisethefundamentalquestionofwhether therecaneverbe internationalconsensusoncombattingterrorism?Orwill thisalwaysbea fieldwherehiddenagendasandcovertloyaltiescometoplay?Around the globe, much thought is currently being put into devising newmethods of both combatting existing terrorist threats and preventing risingradicalization and violent extremism. Unsurprisingly, the approaches that aredeemedmostadequatevaryconsiderablyfromonecountrytothenext,rangingfrom more security-focused methods to ones relying on socioeconomic orideologicalfactors,forexample.Insomecountriesthefightagainstterrorismhasservedasapretext todelaydemocraticreforms, torestrict themediaandcivilsocietyandtocrackdownonpoliticalopponents.Yet,astrongcivilsociety, forexample,canserveasakeyassetinpreventingradicalization,byeducatingandengaging citizens, and providing opportunities and perspectives to youth. 1TheGlobalTerrorismDatabase,https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.2TheRANDDatabaseofWorldwideTerrorismIncidents,http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html.3“Syrianterroristlistproduces163namesandnoagreement.”Reuters,17February2016.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-terrorist-idUSKCN0VQ25E

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Effectivemeasurestopreventradicalizationcanonlybedevelopedwithacloseeartotheground–notatdeskshundredsofmilesaway.Withthispublication,FESwishestofurtheranopenexchangeonthetopicandtocontribute to it by presenting different views on the matter from severalcountries in theMENA region aswell as fromEurope, Russia and theUS. Themajority of the papers compiled in this publication were presented at aninternational conference held in Jordan in June 2016 entitled “Methods ofPreventing and Combatting Terrorism in the MENA Region and the West”organizedbyFESAmman.

Through its line of work on Political Islam and extremism, FES Amman hascloselyfollowedthesetrendsformanyyearswiththeaimofpublishingin-depthanalysis by local experts from the MENA region and fostering an open andeducateddiscourseontheseissues.

Wewishyouan insightful readand look forward toyourcontinued interest intheactivitiesandpublicationsoftheFriedrichEbertFoundation.Pleasevisitourwebsiteatwww.fes-jordan.orgtolearnmoreaboutourwork.

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Counter-TerrorismEfforts:TheDialecticofInputsandOutputs

MohammadAbuRumman

Theconceptofterrorismhasbeenusedforalongtime,andrelatestodifferentformsandtypesofactivitiesandgroupsthathavecarriedoutactionsconsideredto be terrorist, such as hijacking aircraft, taking hostages, and staging armedattacksoncertainareas.However,differentdefinitionsofterrorismexist,firstlyat the regional and international levels, and secondly on lists that categorizeterroristgroups.

Althoughseveralnetworksofgroupsarecategorizedasterrorist,themodethathaspreoccupiedtheworldandmostArabandwesterncountriesisrepresentedby the networks of al-Qaeda and the so-called “Islamic State”. The latterrepresents the new generation of “Islamic terrorist” and is widespread to anextentthathasallowedittoestablishacaliphateinIraqandSyria,andsatelliteemiratesinmorethanonespotaroundtheworld.Moreover,itscellshavebeenabletocarryoutattacksagainstseveraltargetsinEurope,Australia,Africa,andAsia.Thegrouphascometorepresentabasicthreattomanycountriesatlocal,regional and international levels. Hence various approaches and strategies toconfront it are being employed, and that is what this background paper willdiscuss.

1. WhoIsaTerrorist?HowAreTerroristOrganizationsCategorized?Before discussing the directions, strategies and approaches used to confrontterrorism internationally, regionally and locally, it isnecessary todevote someattentiontothedefinitionofterrorismandthecategorizationofterroristgroups.

Paradoxically, although the issue of terrorism has become amajor variable ininternational relations for almost fifteen years, and although it is widelydiscussed along with counter-terrorism strategies, full agreement amongcountries on a specific definition of terrorism and on the categorization ofterroristgroupsdoesnotexist.Rather, there isavariedrangeofdefinitionsofterrorism,anddifferencesexistincategorizingterroristgroups.The Arab Convention, for example, defines terrorism as “any act or threat ofviolence,whatever itsmotivesorpurposes, thatoccurs for theadvancementofanindividualorcollectivecriminalagenda,causingterroramongpeople,causingfear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, oraimingtocausedamagetotheenvironmentortopublicorprivateinstallationsor property or to occupy or to seize them, or aiming to jeopardize a nationalresource.”

Thethirdparagraphoftheconventiondefinesterroristcrimesas“anyoffenseorattemptedoffensecommittedinfurtheranceofaterroristobjectiveinanyoftheContracting States, or against their nationals, property or interests, that ispunishable by their domestic law” as well as incitement to terrorist crimes,praisingthem,publishingorprintingorpreparingprintedorrecordedmaterials

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for distribution or to show to others for the purpose of encouraging thecommittalofsuchcrimes.TheEuropeanConventionontheSuppressionofTerrorismissuedbytheCouncilofEuropeconsidersthefollowing6actionsasterroristcrimes:

- thehijackingofaircraft

- actsofviolenceandsabotage

- actions against persons enjoying special and diplomaticprotection

- the use of bombs, dynamite, missiles and booby-trappedletterstoendangerhumanlife

- the taking of hostages, kidnapping, illegal detention ofindividuals and serious crimes including attacks thatendangerlife,physicalsafetyandliberty

- takingpartintheabovecrimes

The agreement of the Member States of the Organization of American States(1971) defines terrorist crimes as such of kidnapping andmurder committedagainstpersonstowhomthestateoffersspecialprotectionunderinternationallaw.UN resolutions define terrorism as “those actions that endanger the lives ofinnocent people, or threaten basic freedoms, or violate human liberty.” UNexpertshavedefineditas“astrategyofviolencethatisinternationallyforbidden,is motivated by ideology and aims to create violence within society with thepurposeofseizingpowerorunderminingit.”At the Islamic level, the Institute of Islamic Jurisprudencedefines terrorismasaggression by an individual, group or state against the human being (theindividual,religion,property,honor,themind)bymeansof intimidation,harm,torture,andunjustifiedkilling.4

Despite the existence of several differing definitions of terrorism, as we haveseen, there is concurrence among most legal, international and politicaldefinitionsthatterrorism:

First,istheuseofviolenceorthethreatofit.Second,thatitaimstoachieveillegitimatepoliticalobjectives.

Third,thatitisillegal.Fourth, that internal terrorism exists, and that it violatesinternallaw.

4See Mahmoud Said Qirat, “Terrorism: A study in national counterterrorism programs andstrategies”. Research paper, Nayef Arab University for Security Sciences, pp. 62-64. AlsoMohammadMuhyeddeinAwad, “The reality of terrorism and its directions”. CounterterrorismSeminar,Riyadh,31May1999to2June1999,pp.12-20.

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Fifth,inthecaseofexternalterrorism,itislinkedtooperationsagainst the interests of other countries and it violatesinternationallaw.

Sixth, that terroristaction isnot limitedtodirectaction,suchas kidnapping, killing andbombing. It also includesplanning,arranging,incitement,praiseandpromotion.

TheUS StateDepartment has a pragmatic, simple procedural definition that ituses to draw up its list of terrorist organizations. To be added to the list, anorganization must be foreign, must engage in terrorist activity or have thecapabilityofdoingso,andsuchactivitymustthreatenthesecurityofUScitizensorUSnationalsecurity.5

The “security” criterion in relation to the interests and security of statesdominates the categorization and definition of most terrorist states andorganizations.

Theissueofterroristgroupsisoneofthemainpreoccupationsofstates,becausesince theeventsof September11 through to theunprecedentedactivityof thecells and organizations linked to the so-called “Islamic State”, it poses asignificantthreattoglobalsecurityandstability.Suchactivityhasaffectedeverycontinentandeverypartoftheworld,eitherthroughsolidarityamongst“IslamicState”groupsandcells,ormoreaccurately,becauseoftheircompetitionwiththeactivitiesofthelocalandregionalgroupsandcellslinkedtoal-Qaeda.

Toconfrontthespreadandexpansionofterroristgroups,countriesaroundtheworldhavebeenissuinglistsofwhattheyconsidertobeterroristandextremistgroups, on which they impose sanctions. In 2014, the UAE issued a list of 83organizations including parties, groups, Jihadi organizations, aid organizations,andinstitutionsthathavedeclaredculturalcharacters.TheyalsogroupedShiiteandSunnipartiesandorganizations,andseveralwell-knownwestEuropeanandUS organizations, in addition to Hezbollah and all its branches, the al-Ummaparty in the Gulf with al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, “Islamic State” branches, theTaliban,PakistaniJihadiorganizationssuchasAskarTeibaandJayshMohammadaswell as Syriangroups fighting the regime, suchasAhraral-Sham, theGreenBrigadeandothers.6

Saudi Arabia drew up a shorter, more specific list of terrorist organizations,including al-Qaeda and its branches, Jabhat al-Nusra, Hezbollah, the “IslamicState”, theHouthis and theMuslimBrotherhood.However,unlike theUAE list,theSaudilistdoesnotincludeotherSyrianJihadiorganizations.7TheUSlistincludesstates,organizationsandindividualslinkedtoterrorism.Itisa list that is periodically issued by the US State Department, adding someorganizations and removing others. It currently includes 40 organizations, thebestknownofwhichare:al-Gama’aal-IslamiyainEgypt,Hamas,thePakistanial-Mujahideenmovement,Hezbollah,thePalestinianal-Jihadmovement,theIslamicMovement in Uzbekistan, Jaysh Mohammad (Kashmir), Shuhadaa al-Aqsa 5https://www.state.gov/j/ct/6“UAElists83organizationsonterroristlist.”Reuters,15November2014.7“Saudi Arabia issues terrorist list starting with Muslim Brotherhood and Nusra.” AsharqAlawsatnewspaper,9March2014.

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Brigades (Palestinian National Liberation Movement), Usbat al-Ansar (Ein al-Hilweh camp in Lebanon), al-Qaeda branches (the Maghreb, the ArabianPeninsula, Iraq and Martyr Abdullah Azzam Brigades), Islamic Jihad inBangladesh,al-Shababal-IslamiyamovementinSomalia,HezbollahBrigades,theHaqqaniNetwork,Ansar al-Dein movement in Mali, the Libyan FightingGroup,the “Islamic State”, Jabhat al-Nusra, Sham al-Islam movement, Jaysh al-Mujahideenwaal-AnsarinSyriaandothers.8It can be seen that the definition of terrorist organizations is subject to theperspectives of different states with regard to their interests and nationalsecurity.Hence, althougha loosedefinitionof terrorismexists, describing it asthe illegitimate use of force to further an illegitimate political agenda, thecategorization of such organizations and the implementation of theoreticalcriteriainrelationtothemdiffersaccordingtothepoliticalandsecurityagendaofeachstate.

Efforts to combat terrorism are varied, as we shall see below, and they haveoftenbecome intertwinedwithcombattingreligiousextremismonthegroundsthat religious extremism– that is, a hardline interpretationof the teachingsofIslam – could lead thosewho espouse it to resort to violence to achieve theirgoals forcibly and illegitimately. Religious extremism has therefore beenconsidered as a basic phase of terrorism, and many local, regional andinternational efforts have been devoted to countering religious extremism bydisseminating moderate concepts and interpretations of Islam, as we willsubsequentlydiscuss.In the lightof theabove,questionsariseregardingthestrategies,conceptsandtrends that govern the methods used by several countries to confront thisunprecedentedphenomenon.

2. TheHistoricalDevelopmentofHardlineIslamicGroupsThe development of hardline Islamic groups surged significantly over the pasttwenty-fiveyears,withtheemergenceofal-QaedaandarmedIslamicgroupsinmoredangerous forms thanbeforeand the increase in thenumberof terroristoperations in theArab countries, particularly in the1990s.Towards the endofthe 1990s, the concept of the “globalization of Jihad” emerged, with theannouncement by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1998 of theformationof theglobal front toresistZionismandthecrusadertrend. Inotherwords,al-Qaedaswitcheditsprioritiesfromfightingthenearbyenemy(theArabregimes) to fighting the “remote enemy” (the US and western interests). ThisresultedinseveralmajorattacksagainsttheUScarriedoutbyelementsloyaltoal-QaedainYemenandAfrica.

However, the September 11 attacks in the US, planned and carried out by al-QaedaunderthedirectsupervisionofOsamabinLadenhimself,wereaturningpoint. This propelled the various efforts to combat terrorism into a phase ofdeclared global war against terrorism, and the US subsequently waged twoglobalwarsonthepretextofconfrontingterrorisminbothAfghanistanandIraq.

8https://www.state.gov/

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Those twowars, which the Neoconservatives declared as victories, led to twomain consequences: The first was the transformation of al-Qaeda’s leadershipfrom a strict centralizedmode to a decentralizedmode underwhich branchesandvariousgroupsweregivenwideauthorizationtoplanandimplementtheiractivities.Theresultwasthatal-Qaedaturnedintoseveralbranchorganizations,andnew leadersemerged inYemen,SaudiArabia,Algeriaandsubsequently inIraq.ThesecondconsequencewastheemergenceofAbuMus’abal-Zarqawi’sgroupinIraq.Althoughthatgroupofficiallyjoinedal-Qaedain2004,itwasdifferentfromit from the very beginning in several respects. The main difference was itsideological structure,whichwas tougher andmore hardline. Other differencesincluded viciousness in fighting enemies, the use of takfir (declaring others asnon-believers),thegroup’spositiononShias,extensiveuseofsuicideattacksandsanctioning thekillingof civilians.Thosedifferences initiallyemergedbetweenal-Zarqawi and his clerical mentor, al-Maqdisi, but they subsequently becamemoreprominent in2014whenamajorriftoccurredbetweenal-Qaedaandthe“IslamicState in Iraq”, oral-QaedainIraq,whichbrokeaway from themotherorganizationandlaterbecameknownas“IslamicStateinIraqandal-Sham.”TheIslamiccaliphatewassubsequentlydeclared,andall Jihadigroupsfromaroundtheworldwereaskedtojoinit.9Theclearemergenceofthe“IslamicState”inIraqandSyriaandthesubsequentappearance of groups declaring themselves loyal to it in various parts of theworld coincided with the phenomenon of “lone wolves”. The latter developedintomajorcellsthatcarriedoutattackswhichshookEurope,Africa,AsiaandtheArabcountries.Thesedevelopmentswereanunprecedented transformation inthehistoryofterrorismandofhardlinereligiousmovements.10

The“IslamicState”waspartofanewerathroughouttheArabregion,whichwascharacterized by the Arab Spring, the onslaught on it, the counter-revolutionsponsoredbysomeofficialArabregimesandtheoutbreakofinternalconflictsinSyria, Iraq,LibyaandYemen.Suchconflictshadalreadybrokenout inSomalia.Allthosedevelopmentswereconsideredassymptomsandsignsofthecollapse

9Mohammad Abu Rumman, “From al-Qaeda to al-Qaedas: revenues and taxes.” Jordaniannewspaperal-Ghad,28May2007.10Ahmad al-Suba’ee, “Lone wolves: the coming terror of Islamic State”. al-Jazeera, 25 March,http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2015/3/25/-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85. Shamseddein al-Naqaz, “Has theIslamicStateactuallydestroyedtheSykes-Picotborders?”NoonPostnewswebsite,31October2015, http://www.noonpost.net/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%87%D9%89-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%88-%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%8B%D8%A7%D8%9FTareqOthman,“Da’eshParadoxes:thepoliticalhopesthatcametonothing.”al-JazeeraCenterforStudies,Doha,23November2014,http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/isil/2014/11/201411238819725981.html

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oftheauthoritariannationalArabstatesthathademergedintheirpresentformfollowingtheSecondWorldWarandofthecollapseoftheArabregionalorderasother active regional states such as Turkey and Iran gained the ascendancy.Someanalystsaddanotherdevelopment,namelytheUSretreatfromtheregionfollowingtheUSsetbacksinIraqandAfghanistan,orwhatsomerefertoastheObamadoctrine,ortheObamacomplex.11

Thechallengeposedbythe“IslamicState”wentbeyondanypreviouschallengeboth quantitatively and qualitatively atmore than one level. The firstwas theestablishmentofthecaliphateandofanallegedIslamicstate,bothofwhicharehighlysymbolicanddrawonthediscourseof theIslamictradition;andseizingcontrolof territory,whereanauthoritywassetup,andremaining incompletecontrolofitforalmosttwoyears.Thesecondhasbeenthedegreeofsavageryinthegroup’sideology,itsmilitaryoperationsandthemannerinwhichithasdealtwith its various adversaries. The third is its ability to recruit and attract in amanner that has surpassed all previous terroristmovements, both in theArabandWestern worlds. The group has been able to attract west Europeans andwesternersofArabandMuslimoriginaswellassomeconverts.Ithasalsobeenabletoattractwomenandyoungpeople.Ithasfounditeasytokillandcarryoutbombings in public places, or so-called soft targets, as was the case in Paris,Brussels, a touristbeach resort inTunisandeven inShiitemosques inKuwaitandSaudiArabia.

TheThree-DimensionalDangerPosedbythe“IslamicState”(D3)12The first dimension is the state that the “Islamic State”has established in IraqandSyria,which includesa largegeographicareaand rulesmillionsofpeople,althoughithasbeguntorecedeinthelastfewmonths.

Theseconddimensionistheareasandcellsinseveralregionsoftheworldthatarepartoftheorganization.Theorganizationannouncedthatsatellitestateshadbeen established in Sinai (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis), Libya, Saudi Arabia (NajdState), Central Africa (Boko Haram) and the Caucuses, and other groups invariouspartsoftheworldhadalreadypledgedtheirallegiance.Thethirddimension,whichistheideologicalaspect, isthemostsignificantanddangerous. The group represents a system of thought and a trend that isspreading, and that has supporters in over 80 countries. Its supporters eitherhastilymovetothepromisedlandofthecaliphate,orcarryoutterroristactsthatservethegroup’sagendaandareinharmonywithitsobjectivesandideas.Weconsidertheideologicalaspecttobethemostdangerous,becausepinningitdownandblockingitisalmostimpossible,andbecausethiscertainlycannotbedone through conventional security methods or military action. Nevertheless,somecountrieshaveattemptedtowageelectronicwarfareonthegroup,because

11GhayathNaisee,“TheIslamicStateandthecounter-revolution.”InternationalSocialism, issue147,6July2015.And:JeffreyGoldberg,TheObamaDoctrine,TheAtlantic,April2016.http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/12JosephS.Nye,“HowtoFighttheIslamicState”,ProjectSyndicate,8September2015,https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-to-fight-the-islamic-state-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-09?barrier=true

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ofitswide-rangingcapabilityofusingtheinternettospreaditspropagandaandenhance its recruitment ability. There are tens of thousands of electronicaccountsthatsupportthe“IslamicState”onTwitterandFacebook,andwebsitesthatpublishthefilmsitproduces.13Givenalltheabovedetailsandindicators,the“IslamicState”canbeconsideredto be the zenith of extremist religious movements in terms of significance,influenceandgeographical spreadacross theworld.The lands thathave fallenunderthecontrolofgroupslinkedtothe“IslamicState”andthelargeand“high-quality”operationscarriedoutby its followers inrecentyearsaloneareampleevidenceofthis.

3. MappingEffortstoConfrontTerrorismEffortstocombatterrorismcanbecategorizedaccordingtothethreemainlevelsatwhichtheyareoccurring:thefirstisthelocallevel,thesecondistheregionallevelandthethirdistheinternationallevel.At the international and regional levels, the focus of those efforts has shiftedfromterroristgroups,movementsandtrendsthatpredatedal-Qaedatoal-Qaedaand then to the “Islamic State”. As far as the Arab and Islamic worlds wereconcerned, before the shift, some local Jihadi groups were considered to beterrorists.Previously,leftistandlocalrevolutionarygroupshadbeenconsideredas terrorist by their governments. However, with al-Qaeda, and subsequentlywith the “Islamic State”, the Jihadi groups moved from local to regionalframeworks. This was followed by the “globalization of Jihad”, which in turnresulted in the emergence of several international efforts and to a similarglobalization of the fight against such groups. This globalization emerged as aclear trendwhen the US, during the era of the Neoconservatives, declared its“globalwaronterrorism”,andUSPresidentGeorgeBushsetupaninternationalcoalition, which was joined by tens of countries from around the world, toconfrontal-QaedafollowingtheeventsofSeptember11.14

TheUSwagedaglobalwarinAfghanistanaftertheeventsofSeptember11withthehelpofitsinternationalalliance,anditwipedoutal-Qaeda’sstronghold.Afterthe “Islamic State” gained ascendancy in Iraq and Syria, US President BarackObamaformedanewinternationalcoalitiontoconfrontterrorismintheshapeof the “Islamic State”, and declared war on the organization in 2014. Severalcountries from around the world participated in bombing the organization'sstrongholds in Syria, and theUShelped the Iraqi government to confront it inIraq. In2015, SaudiArabia announced the formationof an Islamic coalition tofightterrorism.The security aspect of efforts to combat terrorism was strengthenedinternationally and regionally by meetings amongst European countries andinternational coordination that included the exchange of security-related

13Jonathan Powell, “Bombing ISIS Is Not Enough - We’ll Need to Talk to Them, Too.” TheGuardian,1December2015.14SalehYasser,“SomeaspectsofchangeinUSstrategicthinkingafter11September2001.”alhewaral-mutamadenwebsite,12September2007,http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=%20108854

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intelligence, the signing of agreements, the holding of meetings and theestablishmentofcommittees.ThemostprominentofthosecommitteeswastheoneformedbytheUNSecurityCouncilfollowingtheeventsofSeptember11inline with resolutions taken by the council to freeze assets and criminalizefinancingandhelpingterroristsunderthelawsofUNmemberstates,toprohibitgivingsafehavens to terroristgroups, toexchangesecurity-related intelligenceandtoworktoprevent thosegroups fromreceivingmaterialormoralsupportfromanyquarterwhatsoever.15

International resolutions and various efforts to followup on international andregionalcooperation toconfront terrorism intensified following theemergenceof the “Islamic State”. International and regional committees were formed towork on confronting the organization; to tackle the phenomenon of thoseinfiltrating into the areasunder its control; tomonitor its sourcesof financingand to block its revenues from oil, the black market and other financial andcommercial activities carried out by the organization and by al-Qaeda. Theseresolutionsincluded2133,2160,2161,2170,2180,whichwereissuedin2014.16Resolutionsissuedin2015included2249,2253,and2255.17

Thegistoftheaboveresolutionsistocombatthegroupslinkedtothe“IslamicState” and al-Qaeda using the above-mentioned means, international andregionalcoordinationofsecuritycooperation,depriving the twogroupsofsafehavens, preventing the flow of foreign fighters to them and blocking theirfinancingfromvarioussources.

Agreementsweresignedandinternationalandregionalstrategieswereadoptedto confrontal-Qaeda, and subsequently the “Islamic State”. These included theUnited Nations global counter-terrorism strategy of 2006, and the counter-terrorismagreementamongtheArabGulfStatesof2004.

At the local level, that is, within various states, counter-terrorism efforts,specificallyagainstal-Qaedanetworksandthe“IslamicState”,haveoccurredatseverallevelsandemployedvariousmeans.Stateshaveupdatedtheirlawsandregulations to pursue these organizations and keep upwith theway inwhichtheiroperationshavedeveloped.Forexample,theUSenactedanationaldefenselawknownasthePatriotActimmediatelyaftertheSeptember11attacks,givingthe security agencies wide powers to spy on, investigate and monitor thosegroups inside the US. Similar German laws followed, and France introducedlegislative amendments following the recent attacks in Paris. Arab countries,such as Egypt and Jordan, as well as other countries around the world didlikewise.18

Many countriesdeveloped legislative and concrete counter-terrorismmethods,and theyhavecompiled listsof terroristsand terroristgroups.Othercountries

15Seeinformationonthecommitteeanditsactivities:http://www.un.org/ar/sc/ctc/16http://www.un.org/ar/sc/documents/resolutions/2014.shtml17http://www.un.org/ar/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml18See“TheUSAPatriotAct:PreservingLifeandLiberty”ontheUSDepartmentofJusticewebsite:https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm“French Parliament Votes in Favor of Counterterrorism Draft Law” report in al-Rai al-Yom, 8March 2016. Human Rights Watch, “Jordan: Terrorism Amendments Threaten Rights.”https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2014/05/17/253736

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have criminalized supportingal-Qaeda, the “Islamic State” and Jabhatal-Nusrafinanciallyorevenmorallybyjoiningthem,orbypromotingthemelectronicallyorthroughothermeans.Tothatend,theworkofcounter-terrorismagencieswasdeveloped to include andmonitor the electronic sphere locally, regionally andinternationally. Thousands of electronic accounts used by supporters of thosegroupswere shut down, and the electronic battle between those agencies andthesupportersofthosegroupsturnedintosomethingofacatandmousegame.Localcounter-terrorismeffortsfallintotwocategories:

Thefirstcomprisestheabove-mentionedso-calledhardmethods,suchas laws,imprisonment, military strikes, international, regional and local resolutions,pursuingandmonitoringterroristgroupsandtheirsupportersandconstrainingtheirfinancial,militaryandhumanresources.The second type comprises soft methods. Many countries have attempted todevelop strategies that focus on the cultural and educational aspects; or ontackling the ideological aspect; or on attempting to alter the ideas, beliefs andopinions of those influenced by al-Qaeda and the “Islamic State”, or onestablishingprograms to rehabilitate those returning afterhaving joined thosetwogroupsorthosewhoattemptedtojointhemandfailed.In the context of such soft approaches, Jordan, for example, issued the 2005AmmanMessage to promote dialogue among religions and sects following thehotelbombingsinAmmanplannedandcarriedoutbythe“IslamicState”whenitwas part ofal-Qaeda’s global network andwas led byAbuMus’ab al-Zarqawi.The Jordanian authorities promoted the 2005 Amman Message inside andoutside Jordan as an interpretation of religion that differs from al-Qaeda’sideology.19In Saudi Arabia, theMohammad bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care wasestablished,andtheMinistryofReligiousAffairslaunchedthe“Sakina”campaignto confront al-Qaeda and the “Islamic State” and refute their ideologicaldiscourse using Shari’a, jurisprudence and religion with the help of scholarsspecializedinShari’aandvarioussocialandpsychologicalfields.Thoseaffectedas well as those who are wanted or have been sentenced are given theopportunitytorevisetheirthinking.Thosewhoshowsignsofashiftinthinkingaregivenpracticalandfinancialhelpuponbeingconditionallyreleased.20TheHedayahCenterwasestablishedintheUAEin2012.ItisanoffshootoftheInternational Forum to Combat Extremism in New York. The center, based inAbuDhabi,aimstointensifythescholarlyandintellectualeffortsofspecialiststounderstandextremismandmapoutastrategytoconfrontit.21

A program named the “Aarhus Model” (because it is connected to the city ofAarhus)waslaunchedtorehabilitateforeignfighters.Itsworkislinkedtoaso-called data house, which reaches out to families that fear that their children

19http://www.ammanmessage.com/20www.mncc.org.sa/21Seeinformationonthecenter:http://www.hedayah.ae/about-hedayah/history/

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mightbeaffectedbyextremistthinkingandcouldtrytotraveltoIraqandSyria.Specializedstaffreceivestheircallsanddealwithcases.22IntheUK,theMasarprogramwaslaunchedfollowingtheLondonbombingsof7July2005withtheaimofidentifyingindividualsaffectedbyextremistthinking,and guiding them away from that path. According to statistics, some 1839childrenaged15andyoungerwerereferredtotheprogrambetween2012and2015overfearstheyhadbeenexposedtoextremistideas.TheBritishgovernmentenactedlegislationthatmakesitobligatoryforschools,prisons,healthservicesand localauthorities tomonitor individualswhomightbepronetoextremismandhardlinethinkingunderthe“dutyofprevention”sothattheirpathwayscanbealtered.23

AnotherexamplewithinthiscontextistheRomeMemorandum(whichwastheoutcome of a series of meetings held in 2011 and 2012) on good practice inrehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremist criminals. It has become areference for countries seeking to rehabilitateand integrate returning fighters,orthosewhohavefallenundertheinfluenceofextremistthinking.

4. The“IslamicState’s”Narrative:TheMissingLinkinCounter-TerrorismThevariousapproachesandtrendsattheinternational,regionalandlocallevelsthatincludehardmeasures(military,security,legislative,arrests,droneattacks,etc.)andsoftmeasures(ideologicalcriticism,rehabilitationprograms,care, thereintegration of returning fighters) all revolve around “outputs” and “results”,and ignore or overlook the conditions and “inputs” that have led to theascendancyofthe“IslamicState”,al-Qaedaandothersuchgroups.

There isan increasingunderstandingbyUSandwesternpoliticalelites thatanorganization like the“IslamicState” ismainly theoutcomeofpoliticalorsocialcircumstances,andthatitislinkedtofundamentalproblemssuchasfeelingsofalienation and marginalization, weak integration channels, the search foridentity, and reactions to various causes and factors. However, such anunderstandinghasnotbeenfullytranslatedintocounter-terrorismefforts,orithas remained part of a limited theoretical domain. In themeantime, everyonehas jumped onto the bandwagon of dealing with the “Islamic State” from aresults-drivenperspectivewithoutthinkingofconditionsandcauses.Paradoxically,the“IslamicState”andthenewgenerationofJihadishavebecomemore advanced in their thinking and in their recruitment instruments andsecurityandmilitarytechniquesthanEuropean,westernandArabstates.Hence,weseethatveryyoungmenparticipatedincarryingouttheParisattacks.Theythenmanagedtomountattacks inBrussels,after findingthesecuritygapsthatthey needed and evading security cordons. Abdul Hamid Abaoud was able to 22WashingtonInstituteforNearEasternStudies,“RehabilitationandReintegrationofReturningForeignTerroristFighters,workshopon23February2015:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/rehabilitation-and-reintegration-of-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters23 “Britain: 415 children referred for deradicalization”, 21 January 2016, BBC Arabic,http://www.bbc.com/arabic/worldnews/2016/01/160121_400_children_referred_for_deradicalisation

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evadesecurityseveraltimesashemovedbetweenEuropeancountries.HewenttoSyriaandreturned,eventhoughhewaswantedbywesternsecurityservices.ThesamecanbesaidofSalahAbdulSalamandothers.

The organization was also able to find security loopholes at Sharm al-Sheikhairport, leading to the downing of a Russian airliner. Similarly, it was able toexploitinadequatesecurityatBrusselsairporttocarryoutitsoperation.ItalsostudieditssofttargetsinBurkinaFaso.Therehavebeenmanyprogramstocombatthe“IslamicState”,andagreatdealofpropagandaagainstitanditssavageimage.Thegroupitselfdoesnotdenythatsavageimage,andactuallypublishesfilms,picturesandabloodydiscoursethatstrengthenthatimage.However,alltheprogramsandpropagandatocombatthe“IslamicState”havenotreduceditsabilitytorecruit,promoteitselfandattractsupportersandfollowersinmanycountries.

Focusingonthemilitary,securityandideologicalaspectstocriticizeandweakenthe “Islamic State”, on the cultural approach that tries to develop educationalcurricula in theAraband Islamicworldsandon the improvementofmoderatereligiousdiscoursecanallbebeneficialandsignificantincounteringthe“IslamicState”.However, if suchmeasures are not accompaniedby efforts to eliminatetheconditionsandcausesthathaveledtoitsemergenceandtodismantlethemin various countries and societies, any successes that areachievedwill remainpartial,limitedorshort-lived,andinsomecasesthosemeasuresmightbackfire.Thisoccurswhenanti-terrorismlawsintheArabworldbecomeameansthattheauthoritiesuse toconfiscatepublicandpolitical freedomsandtakerevengeontheir adversaries, and when prisons, detention centers and instruments oftorture become another cause for extremism, terrorism and the desire forrevenge.24

Researchby sociologists, psychologists andanthropologistshasbegun todrawon other concepts and new clues to explain extremism, terrorism and thereasons for the emergence of the “Islamic State”. For example, such researchrefutes the hypothesis that those who belong to such groups were originallycriminalsandnihilistsbeforejoining.Somestudiesdenythatthisissoinmanycases, and hold thatwemust search for other causes and factors that explainwhyapercentageofyoungpeoplewhobelongtothatschoolofthoughtundergoa transformation from a state of being idealistic dreamers to a state ofextremism,terrorismandpracticingmurderandsuicideattacks.25

Some studies refer to the importance of introducing the concept of “brainwashing”whendealingwith thosewhobelong to that trend,particularlygivenThe “IslamicState’s”well-developedability to recruit,promote itselfandreachcategoriesofpeoplethatwerenotpreviouslyaccessibletosimilargroups.26

Hence,itisnecessarywhenplanningcounter-terrorismeffortsandstrategiestogobacktotheinitialquestion,whichrelatestothe“Da’eshnarrative”,notonlyin 24MohammadAbuRumman,“Da’esh:Whytheothernarrativehassucceeded.”al-Arabial-Jadeednewspaper,23November2015.25Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy: Religion, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists.TranslatedbyTaherLabasi,JadawelPublishingHouse,Beirut,2015,pp.7-1026MohammadAbuRumman, “Where is the exit point?” Jordanian newspaper al-Ghad, 21 June2015.

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ordertocritiqueitonreligiousandjurisprudencegroundsandtorespondtoit,assomespecializedcentersaredoing.Thatnarrativemustalsobeunderstood,deconstructed and analyzed in order to comprehend its strengths andweaknessesand to try to changeactualobjectivecircumstances thatarebasedonit.

Examples of the questions we should be asking are: Why did Abdul HamidAbaoud and Ibrahim and Hasnaa Boulahsan, who had not been religious inpreviousyears,becomefaithfulfollowersofthe“IslamicState”?Wasthissimplybecauseof thegroup’smediamessageon Jihadiwebsites,orwas it theFrenchlanguage that themessages used? Or did certain conditionsmake them readycandidatesforsuchabasicradicaltransformation?

Apracticalratherthanatheoreticalcritiqueisneededtodismantlethenarrativeof the “Islamic State”. The Sunni crisis in Iraq and Syria is one of the mostimportant factors that led to the group’s ascendancy. The creation of politicalprospects will defuse a significant part of that narrative, and arguments ofcounter-revolution and the failure of democratic transformation are excusesused by the proponents of theorizing. Approving a democratic system andpluralism, the alternation of power and allowing moderate Islamists toparticipatewill underminean importantpart of the “Islamic State’s”narrative.Corruption, unemployment and government repression are key elements thatthe“IslamicState”dependsupon.Goodgovernance,afairjudicialsystemandafree press weaken the group’s argument. The establishment of an Islamicgovernmentisasymbolthatthegroupexploits.Hence,offeringanindependentIslamicdiscourseandamodernvisionofgovernmentthatisinlinewithShari’a,citizenship and democracy and is advocated by independent scholars willweakenthe“IslamicState’s”logic,andsoon!

Returningtosquareoneregardingthewaronterror, thequestion is:Oneyearafter declaring war on the “Islamic State”, and more than 14 years after theSeptember 11 events, what went wrong with those strategies andconfrontations, given that the “Islamic State’s” thinking is spreading and thenumberofitssupportersaroundtheworldisincreasing?Theansweristhatexistingstrategiestackleoutputsnot inputs,andresultsnotconditions.Ifweweretosuppose,forthesakeofargument,thatairstrikesweretowipeoutRaqqaandthousandsofthe“IslamicState’s”membersinSyriaandIraq, in linewithcurrentdemandsbywesternsecurityexperts,wouldthatendtheproblem,orwoulditcomplicateit,resultinginthebirthofsomethingthatisharsherandmorestridentandnihilisticthanthecultureofthe“IslamicState”?

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ApproachestotheWaronTerrorism:ExamplesofEffortstoEradicateExtremism

HassanAbuHaniehFordecades,most experts have cast doubt on the benefit of limiting efforts toconfront the phenomenon of “terrorism” to military and security approaches,because that phenomenon stems from complex and multi-faceted objectivepolitical, economic and social causes, conditions and circumstances.Moreover,its forms and manifestations depend on prevailing ideological and culturalstructures.Themilitaryapproachknownas“thewaronterror”adoptedbytheUnitedStates followingal-Qaeda’s attacksonNewYorkandWashingtonon11September2001hasproventobeineffectiveinachievingitsdeclaredobjectiveofdestroyingal-QaedaandalliedJihadimovements.

That military and security approach revealed a massive flaw and resulted inspeedyfailure.Militarycampaignshavenotdeprivedthesupposedterroristsoftheir safehavens,norhave theyblockaded themanddriedup their sourcesoffinance, nor have they wiped out their ideological discourse. Moreover, suchcampaigns failed to undermine themedia and electronic propaganda of thosesupposedterrorists.TheinternationalmilitarycampaignagainsttheTalibanandal-Qaeda in Afghanistan thatwas launched in 2001 ended aftermore than 14yearsandyieldedonlymodestresults.TheTaliban, itsallied Jihadigroupsandal-Qaeda stillenjoysafehavens,andtheAfghangovernmentappears incapableofhaltingTaliban’sexpansion.InIraq,the2003USoccupationdidnotresultinpushing back supposed al-Qaeda terrorism. To the contrary, the occupationcontributedtoanewincarnationofal-Qaeda27andthedevelopmentofaglobalJihadimovement intheshapeofthe“IslamicState”,whichhastakencontroloflargeareas.The inadequacyof themilitaryandsecuritywaragainst terrorismisclear.TheUSwasabletosignificantlyweakenthecentralal-QaedaorganizationinPakistanandAfghanistan, and to killal-Qaeda leaderOsamabinLaden andmost of theorganization’simportantleaders,suchasAbuYazidal-Masri,AbuHafsal-Masri,Abual-Laithal-Libi,AbuYahyaal-Libi andAttiyahAbdulRahman.TheUSwasalsoable tohuntdownmajor leadersofregionalbranches,suchasheadof theIraqi branchAbuMus’ab al-Zarqawi;al-Qaeda leader in theArabian PeninsulaAbu Basir al-Waheishi and his deputy Sufian al-Shihri; al-Qaeda’s Yemenitheorist Anwar al-Awlaqi;Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair, leader of the Somali branchknownasal-Shabaabal-Mujahideenandothers.Theywereabletoarrestseveralleaders,suchasKhalidSheikhMohammad,RamzibinShaibah,AbuZubaida,Abual-Farajal-Libi,SuleimanAbuGaith,AbuAnasal-Libiandothers.Theywereallsent to the Guantanamo detention facility. 28 However, such success seems 27Several books and studies have appeared refuting the lie that Iraq had weapons of massdestructionandwassponsoring terrorism.That liewasused to justify theUS invasionof Iraq.Seeasampleofthosewritingsin:BobWoodward,PlanofAttack.TranslatedintoArabicbyFadhilJatkar,Al-ObaikanBookshop,Riyadh,2004.28Guantanamo detention camp is one of the most famous prisons in the world. Its inmatesinclude detainees and prisoners who have not been charged, and it has been criticized by all

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limited, because global Jihadism has developed and been able to expand itsrecruitment,developitsstructures,remainsteadfastandincreaseitsreach.The military and security policies of the war on terror contributed to thecreation of a new, more dangerous Jihadi generation that has become morewidespreadsincetheeventsofSeptember11.ThatformofJihadismhasgainedcontrolof largeareas in several locations, including Iraq, Syria,Libya, Somalia,Yemen, Sinai, Afghanistan, Sub-Sahara Africa and the Sahel. Jihadism has alsosplit intotwodangerousbranches.Thefirst,underthe leadershipofAymanal-Zawahiri, adheres to al-Qaeda’s traditional agenda. The second is led by therenegadeIraqibranchknownasthe“IslamicState”ledbyAbuBakral-Baghdadi.Moreover,Jihadiideologicaldiscoursehasbecomemoreattractive.

ConcreteApproaches:TheParadigmofWarandCriminalJustice

Following the September 11 attacks, the military approach dominated theperspectivesthatgovernedcombattingterrorism.Thatapproachisbasedontheuseofforceanditslegitimization,supportforunilateralactionbythosecapableof it and substituting the principle of deterrence and containment with theprinciple of pre-emptive defense. By comparison, prior to the events ofSeptember 11, legal approaches had dominated efforts to deal with thephenomenon of terrorism. That approach emphasizes the importance ofunderstandingthefundamentalcausesforterrorism,themilitaryoptionisalastresort, anddeterrence and containmentbecome thepreferred strategy.Hence,two patterns dominated efforts to combat terrorism: the pattern of criminaljusticeandthepatternofwar.Bothdependonamonopolizationbythestateofthe use of violence. Under the criminal justice pattern, the police bear theprincipal responsibility togetherwith the courts and the prison system.Underthewarpattern,thearmybearsthemainresponsibility.

The rules of engagement that apply when implementing the criminal justicepattern include a minimal use of force, whereas implementation of the warpattern entails the maximum use of force. Both patterns are subject to strictlimitsregardingwhomaybesubjectedtoviolence,thusbestowinglegitimacyonstatepractices.Despitetheimportanceofthecriminaljusticeapproach,itisslowand not highly effective. The war pattern is effective, speedy and suited todealingwith the typeofnew threats thathaveemerged, suchasdecentralized human rights organizations because it has become notorious for using the harshest forms oftorture.Amnesty International considers that theGuantanamodetentioncenter represents the“barbarity of this era” and that the haphazard campaign of arrests carried out by the US is ablatant legal challenge to thewholeworld.However, thegreater catastrophe is the inability tomakeadecision to shut itdown,despite themanypromises thatUSPresidentBarrackObamahasmadetodososincehecametotheWhiteHousein2009.However,thosepromiseshavenotbeenfulfilled.WorktoestablishtheGuantanamodetentioncenterbeganfollowingtheattacksofSeptember 11, 2001 when former US President George Bush was in office. It was opened inJanuary2002 at aUS coastalmilitarybase in southernCubawithin the frameworkof a rentalcontract dating back to 1903. The inmates of the detention center were classified as “enemycombatants”, and it quickly turned into a symbol of the so-called “war on terror”. There arecurrently around 116 prisoners in Guantanamo out of an original 779. They have not beencharged or tried. They include five persons accused of being responsible for the attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, and they have been referred to the military judicial system and faceexecution.

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terroristnetworksthatarebasedonideologicalmotivesandareundeterredbyconventional criminal justice. However, the war pattern entails a high risk ofconsequences thatwill exacerbateviolent actions, undermine the legitimacyofthe ruling regimes that resort to it, cause those regimes to behaveundemocratically and create an atmosphere that the advocates of terroristmovements can exploit for purposes of recruitment and attractingsympathizers.29The flaws in thewar on terror are not confined to the patterns ofwar and ofcriminal justice. The absence of a precise definition of “terrorism” hascontributedtostateofsemanticconfusionandalackofcredibility,andhasthusbecome a weapon used by the authorities of dictatorial states to confrontpoliticaladversaries,orsupposedenemies.Theterm“terrorism”isbeingusedbyfeuding parties for political purposes, and has turned into an individual,subjective concept. Terrorism, according to JosephMassad, “is not a supposedname; rather, it is always an imposed name. The categorizing concept thattransforms it from a practice into an identity is a specific concept that is notcharacterized by generalization. Whereas a state authority describes somepractices as terrorism and refers to thosewho commit them as ‘terrorists’, allthosewhoaredescribedas terrorists reject thatdescription,which is imposedonthembythestate.”30Thestrategyofnomenclatureinthiscontext,accordingto Jacques Derrida, is not haphazard, but an integral part of the strategy ofcontrolandhegemonyinthegameofpower.Derridaholdsthatthedominatingpowers are those that are able, under certain circumstances, to imposenamesand then impose the interpretations that suit them on those names, hencelegitimizing that nomenclature, and even codifying it on the national andinternational arenas. After a long and complex history, the United Statessucceeded in bringing about an agreement amongst the governments of SouthAmerica to officially designate as terrorist all organized political movementsresistingrulingregimesorregimesthatwereactuallyimposedongovernment.31

Moststateshaveadoptedapatternofstrictcriminalizationtoconfrontpossiblethreats, using policies of “pursuit and judicial prosecution” that encompasseveryonewithoutdiscrimination.InmostofWesternEurope,governmentshaveintroduced more repressive laws relating to terrorism to confront extremismanddealwith thepossible threatposedby the returnof foreign fighters. Suchlaws include strengthening the powers of the public prosecutor, widening thescope of measures for extraditing individuals to their original countries, thecancellation of travel documents, increasing the surveillance powers ofintelligenceservicesandcriminalizingtraveltoareasofconflictabroad.Recentlyadopted measures in the UK, Holland, Germany, Austria, France and othercountries includedealingwith foreign fightersasasecurity issue,whether thisrelates to travelling abroad or returning to the country. Measures have alsoincluded the banning of groups and organizations suspected of helping to

29For further details, see Ronald Crelinsten, Counterterrorism. Translated by Ahmad al-Tijani,EmiratesCenterforStrategicStudiesandResearch,UAE,2011.30See JosephMassad,ThePersistenceof thePalestinianQuestion.Dar al-Adaab,Beirut, 2009, p.11.31See Jacques Derrida, What Happened on 11 September. Translated by Safa Fathi, ToubkalPublishing,Casablanca,2006,p.64.

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facilitate the recruitment of fighters. 32 The electronic monitoring ofcommunicationsforsecuritypurposeshasincreasedandbecomemoreefficient.However,whilerepressivestrategiescanpreventterroristoperations,accordingto Charles Lister, they can result in a backlash by feeding into resentment,creating new grievances and facilitating attraction to new or revived causes.Moreover,thewaronterrorismhasresultedinanerosionintheruleoflawandcivilliberties,reducingthetrustthatcitizenshaveintheirgovernments.33IntheArabWorld,mostcountrieshavealteredlawson“terrorism”sothattheymorestronglycriminalizereturningfighters,andtheterm“terrorism”hascometo includepoliticalmovementsandgroups.Somecountrieshave issued listsofterroristgroupsthatincludealargeunclassifiedcollection,foremostofwhichistheMuslimBrotherhood. InEgypt, theMuslimBrotherhoodwasclassifiedasaterroristgroupon25December2013,34andSaudiArabiaaddedthemovementto its list of terrorist organizations on 7 March 2014,35followed by the UAE,whichplacedthegrouponitslistofterroristgroupson15November2014.36

SoftApproaches:TheGuidanceandReintegrationPattern

Sincethe“IslamicState”tookcontrolofMosulinJune2014,thedangersoflocal,regional and international terrorism increased, because the objectives of theJihadi groups classified as terrorism movements were no longer limited toconfronting“eitherthenearorthefarenemy.”Thoseobjectivesarenowbasedon integrating those dimensions, waging local wars in several countries,particularly IraqandSyria,andcarryingoutexternalattacks like thoseseen inParis on 13 November 2015, in Brussels on 22 March 2016 and in othercountries.Thishasincreasedthedangerposedbyforeignfighters,ofwhomover30,000 have been recruited, according to UN statistics.37Moreover, “IslamicState” continues to attract waves of young people, in what is the biggestvoluntaryenlistmentoffighterssincetheglobalJihadiphenomenontookshapeinitstwomainstrongholdsofAfghanistanandIraq.38 32TheauthoritiesinEuropebannedIslamicorganizationssuspectedoffacilitatingtraveltoSyriaand Iraq for terrorism-related purposes. A prominent example is the banning of the “MilletIbrahim”organizationinGermanyin2012,andthe“NeedfortheCaliphate”groupintheUKin2014,andthe“ShariaforBelgiumOrganization”inBelgiumin2015.33SeeCharlesLister,ReturningForeignFighters:CriminalizationorReintegration?Ibid.,pp.3-4.34“EgyptiangovernmentconsiderstheMuslimBrotherhoodaterroristgroup.”al-Jazeera,http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/12/25/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A935“FirstSaudiListofTerroristOrganizationsincludestheMuslimBrotherhood,al-NusraandDa’esh.”BBCArabic,http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/03/140307_saudi_terror_organizations.36“Emirates Describes Organizations, the Most Prominent of Which is the Brotherhood as“Terrorist”,al-Jazeera,http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2014/11/15/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%85-37CharlesLister,ReturningForeignFighters:CriminalizationorReintegration?BrookingsDohaCenter,Doha,2015,p.1:http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/08/13-foreign-fighters-lister/Ar-Fighters-Web.pdf?la=ar38Attractionandpolarizationprocesseswithintheranksofthe“IslamicState”inIraqandSyriabecomeclearwhentheyarecomparedtothetwolargestpreviousoperationstorecruitforeign

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As Jihadi movements spread and the risks of terrorism increased, theinternational community better understood the need for the adoption of anintegrated strategy in the war on terrorism and the elimination of violentextremism. According to a UN report, over the past two decades, theinternational communityworked to confront violent extremismmainlywithintheframeworkofsecuritytypemeasuresthatwereusedtoconfronttheterroristthreat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. However, with the emergence of anewgenerationofgroups,thereisincreasinginternationalconsensusthatsuchmeasurestocombatterrorismwereinsufficienttopreventthespreadofviolentextremism.Infact,thecategorycomprisingaspectsofviolentextremismislargerthan the terrorist category, and using the terms “violent extremism” and“terrorism” interchangeablycould leadto justifyingtheoveruseofmeasurestocombat terrorism in a widespread manner and applying them to forms ofbehaviorthatcannotbedescribedasactsofterrorism.

Security Council Resolution 2178 of 2014 highlights the connection betweenviolent extremism and terrorism, and emphasizes thatmeasures taken to dealwiththemmustbeinlinewithinternationalprinciples.Italsoacknowledgestheneed for prevention, because “violent extremism can lead to terrorism” andrequires collective efforts, “including the prevention of the dissemination ofextremist thought among individuals and their recruitment to join terroristgroupsandforeignterroristfighters.”Theresolutionaffirmsthatthereisaneedtoadoptamorecomprehensivecourse that isnot limited to thebasic securitymeasuresthatarecurrentlyinforcetocombatterrorism.39International approaches are still based on short-term methods that take theshape of war and criminal justice. They deal with the foreign fighters asterrorists,orconsiderthemaspotentialterroristsinaccordancewithamentalityof criminalization, although statistics indicate that most returning foreignfighters do not have hostile intentions. This requires a reconsideration ofsecurityand legalprocedures,andawideningof theapproachto includemoreeffectivemeasuresinaccordancewiththelogicofliberalpolicies.Suchmeasuresincludesocialintegration,socialcohesionandtherelationshipbetweenthestateand the citizen. All such measures must accord with a comprehensive andintegrated strategy. According to Gilles de Kerchove, any danger that foreignfightersmightposemustbeevaluatedonacasebycasebasis.Whileaminorityof themmight carryout a terrorist attack,manymaybe let downandmaybesuffering frompost-traumatic shock. Somemay feel that theyhave carriedout

fighterssincethisbecameaphenomenoninthe1980s.Thenumberofrecruitedfightersbythe“Islamic State” vastly exceeds those recruited by previous processes. The most recentrecruitment processes occurred over a much shorter period. It is believed that around 5,000peopleleftfortheAfghanfronttofightagainsttheSovietsin1979-1992.Duringthedecadepriorto thisone,some4,000foreign fighters left for the Iraqi front in2003-2007to fightagainstUSoccupation.SeeAaronZelin,SunniForeignFightersinSyria:Background,FacilitatingFactors,andSelect Responses: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/sunni-foreign-fighters-in-syria-background-facilitating-factors-and-select39See United Nations, General Assembly, “Culture of Peace: The UN Global Counter-TerrorismStrategy, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.” Report by the Secretary-General,A/70/674:http://wwwhuman-human.blogspot.com.tr/2016/01/blog-post_93.html

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theirdutyasMuslimsbysupportingthe“ArabSpring”,andmaysimplyneedtoreintegrateintosociety.40Terroristthreatsandthedangersofviolentextremismarenolongerconfinedtotheregionalstatesneighboringthefocalpointsoflocalcivilconflicts.Theyhaveturnedintoaglobalphenomenonthatcrossesborders,raisingsecurityfears inwestern countries of the spread of radical extremist views amongst youngpeople.TheaverageflowsofvolunteersfromtheUSandtheEuropeancountriesto the focalpointsofcivil conflicts in theregionhave increased,andobsessionwith the return of fighters to their countries is a source of anxiety to all thesecurity and civil agencies in those countries. Hence, tendencies, experiments,patterns and approaches have emerged seeking unconventional methods ofdealingwiththephenomenaof“terrorism”and“violentextremism”.

EuropeanModelsofContainment

In the contextof confronting terrorismandviolentextremism, someEuropeangovernments have resorted to innovative, unconventional long-term modelsbasedonredirectionandreintegrationindealingwithreturningforeignfighters.Thisapproach isbasedon theprincipleof citizenshipwithin the frameworkofdemocracy and the rule of law, and gives a citizen another chance forrehabilitation and reintegration into society. It deals in an individual mannerwith themotivationsofreturning foreign fighters,andseeks tounderstandthereasonsthatpromptedthemto join terroristorhardlinegroups,aswellas thereasons that prompted them to dissent from those groups and return to theircountries.Itavoidsdealingwiththemasterroristsandextremistswhocannotbechangedandreintegrated.Themotivesforjoiningterroristandextremistgroupsarepolitically,economically,sociallyandpsychologicallyvaried,andtheyarenotpurelyofanideologicalreligiousnature.

Despite the predominance of governmental military and security approaches,thereisaninternationalunderstandingoftheneedtoincludeandempowerlocalcommunitiesineffortstoeliminateviolentextremism.Theproponentsofliberalpoliciesarebasingtheir fight topromotethisapproachonUNSecurityCouncilResolution 2178, which emphasizes the need to empower local players toeliminate extremism and reintegrate returning foreign fighters. In Aarhus,Denmark’s second largest city, the police and the municipal council incoordinationwithnon-governmentalandlocalorganizationshavejoinedMuslimcommunitiesonawidescaletopreventforeignfightersfromleavingbymeansofan“earlypreventionprogram”andtoencourageotherstoreturnthroughan“exitprogram”.41Recent years have seen the emergence of a number of programs based on apolicy of containment according to unconventional approaches that employreorientation, management of beliefs and integration into society. Some

40GillesdeKerchove, JacobBundsgaard,Maj.Gen.DougStone,USMC(ret.),andMatthewLevitt,RehabilitationandReintegrationofReturningForeignTerroristFighters:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/rehabilitation-and-reintegration-of-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters41CharlesLister,ReturningForeignFighters:CriminalizationorReintegration?Ibid.,p.8.

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Europeanstateshaveadoptedprogramstodealwiththosereturningfromfocalareasofconflict,andwithcasesofextremismonanindividualbasis.Eachcaseisstudied separately, and methods of dealing with them range from intellectualrehabilitation, to psychological care, to social integration. Themost importantsocial integration program is the “Aarhusmodel” in Denmark, which involvesjointeffortsbythesecurityservicesandlocalauthoritiestointegrateextremistsby providing themwith opportunities to complete their studies, andwith life,workandsocialamenitiestoencouragethemtorejectextremismandviolence.The “HayatProgram” inGermany isbasedonan integrationof ideological andintellectual rehabilitationwith functional and social rehabilitation to integrateextremistsintopubliclifeanddealwiththeirfeelingsofsocialalienation.42

TheDanish“Aarhus”modelandtheGerman“Hayat”programareconsideredtobethebest-knownsuchexperiments.TheDanishapproachreliesonintegrationand inclusion by combining the approaches of war, criminal justice andcontainment.While Denmark arrests and prosecutes returning fighters whoseparticipationinterrorismisproven,itoffershelptoothers,andworkstoprovidethemwith jobopportunities,housing,educationandguidance.Theseprogramsdo not aim to alter conservative Islamic belief as long as it is not violent. Theresearch of Preben Bertelsen, professor of psychology at Aarhus University in“psychology and life”, is widely considered to be the scientific basis of the“Aarhus” model. He says, “the so-called ‘Aarhus model’ revolves aroundcontainment.Lookatallthoseyoungmen,andyouwillfindthattheyarefightingsimilarproblemstothoseconfrontedbymanyyoungpeoplearoundtheworld–building their lives, understanding theworld around themand finding a spaceandmeaningintheirsocieties.Whatwehavetosaytothemis:Ifyouhavenotcommittedanykindofcrime,wewillhelpyoutofindawayback.”43

AllanAarslev,whoisinchargeofthepolice’sroleindealingwithextremisminAarhus, sums up the nature of the integrated program involving governmentinstitutionsandcivilsociety,andadmitsthatthemissionandchoicesitfacesaredifficult.Hesays, “It iseasy topassstrict laws,but thedifficulty lies indealingfairly over a long period with those individuals, and it is an operation thatrequiresgroupsofexperts,psychologyconsultants,healthcare,helptogetbackontoaneducationalorprofessionalpathandthesearchforaccommodation.Itisa process of returning to a normal life pattern and to being in harmonywithsociety.Wearenotdoingthisonthebasisofanypoliticalbeliefs,butbecausewethink that we will succeed in the end.” This is because this process runs inparallelwithopen,intensive,andoftentoughdialoguebetweencityofficialsandthe imams of the Grimhojvej mosque. In 2013, twenty-two members of theGrimhojvej mosque in Aarhus left to fight in Syria, whereas only eight otherinhabitants of the city did the same that year. After the counseling team inAarhus contacted the mosque’s leadership, only one member left for Jihad in 42TheDoubleThreat:MechanismsforConfrontingthethreatsof“ThoseReturningfromExtremistFocalPoints”,RegionalCenterforStrategicStudies,Cairo,http://www.rcssmideast.org/Article/4288/%D8%A2%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-43DanielKochis,TerrorintheHappiestPlaceonEarth.TranslatedbyAbdulRahmanal-Husseini,al-Ghadnewspaper,http://www.alghad.com/prints/878625-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1-

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2014. Of the thirty-three Aarhus inhabitants who have left for Syria and Iraqsince 2011, sixteen returned with the help of the authorities and counsellors.None of them subsequently committed any serious crimes, and most of themnowworkorhaveresumedtheirstudies.44ThemostimportantpartoftheAarhusprogram,accordingtoeveryonewhohasparticipatedinit,isitsuseofpersonalteachers.Thisenablesreturningfighters,orthosewhowanttoreturntofightingtoresorttothoseteacherswithregardtotheirdailylives,andtoenterintoseriousdebateswiththemaboutreligionandethics.ThemayorofAarhussays,“Youcannotsimplypasslawsthattellpeoplehow to think andwhat they should believe in, but you canwork sincerely fordialogue and social integration.” Vertical laws and strict measures are good,according to the Aarhus experience, but the basic solution is provided by thehorizontalmethodthatfocusesonthedetailsofdailylife.45

The Aarhus model has become a central discussion point when it comes todealingwithtendenciestowardsextremismandterrorismandreorientationandintegrationprograms. It offers ananswer to thequestion “Howdowepreventthemfromgoing toconflictareas, takinguparms,gettingarmed training, thenreturning to their societies after becoming more hardline?” In that context,JonathanBirdwell,anexpertonwaysofdealingwithhardliners,says,“Thereisanawarenessamongst experts that theAarhusmodel is thebest, andmustbereplicatedinotherEuropeancities.”46

AnotherinnovativeprojecthasemergedinGermany.Itisknownasthe“Hayat”project and has been in operation since January 2012 in partnershipwith theGerman Federal Office for Immigration and Refugee Affairs. It carries outindividualassessmentsofreturningforeignfighters,andwhenpossible,theyareguided through counseling and reintegration in Berlin and eastern Germany.Project Consultant Julia Berczyk emphasizes, “We must distinguish amongsttypesof returneesandunderstand that throwing themall in jail couldactuallyenhance extremism.We need to open some doors to ensure some exits.” The“Hayat”methodisbasedonathree-prongedprocesstoeliminateextremismandencourageagradualintegrationintosociety.Itincludes:Firstly, the ideological aspect: This is based on delegitimization andneutralizationof Jihadidiscourse andencouraging foreign fighters to reconcilewiththeirpast.

Secondly, thepractical aspect:This is basedonhelping foreign fighters to findjobs, education opportunities or training, and on finding accommodation forthem.

44CharlesLister,ReturningForeignFighters:CriminalizationorReintegration?Ibid.,p.9.45“TheAarhusModel..WillitSucceedinStoppingEuropeansfromJoining“Da’esh”?,translatedandeditedbyNoonPost:http://www.noonpost.net/content/434246Nasseral-Sahli,“Aarhus…aModelforCombatinga“HardlineEnvironment”inEurope?”,Alarabial-Jadeed:http://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2015/11/20/%D8%A2%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B3--%D9%86%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B0%D8%AC-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A9-

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Thirdly: the emotional aspect: This is based on dealing with their emotionalneeds, ensuring they get support from their families, and on establishing analternativesocialpointofreference.47

The “Hayat” project has proven its effectiveness at eliminating Islamicextremism, and has dealt with 130 cases. In that context several Europeancountries and the US have worked to adopt innovative programs similar toDenmark’s “Aarhus” project and Germany’s “Hayat” project. The US attorneygeneral Eric Holder announced on 15 September 2014 that the US justicedepartmenthadestablishedaprogramtocombatthespreadofextremistviews,and to deal pre-emptively with the increased recruitment of young people byextremistgroups.Theprogramworks throughpsychological rehabilitationandpsychological, social and religious care for categories thatmight join terroristorganizations. Belgiumhas adopted a similar program that uses psychology todetermine the motivations of those who join terrorist groups. The programsubjectsfightersreturningfromSyriatopsychologicalandsocialmonitoringtodeterminetheirmotivationsforadoptingradicaltendencies,andtheideologicaldiscourseusedby terroristorganizations toattractnewyoungrecruits.Franceadoptedaprogram to combat extremism inOctober2013,basedon launchingawareness campaigns to encourage parents to report any changes in thebehavior or beliefs of their offspring, on preventing the migration of minorswithouttheapprovaloftheirguardiansandonhackingintoandbanningradicalwebsitesthatdisseminateanideologyoftakfirandattractyoungmentofightinSyria and Iraq. In addition to the “Hayat” project in Germany, contact centershavebeen established toprovide counseling to families in the event that theiroffspringstarttoexhibitsignsofextremismandtoofferpsychological,socialandreligious guidance to young people who are potential recruits for terroristorganizations.48

ArabModelsofContainment

The strategies and policies for combatting terrorism and eliminating violentextremism are unarguablymore complex in the Arabworld than in the west.Thisisbecausethebiggestdangerinwesterncountriesisbasicallylimitedtotheissueofforeignfightersandthefearthattheymightcarryoutretaliatoryattacks.Hence, it isaphenomenonrelatingtoaminoritythatdoesnotaimtoestablishphysical control over any location. Moreover, its impacts are limited becauseMuslimsareaminority,andtheyusuallybelongtomoderateIslamicschoolsofthought. However, the danger in the Arab world is of a dual nature, becauseoperationsbyJihadigroupsarenotlimitedtoretaliatorystrikes.Theyareaimedat imposing physical control over areas, overthrowing governments andimposing Islamic Shari’a law. They target the state and society militarily andideologically, their activities are varied and they comprise movements andgroups that are spread over wide geographical areas. The most radical Jihadi

47CharlesLister,ReturningForeignFighters:CriminalizationorReintegration?Ibid,p9.48 “Policies of Containment. Regional Implications of the Implementation of ‘IdeologicalCounseling’ in Western Countries.” Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo:http://www.rcssmideast.org/Article/2852/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%8

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organizations,suchas“IslamicState”andal-QaedacontrollargeareasinseveralArabcountries,suchasIraq,Syria,Libya,Yemen,EgyptandSomalia.Moreover,Jihadi ideology enjoys the support of cells, groups and networks that areembedded in sympathetic social incubators in anArab-Islamic environment inwhich Islamasareligion isabasiccomponent thatshapes identity, tendenciesandbehavior.

Althoughthemodelsofwarandcriminal justicecanachieverelativesuccessinwestern countries, their effectiveness is doubtful in the Arab world, wheremilitary and security approaches on their own have failed abjectly. The Jihadiphenomenon in the Arab world has grown, has become more dangerous andmore widespread, is based on a military security structure, has a violentintellectualideologyandoperatesprofessionalmediaandpropagandaoutlets.Itseems that those managing Arab efforts to combat terrorism have begun tocomprehendthesenewterroristrisksandareexhibitingawiderunderstandingindealingwiththisphenomenonbyresortingtosoftinitiativesinadditiontothehardmilitaryand securityapproaches.Unconventional initiatives,projects andprograms have sprung up focusing on deep causes and long-term treatments.However,themainfaultwithArabmethodsofdealingwiththeproblemisthatmost of them are originated by the governing establishment and its securityagencies, rather than by establishments belonging to civil society, whichgovernmentshaveweakenedandcontinuetopressure.

CorrectionalRevisions

Someof themostprominent initiatives thathavecontributed todelegitimizingviolentextremismintheArabworldwerelaunchedbyJihadigroups,suchasal-Jihadandal-Gama’aal-IslamiyainEgyptandal-Jama’ahal-Libiyyahal-MuqatilahinLibya.Thefirstgrouptoputforwardaninitiativewasal-Gama’aal-IslamiyainEgypt.Itsinitiative,putforwardin1997,wasknownasthe“StoptheViolence”,andthiswasfollowedbyacomprehensiveintellectualrevisionrejectingtheuseof violence, putting forth Islamic interpretations that religiously delegitimizeviolenceasameansofachievingpoliticalchange,andworkingtodismantlethereligious arguments providing a basis for violence in general, and for itsmechanismsandmilitarytactics,suchassuicideattacks.49Followinginthefootstepsofal-Gama’aal-Islamiya,afactionoftheal-Jihadgroupput forward intellectual revisions inNovember2007 throughSayyed Imamal-Sharif,whoisknownasDr.FadhlandasAbdulQaderAbdulAzizandwhoistheformer Emir of the Egyptian al-Jihad group. Those revisions reached similar 49The historical leadership of theMuslim Brotherhood issued a collection of reference books,authoredbyKaramMohammadZuhdi,AliMohammadAlial-Sharif,HamdiAbdulRahmanAbdulAtheem,AssemAbdulMajedMohammad,NajehIbrahimAbdullah,OsamaIbrahimHafez,FouadMohammadal-Doulibi andMohammad Issamal-DeinDurbalahunder the category “CorrectingConcepts”. They are:The Initiative to StopViolence:ARealistic Perspective and a JurisprudenceView, al-Obaikan Bookshop, Riyadh, 2004. Also: Highlighting the Mistakes That Have BefallenJihad. al-Obaikan Bookshop, Riyadh, 2004. Also: Advice and Clarity in the Correction of theConcepts of Those Who Follow Shari’a Law. al-Obaikan Bookshop, Riyadh, 2004. Also: TheForbidding of Exaggeration in Religion and of Declaring Others as Unbelievers. al-ObaikanBookshop, Riyadh, 2004. Another collection of books followed, including al-Qaeda’s StrategiesandBombings,MistakesandDangers.al-ObaikanBookshop,Riyadh,2004.

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conclusions to those reached by al-Gama’a al-Islamiya,50and the movement’shistoricleadershipissuedanumberofstudiestoreviseitsthoughtinDecember2009,andpreparedcorrectivestudies.51

Despite the importance of such revisions, Arab governments used a securityapproachtodealwiththem,releasingthosewhohadtakensuchinitiativesandtheir supporters from jail. However, the authoritarian tendencies of thosegovernments and the course of selective integration that they took weakenedtheir credibility, causing those initiatives to appear like military-securitysurrenders,ratherthanideologicaltransformationsandinterpretationsbasedonjurisprudence. This led to subsequent divisions amongst thosewho had takenthose initiatives, followed by a reverse migration by some members towardsradicalJihadimovements.A Jordanian initiative is among the best known based on dismantling violentJihadi ideology and revealing how it contradicts Islam’s centrist andmoderatemodel.TheinitiativeformedawidecoalitionofmanyreligiousscholarsfromtheArabandIslamicworldstodiscusstheformulationofIslamicprinciplesbasedondialogue and diversity and opposed to violence and closed thinking. Itculminated in the issuing of the “Amman Message” of 2005, which is anintellectualinitiativethatopposesviolentextremismandterrorismandisbasedonstrengtheningthevaluesoftolerance.52In Egypt, al-Azhar and Egypt’s Dar al-Iftaa’ have escalated their role in theintellectualconfrontationofviolentextremismbytakingseveralmeasures,mostnotably:1.TheIntellectualObservatory:al-Azharsetupaforeignlanguageobservatory,which succeeded in revealing the reasons prompting individuals to joinextremistmovements.Itwasalsoablemonitorthemessagesandideasthatthe“IslamicState” transmits toyoungpeopleandrespond in thesame language inwhichthosemessagesandideaswerepublished.2. Peace Caravans: These tour theworld to spread a culture of peace, correcterroneous concepts and call on Arab and Muslim elites, each in its area ofspecialization,toeliminatetherootsofextremistthinking.

50Heauthoredamessageentitled“ADocumentfortheRationalizationofJihadiAction”.SayyedImamisconsideredtobeoneof thebestknowntheoristson the Jihadicondition in theworld,andhisbooksareconsideredtobebasicpillarsofglobalJihadigroups,particularlyhistwobooksA Comprehensive Guide in Pursuit of Honorable Knowledge and That Which is Dependable inMakingPreparations.51Some of the most prominent al-Gama’a leaders who prepared corrective studies are: SamiMustaphaal-Sai’di,knownasAbual-Muntheral-Sai’di,whois inchargeofShari’a inthegroup;AbdulHakimal-KhuweilidiBalhaj,whoisknownasAbuAbdullahal-Sadiqandwhoisthegroup’sEmir;Miftahal-Mabroukal-Thuwadi,knownasSheikhAbduGhaffar;AbdulWahabMohammadQayed “Idris”; Mustapha al-Sayd Qunaifid “al-Zubair, who is in charge of the group’s militarywing;KhalidMohammadal-Sharif,whoisknownasAbuHazimandisthegroup’sdeputyEmir.SeeCorrectiveStudiesintheConceptsofJihad,FollowingReligiousTeachingsandJudgingPeople,IslamistsOnlineandMadbouliBookshop,Cairo,2006.52Dr. Nouh Mustapha al-Faqir, The Amman Message: A Definition and Explanation. Dar al-Mamoun,Amman,2008.

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3. International Conferences: al-Azhar organized several conferences oncombatting terrorism, the most important of which was the International al-AzharConferencetoConfrontExtremismandTerrorisminDecember2014.

4. International Initiatives:Daral-Iftaa’ has played several roles in combattingextremism intellectuallyatvarious levels. Ithas issuedalmost10 internationalinitiatives,includingoneentitled“NotinMyName.”

5.Al-Ro’ya (Insight)Magazine:Daral-Iftaa’hasestablishedamagazineentitledInsight, which is published in several languages to respond to the “IslamicState’s”electronicmagazine,Dabiq.53

ForumsandInstitutesPromotingModerateThought

Other Arab countries have put forward various models based on enhancingmoderatethoughttoconfrontextremism.TheGlobalForumforModerationwasestablished in the Jordanian capital, Amman. The first declaration on centrismand moderation of Islam, later resulting in the Amman Message, was issuedduring theForum’s inaugural session in2004, and itwas signedbyaround70intellectualandreligiousfiguresfromseveralArabcountrieswhoaremembersoftheForum.TheGlobalForumforModerationhasbranchesinMorocco,Egypt,Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, India, Pakistan and Algeria. The Forum cooperates withinstitutionsinothercountries,andithasestablished10branchesinJordan.54The Kuwait International Moderation Center was established in 2007, and itaims to spread centrist religious discourse amongst young people througheducation, themediaandcivilsociety institutionswiththehelpofanumberofspecialized preachers and members of the clergy in order to confront theextremist ideasput forwardby terroristgroups.Thecenterwasestablished todisseminate noble values and to correct erroneous thinking by Muslims andothers in response to thewavesof violence and terrorism that have spread indifferentparts of theworld.The center’s activities arenot confined toKuwait,andhavespreadthroughouttheworld.55

In Qatar, the al-Qaradawi Center for Islamic Moderation and Renewal wasestablished in 2008. It works to enhance the concept of centrism by revivingIslamic thought through scholarly research to contribute to a new phase ofIslamiccivilization.Thecenter’svisionfocusesontheestablishmentofasocietybasedoncentrism,open-mindedcooperationandenlightened justiceenhancedby knowledge in dealing with current issues such as democracy, economics,human rights, the role ofwomen and the family, environmental problems and

53Ahmad al-Shoura, The Limits of Effectiveness: Can the States of the Region Combat TerrorismIntellectually?RegionalCenterforStrategicStudies,Cairo:http://www.rcssmideast.org/Article/4278/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%83%D9%86-%54“The Global Forum for Moderation. The Idea and Establishment: Guidance Document.” TheForum’sofficialwebsite:http://www.wasatyea.net/?q=node/355“TheInternationalModerationCenter–aPlatformforIntellectualTolerance.”RussiaToday,6November2010,https://arabic.rt.com/news/57473

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thechallengesposedbywarandpeace,violence, terrorism,backwardnessandcorruption.56

Rehabilitation,GuidanceandIntegration

TheSaudiexperienceofintellectualcounselingisconsideredasareferencecasefor programs combatting intellectual extremism throughout the region.57Theidea to establish the Mohammad bin Naif Center for Counseling and Careemerged in April 2003 on the instructions of Prince Mohammad bin Naif binAbdul Aziz,whowas theMinister of Interior at the time. The Center began todevelop its work in 2006 to absorb those involved in misguided thinking,reintegratethemintosociety,reformtheirthinkingthroughthecenter’svariousprograms and help the beneficiaries achieve a mentality considered safe forthem and their society. The program also helps beneficiaries to confront theintellectualandsocialchallengestheymight faceaftercompletingtheir judicialsentences. It also helps those who have been misled to understand theirmistakes, return to the correct path and integrate into society as good andproductive citizens in the interest of themselves, their families and theircountries.Theprogram focuseson thepsychological, religious, intellectual andsocial dimensions, and passing it is a precondition for the release of thoseaccusedofextremismandparticipationinterroristgroups.58TheDirectoroftheMohammadbinNaifCenterforCounselingandCare,GeneralSaidal-Bishi,saysthat8916counselingsessionswerecarriedoutinsideprisons,benefitting individuals of 41 nationalities. The center employs 220 academicsspecializedinvariousfields,andtheycounselcertaincasesbasedonthewishesof their relatives, who provide the center with their observations on theirrelatives who are receiving counseling. He says that the external counselingprogramhasscoredsuccesses inover13governorates inthecountry,andthat11womenbenefited fromtheannualcounselingprogramthrough71sessions,aswellasthroughelectroniccounseling.Headdsthatthecenterfocusesonthreepathways relating to marriage, employment and education, and adds that theuptakeratesoftheprogramareencouraging,despitethecomplexityoftheissue,“asitinvolvesdealingwiththought,whereinthedifficultylies.”

Saudi Arabia can be considered ahead of otherswhen it comes to confrontingelectronic terrorism and weakening the electronic media arms of extremistorganizations. In 2003, Saudi Arabia assigned a working group the task ofconfrontinganddealingwithterrorismintellectuallyandattheinformationlevelontheinternet,puttingtheMinistryofIslamicAffairsinchargeofthatworkinggroup,whilealsopreserving its independenceandproviding itwithexperts invarious fields dealing with treatment and confrontation. The program was

56al-Qaradawi Center for Islamic Moderation and Renewal: http://www.qfis.edu.qa/research-centres-ar/al-qaradawi-center-ar57 For more details, see Christopher Boucek, Soft Saudi Strategy in Combating Terrorism:Prevention, Rehabilitation and Recuperation, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Middle East Program, Number 97, September 2008:http://carnegieendowment.org/files/saudi.pdf58 “Policies of Containment, Regional Implications of the Implementation of ‘IdeologicalCounseling’inWesternCountries.”Ibid.

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named “the Sakina (Tranquility) Campaign” and was launched as a popularcampaignbya groupof individualskeen to confront terrorists and respond totheir allegations. The results were positive, and the campaign continued andgrew, and its functions increased. Although this creative idea succeeded inestablishing the largest known platform for the creation of an environment tocombat terrorism and enhance centrism, it did not succeed in widening itsactivitiestoalargeextent,anditsinfluenceislimited,particularlycomparedtothemechanismsandinstrumentsusedbytheextremistgroups.

In 2004, the Ministry of Education announced the preparation of a projectentitled“SponsoringThoughtandStrengtheningBehavior”tosponsormembersof educational establishments – teachers and students – to oversee the schoolenvironment and to protect it from deviant thought. In 2006, the Ministry ofEducationannouncedthatitwouldimplementtheIntellectualSecurityProgramon a country-wide level. In 2008, the ministry announced the launch of theprogram– the largest ever of its kind in the country – to confront intellectualdeviance in boys’ schools and girls’ schools. Its slogan was “Safe Thought ...Secure Life”. Ahead of the launch, teachers had undergone training, and acommittee known as the Intellectual Security Programwas formed under thechairmanshipofthedeputyminister.59

SaudiArabia launched a project entitled “al-Basira (Insight)” on28 September2014 to respond to the distorted ideas that extremist movements use tolegitimizeviolenceandextremism.Theprojectmonitorstheelectronicwebsitesofproponentsofthethoughtunderpinningextremistgroupsandthedocumentsand books that they issue, and it publishes counter ideological theses in themediaandon socialnetworkingwebsitesand thosebelonging to religiousandeducationalestablishments.60

Despite the praise directed at the Saudi experiment in confronting violentextremism, some experts cast doubt on the effectiveness of such programs,particularlywith regard to propaganda campaigns in the virtualworld and onsocial networking websites. According to Alberto Fernandez, the “Sakina”campaignandotherswereincapableofkeepingpacewiththeprofessionalandcoordinatedpropagandacampaignsof the“IslamicState”,because theyseek toimplant Saudi ideology in people’s minds, and significant aspects of Saudiideology coincide with the ideology of the extremists. Hence, those programspromote loyalty to Saudi goals without necessarily affecting “the futureperspectiveofextremists."61

59“IntellectualSaudiEffortstoConfrontTerrorism.”al-Sakinawebsite:http://www.assakina.com/center/files/81996.html60“MohammadbinNaifLeadsaProjecttoRefuteTerrorists’Suspicions.”Al-Arabiya:http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2014/09/28/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%81-61AlbertoFernandez,HeretoStayandGrowing:CombatingISISPropagandaNetworks.BrookingsInstitute,October2015:http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/10/combating-isis-propaganda-fernandez/is-propaganda_web_arabic_v2.pdf

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InternationalNetworkingCenters

The Hedayah Center was launched in the UAE capital of Abu Dhabi on 15December2012.Itisconsideredtobethemostoutstandinginternationalcenterfor the confrontationof violent extremism.TheUAEoffered tohost the centerduringtheministerialmeetingmarkingthelaunchingoftheInternationalForumtoCombatExtremisminNewYorkinSeptember2011.Italsomadeasignificantfinancialcontributiontowardssupportingthecenterduringitsformativephases.Thecenterwasestablishedinresponsetoagrowingdesirebytheinternationalcommunity andmembers of the International Forum to Combat Terrorism forthe existence of an independent organization dedicated to dialogue, training,cooperationandresearch in the fieldofcombattingviolentextremisminall itsforms andmanifestations, bringing together experts, expertise and experiencefromallover theworld.TheHedayahCenterbelieves inpre-emptivesolutionsbypreventingindividualsfromgoingdownthepathofradicalismandembracingtheideologyofviolenceandofsupportingterrorism.Thecenterthereforeseeksto cooperate with countries around the world in their efforts to change themindsofsomeindividualswhohavetakensuchacrookedpathandtoturnthembackbeforetheybecomefullyinvolvedinit.Thecenteralsoseekstoovercomelong-termstrategicchallenges.62

The center’s activities have included the organization of a debate on 23September2014ondisarmamentandreintegrationpoliciesincooperationwiththeGlobalCenteronCooperativeSecurityinNewYork,precededbyameetingofexperts in mid-May 2014 in cooperation with the Global Counter-TerrorismForum on measures to combat extremism and confront the phenomenon offoreign fighters. The center also participated in organizing an activity on theside-lines of the fourth meeting to review the UN’s global strategy to combatterrorism inNewYork in June2014 todiscuss integratingsecurityandhumandevelopment,andmeansofbenefittingfromsuchintegrationtocombatviolentextremism.63

PoliciesonIntegrationandStructuringtheReligiousField

TheMoroccan experiment aimed at eliminating extremism in the long-term isconsidered to be a guiding example. It is based on promoting a politicalenvironment based on the comprehensive integration of moderation byfacilitatingthepoliticalintegrationofmoderationandrestructuringthereligiousfield.Theprogramhas focusedondealingwith jailedterrorist leaderswhoarecapableofattractingnewrecruits.Thoseleadersareisolatedfromotherinmates,and put through intellectual awareness programs. Younger members andsympathizerswho aremore receptive to having their beliefs corrected and tosocial reintegration are rehabilitated. Morocco’s policies in combattingextremism are an example to be followed in dealing with extremism andterrorism.ThemainelementsofMorocco’sstrategytocombatextremismfocuson a reorganization of the state’s religious bodies. This includes sending anofficialbulletintoallimams,theestablishmentofthe“DirectorateofTraditional 62“TheBeginning.”Hedayahwebsite:http://hedayah.ae/about-hedayah/history/?lang=ar63 “Policies of Containment, Regional Implications of the Implementation of ‘IdeologicalCounseling’inWesternCountries.”Ibid.

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Education” at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, abolition of the ministry’scentralizedmodeofoperation,arevisionof lawsthatsponsorplacesofIslamicworship, the formation of a religious council for Moroccan communities inEurope,theuseofradioandtelevisionstationstopromotemoderateteachingsandtherevisionofschooltextbooksandcurricula.

Rabat’sstrategytocombatextremismalsoincludesanumberofpoliticalreformsthatwerecalledforbyrecentconstitutionalamendmentsandbythe“AdvancedDecentralization”projectontheonehand,anddealingwithjailedextremistsandsuccessfullyreintegratingthemintosocietyontheotherhand.JailedMoroccansaregiventheopportunityofcontinuingtheirstudiestoearnuniversitydegrees,and the government forms partnerships with private institutions to providework,trainingandemploymentopportunitiesforthoseprisonersoncetheyarereleased.64

Despitetheprofusionoflocal,regionalandinternationalprogramstoeliminateextremismand theirhighcosts, their resultshavebeen limitedand ineffective.However, it is imperative to persist in developing them, because the mosteffectiveprogramsatuprootingextremism,accordingtoJohnHorgan,arethosethatserveasakindofhalf-wayhomeforformerextremists.Theyhelpprisonerstoprepareforconfrontingthechallengesofreintegratingthemselves intodailylife.Exactlylikeordinarycriminals,theyaretrainedtoanticipatetheirlivesafterbeingreleased,andtheyaremadeawarethat theymayremainatsomeriskofrejoining.Themainobjectiveofsuchprogramsisusuallytomaketheindividualmore aware of such risks, and this serves as a form of long-term preventionagainstrejoining.

The journey into terrorism and out of it is both a personal and a complexexperience.Programstoeradicateterrorismcontinuetooffersomeofthemostcreativemethodsofcombattingterrorism,andtheycanbeeffectiveinreducingthenumberofmembersinthelowerechelonsofterroristgroups.However,ifwedo not carry out a sincere debate on the reasons for the existence of theseprogramsandtheirmodesofoperation,theirfuturewillbeinjeopardy.65

Conclusion

There is no doubt that any approach to combatting terrorism and eradicatingviolentextremismrequiresa comprehensiveand integratedapproach,becausethephenomenoniscomplexandcomplicatedandderivesfromseveraldifferentobjective causes, conditions and circumstances that are economic, social andpsychological. The phenomenon of terrorism is widespread, and its danger isincreasing locally, regionally and internationally. Available strategies to dealwith it are weak and have not achieved clear-cut success and effectiveness.Nevertheless, there ishope thatmore creativity and innovationwill emerge indealing with this phenomenon and confronting it, but this is predicated on 64Ahmad al-Shoura, The Limits of Effectiveness: Can the States of the Region Combat TerrorismIntellectually?RegionalCenterforStrategicStudies,ibid.65JohnHorgan,HowCanFormerTerroristsBeDeradicalized?TranslatedbyAlaaAbuZeinah,al-Ghadnewspaper:http://www.alghad.com/articles/844296-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%B9-

37

increasedknowledgeandunderstandingofitsdeepcauses.AccordingtoJessicaStern,anyeffortatrehabilitationmustbebasedonaclearunderstandingofwhatpushes people towards terrorism in the first place. This is because terroristmovements usually emerge as a reaction to a grievance, whether real orperceived, which members of the movement feel must be addressed.Nevertheless, ideology is almost the only reason, and is the most importantelement in an individual’s decision to join a particular cause. The reasons thatcause people to become terrorists are as varied as those that cause others tochoose their professions: market conditions, social networks, education andpersonalpreferences.Justasfeelingstowardsjusticeandthelawmightmotivatealawyertoavoidworkingforaparticularlegalorganization,themotivationsofterroriststosearchformeaningincontinuingintheir“jobs”orabandoningthemchangeovertime.Programstoeradicateextremismmusttakethesevariations,transformationsandmotivationsintoaccountandlearnfromthem.66

Althoughmillionsofdollarsarespentonstrategiestocombatterrorism,theUSGovernment, according to Hadieh Mirahmadi, remains incapable ofimplementing a coherent, multi-faceted strategy to prevent local violentextremismbydealingwithmanyofthefactorsthatcauseindividualstoturntoviolent extremism. Those factors include social alienation, psychologicaldisturbances, political grievances and violent ideologies. 67 The approach tocombatting terrorismanderadicatingviolentextremism in the long-termmustbebasedonacomprehensiveandintegratedstrategythatdrawsonaknowledgeof the more structural issues aimed at mitigating the ideological forces thatpropelterrorismandradicalization,accordingtoRonaldCrelinsten.Itmustalsobe based on working to improve conditions in countries that repel migrants,promoting social and economic rights, enhancing legal systems, encouragingcross-national dialogue, strengthening education, enhancing mutualunderstandingbetweenculturesandcivilizationsandstrengtheningtherolesofschool,socialcontrolagencies,thepoliceandthearmy.Suchanapproachmustalso be based on democratization, environmental protection, internationalcooperation and combatting terrorism over the long-term. It must also bringtogether all approaches at the local, national, regional and international levels.Policies to combat terrorism cannot simply take the form of a reaction or ofrepression.Indemocraticstatesandwithinaworldorderthatismovingtowardsglobalization,suchpoliciesmustaimtogainacceptanceaswellaseffectiveness,andboththosecriteriamustbebalancedagainstoneanotherinthefightagainstterrorism.Moreover,theuseofviolenceasaneasyoptioninfightingterrorismsimply confirms the beliefs of fanatic and hardline supporters of terrorism,whereas resorting to long-term efforts that entail a difficult path will isolatethosefanaticsandfacilitatesubjectingthemtojustice.68

The policies of the war on terrorism have faltered, and the reasons do notrequire deep insight and perceptiveness. Al-Qaeda and global Jihadism areprominentinseveralcountries,andtheirideologicaldiscoursehasbecomemore

66JessicaStern,“CanExtremismBeEradicated?”http://www.hurriyatsudan.com/?p=78167HediehMirahmadi,AnInnovativeApproachtoCounteringViolentExtremism.WashingtonInstitute:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/an-innovative-approach-to-countering-violent-extremism168RonaldCrelinsten,Counterterrorism,ibid.

38

attractive. Hence depending on a hard security military approach whileneglectingtheobjectivecauses,conditionsandcircumstancesthatproducedtheJihadi phenomenon and the absence of political, economic, social and culturalsolutionshasledtologicallycatastrophicresults.Despiteaneartotalconsensusthat corruption, despotism and the absence of justice are themain causes forhumanrebellionandtheadoptionofviolenceandterrorism,thepoliciesoftheglobal “war on terrorism” that are also being copied at the local and regionallevels, still emphasize dealing with the symptoms and considering “terrorist”violenceasarbitrary,irrationalandnihilistic.

39

BreakingTerrorism:AnEvaluationofCombatting

the“IslamicState”OrganizationinIraq YassirAbdal-Hussein

It is unconventional, on the international level, that an estimated 12.5millionsquarekilometersoflandwouldfallinthehandsofatrans-borderorganization;aminiaturemodelofglobalizedterrorism,practicingmedieval-stylebrutality,aresult of the failure of the project of modernity, and one that reflects a geo-politicalshake-upofthemapoftheMiddleEast.Thisorganizationchangedmanyconceptsandstandards,inparticulartheconceptofwar.Iftheemergenceofthe“IslamicState”Organization(IS) inIraqandthenSyriain2014isthefirstsuchoccurrencesinceWorldWarII,intermsofseizingvastswathesoflandfromtwosovereignnations,thenindeedthiseventreflectsarealchangeinallconceptsofwar,evenmilitaryscience.

It is difficult to study, quantitatively and qualitatively, this rising trend inextremistgroups;atrendthathascometothreatentheWestphaliansovereigntyofnation-statesandcausestructuralandsocialimbalances.Thistrendbegantoflourishwith the escalation of sectarian rhetoric and regional divisions,whichcontributed–onewayoranother–inthemakingofanon-conventionalenemy.If this new enemy is non-conventional, then how can it be combated throughconventionalmeans? Counter-terrorism strategies are no longer just those practical applications,techniques,andproceduresthatgovernmentsandsecurityinstitutionsadopttoprevent and deter terrorist groups, such as precautionary and preventivedetection of potential operations, and decisive response to materializedoperations inorder toprevent theirrecurrence.Thesestrategiesareno longerable tomeet the real capacity needed to confront this new trend in Arab andinternationalsocieties.

The era ofmodernity saw the formation of nations on the basis of a people, astate,andinternalsecurityinstitutionsthattooksecurityanddefensemeasuresto defend the nation, considering that these are themost important targets ofextremist groups; the post-modern era, on the other hand, todaywitnesses anescalation of threats in a more comprehensive manner, not limited to theconfigurations of power and authority in our contemporary society. But,unfortunately, in the same vein, the state of indifference towards currentdevelopments also increased, at least in the following equation: (IS fightseveryone=noteveryonefightsIS).While structural changes in the concepts of terrorism constituted a newdiscourse in the field of international relations and international law, theterrorismofthe“IslamicState”hasyetto leaveitsmarkontheeffectsofthesecriticalrelationsinformingtheterroristidentity.

ThemostimportantstrategicarenaforconfrontingIStodayisinIraq,especiallyafterthecountrywaschosenbyISasthestrategic locationfor itsvirtualstate,

40

bringingtogetherextremistsfromthesevencontinentsunderitsownbannerinIraq.TheinternalandtheexternalfactorsintertwineintheIraqiscene,andthebattleappears complicated, especially in light of the major chaos the region iswitnessing. In the past, Iraq constituted an important pivot for al-Qaeda, andtoday, it isthemostimportantpivotforthe“IslamicState”byvirtueofitbeingtheconnectionspacebetweentheeffortsofthepreviousgenerationsofal-Qaedaandtoday’sISgeneration.

Despite the globalized rhetoric of terrorism, and the extremist organizations’non-recognitionofeasternmapsandborders,aswellasthesafehavenschosenbytheseorganizationsassteppingstones–asmanifestedintheirliterature–yetthe geopolitics of extremism did not neglect the geographical factor in itsdeliberations, and hence, Iraq became the prepared and fertile grounds toactualize their objectives in the creation of the “Caliphate State.” Thedeliberations that resulted in choosing Iraq, in particular, considered thefollowingaspects:

First: Despite the importance of Afghanistan as a starting point for theorganizational structuring of al-Qaeda, and the rise of the “Afghan Arabs”phenomenon there,making Afghanistan the firstmecca for recruitment for allextremist organizations, Afghanistan does not have ideological symbolism forArabsandMuslims,neitherareligioussymbolicdimensionnorahistoricalonein terms of Islamic civilization. Iraq, on the other hand, possesses both thereligious and historical symbolic dimensions, considering that it holds thecharacterizationsofsanctification forMuslimsas the landmostprofound in itsIslamicsymbolismafterMakkahandMadinah.Second: Iraqhas a strong geo-economical dimension, as the countrypossesseseconomic resources, particularly oil, making it a pivot for global strategiccompetition.Third:Thereisbeliefthat,foral-Qaeda,theAfghanistanphasewasjustatrainingground,andthatthisgeographicalarenawouldnotmeettheaspirationsofJihadiSalafismparticularly after the justifications for Jihadipresence there faded. So,thebattlemovedtotheMiddleEast,morespecificallytoIraq.

Fourth: What happened in June 2014 was the result of years of terror andsystematicdestructionaimedtocontrolandcreateapsychologicalenvironmentsuitedfortheriseofthe“IslamicState”initsmanifestform.

On its part, the Iraqi government’s approach to countering this organizationcame gradually and in stages, in terms of grasping the sudden ascension ofextremist groups, especially that such ascension came as a complete shock todecision-makers in Baghdad after the rapid collapse of Iraqi security forces inMosulandAl-Anbar.

Iraq’s strategy in countering terrorism depends on reviving the role of themilitary apparatus, and on involving mass “citizenry” efforts in theconfrontations, through the participation of the Al-Hashd al-Sha‘abi (PopularMobilization) factions with 120,000 fighters, in addition to the tribes and thePeshmerga forces, and cooperationwith the limited air support offeredby theinternationalcoalition.AllthiscameatatimethatIraqcouldnotaffordtoawait

41

the response of the international community against the “Islamic State.” USPresidentBarackObamahadannouncedonAugust8th,2014thatUSforceswillintervenetoprotectUScitizensinthearea,buttheactualcampaigndidnotbeginuntilSeptember10th,2014whenObamaannouncedthathewasinstructingthelaunchof raids inSyria,and intensifying theraids in Iraq, someofwhichweredirect,andothersthroughIranianandRussiansupportincombattingIS.

Many studies have already addressed the “Islamic State” organization, thereasons behind its appearance, and its swift expansion into vast territories inIraq and Syria, butwhat is necessary now is to research the reasonswhy theorganization’s influence has not beenweakened or eliminated, over two yearsafter itseizedcontrolofMosul. IS isstillpresent,andthispromptstheneedtoreevaluatethemechanismsofcounteringandcombattingit.Thispaperseekstohighlightthemainproblematicissuesofthiswar,particularlyinregardstoIraq,fromthefollowingdimensions:

1. Thedilemmaofunilateralvs.multilateralsolutions2. Thedilemmaoflocalvs.regionalenvironment

3. Thedilemmaofurbanwarfarevs.conventionalmilitarywarfare

4. Thedilemmaofdomesticvs.foreignsolutions5. ThedilemmaofIS’splanningstrategyvs.itsimplementationstrategy

6. Thedilemmaofunifiedvs.dividedcities

TheIraqiApproachtoCounter-Terrorism

Theabsenceofamethodologicalapproachinclearlyunderstandingthetheoriesof terrorism is a cumulative systematic crisis on the international level in thefieldsofsocial,legal,andpoliticalstudies.Researchandbooksonthesubjectallspeakofthelackofconsensusonadefinitionofterrorism,whetheronaregionalor international level, so how would it be possible to reach consensus oncounter-terrorismapproaches?Theissueisevenmorecomplicatedinacountrylike Iraq, which has suffered from successive futile wars and systematicterrorism.

InIraqilegaltexts,terrorismisdefinedasfollows:- The current IraqiConstitution, adopted in2005, stipulates inArticle7 that:

“First:Noentityorprogram,underanyname,mayadopt racism, terrorism,the calling of others infidels, ethnic cleansing, or incite, facilitate, glorify,promote,orjustifythereto[…];Second:TheStateshallundertakecombattingterrorisminallitsforms,andshallworktoprotectitsterritoriesfrombeingabaseorpathwayorfieldforterroristactivities.”69

- Article1oftheAnti-TerrorismLawNo.13fortheyear2005definesterrorismas:“Everycriminalactcommittedbyanindividualoranorganizedgroupthattargeted an individual or a group of individuals or groups or official orunofficialinstitutionsandcauseddamagetopublicorprivateproperties,withthe aim to disturb the peace, stability, and national unity or to bring about

69TheIraqiConstitution,adoptedin2005,Article7.

42

horror and fear among people and to create chaos to achieve terroristgoals.” 70 According to legal experts, however, the stated definition ofterrorism in the 2005 Anti-Terrorism law does not constitute a clear andstraightforwarddefinitionofterrorism.

- Iraqi legislations, before the Anti-Terrorism LawNo. 13, did not define theterm“terrorism,”neitherasacrime in thePenalCodenor inanyother law,despitethefactthattheterm“terrorism”or“terroristcrimes”arementionedinsomeoftheprovisionsofthePenalCode,suchasArticle365and366.

There isno cleardefinitionof terrorism in thevisionof Iraqidecision-makers,except for some references in the Iraqi National Security Strategy. The sameproblem faces the issue of constructing a counter-terrorism approach, despitethe multiplicity of agencies tasked with formulating security decisions.Combatting terrorism and preventing its spread is a noble humanitarianendeavorthatneedstobeanationaleffortbythestateanditsstronginstitutionswhich administer the affairs of societies that adopt democracy, respect forhumanrights,andpeacefultransferofpower.Thisendeavoralsoneedsrealandgenuineregionalandinternationalefforts,because,undersuchglobalizedformof terrorism, no state can accomplish this mission alone. This is especiallypertinentincombattingthefinancingofterroristgroups,cuttingtheirsourcesofstrength particularly social incubators and safe havens, and designing strongdomestic strategies that address and treat the causes and factors behindterrorism, such as poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and illicit arms and drugtrades.71 Thereisastrategic“illusion”thattheIraqidecision-makersattempttoconceive,but this isnot sufficient to combat the terrorism thathasdestroyed Iraq sincethe war in 2003 to this day. Countering terrorism, ideally, includes all theactivities, techniques, and strategies implemented by governments and acrossthe security and defense institutions, and all state institutions for thatmatter,including civil society organizations, to combat terrorismmilitarily or througheconomicmeasuresrelatedtodevelopmentandtacklingunemployment,orevenintellectually and ideologically throughMunasaha (advice); this represents therealmeanstotreatingtheproblemofterrorism.72

Typically, in their counter-terrorism approaches, countries rely on a set oftheoriesandstrategiesthataimtodegradeanddestroythethreatofterrorism,including:73

70IraqiAnti-TerrorismLawNumber13,fortheyear2005,Article1.71Amer Hassan Fayyad et al, Wilayat al-Sharr al-Muta’aslim, [Lit. “The Provinces of [self-proclaimed]IslamizedEvil],Beirut:Al-Daral-Arabiyalial-Uloum,2015,p.127.72JassimMuhammad,Mukafahatal-Irhab:al-Istratijiyatwaal-SiyasatfiMuwajahatal-Muqatileenal-Ajanib wa al-Di‘aya al-Jihadiya, [Lit. “Countering Terrorism: Strategies and Policies inConfrontingForeignFightersandTerroristPropaganda”],Cairo:Al-Maktabal-Arabilial-Ma‘arif,2016,p.6.73For more details, see: Jihad Owdeh, Muhammad Abd al-Azeem al-Sheemi and Ayman Zaki,Madkhallial-Zhahiraal-IrhabiyafiMisrwaal-Sa‘udiya:TajarubIstratijiya, [Lit.“AnIntroductionto thePhenomenonofTerrorism inEgyptandSaudiArabia: StrategicExperiences”],Cairo:Al-Maktabal-Arabilial-Ma‘arif,2015,pp.360andfollowingpages.

43

• Coercivestrategy:Theconventional tools in the fightagainst terrorismrelyon the coercive power (use of force) of the state,most commonly throughcriminaljusticeandwar.74

• Preemptive Strategy: This strategy within anti-terrorism approaches isconcernedwithpreventingterroristplotsandplansfrommaterializing,alsodescribed as “initiatory” strategy or countering terrorism throughintelligencework.

• Persuasion Strategy: Most researchers agree that the majority of terroristincidentsaim to sendamessage todifferentaudiences,usingmixedmeansbetweencoercion(threats,violence,terrorizing)andpersuasion(explicitandimplicit demands), especially that terrorism is considered a form ofpsychologicalwarfare.

• Defense Strategy: Includes various types of defensivemeasures in order toreduce the risk of terrorist attack to aminimumbymaking the target lessattractiveforanattack,whichisknownas“solidifyingthetarget.”

• Long-Term Strategy: It is known that there is no quick solution to theproblemof terrorism.Conventional strategiescanstop terroristoperations,buttheymayalsoleadtofacilitatingfurtherpolarizationandanimosity,suchaswhat happened in Iraq after the death of AbuMusab al-Zarqawi,whereIraq–andtherestoftheworld–shouldhaveanticipatedtheriseofanewAl-Zarqawi, considering that the conventional strategy is not a decisive andcompletetreatment.

Itisnotclearwhichcounter-terrorismstrategiesareusedinIraq,inlightofthecomplexityofboththedomesticandexternalscenarios,aswellasthenatureofthesecurityinstitution.Thestrategiesmaybeobservedinthefollowingmanner:

Diagram1:Source:JihadOwdeh,MuhammadAbdal-Azeemal-SheemiandAymanZaki,Madkhallial-Zhahiraal-IrhabiyafiMisrwaal-Sa‘udiya:TajarubIstratijiya,[Lit.“AnIntroductiontothePhenomenonofTerrorisminEgyptandSaudiArabia:

StrategicExperiences”],p.360. 74 Alex. P. Schmid, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and PoliticalViolence,16:2,2004,pp.197-221.

Geographic Variables of Counter-Terrorism

Analysis of Terrorism Problem

Terrorism Phenomenon

Counter-Terrorism Tactics

Counter-Terrorism Strategies

Long-Term Defense Persuasive Preemptive Coercive

44

1. TheDilemmaofUnilateralvs.MultilateralSolutionsTerrorismrepresentsanintegratedandcomplexsystemofpsychological,social,military, religious, propaganda and political aspects, and so in turn, counter-terrorism measures need to address this integrated system through amultifacetedapproachandonvariousstagesinordertoeliminateit.Oneofthemajor complexities of countering terrorismand extremism is that it cannot beaccomplished throughmilitarymeansalone (unilateral treatment), consideringthe fact that thewaron terrorism isapsychologicaland ideologicalone,andastruggle over aberrant minds. Such a war cannot be confined to a singleapproach.

Therearemanymethods,tools,meansandapproachestodealingwithviolence,because of the complexity of the phenomenon and the divergence and/oroverlap of its many aspects. Many studies have been written on such variousapproaches, for example, statistical results of a GlobalNetwork for Rights andDevelopment(GNRD)studyindicatethatmilitarymeanshavelimitedtheabilityofterrorismby7%,whereaspoliticalsolutionsandsecuritysolutionslimiteditsabilitiesby43%and21%,respectively.75

Graph 1. Effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures in limiting the abilities ofterrorism,preparedbytheauthorperGNRD’sfindings

Apoliticalsolutionassociatedwiththevitaltreatmentofrootcausesofviolenceisessentialinconfrontingandlimitingthephenomenonofviolence,neutralizingitsincubators,andprotectingindividualsandthesocietyfromitsconsequences.

75LoaiDeeb,“StatisticsonTerrorism,”presentedat theInternationalConferenceon“BalancingCounter-Terrorism and Human Rights: Challenges and Opportunities,” Geneva, Switzerland,February16-17,2015, inBrianWhitaker, “CombatingTerrorism, theGNRDWay,”Al-Bab, June12,2015,http://al-bab.com/blog/2015/06/combating-terrorism-gnrd-way

MilitaryMeasures7%

PoliticalMeasures43%

SecurityMeasures21%

COUNTERTERRORISMMEASURES

45

IfweconsiderthephenomenonofviolenceinIraq,forexample,itwasnurturedbyvariousfactors,someofwhichwerealegacyofhistoryandanexpressionofitsunderstanding, andotherswere reactions to certainmistakes, amongmanyother factors that cannot be detailed here, but the aim is to expose theineffectivenessofunilateraltreatmentinthefaceofthisdanger.

The national security of countries is no longer an independentmilitary affair,therefore, and in order for the Iraqi counter-terrorism strategy to succeed, itmust be an integral part of a comprehensive national strategy approach thatincludes military, diplomatic, economic, psychological, and propaganda andmediaelements,amongothers,thatreflectstheunityneededtodevelopsecuritypoliciesthatarecapableofmanagingandconfrontingsecuritycrises.

In reviewing the Iraqi security measures, we find that they are confined tounilateraltreatmentandsinglesolutions,byfocusingonthemilitarydimensionwhile neglecting other dimensions essential in the battle against thisorganization. This is evident in observing themilitary expenditure in the Iraqifiscalbudgetinthetablebelow:76

MilitarySpendinginIraqiDinars Year

224,645,072,14 2011

17,171,802,050 2012

19,702,269,000 2013

23,696,430,900 2014

558,296,151,24 2015

858,982,255,20 2016

Table1.PreparedbyauthorbasedonIraqibudgetarylaws

The figures in Table 1 reveal the increase inmilitary expenditure since 2011,reachingpeak figures in2014 (theyearMosul fell in thehandsof the “IslamicState”) as well as in the following year 2015, which saw the highest levels ofmilitary expenditure. Therewas a slight drop in spending in the 2016 budget,due to lower oil prices and the reduction of spending on all state sectors. Yettheseamountsofmoney,distributedmostlyto–andspentby–theMinistriesofDefense and Interior, were undoubtedly greater than the share of any otherministry,includingserviceministriessuchashealth,waterresources,electricity,oranyother.

76InformationinthetablewaspreparedbytheauthorbasedonIraqibudgetarylawsissuedbythe Iraqi Finance Ministry. The figures include military spending allocated to the Ministry ofInterior,MinistryofDefense,theIraqiIntelligenceAgency,andtheNationalSecurityAgency, inaddition to the spending on the Al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization) forces, with theexceptionofthePeshmergaforcesinthenorthofIraq.

46

Graph2.PreparedbyauthorbasedonIraqibudgetarylaws

AccordingtotheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI),Iraq’smilitaryexpenditureroseby536%between2006and2015,whichisthelargestincrease by any country in the world during that period.77 According to theWorldBank,theincreaseisevidentinthefollowingfigures:

Graph3.PercentageofmilitaryexpenditureinIraqintheyears2011-2014accordingtotheWorldBank

The unilateral direction in the country’s counter-terrorism approach is alsoevident in the details of military contracts that Iraq has signed with many

77“WorldMilitarySpendingResumesUpwardCourse,SaysSIPRI,”StockholmInternationalPeaceResearch Institute, April 5th, 2016, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2016/world-military-spending-resumes-upward-course-says-sipri

3,22,8

3,4

4,3

00,51

1,52

2,53

3,54

4,55

2011 2012 2013 2014

Percentage of military expenditure in Iraq according to the World Bank

1407264522417171802050

1970229600023696430900 24151296558

20255982858

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

MILITARYSPENDINGINIRAQIBUDGET

47

countriesinthefieldofarmament,78comparedtofinancialcostsandexpenditurethattheIraqigovernmentallocatestothehealth,culture,oreducationsectors. Yetthisunilateralstrategyhasnotcontributedmuch,eventhoughweaponsareessentially important in the faceof thesophisticatedweapons that IShasbeenabletoobtain.Withallthesefundsspentforthepurposeofprotectingthelivesandsecurityofcivilians,stillthenumbersofinnocentcasualtiesarecontinuouslyon the rise. Despite the fact that Iraq has witnessed brief periods of securitystabilization, this strategy has not been effective in lessening the numbers ofvictims,asshowninthefollowingillustrations:

Graph4:ComparisonofterrorattacksandvictimsinIraqiprovinces(exceptBaghdad)2010-2013.Source:NationalSecurityService,VictimsoftheDissolved

Ba’athPartyandTakfiriTerrorism,pg.13.

Table2:ComparisonofterrorattacksandvictimsinIraqiprovinces(except

Baghdad)2010-2013.

78For further details on Iraqi military armament deals, see: The Iraqi Strategic Report 2010-2011.TheHammurabiCenterforResearchandStrategicStudies,Baghdad,2011,p.212.

Year Assas-sinations

BombingVictims

CarBombings

ExplosiveBelts

IEDs StickyBombs

Shootings MortarShelling

Rockets

2013 1577 1796 441 74 1987 402 1180 146 33

2012 718 837 267 20 1149 273 593 91 29

2011 736 993 105 29 1338 263 560 116 248

2010 610 955 124 39 1666 183 569 245 253

1577

1796

441

74

1987

402

1180

146

33

718837

267

20

1149

27359

3

91

29

736993

105

29

1338

26356

0

116248 61

0955

124

39

1666

183

569

245

253

COMPARISONOFTERRORATTACKSANDVICTIMSINOTHERPROVINCES2010-2013

2013 2012 2011 2010

48

Graph5:ComparisonofterrorattacksandvictimsinBaghdad2010-2013.Source:NationalSecurityService,VictimsoftheDissolvedBa’athPartyandTakfiri

Terrorism,p.13.

Table3:ComparisonofterrorattacksandvictimsinBaghdad2010-2013.

Iraqi decision-makers need to adopt a comprehensive security strategy thattakes into account that countering terrorism cannot be limited to themilitarydimension alone, but needs to also address – and include – various social,cultural, and religious dimensions in the fight against the “Islamic State” andterroristorganizationsingeneral.79

Theproblemofaunilateralapproachtocounteringterrorismhasnotonlybeenan Iraqiproblem,but is theproductof adeficient international vision, evidentthroughtwomanifestations:80

79The global coalition against IS founded a counter-extremism center, known as “Sawab,” thataimstocounterterroristpropagandaideologicallyandculturally(co-foundedbytheUSandtheUAE),butuntilnow,noreal impacthasbeenfelt,particularlyintheideologicalandintellectualaspects.80Futuh Abu Dahab Haikal,Al-Tadakhul al-Dawli liMukafahat al-Irhabwa In‘ikasatuhu ‘ala al-Siyadaal-Wataniya, [Lit. “International Intervention to Counter-Terrorism and Its Implications

11081292

345

51

491

143

1095

46

33

669

456

141

3

387

126

688

32

17

701

505

63

9

758

321

720

90

104

764878

59

20

1022

422

702

233

96

COMPARISONOFTERRORATTACKSANDVICTIMSINBAGHDAD2010-2013

2013 2012 2011 2010

Year Assas-sinations

BombingVictims

CarBombings

ExplosiveBelts

IEDs StickyBombs

Shootings MortarShelling

Rockets

2013 1108 1292 345 51 491 143 1095 46 332012 669 456 141 3 387 126 688 32 172011 701 505 63 9 758 321 720 90 1042010 764 878 59 20 1022 422 702 233 96

49

• The international vision has dealt with terrorism as a “disease,” whereasterrorismisasymptomandanindicatorofotherfarmorecomplexproblemsfacing some communities. Sustainable counter-terrorism efforts need toaddresstherootcausesthatdriveperpetratorsofsuchacts,andnotonlythemanifestcausesofthephenomenon.

• Overestimating theeffectivenessofmilitaryandsecuritymeans in the fightagainst terrorism. Attacking countries or terrorist groups using militarymeansandheavyweaponryobstructsthepossibilityoftargetingthecoreoftheproblemcorrectly,andinfact,exacerbatestheproblemfurther.Researchconducted by RAND Corporation found that of the 648 terror groups thatwere active in the past, roughly 43% of them ended after they reachedpeacefulpoliticalaccommodationwiththeirgovernment,40%ofthemendedasaresultofbeingpenetratedandeliminatedbylocalpoliceandintelligenceagencies,whileonly7%ofthegroupsendedasaresultofmilitaryforce.Thisisfurtherevidencethattheone-dimensionalmilitaryapproachtocounteringterrorismisflawed.81

2. TheDilemmaofLocalvs.RegionalEnvironmentThe phenomenon of terrorism that emerged in Iraq, represented by themostbrutalgenerationsofsavageviolence, isstrongly linkedto internal factors.Thephenomenonof the “IslamicState” isnot separate fromtheArabenvironment,and was not “born” recently. If we observe the local society from the lens ofsociology and delve into the records of history, we would find that historymarred with blood, both at the level of Jihadi Salafism or the other variousversions of terrorist organizations, such as the “Islamic State”, al-Shabaabmovement,andAbuSayyaf,amongothers.ThesimpleequationbelowdescribeshowIScameabout:( extremistSalafistthought+failedstate+tyranny+povertyregionalconflict=IS)82

Thus,thephenomenonisasheerproductoftheArabsocialdeficit,thefailureoftheelixirofcoexistenceintheArabsocialexperience,anaturalconsequenceofthephenomenonoffailedstates,themilitarizationindustryofsociety,thebeastofunemployment,andthephobiaofdifferentidentitiesintheArabmind,andareflectionofarealeducationalcrisisinArabschools.Thephenomenonisalsoaproductofthestatesthatemployedthiscancertoserveitsgoals,makingitintoamultinationalcompanythatmaybehiredtoservethestates’regionalinterests.83

The Iraqi National Security Strategy for 2016, issued by the National SecurityAdvisory,outlinedthemostprominentchallengesandthreatsintheinternaland onNational Sovereignty”],AbuDhabi:TheEmiratesCenter for Strategic Studies andResearch,2014,p.173.81SethG.JonesandMartinC.Libicki,“HowTerroristGroupsEnd:ImplicationsforCounteringAlQa'ida,”RANDCorporation,2008,http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9351.html82 Yassir Abd al-Hussein, Al-Harb al-‘Alamiya al-Thalitha: Da‘ish wa al-Iraq wa Idarat al-Tawahush, [Lit. “WorldWar III: The Islamic State Organization, Iraq, and the Management ofSavagery”],Beirut:Sharikatal-Matbu‘atPublishing,2015.83Yassir Abd al-Hussein, Kayfa Yusna‘u al-Da‘ishi, [Lit. “How a Da’eshi [Islamic State Org.Adherent]isMade”],Al-Alamal-Jadidnewspaper,Baghdad,January6th,2016.

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external environments facing counter-terrorism efforts. The strategydistinguishedbetweenthetwoenvironmentsusingequationsthatmeasurethelevelofthreatsandchallenges,usingthefollowingequation:(“intent”+“ability”+ “weakness” = “net threat value”). In these values, “intent” refers to thepresence of intention to carry out the threat, “ability” refers to the ability toexecute the threator abilityof the threat tomaterialize, and “weakness” valuerefers to the vulnerability of concerned institutions and theweakness of theircapacity to confront the threat. The level of danger, on the other hand, iscalculatedbymultiplyingthevalueof“effect”(themagnitudeofeffectcausedbyamaterializedthreat,from1to5)withthevalueof“potential”(thepossibilityofthe threat materializing, from 1 to 5). The levels of danger are classified asfollows:thefirstlevelis“CriticalDanger,”withthehighestvaluebeing25,whichrequiresimmediateresponse;thesecondlevelis“HighDanger,”withavalueof15-16, which would be addressed in the medium term; and the third level is“MediumDanger,”withavalueof9-12,thethreatofwhichwouldbedealtwithinthelongterm.84

Table4:Domesticthreatsandtheirlevelofdanger

DangerLevel NetThreatValue

Weakness Ability Intent InternalThreats

DangerValue

PotentialEffect

255530 10 10 10 TerrorisminAllForms

1

255524 6 8 10 Administrative&FinancialCorruption

2

204528 8 10 10 PoliticalInstability

3

205421 5 6 10 Extremism&Sectarianism

4

164430 10 10 10 OrganizedCrime 5

164424 8 6 10 Cybernetics(Information&Communications)

6

164426 8 8 10 WaterShortages 7

164426 6 10 10 RentierEconomy

(Single-SourceRevenue)

8

164422 6 8 8 Energy 9

164426 6 10 10 UndetonatedWarMines&

10

84IraqiNationalSecurityStrategyfortheyear2016,Appendix,p.1.

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DangerLevel NetThreatValue

Weakness Ability Intent InternalThreats

DangerValue

PotentialEffect

Projectiles

26 8 8 10 Health 11

22 8 6 8 FragilityofSocialFabric

12

26 8 10 8 WeaknessofEducation

13

20 6 6 8 SocialDiversity 14

153521 5 6 10 ProliferationofSmallArms&LightWeapons

15

93320 6 6 8 AdministrativeBordersbetweenProvinces

16

93320 7 8 5 NaturalDisasters 17

Table5:Externalthreatsandtheirlevelofdanger

DangerLevel NetThreatValue

Weakness Ability Intent ExternalThreats

DangerValue

PotentialEffect

204530 10 10 10 ForeignInterventioninDomestic&RegionalAffairs

1

164428 8 10 10 EffectofSourceCountryActivitiesonIraqWaterSources

2

153520 8 6 6 ProliferationofWeaponsofMassDestructionattheRegionalLevel

3

24 8 8 8 DisruptionofRegionalMilitaryBalance

4

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DangerLevel NetThreatValue

Weakness Ability Intent ExternalThreats

DangerValue

PotentialEffect

24 8 8 8 ClimateChange

5

20 5 7 8 CulturalGlobalization

6

21 8 7 6 ThreatstoOilExportInfrastructure(Land&Sea)

7

18 8 8 2 SideEffectsoftheUseofNuclearEnergy

8

102519 6 10 3 ConventionalAttacksonIraq

9

93313 5 4 4 UnresolvedBorderDisputes

10

TheidentificationoftheissuesthatposeathreattoIraqfallswithineitherlocalandregionalvariables,buttheyalsorepresentaseriousattempttoformulateanIraqi vision towards terrorism-related issues, especially that the internal andexternalenvironmentscannotbeseparatedintheformulationoftreatmentsfortheproblemofterrorism.Itisevidentthatterrorism,inallitsforms,constitutesthe most dangerous issue facing the domestic environment, in addition toadministrativeandfinancialcorruptionandpolitical instability.Ontheexternallevel,themostdangerousthreatcomesfromforeignandregionalinterventioninIraqi affairs, andhence, it is notpossible to separate the internal environmentfrom the external one in such considerations, and the priority is given tostrengtheningtheinternalenvironmenttocounterterrorism.

3. TheDilemmaofUrbanWarfarevs.ConventionalMilitaryWarfareTheIraqimilitaryestablishmenthassufferedmajorsetbacksfollowingthe2003war, especially after the decision to disband the Iraqi army, made by PaulBremer,theUSAdministratoroftheCoalitionProvisionalAuthorityofIraqatthetime,especiallyconsideringthatthearmywasalreadydepletedfromsuccessivedevastating regional wars. In addition, the dire situation after the warexacerbatedthedepletedstatusoftheIraqimilitaryestablishment.The dilemma is that the strategy of the “Islamic State” depends on urban andguerrillawarfare,without clear tactics, and suchwars cannotbedealtwithbythe logic of conventional warfare. Hence, there was a need to establish a

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“civilian” popular alternative, manifested in the founding of the Al-Hashd al-Sha‘abi (The Popular Mobilization Units “PMU”) to serve as an operationalequivalentinthestreetandurbanwarfaretocounterIS’sbrutality.

The idea of alternate or substitute armies is not new, and is based on theprincipleofsupportandreinforcementfor(institutional)securityforceswiththeobjective of achieving human security. The idea dates back to the era of theFrenchRevolutionin1789,whereparamilitaryforceswereformedtodefendthegainsoftheFrenchrevolutionagainstinternalenemies.85

SinceJune2014,IraqishavelookedproudlyatthePMUphenomenon,andwithjustcause.ThepopularmobilizationgaveIraqisa“patrioticsymboltooffsetthefailure of their government agencies. The religious86 and political leadershipcalledonthepeopletomobilizeandtheresultwaspowerful. Insteadof feelingweak, Iraqis felt strong. Perhaps as many as 120,000 volunteers were raisedalmost immediately after Mosul’s fall. Of these a small proportion broughtfirsthand recent battle experience from the fighting undertakenby Iraqi Shiitemilitiagroups inSyria.These junior leaderswere theonlyofficers in Iraqwithexperienceofmid-intensitycombatofthekindfoughtagainstthe“IslamicState”.Iraqi families felt safer knowing their sonswould be fightingwithin units thatwerehighlymotivated,underofficerswhowouldnotabandontheirchildrenorsellthemouttotheenemy.”87

As one of the formations of the Iraqi armed forces, the “PopularMobilization”operates as an official body linked to the General Commander of the ArmedForces, Haider al-Abadi, and commands and controls the PopularMobilizationmilitia forces. According to statistical reports, the forces are not made up ofShiitesonly,but come fromvarious sectarianandethnicgroups fromdifferentprovinces,asshowninthefiguresbelow:88

Table6:Numberofvolunteersinthe“PopularMobilization”forcesfromIraqiprovincesandgroups:

NumberofVolunteers Province

4747 Al-Anbar

4896 Salahuddin

3570 Mosul

4635 Kirkuk

85Abdal-Wahhabal-Kayyali,Mawsu‘atal-Siyasa, [Lit.“TheEncyclopediaofPolitics”],Beirut:Al-Mu’asasaal-Arabiyalial-Dirasatwaal-Nashr,Vol.2,2nded.,1990,p.220.86The Popular Mobilization militia forces were formed after Abd al-Mahdi al-Karbalai, therepresentativeofIraqiShiaSpiritualLeaderGrandAyatollahAlial-Sistani,calledonthoseabletousearmstovolunteerinthewaragainstterrorism,basedonareligiousedict(fatwa) forJihad,duringasermonAl-KarbalaigaveonJune14,2014.87Michael Knights, “The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces,” Al-Bayan Center for Planning andStudies in The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2016, p. 29,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/The-future.pdf88InformationobtainedbytheauthorfromtheSpokespersonofthePopularMobilizationforces,Ahmadal-Asadi,inBaghdad.

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NumberofVolunteers Province

1740 Samarra

500 Christians(BabylonBrigades)

800 Shabaks

3520 Turkoman

ThefoundingofthePopularMobilizationfactionsasamodeltofighturbanandterror guerrilla warfare is a good thing, and in conjunction, forces were alsoestablishedfromvariousIraqitribesandclans,inadditiontothePeshmerga.Theonlypredicamentrelated to these formations is the futureof these forcesafterthe end of the war on the “Islamic State,” although the project to establish a“NationalGuard”isstillunderdiscussioninIraq.

4. TheDilemmaofDomesticvs.ForeignSolutionsThe international response to IS’swar in Syria and Iraqwas clearly slow andgradual, and perhaps the difficulty of the regional and international scenecontributedtothiscoldreactiontothenewequationintheregion.

ThetenthofJune2014representedthebreakingpoint,withISseizingcontrolofMosul.Buttheinternationalreaction,representedbytheglobalcoalitionofmorethan60countriesledbytheUnitedStates,arrivedmuchlater,afterUSPresidentBarack Obama announced on August 8th, 2014 the launch of Americancampaigns.Obamaoutlinedthejustificationforthisinterferenceasfollows:

-TheprotectionofAmericancitizensintheregion;-TheprotectionoftheYazidiminority;

-StoppingtheadvanceofinsurgentstoErbilinIraqiKurdistan.

ButtheactualUSmilitaryinterventionbeganonSeptember10th,2014,withthelaunchofairstrikesinSyriaandIraq.TheUS-ledglobalcoalitionraisedthesloganof“longwar,”aphilosophythathasleftanegativeimpressionthatthiscoalitionisnotseriousindestroyingthe“IslamicState.”

TheproblemisthatIraq,bothintermsofgovernmentandpublicopinion,rejectsanyparticipationofgroundforcesoftheglobalcoalition.Inthesametoken,andduetothenatureofUSdomesticcircumstancesaftercomingoutofacostlywarinIraqthatleftaheavylegacy,theopinionthathasbeensynthesizingfindsthatthe success of the international support for Iraq depends on supporting thosewhoholdtheground(theIraqiarmy),througharmament. Inpracticalterms, itappears that the limitedeffectivenessof theglobalcoalitionwill remainwithinthefoldsofthefollowingframework:89

89KamalHabib,HududFa‘iliyatal-Tahalufal-DawlifiMuwajahatal-Irhab, [Lit. “TheLimitationsof the Global Coalition’s Effectiveness in Combating Terrorism”], Al-Siyasa al-Dawliya(InternationalPolitics)Journal,No.199,January2015,pp.89-99.

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• AirpoweristheonlymeanstodestroyIS.

• TheframingoftheCoalition’sstrategyisbasedonsendingmilitaryadvisorsandexpertstoassistintraining,especiallyoftheIraqiarmy.

• ThecontinuationofISactivitiesinIraqiandSyrianterritories.

• Turkey lacks effective seriousness in fighting IS, especially considering itspositiontowardstheglobalcoalition.

• Absence of the priorities of the global coalition, and contradiction in viewswithin the US administration itself, with President Obama stating that thegoalofthecoalitionistotoppleBasharal-Assad,whiletheSecretaryofStatesaysitistogetridofIS.

• TheUSadministrationisconvincedthattheglobalcoalition’sstrategyinIraqcannotbeseparatedfromSyria.

ThesolutiontothisdialecticproblemliesinthehandsofsheerIraqiconfidenceinIraqisecurityefforts,despitealltheviolationsandsetbacks.Thealternativeisthecontinueddiscreditingoftheeffortsoftheglobalcoalitionwhich,despiteallitsairraids,hasnotbeenaneffectiveinstrumentsofarineliminatingIS.

5. TheDilemmaofIS’sPlanningStrategyvs.ItsImplementationStrategy

ThetheoriesontheemergenceofISvaried;isthebirthofISapurelyIraqione?Or,was itabirth in theLevant that found itsway fromSyria to Iraq?Analysesandinformationwereconflicting,evenonthesubjectofthepresenceofISleaderAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his training in Syria after his release from the USprisoninCampBucca.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis on March 15th, 2011, Iraq has beenviewing this crisis with apprehension, especially considering the geo-politicalandsecuritydimensionsthatlinkIraqtotheSyriancrisis.Iraqsharesnearly650kilometersofborderswithSyria,andhence,thecautionandanticipationintheIraqi position towards the Syrian crisis, which indicates security and politicalcaveatsthattheSyrianalternativewouldspilloverontheIraqiscene. All the information indicates that, for the “Islamic State,” Iraq represents theImplementation grounds, whereas Syria serves as the Planning grounds; andtherefore, Iraq has difficulty in comprehending IS’smovements or in exposingtheplans theorganization seeks to implementwithin Iraq.To this effect, eventheUSstrategiesinleadingtheglobalcoalitionspeakof“liberatingIraq”fromISfirst, before tackling Syria. Other views prefer to secure the Iraqi and SyrianbordersinordertodivideandseparateIS.

In earlier years, these borders (Iraqi-Syrian) had been an impediment to easyflowof foreign fighters, requiring theuseof smugglersand sympathetic locals.WhileISwasabletoovercomethis impediment,theuseofsuchintermediariescreated challenges such as fewer resources for the organization, and otherrisks.90

90DanielMilton, “The IslamicState:AnAdaptiveOrganizationFacing IncreasingChallenges,” inTheGroupthatCallsitselfaState:UnderstandingtheEvolutionandChallengesoftheIslamicState,

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AmericansociologistEricDavis’analysisoftherapidexpansionofISinIraqandSyriainmid-2014,anditscontinuedattacksinnorthernIraq,includingeffortstoseize theKurdishcityofErbil,andmaking furtherprogress inSyria is that IS’sterroristthreatdoesnotonlytargetIraqandSyria,buttheworldbeyond.Whileal-Qaedahasneverreferredtoitselfasastate,anditsprimarilyfocushasbeenattacking the West, IS organization on the other hand adopted the title the“IslamicStateofIraq”in2004,initspursuitofthecreationofamodernnation-stateandgainingterritoryintheMiddleEast.91

TheissueofoilperhapshasthelargestroleindeterminingthedirectionofIS’splanningwhen it comes to a comparisonbetween IraqandSyria.Oil revenuesare reported to make up a large portion of the overall revenue of IS. SomeestimatethatIScontrolsproductionfacilitiesinSyriathatproduceamaximumof200,000barrelsofcrudeoileachday,whilemaximumproductioncapacityinoilfields controlled by IS in Iraq is about 80,000 barrels of oil each day. Table 7representsahypotheticalcalculationofhowmuchmoneyIScouldbereceivingfromoil.92

Table7:PossibleDailyRevenuetoISContingentonProductionandPrice

BlackMarketOilPrices(perBarrel)

Barrels/Day

$60 $30 $18

1200000

2400000

4800000

600000

1200000

4400000

360000

720000

1440000

20000

40000

80000

Iraq

1200000

3000000

12000000

600000

1500000

6000000

360000

900000

3600000

20000

50000

200000

Syria

Michael Eisenstadt presents a set of recommendations toward a successfulstrategy against IS in Iraq through a realistic assessment of the strengths andweaknessesoftheorganization,describedasfollows:93 The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2014, p. 43,https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf91Eric Davis, ISIS's Strategic Threat: Ideology, Recruitment, Political Economy, The NewMiddleEast, August 17, 2014, http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2014/08/isiss-strategic-threat-ideology.html.Ibrahimal-Haidari,Susyolojiyaal-‘Unfwaal-Irhab,[Lit.“TheSociologyofViolenceandTerrorism”],Beirut:Daral-Saqi,2015,pp.220-221.92DanielMilton,“TheIslamicState:AnAdaptiveOrganization…”Op.cit.,pp.57-58.93MichaelEisenstadt,“'DefeatintoVictory':LessonsforRebuildingtheIraqSecurityForcesfromModernArabMilitarySuccessStories,”PolicyAnalysis,TheWashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicy,January21st,2015,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/Eisenstadt-IraqDefeatVictoryBrief-20150121.pdf

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Weaknesses Strengths

Weakenedbymilitaryandairstrikes Seasonedleadershipandeffectivemilitaryorganization

Tendencytooverreach–imposedraconianversionofShari’a

Resonantcause(revivaloftheCaliphate)

Potentiallyfractiouscoalition–notallalliesshareitsagenda

Powerfulpropagandamachine(socialmediaandYouTube)

Ineffectivegovernance/relianceonterrortoensurecontrol

Auraofinvincibilitycreatedbyseriesofimpressivevictories

Overstretchedforces–cannotadequatelydefendallareasitcontrols

Relativelywell-equippedforces

Insufficientfinancestogovern6-8millionpeople

Adaptability

Isolatedandlandlocked–linesofcommunicationsvulnerabletoattack

Interiorlinesofcommunication

From the security and geopolitical standpoint, the Iraqi case in counteringterrorismcannotbeseparatedfromthatinSyria,especiallysincethestrategyofISdependsontheinterdependenceamongbordercitiesandtownsaswellasthefoundations that the organization developed to facilitate continuous two-waycommunications,whichmakes separating the approaches in the two countriesquitedifficult.

6. TheDilemmaofUnifiedvs.DividedCitiesThecharacteristicsofcounteringterrorismineverycountryareuniqueintheirspecificity to that country’s context, distinct from other countries. There is acloseanddirectrelationshipbetweentheprevalenceofviolenceandterrorism,ontheonehand,andthesocial,cultural,andeconomicconditionsthatcontributeto this prevalence, on the other hand. Violence is a social phenomenon thataffects the individual first, who is threatened directly by violence, and at thesametime,affectsthegroupcollectively,whichsuffersfromitsconsequencesasviolence is imposed on it coercively.94 Studies on the phenomenon usuallydistinguishbetweendomesticterrorismandinternationalterrorism,despitethefactthatbothphenomenashareincommontheuseofviolenceinordertoreachspecificgains,mostcommonlypoliticalones.Thetwoalsohaveasetofcriteriaincommon,including:

• Locationsandsafehavens: the fieldsofoperations torecruitsupportersandwintheirsupportideologically

• Thechoiceoftargets

94 Ibrahim al-Haidari, Susyolojiya al-‘Unf wa al-Irhab, [Lit. “The Sociology of Violence andTerrorism”],Op.cit.,p.215.

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• Theideologicalbackground• Anorganizationalstructure• Financiers

Intermsoflocations,whichisthemostimportantaspectinthisspatialdilemma,terroristsusuallydonotsettleinaspecificplace,oriftheydo,theydonotshowany territorial interest or attachment towards their areas of settlement. Moreprecisely,althoughterroristsareabletoresorttoaparticularplaceandoperatethere, because of the existence of exceptional conditions there – as is the casewith countries ridden with instability such as Iraq, yet these terrorist do notclaim, and others do not envision that they or their groupsmaintain a specialattachmenttothisplace.95

Nevertheless,IS’sstrategydoesrelyonthemoralandsymbolicgainofcapturingcities. Psychologically, the black banners that indicate areas that have comeunder their control give the organization a boost of confidence in theiroperations.HereliesakeypuzzleintermsofIraqicities;therehavebeenmajorcitieswithmillionsofresidents,suchasMosul,thatfellatthefirsthearingof“carhonks,” according to the expression of an eyewitness describing it as part of“psychological warfare,” whereas there were other cities that withstood IS’sadvancesdespitealltheobstacles,difficulties,andsiegesimposedonthem.

Inthiscontext,twocitiescanbetakenascasestudies.ThefirstisHaditha,acitywith a Sunni majority, and the second is Amerli, a small town with a Shiitemajority. Following is a description of how these two cities presented greatexamplesinconfrontingIS,despiteallthechallenges.

Haditha

Haditha lies in the western Iraqi Al-Anbar province, about 260 kilometersnorthwest of the capital Baghdad. The city has a population of about 49,000people, and the Haditha district as a whole has about 100,000 people. TheprominentfeaturesofHadithacityinclude:

1. A predominately middle-class society of intellectuals, scholars, andoverallagoodlevelofeducationandemploymentopportunities.

2. Characteristically a tightknit tribal society, interrelated throughintermarriagebetweentheclansandtribesofthearea.

3. TheprevalenceofSufism,wherethecityhasnumerousmosques,shrines,tombs,andSufiorders.96

4. DuringtheUSwaronIraq,thecitywasamajorsecurityproblemforUSforces, prompting them to retreat from the city and reposition in theoutskirts.

The most notable aspect about the city today is its successful resilience afterenduringmorethan35militaryattacksbyIS.ThedistrictofHadithaistheonly 95Abd al-Majid Mablaghi et al, Al-Irhab Ta‘rifuhu wa Aaliyat Mukafahatuh, [Lit. “Terrorism:Definition and Means of Combating it”], Center of Civilization for the Development of IslamicThought,Beirut,2015,pp.63-64.96Among the famous shrines in Haditha city is the tomb of Sheikh Abdul Qadir al-Aalousi al-Tayyar,whoisadescendantofthefamousSufisheikhAbdulQadiral-Gilani,whoseentombedinashrineinBaghdad.

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district remaining under the control of security forces and tribal units, out ofeightneighboringdistrictsthatfellunderIS’scontrol.Therearemajorconcernsabout sabotage in the event that IS seizes control of the city, and takes overcontroloftheHadithaDam,97Iraq’ssecondlargestdam,whichmaypavethewaytooccupyingandcontrollingothercities.Thereisdireneedtotakethenecessarymeasures to prevent terrorist organizations from seizing control of watersourcesinIraq,aspointedoutbyvariouslogisticalreports.98

MapofthecityofHaditha

TherearevariousexplanationsandjustificationsforHaditha’sresilienceagainstIScapture,including:

97TheHadithaDam is Iraq’s second largest dam, lying in the northern part of the city, and isabout260kilometersnorthwestofBaghdad.ThedamreserveswaterfromtheEuphratesRiver,amountingtoalake(TheHadithaDamLake)thatextendsacrossvastswathesofland.See:Iraq1988,theAnnualBookoftheRepublicofIraq,Baghdad:Daral-Ma’mounTranslation,1989,p.79.98JeremyAshkenas,ArchieTse,DerekWatkins, andKarenYourish, “ARogue StateAlongTwoRivers:HowISISCametoControlLargePortionsofSyriaandIraq,”TheNewYorkTimes,July3rd,2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/03/world/middleeast/syria-iraq-isis-rogue-state-along-two-rivers.html?_r=0

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• HadithaliesneartheAynAl-AssadairbaseinthenearbyAl-Baghdadidistrict.ThisproximityhashelpedHadithawithstandISattacks,consideringthattheairbaseisofprimeimportancetotheIraqigovernmentandtheinternationalcoalition.However, this explanation is insufficient to justify IS not enteringand capturing the city, considering that other cities before it fell despitehavingmanymilitarybases.

• TheinfluenceoftheSahawat(Awakening)forcesoftheAl-Jaghayfa99tribeinthecityhadamajorroleinconfrontingIS.However,manyotherlargeSunniIraqi tribes and clanshave confronted and stood against IS, but their citieswerenotabletowithstandtheorganization’sattacks.Hence,thismaynotbeasufficientjustification.

• ManyairstrikestargetedISsitesnearHadithainsupportofsecurityforces,PopularMobilizationforces,andtheJaghayfatribalSahawatintheirdefenseofthecity.Meanwhile,manyotherIraqicitiesalsowitnessedairstrikesonIStargetsthere,butwerenotaprimereasonfortheresilienceofthesecities.

On theotherhand,webelieve that thekey factorsbehindHaditha’senduranceand stand against IS include the general discourse of religious toleranceexperienced in the city, the prevalence of Sufism, and the relationships thatHaditha leaders established with Shiite religious references in Najaf throughsupportforongoingmilitaryandhumanitarianaid,accordingtocityresidents.

Amerli

ThetownofAmerliliesintheTuzKhormatudistrictofSalahuddinProvince.Themajorityofitsfewerthan20,000residentsarefromtheShiiteTurkomanethnicminority. IS besieged Amerli after it seized control of Mosul and most ofSalahuddin province. The organization imposed a tight siege on the town andpreventedtheentryofwaterandfoodinitsattempttotakeoverthearea.

TheattacksonAmerliwereunremitting,withthefirstattackwitnessingtheuseoffivearmoredtanks,sixHumvees,morethanfivearmoredvehiclesseizedbyISduring the takeover of Mosul, and nearly 300 IS fighters. Amerli residentswithstoodnearly50terroristattacksafterwards. The siege was broken after 84 days as Iraqi security forces and PopularMobilizationfactionsenteredthecity.Morethan700militantswerekilledintheconfrontations,whichalsoresultedinabout100civiliancasualties.ISwasnotabletooccupythissmalltown,whichislocatedinaremoteareavoidof any military installations. The map of the area bears the followingobservations:

• Therearenoopen landroutestodelivermaterialandmoralsupporttothecity.

99ISspokesperson,AbuMuhammadal-Adnani,stressedinanaudiorecordingissuedbyISthattheorganizationwillcaptureHaditha“nomatterwhat,”threateningthat“youwillregret,asit[theinvasion]willbearevenge,whereifpeoplepassedbyHadithaandtheirhomestheywillsay‘thereoncewereJaghayfashere.”See:ReportonHaditharesilience,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enGbXp_YmFw

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• Thiscity,smallinsizeandpopulation,islocatednear–andinthemidstof–surroundingareasfullycontrolledbyIS.

MapofAmerli

MichaelKnightsdescribesthedetailsofAmerli’sresilienceduringthesiege:“OnJune20,10daysafter the fallofMosul, IS fightersstartedtooverrunTurkmenvillagessurroundingAmerli.ByJuly15,onlyAmerliwasleftunconquered—thelastbastionoutof31Shiitevillagesinthearea,cutoff fromanescaperoutetoeithertheShiitesouthortheKurdishnorth.SinceJuly17,thedenselypopulatedtownhasreceiveddailyrocketattacks.Thetown’sdefenders,around400localmenarmedsolelywithAK-47s,havebeatenoffmanyISattacks.”100Accordingtosomestudies,AmerliistheonlytownthatISattemptedandfailedto occupy in Iraq and Syria following the events inMosul. IS sustainedmajorlossesthere,moreISfighterswerekilledinAmerliinonemonththanfightersin

100 Michael Knights, “Iraq’s City of Orphans,” Foreign Policy, August 14th, 2014,http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/14/iraqs-city-of-orphans/Alsosee:MichaelKnights,“SavingIraqiTurkmensIsaWin-Win-Win,”TheWashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicy,PolicyWatchNo. 2285, July 16th, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/saving-iraqi-turkmens-is-a-win-win-win

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Syria inayearandahalf.Thecombat force that fought IS inAmerlinumberednearly1,500mostof themciviliansand local tribesmen. IS, on theotherhand,had captured fifty cities and villages in Mosul and the Nineveh plain in twoweeks,halfofwhichfellwithoutanyresistance.Following are the main reasons believed to be behind the city’s victory andresilienceinthefaceofISattacks:

• Societal harmony is characteristic of this town, both ideologically andethnically.

• Thedecisiontoresistwasmadebya largegroupof thepopulation,despitethemodestcapacityandmeansavailable,101comparedtoTelAfar,another–andmuchlarger–Shiitedistrict,whoseresidentswereunabletowithstandIS’s attacks despite having 10 times more fighters than in Amerli (thepopulation of Tel Afar district is more than 250,000 whereas Amerli’spopulationisnearly20,000).

TheresilienceofAmerliwasable to stop IS’s incessantadvance intocitiesandtownsintheprovinceofKirkuk.102

Conclusion

Iraqi efforts to combat terrorism and extremism cannot be denied orunderestimated,consideringthatitisthefirstcountryintheregiontosufferthefirstheavyblowsofal-Qaeda’sterrorism,whichprecededtheemergenceofthe“Islamic State” and current extremist organizations. Iraq today stands at theforefront of countries combatting and countering all local extremist currentsoperating on its land, andhas been sacrificing the lives of its defenders in theIraqiarmedforces,PopularMobilizationfactions,andthePeshmerga,inordertoridthecountryofIS.

But in return, there isdireneed toaddress thesedilemmasandproblems thataffect the core of counter-terrorism operations in Iraq, in order to ensure thesuccessofthesestrategicoperations,protecttheland,andstoprecruitmentintoterroristandextremistorganizations.

ThissuccesscannotbeachievedbyIraqieffortsalone,butrequiresregionalandinternationalsupport,becausethiswarisnotaboutthefutureofIraqalone,butaffectstheoverallregionalandinternationalbalancesaswell.

Knowing what we know today of the real causes behind the emergence ofideologicaldeviationandgravitationtowardsterrorism,inlightoftheinflamedpoliticalandregionalcrisesintheregion,andwithalltheattemptstospareIraqfrom the state of regional strife as much as possible, it remains neverthelessinevitable that the terrorismwesee today, if itdidn’texistnow,wouldexist inthe near future anyway. This inevitability is the result of several consolidatedand interrelated factors, including inparticular the religious education system,

101OnJuly7,2007,Al-QaedaattackedAmerliwith4.5tonsofexplosivesburiedinatruckunderaloadofwatermelons,killing159civiliansandwoundingover350.See:MichaelKnights,ibid.102TheresidentsofAmerlihadtheoptiontoevacuateandfleethetown,especiallyafterseeingwhathappenedinthenearbytownsofBashirandBastamil,butafterconsultations,theydecidedtobuildbarricades,tooktheirpositions,andresolvedtodefendtheirtown.

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high unemployment rates, widespread educational and cultural illiteracy andrampant political and financial corruption, among others. These are all causesthat radical fundamentalism sees no solution to, save violence. The radicalfundamentalistswoulduseviolenceagainstthoseperceivedtobeprotectingtheregimesthatcommit thesesins,and inadoptingviolenceasasolutionto theseproblems, they unknowingly took the path of violent communism, that of the“Red”BolshevikRevolution,forLeninsaidthat“notasingleproblemoftheclassstrugglehaseverbeensolved inhistoryexceptbyviolence,” and likewiseMaoTse-tungsaidthat“historicalexperienceiswritteninironandblood.”

Enhancing Iraq’s counter-terrorism efforts requires formulating a strategy tomonitor the government’s performance on the level of the security forces,especiallyintheperipheralandborderregions,consideringthattheestablishingof“emirates”inmanycountriesisoftendoneinperipheralborderregions.Theissueoffinancingisalsoacriticalelementforterroristorganizations,therefore,the Iraqi government should impose strictermeasures on banking andmoneytransfers, which sometimes hide under the guise of civil society and charityorganizations.

It is important for the Iraqi government to invest in the efforts made by thePopular Mobilization forces in the battle against IS, and to provide adequatesupport for themand integrate themwithin the framework of building a new,strong and professional military, one that transcends all the narrowconsiderations. The government should also relentlessly pursue dividing ISbetweenSyriaandIraq,asmuchaspossible,andtocuttingitssupplylinesinanefforttoneutralizeandeliminateit.

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DoesYemenHaveaCounter-TerrorismStrategy?Nabilal-Bukairi

Before discussing whether Yemen truly has a counter-terrorism strategy, thequestion that needs to be addressed first is whether there is a clear andinternationallyagreedupondefinitionofthephenomenonofterrorism.Or,isthedefinitionthatisavailableamerefunctionalone,wherethephenomenonisdealtwithaccording to theneedsandwantsofdifferentparties thatbenefit from it,and according to the tactics and strategies particular to their interests andinfluenceintheregion?

I think thepredicament that today faces any real efforts or genuine intentionstowards counter-terrorism is that “terrorism” itself has become an ambiguousand impalpable issue, where each party has its own explanation, vision, andsolutions thataresuitable to itsownmethodofdealingwith thephenomenon.Eachpartynowuseswhathascometobeknownas“counter-terrorism”asoneofitstoolsinmanagingitsinterests,policies,andapproaches.

In short, and figuratively, this is what is meant by a “counter-terrorismapproach” in dealingwith this phenomenon in Yemen. This paper attempts tozigzag through this Yemeni approach, which is one of the most unsuccessfulapproaches that has proven to produce further violence and terrorism ratherthan treat it, as described by American activist Medea Benjamin, in her book“DroneWarfare:KillingbyRemoteControl.”103

It is a compounded failure when the phenomenon of terrorism is dealt withnonchalantly, and with a lack of the spirit of humanitarian responsibility inaddressing such issues that impact the lives, security, and stability of innocentpeople.Itisacompoundedfailurewhenthereisalackofseriousandresponsiblemethods of dealing with terrorism; the events of the last two decades haveprovedthemajorfailureofthedownrightmilitaryandsecurityapproach,whichdealswith the phenomenon as amere criminal offense, strippedof the causesand effects, and treats the results without consideration of the factors thatproducethem.Inthisscenario,themagnitudeofthedisastermushroomswithasortofgeometricsequencewherethedisastrousresultsconstantlymultiply.

ThecaseofYemenisconsideredoneoftheoldestcasesintheArabregionwherethe phenomenon of violence ensued, especially with the early connectionbetween the ruling regime in Yemen and Jihadis returning fromAfghanistan –knownatthetimeas“AfghanArabs”–whowereemployedbytheUnitedStatesand itsallies in theArabregiontocounteract theSovietUnionduringtheColdWar,whichwillbediscussedlaterinthisbriefstudy.

103MedeaBenjamin is anAmericanpeace activist, and a staunchopponent of the security andmilitary approach to the phenomenon of what has come to be known as terrorism. In aninterviewwithAl Jazeera,shespokeat lengthaboutthefailureofthesecurityapproach,whichreliesonindiscriminatekillingthroughunmanneddronesthatareusedbytheUSGovernment–and with the blessings of the Yemeni government – as one of the most important means ofcombating terrorism in Yemen. See the interview entitled Al-Drones: Al-Harb al-Samita [Lit.“Drones:TheSilentWar”],https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xiMGRKOfUFs

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The core of the problem, however, lies in the fact that the phenomenon ofterrorism, which remained from the onset a security and military issue, wasutilizedbytheYemeniauthoritiesasthemostadvantageousissuethatcouldbecapitalizedoninthelocalandinternationalpoliticsmarketforovertwodecades.The issue of violence became a political bargaining chip beginning in the1990s,104and the security “function” was added to it later according to theAmericanapproachtodealingwithterrorismandelementsinvolvedinit.This,inturn, corresponds exactly with the main purpose of the emergence of suchgroups,aspropagatedinthemediaandintelligenceagendas.

Thesecurityapproach–whichistheessenceoftheAmericanapproachbasedonthe principle of force, and force alone – in dealing with terrorism produceddisastrous and counterproductive results, not only on the domestic Americanlevel,butontheinternationallevelasawhole,asevidentintheramificationsoftheWaronTerror,whichledtothetopplingofAfghanistanandthenIraq.Thissecurityapproachwaslateradoptedagaininthepost-ArabSpringera,afterthe“Spring” was on the verge of purging all the justifications and root causes ofviolence and terrorism in the Arab world, starting with politicalauthoritarianism,105 economic and developmental failures, and the religioustexts thatwere used as tributary pretexts for the use of violence and force inordertoachievedemandsandexpressrejectionofpolicies.Thus,themorewemoveawayfromthetruedefinitionofterrorism,themorewealsomoveawayfromknowingitsmainrootcauses.Thereisacloselinkbetweenthetruecausesofterrorismandthepoliticalutilizationofthisphenomenon.Thisis evident in the evasion of formulating a substantive approach to thephenomenon, and of defining terrorism and addressing its root causes. Thelonger this evasion continues, the longer the concept of terrorismwill remainpermeable, and its definitionwill remain adaptable to anyparty thatwants touseandemployitfortheirowninterestsandpolicies.Thedisaster today is that the continued implementationof anapproachbasedsolelyon forceandviolence in itself constitutesagenerator thatperpetuates–and exacerbates – the cycle of violence, as evident in the events of overmorethanadecadesincetheattacksofSeptember11,2001anduntiltoday.Thecycleofviolencewidenedduringthistimeperiod;violentextremistgroups(accordingto the Western characterization) were limited to Afghanistan in the past,whereastodaytheyhavebecomeaphenomenonthatextendstovariousregions.

104From the onset, the Yemeni authorities used groups returning from Afghanistan in its warwith its political opponents after the declaration of Yemeni unification in May 1990. FormerPresidentAliAbdullahSalehalliedwith theArabandYemeniMujahideen,whowere returningfromAfghanistanat the time, in the summerof1994battleagainst theYemeniSocialistParty.Many of theMujahideenwere dragged into the battles, and themost dangerous of themwereeradicated, includingMuslimBarasin,whowas first of the Jihadi leaders to be killed after thebattle thatsawthedefeatof theSocialistsand theirexpulsion fromthesouthofYemen.Thoseremainingof theMujahideen, such asTariq al-Fadli, Jamal al-Nahdi andothers,were absorbedintosecurityforcesandthePermanentCommitteefortheGeneralPeople’sCongress,therulingpartyatthetime,headedbyAliAbdullahSaleh.105Sahar Aziz, “In Calling for Muslims to Oppose Terrorism, Obama Ignores Its Root Causes,”Brookings Institute Middle East Politics and Policy, February 15th, 2016,http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/02/16-countering-authoritarianism-counterterrorism-aziz

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These violent groups evolved from the simple and primitive form, controllingsmall areas in the mountains and caves, to groups that today possess thecapabilitiesofstates:vastgeographicalregionswithapeopleandborders,stateeconomiccapabilitieswithoil,taxes,leviesandothercapabilitiesthatmakeupastate,as is thecasewith the“IslamicState”organization(IS) today in IraqandSyria(dubbedinthemediaas“Da’esh”accordingtoitsArabicnameacronyms).

Thephenomenonofterrorismhasbecomecomplicatedwiththeintertwiningofthe political dimensionwith the religious, security, intelligence, and economicdimensions, among others. Its threat has magnified now that terrorism mayextendbeyond the frameworkof attempts to control andemploy it byvariousactors, especially that the interdependent world as a whole has becomesomething likeaoneroom,where theproblemsandmanifestations interrelatemoreandmoreeveryday.

With the advancement of technology and ubiquity of international travel andtransmission of information, the West can no longer afford to ignoredeteriorating conditions in authoritarian states that could quickly becometerrorist safe havens.Oneneedonly look to the terrorist attacks inNewYork,Madrid,London,andmostrecentlyParisasevidenceoftheinternationalizationof localconflicts. Indeed,terroristgroupsbasedinfailingsub-stateshavemadenosecretthattheytargetthe“farenemy”–theWesternnationswhosupporttheautocraticregimes–asmuchtheytargetthe“nearenemy.”106

There is dire need for the success of themassive efforts beingmade today tocounterthegrowingthreatofviolentgroups,especiallyamidtheperpetualstateofdecoyanddeceptioninfailingtoformulateanobjectivedefinitionofapparentterrorism, especially a clear and explicit definition agreed upon not only bypolitical actors,butby social scientists andacademiconesaswell. It isonly inlight of such a definition that we would be able to talk about effective andobjectivetreatmentsandsolutionsforthisphenomenonthatisevergrowingandtakingondiverse,morebrutalandchaoticdimensionscomparedtothepast,inadangerousdevelopmentthatcouldleadthewholeworldintoadownwardspiralofchaosandviolence,theresultsandlimitsofwhichareimpossibletopredict.This is a problem towards which many Western politicians, along with someacademics in this field, turn a blind eye towards, colluding in a field that issubjecttothemoodofpoliticiansandtheirgames.

This following discussion seeks to answer the difficult question of the Yemeniapproachtocounteringterrorism,whethertherereallyissuchanapproach,andif so, what this approach has achieved and what are its pros and cons.Furthermore,itanalyzestherelationshipbetweentheYemeniandtheAmericanviewsofterrorismandmeanstocombatit,andthemajorproblemsandmistakesthathavereflectedontheapproach–ifitexists.ItalsoconsidershowYemenandYemenis have been affected by the policies of combatting what is calledterrorism, particularly the crimes and woes of drone attacks. This endeavorseeks to extrapolate the substance of terrorism through the history of thisphenomenoninthecaseofYemen.

106Ibid.

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TheHistoryofthePhenomenonofTerrorisminYemen

Thephenomenonofterrorismisstillfarfrombeingaddressedmethodologicallyandobjectivelytoday,theonlyapproachthroughwhichitwouldbepossibletoanalyze the phenomenon as it is, devoid of all the augmentations andconceptualizations that have become stuck in the minds of consumers of anynews about terrorism and related aspects. The case of terrorism is consumedthrough the lensofpreconceptionsandprofiling-in-advance, and is a case thathasnotevolvedintothelevelofaphenomenonexceptthroughpoliticizedmediahandlingwherealothasbeensaid,butnotinanymethodologicallydisciplinedandstandardizedmanner,exceptinrarecases.With the numerous events that took place over the past two decades, theproblemofviolentextremistgroupsbecamesignificantlycomplicatedespeciallywith the overlapping and intertwining of the security, political, religious,economic,intelligence,andmilitarydimensions.Butwhathasnotchangeduntilthis moment is the consistent main hallmark of these groups; that is, groupswithoutanobjective,aproject,avision,orfeaturesthatcanbeclearlydelineatedin a manner that enables a researchers to build from their data an approachthroughwhichthisproblematicphenomenonmaybeunderstood,asopposedtofromthestereotypicalapproachusedbymany.

Buttoday,atleast,andaftermorethantwodecadessincetheemergenceofthisphenomenon, there isampledata throughwhichthephenomenonof terrorismcanbedissected andanalyzed inorder to comeupwith adequate informationand facts. Such an endeavor would make it possible to build a practicallyintegratedvisionof theviolentphenomenon, itsmechanisms,orientations,andfutureramifications.It has become clear today,more than ever, the extent of confusion, deception,andconcealmentoffactsinthefieldofresearchstudiesofthisphenomenon,inaddition to the magnitude of utilization and deliberate stereotyping bypigeonholingthisphenomenonintorigidtemplatesthatcannotbereformulated,except by thosewho originally formulated them andwish to keep them to beusedintheirowninterests,unawarethattheycanbeemployedandutilizedbyothers,eachintheirownfavorandobjectives.

The formative beginnings of this phenomenon in Yemen are virtually one intermsofsourceandorigin,andhavebeenknowntoresearchersandobserversfor over two decades of “terrorism.” The early beginnings started with theAfghan Jihad,which produced the phenomenon of “Afghan Arabs,”with all itsbackdrops, complexities and interrelatedness, manifested in each countryaccordingtoitsowncontextoftimeandplace.

TheEarlyBeginningsofViolentGroupsinYemen

The phenomenon of violent groups in the Yemeni case is considered themostambiguous and equivocal, despite the clarity of its early beginnings. Thephenomenon is associated to a great extent with the “original homeland”(Yemen)ofthefounderofal-Qaeda,OsamabinLaden,whosesenseofbelongingtoYemenconstitutedacompassforthemovement,reinforcedbyJihaditheorists

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suchasAbuMusabal-Suri107andothers.SuchtheoristsdelineatedforJihadisman array of ideas through which the organization propagated the idea ofmobilizingan“armyofIslam,”stemmingfromvariousreligious,social,political,andeconomicfactors.Sincethen,theideaofanArmyofIslamwasformulated,inspiredbythestruggleofthe“AfghanArabMujahideen”inthe1980sagainsttheRussianoccupationofAfghanistan.ItwasduringthattimethattheideaofaglobalizedJihadbegantocrystalize, based mainly on indirect support from international and regionalintelligence services that, at the time, employed the tool of Jihad in itsinternationalconfrontationwiththeSovietUnion.AnumberofJihadileadersfromthe“AfghanArabs”returnedtoYemen,andweresoonembracedbytheregimeofAliAbdullahSalehandemployedinthebattlesagainst itsSocialist adversariesat the time.Yet this “employment”didnotendthere,aswasrevealedbyoneoftheprominentideologuesofJihadimovementsinaninterview.108TheYemeniaspectofthisphenomenonisattributablemainlytothepresenceofOsamabinLadenattheheadofthisgroup,consideringhispersonality,wealth,and Yemeni Hadhramaut origin, in addition to a charisma that captivatedeveryone with his generosity, courage, and clarity, and more significantly, hisreligiousdimension thatwas, at the time, employed in a futile battle that onlyservedinternationalandregionalagendasundertheguiseofJihad.

YetthepracticalandoperationalbeginningsoftheJihadiorganizationinYemenbeganwith theadventof theWarofUnitybetween theYemeni SocialistPartyandtheGeneralPeople’sCongress, thepartners in theunityat the time,whichtookplacebetween1992and1994.ItwasthenthattheearlyrealemploymentoftheideologicalviolenceofthesegroupswastakenupbytheregimeofformerPresidentAliAbdullahSaleh,whowasabletolureanumberofAfghanArabsintohisbattleagainsthis thenSocialistadversaries.This is inadditiontowhatwasgoingonbehindthescenes,asOsamabinLaden,whilestillinAfghanistan,beganpreparingtobringdowntheSocialistPartyinSouthYemenafteraccomplishingthemissiontodefeattheSovietsinAfghanistan.109

107AbuMusabal-Suri isoneofthemostprominenttheoristsof Jihadithought.HisrealnameisMustafaSetmariamNasar,andheisconsideredoneofthemostimportantadvocatesoftheideathat Yemen should become a permanent and central headquarters of the Jihadi organization,espoused in his publication “Makanat al-Yamaniyeen wa Dawrihim fi Himayat Muqadasat al-MusliminwaTharawatihim” [Lit., “The Status of Yemenis and their Role in ProtectingMuslimSanctities andWealth”]. This book is one of themost important references related tomakingYemenastrongholdforJihadisandtransferringtheheadquartersfromAfghanistantoYemen.Al-Suriwasarrested in2005byPakistani intelligence forces, andwasgivenup toUS intelligenceservices.Hisfateremainsunknown.108SayyidImamAbdal-Azizal-Sharif,knownasDr.Fadl,oneofthemostprominentideologuesofJihadimovementsandauthorof“Al-‘UmdafiE‘dadal-‘Udda”[Lit. “TheDeliberations[Required]for thePreparations [for Jihad],” said inan interviewwithanEgyptianTVchannel thatAfghanArab Jihadis (Al-Qaeda members) were supported and directed by the Yemeni intelligenceservice,knownthenasThePoliticalSecurityOrganization(PSO).109Abu Musab al-Suri (Mustafa Sitmariam) mentions in his famous book, entitled “Da‘wat Al-Muqawamaal-Islamiyaal-‘Aalamiya,” [Lit., “TheCall toGlobal IslamicResistance”],(which isanencyclopedic and historical chronology and reference on the emergence and path of Jihadigroups) the story of the beginnings of Al-Qaeda organization and how Osama bin Laden

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Al-Qaeda’sSecondPhaseinYemenIn its second phase, al-Qaeda began to focalize and position itself in a moreinstitutionalmannerratherthanagenerallyunrulyanddisorganizedway.Earlyon in this phase, al-Qaeda announced the creation of Jaysh Adan-Abyan (TheIslamicArmyofAden-Abyan“IAA”),headedbyAbual-Hassanal-Mihdarin1997.IAAlauncheditsfirstoperationin1998bykidnappingsixteenWesterntourists,mostly Britons, in the southern province of Abyan, and fortified itself in themountainousregionofHattat.Thekidnappingoperationelevatedal-Qaeda intotherankofmajorviolentgroups,especiallyafterthefailureoftheoperationtorescue the hostages, in which two British tourists were killed. Al-Mihdar wascaptured in the confrontations and was put on trial and executed shortlyafterwardstowardstheendof1998inSana’a.

ThebombingoftheUSSColeoffthecoastofAdenin2000cameinthecontextofal-Qaeda’sresponsetotheexecutionofAl-Mihdar,andwasthebiggestattackbyal-Qaeda before the September 11, 2001 attacks – if these attacks are trulyattributabletoal-Qaeda.

Afterthat,theassassinationofAbuAlial-HarithiinthedesertofMa’ribbyaUSPredator drone attack on November 3rd, 2002 is considered one of the earlyAmericanmeasures against the first cells of al-Qaeda in Yemen. This incidentpresaged the ensuing all-out war between the organization and US forces inYemenaftertheSeptember11attacks.Al-Harithiwasoneoftheearlyal-Qaedaleaders with a direct relationship with Osama bin Laden at the time, and iswidelybelievedtohavebeenadirectenvoyofbinLaden,andhadreturnedfromAfghanistantopreparethegroundsforthereturnofbinLadenandhisfollowerstoYemen,accordingtoAbuMusabal-Suri.

Al-Qaeda’sThirdPhaseinYemenThis stage represents theorganization’sprogression towards globalizing Jihad,whereittranscendedbeyondthelocalscenebeginningwiththeestablishmentofal-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in November 2009, initiating the“globalized”phaseoftheorganization,headquarteredinYemen.

This phase is characterized by large qualitative operations, with a clearpropagandist dimension that resonated widely in the media, such as theattempted blowing up of a US airliner over Detroit in December 2009 byNigeriannationalUmarFaroukAbdulmutallab.Withtheannouncementofformingal-QaedaintheArabianPeninsuladuringthisphase, the media began to portray Yemen as a hotbed of terrorist threat to emphasized,beforetheunification,theneedtoliberateSouthYemenandgovernit,yetaftertheunificationhebelievedintheneedtocontrolandgovernallofYemen.BinLaden,accordingtoAl-Suri,preparedaplanforthisandcommunicatedwithtribalandreligiousleadersthen.Theplanwasmovingsmoothlyandwithgreatprecisionuntil theoutbreakof thewar in thesummerof1994, when one of the most important Jihadi leaders, Muslim Baraseen, was assassinated inShabwaafterSocialistPartyforcesweredefeatedthere.OtherseniorJihadi leaders,suchasAl-Fadli andAl-Nahdi andothers,wereabsorbed intoPresidentSaleh’spartyand security forces,andweregivenhighranks.

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internationalpeaceand security, in amanner that servedprivate agendas thatsoughttoaggrandizethesubjectofterrorisminYementotransformthecountryintoa“closed”terroristzone.This, in turn,hinderedallefforts thatwerebeingmade in order to restore thewell-being of Yemen, a country that has sufferedfromthetarnishingofitsimageasaresultofterrorism.

Al-Qaeda’sFourthPhaseinYemenDuringthisstage,whichbeganwiththeArabSpringrevolutions,al-Qaedabeganto retreat from the spotlight.Yet soonafter, andwith the subsequentphaseofcounter-revolutions and coups against the Arab Spring revolutions, al-Qaedabegan to re-emerge strongly, especially after the coup that deposed EgyptianPresident Mohamed Morsi, the strike against the Libyan revolution, and thesuppression of the Syrian revolution. These events produced a new trend ofuncontrolled and rampantly violent organizations, represented by the “IslamicState”organizationandothers,inastagethatcontinuesuntiltoday.Thisphase ischaracterizedbyrampantviolenceandtheemergenceofobviousintelligenceemploymentofthisnon-objectiveviolence,whichhasmanifestedinforms closer to Hollywood than anything else. This phase witnessed theemergence of cinematic-style films that depicted violent crimes, produced anddisseminated in such a staggering way that targets a massive audience, in anefforttoingraintheideathattheexistenceofterrorismisadirectconsequenceofrevolutionsandcallsforchange.

InYemen,thephenomenonofwhatbecameknownasthe“IslamicState”(IS),orDa’esh, did notmanifest in theway it did in the cases of Syria, Iraq, Libya orEgypt, but the prospects of Da’esh-like implications began to appear in theYemeniscene,albeitreservedly.Thispost-ArabSpringviolentwave,representedby the “Islamic State”, however, was faced by the major problematic obstaclerepresented by the wave that preceded it in Yemen: al-Qaeda.Al-Qaeda, untiltoday,stillmaintainsthestrongestinfluenceontheoverallJihadiSalafistcurrent,anditsactivitiesinYemenhavenotreachedtheextentofthe“IslamicState”duetothestructuraldifferencesbetweentheYemeniscene,ontheonehand,andtheSyrianandIraqionesontheother.110

ThiscurrentphasealsowitnessedthefallofthecapitalSana’aintothehandsofHouthimilitias,whoraisedthebannerof“Waronal-Qaeda,”asadisingenuousslogan aimed to receive Western support for its coup against the legitimateauthorityandnationaldialogue.Houthispropagated the ideaof combattingal- 110AnotabledifferenceinthecaseoftheJihadiSalafistmembershipbasesinYemen,ontheonehand,andSyriaandIraq,ontheotherhand,isthatthepopularbasesinYemenaremembersofasocially conservative society, asopposed to IraqandSyria,where largenumbersof thosewhojoinedthecurrentcamefromLeftist,Baathist,andPan-Nationalistbackgrounds,asanexpressionof the conditions ofmarginalization, injustice, and exclusion inflicted on these components bySectarian governments in Iraq and the like in Syria following theArab Spring. These elementsfoundnothing to lift this injusticeoff them, savemusteringunder thenameandbannerof the“Islamic State” organization. On the other hand, in Yemen, most of those belonging to JihadiSalafist current come from socially and tribally conservative environments. This led to apolarizationbetweentwocamps:the“IslamicState”andAl-Qaeda.Duringthisperiod,thefactorsfortheemergenceandexpansionofthe“IslamicState” inYemenwerealmostnon-existentandcertainlyunprepared,incomparisontotheconditionsinIraqandSyriaatthetime.

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Qaedaandthe“IslamicState”,butthetwosideshavenotengagedagainsteachotherinasinglebattlethroughouttheyear.Onthecontrary,bothal-QaedaandtheHouthiinsurgencytargetedthebulkoftheiroperationsagainstthelegitimategovernment forcesandstate institutions in thesouthandnorthof thecountry,respectively. Not a single battle between the two sides was noted, on thecontrary,therewascoordinationandcooperationbetweenthetwocampswhenal-Qaeda seized control of the city of Al-Mukalla, which was a main crossingpoint for Houthi and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s supply lines for gas, diesel, andweaponscominginfromIranviatheArabianSea.

Furthermore,theHouthidelegationattheKuwaitTalksobjectedtotheissueofliberating the cityofAl-Mukalla fromal-Qaeda byArabAlliance forcesand theNational Army, and considered such a move an occupation and aggressionagainstYemen.

TheYemeniApproachtoCounter-TerrorismReturning to themain subject, the question posed is whether there truly is aYemeni approach to countering the phenomenon of terrorism similar to theSaudiapproach,which isbasedonwhat isknownas theMunasahaCommittee(GivingAdvice) that seeks to rehabilitate individualswhohad joinedextremistgroups, such as the Jihadis returning from Afghanistan, Guantanamo Baydetention,Iraq,andotherplaces.

IntheYemenicase,counteringterrorismisperhapstheonlyapproachinwhichthe regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh was able to identify and parallel with theAmericanapproach.Saleh’sregimewasabletoemployandutilizethesegroupsinitspoliticalconflictsfromtheearlybeginningsofthisphenomenoninYemenstartingintheearly1990s.Thismeansthatthereissomewhatofacorrelation,perhapsarelationship,betweentheAmericansandSaleh’sregimeinregardstothisissue,evidentparticularlyinthewaybothsidesweresimilarintheirmeansofhandlingtheterrorism“game”fromanearlystage.111

In strengthening his power and legitimacy, locally and internationally, Salehpresented his regime as an active partner in the War on Terror after theSeptember11, 2001attacks.Heprovidedall possible support to theAmericanside,particularlyafterthemajoral-QaedaplantoattackUSinterests,thatbeganwiththebombingoftheUSSColeoffthecoastofAdenonOctober12th,2000.

The USS Cole attack was the beginning of major al-Qaeda operations againstAmerican andWestern targets in general, such as the attack on the Frenchoiltanker “Limburg”off thecoastofAl-Mukalla inOctober2002.All theseattacksreinforcedtheAmericanconvictionthatYemen,inadditiontobeingtheoriginal

111TheAmericanpositiononthesubjectisbasedonconsideringthephenomenonofterrorismaspurelyasecurityproblem,andbelievingthattheonlysolutionthesecurityapproachthatreliesonkilling,prisons,torture,andhumanrightsviolations.Thishastakenacriticalanddangerousdimension in this context, and resulted in serious consequences on all levels with respect togravebreachesofhumanrights.Thisstudydiscussessomeoftheseissuesthattookplaceandarestill ongoing in Yemen, from the context of the security approach to counter-terrorism,manifested in secret prisons and drone warfare, the innocent victims of which have reachedgravelylargenumbers.

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homeland of al-Qaeda’s founder Osama bin Laden, is also a major hotbed ofconflictfortheorganization.ThispromptedtheUStoadoptapurelysecurityandmilitary approach to dealing with al-Qaeda and combatting what it called“terrorism,” according to its own characterizations and interests, and notaccordingtothedictatesofcommoninterestsbetweennationsandpeoples.

ItisfromthislimitedsecurityandmilitaryanglethatPresidentSalehmeteye-to-eye with the United States, which led the two sides to enter into a sort ofpartnership in everything related to terrorism. This was manifested in thecreation of the Yemeni Counter-Terrorism Special Forces, with US funding,training, and expertise, and which were closely associated with, and run by,President Saleh’s sons. A new intelligence force was also created for thispurpose,calledthe“NationalSecurityBureau”(NSB).112In addition to the NSB, the special counter-terrorism units, which enjoyedtremendousUSarming,trainingandexpertise,wereoftenusedoutsideoftheirspecial missions’ jurisdiction (which is counter-terrorism), and were draggedinto the February 2011 revolution to crackdown on political opponents. Theforceswere also used against Saleh’s political adversaries in the battles in theregion of Al-Hasba in mid-2011, a matter that reflects the real nature andobjectiveof these forces,under thebannerofanti-terrorism.FormerPresidentAliAbdullahSalehusedtheseforcesasacovertorallyinternationalsupportandlegitimacyforhisregime,whichheintendedtobequeathtohiseldestson.

ItisinthiscontextthatformerPresidentSalehdealtwiththeAmericanviewoncountering terrorism, and he even outperformed the Americans themselves interms of his success in employing his objectives and tools in dealing withterrorism from a purely security angle. Saleh’s security-oriented standpoint,however,servedasrealnourishmenttoextremistgroups,whichusedthearmedconfrontationsasapegto fighttheAmerican-alliedYemeniregime,whichthey[al-Qaeda]viewedasa legitimatetargetofall itsoperationsagainsttheUSanditsregionalallies,or“agents”accordingtoal-Qaeda’sdescription.

Thepurely security approach conversely ledal-Qaeda and extremist groups tosolidifytheiradherenceto–andbeliefintherightnessof–confrontationswiththe localWestern-allied regimes, led by the United States. The US encouragedthis security dimension as an American strategy throughwhich itwas able tofreelyjustifyitspresenceandinfluencethroughouttheworld,underthepretextof combatting terrorism. To serve this aim, the US enacted laws and formedallianceswithouteverdelineatingaconcisedefinitionof“terrorism”.From this context,US “counter-terrorism”policieswere initiated in theMiddleEastand throughout theworld, especially in regions classifiedby theUSasal- 112TheNational Security Bureau (NSB) is a Yemeni intelligence service, created specifically tocombat what is called terrorism. It is the third department of the security and intelligenceapparatus,whichincludesthePoliticalSecurityOrganization(PSO)andMilitaryIntelligence.TheNationalSecurityBureauenjoyedUS funding,expertise,and training for itsmembers,andwascloselytiedwiththeAmericans.ThismadetheBureauthe“AmericanEyeonYemen,”particularlyinregardstotheissueofterrorism,whichwasdealtwithfromapurelysecurityangle,withoutconsideration of other factors and causes that give rise to and exacerbate this phenomenon.Furthermore,theBureauwasinvolvedinthewakeoftheFebruary2011revolution,inwhichtheintelligence and military capabilities of the Bureau were used to crack down on the popularpeacefulyouthrevolution.

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Qaedahavens,suchasYemen,Afghanistan,Somalia,andIraq.Furthermore,theideacrystallizedto“disable”notionsofnationalsovereigntyofthesecountriesinordertoallowtheUSanditsairpowertoflyintheirskiesandcarryoutactsofwar that resulted in thousands of innocent victims who lost their livesextrajudicially.Thisscenarioadverselyresulted in increasedal-Qaedaactivitiesand eased the recruitment of new members who joined its ranks out ofmotivationforrevengeandretaliationfortheirlovedoneswhowerekilledinUSdronestrikesinYemenandelsewhere.113

Theproblematiclegacyofthisapproach,onalllevels,rephrasesthequestionofwhethertheretrulyisaconsciousandresponsibleYemeniapproachtocounter-terrorism into questioning the reality and extent to which there is systematicemploymentandexploitationof theproblemof terrorismin linewithpersonalagendasof theregime. ItalsoexposesAmerican involvement in thismatter,asrevealed in the documentary film “al-Qaeda’s Informant,” which aired on Al-JazeeraaboutHaniMujahid,aformeral-Qaedaoperativeturnedinformant,whoaccused the head of the Yemeni National Security Bureau Brigadier GeneralAmmar Mohammad Abdullah Saleh, nephew of Ali Abdullah Saleh, ofinvolvement and coordination with al-Qaeda cells to carry out terroristoperations, including the targeting of the US Embassy in Sana’a in September2008.Therevelationsexposedinthedocumentaryfilmareonlyasmallportionofthevolume of exploitation andmanipulation of the issue of “terrorism” by Saleh’sregime, and perhaps with US complicity, evident in the persistent securityhandlingofthematterthroughcontinuedsupportandbackingofSaleh’sregimeasa “partner” in theWaronTerrorism,according toSaleh’svisionrather thanaccording to theway it should be. It is this feature that Saleh used to cling toremaining in power, especially after the peaceful February 2011 revolution,which–haditsucceeded–wouldhavesoughttotreatmanyofthedefectsthatafflicted Yemen, particularly terrorism, a large portion of which is caused bytyranny and lack of development, rather than amerewhim or thirst of youngpeopleforwarandfighting.Hence, Saleh’s regimewas always careful to hold tight to this thread since itsinception in the 1990s, and remained in close contactwith elements that hadpreviouslygonetoAfghanistantojointheJihadthere.Theregimewasalsokeentorecruitinformantsamongtheyouth,andentrapthem intothisslipperyslopethrough systematic and deliberate policies that facilitated the rise of thisphenomenon.114

113AninvestigativereportconductedbyJournalistMohammadal-AhmadiforArabReportersforInvestigativeJournalism(ARIJ)entitled“DroneStrikesFuelAl-QaedaSympathyinYemen,”revealedtheharshrealityofthecounter-productiveoutcomesofdroneattacks,especiallyinregionsthatwereheavilyimpactedbythesestrikes,instigatingsomeoftheirresidentstojointheranksofAl-Qaedainrevengefortheirrelativeswhowerekilledintheseraids.Seethereport:http://en.arij.net/report/drone-strikes-fuel-qaeda-sympathy-in-yemen/114Manycasesrelated to the involvementofyoungpeople inactsof terrorismreveal that theyoriginally had no connection with this file, until they were released from National Securityprisons;prisonswhereteenagedyouthwerethrownintofornofaultotherthanhavingarelativeor a friendwhowas suspected of belonging to these groups. Therewere systematic practicesused in theseprisons to instigateyoungpeople toengage inactsof terrorism, includingbrutal

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Drones:BreedingTerrorismAnothergrimaspectrelatedtoproducing,breeding,andperpetuatingterrorismis largely associated with “DroneWarfare,” the strategy of unmanned aircraftkillingmachinesthat theUnitedStatesuses in itsso-calledWaronTerror.Theindiscriminate use of drones and air power and the consequences of such usehave become the most effective means in synthesizing and breeding largenumbersofnewrecruitsintoal-Qaeda’sranks,clearlymotivatedbyrevenge,asrevealedbyaninvestigativereportbyARIJ.115

This criminal technique has been used outside the framework of law, and inblatant violation of international laws and conventions and human rightscharters, apart from violating the national sovereignty of countries that havesufferedsuchacts.Droneandairwarfareisoneoftheproblematic factorsthatprovokedlargenumberstojointheranksofal-Qaeda,anexampleofwhichisthemassacrethatoccurredinthevillageofAl-MaajalainwhichdozensofinnocentBedouinswerekilledwhilesleepingintheirtents.116

Suchincidentsrecurrednumeroustimesinvariousareas,includingthekillingofMa’rib deputy governor Jaber al-Shabwani, whose convoy was mistakenlytargeted by a US drone strike on May 25th, 2010, along with four of hiscompanions.It isbelievedthatAl-Shabwaniwasenrouteonanofficialmissiontomeetwithmembersofal-Qaedawhowereintendingtosurrenderthemselvesandgiveupfightingwithal-Qaeda,accordingtosourcesclosetoAl-Shabwani.

ManyothersfacedthesamefateasAl-Shabwani.14innocentpeoplewerekilledinaUSdroneattackonaweddingprocessionintheregionofYaklaainBerdaacity inAl-Baydaaprovince.Somanyotherstories tellofdozensofvictimswholost their lives as a result of this security approach to dealingwith issues thesolutionstowhichcannotpossiblybefurtherviolence.

Inobservingtheharvestofover12yearsofUS-Yemenicooperationinthe“WaronTerror,”itisevidentthattheharmanddamageinflictedonYemenhasbeenmuchgreaterthantheharminflictedonterrorism.Hundredsofinnocentpeoplewere killed or injured in either US strikes or al-Qaeda counter-strikes. Manycitieswere turned into rubble,while others face the ensuing risk of becomingbattlegrounds.117

torture,humiliatinginvestigations,desecrationoftheQur’anandinsultingtheDivine.Theauthorobtained this information duringmeetingswith relatives of youthwho took part in hostilitieswithelementsoftheAnsaral-Shari’ainAbyanin2012.115The report received “Best Investigative Report” award for ARIJ network, related to theincreased numbers of people joining Al-Qaeda in response to US drone strikes in Yemen. See:Mohammadal-Ahmadi,“DroneStrikesFuelAl-QaedaSympathyinYemen,”Op.Cit.116OnthemorningofDecember17th,2009,oneofthebloodiestUSairstrikesinYemenoccurred,targetingthevillageofAl-MaajalainAbyanprovince.TheattackisbelievedtohavebeencarriedoutbyUSmissileslaunchedfromtheseabyaUSbattleshiponasmallgatheringofvillagersandBedouinshepherdswhoweresleepingintheirtents.About41peoplewerekilled, including14women and 21 children in this criminal incident. US media attempted to falsify the story,presentingitasiftheairstrikeshadtargetedanAl-Qaedatrainingcamp.117Adelal-Ahmadi,“Huroubal-Ta’iratal-Amerikiyafial-Yaman:Al-QatlbilaaAdilla,”[Lit.“TheUSAir War in Yemen: Killing without Evidence”], Al-Araby al-Jadeed (The New Arab), April 3rd,2014, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/investigations/2014/4/3/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-

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The cycle of violence created by the drones and airstrikes’ security-orientedapproachproves that thisapproach fuelsandperpetuatesviolence rather thanbeingasolutiontoit.Thisisduetotheapproachbeingoutsidetheframeworkoflaw and reason, and it being built upon a systematic and deliberate politicalvisionaimedatenablingitsactorstocontinuetoholdandmanipulatethestringsofthisgameratherthanfindeffectivesolutionstocombatit.

Table1.ThenumberofUSdronestrikesagainstal-QaedainYemen,andthenumberofcasualties(includinginjured)from2011toAugust2014.118

YEAR NUMBEROFAIRSTRIKES CASUALTIES

2011 6 18-25

2012 44 322-357

2013 25 100

2014(untilAugust) 26 109

Theabove tableshows the incidents thatoccurred fromthebeginningof2011until August 2014. The following two years (2015 and 2016), however,witnessed near doubling of the attacks and numbers of victims. These figuresdeemtheairoperationsasbreedingmeasuresforthegrowingnumbersjoiningtheranksofal-QaedainYemen,particularlyafterthebigsetbackofthecounter-revolutionthat ledtotheSeptember21st,2014coupthattoppledthestateanditsinstitutions.Thecouptransformedthestate’ssecurityandmilitaryapparatusintosectarianmilitias,asmanyofitsmembersweredischargedandreplacedbysectarian militia members. This has opened the door wide for a forceful re-emergenceofviolent terrorism,which in turngivesrise toanewvariable thatservesasanextensiontothecasesofIraqandSyria,andpavesthewayfortheemergenceofthe“IslamicState”organization’smodel.WiththefallofthestateinYemen,everythingfell;therenolongerisastate,butrathergoverningmilitiasthathavetransformedallthestate’sresourcesinfavorof their sectarian militia wars. This has provided additional factors for theperpetuation of the phenomenon of violent terrorism – according to theAmerican definition and description – which mushroomed as a response andcounteraction to the coup. This has further resulted in the US Government’sidentificationandparticipationwiththeHouthisectariancoup,whichpresenteditselfasanopponentof“violentgroups”(al-QaedaandIS),butinfactwagedwaragainst the Yemeni popular resistance that erupted in the face of the Houthitakeoverthattoppledthestate.119

%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A9118Mohammadal-Ahmadi,“DroneStrikesFuelAl-QaedaSympathyinYemen,”Op.Cit.119USwarplanesparticipated in theAl-QeifaBattle inRedaacity inAl-Baydaaprovince,asaircoverfollowingtheSeptember21st,2014coupinfavoroftheHouthimilitiasagainstthepopular

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Evenmoregravely,theHouthimilitiasrulinginSana’aworkedtotransformtheUS-backed, funded and armed Counter-Terrorism Special Forces into combattroopsintheirmilitiawarsagainstthepopularresistanceandthenationalarmyin Taiz, Ma’rib, Al-Baydaa and other places without any US objection to theinterventionof these forces.Onthecontrary, theuseof these forcesseemedtocomewithUSapprovalandblessings,especially in that thecoupenjoyedclearUSsupportfromtheonset.

Conclusion

The continued absence of a systematic, objective, and clear definition for theconcept,causes,andmechanismsof terrorismposesthebiggestobstacle intheface of any attempt to analyze and question the approach to counteringterrorism.It isonlythroughtheexistenceofarealcounter-terrorismapproachthat the phenomenon itself may be dissected; but this is far from beingaccomplished, considering that the phenomenon itself is complex, ambiguousandoverlappingwithmanyothercomplexitiesthatanswertothewillanddesireofmajorinternationalpowersthatseektokeepthesubjectofterrorismasoneoftheportfoliosthroughwhichtheycanidentifytheirfriendsandfoes,allthewhilekeepingthisphenomenonundertheirdisposal.

In this context, the search for a Yemeni approach to counter-terrorism willremainanexerciseinpaddlingoutsidethescopeofobjectivity,andthus,itisnotpossibletoreachempiricalconclusions.Thiscallsfortheneedtoexposemoreofthecircumstancesrelatedtopoliticalutilizationandexploitationofthissubject,and the implications of this utilization on the nature and prospects of Yemen.ThisutilizationandexploitationoftheissueofterrorismwasoneofthefactorsbehindthefallofthestateintothehandsoftheSeptember21st,2014coup,theperpetratorsofwhich raised thebannerof “WaronTerror” to enable them toinvest it inthe internationalpoliticsmarket,particularlywithregardtotheUS,whoseretreatfromtheYemenisceneconstitutedagreenlightforthetakeover.

This political and security exploitation, coupled with the absence of a clearcomprehensive national counter-terrorism approach, led to the collapse of thestateinYemen,andbeforethatledtotheobstructionofpolitical,economic,andsocial development and transformed Yemen into one of the worst-rankingcountries in the world in the index of safety and security. This has reflectedsignificantlyonthereputationofYemen,resultingincompleteobliterationofthetourismand investmentmarkets,renderingYemena failedstateandhinderinganypossibleprogressanddevelopmentinthecountry.

Yemenishavepaidaheavyprice.TheregimeofAliAbdullahSalehusedtheissueof terrorism as one of its political trump cards in search for internationallegitimacytokeephiminpowerontheYemenipoliticalsceneforalongtime.Hefurthersoughttoexploitthistrumpcardinordertobequeathhispositiontohis

resistance inRedaa.TheuseofUSairpower in supportof theHouthiswasunder theguiseofweak and subjective pretexts that claimed that the ranks of the popular resistance in RedaaincludedsupportersofAl-Qaeda,amatterthatwasdeniedbytheresistanceatthetime.Suchabehavior by theAmericans led to fueling anti-American sentiment and animosity among thesetribes,whichwereonthedefensiveinthefaceofSectarianHouthimilitias.

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son,whomhepresentedasastrongwarrioragainst terrorism,and invested inthe security approach by creating special anti-terrorism forces under theleadershipofhissonsandrelatives.Theseforcesaretheelitecombatunitsthatengagedforcefullyincrackingdownonthepeacefulyouthrevolution,andlater,participatedvigorouslyinthecoupthattoppledthestateinYemeninSeptember2014.

An objective and methodological approach to dealing with terrorism reliesmainly on identifying the root causes of this phenomenon. Politicalauthoritarianismcomesatthetopofthesecauses,followedbysecondaryfactorsthat collectively contribute toproducing, escalating, andperpetuatingviolence,including the strictly security approach to counter-terrorism, economicdegradation,lackofdevelopment,weakanddeterioratingeducation,inadditionto theexploitationofambiguous religious textsasa secondaryand final factorthatviolentgroupsresorttoinordertolegitimizetheirviolenceagainstsociety.

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TerrorisminEgyptandtheCrisisofCombattingIt

AhmedZaghloulShalata DespitethedeclarationofwaronterrorisminEgyptnearlythreeyearsagoandtheEgyptianregime’simplementationofvariousstrategiestocombatit,terroristactivityremainspresentinbothSinaiandsomeinlandareasofEgypt.Thisraisesthequestionabout the secretof the strengthand resilienceof terrorist groupsandthecontinuityoftheiractivitiesagainstthestate.Thispaperseekstoanswerthisquestionbydiscussingthefactorsbehindtheresilienceofthesegroups,thelogistical and social dimensions that nurture them, analyzing the state’sstrategiesincounteringterroristactivityandtheireffectiveness,anddiscussingsome of the ongoing changeswitnessed in the structure of the Jihadi current.Thispaperargues that,despite thevarious strategiesappliedby the regime tocombat terrorism, some of these strategies have been counter-productive, andhavecontributedtoperpetuatingthecausesofviolence,whichpavesthewayforcontinuedterroristactivity.

TerroristActivityinEgypt:TheMotivesBehindTerror’sEndurance

«Amasked group killed the officers, they hadmachine guns. Those ofDa’esh’s,Isawthemputtheflagontheredfour-wheeledvehicle.Fourofthemcamedownandbeattheofficersandthreatenedthecivilians.Not20minuteshadpassedbeforethekilledthevictims,stoletheirweapons,andfledtothehillyarea.»

Thiswasthetestimonyofaneyewitness120inthedistrictofHelwaninsouthernCairoonMay9th,2016afterashootingambushcarriedoutbyagroupofmaskedmen against an unmarked minibus carrying plain-clothed police officers. Theshooting attack lasted 20 minutes and left all the officers dead. The questionremains:what is the secret of the strength, resilience, and steadiness of thesegroups? The answer is connected to the joining of forces of local and regionalcontextsthatcontributeinprovidingtherawmaterialsforviolentideology,andgivesuchorganizationsimpetusandtheabilitytoenduredespitethemeasurestaken against them, and even produce a diverse range of followers andsympathizerswiththisideology.Intermsof“localfactors,”thedomesticpoliciesoftheregimethemselvesinturnbecomealogisticalincentiveforterrorgroups,andprovideampleopportunitiestocontinueintheirJihadi/terroristactivities.Thesefactorsinclude:

IncreasedPublicInclinationtowardsOrganizedPoliticalViolenceSuccessive political tensions in Egypt continue to feed the growing dispositiontowards violence as a tool of political resistance in the face of the rulingauthorities and their “violations.” These dispositions are reinforced by the 120Seethereport:www.elwatannews.com/news/details/1157450

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practices of security services against detainees and the opposition, and theunprecedented use of the term “physical liquidation” in official governmentstatements to refer to the victims of confrontations that are publiclyannounced.121Othersymbolictoolsexacerbatethisinclinationtowardsviolence,suchasthereligiousorsocialjustificationsfortheconceptofviolence,asaresultofongoingpracticesthatpushtowardswideningthesphereofphysicalviolence.

Such justifications stem from thediversityof thosewhoadoptandsympathizewith the concept of violence,whether Islamists or not, both ofwhom share incommon the harm inflicted by security policies upon themat varyingdegrees,and the sense of collective injustice shared by large segments of thepopulation.122Thesejustificationshaveavengefuldimensionthatprovokesthemtosupportorevenjoinvariousviolentgroupsortoformlimitedcellsforspecificgoals.123

TheCoupagainsttheIslamistExperienceThedomesticreactionsafterPresidentMohammedMorsiwasdeposedgavethe“kiss of life” to Jihadi groups, who stressed that what took place was a waragainst Islam, and that Jihad against these “agencies” is the fundamental rule.TheoustingofMorsiconfirmedtheviewadoptedbythesegroupsofthefutilityofparticipating in thedemocraticprocess.Despite theirrejectionof theruleofMorsiandtheirTakfirofhimforadoptingdemocracy,neglectingtoapplyShari’alaw, not opening the door for Jihad to liberate Palestine etc., Jihadis,nevertheless,hada significantpresence in theAl-Nahda andRabi‘aal-Adawiyaprotests against the coup, and contributed to carrying out a series of attacksagainstpoliceandthearmyasadeclarationoftheirrejectionofthereturnoftherepressive police state. As residents of border regions (such as Sinai), theirconvictions in such confrontations is that they “owned the right for reprisal”againstpoliceandstatesecurityagencies,andthattheconfrontationsinstigatedthemtosendastrongmessageaffirmingthattheywillnotallowforthereturnof 121The term “liquidation” first began to be used in official statements with the beginning ofclashesbetweenarmedmilitantsofthe“AnsarBaytal-Maqdis–WilayatSinai”andtheEgyptianarmyonJuly1st,2015.Anofficialannouncementwasmadeof“theliquidationof13membersoftheMuslimBrotherhoodorganization inanapartment in6Octobercity.”Seethereportontheincident:http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/689384.aspx122“Egypt’sRisingSecurityThreat,”TheTahrirInstituteforMiddleEastPolicy,November15,2015,pg.14,http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tahrir_Report_FINAL_WEB.pdf123Itisworthnotingthattheseedsofthispoliticalviolencewereplantedandareacontinuationto the state of violence that fed off political developments and tensions in Egypt since 2011,particularly since the events atMohammedMahmoud Street inNovember 2011,when rubberpellet rifles (known askhartoush) began to appear in the hands of protesters as a reaction topolice violence. Livebulletswereused against protesters at theMinistry ofDefense andotherprotests.ThepoliticaltensionsduringtheruleofMohamedMorsialsonurturedviolentgroupsofvariousbackgroundsandframesofreference,suchastheBlackBlocandsometraditionalJihadigroups.Theviolentreligiousdiscoursealsoaddedfueltofire,reachingitspeakwiththerhetoricofSalafistpreacherMohammadAbdal-MaqsoudintheConferenceforSupportingSyriainJune2013,andothercasesofexchangeofviolence in streetsandattacksmotivatedby “identity” incertain areas, etc. The discourse of violence further dominated with the Protest at Rabi‘a al-Adawiya Square, andwas exacerbatedwith the political developments following the ouster ofMorsi,andthesecuritymeasuresinSinaifueledthecounter-violentsituationandcontributedtotheturningofAnsarBaytal-Maqdistowardstargetingcivilians.

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the police state, even if it leads to war.124All such tensions ultimately lead toprovoking and invigorating the rejectionist mood, both in thought and action,whether in the spread of physical and symbolic violent ideology or throughactivistconfrontations,bothpeacefulandviolentones.

OtherFactors

Thegeographic factoralsohadaneffect in facilitatingthemovementofviolentgroups. There are regions that facilitate – by virtue of their geographiccharacteristics – opportunities for Jihadis to expand and operate, giving themfreedom in terms ofmovement,monitoring, supplies, concealment, hiding, andtheentryandescapeofperpetrators,asisthecaseinborderregionsinSinai,innorthern Egypt, or in the Western desert region, and nearby areas. This wasevidentintheoperationscarriedoutbythesegroups,suchastargetingmilitaryrecruits inAl-Wadial-Jadidprovinceandclasheswithsecurity forces in “Siwa,”“Farafra,” and the “Al-Zahir al-Sahrawi” regions of the provinces of Asyut andBani Suef. The geographic factor is also linked to the facilitations provided bysome border-region mafias, which practically control unofficial entry and exitmovements.Suchfacilitationsareofferedinreturnforfinancialincentiveratherthanbeliefandconvictioninthegoalsoughttobeimplementedbythesegroups.

Regional factors: Domestic developments in the “Arab Spring” countries alsofueledJihadiexpansionintheregionforvariousreasons,mostnotably:

- The intertwining of al-Qaeda’s official position with the “Arab Spring”revolutions, and its declaration that the two approaches are notcontradictory,especiallyasal-Qaeda’smostprominent figuresattemptedtoundertake “ideological adaptation” by circumventing al-Qaeda’s differenceswiththedemocraticrevolutionsinregardstomethodsofchange,objectives,and so forth.Al-Qaeda also viewed thedevelopments as a step in its favor,whereby hostile, Western-allied regimes were being overthrown. Al-Qaedaconsidered that theminimum gain is a better “chance” for its activities toreachitsultimategoal,as longasthereisopportunityforJihadicurrentstostand out and operate.125However, this perspective was not the dominantone across the overall Jihadi current, which generally believes that thefundamental Jihadi ruling is that participating in the democratic process isfutile,andmaintainsJihadagainsttheseregimesastheonlypath.

- The success of the “Islamic State” organization (IS) in imposing its controlovervastgeographical areas towhere itbecamea sortof a “state”andnotjust a Jihadi organization. IS also exhibited resilience in its ability towithstand the global coalition against it, and expanding according to a

124Ismailal-Iskandarani,Al-HarbfiSinai:MukafahatIrhabamTahawulatIstratijiyafial-Ta‘awunwa al-‘Idaa’?, [Lit. “The War in Sinai: Combating Terrorism or Strategic Transformations inCooperation and Enmity?”], Political Analysis Series, the Arab Center for Research and PolicyStudies,January2014,p.15,http://www.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/6a4c3140-7acf-4115-9ad7-a73ba879671c.pdf125 Mohammad Abu Rumman, Aydiuloujiat Al-Qa‘eda wa Muhawalat “al-Takayyuf” ma‘a al-Thawrat al-‘Arabiya, [Lit., “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology and the Attempt to ‘Acclimate’ with ArabRevolutions”], Al-Siyasa al-Douwaliya (International Politics) Journal, No. 158, July 2011,(paraphrased).

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dynamic,well-deliberated strategy and calculated, complex tactics that relyon solid structural and ideological foundations.126This constituted impetusfor the growth of Jihadi ideology, whereby the “caliphate” is no longer adreambuthasbecomeareality,promptinglargenumbersofyoungpeopletotravel to join the “Jihad,” whether from among followers of old and fadedJihadi groups (such as remnants of Tanzim al-Jihad or Al-Jamaa‘a al-Islamiya),127orfromthefluidoverall Jihadibloc.Somehadinitiallytraveledsolelyforreliefworkforaperiodoftime,buteventuallyfluctuatedbetweenvariousarmedgroupsandsettledwithoneofthem.Meanwhile,othersfromthosewhotraveledwerealreadyinfluencedbyJihadiideologywhileinEgypt.

- ThefallofsomeArabregimesandtheconsequentcollapseoftheirmilitariesfueledthestateofviolenceby increasingopportunities fortheflowofarmsinto the country, especially Libya which remains the primary exporter ofarms intoEgypt.According to security statements,80percentofdrugsandweapons that flood into Egypt comes from Libya.128Furthermore, internalconflicts in other countries contributed to creating momentum for Jihadithought. Calls for Jihad against ruling regimes multiplied, contributed tocreatingaclimatethatallowsforexercising“Jihad”onawidescale,andinaformalway,especiallyamidthedisseminationofmaterialthatdocumentstheatrocitieshappeningincountriessuchasSyria,Yemen,Mali,andelsewhere.

TheStateandItsCounter-TerrorismStrategies

ThestrategiesoftheEgyptianregimeincombattingviolenceandeliminatingthetargeting of military, police, and public facilities include the followingdimensions:On the legal level: The assassination of Attorney General Hisham Barakat onJune 29th, 2015 prompted Egyptian authorities to swiftly issue the Anti-TerrorismLaw,129whichwaspassed onAugust 16th, 2015, as a supplement tothe “Terrorist Entities Law”130of February 2015, which delineated the legalmeasures of dealing with terrorist entities and individuals, including legalrestrictionsagainstdetaineesandtoughercourtrulingsagainst leadersofsuchentities,includingdeathsentencesandlifeimprisonment.

126HassanAbuHanieh,Al-Dawlaal-IslamiyaminHalabilaal-Mosul,[Lit.“TheIslamicState:FromAleppotoMosul”],Altagreer,June7th,2015,http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/221115127Istishad3MasryieenYantamounailaal-Jamaa‘aal-IslamiyafiSuriya,[Lit.,“ThreeEgyptiansbelongingtotheAl-Jamaa‘aal-IslamiyakilledinSyria”],Al-WatanNewspaper,September1,2012,http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/44184#.U_0YVtosTx4.facebook,Also,therewasthedeathoftheformerheadofthemilitarywingofAl-Jamaa‘a,RifaiAhmadTaha,onApril9th,2016inanairstrikeonhisvehicleinSyriawhilehewasonroutetoattempttoreconcilebetweenAl-NusraFrontandAhraral-Shamgroups,bothofwhicharefightingtheSyrianregime.Seethereport:http://goo.gl/Uvqgn7128See the report on “Secrets of Smuggling and the Volume of Arms Trade in Egypt, ‘Israeli’WeaponsStocksFloodSinai,CelebritiesCarryArmstoDefendthemselves,PeopleinUpperEgyptCannotdowithoutWeaponsforBattlesandRevenge,”July22nd,2015,:http://goo.gl/W4SSXl129SeethetextoftheAnti-TerrorismLaw:http://goo.gl/oYvjK8130SeethetextoftheLawonTerroristEntities:http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/605740

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Onthepolitical level:TheStatedeclaredtheMuslimBrotherhoodmovementaterrorist organization, and restricted Da‘wa and religious preaching on theoverallIslamiccurrentunderthepretextof“dryingup”theideologicalsourcesofviolence.Onthereligiouslevel,theregimesoughtto“nationalize”andinstitutionalizethereligioussphere,underthepretextofwarningof thedangersof Jihadi thought.Such efforts were carried out through the policies of the Ministry of Awqaf(religious endowments) towards administrators of the affairs ofmosques. Theefforts included propagandist “media” contributions by the official religiousinstitutionsthroughconferencesorganizedbyal-Azharinstitution,andthestateinstitutions’ attempt to rival the “producers” and ideologues of Jihadi thoughtacross social networking sites by creating two pages on Facebook under thenamesof“The‘IslamicState’(IS)underthemicroscope”and“Theobservatoryofdeviant and Takfiri religious edicts,” in an effort to dismantle and refute thepremisesofextremistorganizations.On the economic level: the state put a freeze on the funds of some Islamicsocieties under the pretext of their association with the Muslim Brotherhoodmovement.Themoveaimedto“dryup”thesourcesoffundingforanypotential“terrorist”activities.

Onthemedia level:thestatepropagatedandstressedtheresponsibilityoftheMuslimBrotherhood forallviolentgroupsandclaimed that itoperates them–basedonthehistoryoftheBrotherhoodwithviolence.Thispropagandaarguedthat,throughtheseviolentgroups,theMuslimBrotherhoodseekstoensurethecontinuity of its popular bases and incubators for its activities. The state’srhetoric,however,evadedanymentionoftheindependentbranchofthe“IslamicState” organization in Egypt (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis), for various purposes,including:

1. Directingthepoliticalconflict intheregime’s favor, tobuttress itspositionsasthe“savior”thatremovedtheMuslimBrotherhoodfrompower,andhence,it was the Brotherhood that provoked the regime to use violence in itsconfrontations, since the Brotherhood is a “terrorist” organization and itsactionsintheaftermathconfirmthecorrectnessoftheregime’sapproachindealingwithit.

2. Recognizing the existence of an independent organization that has pledgedallegiance to the “Islamic State”, and has no relation to the MuslimBrotherhood,deprivestheregimeofa“domestic”sourceofpowerbyvirtueof it being the “savior/rescuer.” For the regime to admit and recognize the“Wilayat Sinai” IS branch amounts to a political and security failure,especially since this entity emerged during the current regime’s reign.Furthermore, such an admission would contradict the “image” that theregimehasmadeforitselfattheexpenseoftheMuslimBrotherhood,whichwould consequently lead to a diminishment of the acceptance and supportthattheregimeenjoysfromthepublic.

3. The Egyptian regime’s recognition of IS’s Egypt branch may have otherrepercussions on the international level, considering that Egypt’sparticipation in anti-IS measures has been confined to the political andreligiousspheres.Egypt’sparticipationonlyextendedtomilitaryengagement

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when it launched airstrikes against IS strongholds in Libya after theorganization killed 21 Coptic Christian Egyptians on February 16th, 2015,limiting its response to airstrikes under the pretext that the domesticconditionsdonotallowfordeployingforcesoutofthecountry.IftheregimeweretorecognizeISnow,thiswouldcompelittoparticipatemorestronglyinthecoalitionandconsequentlywidenthescopeofthearmy’sbattles,andbroadenthescopeofcooperationinamannerthatmaypushforalliancesandarrangementsthatwouldyieldinternalcomplications.

On themilitary level: Egyptian security policies are the main force behindexhausting and straining the activities of Jihadi organizations, evident throughvariousmeasures,including:- ContinuoustargetingofJihadicells,suchasthemeasuresagainstwhatwere

knownas the“Wadi”(Valley)cells,which ledtodiminishingtheir influencecomparedtoearlierin2013.

- Continuous security confrontations against leaderships to weaken theorganizations, such as the killing of the leader of “AjnadMisr” on April 5th,2015 during confrontations with security forces, which subsequentlyweakenedtheorganization’sactivities.

- Cuttinglogisticalsupportforthesegroupsbytargetingtheirweaponsstoresindifferentlocations.

- Efforts to infiltrate these organizations: despite some failed attempts –according to claims declared by IS’sWilayat Sinai131– yet there have beensuccesses that were not given their due in the media. Security forcesmanaged to pre-emptively strike theAl-Murabitounmovement (whichwasestablished by Hisham Ashmawi, the former head of the military wing ofAnsarBaytal-Maqdis), in themovement’s first – and last – operation (untilthe writing of this paper). The strike happened after members of themovementclashedwithairandground forces inSiwaOasis in thewesterndesertregionneartheLibyanborderonAugust13th,2015,whichresultedindowning two helicopters and the survival of Ashmawi, who reportedlyreturned wounded to Libya, and no information about him since then isknown.132

- ThediminishingstrengthofWilayatSinaiinrecentmonths,particularlysincethe major clashes in Sheikh Zuweid in early July 2015, which affected itsactivitiesontheoperationalandpropagandalevels.

131The “Islamic State’s” branch (Wilayah) in Sinai published a video entitled “Harb al-‘Uqoul”(TheWarofMinds), on June8th, 2015, inwhich it emphasized the failureofEgyptian securityforcestoinfiltratetheorganization.Thevideoreportedtwocases,oneofaSinairesidentwhosecarwasbooby-trappedwithouthis knowledge so that itwould explodewhenpassing throughoneoftheambushessetupbyWilayatSinai.Anothercase isofaSalafistyoungmanfromKafrSheikhgovernoratewhowas“planted”asaninfiltratorbythesecurityforces,andwasforcedbytheorganizationtodighisgravewithhisownhandsbeforehewaskilled.132Formoreinformationontheseconfrontations,see:Ismailal-Iskandarani,Ma‘arikfiAl-Sahraaal-Gharbiya..WaNajaatal-Matloubal-AwwalAmniyan, [Lit. “Battles in theWesternDesert..andthe Escape of the Most Wanted man”], Al-Modon electronic newspaper, August 14th, 2015,http://goo.gl/isjDWg

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On the operational level, the IS Egyptian branch, Wilayat Sinai, has beenweakened, which is evident in its inability to carry out significant operationsinsideSinaisinceApachehelicoptersandF-16jetstargeteditsstrongholdsandinflictedsignificantdamagesandcasualtiesthatcannotbeunderestimated.

It has also been weakened on the propaganda level, where its recentpublications133areameredesireformediapresenceratherthanactualphysicalpresence, power and influence. The publications orbit in the framework of“mediawarfare”butwithoutanynewfactsorevents,asisevidentintheabsenceof its documentation of the confrontations in Sheikh Zuweid compared toprevioussimilarincidents.134Furthermore,recentpublicationshavebeenmuchpoorer in technical quality compared to previous ones, indicating that theorganizationhasbeenlosingitstechnicalcadres.

DidThesePoliciesSucceed? Despite the partial successes in dismantling some terror organizations anddepleting them militarily during confrontations, however, combatting thephenomenonas awhole requires re-examinationof these strategies in light ofthe continued terrorist threats and operations that result in casualties fromamong the police, army, and civilians. Re-examination should stem fromobservingtherealityoftherepercussionsofthesestrategiesontwolevels:first,thestatusofthe“Jihadibloc”inlightofthecontinuityofconfrontations,andthesecondisrelatedtotheoutcomesofthe“tactical”stateofaffairs,particularlythetacticalmobilizationofthereligioussphere,inlightoftheregime’smobilizationofallitsresourcestonationalizeandregulatethereligioussphereinanefforttotightenthegriponJihadigrowth.

Despite the diversity of these strategies, we find that in some respects theirresults were counterproductive, leading instead to provoking and pushingtowards supplying Jihadi groups with more followers and sympathizers,especially amid the greatly diverse and organizationally un-regulated Islamistcurrent,andamidthegrowingnumbersofpeopleharmedbycurrentpoliticalorsecuritypracticeswhomaytransformintorealactorswithinthesegroups.This

133Theweakeningof theorganization’spropagandaandmedia influence isevident in itsvideopublications entitled “Sayd al-Murtadeen: Rad‘ al-Muwahideen li Hamalat al-Murtadeen” [Lit.,“Hunting the Apostates: The Unitarians’ (believers in one God) Repelling of the Apostates’Campaigns”],(1and2),andanotherentitled“Hassadal-Ajnad”[Lit.,“TheSoldiers’Harvest”],onSeptember1st,2015,which is theweakestvideoconsideringthat itdidnotdocumentanythingnewexceptforpicturespreviouslypublishedbytheorganization,whichweredullandweak.Thevideo focused on previous operations that targeted soldiers, and was keen to highlight thepresence of a social incubator and host, showing children welcoming members of theorganization as they returned fromoperations, however, there are facts that refute this.OtherscenesportrayedinthevideoincludedthekillingofaresidentofSheikhZuweidwhorefusedtoallow armed groups into his home in the beginning of the operations there, and membersascendingtotheroofofthehousetoattackanearbyfacility.134Forexample, thedetaileddocumentingoftheattackonacheckpoint inKarmal-QawadisonOctober 24th, 2014, showing details of the attacks, casualties, and weapons seized by theorganization.Thevideo,publishedbyWilayatSinaionJuly3rd,2015isentitledGhazwatal-SheikhAbuSuhaibal-Ansari[Lit.,“TheBattleofSheikhAbuSuhaibal-Ansari”].

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may even transform the outcomes of domestic and regional political contextsinto real physical and material, and even symbolic resources for the Jihadimovement.

Thesteadinessofthe“IslamicState”organization’soperationalandpropagandaactivitiesreflectstworealities:first,thattheorganizationenjoystwogeographicspheres,oneisinthereal“practical”geography,situatedinIraqandSyria,whereithasvariedandsophisticatedheavyweaponryandhasoperationalcontrolviacadresandcellsthatreinforceitdirectlyandacrossborders(andinturn,thesecellsreceiveIS’smaterialandmoralsupport).ThisallowedittobranchoutandexpandintoterritoriesinothercountriessuchassouthernYemen,Libya,Egypt’sSinai, Somalia, northeastern Nigeria, and Pakistan. The second geographicalsphereis“virtual,”representedinthemassivefluidblocthatbacksitinregionsitdoesnotcontrolorisunabletoreach.Throughthisinternet-enabledexpansion,it can reach various parts of the world that are inaccessible to it throughweapons and physical reach. IS has cunningly used various social networkingoutlets to recruit new members and penetrate into the minds of youth inWesterncountries. Ithasalsobeensuccessful in rivalingal-Qaeda andrallyingthe fluid Jihadi bloc behind it, especially because it represents the practicalexperienceofJihadiideologyintheconsciousnessoftheseyoungpeople.

The second reality indicates that the organization does not only rely onideologiesanddeepconvictioninreligioustextsasmuchasitreliesimmenselyinitspracticeson“reactionary”policies,allthewhile,itremainskeentoplayupthesolidreligiousgroundsforitspractices.IS’spracticalandvirtualexpansionandthegrowingsupportitenjoysreflectanactualcrisisbeingexperiencedbythe“fluidJihadibloc,”135whichroamsbetweenits theoretical ideas and the possible reality of actualizing these ideas. Thegeneral Jihadi scene manifests two main characteristics: first, the absence ofcentralizedorganization,wherebythefluidJihadibloc,whichremainsthelargestin terms of numbers, tries to identify with its surroundings while slowlyexpanding, adopting complex strategies in choosing those targeted forrecruitment and testing them afterwards. This does not negate that there areorganized groups fromwithin this fluid Jihadi current, which adopted amoreclusterednon-hierarchicalstructure–forsecurityreasons–andoperatesonthemodelofsmallcells.Someofthesegroupsformedalliancesandorganizationsinparticularpoliticalcontextsandwithdifferentobjectives,whichtendtowiltwiththefadingofitspurposesorweakenwiththewithdrawalofitsconstituents.The second characteristic is manifested in the absence of an integrated andcomprehensive vision towards the aspired political project. As previouslymentioned, this bloc has suffered several crises; startingwith the outcomes ofthe2011revolutionarymovements,whichoverthrewandchangedArabregimes“peacefully” inamannerthatunderscoredthe ineffectivenessof thetraditionalJihadi thought when it comes to “change.” This was manifested in al-Qaeda’s

135The“fluid”Jihadiblocistheonenotsubjecttoorbelongingtoanyorganization,butratherisanideologicalbloc–orspectrum–thatadoptstheprincipleofthenecessityofJihad,andistheclosest to logistical support for any activist group. It also represents the first and “theoretical”phasethatprecedesthe“movement”ororganizationalphasethroughwhichitseekstoactualizeitsideasandpracticallyimplementthem.

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keennesstoaffirmandexpanditssymboliccontroloverthefluidJihadiblocbyencompassingtheprincipleofpeacefulrevolutionarysurge,asdelineatedinthecollectionoflettersbyitsleader,Aymanal-Zawahiri,entitled“MessagesofHopeandGladTidings toOurPeople inEgypt” in the firsthalfof2011.At thisearlystage, the loyalty ofmost Jihadis – whethermaterial or symbolic – was to al-Qaeda.Butinalaterstage,theexperienceofthepoliticalriseofIslamists,theirascension to power, and the subsequent coup against them and the ongoingconflictsthatensued,provokedandfueledtheviolentandTakfiritemperamentamongbroadsegmentsofIslamists.

Theabsenceofaprojectandastructuralmodelareoldfeaturesthatdidnotseemtocreateanytangibleormanifestcrisisinthepastasithasinthelastfewyears.The fluid Jihadi bloc has been experiencing a real conflict, much clearer thanbefore, related to thesearch for the “model” toemulate.After ithadreachedaconsensus on the symbolic role ofal-Qaeda, this consensus shatteredwith thedefectionofwhatcametobeknownasthe“IslamicStateinIraqandSyria”(ISIS,or Da’esh according to its Arabic acronyms), which later became the “IslamicState”Caliphate.Theschismwasexacerbatedwiththerivalrybetweenthetwocamps in polarizing and recruiting, resulting in a real crisiswithin fluid Jihadicircles. Jihadiswere in a dilemma; between themodel that has been achievedwiththeestablishmentofthe“CaliphateState,”andtheuncontrolledpracticesofthisgroup,especiallytheobliterationofthosewhodisagreewithit,inadditiontoitsinternalstrifewithJabhatal-Nusra.Nevertheless,thesedevelopmentsdonotseemtohaveaneffectonreducingtheTakfirimomentumthatcontinuestogrowand attract new supporters. There are varying perceptions and frames ofreferencesregardingthestrategiesofchangebetweenJihadigroups,ontheonehand,andpoliticalIslamismgroups–themajorityofwhichhavetakenadecisiveposition towards Takfir – on the other hand. Yet the reality of the situationindicatesthattherearewidegreyareasbetweenthetwogroups;especiallythatthesegroupsare–inprinciple–ideologicalinnatureandadoptintellectualandideologicalcausesthatarereflectedineachgroup’sactivismandpractices.

Returning to the tactical strategy of the state in Egypt concerning religiousaffairs,wefindthatthepracticesofthe“official”religiousestablishmenttendtobe primarily propaganda-oriented, geared towards the outside rather than“practical” practices that achieve tangible results on the ground. Thispropagandaapproachisevidentintwodimensions:

First,thepolicyofconductingconferencesandofficialreportsandstatements;al-Azharinstitutionorganizedaninternationalconferenceforcombattingterrorismandextremism(onDecember3rdand4th,2014),attendedbynumerousMuslimand Christian religious figures from around the world, aimed at discussingmeans to confront this phenomenon. Despite its symbolic purpose, theconferenceinfactreflectednegativelyonal-Azhar,whoseGrandSheikhAhmadal-TayyibrejectedtheTakfirofthe“IslamicState”organization,stressinginsteadthe“impermissibilityofTakfirofanyMuslimregardlessoftheirsins.”ThiscameinthewakeofmediaattentiontotheNigeria’sGrandMufti’sTakfirofISduringhisspeechattheconference.Thispositionmaybeanalyzedontwolevels:

Religiously:Thepositiontakenbyal-Azharinstitution,consideringitsreligiousesteem, stems from fears of the repercussions of opening the door of Takfir,

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which may spill over to the domestic Egyptian scene between the varioussegmentsofsocietyandthreatenthesecurityofsocietyandthestate.Politically:OpponentsoftheGrandSheikhAhmadal-TayyibandotherIslamistcurrentscharacterizethispositionaseither:a) Dissolving of responsibility; from the perspective of national interest,considering that acknowledging the Takfir of such groups would serve ISsupporters and sympathizers, and would lay the responsibility of theoutbreakofterrorismandgrowthoffundamentalistmovementsonal-Azhar,indirectlyattheleast,or;

b) Hesitant; in terms of Al-Tayyib’s unwillingness to clash with the generalorientationsof theregime, inaddition tohisdesire toavoid furtherattacksagainsthimforhiscontinuoussubserviencetothe“secular”regimes.

This propaganda level also saw a declaration issued by theMinistry ofAwqafentitled “The Egyptian Letter to Renounce Violence and Extremism.” TheMinisterofAwqafseekstopassthis letterinanofficialmannertotheEgyptianForeignMinistry to be presented to the UN Security Council, considering thatEgyptcurrentlyheadstheCouncil’sCounter-TerrorismCommittee.136

Thesecondlevelofthesepracticesistherelianceofthereligiousestablishmentoninitiatives and campaigns: Less than a week after the November 2015 Parisattacks, the EgyptianDar al-Iftaa’ (Religious Edicts Department) announced anewuniversalinitiative,entitled“DoNotTalkinOurName”aimedatcounteringislamophobiaandaddressingnon-Arabsaroundtheworld.TheinitiativefocusesonhighlightingfactsaboutIslaminvariouslanguages,includingEnglish,French,German,andSpanish,andseekstoexposetheideologicalfoundationsofTakfirigroups.The initiativecomesafter9previousonesundertakenbyal-Azhar, theMinistry of Awqaf, and the Dar al-Iftaa’ itself, which perhaps undertakes thelargesteffortsinthisarea.Thedepartmenthadissuedthemagazine“Insight”inEnglish to counter the “Islamic State’s” Dabiq magazine. It also issued an“Observatory” to monitor Takfiri practices in March 2014, in addition to itsattempt to compete with productions of Jihadi ideology on social networkingsites by creating two Facebook pages “The ‘Islamic State’ [IS] under themicroscope”andthe“TheobservatoryofdeviantandTakfirireligiousedicts,”inanefforttodismantleandrefutethepremisesofextremistorganizations.137The State’s religious establishment’s efforts in refuting Jihadi and Takfiridiscourse of both the “solid” and the “fluid” Islamist blocs remain far fromproducing real impact, especially considering that this religious establishmenthasanegativeimageintheconsciousnessofIslamistsingeneral,whichhampersthe roles it is expected to assume. This negative perception stems from thefollowingissues:

136Seereportontheconferenceanddocument,http://goo.gl/2EYSz3.ItisworthnotingherethattheactivitiesoftheMinistryofAwqafcomeinpartofitsrivalrywithal-Azharclericsoverwhoismore qualified andwho does their dutymore effectively in regards to counteringTakfir. Thisrivalrycomesasaresultof theunprecedentedpracticesof thetwoinstitutions inthepost-July3rd,2013era,arivalrythatneverexistedbeforeinthehistoryoftheirrelationship.137Ahmad Zaghloul Shalata andMustafa Hashim, FiTafkikDa‘esh, [Lit. “In Dismantling Da’esh(TheIslamicStateorganization)”],unpublishedanalysis,November2015.

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• Al-Azhar representstheauthoritativeofficialregimeintheconsciousnessofIslamists,andthus,therearecontinuedreservationsagainstacceptingitasareligious frame of reference, and there are continued desires to rival itsreligiousrole.

• There are differences in approach and school of thought; Islamists tend topredominantly adopt the Salafist approach, to varyingdegrees,whereasal-Azhar has adopted Ash‘arism in the modern era, which increases thedifferencesbetweenthetwocamps.

• Al-Azhar’sclericsareviewedtobeinconstant“closeness”torulingregimes,andtheycontinuetoattempttoembellishtheregimes’practices,inadditiontotheclerics’unrelentingnegativepositionstowardstheIslamistcurrent.

Conclusion

The previous review of the strategies adopted during the past three years, inwhich the Egyptian state declared a comprehensive war against terrorism,revealsthefailureofthesestrategiesineffectivelycounteringterrorismwhetherbyeliminatingtheexistinggroupsoraddressingthecausesofviolenceinsociety.The military confrontations, despite limited successes, have not been able topractically accomplish any more than exhausting and weakening Jihadiorganizations by cutting supply lines and eliminating leaders andmembers ofthese groups, but have not been able to completely eradicate these groups, oreliminatetheirnegativeshortandmedium-termrepercussions;fortworeasons:

Firstly, the fight against terrorism is not a military battle, but a security andintelligencebattle.Therefore,themostimportantroleisthatofpoliceforcesincoordination with the intelligence apparatus, especially that these forcespossesses the flexibilityandexperience indealingwiththe“gangwarfare” thatterrorist organizations wage, and are able to engage in confrontations inresidential and urban areaswithout significant losses. The army, on the otherhand,doesnothaveadequateflexibilityforsuchconfrontations,consideringthatitscombatdoctrineislimitedtoprotectingthebordersofthecountry,anddoesnot include counter-terrorism activities. 138 This incompatibility would bereflectedintheseverityofconfrontations,whichwouldinturnhavesignificantnegativeimpactonthepeoplelivinginconfrontationareas.139 Secondly, leaders of some Jihadi organizations have extensive militaryexperience, considering that many of them were former army officers. Thisfurther complicates the army’s operations since opponents would be familiarwiththetacticsofthearmy’smovementsandoperations. 138OntheissueofchangingtheEgyptianarmy’scombatdoctrineandtherelatedregionalandinternationalcontexts,see:MohammadAl-Minshawi,Al-Aqidaal-Qitaliyalial-JayshwaKhilafal-Qahira-Washington,[Lit.,“TheArmy'sCombatDoctrineandtheCairo-WashingtonDispute”],ShoroukNews,May5th,2014,http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=05052014&id=baac8537-855c-4e3e-bc63-9d9a826c7e77139Forexample,the“MassacreoftheHabediFamily”inSinaionNovember11th,2015reflectstheimplications of the militarization of confrontations with terror groups on society and thenegative effects resulting from that. As a result of an errantmissile by the army, the family’shouseturnedintocompleterubbleand13peoplewerekilled.See:http://goo.gl/n8nUdh

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Theseorganizationsalsoderive factors for theirsurvival fromthesurroundingcommunity. For example, political, security, or legal practices against politicalfactions,humanrightsorganizations,andcivil society fuel thestateofviolencealready enflamed in society, and fan the anger among the people towards thesecurity forces. This prompts the need for revision, evaluation, andreconsideration of the adopted strategies from a multi-dimensional aspect,wherethepolitical,security,andsocialelementsareintegratedandinterlinkedinlightofthefollowing:

First,addressing the predisposing conditions for terrorism by eliminatingthe factors thatallow for thecreationof social incubatorsofviolence,which isdonethrough:

1. Political reconciliation with the opposition, especially theMuslim Brotherhood, in order to prevent segments of themovement from adopting violence in retaliation to what ishappeningtothemovementanditsleadership.2. Review of the legal situation of detainees, includingreleasing individuals who were not involved in any particularcases, especially in light of human rights groups’ confirming thatauthorities practice pretrial (preventive) detention as a politicalpunishmentratherthanaprecautionarymeasure.140Also,theneedto reconsider the politically motivated sentences imposed onIslamists and opposition leaders, which include long prisonsentencesorthedeathpenalty.3. Re-evaluationofexistingsecuritystrategies,particularly inSinaiandelsewhere,andaccountabilityofmembersofthesecurityforces (both army and police) to prevent instigating facilitatingfactorsforthecreationofsocialincubatorsofviolence.141

140AccordingtoareportissuedbytheEgyptianInitiativeforPersonalRightsentitled“DetentionwithoutEnd,”thereareatleast1,464peopleheldinEgyptianprisonswithpendingtrial,whosearrestshaveexceededthelegallimit,inviolationofArticle143oftheCodeofCriminalProcedures,whichsetsaceilingonpretrialdetentionfrom18monthsto2yearsincriminalcases.Seethereport:http://www.eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2016/05/10/2600Furthermore,areportbyAmnestyInternationalfor2015-2016revealsthatsecurityforcesarrested11,877membersof“terroristgroups”duringtheperiodbetweenJanuaryandtheendofSeptember2015,accordingtotheAssistantMinisterforPublicSecurityattheMinistryoftheInterior.ThecrackdownwasthoughttoincludemembersandperceivedsupportersoftheMuslimBrotherhoodandothergovernmentcritics.Theauthoritieshadpreviouslystatedthattheyhadarrestedatleast22,000peopleonsuchgroundsin2014.Insomecases,detaineesinpoliticalcaseswereheldinprolongeddetentionwithoutchargeortrial.Bytheendoftheyear,atleast700peoplehadbeenheldinpreventivedetentionformorethantwoyearswithoutbeingsentencedbyacourt,incontraventionofthetwo-yearlimitonsuchdetentioninEgyptianlaw.StudentMahmoudMohamedAhmedHusseinremaineddetainedwithoutchargeortrialformorethan700daysafterhisarrestinJanuary2014forwearingaT-shirtwiththeslogan“Nationwithouttorture”.SeetheAmnestyInternationalReport2015/2016:TheStateoftheWorld’sHumanRights,pg.147,https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2016/02/annual-report-201516/141 Reports indicate some negative practices by security forces, such as provocations,harassments, longwaits, and sometimes violence, not tomention the obstruction of food andvegetables to the cities of Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid at army checkpoints such as theAl-Reesaland checkpoint on the outskirts of El-Arish city. See:Kama’inal-Jayshal-MasriTastafizNisaa’

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Second,openingacivildialogueonthereintegrationofIslamistswhowerenotinvolvedinactsofviolenceintosociety.ThecontinuedmarginalizationoftheIslamistcurrentfrompubliclifefurtherdeepenstheidentitycrisisafflictingthem,whichreflectsnegatively in theiractions(as is thecasewith Islamists inEurope,whoseidentitycrisisledthemtojointhe“IslamicState”organization,amodel that allows them to practice “Islam”). All this lies in favor of the Jihadidiscourse, which perpetually affirms to Islamists that the conflict revolvesaroundthe“Islamistpresence,”andthat it isnotnecessarilyapoliticalconflict.Constrictions against the overall Islamist current nurtureTakfiri thoughts andpractices,whichinturnposesamajorthreattosociety,especiallywiththelargepopularbaseoftheIslamistcurrent,estimatedatnearly10million(accordingtothe volume of voting by the Islamist current in the 2011 Parliamentaryelections).

Consideringthereservationsaddressedinthispaperregardingtheperformanceofthestate’sreligiousestablishment,itisnecessarytoengageIslamistcurrentsthatarequalifiedandproficientinintellectuallydebatingissuesofTakfir,astheeffectivenessofsuchintellectualconfrontationsvariesaccordingtothelevelandcompetence of those participating in them, and depends on various methodsincluding sermons, lessons, studies of the principles and regulations of Takfirandjurisprudentialissuesrelatingtotheexcusesofignorance,lackofrulershipetc..Theexamplesof twoprecedents thatachievedsuccessatvarying levels inthepaststrengthenthechancesofsuccessofsuchanendeavortoday.Thefirstwas the debates carried out with Takfiri groups in the 1970s and 1980s.DebatingIslamistcurrentsreliedon“evidence,”andaslongasthedebatersareadeptintheirmethodsofdialogue,theyareabletoconvincetheiropponentstoacceptwhattheysay.

Theotherexampleappearedinthe1990s,withseveralattemptsbyclericsandintellectuals – not affiliated with the official religious establishment – mostnotably Mohammed Mitwalli al-Shaarawi, Mohammed al-Ghazali, andMohammedSalimal-Awwa,tomediatebetweenthegovernmentandAl-Jamaa‘aal-Islamiyagroup,whichlaterresultedinintellectualandideologicalrevisionsinwhichthemovementrenouncedviolence.Thispracticaladeptnessisavailableintwo categories within the Islamist currents: the scholarly (scientific) Salafistcurrent,with its twobranches, the“organizational”represented inAl-Da‘waal-Salafiya (Salafist preaching) movement, and the “non-organizational”represented in independent Salafist sheikhs, including Mustafa al-Adwi,MohammedHassan,AbuIshaqal-Heweni,andothers,andSalafistsheikhsfromtheMadhkhaliyyaSalafismtrend,mostnotablyMohammedSaeedRaslan.

Sinai,[Lit.,“EgyptianArmyCheckpointsProvokeWomenofSinai”],Al-Jazeera,March23rd,2016,availableon the following link:http://goo.gl/FVnwXYSuch incidentsareexploitedby terroristorganizations to create social incubators for themselves; as a result of the security practicestowardsthewomenofSinaiattheAl-Reesacheckpoint,the“IslamicState’s”Sinaibranch(AnsarBaytal-Maqdis)targetedasecuritycheckpointinAl-SafaregioninsouthernEl-Arishwithacarbomb on March 19th, 2016, killing 18 security officers. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis indicated in itsstatement that the attack came in response to the “inspection of Muslim women and theirhumiliationatcheckpoints.”Seethereport:http://goo.gl/48wHFh

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Third,encouraging the involvement of civil society in the confrontations:thereistheneedtoprovideopportunitiestocivilsocietyorganizationstoworkwithout restrictions and limitations,142and the need for these organizations tocontributetoformulatingcounter-terrorismstrategies.

142Forexamplesofsuchrestrictions,see:Al-Mujtama‘al-MadanifiMisrbayna40AlfMunazamaaw la Shay’ Ghadan, also in English, entitled “Egypt: 40,000 NGOs or No NGO,” Human RightsMonitor,:http://humanrights-monitor.org/Posts/ViewLocale/3108#.V5smOo-cE2wIt is alsoworthmentioning that inMarch2016, the issueof “foreign funding” resurfaceddaysaftertheEuropeanParliamentissuedastatementonthedeathofanItalianstudentinEgyptandonthestateofhumanrightsandrestrictionsonhumanrightsorganizationsoperatinginEgypt.Forfurtherdetails,see:“Ihiyaa‘al-Qadiya173’biSha’nal-Tamweelal-AjnabiIrhablial-Mujtama‘al-Madani, [Lit., “Reviving Case 173 Regarding Foreign Funding: Terrorizing Civil Society”],http://humanrights-monitor.org/Posts/ViewLocale/24611#.V5smmo-cE2x,seealso:http://albedaiah.com/news/2016/03/17/109135

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Jordan’sApproachtoCounter-ExtremismHussainal-Rawashdeh

SincetheendofJune2014,whenAbuBakral-Baghdadiannouncedthecreationof the “Islamic State” and proclaimed himself Caliph of all Muslims, questionscontinue to arise: where did this organization come from? What is the truthbehind it?Howhas itmanagedtospreadandexpandsorapidly?Whatare theideologicalandsocialincubatorsthatenabledthisorganizationtorise?Whatarethenetworksofrelationsthatlinkittoitssurroundings?Whatareitsobjectives?And,whatistheconceivablefateofthisorganization?

Answerstosuchquestionswereamixtureoftruthsanddelusions.Somethink,undertheimpactofcoincidenceandsurprise,thatwhathasbeentakingplaceisa foreignplot aimedat embeddinga functional entity thatwouldbreakup theArabworldandplungeit intochaos.ThisperspectivetendstoaccusetheWestandsomemajorpowersintheregionofbeingpartnersintheplot.Ontheotherhand, there are otherswho see the “Islamic State” organization (IS, commonlydubbed as “Da’esh”) as the real and legitimate “child” of the ArabWorld, andconsider the Arabs are responsible for its birth. This perspective finds that ISemerged from a dire political and social context, and is the natural result ofcenturies worth of oppression and tyranny that has exploded in a moment,bringingaboutthis“monster.”

Jordanhasnotbeensparedthischargedatmosphereofextremism,violenceandterror.Nearlytenyearsbeforethe“birth”ofIS,inOctober2005,Jordan’scapitalAmman witnessed three terror bombings that targeted hotels, killing 57 andinjuring115.Theattackswereclaimedbyal-QaedainIraq,ledbyAbuMusabal-Zarqawi–the“mother”organizationfromwhichISemerged.Moreover,Jordan’smemory is laden with marks of terror activities, beginning with JayshMuhammad (1991), the Afghan Jordanians (1994), the Al-Islah wa al-Tahaddiorganization(1997),theassassinationofUSdiplomatLaurenceFoley(2002),theJayyousi cell (2004), down to the Irbid terrorist operation (2016), in which aJordanianofficerwaskilled.

Jordan found itself face to face with the “Islamic State”, an entity that hasstretched itsboundaries in Iraqandexpanded intoSyria,passing throughDeirez-Zour,Al-Raqqa,andreachingnorthernAleppoandnorthernIdlib. InIraq, ISexpanded intoMosul and theAnbarprovince,where the townofAr-Rutbah isonly 70 kilometers away from the Jordanian border. IS has stretched intoterritoriesover181kilometersalongtheJordanianborderswithIraq,andabout370kilometersalongtheJordanianborderswithSyria.ForJordan,thesourcesofconcernfromthethreatofISarenotonlythequestionofhistory,whichhas left a “footprint” of terrorism in themindsof Jordanians,nor only the question of geography, where the kingdom lies alongside the“Caliphate State,” but also an array of other interrelated concerns, includingJordan’s participation in the international coalition against terrorism, Jordan’salliancewith the United States andmostWestern countries against terrorism,and the threatof the spreadof terrorist andextremist thoughtespecially after

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nearly2,500fightersfromtheJihadiSalafistcurrentinJordanjoinedtheranksofIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. There are nearly 7,000 affiliates of the Jihadi Salafistcurrent in Jordan,whomay at anymoment become a “social incubator” for ISinside the kingdom, in addition to the presence of renowned Jihadi SalafistideologueswithinJordan,suchasOmarMahmoud(AbuQutadaal-Filastini)andMuhammad al-Maqdisi, among others. Despite having espoused positions thatare in opposition to IS’s practices, these ideologues nonetheless considerthemselves“mentors”ofAl-Baghdadiandhisfollowers.

The answer to the question of whether the “Islamic State” poses a threat toJordan was determined from the onset. Yet, the Jordanian approach tounderstanding the “phenomenon” of IS, firstly, and in determining how toconfrontit,secondly,neededmoretimeforclarification.PerhapstheincidentofIS’s burning alive of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbah, in January 2015,amountedtoaturningpointinJordan’sofficialandpopularpositiontowardsthewar against the organization. This heinous incident indeed provided thenecessarylegitimacyforthiswaronalllevels.

This paper seeks to understand the Jordanian approach to fighting extremismand terrorism, specifically in themodel posed by IS. In Jordan’s approach, themilitary, security,political,andreligiouscontexts intertwine,and theeconomicandsocialcontextsintertwinewiththelegislativeaswell.Tograspthisapproach,firstwemustunderstandwhattookplace,andwhy,withrespect to the general atmosphere and the historical moment in which ISemergedasaterroristorganizationinIraqandSyria,andalsoinregardstothereasonsandfactorsthatproducedthisorganizationandenabledittoexpandandspread. Furthermore, we need to grasp the political, religious, and socialinterpretationsthatISreliedontogainsympathizersandbelieversinits“idea.”

TheKing’sSpeechesHerewecanbuildontheapproachpresentedbyKingAbdullahIIinhisspeechesthatdealtwiththeproblemofextremismandterrorism,whichhelpsshedlightontheJordanianapproachtocountertheextremismthatthekingdombelievesisathreat,bothintermsofISasanorganizationorasanideology.

TheKing believes that it is not possible to tackle the threat of terrorism “in avacuum,”foraworldthatallowsthePalestinian-Israeliconflicttomovefurtherawayfromatwo-statesolutionisaworldthatfuelsextremists’recruitment.TheKingalsoseeslinksbetweenextremismandterrorism,ontheonehand,andthecoreissuesthatconstitutekeysourcesofsuchthese‘isms,’ontheotherhand.Hestates: “Winning hearts and minds remains a big challenge, as this will alsorequire, in the longer and medium terms, dealing with fundamental issuesrelatedtogoodgovernance,poverty,youth,jobcreation,andeducation.”(FromKing Abdullah’s speech at the UN Leaders’ Summit hosted by US PresidentBarack Obama on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism in New York,September29,2015).

In other speeches, the King also links extremism and terrorism to politicalviolence, and to globalization as well. He states: “We are all at risk of beingvictimsof furtherviolenceresulting fromideologiesof terrorandhatred…The

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choice is ours: anopenworld full ofpromise,progress and justice for all; or aclosed world of divided peoples.” (King Abdullah’s speech before the USCongress,March7,2007).

TheKingalsobelievesthatthewaronextremismandterrorismisawarwithinthecircleofIslam.Hestates:“ItisawarthatweMuslimsarefightingindefenseof our religion and higher moral values against terror groups that have noconnectionwith Islam.” (King Abdullah speech at Sharm el-Sheikh conference,2014).But thiswar, in theKing’s view,must garner international consensus ifthe goal is to win it. He states: “Jordan has worked actively with the globalcommunityforacomprehensiveapproachtothechallengesthatterroristgroupsposetoday. Ihavesaid fromtheoutset thatweare fightingawarwithinIslamagainst the outlaws of Islam, the Khawarej. Yet, as is painfully seen, theseterrorists and outlaws threaten the entireworld. They spare no peoples; theyrespectnoboundaries,moralorgeographic…Thisisawarwehavetofight,andwin,asaunitedglobalcommunity.Oureffortsmustbeframedwithinabroaderstrategyofmilitary,diplomatic,andhumandevelopmentpolicies.(KingAbdullahspeechat theMED2015–MediterraneanDialoguesConference inRome, Italy,December10,2015).In thecontextofcounteringextremismandterrorism, theKing focuseson twomain dimensions: the intellectual dimension, which requires securitycoordination and exchange of information on an international level; and themedia dimension, related to the communications revolution and socialnetworkingsites, inparticular.TheKingstates: “I spokehereof theneed fora‘coalitionofthedetermined’,andindeedthishastranspired…Whilethebattlesmaybefoughtontheground–andbythepopulationthatismostaffected–thiswar can only bewonon the ideological plane.” (KingAbdullah’s speech at theleaders’ Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism in New York,September29,2015).Onthemediadimension,theKingsaysinthesamespeech:“Anotherchallengewestillneedtoaddressmoreeffectivelyisthebattlegroundincyberspace.Weknowthe“IslamicState”isreplenishingitsranksbytargetingandluringpotentialmembersworldwidethroughsocialmedia.”

ThePathsofJordan’sApproachTheKing’sapproachtowardsextremismandterrorismisnotnecessarilynew,orrelated particularly to the “outlaws of Islam” or “Khawarej,” which is thedescriptionhegaveofIS.TheKinghadpreviously,inNovember2004,launchedthe “AmmanMessage,” which is a statement aimed at correcting the image ofIslam, and expressing the religion’s position towards contemporary issues,particularly the issue of terrorism. Jordan also sponsored the launch of thesubsequent three-point declaration, signed by 300 Islamic scholars in aninternationalconventionheldinAmmanin2005,asasupplementtotheAmmanMessage,whichdefined:whoisaMuslim,whetherexcommunicationfromIslam(Takfir) is permissible, and the stipulations related to issuing religious edicts(Fatawa).Furthermore, Jordan later issued an open letter in October 2006, entitled “ACommonWord” adopted by 138Muslim scholars, addressed to leaders of theChristian religion, aimed at clarifying Islam’s true teachings, especially those

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related to Islam’s position towards followers of other faiths, Christianity inparticular. Another open letter, signed by 126 Islamic scholars, was issued torespond to the “Islamic State” leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and includes 24pointsofrefutationoftheactionsandideologyofIS.The abovemeasuresmay be interpretedwithin the context of a “preemptive”approach to rebut the thought of terror organizations. However, andwith therise of IS and the spread of its threat, Jordan came to face a challenge thatrequiresabroaderandmorecomprehensiveapproach.Thisapproachdependedontwotactics:

- Confrontation abroad (military and security deterrence): aimed attargeting the organization, inflicting losses on it, and preventing itfrom reaching the Jordanian borders or penetrating the internalfront.

- Internal containment: targeting the idea and thought of theorganization, which has become an attractive one, and targetingsympathizersusingbothsecurityandintellectualmeans.Inaddition,this tactic also exploits and utilizes the differences anddisagreements within the Jihadi-Salafist current in the country inordertocountertheorganization.

In a report prepared by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University ofJordan in 2015 on Jordan and its position on the wars in Syria and Iraq, arecommendationwasmade highlighting the “need to expand and develop theconcept of security, and the need for integrating the cultural, political, andeconomic dimensions into the concept of security.” The report also pointed tothe danger of “the absence of a political strategy to defeat this organization,becausetherootsoftheproblemarenecessarilypolitical.”

In this context, and according to a document leaked by the Ministry of theInterior,theJordanianapproachtocounteringterrorismhasbeenformulatedonthreelevels:

The domestic level: includes preventive measures on the security, intellectual,and educational levels to prevent the spread of extremist thought and toeradicateitsroots, inparallelwithconductingdialoguesandmeetingstorefuteextremistthoughtandspreadmoderatethoughtinstead.Thiscomesinanefforttoeducatesocietyandprotectitagainstextremism.Inaddition,theplansincludeimplementingprogramsfortrainingpreachersandimams,andrehabilitationofindividuals who have returned to Jordan from fighting with terroristorganizations,andattemptingtointegratethembackintosociety.

Domestically, there is also the “National Counter-Extremism Strategy,” whichwaspreparedby the government in2015, but the contents ofwhichwerenotdisclosed.The strategy includeda “plan” todistribute roles and tasksbetweenofficialstateinstitutions.Othermeasuresonthedomesticlevelincludeareportprepared by committees formed by the Scientific Research Fund to preparerecommendationsonreligious,educational,andmediareforms.Also,legislationswereenactedrelatedtocounteringextremismandterrorism,mostimportantofwhich is the Anti-Terrorism Law, passed in June 2014, which widened thedefinitionofterrorismtoincludecrimesofelectronicpublishing,andincreased

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punishments for supporters and sympathizers of terrorist acts. Furthermore,Jordanenhanceditssecurityeffortstocurb“hotbeds”ofterrorismandprosecutethoseinvolvedinthem.

The regional level: According to the Interior Ministry document, theregional level incountering terrorismhasbeen limitedtoprotecting thebordersfrominfiltrationoffighterstoandfromJordan.

TheinternationallevelrelatestoJordan’sparticipationintheinternationalcoalitionagainstterrorismanditscooperationwithcountriesaroundtheworldtopreventitsspread.

The samedocument refers to three areas of this confrontation: 1) confrontingextremist ideology; 2) promoting social cohesion; and 3) building flexibilitywithinJordaniansociety.Through its security approach to confronting extremismand terrorism, Jordanhas managed to maintain security and stability in the midst of fiery regionalsurroundings. Jordanhas alsobeen able toprevent the infiltrationofmilitantsacrossitsbordersandtheirabilitytoformcellswithinthecountry.Furthermore,ithaseffectivelyexploitedandutilizedthedifferencesanddisagreementswithintheJihadiSalafistcurrentinanefforttocrackdownonthe“idea”ofIS,andtheorganizationitself,simultaneously.

Yet,whatabouttheintellectuallevel,whichtheKinghimselfconsideredthemain“battlegroundinwhichweshouldwin”?

AnotherReadingPerhapsanotherreadingisnecessaryhere,inordertounderstandwhatistakingplace in the Arabworld, down to the emergence of the IS “monster.” Such anunderstanding would help develop the necessary approach to confrontingextremismandterrorism,whichindisputablyconstitutesagraveandimminentdangertoJordan,andtoothersintheregionandthroughouttheworld.WhathappenedintheArabworldmaybesummarizedinafewwords,namely:“our history has exploded!” Simply put, all the confinements and tensions thathave accumulated during the Arab historical experience has transformed intocolossal abscesses. Whether they were caused by political disappointments,religious wounds, cultural wretchedness, or civilizational backwardness, theyneverthelessreachedthepointofexplosionasaresultofpressure,oppression,injustice, and hopelessness. The accumulated abscesses gushed out all theycontainedofblood,toxins,andlesionstothepointthattheunnervinglychillingimages we see today are nothing but a natural outcome of a long phase ofenduringandsuffering,coupledwithdespairanddeepsenseofinjustice,andtheconsequentattemptstoescapeatanycost,evenifthatcostis“suicide.”

Aswithanyexplosionthathappensinnature,theArabworldfounditselfbeforea“catastrophe,”thelikesofwhichithadneverexperiencedinitsmodernhistory.And; inthemidstofdisappointmentanddespair fromtheoutcomeoftheArabAwakening, and the shocking images of killing and repression, the so-called“IslamicState”emergedinitsbeastlydystopicform,asifitweretherawanswertothequestionofthecolossal“explosion”thathasbewilderedus.

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TheattemptstounderstandwhathasbeentakingplaceintheArabworldleadstothreeareasthatsumuptherealityofcurrentconditions:thefirstisthefieldofpolitics,whichhasfailedtobuildastateandasocietyonthebasisofcitizenship,justice,anddemocracy,andfailed increatingavitalconnectionwiththeworldandourcontemporarytimesonthebasisofmutualunderstandingandrespect.The second area is religion, which has been turned – at the hands of somepreachersand theologians– intoa servant forpoliticsora followerof it, or insome instances became a dagger in the hands of themarginalized, oppressed,andtheinsane.Thosewhotransformedthespiritofreligionhavedonesowiththehelpof jurisprudential rulingsandedicts thatareno longer fit foruse.Thethirdareathatshedslightoncontemporaryreality isthatofhistory,wherewerummaged into itswaste, knowingly or not, only for it to explode in our faceswithallthatitholdsoffuelforconflictbetweensectsanddenominations,andofthe strife of victimization, governance, and idolization of special figures andpersonages.Fromherecametheideaofterrorisminitsnewestversion,representedbythe“IslamicState”.Itwasnotacoincidencethatthisidea,whichtransformedintoafierceorganizationwithanactual“state”ontheground,camewithintwotime-basedcontexts.Thefirstisthedeteriorationofthe“ArabAwakening”:thistimecontextsawthedemiseofmassprotestsanddemonstrations,whichhaddreamtof “change”, called for freedom, justice, and dignity –movements that inmostArabcountries,whichexperiencedthemculminatedinmilitaryrulesoroutrightwars. Itwas evident that the tools of the conflict between the various playerscameintheformofsectarianismanddividingtheland,andthatregionalpowersinterfered toexpand thesphereof their influenceandgains.Meanwhile,majorpowerswerenot farbehindin jumpingonthebandwagon,whetherdirectlyorby proxy instruments in the region. Hence, the Arabworld found itself beforecomplexandoverlappingequations,andnewgrievances,themostprominentofwhichisthatof“Sunnivictimization.”ISwasindeedapartofthescene,butsoonbecamethekeyplayerinit.

Theothercontext is thepassageofonehundredyearssincethestartofWorldWarI(June28,1914),whichisthesamedateonwhichAl-Baghdadiproclaimedthe establishment of the Caliphate State. The Arabmemory still recalls to thisdatethecalamitiesthatbefelltheArabUmmah:ThefalloftheOttomancaliphate,the Balfour Declaration granting Jews a state in Palestine, the Sykes-PicotredivisionoftheArabregion,andsoforth.This gives rise to the question of whether these two temporal contexts – thecollapseof theArabawakening,and thecrushingof theArabdream100yearsago – have any bearing on the current “revelation” of the Arab “self”? Is the“IslamicState”anexpressionofthisrevelation,withitssavagereactionsnotonlyagainst the “other” (who played a role in this current catastrophe), but alsoagainsttheArab“self”aswell?

The advent of the “Islamic State”didnot comeas a surprise. Theorganizationand its thoughtbelong towhatcame tobedubbedas the “thirdgeneration”ofglobal Jihadism. This generation began with the Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra(ExcommunicationandExodus)groups,andlateral-Qaeda,until2004whenAbuMusab al-Zarqawi established the Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad organization in Iraq,

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whichlatercalleditselfal-QaedaintheLandsofMesopotamia(al-QaedainIraq,AQI).AfterAl-Zarqawiwaskilledin2006,AbuHamzaal-Muhajirwaselectedtolead the organization until 2010, when Abu Omar al-Baghdadi formed the“Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI). After AbuHamza and AbuOmarwere both killedtogether,AbuBakral-Baghdadiemerged in2010,butby then theorganizationhadbeenontheretreatasaresultofthetribalSahawat(Awakenings)formedbySunniIraqis.This“generation”ofJihadisre-emergedstronglyin2014,whenAl-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”(ISIS or ISIL), after it had previously taken over Syrian regions, including Al-Raqqa and Khan Assal in 2013. This culminated in IS’s shocking takeover ofMosulandthecompleteretreatoftheIraqimilitarytowardstheendof2014.

These beginning, the birth pangs of the advent of the “Islamic State”, wereawaiting the prime moment for a historic explosion, which indeed soon tookplace. Hence, the “Islamic State’s” terror is the result rather than the cause.Terrorismisareflectionoftheconditionsofeachsociety,andiscommensuratewith these conditions. On the other hand, the “savagery” of terrorism alsocorresponds to some degree with what the political regimes have done to itspeoples,ortothevolumeof“rubble”theyleftbehindwhentheycollapsed,ortothedegreesofschisms,rupturingandschizophreniathatconflictsoveridentitieshavecaused in theArabcharacter. Itmayalsobeaddedhere that terrorismattimesfindsitsownjustificationswithinitself;itisagainstdemocracyandagainstany human experience that aims to build, progress, and civilize, because thewhole concept of terrorism, in and of itself, is based on destruction and notbuilding.

FactsandMyths

Butwhydidthishappen?Wedonotreallyneeddeepexcavationsintothe“ArabSelf,” particularly in the sociological and religious dimensions, in order todiscoverthemythsthroughwhichterrorism,representedtodaybyIS,hasbeennurtured. There is themythof the “nation state,” for example,which theArabSelf has not been able until now to even define or demarcate its borders. TheArab“state”remainsaskeletalstructure,voidofanycontent.Thisstate,whichtheArab“emotional”awarenesshasbeennurturedtobelieveisthepropertyofitscitizens– in themythical imagination– is innoway like it is inreality.Thesamegoesforthemythsandlegendsofdevelopment,democracy,justiceetc..

TheArabSelfalsofoundthatthemomentumandmovementofthestate,andthatofthesocietywithit,wasoftenmovingintheoppositedirectionofthesevaluesandprinciples.Thefactis,thereareover60millionilliteratepeopleintheArabworld, and over 100 million unemployed youth. There is not a single Arabuniversityamongthetop100universitiesintheworld.Thedismalsceneextendsto scientific research, press and academic freedoms, and the overwhelmingnumbers of Arabs displaced from their countries. It suffices to read annualhumandevelopmentreports toknowwhat thesepolitical “myths”havecauseddisappointment for the Arab peoples and hopelessness, which spawned the“IslamicState”,andis likelytospawnevenworsephenomenaifthescenarioofrepression,corruption,anddespotismcontinuesasis,andifthedoorswereshutin the face of “moderates” who are looking for a glimpse of hope of a better

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future.

Moreshocking,however,werethemythsthatlaidthefoundationandfurnishedfor the “Islamic State” a place in the religious sphere, not only because thesemythsderivetheirlegitimacyfromtheIslamicframeofreferencetowhichtheyclaim tobelong,butalsobecause the formeda launchingpoint fromwhichwebuilt our consciousness and culture, and based our judgements towards the“self”andthe“other.”ThisdoesnotmeanthattheideaofISisinaccordwithourreligious and culturalheritage, as sucha generalizationneedsdeeper scrutiny,but I do believe that it is these religious myths that have deviated from ourdoctrinalandjurisprudential corpusandheritage(forreasonsrelatedtopower,the relationshipof religious leaders to rulers, and thebreakupof society) thataretheonesthatthis“IslamicState”employedtojustifyitsterrorandsavagery,andattractsympathizers.

For example, there is the myth of the “caliphate,” which continues to pose apsychologicalcomplextomanyMuslims.Thismythhasbeenemployedtojustifybrutality, killing and transgressionagainsthumanvalues,which the ‘just state’employs in supposed accordance with the principles that religion represents.There is also the myth of Takfir (excommunication from religion), which hasreducedsalvation to the “self,” and judgesothers tobe “doomed.”Themythof“Jihad” has been reduced to fighting, andmeanwhile anothermythdivides theworldintotwocampsbasedonthescaleofAl-Walaa’waal-Baraa’(loyaltyanddisavowal).

IS exploited these religious “myths,” but this in no way means that thisorganization belongs, one way or another, to Islamic “religiosity,” unless weconsider itanaffiliationtothe“wounded”and“oppressed”versionof Islam,orperhaps the religiosityof thementally ill. ISused thesemyths to take revengeuponhistoryandthepresent,todestroytheselfandtheother;becausetheonlymeans theyhave is thatofkilling,which is,unfortunately, theworstmeans forchange,andtheswiftestwaytorespondto,andconfute,opponents.

And so; the responsibility for theproductionof the “Islamic State” falls on theArab political regimes, the myths of which were uncovered by contemporarygrievances, as is the casewith the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. The responsibilityalso falls on the “religious authority,” which has failed to free itself from thesuperstitionsthathaveboundedthespiritofreligion.Itisimportanttonoteherethat it is the sociological factor, not the ideological, that is the basis of theproblem, on grounds that it is social environments that produce crime. IS hasindeed nurtured itself from these sociological grounds, whether under thepretextofSunni-Shiiteconflict,orbyplayingonthe“lure”offorce,orbypairing“parties” of historical feuds (the Sunniswith the Baathists and the youthwhocameouttospitetheirregimes),ortosimplyfillthevoidleftbyregimeswhenthelocalsocialservicesbecameabsent.It is evident that it was none other than the Syrian regime that allowed the“Islamic State” to expand into Syria, and it was none other than the“sectarianism”thatal-MalikifueledthatallowedtheorganizationtoberevivedinIraq. It is the ongoing tyranny, or the rubble left behindby collapsed regimes,thatgaveISthechancetorise,expand,andproliferateintheArabregion.Hence,IStodaymocksallthosewhowageredonthe“ballotboxes”andpaidthetollin

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prisonsandcemeteries.Meanwhile,itextendsitshandto“shakethehands”ofallthosewhocontributedandinvestedinthemanufacturingofitsterrorism,andinitsrebirth.

Remarks

Intheframeworkofthisunderstanding,ifitiscorrect,thenitfollowsthatJordanoughttoutilizethe“pointsofstrength”thatitenjoys,andaddressthe“pointsofweakness”itsuffersfrom,toformaholisticapproachtocounteringthethreatofterrorism and extremism. Jordan ought to rely upon the cornerstones thatconstitute points of strength in its fight against terrorism and extremism,including the basis of its political leadership on “religious legitimacy,” thepolitically-moderate character of its political system, the moderate mood of“religiosity”amongtheJordaniansociety,andtheabsenceof“identity”conflicts,whetheronthereligious,sectarian,orethniclevels.

Inconjunction, Jordanoughttodealwiththepointsofweaknessthatmakethecountryanattractivefieldforterrorism,whetheritisthe“IslamicState”(whichdoesnothideitsanimositytowardsJordan),orthe“idea”ofthe“IslamicState”,whichfindsfertilegroundinJordaniansocietyamongelementsthathavenotyettransformedintostablesafehavensandsocialincubatorsforterrorism,butaresusceptibletobecomeso.ThepointsofweaknesswithintheJordanianstateinclude:

Political impasses and an obscure future for reform, the dire economicconditions (with the national debt reaching $35 billion and unemployment ofnearly14%, according to official statistics), the lackof trust between the stateandsociety,thereductionoftheconceptofsecuritytoits“technical”dimension,carried out by specialized security forces, rather than a holistic approach thattreatsthepolitical,cultural,economicandotherdimensionsaswell.

ItisrelevanttonoteherethefollowingobservationsinthecontextofanalyzingtheJordanianapproachtocounteringterrorismandextremism.

1. Theneedtoidentifythenatureoftheapproachorstrategybeingadopted,whetheritisanapproachof“extraction”byforceorbylaw,whichwouldamount toemergencyand firstaid fixesoranapproachof “infiltration,”where the “less extreme” elements may be co-opted and employed tochangeandinfluenceothers’convictionsora“purification”and“purging”strategy, which would require endurance and long-term vision. Theseapproachesmaybeadoptedincombination,orinstages.Jordancurrentlyemploys two main approaches: deterrence abroad and containmentinside.

2. Anyapproachtobeadoptedrequiresanaccurateandsystematicanswerto the question of extremism, in terms of comprehending its causes,diagnosingthe“grounds”fromwhichitemerges,andhavingawarenessofthe areas and environments in which it spreads, the numbers of thoseinvolved and their sympathizers. To accomplish this, there must beextensiveinformationandstudiesonthephenomenon,becausestrategiesare not built upon impressions and whims, but on facts, studies, and

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capabilities. Furthermore, strategies are not merely a process ofdistribution of roles and tasks, but rather requires rules thatwould layfoundations for “change” in major issues, such as political, economic,educational, and religious reforms, rather thanmerely embellishing thefaçadeofthecurrentrealities.

3. Theextremismafflictingusisoftencloakedinthegarbof“religion,”andspeaks in itsname.Thereality is that religionservesasan “impetus”attimes,anda“cover”atothers.Therefore,thereisdireneedforproactiveinstitutionsinthereligiousspheretoplayaroleinrationalizingthestateof “religiosity.” But this alone does not suffice, for extremismhas othersources of nourishment, and these sources ought to be dried up andpurged,whethertheybepolitical,economic,social,orintellectual.Thisisnotlimitedtosocial“environments”thatproduceextremismonthelocaldomestic context, such as poverty and injustice, but also the externalcontexts,whethertheybeinouroftenimbalancedforeignrelationsorourpolitical positions towards what happens in our surroundings. Thesepositionsreflect,necessarily,onpeople’s livesandtheirsenseofdignitytowardstheirhomelands.

4. Whendevisinganyapproach,twoissuesmustbetakenintoaccount:thefirstisfortheapproachtobearesultofageneralconsensus,andwiththeparticipationofbothofficialentitiesandcivil society institutions,whereexpertsrepresentingvarious fieldsrelatedtothephenomenonput forththeircontributions.Thesecondisrelatedtotheneedforpoliticalwilltogive theapproach thenecessary legitimacyandthehumanandmaterialresourcesneededtoimplementit,andthenecessarycontentandtoolstoconvince thepublic of its value,whether that public audience are those“involved” in extremism, or sympathizers, or those susceptible to beinfluencedbyit,oreven“moderates”whoneedtobedeeplyingrainedin“moderation.”

5. Inthecontextofanyapproach,theactofvilifying“extremists”andcastingjudgements upon them based on this general characterization (unlessthey commit acts of violence or terrorism), will not be of benefit tocountering extremism. Hence, and firstly,what is needed is to confrontand counteract extremism, and not merely crack down on extremists.“Extremists”shouldbedealtwithasvictimsorpersonsafflictedwithanillness that needs treatment, and should be classified according to thedegree of their threat and danger. There need to be efforts to support“moderates”andnotpigeonhole themwithextremistsinonebasket.

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SaudiArabia’sNationalCounter-TerrorismStrategy:TheLegislativeApproach

Awadhal-BadiSaudi Arabia is, and has been, a target of terrorism. The country has faced anumberofterroristactsthroughoutitsmodernhistory.Evenbeforetheattacksof September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda carried out terrorist attacks against theKingdom. However, Saudi Arabia’s response fell short of devising acomprehensivenationalstrategytotacklesuchathreat.143Theterroristattacksof September11,2001 in theUnitedStates and the launchingof theUSglobalwaron terrorismpositioned theKingdom in the forefrontof thiswar’sbattles,nationallyandinternationally.Thefactthatanumberoftheperpetratorsof9/11wereSaudinationalsunleashedacampaignholdingtheKingdomresponsibleforthe spreading of radicalism and extremist ideology and their financing in theMuslim world. This campaign included attacks on Saudi religious, legislative,cultural, educational,media, finance, and social policies. However,while SaudiArabiawascooperatingwiththis internationalcampaignagainst terrorismandconfrontingtheseaccusations,144ithadtofaceitsown9/11.In2003,aseriesoffatal terrorist attacks struck the Kingdom at the hands of al-Qaeda, the sameorganizationthatclaimedresponsibilityfortheterroristattacksintheUS.145Thedeclared aims of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacks on SaudiArabia’s soil were to destabilize the Kingdom, to question the religiouslegitimacyoftheSaudistate,toalienateitfromtheUnitedStates,andtotopple

143For details of the nature of Saudi Arabia’s response to these attacks, see Anthony H.Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, andChallenges,Westport,CT:PraegerSecurityInternational,2005,pp.256-262.144In a press conference held on December 3, 2002, Adel Al-Jubeir, Foreign Policy Advisor toCrownPrince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz at the time and Current ForeignMinister, voiced Saudifeelings toward these accusations: “Since September 11, we have engaged in several issues.Whether it involves the war against terrorism, whether it involves intelligence, whether itinvolvesfinancialissues,whetheritinvolvescoordinationandcooperationwithothercountries,we’vedone that...Webelieve thatour countryhasbeenunfairlymaligned.Webelieve thatwehave been subjected to criticism that we do not deserve. We believe that people have beenmisinformedaboutSaudiArabiaandwhatSaudiArabiahasdoneorfranklythatpeoplehaveliedaboutwhatwehavedoneorwhatweallegedlyhavenotdone...Wehavebeendescribedasthekernel of evil, the breeding ground for terrorists. Our faith has beenmaligned.” Adel Al-JubeirHoldsNewsConferenceonFightingTerrorism, in “SaudiArabiaAnnouncesCounter-TerrorismMeasures,”SUSRIS,December9,2002: http://susris.com/2002/12/09/saudi-arabia-announces-counter-terrorism-measures/ 145Three suicide bombers simultaneously attacked three expatriate residential complexes inRiyadhcausing35deathsand200injuries.AnothermassivebombinghappenedintheAlmaheahousingcompoundinRiyadhonNovember10,2003,resultinginnearly17deaths,andasmanyas116injuries.OnApril21,2004,terroristslaunchedtwosuicidecarbombattacksagainstSaudiArabiansecurityheadquartersinRiyadh.Fivepeoplewerekilledandover150werewoundedinthe attack. Terrorist acts carried by Al-Qaeda continued to strike the Kingdom. For achronological list of terrorist acts committed in Saudi Arabia up to 2016, see:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents_in_Saudi_Arabia

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its government; hence, to establish their form of governance in the cradle ofIslam.146Saudi Arabia then had to develop its own national counter-terrorism strategyandengageinitsownwaronterrorism.AfterthefirstterroristattackinRiyadhinMay 2003, the strategic objective of the Saudi war on terrorismwasmadeclearbyPrinceAbdullahbinAbdul-Aziz, thenCrownPrinceandde factoKing,whostated:“Wewillfighttheterroristsandthosewhosupportthemorcondonetheiractionsfor10,20or30yearsifwehaveto;untilweeliminatethisscourge.Ibelieve that theworldmuststandshoulder toshoulderwitheachother ifweare to eliminate this evil from ourmidst.”147The far-reaching aim of this dualstrategy of combatting terrorism domestically and internationally was toeradicate this threat by adopting policies that employ “hard” means in thebattlefield and “soft”means in the battlefield of themind at the national level,and by cooperating with others at the international level to tackle this globalphenomenon.Thismultifacetedstrategyhasbeenanevolvingprocessduringthelast 16 years in all its aspects.148It has succeeded in containing al-Qaeda’sterrorism in theKingdom.However, since2014,al-Qaeda’s terrorismhasbeensupplementedby anewwaveof terrorist activities conductedby the so-called“Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s war onterrorismiscontinuingwithouthindrance.ThispaperaimstocontextualizetheSaudi legislative efforts in enacting the necessary legal instruments to achievethestrategicgoalofitswaronterrorism.

TheInternationalLegalContextofSaudiArabia’sWaronTerrorism

Terrorism is not new inmodernworld history. The use of violence by radicalmovements and non-state actors to realize their objectives is a historical fact. 146Cordesman&Obaid,op.cit.,p.120-122;alsoseeThomasHegghammer,JihadinSaudiArabia:ViolenceandPan-Islamismsince1979,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010,pp.199-202.147Hereiteratedthispositionagainafterassumingthethronein2005,see“Transcript:SaudiKingAbdullahTalkstoBarbaraWalters,”ABCNews,October14,2005,http://abcnews.go.com/2020/International/story?id=1214706&page=1148Aspectsofthismultifacetedstrategyinclude:security,religious,financial,legislative,administrative,judicial,cultural,andmedia.Newrigorouspolicieswereadoptedaspartofthisstrategytocombatterrorism.SaudiArabia’seffortsoneachofthesefrontsarethetopicofnumerousbooks,studies,briefs,reports,conferences,andmediadiscussions.ForanoverviewoftheseSaudiefforts,seeasexamples:AbdullahF.Ansary,“CombatingExtremism:ABriefOverviewofSaudiArabia'sApproach,”MiddleEastPolicy,Summer2008,Vo.XV,No.8,11,availableat:http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/combating-extremism-brief-overview-saudi-arabias-approach?print;AliS.AwadhAsseri,CombatingTerrorism:SaudiArabia’sRoleintheWaronTerror,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2010;ChristopherBoucek,“SaudiArabia’s“Soft”CounterterrorismStrategy:Prevention,Rehabilitation,andAftercare,”CarnegiePapers,No.97,September2008,availableat:http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp97_boucek_saudi_final.pdf;HamzaA.Baitalmal,“ConceptualFrameworkofSaudiArabia’sEffortsinCounteringTerrorism:TheCaseofIntellectualsandMassMedia,”HarvardPub,17-18,Cambridge,MA,2016,availableat:http://scholar.harvard.edu/majidrafizadeh/BaitalmalSAEfforts;SaudiArabia’sMinistryofInterior,“CombatingMoneyLaundering&TerrorismFinancing:TheLawandPracticeoftheKingdomofSaudiArabia,”PaperpresentedPERatThe11thInternationalSummitonTransnationalCrime,CransMontanaForum,Geneva,Switzerland,November16-19,2011,availableat:http://www.cmf.ch/wp-content/uploads/Saudi-Arabia-Crans-Montana-Forum-Paper-in-English.pdf

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However, since the 1930s, the issue of combatting terrorism has been on theglobalagenda.Theinitialuniversalefforttocurbactsofterrorismwasreflectedin the League of Nations’ Convention for the Prevention and Punishment ofTerrorism of 1937. This Convention, which was adopted by 24 states of theLeague of Nations, introduced the preliminary international attempt to defineterrorism. Its Article 1.2 stipulated terrorism as: “All criminal acts directedagainstaStateandintendedorcalculatedtocreateastateofterrorinthemindsof particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.” Theconvention, in its Article 2, specified acts that were to be considered acts ofterror against the state: “attacking public officials, heads of state and theirfamilies,orthedestructionofpublicfacilities,endangeringthelivesofmembersof the public, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying arms,ammunition, and explosive or harmful substances in order to commit suchactions.”149This convention, which ended with the demise of the League ofNations, became a point of reference for subsequent deliberations relating tolegal and political standpoints regarding terrorism in the United Nations andregionalintergovernmentalorganizations.150

Since the1960s,under theauspicesof theUNand its specializedagencies, theinternational community has elaborated a multitude of multilateral legalinstrumentstodealwithsuchactsofviolenceandtoprescribetheobligationsofstates towards them. At the present time, this framework includes 16 UNconventions and protocols,151a set of Security Council resolutions,152the UN

149SeethetextoftheConventionat:https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11579/view/1/1/150JBenSaul,“TheLegalResponseoftheLeagueofNationstoTerrorism,”JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice,Vol.14,No.4,September2016;alsoseeJavierRupérez,“TheUnitedNationsintheFightagainstTerrorism,”lectureatThe132ndInternationalSeniorSeminar,2006,p.2,http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/statements/2006_01_26_cted_lecture.pdf151Inhis report (DOCA/64/161-22 July2009) to theGeneralAssembly, entitled “Measures toEliminateInternationalTerrorism,”theUNSecretaryGeneralindicatedthat“currently,thereare30instruments,16ofwhichareuniversal(13instrumentsand3recentamendments)and14ofwhich are regional, pertaining to the subject of international terrorism, available athttp://www.refworld.org/docid/4a9e2c190.htmlThese universal instruments are: 1) 1963 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other ActsCommittedOn Board Aircraft; 2) 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure ofAircraft; 3) 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of CivilAviation;4)1988Protocol fortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsofViolenceatAirportsServingInternationalCivilAviation;5)2010ConventionontheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsRelatingtoInternational Civil Aviation; 6) 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for theSuppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; 7) 2014 Protocol to Amend the Convention onOffencesandCertainActsCommittedonBoardAircraft;8)2005AmendmentstotheConventionon the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; 9) 1988 Convention for the Suppression ofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofMaritimeNavigation;10)2005ProtocoltotheConventionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainst theSafetyofMaritimeNavigation;11)1988Protocolfor the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on theContinentalShelf;12)2005ProtocoltotheProtocolfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainstthe Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf; 13) 1991 Convention on theMarkingofPlasticExplosivesforthePurposeofDetection;14)1997InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionofTerroristBombings;15)1999InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionoftheFinancingofTerrorism;and16)2005InternationalConventionfortheSuppressionofActsof Nuclear Terrorism. For more on these treaties, see texts athttp://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legal-instruments.shtml.152SeetextsoftheseResolutionsatwww.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/res-sc.html.

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General Assembly Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006,153 and manyregional treaties. These treaties, conventions, and protocols have formed theframeworkforcombattingactsofterrorismandhaveprovidedauniversallegalregimeagainstterrorism.However, theyalldonotagreeuponauniversallegaldefinition of terrorism, but they do identify offenses considered as acts ofterrorism. The basic commitment indicated in these legal instruments is “toincorporatethecrimesdefinedinthetreatyat issueintothedomesticcriminallaw, and tomake them punishable by sentences that reflect the gravity of theoffense.Thestates,whicharepartytothesetreaties,alsoagreetoparticipateinthe construction of ‘‘universal jurisdiction’’ over these offenses, that is, to takethe necessary measures to give their courts very broad jurisdiction over theoffenses in question. In addition, these treaties require various types ofcooperationamongthesignatorystates,rangingfromcooperationinpreventingterroristactstocooperationintheinvestigationandprosecutionoftherelevantoffenses.” 154 In general, international terrorism is the domain of theseinternationallegalinstruments,andthereforetheyareconfinedtooffensesthathaveaninternationaldimension.155

The events of September 11, with their international dimension, provided theidealconcomitancestotheimplementationoftherelevantuniversalconventionsrelating to terrorism. As much as these events were a turning point incombatting terrorism internationally, they were also a turning point indomesticatingthecrimeofterrorismintothenationalcriminallawofstates.

In theaftermathof theseevents, theSecurityCouncil adopted three importantresolutions, 1368, 1373, and 1377. Chief among these resolutions is theSeptember28,2001Resolution1373adoptedunderchapterVIIoftheCharterofThe United Nations. This resolution, which is binding on all member States,representsaguideforacomprehensiveactionplanofcombattingterrorismandits financing.156It decides that all States shall take the necessary measures topreventandsuppressthefinancingofterroristacts,includingfreezingfundsandother financial assets. The resolution also obliges all States to improve bordersecurity, clamp down on the recruitment of terrorists, intensify informationsharing and law enforcement cooperation in the globalwar on terrorism, anddenyterroristsandtheirsupportersanyassistanceorsafehaven.Inaddition,itrequires all member States to ratify and implement the provisions of theinternational counter-terrorism instruments, including the InternationalConvention for theSuppressionof theFinancingofTerrorismofDecember9th,1999, which constituted the foundation of the global fight against terroristfinancing. Furthermore, this Resolution establishes the Counter-TerrorismCommittee(CTC),asubsidiaryorganoftheSecurityCouncil,comprisingall15ofitsmembers tooversee implementationof theResolution.As stipulatedby theUN, the mandatory requirements arising from Resolution 1373 and legally 153Seetextathttps://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/united-nations-general-assembly-adopts-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.154DanielO’Donnell, “InternationalTreatiesagainstTerrorismandtheUseofTerrorismduringArmed Conflict and by Armed Forces,” InternationalReviewofTheRedCross, Vol. 88, No. 864,December2006,pp.856-58.155Ibid.,p.860.156S/RES/1373,September28,2001,http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373(2001).

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binding standards are: criminalization of terrorist acts; penalization of acts ofsupport for or in preparation of terrorist offenses; criminalization of thefinancing of terrorism; and depoliticization of terrorist offenses. Measures toensure effective criminalization include: refusal of asylum rights for terrorists;bordercontrolsandpreventionof theforgeryof traveldocumentsandidentitypapers;freezingoffundsofpersonswhocommitorattempttocommitterroristacts; prohibition on placing funds or financial services at the disposal ofterrorists. Furthermore, international cooperation in criminal matters ismandatory through mutual assistance between States, intensification ofexchanges of operational information, use of bilateral and multilateralagreements to prevent and eradicate terrorism, and prevention of abuse ofrefugeestatus,andrejectionofallpoliticallymotivatedgroundstojustifyrefusalofanextraditionrequest.”157

Though this resolution’s provisions are binding, their implementationwas leftfor member States to determine the best approach to either amending theirCriminalCodeorbyadoptingnewones incorporatingprovisionsof all ratifiedinternationalinstrumentspertainingtoterrorism.158

SaudiArabia’sLegislativeApproach

Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 that required allStates to report to the CTC on steps taken to implement its provisions, SaudiArabia confirmed, in December 2001, its resolute stance on terrorism, andtherefore, its condemnation and combatting terrorism is based on basicprinciples, not a reaction to circumstances or events. These principles are: 1)Commitment to the Islamic Shari’a, the norms of international law, moralprinciples,andthehumanitarianlegacyoftheArabnation;2)Condemnationandinterdiction of terrorism in all international and regional forums and effectivecontribution to all their efforts, and signature and ratification of relevantinternational and regional conventions following active participation in theirformulation;3)Adoptionofresolutemeasurestoprosecutetheperpetratorsofterrorist crimes and institute legal and judicial proceedings against them inaccordance with the Islamic Shari’a and the Kingdom’s international, regionaland bilateral commitments; 4) Enactment of stronger and more sophisticatedstatutesandregulations forthesuppressionof terrorismandterroristoffensesand further development of security services and all other entities involved incombatting terrorism; 5) Modernization and further development of securityservices and all other entities involved in combatting terrorism; and 6)Promotion of cooperation with other countries and with international and

157UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,GuidefortheLegislativeIncorporationandImplementationoftheUniversalAnti-TerrorismInstruments,NewYork:UnitedNations,2006,pp.10-11,availableat«https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Guide_Legislative_Incorporation_Implementation/English.pdf.158Ibid.,p.6.

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regional organizations in preventing and combatting terrorism, especiallythroughtheexchangeofinformation.159Basedontheseprinciples,SaudiArabiaembarkedoncooperatingwiththeCTCin implementing this resolution and related international conventions andprotocols, and reporting on steps it has taken toward binding provisions,international conventions, and protocols.160While all issues stipulated in theResolution were important to its implementation, nevertheless, legislation,financial controls, and adherence to international legal instruments were thedominantsubjectsofexchangebetweenSaudiArabiaandtheCTC.Ontheissueof legislation regarding criminalizing acts meant to provide and facilitatefinancing for terrorist activities, Saudi Arabia stipulated that “[i]n the IslamicShari’a,whichtheKingdomapplies,andfromwhichitderivesitsstatutes,crimesofterrorismareincludedamongcrimesofhirabah,theseverestofpenaltiesareappliedtothesecrimesinIslamicShari’aassetforthintheHolyQur’an[Qur’an:5:33].Thecrimesofhirabah(brigandage)includethekillingandterrorizationofinnocent people, spreading evil on earth (al-ifsad fi al-ard), theft, looting andhighway robbery.” 161 On supplementary reports to the CTC, Saudi Arabiastipulated that the financing of terrorism also falls into the crime of “hirabah”becauseit“falls intothecategoryof ‘spreadingevilonearth’(al-ifsadfial-ard).This may incur the non-discretionary hadd penalty for hirabah (brigandage),whichcansometimesmeantheapplicationofthedeathpenalty.”162

Ontheissueoffinancialassetcontrols,SaudiArabiareportedmeasurestakentocountermoney laundering activities in all economic sectors and in the field ofinternationalandregionalcooperation.Thesemeasures include issuanceof theregulations required for the implementation of theUnitedNations Conventionagainst Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, andapprovaloftheFinancialActionTaskForce163(FATF)’s40Recommendations.164

159ReportoftheKingdomofSaudiArabiaSubmittedPursuanttoParagraph6ofSecurityCouncilResolution1373(2001)ConcerningCounter-terrorism,at5,U.N.Doc.S/2001/1294(December26,2001),at:http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373.html(scrolltoSaudiArabia,reportavailableathttps://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/722/76/PDF/N0172276.pdf?OpenElement).160Ibid.161Ibid.162ReportoftheKingdomofSaudiArabiaSubmittedPursuanttoParagraph6ofSecurityCouncilResolution1373(2001)ConcerningCounter-terrorism,at5,U.N.Doc.S/2001/1294(July.10,2002),at:http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373.html(scrolltoSaudiArabia,reportavailableathttps://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/513/51/PDF/N0251351.pdf?OpenElement).163The Financial ActionTask Force (FATF) is the Paris-based inter-governmental organizationestablishedbytheG-7Summitin1989to“setstandardsandpromoteeffectiveimplementationof legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terroristfinancingandotherrelatedthreatstotheintegrityoftheinternationalfinancialsystem.”Ithas37memberstates.InAugust2015,SaudiArabiajointedtheFATFasanObserverMember.FormoreonFATF,seetheirwebsiteathttp://www.fatf-gafi.org/home/164In 1990, FATF developed 40 recommendations to combat the laundering of drug money.Theserecommendationswererevisedin1996toreflectdevelopmentsinthebusinessofmoneylaundering.FollowingtheSeptember11,2001attacks,FATFexpanded itsrecommendationstocover the issue of terrorist financing, adding nine special recommendations. The FATFRecommendationswererevisedforthesecondtimein2003,andthese,togetherwiththeSpecialRecommendations,havebeenendorsedbyover180countries,andareuniversallyrecognizedas

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InOctober2001, theFATFexpanded itsmandate todealwith the issueof thefundingofterroristactsandterroristorganizations,andtooktheimportantstepof creating the 8 (later expanded to 9) Special Recommendations on MoneyLaundering and Terrorist Financing. Saudi Arabia later approved all 49recommendations.165Implementing these recommendations set the frame ofreference for Saudi Arabia’s compliance with international standards oncombatting terrorism financing and money laundering. In adherence tointernationallegalinstrumentsandtheirprovisions,SaudiArabiaconfirmedthatwhen it acceded to such international or regional instruments,166itmade theirprovisions part of the Kingdom’s domestic legislation with the same effect asdomesticlaws.167

TheLongRoadtowardstheLawofTerrorismCrimesandFinancing

AlthoughIslamicShari’aremainsthemainsourceoflegislationinSaudiArabia,theurgencyoftakingeffectivelegislativemeasurestocombatterrorismanditsfinancingpromptedSaudiArabiatoquicklycodifynewlawsandregulations.Inordertocriminalizemoneylaunderingandterroristfinancingactivities,theAnti-Money Laundering Law was enacted in August 2003.168 This law, with itsimplementingregulations,incorporatedallexistingnationallawsintheareasofconcernsregardingmoneylaunderingandtheprovisionsofrelatedinternationalconventions and protocols. Through its 29 articles, the law defines offenses,penalties,dutiesandresponsibilitiesoffinancialinstitutionsandtheirofficials.Itestablishesaunitforcombattingmoneylaunderingunderthenameof“FinancialIntelligence Unit” in accordance with the requirement of FATFRecommendations,toberesponsiblefor“receivingnotifications,analyzingthemandpreparingreportsregardingsuspicioustransactionsinallfinancialandnon-financial institutions.”169Furthermore, it stipulates theexchangeof informationdisclosedby financialandnon-financial institutionswithcompetentauthorities

theinternationalstandardforanti-moneylaunderingandcounteringthefinancingofterrorism(AML/CFT). See ATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and theFinancing of Terrorism & Proliferation, updated October 2016, FATF, Paris, France,at:http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html165Thefirst40RecommendationsofFATFwereapprovedbytheSaudiCouncilofMinistersinitsdecisionNo.15of17thMuharram1420(May4,1999).166 Saudi Arabia acceded and ratified 13 UN conventions and protocols, including theInternationalConvention for theSuppressionof theFinancingofTerrorismof1999,andotherregional conventions including theArabConvention on the Suppression of Terrorismof 1998,theOrganizationofIslamicConference(OIC)ConventiononCombattingInternationalTerrorismof1999,andtheGCCAgreementtoCombatTerrorismof2004.167ReportoftheKingdomofSaudiArabiaSubmittedPursuanttoParagraph6ofSecurityCouncilResolution1373(2001)ConcerningCounter-Terrorism,at5,U.N.Doc.S/2001/1294(September26,2002),athttp://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373.html(ScrolltoSaudiArabia).168Royal Decree No. M/39, 25 Jumada II 1424/ 23 August 2003, English text available athttp://www.nazaha.gov.sa/en/Library/Document/Regulations/Documents/Anti-MoneyLaunderingLaw.pdf169Ibid.,Article11.

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in other countries based on reciprocal treatment.170General courts have thejurisdictiontodecideallcrimesprovidedforinthislaw.171Money laundering was defined in this law as: “Committing or attempting tocommit any act for the purpose of concealing or disguising the true origin offundsacquiredbymeanscontrarytoShari’aorlaw,thusmakingthemappearasif they come from a legitimate source.”172Criminal Activity is defined as: “AnyactivityconstitutingacrimepunishablebyShari’aorlaw,includingthefinancingofterrorism,terroristactsandterroristorganizations.”173Thelawstipulatesthatmoney-launderingcrimesinclude:

(a) Conducting any transaction involving funds or proceeds, with theknowledge that they are the result of a criminal activity or have anillegitimateorillegalsource;

(b) Transporting, acquiring, using, keeping, receiving, or transferring fundsor proceeds with the knowledge that they are the result of a criminalactivityorhaveanillegitimateorillegalsource;

(c) Concealing or disguising the nature of funds, proceeds or their source,movement, ownership, place ormeans of disposal, with the knowledgethat they are the result of a criminal activity or have an illegitimate orillegalsource;

(d)Financingterrorism,terroristactsandterroristorganizations;(e) Participating by way of agreement, aiding and abetting, incitement,

counsel, advice, facilitating, collusion, covering or attempting to commitanyoftheactsstatedinthisArticle.”174

170Ibid.,Article13.171Ibid.,Article26.172Ibid.,Article1.1.173Ibid.,Article1.7.174 Ibid., Article 2. Implementing Regulations of this article considers financing terrorism,terroristactsandterroristorganizations includes fundsresulting fromlawfulsources,andthatknowledge can be inferred from the objective and factual conditions and circumstances; thus,creatinganelementofcriminalintentconstitutingoneofthecrimesprovidedforinthisArticle.Examplesofthecriminalactivitiesortheunlawfulorillegalsourceswherebythedealinginfundsresultingtherefromisdeemedamoneylaunderingcrimeareasfollows:(a)CrimesprovidedforinArticle (1) of the ImplementingRegulations of theUnitedNations ConventionAgainst IllicitTrafficinNarcoticDrugsandPsychotropicSubstances,fortheyear1988,whichwasratifiedbytheCouncilofMinisters’ResolutionNo(168)dated11/8/1419H;(b)Organizedcrimesprovidedfor in theUnitedNationsConvention forControllingTransnationalOrganizedCrimes (PalermoConvention)issuedinDecember2000andratifiedbyRoyalDecreeNo.(m/20)andthedateofe24/3/1425;(c)Thecrimessetoutinparagraph(5)ofArticleIIoftheInternationalConventionontheSuppressionof theFinancingofTerrorism,ratifiedbyRoyalDecreeNo. (m/62)andthedate of e 18/7/1428; (d) Smuggling, manufacturing, trading in or promoting intoxicants; (e)CrimesofmoneycounterfeitingprovidedforintheRoyalDecreeNo(12)dated12/7/1379H;(f)Forgery crimes provided for in the Anti-Forgery Law issued by Royal Decree No (114) dated26/11/1380H amended by Royal Decree No (53) dated 5/11/1382H; (g) Bribery crimesprovided for in theAnti-BriberyLaw issuedbyRoyalDecreeNo (36)dated29/12/1412H; (h)Smuggling weapons and ammunitions or explosives, or manufacturing or trading in them; (i)Procurementandpreparationofbrothelsorexercisingofdebauchery; (j)Plunderingorarmedrobbery;(k)Thefts;(1)Defraudandswindling;(m)Embezzlementofpublicfundsofgovernmentbodies or that which the state contributes to, as well as private funds of companies andcommercialestablishmentsandthelike;(n)Engaginginbankingactivitiesillegally,asprovided

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Penaltiesforsuchactsstipulatedinthislawasfollows:

• Imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years and a fine notexceeding five million riyals, or by either punishment, along with theconfiscationoffunds,proceedsandmeansassociatedwiththecrime.175

• Imprisonment for a period not exceeding fifteen years and a fine notexceeding seven million riyals, if the crime of money laundering iscoupledwithoneofthefollowingcases:

o The perpetrator commits the crime through an organized crimesyndicate;

o Theperpetratorusesviolenceorweapons;o The perpetrator occupies a public office to which the crime is

connectedorexploitshisauthoritiesorpowers incommissionofthecrime;

o Deceivingandexploitingwomenorminors;o Committing the crime through a correctional, charitable, or

educationalinstitutionorinasocialservicefacility;o Issuance of previous local or foreign judgments convicting the

perpetrator,especiallyinsimilarcrimes.176• Imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years and a fine not

exceeding five hundred thousand riyals or by either punishment of anychairman of the boards of directors of financial and non-financialinstitutions,orboardmembers,owners,managers,employees,authorizedrepresentatives, or hired hands who act under these capacities if theyviolateanyoftheirobligationsspecifiedinthelaw.Thesamepunishmentisappliedtothoseperformingtheactivitywithoutobtainingtherequiredlicenses.177

• Afineofnotlessthanonehundredthousandriyalsandnotexceedingthevalueoffundssubjecttothecrimemaybeimposedonfinancialandnon-financial institutions whose responsibility is proven pursuant to theprovisionsofArticles2and3ofthisLaw.178

• With the exception of punishments provided for in this Law,imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months and a fine not

forinArticle(2)oftheBanksMonitoringLaw,issuedbyRoyalDecreeNo(5)dated22/2/1386H;(o) Mediation in the securities without a license provided for in Article (31) and dealing insecuritybasedoninformationobtainedfromaninsiderprovidedforinArticle(50)oftheCapitalmarket law by Royal Decree No. (m/30) and the date of e 2/6/1424; (p) Mediation in theinsurancebusinesswithout a licenseprovided for inArticle (18) of theCooperative InsuranceCompanies lawbyRoyalDecreeNo. (m/32)andthedateof2/6/1424H;(q)Crimesrelatedtocommercialactivities suchas fraud inbrands,weightsandpricesaswellas imitationofgoodsandcommercialconcealmentasprovidedforinArticle(1)ofAnti-CommercialConcealmentLaw,issued by Royal Decree No (m/49) dated 16/10/1409H; (r) Smuggling provided for in theUnifiedCustomsLawfor theGCCStates, issuedbyRoyalDecreeNo(241)dated26/10/1423HTax evasion crimes. Full text of Anti-Money Laundering Law & Its Implementing Regulations:Annex4ofFATFandMENAFATS,MutualEvaluationReportoftheKingdomofSaudiArabia,2010,pp224-236,availableat:http://www.menafatf.org/MER/MER_SaudiArabia_English.pdf 175Ibid.,Article16.176Ibid.,Article17.177Ibid.,Article18.178Ibid.,Article19.

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exceeding one hundred thousand riyals, or by either punishment foranyoneviolatingitsprovisions.179

While this law and its implementing regulations provided the legal base forcombattingmoney laundering and terrorism financing in Saudi Arabia, it wassubjecttoreviewafterfiveyearsorwhennecessary.180However,amendmenttothis law was warranted to correspond to judicial reforms taking place in theKingdom,includingtheestablishmentofthe“SpecializedCriminalCourt”in2008to try terrorism-related cases.This lawand its implementing regulationswerealso subject to review by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assessprogress in implementing its40+9recommendationsand relatedprovisionsofUN conventions and UN security resolutions. The Mutual Evaluation Reportissued by FATF and Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force(MENAFATF), 181 concerning Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting theFinancing of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia, concluded that while Saudi Arabia islargelyincompliancewithmostofitsrecommendations,itisnonethelessstillinneed of improvement in implementing other recommendations. On the legalaspect, it was recommended to separate the issue of money laundering fromterrorism finance.182Reviews have led to enacting two new laws. In 2012, theAnti-MoneyLaunderingLawwasenacted183toreplacetheoldone.Thenewlaw,inits32articles,maintainstheoldmainarticles,butintroducesnewprovisionsincluding: referring the jurisdiction of cases to the Specialized Criminal Courtinstead of the General Courts;184more duties and responsibilities on financialandnon-financial institutions, includingnon-profitorganizations;applicationofits provisions on Saudis and non-Saudis; and adding a travel ban for Saudinationals for a period equal to the term of imprisonment, and deportation forforeignnationalsafterservingthetermofimprisonment.

Thesecond law, the “LawonTerrorismCrimesandFinancing”,wasenacted in2013.185This law of 41 articles, which took effect in February 2014, definesterrorism,terrorismfinancing,andprocedures.Itreferstothecrimeofterrorismas“anycriminalactcommitted,individuallyorcollectively,directlyorindirectly,byaperpetrator,withtheintentiontodisturbpublicorder,destabilizenationalsecurity or state stability, endanger national unity, suspend the Basic Law ofGovernanceorsomeof itsarticles,underminestatereputationorstatus, causedamage to state facilities or natural resources, attempt to coerce any of itsauthoritiesintoaparticularactionorinactionorthreatentocarryoutactsthatwouldleadtoanyoftheaforementionedobjectivesorinstigatesuchacts.”186The 179Ibid.,Article20.180Regulation28-1oftheImplementingRegulations.Seefootnote32.181MENAFATFisFATFStyleRegionalBody(FSRB)establishedinBahrainin2004byagreementbetweenthegovernmentsofitsmemberstosetregulations,rulesandproceduresandcooperatewithFATFtoachieveitsobjectivesofCombatingMoneyLaunderingandFinancingofTerrorismandProliferation.http://www.menafatf.org/topiclist.asp?ctype=about&id=546182Forfullreport,seefootnote39.183 Royal Decree No. M/31 dated 11/5/1433H (3 April 2012), English text available athttps://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=29&VersionID=280184Ibid.,Article29.185Royal Decree No. M/16 dated 24/2/1433H (7 December 2013), English text available athttps://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=327&VersionID=305186Ibid., Article 1.a. The broadness of this definition has raised the concerns of internationalhumanrightsgroupsandorganizations.

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lawalsodefinesthecrimeofterrorismfinancingas“anyactinvolvingcollecting,providing, receiving, allocating, transporting or transferring of funds orproceeds,wholly or partially, for any individual or collective terrorist activity,organized or otherwise, within the Kingdom or abroad, directly or indirectly,from a legitimate or illegitimate source; carrying out for the benefit of suchactivity or its elements any banking, financial or commercial transaction;collecting,directlyorthroughanintermediary,fundstobeutilizedforitsbenefit;promotingitsideologies;arrangingfortrainingsites;shelteringitsmembersorproviding them with any type of weapons or forged documents; knowinglyproviding any other means of support and financing as well as any act thatconstitutes a crime within the scope of the agreements mentioned in theappendixtotheInternationalConventionfortheSuppressionoftheFinancingofTerrorismandasdefinedinsaidagreements.”187ThislawappliestoallresidentsinSaudiArabia,nationalsornon-nationals,committingterroristcrimesspecifiedinthelawinsideoroutsideofSaudiArabia,ifnottriedforthecrime.188Thelawgives the Minister of Interior the authority to arrest anyone suspected ofcommittingacrimecoveredbythislaw.189Itprovidestheinvestigatingauthoritytodetainanypersonaccusedofaterroristcrimeforperiodsnottoexceedoneyear,andpossiblylonger,ifapprovedbythespecializedcourt.190Jurisdictionofthis lawisthesoleresponsibilityofthespecializedcriminalcourt;however, itsverdictscanbeappealed.191Thelawpermitsatrialinabsentiaiftheaccusedisdulynotifiedofhiscrime,andstipulatestherighttoappeal.192

Thelawalsostipulatesthattheaccusedhastherighttoseektheassistanceofanattorney.193This law sanctions, through its procedural and general provisions,the Minister of Interior and the Specialized Court, full authority over the fullprocess of regulating, monitoring, investigating, jailing, sentencing, trying,extradition, and theprocess of implementationof SecurityCouncilResolutionsNo.1267andNo.1373.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia is fighting itswar on terrorism on all fronts to achieve itsstrategicgoalofeliminatingthisdestructiveglobalthreat,thelegalaspectofthiswar is as important as the other aspects of its National Counter-TerrorismStrategy. SaudiArabia has enacted themost stringent statutes and regulationsfor the suppression of terrorism and its financing in accordance with itscommitmentto implementtheprovisionsofUNconventionsandprotocols,UNSecurity Council resolutions pertaining to combatting terrorism and itsfinancing, and the 40+9 recommendations of FATF that constitute theinternational standards for curbing money laundering and terrorism finance.Eliminating terrorism isnotaneasy task.However, furnishing the legalbase is

187Ibid.,Article1.b.188Ibid.,Article3.189Ibid.,Article4.190Ibid.,Article5.191Ibid.,Article8.192Ibid.,Article9.193Ibid.,Article10.

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animportantstepinthelongroughmarchtowardthatend.SaudiArabiaisdoingjustthatincriminalizingcrimesofterrorismanditsfinancing.

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Anti-TerrorismPoliciesinMorocco:FromaSecurityApproachtoaHolisticApproach

KhalidChegraouiCo-author:El-MostafaRezrazi

TheTerrorismThatAfflictsUs

Justweeksago,MoroccanscommemoratedthevictimsoftheterroristattackthatstruckCasablanca13yearsago(onMay16th,2003).Theattackwas,andstillis,awoundinthememoryofMoroccans,andinthememoryofCasablanca,which–like the restof theKingdom’s regions–hasbeenrecoveringdayafterdayandcontinues to confront terrorism with an enduring strong will to build andprogress in all fields, including the economic, social, intellectual, political,religious,andhumanrights.Meanwhile,thejostlingbetween“exclusionistthought”–whichdoesnotbelieveindialogue–andtolerantandmodernistthoughtisongoing,andcontributestothe perpetual regeneration of both sides, even if the paths andmethods vary.Jihadi thought,unfortunately, continues to find followers inour society. In thiscontext, terrorist incidentscontinuedtorecur, includinginCasablancain2007,and inMeknes andMarrakesh in 2011. Terror attacks also struck in the past,includingthebombingoftheAtlasAsniHotelinMarrakeshonAugust20th,1994,aspartofinitialattemptstoinvolveMoroccointhephenomenonofterrorism.194Althoughthepaceofterroristthreatshassloweddownrecently,intermsofthethreatsthatseektoharmpublicsecurityofsocietyandthestate,thesethreats,however, remain credible in terms of the potential for infiltration and causinglimited or significant economic and human damages. These threats continuethroughterrorgroupsaffiliatedwiththe“IslamicCaliphateState,”dubbedinthemediaas“Da’esh,”whichperiodicallythreatentostrikeinMorocco.195

The continuation of threats and the desire to ensure the continuity of theireffectivenessisadifficultpredicament,becausetheterroristthreatsthatcameinthepost-BinLadenera,andsincethebirthofthe“IslamicStateinIraqandSyria”(which laterbecame the “Islamic State” (IS) organization), aremechanisms forgenerating threats from outside the kingdom by attracting elements fromvulnerablesegmentsof the localsociety,196andthenrelyingon infiltrationthataimstodestabilizethesecurityofthecountry.Thishasbeenevidentthroughout

194El-Mostafa Rezrazi, et al., “Al-Kitab al-Abyadh ‘an Al-Irhab fi al-Maghreb,” [Lit. “The WhitePapers on Terrorism in Morocco”], The International Research Group for Transregional andEmergingAreaStudies,Tokoyo,Japan:RedmekPublishing,Rabat,2015(Arabicedition),pp.38-40.195Most recent threats were made through a video in which a follower of the “Islamic State”threatenedtostrikeinthecityofRabat,:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dttm-h_LqG4,Seealso http://www.alriyadh.com/1022931, and “Al-Irhab Yatarabas bi Shamal Ifriqiya,” [Lit.“TerrorismLurksinNorthAfrica”],Al-Bayan,No.12648,February3,2015,pp.30-31.196 This analysis seems to be on the retreat, considering that vulnerability, isolation, andeconomic, social, cultural, and religious marginalization are no longer direct factors inmobilizationandrecruitmentwithinextremistorJihadiorganizations.

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themajority of operations carried out byMoroccan security forces in the pasttwoyears.197Likeothercountriesintheworld,Moroccofacestwootherphenomena,thefirstis self-suggested radicalization and recruitment, and the self-receptiveness(individualdecision) to thepropagandadiscourseof Jihadigroups,orwhat themedia dubs “lone wolves.”198The other phenomenon is that of terrorism inprisons.Whobearstheresponsibilityforterrorism?Theresponsibilityisindeedasharedone between history and key actors, and it is a mixture in which povertyintersectswith ideology, andwith psychological enticement, alongwith cross-continentalandcross-regionalcurrentsthatintersectintheirperceptionsoftheworldinaviolent,reductive,andchauvinisticmanner.In terms of history, Jihadi ideology emerged and reproduced for over sevendecades, weaved special relationships with the religious texts, and gainedfollowersthroughouttheMuslimworld,beforeitbeganspreadingthroughgapsand fissures to penetrate theWestern social fabric.199It then began to branchintosmallergroupsthatdivergeattimesandconvergeatothers,dependingonthecircumstancesandthegeneralinternationalclimateatvarioustimes. On the other hand, there are international actors and keyplayers,who – for aperiodof time– took advantageof, andutilized, Jihadi thought to strikedowncommunistmovements,200andviceversa.Themechanismofexploitingterroristactivityfurtherevolvedinunethicallyconcoctingsomeofthecrisesexperiencedinourworldtoday.201Moroccoalsowitnessedfanaticalreligiousmovements inthemid-1960s,whichlaterevolved tobecomean inquisitorialmachine, as illustratedby theChabibaal-Islamiya(IslamistYouth)movement.ButafterthekillingofOmarBenjelloun,oneof thepioneersandactivistsof theMoroccan leftistcurrent in1975,202the 197 Statement by the Moroccan Ministry of Interior, dated March 20, 2016, regarding thedismantlingofanarmedterroristcell,spreadacrossninecities,thatwaspreparingtocarryout“aseriousterrorplotthattargetedthestabilityofthekingdom.”AlsoseethelateststatementsonMay13thand18th,2016regardingdismantlingaterroristcellinthenorthernandeasternpartsofthecountry,headedbyamemberofthe“IslamicState”organization,ofChadiannationality,whowasarrestedinasafehouseinTangier.MembersofthecellsincludedMoroccansandAlgerians.The seized materials reveal the level of threat posed by this cell, including bomb-makingmaterials,recordings,andobservationandsurveillanceofpotentialbombingtargetsites.198 Ramon Spaaij, “Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations andPrevention,” Springer. 2012, also Pantucci Raffaelo, “A Typology of LoneWolves: PreliminaryAnalysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists,” International Center for the Study of Radicalization andPoliticalViolence,2012.199El-Mostafa Rezrazi et al., “Al-Kitab al-Abyadh ‘an Al-Irhab fi al-Maghreb,” [Lit. “The WhitePapersonTerrorisminMorocco”],Op.cit.200MohamedTozy,MonarchieetIslamPolitiqueauMaroc,[Lit.“TheMonarchyandPoliticalIslaminMorocco”],PressesdeSciencesPo,1999,AlsoinArabicentitled“Al-Malakiyyawaal-Islamal-Siyasifial-Maghrib,”translatedbyKhalidChegraouiandMohamedHatami,Casablanca:Al-FanakPublishing,2001.201MichelBugnon-Mordant,États-Unis,lamanipulationplanétaire,Favre,2003.202MohamedTozy,MonarchieetIslamPolitiqueauMaroc,[Lit.“TheMonarchyandPoliticalIslaminMorocco”], op. cit., pp. 226-242.Meanwhile, renowned researchers in theWest did not payattentiontothis issuewhenitemerged.Forexample,thevaluablestudybyJohnWaterburyonMorocco in 1968 did not make any reference to the Moroccan regime’s employment and

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Chabibafragmented,reflectedinwavesofdivision,exodus,anddiffraction.Othergroups also faced a similar fate, including the TabayyunGroup, the MoroccanMujahideen Movement, Al-Sirat al-Mustaqeem (The Straight Path) group, Al-Takfirwaal-Hijra(ExcommunicationandExodus)group,TheMoroccanIslamicCombatant Group (GICM),Al-Khayaral-Islami (The Islamic Choice) group, andHizbut-Tahrir,amongothers.203

TheMoroccansecurityinstitutions’dismantlingofmorethan150terroristcellssince2000constitutedrichmaterialforresearchersthatenabledthem,byvirtueofaccumulationof incidents, to reachconclusionsbasedon the facts.First, theconclusionsrefutetheinterpretations(whichseemclosertojustificationratherthe explanation) that argue thatmost of the suicide bombers of theMay 16th,2003 attacks came from poor backgrounds. This led some researchers tomisconnect thephenomenonof terrorismwithpoverty andmarginalization.204However, reviewing the list of those involved in terrorist acts afterMay 2003reveals this misconnection, as most of them belonged to stable or even highsocial class backgrounds. The majority of those convicted in terrorism casesbegan to practice their extremist tendencies through “Ta‘zir” (scolding andreprimand) based on the concept of the “Prevention of Vice.” This “moralimpetus” often becomes a gateway to Takfiri-exclusionist ideology, whichinevitably leads to legitimizing systematic and organized violence. The path ofterrorists reveals thatmostof themgradually advanced intoandwithin terrororganizations,whichthemselvesgraduallyadvancedintheirideologicalmakeupandpoliticalproject.Thiscalls forstudying therelationshipbetweenextremistthought and the process of establishing ideological foundations of violent andterroristpractices.Many Moroccan “Mujahideen” have gone to areas of tensions, such asAfghanistan,Bosnia,Sudan,andothers.205Upontheirreturn,someattemptedtopresentthemselvesaspioneeringfiguresofJihadiSalafistthought.Someofthemmaintained connections, material ties, or pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. WiththenewwaveofJihadism,whichcoincidedwiththedisintegrationoftheconceptof “domestic” terror organizations in Jihadi thought that sought to overthrow utilizationofthereligiousdimension,particularlytheextremistcurrents,inconfrontingtheLeft.See:JohnWaterbury,“TheCommanderoftheFaithful:TheMoroccanPoliticalElite-AStudyinSegmentedPolitics,”Weidenfeld&Nicolson,1970.AlsoinArabic,entitled“Amiral-Mu’minin:Al-Malakiyyawaal-Nukhbaal-Siyasiyaal-Maghribiyya, translatedbyAbdulGhaniAbual-Azm,Abdal-Ahadal-Sabti,andAbdulLatifal-Falaq,Rabat:Mu’asasatal-Ghani,2004,pp.367andfollowingpages.-ThesameproblemcanbedetectedinnumerousotherArabandMuslimcountriesthatwerenotMarxistorsocialistinnature,andwithsomeambivalenceinregardstootherArabcountrieslikeAlgeria,whichdevelopedmechanismsofthe“IslamicUniversity”inthe1970sduringthereignofthe late President Houari Boumediene, which served as a hub for elements of the MuslimBrotherhood,suchasAl-QaradawiandAl-Ghanouchi,tomeetandthrive.LibyaduringtheeraofGhaddafiisanotherexample,wheretherewasstatepatronageofIslamicschoolsanduniversitiesandreligiouspropaganda,atthesamelevelasthestate’spropagandaforGhaddafi’sAfricanunityprojectandattemptsatIslamizationthroughallurementandappeal.

203El-Mostafa Rezrazi et al., “Al-Kitab al-Abyadh ‘an Al-Irhab fi al-Maghreb,” [Lit. “The WhitePapersonTerrorisminMorocco”],op.cit.,pp.30-34.204El-Mostafa Rezrazi, Al-Dinamikiyat al-Nafsiya ‘inda al-Intihariyien al-Jihadiyien, [Lit., “ThePsychologicalDynamicsofJihadiSuiciders”],PhDdissertationinClinicalPsychology,MohammedVUniversity,Rabat,2014.205El-MostafaRezrazietal.,“TheWhitePapersonTerrorisminMorocco,”op.cit.

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national regimes, and the rise and subsequent retreat of the concept of GlobalJihad,espousedbyAl-ZawahiriandBinLaden,wewitnesstodaythereturnoftheconceptofasingleunitedCaliphate.TheCaliphateconceptionisbuiltuponthestrategies of centralized empowerment and the vicegerency system ofgovernance, 206 along with the establishment of a network of “emirates”whenever followers in various parts of the Muslim world manage to securegeographicalareas,regardlessoftheirsize.The responsibility for confronting terrorism is shared between all, includingsecurityagencies,citizens,governmentalandcivilorganizations,themedia,andreligiousscholars.Itisunfairtoblamesolelythestatesecurityapparatusfortheweaknessofeffortstomonitor,refute,andcombatJihadiideology.Itisalsofutileto blame the state for some secular trends in Morocco that exploit the waragainst terrorism for the sake of settling their scoreswith Islamas a religiousdoctrineandvaluessystem.

Here, thequestionofresponsibilitiesoughttoberephrased,not forthesakeoflayingresponsibilityandblameononepartyoranother,butrather inordertodivideanddistributeresponsibilitiesamongallbasedonasenseof citizenshipandpatriotism.

ReligiousTextandtheBirthofJihadiViolenceThe Islamic religious texts are independent and liberated frominstitutionalization.Hereinliestheirstrength,butalsotheriskofbeingwronglyinterpreted.Neutralizingreligioustextsfrompoliticshasbeenafailedmissioninmost Muslim countries, because the Islamic religious substance, or content(Matn,i.e.gist),isladenwithpoliticalinstances,especiallyinmattersrelatedtotherelationshipbetweensocietyandthestate,andbetweenstates.207Sincethe1930s,extremistreligiouscurrentsproducedliteraturethatsoughttoformulateaworldviewthatisbasedontheneedtogovernbyGod’sdecrees,208followedbyformulations that divided the world into an “abode of peace,” “abode ofreconciliation,” and “abode of war.”209Such discourse sought to reframe localsocieties, and classify them into an “Islamic” society and a “Jahili (era ofignorance)”society,210andyetanother“misguidedandallured”society.211Then,inmomentsoftensionandmobilization, Jihaditheorizationspawnedtobuilda 206AtlanticCouncil,“BriefingonMoroccan-EuropeanCounterterrorismCooperation,”December7,2015.207 On this issue, and on the Moroccan experience and the process of intertwining andinterlockingbetweenreligionandpoliticalinstitutions,see:MohamedTozy,“TheMonarchyandPoliticalIslaminMorocco,”op.cit.,pp.15-155.208AmongtheprominenttheoristswhosoughttoestablishrootsforthisconceptisAbdal-QadirAwdeh, inAl-IslamwaAwda‘unaal-Qanuniya, [Lit., “Islam and Our Legal Conditions”], 2nd ed.,1967.209Muhammad bin Abd al-Salam al-Ansari, “MustalahatShar‘iyya:Daral-IslamwaDaral-Kufr”[lit.,“IslamicDoctrinalTerms:TheAbodeofIslamandAbodeofDisbelief”].210SayyidQutb,Ma‘alimfial-Tariq,[Lit.,“Milestones”],Cairo:Daral-Shuruq,1973.211Al-Zubayr Khalafu Allah,Al-Taghyeer:AaliyatuhuwaWasa’iluhu fial-Minhajal-Nabawi liAl-ImamAbdal-SalamYasin, [Lit., “Change: ItsMechanismsandMeans in thePropheticMethod intheThoughtofImamAbdal-SalamYassin”],inaseminaron“ChangeintheThoughtofImamAbdal-SalamYassin,”SaturdayDecember13,2014,heldattheorganization’sheadquartersinthecityofSala.

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dividingthresholdbetween“thosewhoarewithus”and“thosewhoareagainstus,” founded upon the notion of “Al-Walaa’ wa al-Baraa’ (loyalty anddisavowal).212

Butfortheirpart,Islamicscholarsandjuristsheldtotheirconvictionsthattheywere “right,” without putting in genuine efforts to safeguard and solidify this“rightness” and “correctness.” They belittled the misguided youth who joinedTakfiriandexclusionistgroupswithpatronizingcondescension,inthebeliefthatthey–thescholarsandjurists–arethe“mostrightful”andhencethe“strongest.”Over time, Jihadi groups branched out, strengthened, and fortified themselvesagainstthe“scholars”fromthepremiseofadismissivenotionthatthesescholarsare“juristsoftheSultan.”213Inamoment’stime, Islamic librariesbecamefilledwithdiscourseandtheorizationthatworkedtoreinforceJihadithoughtoverthedecades.

Abouttenyearsago,religiousentitiesinanumberofArabcountriesundertookapioneeringefforttorefuteextremistJihadithought,andfocusedonscrutinizingand dismantling the fundamental conceptions upon which this exclusionistthought is based, such as the concepts of Al-Jahiliya (state of ignorance), Al-Hakimiya (God’s sovereignty), Al-Walaa’ wa al-Baraa’ (loyalty and disavowal),and others. But a preliminary reading of this pilot project reveals that theseeffortswerenotcontinuous,andtherewaslimitedfollow-upofJihadiliteraturethatproliferatedinthe1970sand1980s.Furthermore,effortstoscrutinizeandrefutedidnotkeeppacewithnewandreemergingJihadithoughtinpublicationsandJihadiwebsites,particularlythe“IslamicState”organizationandnewgroupsaffiliatedandalliedwithit.214

TheNatureofTerrorThreatsinMorocco

Ingeneral,thethreatof–andharmcausedby–terrorismisbuiltuponcommonfoundations,eveniftheresultsandmethodsofdifferentterroristgroupsvary.InthecaseofMorocco,thethreatsofterrorismremainedforalongtimelimitedto cells that were generated from within the local society, in addition to thethreatsofforeigninfiltratorsorMoroccansreturningfrombattlefrontssuchas

212Muhammad bin Saeed al-Qahtani, Al-Walaa’ wa al-Baraa’ fi al-Islam, [Lit., “Loyalty andDisavowalinIslam”],Al-DurarPublications,nopublishingdate.213The study of historical experiences of opposition and rebellion of jurists against Sultans isveryimportantinunderstandingthecurrentconditions.See:MohamedTozy,“TheMonarchyandPoliticalIslaminMorocco,”op.cit.,pp.41-61.214SeelimitedinfluenceexamplesinEgypt,MinistryofInterior,inMohammadHamza,Mukafahatal-Irhabwaal-TatarufwaUslubal-Muraja‘aal-Fikriya”[Lit.“CounteringTerrorismandExtremism,andtheMethodofIntellectualRevisions”],2012;Seealso:MuhammadbinOmarBazmol,“Dawral-TarbiyafiMukafahatal-Tatarufwaal-Irhab,”[Lit.“TheRoleofEducationinCombatingExtremismandTerrorism],FacultyatUmAl-QuraUniversity,Da‘waandPrinciplesofReligionDepartment;andChristopherBoucek,“SaudiArabia’s“Soft”CounterterrorismStrategy:Prevention,Rehabilitation,andAftercare,”CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,September22,2008,http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/09/21/saudi-arabia-s-soft-counterterrorism-strategy-prevention-rehabilitation-and-aftercare-pub-22155;SeealsoAssakinawebsite,runbytheSaudiArabianMinistryofIslamicAffairs,http://www.assakina.com/about-php

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Afghanistan,Iraq,andthenSyria,LibyaandMali,215orthosewhowererecruitedin immigrant diasporas in Europe to carry out attacks in various parts of theMuslimworld.216

Jihadi elements also went to the African regions of the Sahel and Sahara,especially the countries where al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) wasactive.AQIMhadbranches inall theNorthAfricancountries,but initiallygrewandthrivedinAlgeria,whereadecadeofcivilwarinthe1990smadethecountryfertileground for theorganization.Al-Qaeda elementsalso foundsafehaven inregions north of Mali, especially with the settlements of conflict with TuareggroupssincetheAlgiersandTamanrassetAccordsin2005-2006andafterwards,which contributed to clearing the Azawad region from Malian oversight andauthoritywiththewithdrawalofpoliceandthemilitaryfromthearea.TheeasynetworkingofJihadigroupswithcriminalelementsandsmuggling,drugs,armsmafias,humanandundergroundimmigrationtraffickersandwithTuaregrebelsenabledtheformationoftacticalalliancesandconstitutedanimportantmaterialandfundingresourceforJihadis.

WiththecollapseoftheLibyanregime,thepathbecameclearfordangerousandcross-border illicit trade, enabling al-Qaeda to enter into the Malian conflict,followedbysuccessivegroupssuchasthe“IslamicState”,whichpermeatedandspread throughout the Sahel and Sahara regions, which are closely linked toNorthAfricancountries,217despiteAfricanandFrenchintervention,particularlyafterOperationServalandOperationBarkhane.218Thetwooperationsmanaged

215Muhammad Mahmoud Abu al-Ma‘ali, Al-Qa‘ida wa Hulafauha fi Azawad: Al-Nash’a wa al-Tawasu‘,[Lit.,“Al-QaedaanditsAlliesinAzawad:OriginsandExpansion”],Al-JazeeraCenterforStudies,2014.216ForfurtherdiscussionoftheterrorcellsinMorocco,andthechronologyoftheirdismantling,see:El-MostafaRezrazietal.,“TheWhitePapersonTerrorisminMorocco,”op.cit.,pp.79-287.217Abu Al-Walid Adnan al-Sahrawi, one of the pioneers of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel repeatedlythreatenedMoroccowith Jihadiattacks.Al-Sahrawi isoneof the leadersof thePolisarioyouthwing (the Sahrawi youth movement), and organizer of the Belmokhtar group, despite themhavingdisagreedwitheachotherandcuttieslateron.Onhispart,BelmokhtarreestablishedhisrelationswithAQIM,whichhadbeentenseforawhile.218 Several studies and reports on this subject were conducted by the research team atMohammedVUniversityinRabat,seeforexample:-ChegraouiKhalid,«leMaghrebetl’Afrique,unehistoiremouvementée;continuitéetconflitsdel’interrégionalaucontinental:leMarocenvoisinage»,inlesidentitésrégionalesetladialectiqueSud-Sudenquestion,Dakar,Codesria,2007,p.49-63.-Défis stratégiques et sécurité au sahel Sahara, le rôle duMaroc, Assemblée parlementaire del’OTANsous-commissionsur lagouvernancedémocratique (CDSDG)et sous-commissionsur latransitionetledéveloppement(ESCTD),chambredesConseillés,Rabat,Maroc,15April2014.-«DelaTunisieàlaLibye:analysededeuxapprochesdegouvernancepolitiqueetsécuritaire»in Lesperspectivesdes évolutionspost-printempsarabedans la régionMENA, GRESS, FondationHannsSeidel,5June2015,Marrakech. -ELMoussaouiELAjlaoui,"LesenjeuxstratégiquesduMarocdansl'espaceSahéloSaharien»,LeMarocdanslagéopolitiqueafricaine,Institutdesétudesafricaines,Rabat,May2015.-«Architecturesécuritairedansl’espacesaharien»,Bamako-3,4December2013.-«Dialoguessécuritairesdansl’espaceSahélosaharien.Repenserlasécuritésousrégionale.«LesdéfisetenjeuxsécuritairesauMaroc»,EtudeinterneencollaborationaveclaFondationF.EbertetleSIPRI,2016.-«Lescrisessahélo-sahariennes:germesdelabalkanisation».RevuedesFAR.N°356,2013.-«Les enjeux duMaroc dans l’espace sahélo saharien».Colloque: le Maroc dans les nouveauxenjeuxafricains.20émesessionduGERM.Rabat.October,2015.

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totemporarilyhalttheprogressoftheJihadiandexclusionistprojecttoestablishanentity innorthernMali,butdidnot completelyeradicate theirpresence.Onthecontrary,theoperationsledtoscatteringanddispersingtheseelementsintoneighboring countries, especially in southern Libya. Scattered elementssporadicallymixedwiththegeneralpopulationsorresortedtosafehavensintheSahelandSahararegionsawaitingtheretreatofAfricanandFrenchsecurityandmilitary operations. These ramifications became evident recently with theincrease in military operations in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cote d'Ivoire.Simultaneously,thethreatisalsobecomingevidentintheoverallNorthAfricanregion,andalsoonEurope,especiallyaftercasesofkidnapping,takinghostages,andthreateningFrenchinterestsintheSahelcountries.

However, Morocco is the only Arab Muslim country where terroristorganizations have failed to create hotbeds on the ground to use as sites fortraining,positioning,andlaunchingattacks.TerroristcellsinMoroccofollowthemodelofsleepercells,particularlyinurbanareas,andhavetriedtoexpandintothemountainousareasbutgenerallyfailed.219

Whatisnew,however,isthegrowingandincreasinglevelofthreatsemanatingfrom Libya and the Sahel and Sahara regions especially amid the absence ofsecuritycooperationandcoordinationwithMorocco’sneighbors in theeasternpartofthekingdom.220Inaddition,theIslamic“Caliphate”StateorganizationhasmanagedtoimplementanewstrategyaimedatencouragingJihadistostayintheirhomecountries,andtowork in fullsecrecyuntil theycarryout theattacks frominsidethecountry.This aspect raises further concerns, considering that theprocessesof tracking,monitoring, and prevention require continuous and systemized intelligenceworkinordertocontrolurbanareas.Itisindeedapossible–butcomplicated–task.221Inthistask,traditional intelligenceandinvestigativehumaneffortsplayan important, decisive, and integral role that complements electronicsurveillance,whichstartedtoformthebackboneofmanyEuropeanintelligenceagencies, but exposed their countries to major risks, considering the limitedscopeandresultsofelectronicintelligencework.AnotherconcernforMoroccotoday is forthedifferenceswithAlgeriatoplayarole in exacerbating the already lax security measures in controlling andmonitoring Algeria’s borders with Morocco. Reports emerged confirming thatthe Algerianmilitary leadership reached a secret understandingwithMokhtarBelmokhtar to attackMorocco’s interests, in return for not attacking Algeria’s -Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique et les enjeux géostratégiques en Méditerranée occidentale.Colloque«Ceuta,MelillaetlesIlesméditerranéennesàlumièredesexpériencesinternationalesetdudroitsinternational»Rabat25September2010.219Ibid.220Khalid Chegraoui, in Institut Royal des Etudes Stratégiques en coopération avec Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung-Rabat, LasécuritéauSahelaprèslacriseduMaliQuelsenjeuxetdéfispourlespaysrégionauxetinternationaux?Séminaireinternationalorganiséle28March2014àRabat.-KhalidChegraoui,BokoHaramunmouvementopportuniste,LEMATIN,11September2014.-Leterrorisme,problématiqued'unedéfinition,leMATIN,16May2005-LesnouveauxTalibansdelaCornedel’Afrique,Libération,15June2006.221El-MostafaRezrazi,Al-Ta‘awunal-AmniliMukafahatal-Irhab:Al-Aaliyatal-Mutadakhila, [Lit.,“Security Cooperation to Combat Terrorism: Intertwined Mechanisms”], The First Moroccan-SpainForumforCombatingTerrorism,Madrid:theArabInstituteforCulture,May5th,2016.

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interests. Although this is the logic of “conspiracy theory,” it nevertheless andcertainlyaddstoMorocco’sconcerns.222

AFrankOpinionRegardingRevisionsMaking revisions is apositiveendeavor that reflects thedynamismofdialoguepossiblebetweenvariousactorsinsocietyandthestate,includingelementsthatwere formerly involved in wrongdoing. Revisions are also an importantmechanismforreintegratingtheseelementsintosocietyandnormallife.

However, there are two reservations that merit consideration. First, revisionsmust include a comprehensive and genuine apology from what repentingcriminal entities or individuals have done to society and the state, withoutdiscrimination.Itisinsufficienttoapologizetothestate,andthenexpectsocietytoacceptandreintegratethem.Second,suchrevisionsmustnotbecomepretextinordertoevadepunishmentforcrimesstipulatedbythePenalLaw.Revisionsmay lead to lessening punishments, but not to dropping the civil right toprosecutethecrime.

TheMoroccanApproachtoCounteringExtremismandTerrorism

The holistic approach adopted by Morocco since the attacks in 2003demonstrateditsworth.It includedtherestructuringofthereligioussphere,223

222See“LatestFrenchIntelligenceReportsonAlgerianHostageCrisis,”https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/12095223Moroccohasappliedanewreligiouspolicythroughrehabilitating,regulatingandmonitoringthereligioussphereingeneral,inpartofthepolicydelineatedintheKing’sspeechonApril30,2004. “ItispossibletoreadthereligiouspolicyapproachesthroughtheeffortoftheStateinthefieldofreligiouseducation.TheMinistryofAwqaf (ReligiousEndowments)andIslamicAffairsworkedtoimprovethequalityofeducationandtrainingintheTraditional(religious)Educationsector,provided support classes inmodern sciences and foreign subjects,whichbenefited over 1,000students in 54 traditional education institutions during the year 2005. On its part, theDepartment of Traditional Education in theMinistry ofAwqaf conducted training sessions forpreachers and “Fuqahaa” (jurists) of traditional schools. One of the sessionswas dedicated toproviding jurists with knowledge of administrative and financial management of educationalinstitutions, while another session aimed to provide them with a certain modern educationcurriculumandmethods.TheDepartment’seffortscomeinpartfromitsendeavortoimplementmoreseriousmeasuresandissueexecutivedecreesrelatedtotheTraditionalEducationLawinaccordancewiththedirectivesoftheKing’sApril30,2004speech.Theyear2005witnessedthelaunchofeducationforthefirstclassofatrainingprogramfor150imams and 50 female counselors (Murshidat) each year. Graduates of this training programwould be employed by a labor contract with the state and would receive the same pay andcompensation of assistant administrator (10th rank). Also, the training system at the Dar Al-HadithAl-Hassaniawas reconsidered, and the institute became a subsidiary of theMinistry ofAwqaf in an effort to attract a new generation capable of carrying out the new tasks, whichinclude:developing thecreativeandpersuasiveabilitiesof scholarsassociatedwith theofficialinstitution,trainingthemtoaddressanddealwiththemediafieldandtocompeteinthepluralityand appeal of religious discourse that broadcasts through channels that have widespreadaudiences,especiallyafterthenationalmediasectorwasreinforcedwiththeestablishmentoftheMohammedVIChannel forQur’an (onNovember2,2005)aimed to “enhance thepublic audioand visual media’s educational role, and making it a key tool in restoring the identity of theMoroccan nation and highlighting its doctrinal and religious unity.” Other efforts included the

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wherebysectors that supervise this spherewere reorganized, andnewsectorswere created, meanwhile each sector’s responsibilities were better organizedandclarified.TheMoroccanapproachtoreligiousaffairsincludedeffortssuchas:

-EstablishingtheDepartmentofMosques-EstablishingtheDepartmentofTraditional(Religious)Education

-RestructuringtheSupremeScientificCouncil(April22nd,2004)

-EstablishingaScholarlyCommitteeforIftaa’ (Issuingreligiousedicts)(April22nd,2004)

-RestructuringtheMoroccanLeagueofIslamicscholars,whichbecametheMoroccanMohammadiyaLeagueofScholars(April30th,2004)- Establishing the Mohammed VI Holy Qur’an Radio Station (October16th,2004)- Launching the Mohammed VI TV Channel for Holy Qur’an andlaunching the website of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs(November2nd,2005)-ReorganizingtheDarAl-HadithAl-HassaniatobecometheInstituteofDarAl-HadithAl-Hassania(August24th,2005)

-Establishingacentertotrainandprepareimamsandmaleandfemalecounselors2005-2006

- Establishing the European Council of Moroccan Oulema (scholars)(November6th,2008)

- Launching the plan for the Charter ofOulema (Scholars) (April 29th,2009)-EstablishingtheMohammedVIFoundationforprintingtheHolyQur’an(2010)-EstablishingtheMohammedVIFoundationforthePromotionofSocialWorksofReligiousCustodians(2010).224

Other efforts include promoting and reinforcing the foundations of democraticgovernance,225reflectedintheriseofamoderateIslamistpoliticalpartytoleadtheMoroccangovernment andovercoming theproblematic tensionsof the so-called Arab Spring after holding elections in which all participating partiesattested to the credibility of the electoral process compared to pastexperiences.226Accountability was reinforced, especially in the field of human

establishmentofawebsitefortheMinistryaimedto“highlightthedoctrinalandreligiousunityofMorocco.” See: Abd al-HakimAbu al-Lawz,Al-Tawajuhatal-Jadida lial-Siyasaal-Diniya fial-Maghreb,[Lit.,“NewTrendsofReligiousPolicyinMorocco”],Insaniyaat(Humanities),IssueNo.31,2006.224Formore on theMoroccan governmental and official institution’s activities in the religiousfield, see: A Chronology of Religious Affairs in Morocco from 1999 to 2016,http://www.habous.gov.ma/%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A7.html225TheConstitutionoftheKingdomofMoroccoforyear2011.226Somepolitical sectors continued tooppose this trend,particularly Islamist extremists andagrouppeculiar toMorocco,which is amixbetween extremism, a formof Sufism, and Salafism

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rights.227ThesecurityfieldwasalsooverhauledthroughtherestructuringoftheGeneral Directorate for National Security. Furthermore, a Central JudicialResearch Center was established, whereby the processes of monitoringorganized crimeand terroristmovementsbecameorganizedundera legal andjudicial framework,andwherethesecuritydimensionconstitutesaprovisionalframework for pre-emptive and arrest measures. In the same context, priorintelligence arrangements and important practices were also part of theMoroccanapproachtocombatextremismandterrorism.

TheStatusofExtremistandTerroristOrganizationsRelatedtoMorocco228

TerroristGroups ExtremistGroups

GroupName CurrentStatus GroupName CurrentStatus

TheMoroccanMujahideenMovement

Dispersed Al-Chabibaal-Islamiya(IslamistYouth)

Dismantled,nowoperatingoutsideofMorocco,withsmallcellsstillactiveinsidethecountry

TheMoroccanIslamicCombatantGroup(GICM)

Dispersed Al-TabayyunGroup Faded

Jama‘atal-Salafiyaal-Jihadiya(JihadiSalafist)Group

Dispersed Al-‘Adlwaal-Ihsan(JusticeandSpirituality)Group

Active

Al-Siratal-Mustaqeem(TheStraightPath)

Dismantled

Al-Takfirwaal-Hijra(ExcommunicationandExodus)

Dismantled

al-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM)

Beingpursued

Al-Muwaqi‘ounbial-Dam(ThoseWhoSigninBlood)

Beingpursued

calledAl-‘Adlwaal-Ihsan(JusticeandSpirituality)group,andtheradicalLeftcurrent,especiallytheMarxist“DemocraticWay”party.227Amongtheindicatorsofincreasedaccountabilityinthefieldofhumanrightsisthepromotionof the “National Council for Human Rights” to the rank of a constitutional institution that haslocal councils tomonitor human right conditions. Noteworthy also isMorocco’s experience ofestablishing the Equity andReconciliation Commission to address the effects and remnants ofyearsof “bullets”during thereignofKingHassan II.TheCommission is thepredecessorof theNational Council for Human Rights, and had worked to promote the culture of responsibledialogueandreconciliationwiththepast,andstressedtheneedforreparationforphysicalandemotionaldamagesandthearrangementofwritingthedifficulthistory.228 El-Mostafa Rezrazi, Al-Dinamikiyat al-Nafsiya ‘inda al-Intihariyien al-Jihadiyien, [Lit., ThePsychologicalDynamicsofJihadiSuiciders],Op.Cit.

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TerroristGroups ExtremistGroups

GroupName CurrentStatus GroupName CurrentStatus

Al-Murabitoun(TheSentinels)

Partsofthemovementdismantled

Jama‘atal-Mulathamoun(TheMaskedOnes)

Partsofthemovementdismantled

Ashbalal-Jihad(JihadCubs) Dismantled

Fatahal-Andalus(ConqueringAl-Andalus)

Dismantled

The“IslamicState”Organization-NorthAfricaWilayaBranch

Beingpursued

Smallindependentcells,loyaltoeitheral-Qaedaor“IslamicState”

Mostlydismantledbetween2013-2016

Furthermore, the King launched various workshops in the fields of judicialreform and combatting economic and social marginalization.229Morocco alsoadoptedapolicyofeconomictake-offbytransformingthevariousregionsofthecountryintoinvestment-attractinghubs.230

The fundamental elements of restructuring the religious field inMorocco stemfromeffortstoreinforcetheroleofthe“Amiral-Mouminine”(CommanderoftheFaithful,i.e.theKing),whichisaprestigiousinstitutionthathasgivenMoroccanshistorical depth to spiritual stability and security,231and deprives extremistsfromany religious legitimacy in theirpoliticaldiscourse,which is ideologicallyinfusedwithreligiousrhetoric.

What distinguishes Morocco’s experience in handling the religious field fromothercountriesintheArabandMuslimworldisthatitsapproachdoesnotonlyaddressthecontentofreligiousdoctrine,withafocusonmoderateAsh‘ariandMalikischoolsofthought,butalsoincludesregulatingworshipcenters,careandinterest in religious practitioners, such as Imams and male and femalecounselors, training them, and integrating them into the public service labor

229The first of such experiences was launched in 2003-2004 under the National Initiative forHumanDevelopmentprogram.230These include launching major economic and industrial projects in cities and areas nearTangiers,Casablanca,Ouarzazate,andothers.231Kei Nakagawa, The Mixed-Best Strategy in Fighting Extremism in Morocco, ITEAS, Tokyo,2015.

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sector. Morocco adopts an approach of relying on accredited imams, whichpreventsthephenomenonofvolunteeringintheadministrationofmosques.232

Morocco’scontributiontosecuritycooperationwithitspartnersisnotlimitedtoits integrationandenhancementof informationalandoperational coordinationandcooperation;Moroccotodayhasbecomeapioneeringpartnerinestablishinganewdoctrine for internationalcooperation in the fieldofanti-terrorism.Thisdoctrinepromotessecuritycooperationtoadegreeofsupra-diplomacy,makingcooperativerelationsimmunetoincidentaleffectsofapathy,lackofinterest,ordisputesthatmayarisebetweengovernments.

The Moroccan approach has focused on promoting security cooperation withother countries. However, successes in security cooperation sometimes faceobstacles that stem from political backdrops, as is the case in the nearly non-existent cooperation between Morocco and Algeria, despite the commonimminentsecuritythreatsfacingthetwonationsfromtheSahel,Libya,andtheMediterranean region. One reason for this lack of cooperation is Algeria’sunwillingness to separate its disputes with Rabat over the Western Saharaissue233fromtheneedforsecuritycooperationtotranscendandriseabovethesedisputes. There are also technical obstacles, related to the reliance of somenations,particularlyinAfrica,ontheirmilitariestocounterterrorism,especiallycountrieswhereterroristorganizationstheresucceededinsecuringsafehavensfortheiractivitiesandoperations.Morocco,ontheotherhand,adoptstheurbanintelligence approach, which relies on surveilling and dismantling cells beforetheygrowandspreadtowardsmountainousorremoteregions,andbeforetheysucceedinsecuringsafehavensorgeographicalcontrol.234

Cooperation with Western countries is also sometimes mired in difficulties,especially when the security cooperation is overshadowed by a mentality ofunequal “North-South” detachment, and lack of respect for the concept ofseparatingbetweenthefactsandtheirsources.235

232Ibid.233“WesternSaharaRealities,”Wikileaksdocuments,https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RABAT706_a.html.ElMostafaRezrazi,“ChegraouiKhalid,(coll.),BehindtheScenes:ExploringTindouffromInside,”Tokyo:NihonHyoroPublishingHouse,2015.234El-MostafaRezrazi,“Morocco’sWaronTerrorism:TheCaseforSecurityCooperationToday,”London:GilgameshPublishingHouse,2016.235Ibid.

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Tunisia’sApproachtoFightingTerrorismthroughthe“NationalCounter-TerrorismStrategy”

SamiBrahemTheoreticalPreludes

SincethefirstterroristassassinationincidentinTunisia,politiciansandexpertshave expressed the need for a national anti-terrorism strategy. Thisamalgamated phrase has come to have a “magical” effect, whereby everyonewagersonitsexistence,andcompetestohavethehonorofparticipatinginit,ontop of the fact that disputes may even erupt over which entities have theauthority to formulate and oversee it. I have been honored to participate informulating the ideasof thestrategy,whichwas formulatedduring the timeofthe government of Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, on behalf of the TunisianInstituteforStrategicStudies(ITES),apresidentialresearchinstitution.Thispaper seeks to shed lighton thenatureof thenational strategy, its value,andwhatitpresentsofperceptionsandmechanismstocombatterrorism,whilerespectingthereservationsregardingitspracticaloutcomes.

Beforepresentingaperspectiveonthephilosophybehindthenationalstrategy,thispaper sets forth some theoretical introductions that includeadiagnosisofthe religious situation after the revolution, the relationship between the stateand religion, and the problems facing the administration of religious affairs,whichhindereffortstoadequatelycombatandpreventterrorismbycuttingitslifelines,causes,motives,andaddressingitsmanifestationsandthreats.

DiagnosingtheStatusofReligionaftertheRevolution

Overthecourseofdecadesofthe“nationalstate,”therelationshipbetweentheTunisianstateandreligiousaffairswas markedbytensionandimbalance.Beforetherevolution,therelationshipwasslantedinfavorofthestate,puttingreligionunderthetutelageofthestate.Aftertherevolution,however,thescalestipped,this time in favorof society,with thestate’s “guardianship”andauthorityoverreligiousaffairsofsocietyandpublicconsciencecollapsing.Thestatewasunableto keep pace with the rapid transformations in the religious sphere and theoutburstofrepressedreligiosityinamostchaotic,scenic,anddisorderlyfashion.This chaos and disruption led to sharp polarization on the basis of identity,manifestedinaclashbetweenthemediaandculturalspheres,ontheonehand,and the religious one on the other, which nearly led to serious social rupturebeforetheConstitutionresolvedthisconflictthroughavisionthatcombinedthevaluesofreligionandthevaluesofmodernity.

Religious affairs have also been marked by the weakness of the civil societyframeworks that operate in the religious sphere, such as associations andresearch centers, which have lacked the influence and ability to frame andadministerdialogue,andhavebeenunabletoeffectivelymediatebetweensocialactors in the religious sphere and oversight authorities and institutions in thestate. This has been evident in the inability to shield the youth from the

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magnetization of extremist and terrorist groups, and other polarizations inissues such as the Al-Zitouna University religious education and the disputesover freedomof expression, creativity, and respect for sacredness. Such issueswere administered with the mentality of wrestling and conflicting resolves,whichattimesledtosecurityintervention.

Another weakness has been the lack of influence of Al-Zitouna University onsociety,intellectually,culturally,andeducationally,anditsinabilitytoassumeitsrole in intellectual, doctrinal, and cultural framing and arbitration, mainlybecauseofthemarginalizationandconstrictionitfacedbeforetherevolution.

ResultsoftheDiagnosis

All of this has led to the emergence of new religious identities in anunprecedentedmanner,suchthatreligiouspeoplecanresortonlytotheirownconscience and awareness, and to the new intellectual and cultural mediums,particularlythevirtualones(theinternet).Thishasledto:- A break with the “nationalization” of religion, meaning that now every

Tunisian has the freedom to belong to any ideological, sectarian, orjurisprudentialschoolofthoughtheorshechooses,orispolarizedtowards.ThishasruncontrarytotheTunisianculturalcontext,whichledto:

- Theinfiltrationofthelocalreligiousspherebyoutsidedoctrinal,ideological,andintellectualinfluences,andnewreligiousdiscoursesthatlackedTunisianauthenticity and intellectual frame of reference. This was coupled withquestioning and casting doubts on the very credibility of the Tunisianreligiousframeofreferenceandreligiousinstitutions.Furthermore,formsofreligiousadherenceemergedthatmanagedtoevadecivicoversightandlegalcontrols,onesthatderivetheirlegitimacydirectlyfromwhattheyconsidertobe divine authority, some of which leaned towards extremism, violence,threatening public security, insurgency against the law, and latertransformedintoorganizedterrorism.

Asaresult,newreligiousandculturaljostlingerupted,ofteninachaoticmanner,throughwhichdifferentcategoriesofsocietyexpressedtheirvariousapproachestowardstheconcernsofreligionanditsissues.

IssuesofReligiousAffairs

What are the functions of the civil democratic state – the religion of which isIslam and the language of which is Arabic – in administering the subject ofreligion, a subject that is characterized by diversity, and often collision anddisarray,andsometimesreachingtheextentofchaos?Howdowedefinetheconceptandsetthelimitsoftheaxiomof“autonomyofthereligious sphere,” in light of theConstitution’s stipulation that “the state is theguardianofreligion”?Isthestateanoriginalpowerthatderivesitsauthority,regulatorycharacter,andlegitimacyofitsadministrationofreligiousaffairsfromitself?

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Or is its role procedural and functional in the context of a civil contract tooverseethisreligioussphere?Towhat extent does the society have amargin of autonomy in administeringreligious affairs, especially after the Tunisian experience in which we havewitnessedtheoutcomesoftheindependenceofreligiousaffairsfromthestate?

Is the revolution an opportunity to decisively and finally restore the strategicbalancebetweensocietyand the state, andputanend to the state’smonopolyoverreligiousaffairsandreorganizetherelationshipbetweenthetwo?

StateGuardianshipofReligiousAffairsSocietyhasabasicneedforasymbolicmoralandguidingauthority,asoneofthemainreasonsforthedisturbanceofbalancebetweenthestateandsocietyisthecollapse of the moral authority of the state; that is, its ethical and moralcredibility.Thiscollapsehappensasaresultoftyrannyandcorruption,andtheforced, condescending, coercive modernization projects that encompass allareas, including religious affairs. This calls for rebuilding the relationshipbetweenthestateandthereligioussphereonthebasisoftheconstitution,whichhaschosentheterm“guardianship”toregulatethisrelationship,andtheneedtodefinetheparametersoftheconceptof“guardianship.”

Here, we need to distinguish between the different forms of relationshipsbetweenthestateandthereligioussphere:

TheInterventionistMonopolizingState:

Isastatethatmonopolizestheadministrationofreligiousaffairs,bycontrollingthe spaces of worship, rituals, regulating religious education, and unilaterallymaking decisions related to these affairs. This state is one that combinestemporalpowerandspiritualpower.

TheResigned(Acquiescent)PassiveState

Isastatethatdoesnotinterfereintheinternalreligiousaffairs,butdoesexercisethe role of public authorities in terms of monitoring, oversight, andaccountabilitywhen transgressions criminalizedunder the lawoccur. But, thisstate does not have a regulatory character in all that is related to the internalaffairs of the religious sphere, and in return, the religious sphere does notinterfereinpublicaffairs,exceptinindirectwayssuchaseducationalguidance.Thisstateseparatesbetweenthetemporalpowerandthespiritualpower.

TheStateGuardianshipoverReligiousAffairs

Isastatethatcombinestheregulatoryandtheneutralcharactersinitsrelationwithreligiousaffairs.Itsregulationsarenon-monopolizing,anditsneutralityisnot resigned. The state has responsible guardianship, motivated by nationalinterest, preservingmoderate-centrist values of religion, and protecting publicrightsandinterests.

Here, the state has a regulatory and arbitration function in religious affairs inregards toadministeringdialogueandconsultationwith theoristsandscholarsof the religious sphere in the framework of a set of standards, laws, andregulations,someofwhichareregulatedbya legislative institution,andothers

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by specialized scholars of “rituals andworship,”while others through amoralcontractwith civil society. Suchan administration isnotwholly left to society,butisalsonotmonopolizedbythestate.

ReligiousFunctions

The state is the only entity entitled to appoint and remove occupants ofpositions, but within standards agreed upon through consultation. The stateappoints thosewhomeet the legalandreligiousconditions,and thosewhothepublic accepts, with the need to distinguish between the functions ofadministrativepositionsandreligiouspositions.Theroleofthe“guardianstate”istoadministerthesocietaldialogueinregardsto religious affairs, and to follow the path of collective conscience, withoutinterferinginthefreedomofconscienceandbelief,asthismatterisnotopenfor“nationalization” or state regulation, because it is related to the conscience ofbelievers.This form of administration requires – out of necessity, rather than credit orimprovements – the broadening of the circle of relationship and mutualconsultationbetweenthestateandcivilsocietyworkinginthefieldofreligiousaffairs (including notables, experts, and opinion leaders), not for the sake of“openness”andsuperficialenlightenment,butratherforthesakeofpartnershipin the administration of these affairs, and building agreements and covenantsthatorganizetheseaffairsandserveasareferencewhendisputesandconflictsoccur.Religiousaffairsareaspecialcase,particularlybecauseoftheoverlappingofthecivil and spiritual dimensions, which requires from the state an open-mindedregulatory function,whichwould protect the right of stakeholders of religiousaffairs to express their opinions, suggest and participate in decision-making,especially inmajorchallenges that face thestateandsocietysuchas reformofreligiouseducation,restructuringreligiousissues,organizingandadministeringhuman resources and institutions, reforming religious discourse, and theprevention of fanaticism, extremism, violence, and terrorism in the name ofreligiousinterpretations.

Thisrequirestherebuildingandrestructuringofbothofficialandcivilreligiousinstitutions.

OfficialInstitutionsRebuilding and restructuring official religious institutions in terms of theirfunctionasmoralsupervisoryandadministrativeauthoritiescapableofpushingtowardsdevelopingcommonreligiousvaluesthatreflectpublicconscience.Theyshouldbeabletotakemutualandsharedpositionstowardscontroversialissuesandincrisismanagement,andabletoassumetheroleofneutralintermediaryincommunicatingwithpublicopinion.Suchofficial institutionsought tohave thecredibility to encourage commitment and adherence to human and ethicalprinciples,andtheabilitytoplayakeyroleintheorganizationofsociallifeandconflictresolutionwithinsocietyandthereligioussphere,inadditiontobuilding

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frameworks of cooperation and solidarity in everyday life matters betweenindividualsandgroups.These institutions shouldbequalified tobepartof thesolution,ratherthanapartoftheconflict.

Civil(Non-Governmental)Institutions

There is the need to build independent and stable civil institutions that areesteemed and respected, and distant from political rivalries and sectarian orgroup conflicts, institutions thatwould contribute to defining and propagatingthecorpusofthereformmovementinTunisia,whichisregardedasacommonasset in termsof intellectual competence,methodology, andvalues, expressingthe collective conscience and public consciousness and contributing to theirdevelopment and actualization. These institutions need to be qualified tomediatebetween the state and society andbetween the actors in the religioussphere,and tobe indirectpositive interactionwith thestateand thespiritual,intellectual, andcultural socialmovements inamanner that contributes to thecrystallization of a centrist-moderate project that stems from the depth ofsociety.

Reforms

This reality necessitates the actualization of a set of fundamental reforms thatwouldbringaboutastrategicvision.Thesereformsincluderestructuringofficialandsemi-officialinstitutionsthatanswertotheMinistryofReligiousAffairsandcooperate with it (such as the Higher Islamic Council, the Higher Council forCulture,andtheHigherCouncil forEducation),asesteemedreferentialentitiesthathaveadequateauthorityandfinancialandhumanresources,whileensuringthe representation of effective experts and professionals who are known fortheir integrity, effectiveness, dynamism, and qualifications to assume thesepositions.These institutions are capable of correcting the imbalances between the stateandsocietyonthelevelofguidance,formulatingvisions,anddevelopingsharedvaluesinorderthattheybeaproductofsocialdynamismandworktosafeguarditsstability,sustainability,andconformity.

Otherneededreformsinclude:- EmbarkingonacomprehensivereformoftheAl-ZitounaUniversitytoenable

it toplay its role as aworld-class educational and scholarlybeacon, and tocontributeinthedevelopmentofreligiousdiscourseandcontent.Thisreformwouldemanatefromthescholarlyframeworksofthisuniversity.

- Supportingreligiouseducation,underthesupervisionofAl-ZitounaMosque,as supplementary education geared towards nurturing and educating thepublic in the principles of religion, without the outcome of this educationamountingtoacademicdegrees.

- DevelopingalegislativeframeworkthatwouldregulatetheAwqaf(religiousendowments) and restore its civic role in a manner that strengthens civil

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institutions to improve religious affairs, andgrants these institutions socialimmunityandfinancialindependence.

- Controlling and monitoring the sources of financing and funding of socialwork in institutions and centers in order to protect society from foreigninterventionthroughfundingthat isoftenconditionalupon implementationofforeignagendas.

- Deepreformofreligiousandeducationalcontentsinschoolcurriculum.All of these above issues andobjective goals could contribute to launching thepathofcomprehensivereformunderthetitleofliberationandenlightenment.

TowardsaNationalStrategytoCounterTerrorism

Theaboveintroductionswereoverturestoaddressingtheproblemofterrorismin lightofanewconceptionof therelationshipbetweenthestateandreligiousaffairs, a conception that would free it from the sediments of a strainedrelationshipbeforetherevolution,andthestatusofweaknessandfragilityaftertherevolution.

Terrorism is an old yet regenerating global scourge that has been practicedunder the banner ofmany religions, nationalities, ideologies, and spheres. Thehistory of various nations and civilizations is laden with various patterns ofterrorism, including tyrannical dictatorships, the terrorism of brutal colonialpowers, foreign and domestic “economic terrorism” practiced today under thebannerof globalization, the systemsofdominationover economic sovereignty,international trade, flow of foreign direct investment, the activity of globalcapital,andthemovementofpeopleandgoodsetc..

There is also the terrorism perpetrated by networks of corruption, organizedcrime, money laundering, arms and drug trade. Then, there is the Takfiri(excommunication from religion) terrorism, which often intertwines with theaboveformsofterrorisminitsemergence,development,andmanifestation,andisclassifiedintherankofaggression,oppression,andcorruptiononearth,andisfounded upon a figment as one of the varieties of violent extremist religiositythatadoptsaclosed-mindedunderstandingofreligionandexcommunicationofthosewhodiffer,andadoptsarmedviolenceasameanstoanend.

This subversivedestructive thoughtand thispatternof terrorism,grewamongsome Tunisians outside the country during the 1990s. Inside the country, itsemergence was associated with the marginalization and exclusion of themoderateIslamistmovementwhichendedupinprisonorinexile,andwiththedetrimentaloutcomesofastrategyto“dryup”thesourcesandmanifestationsofreligiosity.This thoughtandpatternof terrorismbrokeoutwith theattacksofSeptember 11, 2001 and the occupation of Iraq, and the country witnessedseveralterrorattackspriortotherevolution,mostnotablythe“SuleimanGroup”plot.After the revolution,militant groups gradually rebuilt themselves, exploiting aclimateofinattention,lawlessness,andweaknessofsecurityforces,coupledwithregionalunrest.Thegroupsformedvariouswings,attractedandrecruitedyoung

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people, and stockpiledweapons. InMay2011, the first post-revolution clasheswithterrorgroupsoccurredinthenortherntownofRouhia.Terroroperationsandthreatscontinuedprogressivelyafterthat,withtheaimofweakeningthestateaccordingtotheprincipleof“warsofvexationandattrition,”and as a prelude to undermining the state and bringing about the “savagery”requiredtoestablishtheso-called“Islamicstate,”asdetailedintheliteratureofJihaditerrorideology.Terrorismtoday is themostcrucialnationalandcivilizational challenge,and ithascostthecountryheavylosses,hashadanegativeeffectonitsconditions,andhas constituted a serious threat to democratic transition and social peace.Terrorismhasalsohadsevereeffectsonthenationaleconomy,andonthesenseof security and confidence in the future. Despite the successes achieved incombatting it on the state and social levels, and the foiling ofmany plots, anddespite the efforts of successive post-revolution governments in tackling thephenomenon, its danger still exists and is prone to grow. The methods ofterrorismwitnessedaquantumleap,suchastheincreasedsophisticationintheBen Guerdane operation, where the “Islamic State” organization attempted toseize the city and establish an Islamic Emirate in the country, in line with itsstrategicobjectivetoestablishandmaintainastrongholdthatwouldserveasajunctionforhumanresourcesandalaunchingpointforexpansion.Luckily,itdidnotsucceedinthis.

The problem of terrorism is extremely complex and overlapping, and is – asserious research has shown – dependent on a diverse and tangled web ofsubjective andobjective factors, andanumberof variables that vary fromoneperson to another. The terrorist personality is one that is abnormal andaggressive, molded collaboratively by unpredictable atmospheres andmotivatinghubs,coupledwithpersonalpredispositionsandthepersuasivelureofextremistandfanaticgroupsandorganizationsofcorruptionandcrime.Hence,confrontingthisscourgenecessitatesacomprehensivestrategy,onethatcombines prevention and treatment, in the short and long run, applies thevertical and the horizontal approaches, combines addressing the roots andcauses of terrorism on the one hand and confronting its manifestations andeffects on the other hand. This strategy would divide the roles andresponsibilitiesamongallnationalcomponents,withoutexception.

TheNationalCounter-TerrorismStrategy1.Themainstakeistoweakenterrorismasapreludetoeradicatingit.

2.Objectives- Enhance the state’s capabilities in combatting terrorism and

improvingitsperformance- Protectingnewgenerationsfromfallingintothetrapofterrorism

- Convincingterrorelementstorevisetheirconvictionsandquittheirpractices.

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3.StartingPoints:

- This proposed strategy is based on the effort to understand thephenomenonofterrorismandtodismantleit.Itisdependentontheutilization of all national energies, and the experiences of variousnationsandpeoplesincombattingit.Itstemsfromtheconfidenceinthe ability of Tunisians to defeat terrorism and from the realisticoptimismforabetterfuture.

- The democratic state that is rooted in the country’s civilizationalidentity is the one capable of dealing with this phenomenon.Restrictingand tightening thegripon freedomsandreligiosity,andprovokingreligioussentiments,doesnotdealwith theproblembutinsteadexacerbatesitandattractssupportersandsympathizerstoit.

- Itisnecessarytodistinguishbetweenthosewhoespousenon-violentSalafist ideology, and Salafists who are supporters of violence andterrorism.Pigeonholingallsuchelementsintoonecategoryisunjust,andonlyservestoexpandthecircleofenemiesandthedisgruntled,andfuelstheflamesofterrorism.

- Takfiri (excommunicative) terrorism cloaks itself with a religiousgarb, anduses the Islamic frameof reference in a skewedmanner;therefore,winningthebattleagainstitcannotbeachievedwithoutastrongandcentralinvolvementofthereligioussphereinthefight.

- The strategy of terrorism is based on targeting the transitionaldemocraticpath, strikingat the internalhome front,weakening thestate,andpushingtowardschaosand“savagery.”Therefore,itmustbe confronted with a counter-strategy that works to fortify thepolitical path, strengthen national unity, reinforce the state, andempowerstability,solidarity,andcamaraderie.

4.TheLegislativeFrameworksandHumanRightsGuidelinesCountering terrorism on the national level is actualized through legislativeframeworks and is subject to legal texts and guidelines. Adherence to theseparameters ensures an effective response to terrorism and safeguards thestrengthofthestate.

A.TheConstitutionAccording to the secondparagraphofArticleVIof theConstitution: “The stateundertakes to disseminate the values of moderation and tolerance and theprotection of the sacred, and the prohibition of all violations thereof. Itundertakes equally to prohibit and fight against calls for Takfir and theincitementofviolenceandhatred.”Thismeansthatitisthestate’sresponsibilitytoconfront,withitslegalandjudicialpowers,allmanifestationsofincitementofviolenceaswellasactsofviolence.Thestateistaskedwithcounteringallformsof intellectualandphysical terrorismwithoutviolatingtheguaranteesofrightsandfreedomsstipulatedintherestoftheclausesoftheConstitution.

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B.TheAnti-TerrorismAct

The Anti-Terrorism Law is the second framework that determines the state’smethodsofcounteringterrorism.Thelawisalegaltranslationofthestipulationsof the Constitution. The parliamentary ratification of this law represented aresponse to numerous calls for the need to provide a legal framework tocounteringterrorism.Despitetheimportanceandsignificanceofthislegislativetext, it is worth noting here that the ratification of the law did not enjoyconsensus.Thehopesoferadicatingterrorismthatwerebuiltuponthislawwereexaggerated. Prior to issuing the law, itwas envisaged as amagical and rapidsolution.Thefactofthematteris,terrorattacksfollowingtheratificationofthelawmultipliedatahigherpaceandstrongerimpact.

C.Counter-TerrorismandHumanRights:TheRelationshipThere is usually tension between counter-terrorism and human rights. Theperformance of security force in terms of monitoring, surveillance, pre-emptiveness,intervention,investigation,andotherproceduresisgovernedbyasetoffactorsandconstraints.Someofthesefactorsareduetothenatureofthephenomenon itself, andothers are related to the security establishmentwhichstillhasnot completelygotten ridof the securitymentalityandsomeviolatingpractices. It is not beneficial to pit the need to combat terrorism against theprotection of human rights. On the contrary, the effectiveness of combattingterrorism is strongly connected to the respect of human rights. As for theargumentoftenusedincounter-revolutionarydiscourse–whicharguesthatanautocratic system is better than uncontrolled freedom, and that the dictatorialregime at least achieved security and stability – it is a completely flawedargument.Whenaregimecontrolssocietywithanironcladgrip,andenclosesitasifitisapressurecooker,thenupontheremovaloftheregime,societyisonlybound to explode as a result of the repression and injustice that haveaccumulatedovertheyears.

5.SolutionsNeededontheNationalLevel

A.PreventiveTreatment:Manyparties,bothfromthestateanditsministries,andsocietyanditsvariousinstitutions,needtointerveneandplayaroleinpreventivesolutions.Thistypeof solution is a deep structural one that addresses the causes, factors, andclimates that produce and nurture terrorism in an effort to break the linkbetweenterrorismanditspossibleharbors,andtocutthesupplyofrecruitsandprotecttheyouthfromdriftingtowardsitscircles.

Terrorgroupshaveextensivecapabilitiesofattractingpeople,andoffervariousservices.Theyprovideanalternativecommunalandeconomiclife,asafehaven,a sense of presence, relevance, anddistinction, and a sense of belonging to anambitious project and an alluring new narrative whose discourse isdistinguished by an ability to overwhelmwith its illusions, ideals, techniques,andeffects.

Hence,whatisthebestcourseofactioninlightofthesechallenges?

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What is needed in this preventive course of treatment is to actualize a social,economic, political, and cultural environment that produces moderation andcentrismratherthanextremismandterrorism.

! Politically:

The phenomena of extremism and terrorism feed off the state of coerciveauthoritarianism that has afflicted the Arab world, and the atrocities ofoccupationandunjustinternationalpolicies.Indeed,thepost-revolutionarystateof turmoil and uncontrolled freedoms, which were accompanied by internalschisms, political divisions, ideological polarization, and demonization of the“other,” have provided a fertile environment for extremism and the spread ofviolence. After the revolution, Tunisia witnessed intense social and politicalprotests, and a tremendous amount of strikes, sit-ins, and violent targeting ofstate and security institutions, a matter that worked in favor of terrorism inpushing towards chaos, instability, and armament, and hampered thework ofvariousauthoritiesandexhaustedandscatteredtheeffortsofsecurityservicesin the early prevention and protection from these phenomena. The post-revolutionaryconditionsalsoreflectedthecollectivesocialandofficialmentalitythatreachedapointofapathytowardsprospectsandoutlooksandtowardsswiftattentiontotheimminentdanger.Therefore, combatting this scourge requires the preservation of a sounddemocraticenvironmentandthepolicyofaccord,andbroadeningthemarginsofpolitical participation for all. The most prominent hallmark for this level ofstabilityisstrengtheningnationalunity,consideringthatTunisiacannotsucceedinthefightagainstterrorismifthenationalranksareinashambles.Addressingandcombattingthephenomenonofterrorismcanbedonemosteffectivelywhenthepoliticalsceneismostunited,steadfast,andvigilant.

! EconomicallyandSocially

The deteriorating economic situation that is unable tomeet the aspirations ofyoungpeople,andthemarginalizedsocialclimatethatisfuriouswiththestate,areamongthefactorsthatfomentterrorism.Insuchaclimate,uncontrolledandragingreligiositybecomesashelterforcrushedsocialsegmentsthathavebeenunabletoexpressthemselvesinalternateways.Terrorismisalsofueledbythedisintegration of social and family ties, the lack of social stability, andmanifestations of homelessness, delinquency, and criminality. Indeed, a largeproportion of those involved in terrorism were, at some stage of their lives,delinquents,drugaddicts,orimprisonedfelons. Studieshaveshownthatthefightagainstpovertyandmarginalization, throughimprovingeconomicandsocialconditionsandthereductionofunemployment,helpreducetheconditionsthatharborextremism,consideringthatdevelopmentdestroysthecausesofresentmentandfrustrationthatusuallyfeedthedesireforrevengeand the tendency todrift towardsextremesolutions.Otheralleviatingfactors includecontrollingpricehikestopreservethepurchasingpowerof lowandmiddle-incomesegmentsofsociety,improvingthemechanismsofsocialandhealth care for vulnerable groups, taking preliminary steps to break down the

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ties between smuggling and terrorism by finding deep-seated solutions to theproblem of smuggling, and strong engagement in the fight against crime,corruption,andmoneylaunderingthroughoversightanddeterrentmeasures.

It is also important to engage the family structure through awareness andtrainingonsoundnurturinganddealingwithchildrenwhoshowearlysignsofgravitatingtowardsextremismandviolence.

! CulturallyandEducationally

Terrorismthrivesinaclimateofculturalmarginalization,weaknessofsocialandeducational institutions, declining influence of role model figures such asparents, teachers,officials, intellectuals,andreligiouspreachersinpreservingaspiritual and emotional balance in new generations, and in a climate of anti-religious extremism that is disrespectful of the sacred. In Tunisia, terrorismbenefited from the policies of eradicating sources of religiosity, and their by-products, which resulted in the absence of a Tunisian religious frame ofreference that enjoys legitimacy and trust. This created a hybrid climate ofintellectual aridity and ignorance of religion, especially among the youth, andweakenedtheTunisianreligiousfieldinthefaceofimportedformsofreligiosity,renderingitunabletoanswertheneedsofupcominggenerations.MostofthosewhobelongtothephenomenaofextremismandterrorisminTunisiawerenotnurturedonthe“normal”moderatereligiosity,butratherdiscovereditexcitedlythroughtheJihadiSalafistdiscourseimportedfromtheoutside.Itisthereforemosturgenttorehabilitatethecentrist-moderatereligiousfield,inall its components, to enable it to better encompass the youth and counteractextremism. There is also a dire need to establishing an enduring cultural,intellectual, and religious preaching movement to undertake intellectual andideologicalconfrontationof terrorism, toexpose itsdeviationusingreasonandreligion, and to empower the role of the educational system in rejectingextremismandviolenceandingrainingthecultureofmoderationandnurturingpublicethicsandpatriotism,andtoadoptanintensivemediacounter-campaignthatutilizesdigitalmediatoconfrontterrorism,whichhasprovensavvyinusingsocialnetworkingtocommunicateanddisseminateitsdestructivemessagesandtoembodyandmagnifyitscommunicationplans.In order for these preventive treatments and solutions to bemethodical, builtupon real data and accurate diagnosis, a national research center ought to beestablishedtostudythephenomenonofterrorism,itstrendsandstrategies,andto encourage scientific and scholarly research and regularly conduct seminarsandstudiesinthefield.

B.CorrectionalandRehabilitativeTreatment:

ThistreatmentisthetaskoftheMinistriesofJustice,ReligiousAffairs,andSocialAffairs, inaddition tocivil societyandexperts in the field. It isgeared towardsthosewhoespouseviolentapproaches,bothinprisonsandinsociety,toengagethem in dialogue, work to reform and rehabilitate them within a nationalprogramthatalso includespsychologists, socialworkers,andreligious leaders,

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throughclassesandseminarstoattempttoremovethesuspicionsandillusionsfromtheirminds,andtocorrectthedisorderedfeelingstheyhave.Indeed,manyof thosewho fell into the trapof terrorismweredrawn to itoutof frustrationand a sense of humiliation, poor self-esteem, spiritual void, and inability tointegrate andprove their existence, in addition to the fact that themajority ofthemtendtobeofayoungage,fueledbyenthusiasm,impulse,rejection,andlackofabilitytoevaluatetheconsequences.Thestateshouldmonitorandencouragethepositive transformationsthatmayoccurwithin these extremist groups,whichmay bemanifested in revisions orreflections, and should allow them the opportunity to grow in the direction ofweakeningthephenomenonofextremism.

C.FieldTreatment(SecurityandMilitary):

Thistreatmentisthejurisdictionofthemilitaryandsecurityforces,whichneedto develop and enhance their efforts. This is done through an objectivemethodological assessment of the security situation in the country and anevaluation of the volume of successes, failures, and threats. This treatment isbased on measures of prevention, protection, surveillance, and confrontationthatistheexpertiseofthoseinthefield.

Enhancing the “field” treatment is dependent on the improvement ofperformance in these four measures, which is the role and arena of stateapparatusesandexpertsinsecurityandmilitaryaffairs.Politicalpartiesarealsoencouraged to present general observations such as calling for developingtraininginthefieldofnon-traditionalwarfareagainstterrorism,revampingandupdating equipment and machinery, organizing joint field work andstrengthening cooperation and coordination between various agencies,restructuring and updating the state’s information system, reforming thepenitentiarysysteminaccordancewiththelaw,strengtheningcooperationwithfriendly countries, and better organizing the work of security trade unions toprotectitfromdeviatingfromthelegaltracks.

6.TheRegionalDimension

A.TheLibyanCase:Libya represents a strategic depth and importance for Tunisia, as the twocountries share strong economic ties, and because the number of TunisiansworkinginLibyaisestimatedtobeinthetensofthousands,andwherealargenumberofLibyanscurrentlyresideinTunisia.Simplyput,whatishappeninginLibyaspillsoverdirectly into thedomestic conditions inTunisia.Conditions inneighboringLibyaarewitnessingmajortensionsandinstabilitiesthatarebeingexploited by armed terrorist organizations that use Libya as a ground fortraining,planning,andlaunchingoperations,suchaswhatoccurredinthebattleofBenGuerdane,whenmilitant“IslamicState”elementstriedtoseizethecoastalTunisiancityneartheborderswithLibya.WiththestalematedpoliticalprocessinLibya,thenegativeeffectswillnotstopattheLibyanborders,butareboundtospilloverintoneighboringcountries,particularlyTunisia.Therefore,it isinthe

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interest of Tunisia to give the Libyan file ample importance in amanner thatwouldcontributetoreachingaconsensualpoliticalsolutionbetweenthewarringparties inLibya.As longasthepoliticalsolutionishinderedanddelayed,thereremainsconstantpressureonthedemocraticexperienceinTunisia.

B.CoordinationwithAlgeria:

Algeriasufferedapainfulexperienceinwhatisknownasthe“BloodyDecade”inthe 1990s. The country also has considerable experience in dealing with thephenomenonofterrorism,asithasbeenladenwiththepainsandconsequencesofterrorismuntilnow.Moreover,thecountryisstillconcernedwiththeproblemof terrorism as it continues to face it today. Several terrorist elements havepositioned themselveson theAlgerian-Tunisianborders, andAlgeria is locatedon the African coast, which includes North African countries where armssmuggling,drug trafficking,and illegal immigrationareactive.All these factorsrender Algeria a country in the heart of the confrontation with terrorism.Cooperation and coordination with Algeria is of the utmost importance. Inadditiontothesecurity-militarytreatment,Algeriahasalsoadoptedanapproachof dialogue, and called on armed groups to disarm in return for theirreintegrationintosocietyinpartoftheNationalReconciliationProgram.

7.InternationalAxes:

Terrorism isaglobalcross-borderphenomenon,andconfronting it takesplacewithintheframeworkofnumerousinternationalagreementsandlegislations.InTunisia, the confrontation of terrorism is also bound by the TunisianConstitutionandtheAnti-TerrorismAct.International cooperation constitutes a strong front in addressing andcombattingterrorism,however,itisalsogovernedbybalancesanddifferencesinpurposesandgoals.Itisimportanttonotethat,intheinternationalcontext,eachparty whether regional or international is governed by its own agendas andinterests,whichstemfromitsowncalculationsandcircumstances.Thistangledsituation,whichintersectsattimesandcontrastsatothers,adverselyaffectstheinternational coalition and weakens it, and in turn facilitates and strengthensterrorism.Whenpurposesandobjectivesvary,crucialgapsoccur. It is throughthesegapsthatthethreatofterrorismcontinuestostrike.

ThroughthispaperIhopethatthevisionpresentedhereisacontributiontothebuilding blocks of a national and civilizational counter-terrorism project, theeffectivenessofwhichwillonlymaterializethroughconcertedeffortsandvisionsand the cohesionof all forcesand contributions.MayGodprotectour country,ourpeople,ourArabnation,andallofhumanityfromthescourgeofterrorism.

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Appendixes(Tunisia)

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Governorate IlliteracyRate

UnemploymentRateamongGraduate

DegreeHolders

UnemploymentRate

PovertyRate

NationalRate 18.9% 30% 16.5% 15.2%

Beja 30.4% 46.3% 19.5% 25.7%

Jendouba 32.8% 47.1% 19.1% 25.7%

Kef 25.6% 36.4% 10.8% 25.7%

Siliana 28% 38.8% 20.5% 25.7%

Kasserine 29.9% 38,8% 46.9% 32.3%

SidiBouzid 29.8 57.1% 24.4% 32.3%

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Figures retrieved from a report by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (January 2015)

The proportion of the Religious Affairs Ministry's budget compared to other

sectors

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PursuingaMoreComprehensiveStrategytoCounter-Terrorism:TheChallengesofMovingfromTalktoWalk.

TheExperienceoftheUnitedStatesEricRosand

Co-Author:SumayaAlmajdoubTheThreat

SinceSeptember2001, the terrorist threat in theUnitedStatesandaroundtheworld has evolved, and is bothmore globalized andmore localized than everbefore, with an array of terrorist threats having gained traction in areas ofinstability, limited opportunity, and broken governance. Today, the principalthreat to the United States no longer comes from a centralized al-Qaedaleadership operating out of Afghanistan, but from decentralized al-Qaedaaffiliates and extremists, many with agendas focused on the countries andregionswheretheyoperate,includingtheSahel,ArabianPeninsula,andHornofAfrica.Italsocomesfromthe“IslamicState”organization(IS,alsoknownasISIS,ISIL,orDa’esh),whichcontinuestoholdterritoryinIraqandSyria,andisnowestimated to have operational branches in 18 countries,236and propagates itsnarrative using social media and other 21st century technology. Tens ofthousands of fighters have traveled frommore than100 countries to Iraq andSyria to join the “IslamicState”,andnearlyone thirdof themhavereturned totheir home countries, somedisillusioned and others trained and committed tocarrying out violent attacks upon their return.237With the “democratization ofterror,”238whereattackscanbecommittedwithouttrainingby,resourcesfrom,orconnectionstoterroristgroupsandagrowingnumberofattacksperpetratedbyindividualswhowerenotontheradarofintelligenceservices,butmayhavehad criminal backgrounds or mental health issues, the threat today issignificantlymorecomplexthanitwasonSeptember12th,2001.

Speaking intheaftermathof theDecember2015SanBernardinoattacks intheUS that killed14people, Jeh Johnson, theUS Secretary forHomelandSecurity,saidthat“wehavemovedtoanentirelynewphaseintheglobalterroristthreat.”Terrorists have “in effect outsourced attempts to attack our homeland.We’veseenthisnotjustherebutinotherplaces.Thisrequiresawholenewapproach,inmy view.”239Whereas al-Qaeda would spend years planning, today, in largepart because of the internet and socialmedia, the time it takes tomove from

236WilliamArkin, RobertWindrem and CynthiaMcFadden, “NewCounterterrorism 'HeatMap'ShowsISISBranchesSpreadingWorldwide,”ABCNews,3August2016:http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/new-counterterrorism-heat-map-shows-isis-branches-spreading-worldwide-n621866237“ForeignFighters:AnUpdatedAssessmentoftheFlowofForeignFightersintoSyriaandIraq,”TheSoufanGroup,2December2015:http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf238DanielBenjamin,“TheNiceAttackandtheDemocratizationofTerror,”TIME,15July2016:http://time.com/4408909/nice-attack-democratization-terror/239“USrethinkingstrategyonfightinghomegrownattacks-NYT,”Reuters,5December2015.http://www.reuters.com/article/california-shooting-policy-idUSKBN0TP01M20151206

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“flash” to“bang” ismuchshorter.When interviewedonthe14thanniversaryofthe 9/11 attacks, the Director of the US National Counter-Terrorism Centersummed up the current threat very simply: the United States “face[s] morethreats,comingat[it]frommoreplaces,involvingmoreindividualsthan[ithas]at any time since 9/11. It’s also worth remembering that the scale of thecapabilitiesoftheseextremistactorsdoesnotrisetothelevelthatcoreal-Qaedahadatitsdisposalatthetimeof9/11.”240

EvolutionofResponsesince9/11:ExpandingCVEinCT

In the initial period after 9/11, the United States focusedmost of its counter-terrorism (CT) attention on hardening its own defenses at home – spendingupwardsof$650billiononhomelandsecurityduringthistime,accordingtooneestimate241–inadditiontodeployingitsmilitary,andexpandingitsintelligenceand law enforcement efforts that targeted operational planning, terroristfundraising, travel, facilitation, and recruitment ofal-Qaeda core. Those effortsproved to be successful in disrupting plots, removing terrorist leadership, andkeepingtheAmericanhomelandsafefromattacksplottedoverseas.

LargelybecausetheUnitedStates identifiedandaddressedtheintelligenceandother security shortcomings that contributed to 9/11,242the national securitymachine has proven increasingly adept at identifying and disrupting terroristnetworks. As a result, there have been no successful large-scale attacks.Overseas,muchof theUS strategywasbasedonan intelligence campaign thatinvolves partneringwith countries around theworld to gather information onsuspectedtopterrorists.IncaseswheretheUSGovernmentorpartnerscannotarrest terrorists – and Washington has devoted increasing attention andresources to building the capacity of its partners to investigate, prosecute andincarceratethemwithinaruleoflawframework–itkillsthemindronestrikesorthroughotherdirectactions.Yet,whilethemilitaryandbroadersecuritydimensionsofCThavecontinuedtograb most of the headlines – and attract the overwhelming majority of theresources–theUSstrategyforaddressingthethreathasinfactevolvedoverthepastdecadeinavarietyofways.Forexample,ithasmovedbeyonda“GlobalWaronTerror”toacampaignfocusedonspecificterroristgroupsthreateningtheUSanditsallies.Ithasshiftedawayfromtheuseofwaterboardingandothertacticsthatarguablydidmoretodriveradicalizationandalienatepartnersthanreducethethreat,toonethatunderscoredthatthemosteffectiveCTstrategyandtacticsare ones that respect human rights. It has expanded from a military andintelligence-dominated approach to one that emphasizes the importance of a“wholeofgovernment”response,withincreasingemphasisplacedontheroleof

240PaulCruickshank,“AViewfromtheCTFoxhole:AnInterviewwithNickRasmussen,Director,NCTC,” Combating Terrorism Center, 11 September 2015. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-an-interview-with-nick-rasmussen-director-nctc241DanielBenjamin,“IsAmericaNext?”PoliticoMagazine,22March2016.http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/brussels-terrorist-attack-united-states-next-213758242StevenBrill,“IsAmericaanySafer?”TheAtlantic,September2016.http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/

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civilianinstitutions,beginningwiththecriminaljusticesector.Itnowrecognizesthatgovernmentsalonelackthesolutions;andpartneringwithandempoweringlocal communities as part of a “whole of society” response to the threat isrequiredinordertopreventviolentextremismfromtakingrootincommunities.Itnowplacesincreasedemphasisonbuildingthecapacityofthemostvulnerablestates and communities to defeat terrorists locally, and strengthening theinternationalCTarchitecturetoallowformoreeffectiveinter-statecooperationandburden-sharing.

Theseshiftscanbeseeninfourcorestrategicdocuments:1)the2011NationalStrategy for Counter-Terrorism243(national CT strategy); 2) the 2011NationalStrategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in theUnited States 244 (national CVE strategy); 3) the 2015 National SecurityStrategy245; and 4) the 2016Department of State andUSAID Joint Strategy onCounteringViolentExtremism.246

AlthoughmuchhasbeenwrittenabouttheevolutionoftheUS’sCTstrategyandpolicies over the past decade,247this paper focuses on the increased attentionthathasbeengiventoCounteringViolentExtremism(CVE)–bothathomeandabroad–overthepastcoupleofyears.AsmorepoliticalandmilitaryleadersinWashington and in other capitals have come to understand thatwhile focusedmilitary campaigns against terrorist groups remain essential, more attentionneedstobegiventoidentifyingandaddressing–oftenthroughcommunity-ledinitiatives– theoftenvery localizedgrievances that terroristsexploit toattractnew recruits ifwe hope to get ahead of the threat and prevent future threatsfromemerging.Whilethisisincreasinglyrecognizedasthekeytogettingaheadof the threat, it has proven much easier to say than do.248This paper willhighlightsomeofthechallengestooperationalizingalocally-ledefforttocounterandpreventviolentextremism(CVE)bothintheUnitedStatesandabroad.

243“NationalStrategyforCounterterrorism,”TheWhiteHouse,June2011.https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf244“EmpoweringLocalPartners toPreventViolentExtremism in theUnitedStates,”TheWhiteHouse,August2011.https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf245“NationalSecurityStrategy,”TheWhiteHouse,February2015.https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf246USDepartmentofStateandUSAID,“DepartmentofState&USAIDJointStrategyonCounteringViolentExtremism,”May2016.https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257913.pdf247For example, see the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses toTerrorismattheUniversityofMarylandwebsitehttp://www.start.umd.edu/counter-terrorism-and-countering-violent-extremism?qt-qt_content_types=0#qt-qt_content_types248AlexP.Schmid,“CounteringViolentExtremism:aPromisingResponsetoTerrorism,”InternationalCenterforCounter-terrorism(ICCT),12June2012.https://icct.nl/publication/countering-violent-extremism-a-promising-response-to-terrorismandGeorgiaHolmer,“CounteringViolentExtremism:APeacebuildingPerspective,”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,September2013.http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/CVEUSIP.pdf

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CVEintheUnitedStates

Before turning to CVE in the United States, a brief overview of the threat ofviolent extremism249 in the country is warranted. There are currently 102individualsthathavebeenchargedwithIS-relatedoffensessinceMarch2014.48of these individuals have pleaded or were found guilty. 250 Furthermore,according to the FBI, there are 900 open terrorist investigation cases,most ofwhicharerelatedtothe“IslamicState”organization,withatleastoneineachofthe50states.251

Overall, there have been 250 Americans who either tried to or successfullyjoinedIS.Thereisnosingleterroristprofile,andtheirdemographicsarediverse.MostareyoungandfoundtobeactiveonlineinJihadicircles.Theaverageageis25, 1 in 7 are women, and 1 in 5 had familial ties to Jihad either throughmarriage,orthroughhavingafamilymemberthattraveledbeforethemtoSyriaorIraq.252

IntheUS,authoritiesareincreasinglydealingwithterrorist-inspired,ratherthanterrorist-directed attacks. This constitutes a more complex security challengethan the one that confronted the US in the decade after September 11 –disruptingplotsagainsttheUSthatwerebeinghatchedinterroristsanctuariesandsafe-havenssuchasinAfghanistanorYemen253–becauseaself-radicalizedindividualdoesn’tneedtocontactaterroristgroupbeforecarryingoutanattack.This makes preventing and detecting them even harder. In addition toprevention and detection, US officials are grappling with a number of otherchallengesthathavebeenincludedintheCVEissuebasket,forexample:1)howbest to steer radicalizing individuals, who celebrate terrorist propaganda, buthave not committed violent crimes, away from violence; and 2) how torehabilitateandreintegrate thoseviolentextremistprisonerswhohaveservedtheirtimeorthosedisillusionedyoungpeoplewhotravelledorwereseekingtotraveltoSyria,butnolongerposeathreattosociety.There is increasingrecognition inWashington that the traditional security toolkit,whichisfocusedonarrests,prosecutions,andincarceration–andthezero-tolerance approach to terrorism that has permeated the United States,

249While CVE efforts in the United States have looked at all forms of violent extremism,regardless of religion, ideology, or geography, this paper is focused particularly on efforts tocounter the violent extremism linked to those terrorist groups that subscribe to Salafi-Jihadiideology. This form of violent extremism is, in fact, the primary concern of CVE policy in theUnitedStatestoday.250George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, “ISIS Recruits in the US LegalSystem,” 29 August 2016.https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/August%202016%20Snapshot.pdf251JesseByrnes,“FBIinvestigatingISISsuspectsinall50states,”TheHill,25February2015.http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/233832-fbi-investigating-isis-suspects-in-all-50-states252Peter Bergen Congressional Testimony, “ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization &RecruitmentOntheInternet&SocialMedia,”USSenateCommitteeonHomelandSecurity,6July2016.http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/bergen-testimony_psi-2016-07-05253“Homeland Security Chief Discusses Changing Nature of Terrorism,” US Department ofDefense, 13 October 2016. http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/622878/homeland-security-chief-discusses-changing-nature-of-terrorism

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particularly since 9/11 – may be inadequate for dealing with the currentsituation.

Prevention,RehabilitationandReintegration

Police,prosecutors, judges,andprisonofficialsacrosstheUSrequireabroaderset of tools for addressing the threat. For example, if one looks at therehabilitationandreintegrationchallenges,oneseesthatsome300peoplehavebeenfoundguiltyofterrorism-relatedchargesintheUSsince2001.254Inthelasttwo years alone, 102 individuals have been charged with IS-related offenses,most of them non-violent,255and American prisons currently hold some 450convictedterrorists.256Accordingtooneanalysis,257atleast41individualshavebeenreleasedfromprisoninthelastfewyearsandmorethan100inmatesinUSprisonswithlinkstoterrorismwillbereleasedoverthenextfiveyears.258Thesefigures,however,generallydonot includethoseconvictedsincetheemergenceof the “IslamicState”organization,when thepaceofprosecutionsofsuspectedterroristsandsupportersskyrocketed.

Yet, despite the growing number of people sent to prison for non-violentterrorism charges, the US Government, unlikemany of its partners in Europe(and increasingly beyond) has yet to put in place tailored plans for theirrehabilitation inside prison or reintegration once they are released. Althoughplansmaybeunderwaytocreatespecialprogramsforthissegmentoftheprisonpopulation,259the US Federal Bureau of Prisons currently does not appear tohave a systematic way to address disengagement and deradicalization ofterroristoffenders.Forexample,thosewhohavebeenconvictedofcommittingacrimebygoing toSyriaand Iraq to fight andhavebeen incarceratedwillhaveneedsthataredistinctfromthegeneralprisonpopulation.Theymaynotregardtheir actions as criminal, and the prison experience may serve to furtherradicalizethem,givingrisetoanenduringthreatupontheirrelease.The options available to investigators, prosecutors and judges are similarlylimited, particularly for dealing with disillusioned young people arrested forhaving travelled or seeking travel to support the “Islamic State”, but who arejudged not to pose a security threat and for whom a 10 to 20-year prison 254USDepartmentofJustice,“2009BudgetandPerformanceSummary,”16September2014.https://www.justice.gov/jmd/2009-budget-and-performance-summary-2008-budget-highlights-key-performance-measures-and255George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, “ISIS Recruits in the US LegalSystem,” 29 August 2016:https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/August%202016%20Snapshot.pdf256Hannah Fairfield and TimWallace, “The Terrorists in US Prisons,” The New York Times, 7April2016.http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/07/us/terrorists-in-us-prisons.html257JeromeP.Bjelopera, “Terror Inmates:CounteringViolentExtremism inPrisonandBeyond,”CongressionalResearchService,28October2015.http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20151028/104102/HHRG-114-HM05-Wstate-BjeloperaJ-20151028.pdf258NicoleHong,“TerrorConvictsPoseDilemmaAfterReleaseFromPrison,”WallStreetJournal,15February2016.http://www.wsj.com/articles/terror-convicts-pose-dilemma-after-release-from-prison-1455560250259Ibid.

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sentencemightriskfurtherradicalization.Theemphasiscontinuestobeplacedonarrestingandprosecutingsuchindividuals,despiteanincreasingrecognitionamongpolicymakersthatalternativestocriminalprosecutionandincarceration,in certain circumstances, can help facilitate the cooperation of family, friends,and other members of vulnerable communities who may be reluctant tocooperatewithlawenforcementiftheyknowthatanyoutreachmightputtheirlovedoneinaprisoncell.In the absence of any federal guidelines in this area, a federal judge inMinneapolishas taken it uponhimself to explore thepossibilityofdesigning aderadicalizationprogram–inlieuofjailtime–forsomeyoungdefendantsinatrial related to the “Islamic State”.260 Seeking to move beyond this ad hocapproach, the Justice Department has an “Alternative Dispositions WorkingGroup”lookingtodeveloppolicyguidanceforprosecutorsandjudgesaroundtheUSseekingalternatives (e.g.,disengagementprograms) toprosecution incaseslikethese.261Similarly, the FBI is soon expected to roll out its – somewhat controversial –SharedResponsibilityCommittees(SRCs)designedtoprovideFBIalternativestosimply arresting individuals on the path to violence. The SRCs would be a“voluntarily-formedgroupmadeupof lawenforcementofficials,mentalhealthprofessionals, religious leaders, family and community members that identifypotential violent extremists for intervention.”262Concerns have been voicedsurrounding the FBI’s role in these non-criminal entities and the privacy andother protections that will be afforded to those identified for, and thosedelivering,theinterventions.263

TheFBIalsorecentlyunveiledanonlineclassroomresourceonextremismcalled“Don't Be a Puppet”264and provided a guide to school administrators thataddresses“concerningbehavior”andhowtointervene.265MuchlikeitsplannedSRCs, this initiativehasalsobeenheavily criticizedby civil rights andMuslim-community advocacy groups, which claim the tool “perpetuates profiling andnegative stereotypes of Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim, andencouragesthepolicingofideasandbeliefs.”266Foritspart,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS),includingthroughitsnewOfficeforCommunityPartnerships(establishedin2015)anditsJuly2016

260LauraYuen,“TwoMenConvictedonISIS-relatedChargesAskforRehabilitation,”MPRNews,30 June 2016. https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/06/30/two-men-convicted-isis-related-charges-seek-rehabilitation-deradicalization261EricRosand,“TakingtheOff-Ramp:APathtoPreventingTerrorism,”WarontheRocks,1July2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/taking-the-off-ramp-a-path-to-preventing-terrorism/262SeecollectionoflettersexpressingconcernoverCVE,USHouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonHomelandSecurity.https://democrats-homeland.house.gov/sites/democrats.homeland.house.gov/files/sitedocuments/pclobletter.pdf263Ibid.264FederalBureauofInvestigation,“Don’tBeAPuppet,”https://cve.fbi.gov/home.html265LaurenCamera,“FBI'sAnti-ExtremismWebsiteShouldBeScrapped,GroupsSay,”USNews,6April 2016:http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/fbi-dont-be-a-puppet-website-criticized-by-advocacy-groups266Ibid.

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announcementof its first-evergrantsolicitationtosupportcommunity-ledCVEefforts,isincreasinglyfocusedonempoweringlocalcommunitiestohelppreventyoung people from being captivated by terrorist propaganda and dissuadingthosewhohavealreadybeencaptivatedfromturningtoviolence,stressingthattheseeffortsmustbeginwithinthecommunitiesthemselves.

Multi-stakeholderlocalprograms,announcedwithgreatfanfareattheFebruary2015WhiteHouseCVESummit,havebeguntobepilotedinthreecities(Boston,LosAngeles,andMinneapolis),withofficials inthosecitiesonly juststartingtodistribute more than $500,000 in Department of Justice grant money tojumpstartnewlocaleffortstoaddressyouthpreventionandintervention,mentalandbehavioralhealth,andradicalizationinprisons.267ThenewDHSmoneythatis now available (although only $10million in total, roughly the same amountavailable in the Netherlands, a country of less than 17 million people, forcommunity-ledCVEwork)shouldallowtheseprogramstobescaledupandnewones to be developed. This money is being made available – via the verycumbersomeUSGovernmentgrant-makingprocess–tosupportlocalCVEworkin five areas: building resilience, training and engaging with communitymembers, managing intervention activities, challenging the narrative, andbuildingthecapacityofcommunity-levelNGOsactiveinCVE.

Someobservershavecomplainednotonlyoftheinadequateandslow-to-arriveCVE funding, but that thedevelopedprogramshavebeen “hobbledby a vaguemission thathassownconfusionand fueledstrongopposition fromcivil rightsandcommunitygroupsthatfeartheprogramswillamounttogovernmentspyingonlaw-abidingMuslims.”268

Oneprogramthathasseeminglymanagedtosteerclearofthecontroversiesandcriticismsofothercommunity-ledCVEprogramsintheUSwasdevelopedbytheWorld Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) incooperationwith authorities fromMontgomery County,Maryland.269It focusesongeneratingpublicawarenessabouttheriskfactorsofviolentextremismandempowering the appropriate figures in the community to intervene withvulnerableindividualsbeforetheychooseapathofviolence.Itwasbuiltonthepremise that preventing violent extremism is a multi-disciplinary, multi-stakeholder endeavor that needs to involve a wide spectrum of community-basedactorsacrossthepublicandprivatesector.

This initiative is reportedly the first empirically evaluated community-led CVEprogram in the US, with a National Institute of Justice grant used to fund theevaluation that was released in June 2016.270The evaluation found that theprogram“hadintendedpositiveeffectson12of14CVE-relevantoutcomes…and

267PhilipMarcelo,“AfederalpilotefforttocombatextremistrecruitmentinBoston,LosAngelesandMinneapolishasbeenslowtostartsinceitwasannouncednearlytwoyearsago,”USNews,24March2016.http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2016-03-24/effort-in-3-us-cities-to-combat-extremism-off-to-slow-start268Ibid.269“The Montgomery County BRAVE Model,” WORDE. http://www.worde.org/programs/the-montgomery-county-model/270Michael J.Williams, JohnG.Horgan andWilliamP. Evans, “Evaluation of aMultifaceted, USCommunityBased,Muslim-LedCVEProgram,”USDepartmentofJustice,June2016.www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf

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[is] the first evidence-based CVE-relevant programming in the United States.”Among the recommendations in the evaluation was that the WORDE-runprogramshouldbereplicatedinothercommunitiesacrosstheUS.

It remains to be seen whether this program, which has benefited fromconsiderablesupportfromWashingtonandoperatesinacommunitywherethecriticismsof“CVE”aren’tnearlyasacuteasinothercornersoftheUS,caninfactbe replicated. Onewould assume that at least some of the $10million inDHSfundingforcommunity-basedCVEworkwillbeusedtoatleasttrytodoso.

In addition to thenewCVE funding, in 2016 theUSGovernment established aDHS-led task force271to coordinate federal CVE efforts – which have beencriticized272for being duplicative, disjointed, and disconnected. The new taskforce,whichhasbeenhobbledbythesomewhatfamiliarbureaucraticobstaclesinWashington,isfocusedon:“developinginterventionprograms;synchronizingfederal CVE outreach and engagement; managing CVE communications andleveraging digital technologies to engage, empower, and connect CVEstakeholders; and coordinating and prioritizing federal CVE research andestablishingfeedbackmechanismstoincreasetherelevanceofCVEfindings.”273

With the task force slowly becoming operational, there is also the hope thatfederal agencies that have an important role to play in CVE, particularlyprevention,will becomemore involved, such as theDepartments of EducationandHealthandHumanServices,whichhavehistoricallybeenreluctanttodosobecauseofthelinkstotheFBIandothersecurity-focusedagencies.

However,with the task force lackingauthority to (re)-direct theCVEeffortsofindividualfederalagenciesorcontrolordirectthefundingallocatedbyCongressto individual federal agencies for CVEwork, it remains to be seen howmuchimpactitwillactuallyhave.

Moreover,thecreationofa“federal”CVEtaskforcedominatedbytheFBI,DHS,and DOJ may improve coordination in Washington, despite lacking anyrepresentationfromstateandlocalauthoritiesletalonethekindsofcommunity-level professionals viewed as being essential for developing and implementingeffectiveprevention,intervention,andevenreintegrationprograms.However,itisprobably ill-suited to the taskof trulyempoweringcommunities togetmoreinvolved in CVE efforts across the country. As noted above, a number offederally-led CVE efforts have been (often unfairly)accused of stigmatizing

271“Countering Violent Extremism Task Force,” Department of Homeland Security, 8 January2016.https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/01/08/countering-violent-extremism-task-force272LorenzoVidinoandSeamusHughes, “CounteringViolentExtremism inAmerica,”Center forCyber&HomelandSecurityattheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity,June2015.https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CVE%20in%20America%20.pdf273“Written testimony of DHS Office for Community Partnerships Director George Selim for aSenateCommitteeonHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairs,PermanentSubcommitteeonInvestigationshearingtitled“ISISOnline:CounteringTerroristRadicalization&RecruitmentOntheInternet&SocialMedia,”USDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,6July2016.https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/07/06/written-testimony-ocp-senate-homeland-security-and-governmental-affairs-permanent

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Muslimcommunities,servingasaguiseforintelligence-gathering,andviolatingthecivillibertiesoflaw-abidingMuslim-Americans.274Infact,localconcernsaboutthe“CVE”monikerhaveledsomecitiestoabandonthetermastheymoveforwardtodesignandimplementmulti-agencyprogramsaimed at preventing violent extremism from taking root in their communities.Forexample,Bostonrecastwhatwasoriginallyintendedtobeoneofthethreemodel city-ledCVE initiatives in theUnitedStates.Theprogram isnowcalled:“PromotingEngagement,AcceptanceandCommunityEmpowerment,”orPEACE.Minneapolis, another pilot city, rebranded its CVE program as “BuildingCommunityResilience.”275Relatedly,LosAngelesisattheforefrontofincreasingeffortsinmunicipalitiesintheUStouseapublichealth(asopposedtoacriminaljusticeorlawenforcement)frameworkforaddressingviolentextremismatthecommunitylevel.276

Yet,despitethedistractionthat“CVE”hasbecome–andtheimpedimentthattheterm creates to getting the necessary involvement from local communities –Washington continues to frame federal government-led or -funded efforts toprevent extremism in theUS around the term.Moreover, the federal CVE taskforceisdominatedbynationalsecurityagenciesacrossthecapital,withtoofewopportunities for other parts of the federal government, like those focused oneducationandhealth, let alone cityor community-level actors, to get involved.Thereisalsoaquestionoftheextenttowhichthoseactorswouldwanttobetoocloselyassociatedwithanentitysodominatedbythe“usual”CVEsuspects.Thus,it seems unlikely – on its own – to be effective in catalyzing the depth andbreadthinvolvementfromtheseactorsintheeffortthatwillberequired.

As a complement to the federal task force, consideration should be given tocreatinganon-government-led“NationalPreventionNetwork”277toharnesstheefforts of communities and professionals around the country interested inhelpingpreventtheviolentradicalizationofindividualsintheircommunities.Such a network could help mobilize resources by leveraging corporate andphilanthropic contributions to support local prevention and interventionprojects and involve non-law-enforcement professionals around the countrywithexperienceworkingonCVEorrelatedfields(e.g.,publichealthordrugorbroader crime prevention).It could allow communities, including localauthorities,tomoreeasilydrawontheexpertisefromthegrowingnumberofitsmembers and professionals (both in the US and overseas) that need to be 274Murtaza Hussain, “Critics Say Bill Would Turn Muslim Communities into Mini-SurveillanceStates,”The Intercept, 15 July2015.https://theintercept.com/2015/07/15/civil-rights-groups-blast-proposed-government-office-countering-violent-extremism/275PhilipMarcelo, “What's in a name? Governments recast anti-extremism efforts,” AssociatedPress, 26 August 2016.http://bigstory.ap.org/article/29e87290d5a74a988cce221ef6a14996/whats-name-governments-recast-anti-extremism-efforts276 Stevan Weine, David P. Eisenman, Janni Kinsler, Deborah C. Glik, and Chloe Polutnik,“Addressing violent extremism as public health policy and practice,” Behavioral Sciences ofTerrorismandPoliticalAggression,28June2016.http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19434472.2016.1198413?needAccess=true277The author first put forward this proposal in “Communities first: A national preventionnetwork to defeat ISIS,” The Hill, 2 August 2016. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/290046-communities-first-a-national-prevention-network-to

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involved in designing and implementing “social service” prevention andinterventioneffortsastheymovetodeveloptheirownprograms,tailoredtotheneeds of their citizens. It could help ensure that communities that don’t feelcompelled todevelop a full-fledgedCVEprogram,but are interested in gettingmuch smarter about the problem and how they can identify early signs ofradicalization and steer their young people away from violence, have theopportunity to do so without having to involve Washington. Such a networkwouldenergizeprofessionalassociationsofeducators,communitydevelopmentworkers,mentalhealthandsocial servicesorganizations,whichhavegenerallybeenreluctant toactivelyengage inWashington-drivenCVEefforts, andcreatescalable partnerships with a philanthropic sector that has also been leery ofinvolving itself inefforts thathavebeensocloselyassociatedwith theFBIandothersecurityactors.

ANationalPreventionNetworkwouldalsohelpensurethatthecommunity-ledapproach to CVE thatwas the centerpiece of the February 2015White HouseCVE Summit – where President Obama underscored how important it is to“empowercommunitiestoprotecttheirfamiliesandfriendsandneighborsfromviolent ideologies and recruitment”278– becomes a reality in theUnited Statesand is not dependent on who is in the White House or, more broadly, inWashington.

CVEAbroad

Starting with President Obama’s September 2014 address to the UN GeneralAssembly,whenhecalledonallcountries todomoretoaddressthedriversofviolent extremism within their borders, the global conversation about violentextremismandhowbesttocounteritandpreventitsspreadhasmushroomed.

This speech didn’t initiate the global CVE conversation, but it elevated and,perhapsequallyimportantly,broadeneditfromonethathadlargelybeenlimitedtoaddressingtheideologyorpropagandausedtodrawinrecruitsandnarrowlyfocused on trying to identify the small number of individuals on the cusp ofviolent radicalization.Now, partly as a result of theWhiteHouse CVE Summitand the follow-on regional summits, which produced a far-ranging ActionAgenda279that informedthedevelopmentoftheUNSecretary-General’sPlanofActiononPreventingViolentExtremism,theconversationsnowincludeafocusonthesocial,economic,andpoliticalconditionsthatcreatethemarginalizationand alienation that canpushpeople into the armsof terrorist groupsormakeindividualsmorevulnerabletothesirencallofviolentextremism.Nolongerarewesimplydiscussingthe“pull”factors.Second,andrelatedly,withthisexpandedfocus,questionsofhowstatestreattheircitizensandcommunitiesandtherole

278“Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” The WhiteHouse,19February2015.https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/19/remarks-president-summit-countering-violent-extremism-february-19-2015279“Draft Follow-On Action Agenda, the White House Summit to Counter Violent ExtremismMinisterialMeeting,”GlobalCenterforCooperativeSecurity,19February2015.http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Draft-Follow-On-Action-Agenda-3-April-2015-version.pdf

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that thesecommunities themselves canplay inmarginalizingcommunitiesandalienatingyoungpeoplearenowcentraltotheCVEdiscourse.TheUStookanumberofstepstosustainthemomentumgeneratedbythehigh-levelpoliticalattentionthatCVEreceived in2015.Onthebureaucratic front, itelevated CVE as a prioritywithin theDepartment of State.What had been theBureau of Counter-Terrorism became the Bureau of Counter-Terrorism andCountering Violent Extremism. It created a dedicated CVE office within theBureauandcreatedthefirst-everseniorpositionintheDepartmentfocusedonCVE.However, the funding that theBureauhas to support community-ledCVEprojectsinkeyregionssuchastheMiddleEast,North,EastandWestAfrica,theGulf,andSouthandSoutheastAsiaisonlysometenpercentofitsoverallbudget.While CVE spending is expected to increase in 2017, it will continue to bedwarfedbywhattheBureauspendsonsupportingforeignlawenforcementandsecurityservices.

As a complement to this bureaucratic shift, the US established the GlobalEngagementCenter(GEC)toinvigorateitseffortstocounterthepropagandaandothermessagesthe“IslamicState”andotherterroristgroupsareusingtorecruityoungpeopletoturntoviolence.TheUSGovernmenthasstruggledwhentryingtodiscreditextremistpropagandadisseminatedbygroupslikeISandal-Qaeda.At the State Department, then-Secretary Clinton established the Center forStrategicCounter-TerrorismCommunications(CSCC),aunitofcommunicationsspecialists fluent in Urdu, Arabic, Somali, and other languages to battle withextremists online. The CSCC was a major improvement on previous efforts tocoordinateUSGovernmentresponsestoextremistpropagandaandshowedearlypromisewhenmessaging directly against terrorist recruiters online in Arabic,but a shift towardEnglish-language messaging downplayed the center’sstrengthsandopenedthefloodgatesofmediascrutiny,mostofithostile.

InreplacingtheCSCC,theGEC–whichwasgivenmorestaffandfundingthanitspredecessor –was intended to signal a shift fromdirect online engagement topartner-drivenmessagingandcontent,reflectingthewidespreadconsensusthat“whiletheUSGovernmenthasagoodmessagetotell,[itis]notalwaysthemostcrediblevoicetotellit.”280

Although launched with great fanfare, the GEC appears to be building on anapproach similar to the one the CSCC had already gravitated towards – as itshifted increasingly away from direct messaging: identifying and empoweringcredible, independentvoices to counterextremistmessaging– seedingbutnotdirecting those efforts; supporting the development of regional messagingcenters in countries in key regions (UAE, Malaysia, and Nigeria); developingthematic campaigns around specific issues (families, returnees); and working 280JeffSeldin,“USin‘CrisisMode’inFightagainstISOnlineMessaging,”VOANews,6July2016.http://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-crisis-mode-fight-islamic-state-online-messaging/3407346.htmlThefourgoalsofthenewoperationincludeempoweringandbuildingthecapacityofaglobalnetworkofpositivemessengers(includingNGOs,schools,youngpeople,social and civil society leaders) against violent extremism; using data analytics to betterunderstand the dynamics of on-line radicalization and inform the design and targeting ofcounter-messaging programs; working with partners, including governments and the privatesector, to design and implement thematic counter-messaging campaigns; and coordinating theeffortsofthemanyUSGovernmentagenciesworkinginthiscounter-messagingspace.

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withprivatesectorleadersfromtheentertainment,technology,andadvertisingsectorstoexploreinnovativewaystocounterISpropagandaandamplifyanti-ISvoicesinternationally,fromreligiousleaderstoISdefectors.

Whether theGEC–which is currently ledbya formerUSDefenseDepartmentofficial –will bemore successful than the (somewhat unfairly)maligned CSCCremainstobeseenandwilldependonanumberoffactors.Forexample,willitbeabletoidentifyandsupport–withUSGovernmentfunds–themostcrediblemessengers, a challenge that isn’t eliminated by moving away from direct USGovernmentmessaging;willitbeabletomatchmessagingandmessengertotherightaudienceandthusplantseedsofdoubtorencouragefence-sitterstomoreactivelycounterextremismontheirown;willitsworkbemoreintegratedwiththe broader international CVE efforts of the US Government, recognizing thatcounter-messagingalonecannotsteeryoungpeopleawayfromviolence.

Onthestrategicfrontin2016,andwiththeintentionofmemorializingtheCVESummit’s Action Agenda in US policy, the US Department of State and the USAgency for International Development (USAID) released their first-ever jointinternationalCVEstrategy.Amongotherthings,thestrategycallsforbuildinga“whole of society” approach to preventing violent extremism from taking rootand one that involves national and local governments, the private sector, andcommunities. It has five elements: 1) expanding international political will,partnerships, and expertise to better understand the drivers of violentextremism and mobilize effective interventions; 2) assisting foreigngovernments – at both the national and sub-national level – to adopt moreeffectivepoliciesandapproachestopreventthespreadofviolentextremism;3)using development assistance to reduce specific political, social and economicfactors that contribute to community support for violent extremism; 4)empowering and amplifying locally-credible voices that can change theperception of violent extremist groups and their ideology among keydemographicsegments;and5)strengtheningthecapabilitiesofgovernmentandnon-governmental actors to isolate, intervene with, and promote therehabilitation and reintegration of individuals caught in the cycle ofradicalizationtoviolence.281

Although this new prevention-oriented international CVE strategy, with itsemphasis on supporting efforts of partner governments to implement the UNSecretary-General’s PVE Plan of Action, is seemingly straightforward, both theDepartment of State andUSAIDwill face numerous challenges as they seek tooperationalizeitoverseas,includingthefollowing:

I. LackofResources

First and foremost is whether national governments around the globe canmuster the political will to invest in the resources and tools required toimplementtheglobalCVEagenda,withitsheavyemphasisonempoweringlocalcommunities.Thisbecomesparticularlydifficultinthefaceofagrowingnumber

281USDepartmentofStateandUSAID,“DepartmentofState&USAIDJointStrategyonCounteringViolentExtremism,”May2016.https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257913.pdf

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of terrorist attacks, with political leaders under increasing pressure to showtoughness and their constituents generally pressing for a muscular response:tighter borders, better intelligence cooperation, longer prison sentences,moremilitary operations. Thus, while you might see political leaders coalescingaroundthecallsattheUNforaprevention-focusedapproachtoaddressingthethreat at home, the political dynamics and resource allocations, particularly intheaftermathofanattack,areoftenquitedifferent.

II. SynergybetweenDifferentActorsandDisciplines

Second,thereisthesheernumberofactorsthathavearoletoplay,whetheratthe national or sub-national level, domestically or internationally, within oroutsideofgovernment,toimplementtheCVEagenda.Whilethecallfora“wholeof society” approach sounds appealing in theory, it risks producing a web ofoverlapping mandates, activities, and structures, some with ties to moretraditional fields such as counter-terrorism, peacebuilding, conflict resolution,human rights, and development, that could hinder overall effectiveness if notorganizedproperlyatdifferentlevels.

III. FromState-CentrictoCommunity-Centric

Third,thereisthechallengeofgettingnationalgovernmentstotrulyembraceaCVE agenda that focuses so much attention on prevention and the role ofcommunities, mayors, teachers, social workers, youth, women, and religiousleaders,andmentalhealthprofessionals,notnationalsecurityprofessionals, letalonenationalgovernments.Communitiesneed tobeempoweredand inmanycasestrainedandresourcedbythenationalgovernmenttomaximizeimpactinthisarena,which ismucheasiersaidthandonegiventhecontrol thatsomanynational governments continue to want to maintain over issues of nationalsecurity,evenwhile recognizing theneed for local solutions.Furthermore, it isgenerallythecasethatthemosthighlycentralizedcountries,wherepowerisinthehandofafew–oftencorrupt–actorsorinstitutionsarealsotheonesfacingthegreatestviolentextremismchallenges.282The historically state-centric nature of counter-terrorism strategies andcooperation can make it difficult to identify and enable sub-national actors,whetherlocalauthoritiesorcommunityleaders,thathavecriticalrolestoplayinidentifying and intervening against early signs of support for violence. Forexample, although more cities are developing innovative CVE programs in

282Formoreontherelationshipbetweengovernance,corruptionandterrorism,see“InvestinginIraq'sPeace:HowGoodGovernanceCanDiminishSupportforViolentExtremism,”MercyCorps,January2016:https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdfandSarahChayes, “Corruption:ViolentExtremism,Kleptocracy,andtheDangersofFailingGovernance,”CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,30June2016.http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/corruption-violent-extremism-kleptocracy-and-dangers-of-failing-governance-pub-63982 and Sarah Chayes, “Corruption and Terrorism: TheCausalLink,”CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,12May2016.http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/12/corruption-and-terrorism-causal-link-pub-63568

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partnership with local communities, too many national governments remainreluctanttoempowermunicipalitiesinthisspace.Civil society is providing expertise and support in efforts tobuild resilience toviolentextremism,butmanygovernmentsremainunwillingtoenablegrassrootsactors to contribute, or they seek to micromanage civil society-led CVEinterventions. Somegovernmentseven label civil societygroups themselvesas“violent extremists,” which only damages the state’s credibility in thecommunities they are trying topositively influence.One exampleof this is theKenyan government’s decision to list two NGOs, Muslims for Human Rights(Muhuri) and Haki Africa, among organizations accused of supporting al-Shabaab in April 2015. These twoNGOswork directly on building communityresilienceagainstviolentextremism,and theywereable to successfullyappealthecourt’sdecision,nullifytheterroristdesignationandunfreezetheirassets.283

In some instances, the international push to crackdownon terrorist financinghas had the unintended consequence of negatively affecting the ability oflegitimatecivil societygroups toaccess funding to implementcommunity-levelprograms to help address the local drivers and build community resilience toviolent extremism. The broad Financial Action Task Force requirement toregulatetheNGOsectorasawholeforgreatertransparencyandaccountabilityhas contributed to increased surveillance and state regulation, the creation ofburdensomeand restrictive laws, rules, and regulations for the sector, and thecutting-back, in general, of civil society space. Some, including the UN SpecialRapporteurontherightstofreedomofassociationandpeacefulassembly,haveasserted that this requirement has reinforced the already existing tools in thestatetoolboxtoclampdownfurtheroncivilsociety.284Recently,theFinancialActionTaskForcehasrevisedits“Recommendation8andInterpretive Note” to remove the statement that the non-profit sector is“particularly vulnerable” to terrorist abuse. The hope is that this revision andchangeinlanguagewillhelpshifttheoften-unnecessaryscrutinyNGOsandCSOsfaceinthefield.285

ArelatedchallengethatmaybeuniquetotheUnitedStatescentersaroundtheUSlawthatprohibitstheprovisionof“materialsupport”toterrorism.Thishasleft NGOs operating in conflict zones where foreign terrorist organizationsoperateoftenunabletoworkintheareaswheretheneedisgreatest,orpartnerwith the most locally influential organizations, because of the risk of beingchargedwith“materialsupport” for terrorismbytheUSDepartmentof Justice.TocomplywiththisUSstatute,manyNGOsreceivingUSGovernmentfundsarerequiredtoadopt“nocontact”policieswithcertaingroupsandcommunitiesandtovetdowntotheindividuallevelwherethosefundsarelanding.Majorfinancialinstitutions,includingmanyoftheworld’slargestbanks,arealsoconstrainedby 283“Kenya:CourtDeclaresNGOsDidNoWrong,”FreedomHouse,12November2015.https://freedomhouse.org/article/kenya-court-declares-ngos-did-no-wrong284“KiaiToFinancialCrimeBody:FosterCivilSocietyAsAPartner,NotAnEnemy,InTheFightAgainstTerrorism,”UNSpecialRapporteurontheRightstoFreedomofPeacefulAssemblyandofAssociation,18April2016.http://freeassembly.net/news/fatf-recommendation-8/285“TheFATFRecommendations,”FATF,February2012.http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf

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the “material support” statute, and are backing out of conflict zones, closingaccounts of (principally Muslim) charities around the world, and significantlyscaling back financing in areas and with communities who need it most. Thisregimehashadasignificantchillingeffectoneffectiveengagement.Asaresult,actors that are well-positioned to support efforts to prevent individuals fromradicalizing to violence and reintegrate them into their communities areincreasingly reluctant to do so.286Thus, there is need to clarify the scope of“materialsupport”andotherrelevantCTlegislationtoreversethechillingeffectthey are having on civil society’s ability to support CVE efforts – particularlyrehabilitationandreintegrationandotherCVEprogramsthattarget“formers”or“defectors.”287

Leaving theFATFanddomestic requirementsaside, theUSandotherWesterngovernmentssometimesshyawayfromresourcingtheNGOswiththemostlocalcredibility, preferring to partner with safer NGOs that may have limitedinfluence.Non-violent Salafists, for example,might agreewith theWeston the“IslamicState”butlittleelse.TheseSalafists,fortheirpart,mightbereluctanttoreceiveWesternfunding. Inother instances, thesmall, localpartnersmightnothave the wherewithal to comply with the often-onerous grant or other legalrequirementstoreceivelargegrants,andthus,spacemustbefoundforsmallergrantsforsmallorganizations.For Brussels, London, Washington, and other donor capitals interested infundinggrassroots-ledCVEinterventionsinthirdcountries,therearethethornyissuessurroundingtheextenttowhichthehostgovernmentshouldbeconsultedbefore deciding which local organizations to fund. Giving host governments avetowould seem tomake it difficult to fund those groupsmost likely to havegreatest credibility in the marginalized communities. Failure to consult withthesegovernments,however,runstheriskofhavingtheprogramssuspendedorterminated as occurred recently with the EU CVE program in Pakistan. Thecomplexityofthisissueiscompoundedinthegrowingnumberofcountries,suchas Egypt, Ethiopia, India, and Israel, where governments have restricted localNGOsfromreceivingforeignfundinginthefirstplace.288

286The Prevention Project: Organizing Against Violent Extremism, “Building Off-Ramps andReintegrating Foreign Fighters and Terrorist Offenders: Challenges and Opportunities,” 9 June2016.http://www.organizingagainstve.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Meeting-Summary.pdf287Ibid.288“Donors:keepout:moreandmoreautocratsarestiflingcriticismbybarringnon-governmentalorganizationsfromtakingforeigncash,”TheEconomist,13September2014.http://www.economist.com/news/international/21616969-more-and-more-autocrats-are-stifling-criticism-barring-non-governmental-organisations.OnEgyptsee:https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypt-cracks-down-on-ngos-over-foreign-funding/2016/03/24/3b33b0f6-f1ed-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html;OnEthiopiasee:http://faculty.washington.edu/aseem/ripe2015.pdf.OnIndiasee:http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/over-14000-ngos-barred-from-receiving-foreign-funds-govt-2924258/.OnIsraelsee:http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/u-s-warns-israel-over-bill-to-limit-foreign-funding-to-ngos-1.399442

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CVE:ToDefineorNottoDefine

Fourth, there is the challenge of ensuring the importance of having a commonunderstandingofwhat “violent extremism” is, i.e., it is not viewsexpressedbypeacefulpoliticalopponentsorreligiousorethnicminorities,andwhat“CVE”is,i.e.,itisnotthrowingbloggersinjailorshuttingdowncivilsocietyorganizationsinthenameofsecurity,whichonlycreatesmoremarginalization.Suchclarityisparticularly important given the increasing vitriol, including among somepoliticians, which has generated calls from some quarters for the closing ofborders to those fleeing violence in Iraq and Syria and the labeling ofMuslimmigrantsandrefugeesa“securitythreat.”Inpromoting theglobalCVEagenda, theUnitedStateswillneed tobemindfulthatgovernmentsproperlytargettheirCVEinterventionsanddonotstigmatizethe communities fromwhomcooperation isneeded.Forexample,whenKenyatargetsentireSomalicommunitiesandpaintsthemasa“FifthColumn,”wehaveaproblem.Whilethereislimitedappetiteforaddressingthedefinitionaldeficitatthegloballevel,thebodyofresearchonthedriversofviolentextremismisrapidlygrowing.The data increasingly shows thatmarginalization, poor governance, and state-sponsoredviolenceareamongthemostprevalentfactors.EffectivetargetingofaCVE program should therefore focus on both governing institutions andcommunities. National governments need to acknowledge their own role infueling grievances and advance bold policies of inclusion and reconciliation aspart of an effort toprevent violent extremism.The extent towhich theUnitedStatesanditsEuropeanpartnersarewillingtoconsistentlypressthisissuewithcounter-terrorismpartnersintheMiddleEast,NorthAfrica,theGulf,andHornofAfricaandelsewhereremainstobeseen.Although,atleastfortheUnitedStates,theStateDepartment/USAIDCVEStrategyseemstosuggestitwill.

This ispartofabroaderchallenge,whichistheextenttowhichtheglobalCVEagenda can in fact shape counter-terrorism policies and actions or if it willbecomesimplyaprogrammatictool–includingforforeignassistanceandlargelylong-termdevelopment–withlimitedrelevancetodealingwithexistingthreats.WilltheUS,forexample,bepreparedtointegratecoreCVEmessagesabouthowgovernments treat their citizens into security dialogues? Or will they be keptseparate for fear of jeopardizing tactical cooperation against existing terroristthreats? This tension is, of course,well-illustrated in the relationship betweentheWestandcountrieslikeEgyptandSaudiArabia.289Bothareoftendescribedascriticalcounter-terrorismpartnersagainstISandal-Qaeda,whileatthesametime being considered as fomenters of violent extremism, the former with its

289DanielByman,“TheUS-SaudiArabiaCounterterrorismRelationship.”Brookings,24May2016,https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-u-s-saudi-arabia-counterterrorism-relationship/.ShadiHamid,“RethinkingtheUS-Egyptrelationship:HowrepressionisunderminingEgyptianstabilityandwhattheUnitedStatescando.”Brookings,3November2015:https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/rethinking-the-u-s-egypt-relationship-how-repression-is-undermining-egyptian-stability-and-what-the-united-states-can-do/

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heavy-handed security tactics and the latter with its sponsorship of Islamicradicalismacrosstheglobe.290At the multilateral level, the tension is seen in the work of the Counter-ISCoalition, where “counter-messaging” issues – particularly building the onlinecapacity of Coalition governments and civil society actors to push against theviolentnarrativeofthe“IslamicState”–areessentiallytheonlyCVEtopicsbeingaddressed. There has been a reluctance to discuss those issues, inmany caseslinked tohowgovernments treat theircitizens, thatmaypushyoungpeople toviolence. Among the reasons for this is the priority that is being placed onsecuring cooperation and military and other “hard” contributions fromMENA/Gulfcountriesandnotwantingtojeopardizetheseefforts.

So, as theUSmoves forwardwith the implementation of its international CVEstrategy, itwillneed toensure that sufficientattention isplacedon the impactthatsecurity-focusedinterventions–whetherwithinacountrylikeinEgyptoraneighbor like Yemen – can have on marginalized populations most prone toradicalizationtoviolence.

IV. CVEorBusinessasUsual

AfifthchallengeconfrontingtheUSinvolvesadjustingitstraditionalapproachtodevelopmentandotherforeignassistanceprogrammingtotakeintoaccountthesuigeneris nature of CVEwork. Because CVE is a nascent field and prioritizesidentifyingand supportingoftenhyper-local organizationsworking in complexand dynamic environments, and few rigorous metrics exist to measure theimpact of CVE programs, it requires more risk-taking, risk-mitigation, andinnovation than is traditionally tolerated by development or securityinterventions.291Ratherthanmovinginthisdirection,CVEprogrammingfundedby the US and other Western donors aimed at supporting community-ledinterventionsremainsabureaucratic,administrative,andrisk-averseendeavor.CVEfundstakemonthstoreachthegroundandaregenerallydirectedtothoseorganizationswith a demonstrated capacity to complywith the often onerousdonorrequirements.Although theUSandotherdonorsunderscore the importanceof ensuringCVEefforts are demand-driven and locally owned, the approach they are generallytaking risks undermining these objectives.292For example, too often, donorsprovide short-term project funding to implement narrowly-scoped programs,whichmaynotbesustainablepastthelifeofthegrant.Instead,ashighlightedat

290Scott Shane, “Saudis and Extremism: ‘Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters’,” New YorkTimes,25August2016.http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam.html?_r=1291 “Lessons learned from Danish and other international efforts on Countering ViolentExtremism(CVE)indevelopmentcontexts,”MinistryofForeignAffairsofDenmark,March2015.http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/evaluation_study_2015_03/html/helepubl.html292“AnkaraMemorandumonGoodPracticesforaMulti-SectoralApproachtoCounteringViolentExtremism,”GlobalCounterterrorismForum,19September2013.https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/72352/13Sep19_Ankara+Memorandum.pdf

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ayouthsymposiuminJune2016inDjibouti,293longer-termprojectsdesignedtoaddress long-standing grievances of marginalized or alienated youth and thatdemonstratethedonors’sustainedcommitmenttothecauseareneeded.Betteryet, rather than simply providing project funding to local organizations, thecapacitiesofwhichareoftenquite limited, theUnitedStates andotherdonorsshouldconsider focusingmoreresourcesonbuildingthesecapacities.Thiswillallowforgreaterlocalownershipandhelpgrowthecapacityoflocalcivilsociety.Ratherthanfullyinvestinginthecommunity-levelpartners,however,theUSandother donors are often relying on international NGOs or even private sectorcontractors to serve as “middle-men” to provide oversight (e.g., accounting,monitoring,andevaluation)overthelocalgrantsthatdonorsinsistupon.

V. AFinalChallenge:UpdatingtheGlobalandMultilateralArchitecture

A final challenge confronting the United States and its partners that arecommitted to the “whole of society” approach to CVE,which is embodied in agrowing number of largelyWestern government CVE strategies and in theUNPVE Plan of Action, centers around ensuring that the necessary internationalarchitectureisinplacetosupportandsustaintheapproach.This comprehensive approach is one where subnational actors (mayors,researchers, teachers, social andmentalhealthworkers,psychologists, and thereligious,youth,andothercommunities)haveessentialrolestoplay.Thesearenotyourtraditionalnationalsecurityactorsthathaveworkedtodevelopasetofrobust multilateral cooperation frameworks and platforms, particularly sinceSeptember2001.

Encouragementfromcapitalsandmultilateralbodiesforgreaterinvolvementofthesestakeholdersisimportantbutnotsufficientforbuildingandsustainingthe“whole of society” approach. Facilitating and ensuring collaboration andcooperation among these local actors so they can share experiences and learnfromeachotherisalsocritical.Thiswillrequire,amongotherthings,anupdatingoftheinternationalarchitectureforaddressingterrorismandviolentextremism,which has been focused almost entirely on national governments. It has beenstrengthened over the past decade to facilitate deeper and broader practicalcooperationamonganarrayofnationalofficials(suchasbordersecurityguards,prosecutors,judges,andparliamentariansfromcountriesofeveryregion)andtomobilizeresourcestosupportstrengtheningthecounter-terrorismcapacitiesofnational institutions. However, this architecture is dominated by multilateralbodies, such as the United Nations and Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, andregional organizations like the African Union and Organization of IslamicCooperation, which are driven by the interests and needs of nationalgovernmentsandareill-suitedtofacilitateandsustaincooperationamonglocalCVEactors.Although local officials, professionals, and community leaders are occasionallyinvolved intheworkof these intergovernmental fora, it isgenerallyassecond-

293“SymposiumonYouth and CVE in theHorn of Africa,” EUCT-MORSE, June 2016. http://ct-morse.eu/global-counterterrorism-forum-horn-of-africa-working-group-co-chaired-by-turkey-and-the-eu/

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classcitizens.Theyarenottreatedasfullpartners.Forexample,theydonothaveavoiceindeterminingthepriorities,whichcandiffer–oftendramaticallyinthecaseofcounter-terrorismandCVE–dependingonwhetheroneislookingattheissuefromanationalorlocalperspective,orshapingtheagendas.Attheendofthe day, for the multilayered approach embodied in the State/USAID CVEStrategy and theUNPlan ofAction to thrive, the cities, communities, and civilsocietyactivistsonthefront-lineofCVEeffortsneedmorefromthemultilateralsystem.Forstarters,thetraditionalforacanandshoulddomoretoengagelocalactorsonanongoingbasis.Theyshouldpromotethemeaningfulinvolvementofsubnationalstakeholdersinnationalcounter-terrorismandnowCVEdiscussionsthat have generally been limited to national officials. They should mobilizeresources to support the strengthening of subnational capacities – whethermunicipal authorities or civil society. However, more is required. Subnationalstakeholders need their own platforms to facilitate networking at the local,national,regional,andglobal levelstoallowthemtolearnfromeachotherandcollaborate without giving national governments or intergovernmental bodiescontrol over a cooperation agenda that is no longer limited to national actors.These subnational platforms can press national governments to create thenecessary legal and policy space, which is all too often shrinking, to enablegreater involvement of subnational actors in addressing the increasinglylocalizedthreatofviolentextremism.

The US has played a role in encouraging and, in some cases, funding thedevelopment of new platforms to facilitate the sharing of challenges, bestpractices, and information among subnational stakeholders. Over the past 18months, new global and regional CVEnetworks focused on bringing cities andlocalresearcherstogetherandregionalplatformstoconnectyouth,women,andother civil society players, including those working on the rehabilitation andreintegrationof former terrorist offenders and returning foreign fighters, havebeenlaunched.294Theseplatformsneedtobescaledupandsustainedinordertoensure that the “whole of society” approach being championed receives thenecessaryoxygen to survive.Governments and intergovernmentalbodiesneedto support and mobilize funding for them without micromanaging orunderminingtheirindependenceorcredibility.Inaddition,theyneedtopromotethe space for subnational actors and other nontraditional stakeholders withinnational counter-terrorism strategies and the traditional, state-drivenmultilateral system, where far too many states continue to view issues ofnationalsecurityasbelongingexclusivelytonationalsecurityofficials.

Conclusion

As thisstudyhighlights,oneof the legaciesofPresidentObama’s time inofficewill be the broadening of the United States’ approach to addressing terrorist

294TheUSfundsandsupportsanumberoftheseplatforms,examplesinclude:TheStrongCitiesNetwork http://strongcitiesnetwork.org/; The Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism(RESOLVE)Networkhttp://www.resolvenet.org/;TheYouthCivilActivismNetwork(YouthCAN)http://www.youthcan.net/; and the Women and Extremism Networkhttp://www.waenetwork.org/

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threats both at home and abroad and spearheading international efforts to dothesame.Newstrategies,frameworks,policiesandprogramsarenowinplaceintheUS(andelsewhere)thatlookbeyondtheroleofthemilitary,intelligence,andlaw enforcement services and even governments themselves. Increasingattentionisnowbeinggiventotherolethatsub-nationalactors,whetherintheUS or overseas, need to play in identifying and preventing radicalization thatleads to violence. Yet, as this study has also revealed, there are a number ofchallenges–includingpoliticalandinstitutional,bothintheUSandelsewhere–that will need to be effectively addressed in order tomaximize the impact oftheseefforts.Amongother things,national securityofficialswillneed to figureout how to best build durable partnerships – based on trust – with localcommunities, while the multilateral system, which was designed to facilitateinter-state cooperation, will need to figure out how to ensure that the sub-nationalactorswiththelocalsolutionsareintegratedintoglobalconversationsabout how to reduce the threat of terrorism around the world. Much as USleadershipwascriticaltocatalyzingtheglobalCVEconversation,USleadershipis likely going to be required to overcome these challenges to ensure that thetalkingmovestowalking.

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TheNationwideCounter-TerrorismSystemintheRussianFederation

NikolaySukhovAt the endof the20th century, terrorismbecamea global social phenomenon.The Russian Federation was one of the first countries to encounter itsmanifestations,andsufferedconsiderablehumanandmateriallosses.Therewasa real threat to the territorial integrity of the state. In the early 2000s, Russiawitnessedaseriesofcatastrophicterroristincidentsconnectedtotheinsurgencycampaign in Chechnya and the broader North Caucasus region. The campaignbeganwiththesiegeofthecrowdedDubrovkaTheaterinMoscowon23October2002byarmedChecheninsurgents,whichresultedin129casualtiesduringtherescue attempt by Russian security forces. This was followed by a series ofsuicide bombings in the Moscow subway that killed almost 80 civilians inFebruaryandAugustof2004.Inthesameyear,agroupofmostlyChechenandIngushmilitantscarriedouta successful raidon theRussian InteriorForces inNazran, Ingushetia, killing 80 troops. Furthermore, two Russian passengerplaneswereblownupalmostsimultaneouslyon24August2004.

The most shocking in a series of deadly attacks by secessionist and Islamistmilitants seeking to “liberate” the North Caucasus from Russian presencewasthecaptureofover1,100hostages ina school inBeslan,NorthOssetia,on1-3September2004byChechenandIngushmilitants.BrandedasRussia’s9/11,theterrorist attack resulted inmore than 342 deaths, including 186 childrenwhoperishedintherescueoperationprovokedbypowerfulexplosionsattheschoolandthefollowinggunfire.

Theseattacksrequiredtheleadersofthecountrytoacturgentlyandresolutelyinordertocreateanadequatesystemforcounteringterrorism.ThePresidentofthe Russian Federation decided to dramatically change the approaches toantiterrorist activity, including the involvement of all ministries, agencies andthe civil society of the country in order to address this problem. “Fightingterrorism must become a fully nationwide activity and that is why it is soimportant for all institutionsof ourpolitical systemand for the entireRussiansociety to actively participate in it,” the President said at the GovernmentextendedsessioninSeptember2004.As a result, the Federal Law “On Countering Terrorism” and the RussianFederationPresident'sDecree“OnMeasurestoCounterTerrorism”createdthecompletelynewnationwidesystemofcounteringthisdangerousphenomenonatthebeginning of 2006. Itwasbasedon the transition from theprimaryuse offorce in combatting terrorism to multilevel activities in countering thephenomenon. The system includes measures of detecting, preventing,suppressing,exposingandinvestigatingterroristattacksandactivitiesaimedatpreventingterrorism,minimizingandeliminatingitsconsequences.On10March2006,theNationalAntiterrorismCommittee(NAC)wascreatedasthemain organizational and coordination center for these activities,while theFederal Operational Coordination Center (FOCC) was created within it to

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organizeinteragencycooperationduringthepreventionofterroristattacksandto control counter-terrorismoperations. These government authorities includethe heads of the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, theMinistry of Transport, the Ministry of Health and other governmentorganizations.

AnimportantpeculiarityoftheCommitteeisthatitincludesnotonlytheheadsofthefederalexecutiveauthorities,butalsorepresentativesfromtheleadersofbothHousesoftheRussianParliament,thePresidentialAdministration,andtheGovernment of the Russian Federation. The Director of the Federal SecurityService assumes the position of Chairman of the National AntiterrorismCommittee.

Counter-terrorismactivities areorganized inall83 regionsof the country thathave corresponding antiterrorism commissions (ATC) headed by the heads ofthe constituent territories, and the Operational Coordination Centers (OCC)headedbythedirectorsoftheterritorialsecurityservices.Currently,formationofcounter-terrorismorganizationsonthebasicadministrationlevel(municipaldivisions) is being finalized,whichwill allow the Government to complete thesingleantiterrorismlineofcommandfromthefederalleveltothelocalone.TheNationalAntiterrorismCommittee(NAC)CentralOfficewascreatedwithinthe Federal Security Service to ensure the permanent operation of theCommitteeandFOCC,analyzetheconditionofthenationwidecounter-terrorismsystem,preparenecessarypropositionsforitsoptimization,andalsotocontrolandrenderpracticalandmethodologicalhelptotheantiterrorismcommissions(ATC) and the operational coordination centers (OCC) in the Russian regions.Thus,theorganizationalbasisforcounteringterrorismiscurrentlyrepresentedas two interrelated lines of command operating antiterrorist activities in theRussianFederation.

The first one is comprised of structures that coordinate the activities of theexecutive authorities concerning the prevention of terrorism and theminimizationandeliminationoftheeffectsofterroristacts:theNACandATCs.The second line consists of structures that control the activities related tocombattingterrorism:FOCCandOCCs.

Themostsignificantfeaturesofthenewsystemare:1. A complex solution to problems involving all three aspects of counteringterrorism:preventing terrorism,detectingand theneliminating thecausesandconditions contributing to committing terrorist attacks; combatting terrorism;andminimizing and eliminating the consequences of terrorismmanifestations.Lately, the main efforts have been focused on the prevention of terrorism,includingcounteractionagainstitsideology.

2. Clear division of competence in the field of countering terrorism betweendifferentexecutiveauthorities.3. Giving the necessary amount of authority to the heads of all coordinationstructures (NAC,FOOC,ATCs,andOCCs).Theyhave therightandobligation tomakedecisionsonthelocallevelandimplementthemwithintheframesoftheirauthorityindependentlywithnoprioragreementwiththefederalauthorities.

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4.ThestaffoftheNationalAntiterrorismCommitteeandtheFederalOperationalCoordination Center include only the heads of the relevant ministries andagencieshavetherighttomakefinaldecisionsindependently.

5.Enhancingthepersonalresponsibilityofthecorrespondingleaders(theheadsof the Russian Federation constituent territories in the field of counteringterrorism and the heads of the territorial branches of the Federal SecurityServiceinthefieldofcombattingterrorism).6.Developingtheproceduresandplansofantiterroristactivitiesbeforehandandensuringtheirpracticalimplementationduringtrainingsessions(nofewerthanfourperyearforeachconstituentterritory).Regularlyconductinginternationalantiterrorismexercises,withrepresentativesfromvariousforeigncountriesandinternationalorganizationsbeinginvitedasobservers.The specified changes resulted in eliminating the system drawbacks of theprevious antiterrorism legislation and developing the legal institution ofterrorism prevention that has been earlier considered as an auxiliary meansduringthesuppressionofterroristattacks.Itbecameobviousthatterrorismisacomplexsocialandpoliticalphenomenoninsteadofjustaregularcrime,andthatforcecouldnotprevailincounteringit.Inordertodevelopthecurrent legislation,on5October2009,thePresidentofthe Russian Federation approved the Concept of Countering Terrorism in theRussianFederation,which is thebasicdocumentsupplementing theprovisionsoftheFederalLaw"OnCounteringTerrorism"andformulatingourcountry’skeyapproaches to the furtherorganizationofantiterrorismactivity. In formulatingthe Concept, the following fundamental factors were taken into account: thegeographical spread of terrorism and the international nature of terroristorganizations, the increased leveloforganizedterroristactivity, theemergenceof large terrorist units with elaborated infrastructures, the intent of terroristunits and organizations to take possession of weapons of mass destruction,attemptstouseterrorismasameansofinterventionintotheinternalaffairsofcountries,amongotherfactors.

Taking intoaccount that theuseof force canproduceonly temporaryeffect incombatting terrorism and does not make it possible to eradicate thisphenomenon completely, the Concept pays special attention to preventingterrorismbythefollowingmeans:

a)Creatingasystemforcounteringtheideologyofterrorism;

b)Takinglegal,organizational,operational,administrative,security,militaryandtechnicalmeasuresaimedatprotectingpotentialtargetsofterroristattacks;

c) Enhancing control over adherence to the administrative and legal securitymeasures.Considering thepeoplewhosuffer froma terroristattack isdeemedequallysignificant.

Thefollowingtasksarebeingaddressedinordertominimizeand/oreliminatetheeffectsofterroristattacks:

a)Providingurgentmedicalhelp;

b)Medicalandpsychologicalassistanceduringrescueandfireemergencies;

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c) Social rehabilitation for people who were victims of a terrorist attack andpeoplewhoparticipatedinitsprevention;d) Restoring the normal operation and ecological safety for the targets of theterroristattacks;e)Recoveringmoralandmaterial loss forpeoplewhosufferedfromaterroristattack.

A significant part of the Concept is dedicated to resources supplied forantiterrorismactivity.The concentrationof technical and financial supplies fortheactivitiesofcounter-terrorismforcesisachievedthroughtheFederalTargetPrograms (FTP). FTPs fully implement activities that make it possible to:establish a unified system for training employees from various counter-terrorism agencies; improve special technical complexes and methods ofobtaining preventive information about the actions and intentions of terroristgroups; developnew equipment andweapons for preventing terrorist attacks;considerably increase the antiterrorist protection of vitally important targets;andalsosolveothernotlessimportanttasks.

Creatingasystemoflevelsforsituationalresponsetoterroristthreatsbasedonthe world practice became an important stage in the further improvement ofantiterrorism legislation. The system provides three levels of terrorist threat:raised–blue;high–yellow;critical–red.Thedecisiontoset,changeorcanceltheraisedandhighthreatlevelswithintheterritoriesoftheRussianFederationis made by the chairman of the antiterrorism commission of the affectedterritorytogetherwiththeheadofthelocalbranchofthesecurityservice.The critical terrorist threat level canbe set exclusivelyby theChairmanof theNational Antiterrorism Committee after the chairman of the antiterrorismcommission in the affected region submits the corresponding request. Theterrorist threat level can be set for a period of up to 15 days. After a certainthreat level is set, additionalmeasures concerning the safetyofpeople, societyandthestatemustbeundertakenaccordingtothepreviouslyelaboratedplans.

Inthisregard,theheadofthelocalbranchofthesecurityserviceisresponsiblefor:organizingandverifyinginformationaboutpossibleterroristattacks(whenthe raised threat level is set); providing additional training for operationalgroups in municipal divisions and also manpower and equipment used incounter-terrorismoperations (when the high threat level is set); and ensuringthat measures for getting the manpower and equipment used in counter-terrorismoperationsareready(whenthecriticalthreatisset).Itshouldbeparticularlymentionedthatsettinglevelsofterroristthreatdoesnotrestrict the rights and freedoms of citizens, but implies the necessity for theauthorities to takeadditionalmeasures inorder topreventapossible terroristattack.Besides, thissystemsetshighrequirements for the interactionbetweenthe heads of the operational coordination centers and the antiterrorismcommissionsintheconstituentterritories.

Overall, these measures have resulted in a systematic decrease of terroristactivity(1030terroristcrimeswerecommittedin2009,779crimesin2010,365crimesin2011,316crimesin2012,and218crimesin2013).Terroristgroupsnolongerengageinopenconfrontationsthatusedtoresultinlarge-scalearmed

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assaultsoncivilobjects,federalforcesandlocalauthorities.Firstandforemost,this progress results from the proper implementation of the antiterrorismlegislation regulations and the effective operation of the counter-terrorismsystemintheRussianFederation.The significant results of antiterrorism measures are mainly due to thecooperationandcoordinationofactionstakenbyall interactingstructures;thisis evident in the Russian experience. Indeed, the prevention of terrorism,includingthecounteractionagainst its ideology, theproactiveorganizationandtrainingofmanpowerandequipmentusedincounter-terrorismoperationsandalso the effectiveness of counter-terrorism activities all in all are the mainconditions for the improved results shown by the entire system of counteringterrorism.

CounteringtheIdeologyofTerrorismintheRussianFederation

The efforts of Special Forces allow the Russian state to keep the increase ofterroristactivityinchecktosomeextent,butthestrategicvictoryinthewaronterrorismcannotbeachievedwithoutthevictoryoverterroristideology.Thatiswhy, currently, countering terrorism implies active protection against itsideology,whichisconstantlygrowingincirclesofundergroundgangsandtheiraccomplices.The threatof thespreadof terrorist ideology is currentlyamajorissue of concern on the international level. The “Islamic State” terroristorganization (IS)hasalready longbeenaimingatnot just carryingout specificactsofterror,buttheglobalspreadofitsterroristideasandthetechnologiesofrecruitingnewmembers.Infact,similaritiesinideologiesofterroristgroupsareamain factor in uniting them in various part of theworld (IS,al-Qaeda in theArabianPeninsula,al-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb,BokoHaram,al-Shabaab,theCaucasusEmirateandothers).OrganizationssuchastheCaucasusEmirate,Hizbut-Tahrirand certain other criminalmovements aremost active in promotingterrorist and extremist propaganda in Russia. To that end, they use bothtraditional channels, such as religious organizations and institutions, andmodern means of communication (social networks, websites dealing with thetopic such as KavkazCenter.com, Kavkaz.org.uk, Guraba.info, Hunafa.com andothers) to attract new followers to extremist ideas and then recruit themremotely.

TakingintoaccountthattheRussianFederationhasconsiderableexperienceinfighting the actual threat of terrorism, the country has developed a complexapproachtopreventingtheideasofviolencefromspreading.Inaccordancewiththe Federal Law “On Countering Terrorism” adopted in 2006, terrorism isdefined as the “the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing theadoption of a decision by public authorities, local self-government bodies orinternational organizations connected with frightening the population and/orother formsofunlawfulviolentactions.”The inclusionof the term“ideologyofviolence”intheconceptof“terrorism”actuallyconstitutesalegalandtheoreticalbasis for the necessity of not only institutions combatting terrorism, but alsoinstitutionspreventingit.

Meanwhile, the ideology of violence or the ideology of terrorism means theentirescopeofideas,concepts,beliefs,goalsandslogansjustifyingthenecessity

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of terrorist activity and aimed at attracting people to participate in it. Manyterrorists primarily use the ideology of Islamism (so-called radical Islam) tocreate the ideologicalplatformfor theiractivity.At thesametime, it shouldbekeptinmindthatterrorismwaspromotedbeforeandisbeingpromotednowbymany other non-Islamistmovements: neo-fascist, national-separatist, religious,etc..Therefore,nomatterwhichofsuchideologiesyouconsider,eachofthemislethally hazardous to society and requires an adequate response from thegovernment.

TerroristideologyisbeingcounteractedinRussiaonthefederalandlocallevelsof government authority with the use of local self-government. Regionalantiterrorism commissions (ATC) do this job in constituent territories of theRussianFederation,whilemunicipalantiterrorismcommissionsdealwith itonthe local level. Their practical role is especially prominent because itworks ineveryday contact with the population and can address particular citizensinfluencedbyradicalideologies.While the federal level committee is mainly engaged in developing plans andcoordinating the efforts of all authorities, creating proactive techniques,specialized training programs and training specialists, the commissions on theregionallevelorganizetheworkintheparticularterritory,adaptthenationwidemethods to the local conditions, and maintain proactive public relationscampaignsinmassmediaoutlets.

As for the direct implementation of plannedmeasures, it is done on the localmunicipallevel:sportsandpubliceventsareheldmakingitpossibletointegratevulnerable categories of citizens into public life; personal interventions arecarriedout(includingthosethatexplainwhereradicalreligionmovementsarewrong);meetingswithpeoplewhohaverespectandauthorityareorganizedforstudents; people fromproblem families get help in finding jobs and in solvingeveryday problems that provoke radicalization. Furthermore, some measuresare taken to reintegrate militants and their accomplices who have not beeninvolvedinviolentcrimestopeacefullife,andpersuadethemtogiveupcriminalactivities. This system allows us to integrate the efforts of authorities bothverticallyfromthefederaltomunicipallevelandhorizontallybyreinforcingthecapabilitiesofnotonlymilitaryministriesandagencies,butcivilonesaswell.Indeed,it istheauthoritiesthatimplementthepolicyinthefieldsofeducation,culture, sport and youth guidance that have the leading role in countering theideologyofterrorism.Thegoalofthiseverydayworkistocreateinthesocietysuch a system of ideas and views, as well as channels and ways for thedistribution of these ideas, that would allow for fundamentally changing thementality of people influencedby terrorist ideology, so that the overwhelmingmajority of people would reject even the idea of using violence in order toachievepoliticaloranyothergoals.Nevertheless, the government alone cannot tackle the task of countering theideologyofviolenceinthemodernworld.Theideologyofviolenceisacomplexofideasthatreproducesitselfinsidethesociety andisintroducedintocollectiveconsciousness from the outside. The reception of such ideas is instigated by awhole range of factors both objective (economic situation, crime rates,population employment, etc.) and subjective (mental deviations, personal

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failuresandinconsistency,jealousy,complicatedlifesituations).Thatiswhyitisveryimportanttoemploythehealthyresourcesofthesocietyitselfinopposingterrorist ideology, in an effort to strengthen the immunity of society. For thatpurpose, Russia puts a special emphasis on including civil society institutions,the scientific and business community, educational organizations and massmediainantiterrorismefforts.

Representatives from scientific and educational communities as well as civilsocietyaremoreofteninvolvedinthedevelopmentofstrategiesandprogramsaimed at preventing and countering the ideology of terrorism, and also inpreparing and holding public relations events, such as speeches on TV, directcommunication with young audiences, explanatory lectures in penitentiaries,etc..Thesepublicorganizationsreceivethenecessarysupportfortheiractivitiesaimed at increasing the level of interfaith and international trust. Suchorganizations are active in every region and their significance cannot beoverestimated, examples of these organizations include The Union of theStavropolTerritoryNations forPeace in theCaucasus,TheSupremeCounciloftheOssetians,andmanyothers.

Every constituent territory in the Russian Federation has its own uniqueprojects. For instance, the ATCworking in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic hasbeen implementing the interregional youth project “Kunachestvo”(Brotherhood)forseveralyearsnow.It involvesallkindsofpubliceventswithchildrenfromNorthCaucasianrepublics.IntheRepublicofNorthOssetia-Alania,the Nykhas National Cultural Center actively participates in the Peace toCaucasian Children project and organizes friendship visits for schoolchildrenfrom neighboring republics. Furthermore, commissions for adapting andreintegrating people who decide to give up terrorist activities to peaceful lifewere created in some republics of the North Caucasus. These organizations,which include representatives from various authorities including lawenforcement agencies, reflect that the government is actually ready tocommunicatewithpeoplewhorealizehowwrongandhopelesstheirextremistactivities are and assist them in actually returning to peaceful life. The NACsuggested that the commissions shouldmore actively engage informal leaders(well-known athletes, successful businessmen, authoritative religious leaders,etc.)intheiractivities,enhancemediacoverageoftheresultsoftheirwork,andexposethecriminalessenceofgangactivities.

ThelackofqualifiedpersonnelwhocouldeffectivelyworkinthisfieldwasandcontinuestobethekeyproblemfacingtheNationalAntiterrorismCommittee.Inordertosolve it, the followingthreeaspectswereaccomplished:establishingatheoretical basis for carrying out effective counteraction against propagandaactivities that targets the audience influenced by the ideology of violence;formulating scientific, methodological, and practical recommendations on theprevention of terrorism and the spread of religious and political extremistideology;anddevelopinginformationproductsandvisualaidsforpracticaluseintheeverydayideologicalcounteraction, includingorganizingtrainingcoursesin various educational institutions, which are regularly attended byantiterrorismcommissionsemployees.For instance,a two-year trainingcoursewas organized for employees working in executive authorities in constituentterritoriesoftheRussianFederationandinlocalself-governingauthoritieswho

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areengagedinthecoordinationofactivitiesagainstterrorist ideology,andwasheld at the Southern Federal University and at the State University of NizhniyNovgorod.

Anothereducationalchallengeistopreparespecialistsincounteractingterroristideology who can work not only with adults, but also with the youth. It goeswithoutsayingthatinthiscasethemainareaofactivityistheschool,wherethemost important goal comes down to not only imparting the attitude ofunacceptability of violence for achieving one’s aims, but also contributing toestablishingaconsistentpersonalityandbeingawareofhisorherplace in lifeandsociety.Morethan500teacherstookfurthereducationcoursesdealingwithreligious and moral guidance of the youth in the leading higher educationinstitutions of the country. The two-week training courses entitled “TerrorismPrevention in the Russian Federation” are regularly held for directors anddeputy directors of secondary schools in the Moscow State LinguisticsUniversity. Furthermore, the state cooperates with Muslim religiousorganizations and religious educational institutions in creating a multi-levelsystemofpreparingcertifiedspecialistsinIslamichistoryandcultureforfuturework in religious and secular educational institutions, religious and secularorganizations, and in national and local authorities.Nevertheless, these effortsunfortunatelyfallshortofmeetingtheneedsinthisfield.Other efforts taken within the framework of countering terrorist ideologyinclude: More than 250,000 materials dealing with the topic of antiterrorismwere disseminated through federal and regional mass media between 2010-2012; more than 2,000 video materials (feature films, documentaries, publicservice ads) were created; and over 240,000 events (meetings, tutorials,conversations) were held with citizens from social categories vulnerable toinfluencebyterroristideology,includingschoolanduniversitystudents,peoplefromMuslim countries, representatives of clans, peoplewho are in prison forextremist and terrorist activity, and former gang members. Law enforcementbodies revealed that in the period between 2008 and 2012, there weremorethan 2,500 information sources that spread extremist propaganda materials(websites,videos,books, leaflets,etc.).Thenecessarymeasuresforsuppressingtheir illegal activity are carried out within the framework of the currentlegislation.

Currently, the second stage of developing the terrorist ideology counteractionsystem is being implemented,with events scheduled up to the year 2018.Wehave taken into account the drawbacks detected during the first stage andreachedconclusionsontheneedtoenhanceeffortsrelatedtoaddressingsocialgroupsthataremostvulnerabletoterroristpropaganda,andbetterrestrictionson terrorist ideology distribution channels. Taking into account that terroristorganizations' propaganda activity is constantly becoming more and moreintensive and varied,we also ensure that our countermeasures continue to bemoreandmoresophisticated.Theseproactiveeffortsaregettingmoreintensivenotonlyintraditionallyunstableregionsofthefederation,butalsoinrelativelyquietrepublicsandregions.Thepreventivemeasureswetakearegettingmorediverse, specific and, as already mentioned, targeted towards particularaudiences.

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Byanalyzinghowterroristorganizationsrecruitnewfollowers,weclassifiedandsegmented groups of the population from the point of viewof vulnerability toterrorist propaganda.We singled out territories and categories of peoplewhorequirespecialattention,suchastheyouth,relativesofgangmembers,studentsofreligiouseducationalinstitutions,theunemployed,etc..Withthatinmind,theNACadjusted themethodsofpreventiveactivities foreachof these categories,and determined the measures that should be taken by the government tosupport this work. The following measures have been planned and are nowbeingtaken:developingexplanatoryradioandtelevisionshows;meetingswithcorresponding audiences; social rehabilitation for citizenswhowere in prisonfor terrorist and extremist crimes; preventing extremist content from gettinginto the religious education system; detecting and eliminating extremistmaterials on the Internet; training teachers, psychologists, and social workersspecializinginthisfield;andmonitoringpublicopinion,etc..

Inordertopreventyouthradicalizationandthespreadofreligiousandpoliticalextremism,whichareamongthemainfactorsofdevelopingterroristthreats,thefollowing issuesarecurrentlybeingactivelyaddressed:with thecapabilitiesofreligiousleadersandcivilinstitutionstakenintoaccount,launchingalong-termand widely spread propaganda campaign aimed at keeping the populationadherent to the traditional religious values and principles; ingraining theantiterroristmentality in the youth; continuing the civil and inter-confessionaldialogue in society based on condemning terrorism and any other forms ofviolenceandextensively involvingall theconstructiveresourcesofcivilsocietyinthisprocess;activelyutilizinginformationresourcesofmajormediaoutletsinorder to explain the criminal misanthropic essence of extremist religiousideology and preventing its dissemination on the Internet, including efforts tocreate alternative online resources targeted at the youth and capable ofdeveloping trust and popularity among them. One of the main aspects in thelatter case is the understanding that the Internet is the main source ofinformation for young people, who are the most vulnerable group to theinfluenceofterroristideologypropagatedovertheInternet.In order to prevent the spread of terrorist and extremist ideas as well asinformation about methods and tools of committing terrorist attacks in theRussian segment of the Internet, a number of initiatives were alreadyimplemented in the form of industrial self-control during the first stage ofestablishing the terrorist ideologycounteractionsystem.For instance, thenon-commercialpartnership,theRussianAssociationforElectronicCommunications,developed the Internet Professional Activity Code containing requirements forpublishing information in the abovementioned information environment. TheDeclaration for the Children and Youth Security on the Internet was alsoprepared. Its provisions are based on the corresponding international andRussian legaldocumentsandrecommendations,and ithasalreadybeensignedbymorethan60Russianorganizations.

Nevertheless,itisstilldifficulttocounterthespreadofterroristideologyviatheInternet. First of all, this is due to its global and international nature. PracticeshowsthatitisnotenoughtohaveonlynationalregulatoryandprohibitivelawsinordertocountertheideologyofterrorismontheInternet.Generally,terroristsites are created in the domain extensions that belong to other countries and

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theydonotbelongtothejurisdictionoftheRussianFederation.Thatiswhy,inorder to eliminate terrorist and extremist propaganda on the Internet, it isnecessary to enhance international cooperation in this field to create acorrespondinginternationallegalbaseandtoworkouteffectivemechanismsforthisinteraction,andalsotogetridoftheso-calleddoublestandards.Clause12oftheUNGlobalCounter-TerrorismStrategycouldserveasabasisforthiswork.Itcalls on all countries “...to work with the United Nations, with due regard toconfidentiality, respecting human rights and in compliance with otherobligationsunderinternationallaw,toexplorewaysandmeansto:a)coordinateeffortsattheinternationalandregionalleveltocounterterrorisminallitsformsandmanifestationsonthe Internet;b)usethe Internetasa tool forcounteringthespreadofterrorism,whilerecognizingthatStatesmayrequireassistanceinthisregard...”.

Thus, increasingtheefficiencyofcounteringInternetuseforterroristpurposesrequires improving the legal base of its use; managing active informationexchange between law enforcement agencies; enhancing the interaction ofgovernment authorities with communications service providers andorganizations assisting in fighting Internet crimes; and working out themethodological recommendations for creating a unified procedure of therelevantauthorities’responsetopublishingillegalinformation.Operationally, Russian security forces have increased their efficiency to deterterroristattacksandincursionsinthebroaderNorthCaucasusregion,andmakepotential targets outside of this tumultuous area unattractive to terrorists byincreasing their securityandprotection.TheRussiangovernment continued tomake Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts a priority during all these years. Thiswas especially true in light of the incident-free February 2014 Sochi WinterOlympic Games, organized in proximity to areas of the North Caucasuswhereongoing violence and violent extremist activity had occurred, resulting inheightened concern over potential terrorist activity targeting the Games.Nevertheless, terrorist attacks related to problems in the North Caucasuscontinuedtooccur inRussia.Separatistsandviolent Islamistextremistscallingfor a Pan-Islamic Caliphate within the North Caucasus constituted the mainterroristthreat.Moreover, there are still many problems associated with the non-professionalism of law enforcement personnel. Unfortunately, these practicesaffectedthesituationofhumanrightsandfreedomsandtherightofexpression.The broad definition of terrorist activity provided by the 2006 law, whichincludes among other things “informational or other types of assistance” toterrorism, as well as the “propaganda of terrorist ideas, dissemination ofmaterials or information,which urge terrorist activity, substantiate and justifytheneedforsuchactivity”hashadachillingeffectonthefreedomofspeechandopendebateconcerningterrorism.Broadcastingorganizationsaredeterredfromcirculatingunofficialinformationaboutterroristattacksbythecriminalliabilityfor “justification of terrorism,” which was established by an amendment toRussia’s Criminal Code in July 2007. Furthermore, the regime of counter-terrorism operation, which does not require the declaration of a state ofemergency and is not subject to either international accountability orparliamentaryoversight,grantsenormoussurveillancepowerstosecurityforces

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and ultimate discretion to the chief of the counter-terrorist operation indetermining the area and duration of the operation. In this way, the new lawopensuppossibilitiesforinfringingonthebasicrightsofpeople.

The Russian government continued to use its “anti-extremism” legislation toprosecute peaceful individuals and organizations, including the politicalopposition, independentmedia,andcertainreligiousminorities.Despitehavingcounter-terrorism as its ostensible primary purpose, the law criminalizes abroad spectrum of activities, including incitement to “religious discord” and“assistance to extremism,” yet does not precisely define what is meant by“extremism.”The law includesnostipulation that threatsofviolenceoractsofviolence must accompany incitement to religious discord, for example. Thethreat of prosecution under Russia’s “anti-extremism” legislation has anintimidatingeffectthatresults inrestrictionof freedomofspeechandreligiousfreedomundertheguiseofcounteringterrorism.

On the other hand, in terms of success stories, we can cite that Russia issuedpassports compliant with the International Civil Aviation Organization/EuropeanUnion(ICAO/EU)withenhancedsecurityfeatures,suchasholographicimagesonthehardplasticbiographicdatapage.Russiancitizenshavetheoptionofreceivinga five-or ten-yearversion.AlthoughICAO/EU-compliantpassportswere introduced in 2010, the previous style of passport (containing aphotographlaminatedtoabio-datapage)continuestobeissuedandremainsinwidespread use, despite having fewer and less sophisticated security features.Recently,theRussiangovernmentmovedtofurtherstrengthensecurityfeatures,passingabillthatmandatestheinclusionoffingerprintdatainRussiancitizens’foreigntravelpassports.In conclusion, more analytical work needs to be done in order to improveunderstandingofcomplexscientificandmethodologicaltoolsforthesystematicprocessing and evaluation of data with the purpose of assessing strategicsituationsinthecountry,identifyingpatternsofcrimes,aswellasthecausesandconsequencesof criminalization.Suchendeavorswouldserve thedevelopmentofcounter-terrorismstrategiesatboththenationalandinternationallevels.

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WorkingTogetheragainstTerrorism–APerspectiveontheCollaborationoftheGermanAuthorities

BelindaHoffmannGermany isa federallystructurednation that includes16statesandalmost82million inhabitants. In 2014, almost 16.4 million people in Germany had animmigrationbackgroundeitherasfirst,secondorthirdgeneration.However,theyear 2015 saw an unusually high number of refugees coming toGermany andseekingasylum.TheFederalOfficeofStatisticsreportedthatnearlytwomillionpeoplehadenteredGermanybytheendoftheyear.Meanwhile,another860,000non-Germancitizenshadleftthecountry.Thismeansthatin2015alone,about1.14millionnon-Germancitizenshadcometoseekshelterandanewfutureforthemselvesandtheirfamilies,whichisthehighestnumberforanygivenyearinthehistoryofpost-WorldWarIIGermany.

Current estimates report that about four million inhabitants in Germany areMuslim.

TheGermanpoliceorganizationisdeeplyrootedwithinthenationalconstitution(orFundamentalLaw),andplacedwithintheresponsibilityoftheGermanstates.Each police force directly answers directly to its own state Ministry of theInterior,andconsequently,everyGermanstatehasitsownStateCriminalPolice(Landeskriminalamt–LKA).Inaddition,theFederalGovernmentcanmakeuseof the Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) and Federal Police(Bundespolizei). These police forces belong to the federal authorities and areplacedundertheresponsibilityoftheFederalMinistryoftheInterior.

Currently,Germanauthoritiesarefocusingonabout7,000high-riskindividualswho are considered to pose a substantial threat to national security, includingabout820foreignterroristfighters(FTF),ofwhichaboutone-fiftharefemales.Themajorityoftheseindividualsareyoungerthan30yearsold,andatleast140have been killed in action in Syria or Iraq. At this time, German authoritiesestimate that about 250-300 individuals from this group have returned toGermanysofar.Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal Ministry of the Interiorannouncedthat11Islamistattackplotshavebeenfoiled.

ResearchUnitforExtremismandTerrorism(FTE)

Asaconsequenceofthe9/11attacks,theFederalCriminalPolicedevelopedandimplemented its own interdisciplinary research unit focused on violentextremism and terrorism in 2003. As a joint academic and criminal policeinstitution, the goal of the unit is to combine researchers from various fieldsalong with police officers in their analytical work regarding individual crimecases, aswell as professional research on topics of high interest for the policeandauthorities.Usingthehighestacademicstandards,theoutputofthisunitisdirected at improving the police forces’ understanding of specific criminalphenomenaandhelpingtodevelopappropriatecounter-measures.

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Oneof themaingoalsof thisresearchunit is toanswerthequestion:Whyandhowdocertain individuals interact ina terroristorextremistenvironment thewaytheydo?

Serving the purpose of improving Germany’s counter-terrorismmeasures, theFTEisalsothemaincoordinatorforcrimepreventionintheareasofterrorismand violent extremism. The unit is active in various federal and localworkinggroupsandresearchprojectsinthefieldofcrimeprevention,andaddsitsownscientificexpertisetothedevelopmentofspecificandeffectivepreventivetoolsandmethods.

CurrentlytheFTEisdevelopingahandbookfocusingonanationalstrategyforcounteringviolentextremism(CVE).However,andduetothe federalstructureof the country, the FTE handbook can only function as a recommendationcharacterfortheotherstates.

The“JointCounter-TerrorismCenter”(GTAZ)Jihadi-inspired terrorism has created previously unknown challenges forGermanauthorities.The9/11attacksof2001demonstratedthehighthreatlevelposedby Jihadi terror groups and theneed for highly specialized anddetailedknowledge and expertise for effective counter-measures. In addition, thecombination and quick exchange of relevant information within the differentagencieswashighlightedasabsolutelyessential.

Consequentially, in 2004, the Federal Government introduced the new JointCounter-Terrorism Center (Gemeinsame Terrorismusabwehrzentrum – GTAZ)asatooltoensurecommunicationandcollaborationbetweentheauthoritiesanddifferentagencies.LocatedinBerlin,theGTAZisnotanindependentagency,buta joint cooperation and communication platform of 40 national securityinstitutions,whichmeansthatnoextralawhadtobepassedinordertocreateit.Each involvedagencydecideson theirown levelof cooperationbasedon theirownstate-level legal frameworkandsendsarepresentativetocooperateonanequallevelwiththeotherinstitutions,suchas:

• Federal Domestic Intelligence (Office for the Protection of theConstitution/BundesamtfürVerfassungssschutz–BfV)

• FederalCriminalPolice• Federal(foreign)IntelligenceService(Bundesnachrichtendienst–BND)• FederalProsecutorGeneral• FederalPolice• CustomsandBorderProtection• FederalOfficeforImmigrationandRefugeeAffairs• MilitaryIntelligence• StateIntelligenceAgencies(LandesämterfürVerfassungsschutz–LfV)• StateCriminalPolice

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In the last two or three years, a number of German states have acted upon aresolutionoftheConferenceofInteriorMinistersfrom2012andstartedtobuildtheir own coordination and competence centers to guide and steer their localderadicalizationandpreventionmeasuresinthefieldofIslamistextremismandterrorism.These state centers are verydifferent in their structure andnature;somearelocatedwithinSocialMinistries,somewithinInteriorMinistries,someare fully governmental,while others are based on public-private-partnerships.Ultimately,comparativeresearchfoundthatitisnotasrelevantforthesuccessof these coordination centers where they are located and what their specificstructure in detail is, but rather that they are designed to be interdisciplinary,sustainable and able to develop customized solutions. In addition, a robustnetwork of reliable partners alongwith consistent funding is essential for theeffectivenessofthesecenters.

Currently, the Federal Criminal Police is developing a CVEhandbook for thoseworking in prevention in Germany. Aiming to help establish quality standardsandnecessarybasicsforevaluation–whicharemissingintheGermanlandscape– the authorities hope that in thisway, a step forward can be taken to assurequalityoutput.Germany isoneof the fewWesterncountrieswithoutanationalpreventionorcounter-terrorism strategy. German politicians and experts in this field areindeed debating if this might be necessary or not. Whether or not a nationalstrategywill come to lifeany timesoon, it is important torecognize that therearenoone-size-fits-allsolutionsorperfectstrategies tocounter terrorism. It isnecessarytoanalyzeandunderstandthespecificthreat,aswellasthefeasibilityofpreventionmeasuresandtools,andtobuildsustainablenetworksbetweenallrelevantactors.Thisrequiresaroadmapforthedevelopmentofbindingqualitystandards for all German states in order to guarantee effective andcomprehensivepreventionandCVEworkinthishighlyimportantandriskyfield.

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Francevs.Jihadism:TheRepublicinaNewAgeofTerror

MarcHeckerandElieTenenbaum

The terrorist threat in France has dramatically increased since 2012, andespecially over the past two years. Several fatal attacks occurred during thisperiod: 17 people died in January 2015, 130 in November 2015 and 86 onBastille Day 2016. Other attacks, though less lethal, have also attractedsignificant media coverage. In June 2015, a man claiming to be part of the“IslamicState”organization(IS)beheadedhisbossandattemptedtoblowupachemicalplant.InJune2016,apolicemanandhiswifewerekilledintheirhome.Amonthlater,an85-year-oldpriestwasexecutedbytwomenduringachurchceremony in a small provincial town. In addition, at least a dozen attacks hadfailed or were thwarted, but which demonstrated that Jihadis could strikeanywhere,atanytime.

There are several reasons why France has become a prime target for Jihadigroups. In the past, groups such as the Algerian-based Islamic Armed Group(GIA),theSalafistGroupforPreachingandCombat(GSPC),andlateral-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM)allblamedFranceforitscolonialhistoryanditstieswith Algiers’ perceived infidel government. They also criticized the French forbeingimpiousandperverted.Today,ISputsaheavieremphasisonthesekindsof essentialist remarks. Furthermore, this organization targets Francespecificallyforthreereasons:First,JihadiscondemnFranceforits“anti-Muslimpolicies” at home. The “Islamic State” has repeatedly used the 2004 lawprohibitingreligioussignsinschoolsandthe2010lawbanningfacecoveringinpublic spaces – both voted on according to the French principle of laïcité– tounderline how Muslims are consistently humiliated in France. Second, JihadisfaultFrance for interveningmilitarily in theMuslimworld.France’soperationsinMali, IraqandSyriahavepredominantlybeenpointedout,assumptions thatpromptIStoclaimthatFranceiswagingawaragainstIslam.Consequently,theyview terrorist attacks on French soil as just reprisal. Finally, Jihadis target theFrench population – ofwhichMuslims represent approximately 8% – becausetheyviewFrenchsocietyasweakandextremelydivided.Jihadishopetocreatechaos, enabling them to extend their influence and eventually carry out theirorder.

TheFrenchWayofJihadOver the summer of 2016, several municipalities across France cancelledpopulareventsoutoffearofanattack.Forexample,thecityofLillecancelleditsannualgaragesaleandNicecancelledtheEuropeanroadcyclingchampionship.In turn, IS exploited these preventive measures to bolster its propagandamessages, insisting on having successfully spread fear across the country.295

295SeethesecondeditionofIS’sFrancophoneonlinemagazine,Daral-Islam,August2016,pp.26-27.

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Localauthoritiesbased theirdecisionon their inability toprotecthugecrowdsgiventhebreadthofthethreat.Jihadism looming over France may be outlined in the following four threatcategories:The most immediate threat originates from the wars in Syria and Iraq.AmongWestern states, France has the highest number of nationals that havejoinedJihadigroupsinSyriaandIraq.TheFrenchPrimeMinister,ManuelValls,presented alarming figures before the National Assembly on July 19, 2016,296notingthat680Frenchadults–athirdofwhichwerewomen–and420minorswere living in Syria or Iraq at the time. He added that 187more had died incombat there. When people return from war zones, authorities struggle todistinguish thosewho present a genuine threat from thosewho can integrateback into French society. For now, anyone returning from Syria is prosecuted,andmostindividualsareputintopre-trialcustody.InJune2016,theMinisterofJustice, Jean-Jacques Urvoas, revealed figures that highlight how France’sjudiciary system is facing an unprecedented challenge, stating that currentlythere are 317 legal proceedings being processed concerning people returningfromSyria.297In addition to the returnees identified by authorities, there is also the risk ofterroristsclandestinelyinfiltratingFrenchborders.TheNovember2015attacksexemplify thismenace. The nine terrorists that coordinated these attacks hadtrained with IS in the Middle East, returned to Europe unidentified, and thentraveled freely within the Schengen area. Some of them arrived with thehundreds of thousands of refugees that had fled to Europe over the course of2015. 298 Such a large influx of people proved difficult to manage. Later,investigators discovered that two of the three suicide-bombers that blewthemselvesupoutsideoftheStadedeFrancehadarrivedontheGreekIslandofLeroswithfakepassports,alongwithabout200refugees.The perpetrators of the November 13th attacks had obviously trained in aterrorist sanctuary. On that day, 3 commandos acting simultaneously killeddozens using suicide belts. This level of sophistication could not have beenreached had they only trained in France, where firearm sales are heavilycontrolledand it isnearly impossible topracticeshootingwithoutcatching theattentionofFrenchauthorities.Thus,solongasJihadigroupshavesanctuariesattheir command around the Mediterranean Sea, the threat will remain high inEurope.Today,the“IslamicState”istheorganizationmostlikelytosendfighterstocarryoutmoreattacks.ThisisreinforcedbythefactthataFrenchman,knownby thenomdeguerre Abou Souleiman al-Firansi, allegedly holds an importantpositionamongthoseresponsiblefororganizingattacksabroad.299

296 Full transcript of July 19, 2016 National Assembly session, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cri/2015-2016-extra/20161015.asp,pagevisitedonAugust24,2016.297Jean-Jacques Urvoas, hearing before the National Assembly, June 1, 2016. All hearingsreferencedinthisarticletookplaceundertheinquirycommissiononthegovernment’smeasuresimplementedsinceJanuary7,2015tofightterrorism.298Philippe Chadrys (deputy director in charge of anti-terrorism for France’s judiciary police),hearingbeforetheNationalAssembly,March9,2016.299“AbouSouleiman:l’émirfrançaisdeDaech”,TTU,n°1016,April13,2016.

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The threat of an attack operated by al-Qaeda should not be underestimatedeither.BycommittingaspectacularattackinaWesterncountry,al-Qaedawouldprove that it still competes against IS for the leadership of global Jihadism.Moreover,severalformerFrenchresidents,suchasDavidDrugeonandSaidArif(both killed byWestern air strikes in Syria in 2015) had joined the Khorasangroup,which is allegedly responsible foral-Qaeda’s foreignoperations. Finally,manyFrenchmenwhodecided to join Jihadiorganizationsabroadhavechosenal-QaedaoverIS.Forinstance,themainFrench-speakingrecruiter,OmarOmsen,hassuccessfullyrecruiteddozensofyoungFrenchmenintoal-Qaeda’snetworks.HewasveryactiveintheregionaroundNicebeforeheleftforSyria.HeisalsotheauthorofpropagandavideosthatwerewidelycirculatedacrosstheInternet.

The second type of threat emanates from the reactivation of older Jihadinetworks. Before the civil war in Syria, France already had a 30-year-longhistory of confrontation with Jihadism. Dozens of Frenchmen had trained inAfghanistan,Bosnia,Chechnya, Iraq,Sahel,SomaliaorYemen.However,Frenchauthoritiesonlyrecentlybecameconsciousof therisksthesemenengender. Inthepast,jailsentencesrarelyexceededafewyearsformenwhowerecaughtasthey returned from Jihad fronts, and only a fewmonths if theywere arrestedbeforeleaving.Forexample,inJanuary2009,WalidOthmaniwasinterceptedatCharlesDeGaulleairportwhenhereturned fromTurkey.Theauthorities laterfoundouthehadspent fivemonths ina trainingcampon theAfghan-Pakistanborder. During the investigation, he confessed to having learned how to shootautomaticweaponsandbuildexplosives.HewassentencedinFebruary2011tofive years of imprisonment, 30months of which was suspended. Judges werelenientastheythoughtOthmaniwas“becomingincreasinglyrespectfulofpublicorder.”300Hewas released soon afterwards, given that he had already spent asignificant amount of time in pre-trial custody. No later than April 2011, hevisitedSaidArif,whowasunderhousearrest in a smallprovincial town.Bothmen disappeared but were later identified in Syria, where Othmani waspurportedlykilledinearly2016.

BoubakeurelHakimisanotherJihadiwhoservedtimeinFrenchprisonsbeforeleaving forSyria.ThisFranco-Tunisianmanwashandedover toFranceby theSyrian authorities inMay 2005. The investigation disclosed that el Hakim hadfought in IraqandrecruitedotherFrenchmen,suchashisbrotherwhodied intheBattleofFallujah in2004.ElHakim told investigators that “attacksagainstAmericans or Iraqi police forces were legitimate” and that “Jihad shouldeventuallyresult in theestablishmentofanIslamicState.”301Hewassentencedin2008 to sevenyears inprison.Afterhewas released in2011, he joined theJihadigroupAnsaral-Shari’a inTunisia. In2015,elHakimgaveaninterviewtoDabiq, IS’sEnglish-speakingonlinemagazine,inwhichhetookcreditforkillingthe Tunisian Member of Parliament, Mohamed Brahmi, before heading toSyria.302

300“Ministère public contre Othmani, Aziri, Ghamri et autres”, Paris District Court, sentencedFebruary18,2011.301“Ministère public contre El Ayouni, Bouchnak, Benyettou et autres”, Paris District Court,sentencedMay14,2008.302“InterviewwithAbuMuqatil”,Dabiq,No.8,March2015.

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ChérifKouachiwasprosecutedat the same timeasBoubakeur elHakim.Theywerebothpartofthe“ButtesChaumont”Jihadinetwork,whichwasnamedaftertheParisianparkwhere the groupused toworkout.Kouachiwas arrested theday before he had intended to leave for Iraq in January 2005. In addition tofinding his flight tickets, the police discovered documents on Jihadism andsuicide attacks. The group leader, Farid Benyettou, told investigators thatKouachiwasready todie incombat.Despite thisconfession,Kouachiwasonlysentenced to three years of imprisonment, of which half was suspended. Tenyears after this arrest, he andhisbrother Said–who trainedwithal-Qaeda inYemen–committedtheattackagainstCharlieHebdo.AyearandahalfaftertheCharlieHebdomassacre,LarossiAbballabrokeintoapoliceman’s home inMagnanville, located in the suburbs of Paris. After killingthepoliceofficerandslaughteringhiswife,whilestreamingitliveonFacebook,Abballaquestionedwhetherhe shouldalsokill the couple’s3-year-old son.Hetoowasaformerconvictofterrorism.In2013,hehadbeensentencedtothreeyearsofimprisonment,with6monthsofitsuspended,forbeingpartofaFrenchJihadinetworkthatsentfighterstoPakistan.

Thirdly, France faces the threat of people who did not receive trainingabroadbutwereradicalizedathome.Theseindividualsareoftenreferredtoas “lone-wolves.” Yet, police investigations have shown that, in fact, they oftenretain tieswith other radicals through the Internet or in real life. The “home-grown” threathasbecomean increasing concernover thepast twoyears as ithas gradually become more difficult to leave Europe for Syria. What’s more,Jihadishaveencouragedtheirsupporterstotakeupactionindependently.ThesemessageshavebeenbroadcastbyimportantleaderssuchasIS’sspokesmanAbuMohammad al-Adnani – killed in August 2016 – as well as foot soldiers. Forexample, in February 2015, two francophone fighters broadcast a video, fromSalah al-Din’sWilaya in Iraq, urging French Muslims to perpetrate attacks athome.They claimed “Defend thehonorof yourProphet!Fight them,kill them![…]Spitatthem,burntheircars,burndowntheirpolicestations,don’teverpitythem.”303TheFrenchgovernmenthastriedtoidentifythepeoplewhomaybereceptivetothis kind of message. In 2015, a national database of suspected radicalizedindividuals was created, listing 13,000 persons by mid-2016. 304 Cases ofradicalizationhavebeenreportedthroughoutthecountry.ThroughtheInternet,IShasbeensuccessfulinreachingbigcitiesandtheirbanlieuesaswellasremoteruralareas.RadicalizationdoesnotonlyaffectmarginalizedMuslimswithpoorbackgrounds and lacking prospects for the future: all levels of society areconcerned. The French Member of Parliament, Sébastien Pietrasanta, wrote areport on deradicalization, in which he sampled 2,281 individuals tagged forradicalization.Hehighlightedthat25%wereminors,42%werewomenand56%were converts to Islam. According to him, “the new Jihad candidates are

303MarcHecker, “Web social et djihadisme.Dudiagnostic aux remèdes”,Focusstratégique,No.57,June2015,p.21.304OlivierdeMazières(headofthegeneralstaffforthepreventionofterrorism),hearingbeforetheNationalAssembly,May23,2016.

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increasingly young, come from various social backgrounds andmany have nocriminalrecord.”305Securityforcesdonothavethemeanstoconstantlymonitortheindividualswhohave been tagged for radicalization. The level of surveillance depends on howdangeroustheindividualispresumedtobe.Ofcourse,suchmeasurescanneverbecompletelyreliable.Forexample,thetwomenwhoslaughteredthepriestinJuly 2016 were included in the list. In addition, some resort to ‘taqqiya’, anArabicwordthatreferstoanactofdissimulation,inordertopreventthemfrombeingtaggedas‘radicalized’.ThisseemstobethecaseforMohamedLahouaiej-Bouhlel,whoranoverthecrowdwithatruckinNiceonJuly14,2016.Thepoliceonly knewof him for assaulting anotherdriver but never suspectedhim to beradicalized.The fourth threat comes from what French intelligence specialists call‘oblique attacks’. This refers to attacks committed in France by foreignnationals.Franceparticularlyfearstwoscenarios.ThefirstconsistsofEuropeannationals, taking advantage of free movement of people within the Schengenarea,committingattacksonFrenchterritory.Thisiswhatsomeoftheassailantsof the November 13th, 2015 attacks did. Among the nine terrorists who werekilled,twohadBelgiancitizenshipandtwootherswereresidinginBelgium.Theheadof the FrenchDomestic IntelligenceAgency (DGSI), PatrickCalvar, statedthat the attackers had only come to France from Belgium the day before theattacks.306Thus,itwasnearlyimpossiblefortheDGSItoidentifyandpreventtheterroristsfromperpetratingtheattacks.The secondscenarioFrance fears is the cultural andgeographicalproximityofthefrancophoneworld.Calvaropenlyacknowledgedthat“Weshouldnolongerthink in terms of French nationals or residents, but rather in terms of Frenchspeakers.ThousandsofTunisians,MoroccansandAlgerianscouldbesenttoourcountry.”Tunisia isaparticularlyworryingcase,giventhataround6,000of itsnationalsarethoughttohavefoughtinSyria.Calvaradded,“Myproblemisthatwehave noway ofmonitoring French speaking people coming fromNorthernAfrica.”Insum,JihadisuseafullspectrumofterrortacticstotryandundermineFrance.TheyrangefromindividualviolenceinspiredbyIS’spropagandatomuchmoresophisticatedattacksplannedfromwarzones.Inlightofthesesecuritythreats,France’smeasurestocombatterrorismhaveconstantlyevolvedsince2014.

TheFrenchWaronTerror

The January2015attacksonCharlieHebdo causedgreat tremorwithinFrenchpoliticallife.AlthoughthiswasnotFrance’sfirstencounterwithJihaditerrorism,itpromptedstrongerreactionswithincivilsocietythananyotherinthepast.Inthedaysfollowingtheattacks,millionsofpeoplemarchedthestreetsofFrance–along with dozens of leaders from all around the world – in opposition to

305SébastienPietrasanta,Ladéradicalisation,outildeluttecontreleterrorisme,reportdraftedfortheMinisteroftheInterior,June2015,p.8.306PatrickCalvar,hearingbeforetheNationalAssembly,May24,2016.

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terrorism and unconditional support for liberal values such as freedom ofexpression,whichmanyhadinterpretedasbeingtheJihadis’target.The unprecedented scale of the movement incited French political leaders towidely adopt the ‘Je suis Charlie’ slogan. This was originally used to showsolidaritywiththemagazineCharlieHebdo,whichhadbeenthefirsttargetoftheattacks.Although thismottowas supposed tounite all strataof society, itwasperceivedbysomeasconveyingasecularist–andevenantireligious–message.It was particularly true for a portion of French Muslims, who already feltstigmatized by themedia and discriminated against in the economy, and thuscouldnotfeeltheywerepartofthisunion.307Despite these unresolved tensions within French society, the Prime Minister,ManuelValls,deliveredawarlikespeechbeforetheParliament.HedeclaredthatFrancewas,fromthenon,engagedina“waragainstterrorism.”TheuseofthisBushian phrase by a French leader came as a surprise, as it had long beencastigatedbymostFrenchpoliticians.In2006,theexpressionwasevenformallyrejected in theWhite Paperon Internal Security and Terrorism. However, thewarring rhetoric slowly crept in as France increased its interventions abroad.NicolasSarkozy’sdecisiontostepupFrenchtroopsinAfghanistanin2008andFrançoisHollande’s choice to go towar inMali againstAQIM in January2013,both contributed to bolstering the idea of a French war on terror. Hollande’sDefense Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, was the first official to speak of a “waragainstIslamicterrorism,”withoutitattractingmuchattentionfromthepressatthetime.308ButitwastheNovember13thattacksthatreallytippedthebalance.Thesewereimmediately qualified as “acts of war” by President Hollande. In a dramaticaddresstotheNation,hedeclareda“stateofemergency,”whichhadonlybeendeclaredtwicesincetheendoftheAlgerianwar.InhisspeechbeforeCongressinVersaillesonNovember16th,thePresidentofferedtoamendtheConstitutioninorder to strip any French national convicted for terrorism of their citizenship.Thissuggestiontriggeredendlesspoliticalandmediadebates,whicheventuallyconvincedtheexecutivetogiveupitsattemptedreform.InFrance,unlikeintheUnitedStatesaftertheSeptember11,2001attacks, thethreatwasnotonlycomingfromabroad,butalsofromwithin,giventhatFrenchnationalshadturnedagainst theirowncountry.Theexpression ‘waronterror’wasthereforesomewhatassociatedwiththeideaofa ‘civilwar.’Thisdomesticdimension to Jihadism is actually part of the strategy, as it has been stated byJihadiideologuessuchasAbuMusabal-SuriorAbuBakrNaji,underthetermsofwaging a “war of enclaves.”309This led some right-wing politicians to refer toJihadis as France’s “fifth column.” TheArmy’s Chief of Staff did not hesitate totalk about an “enemywithin,” while the Chief of General Staff warned FrenchMPs against “a comprehensive project of political and religious subversion.”Jihadis, andespecially the “IslamicState”organization,were referred toby the

307EmmanuelTodd,QuiestCharlie?Sociologied’unecrise,Paris:LeSeuil,2015.308DavidRevaultd’Allonnes,LesguerresduPrésident,Paris:LeSeuil,2015.309GillesKepel,Terreurdansl’Hexagone,Paris:Gallimard,2016.

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Ministry of Defense, as a “terrorist army,” a “militarized threat,” whichwouldhavetoberespondedtoinkind.310YetPresidentHollandedidnotwait for theCharlieHebdoattacks tohappen tostart his “war on terror.” In January 2013, the French Army deployed 4,000troops to Mali to halt Jihadi armed groups advancing toward Bamako. In lessthan sixweeks, theFrench “liberated” thenorthernpart of the country,whichhadbeenlivingunderrigorousShari’alawforsixmonths.Parisknew,however,thataone-shotmilitaryvictorywouldnotputanendtoendemicJihadismintheregion. In agreementwith its local allies, France decided to adopt a “low-cost,long-endurance” approach in order to contain – rather than eradicate –terrorism.OperationBarkhane started in2014andstill comprisesabout3,500troopstoday.TheyarespreadthroughouttheSahelregion(Chad,BurkinaFaso,Mali,Mauritania andNiger) forming a small but highlymobile force. They aresupportedbyjetfighters,MQ-9Reaperdronesandattackhelicopters,whichcanstrikequicklyonlocallyimplantedterrorgroupssuchasAQIM,Al-MourabitouneorAnsaral-Dein.Franceisworkinghard,atthediplomatic-level,toencourageafrustratinglylongpeaceprocessinMali.Whiledoingso,itisalsotakingonakeymilitary assistance role in helping local forces build sustainable security.However, the situation in the Sahel region is deteriorating, which is why theFrench government is now considering a possible widening of the Barkhaneoperation. They intend to hold backBokoHaram’s northern expansion aroundLakeChadandcontaintheloomingthreatinsouthernLibya,whichhasbecomeanewsanctuaryforallkindsofJihadimovements.HoweverimportantAfricaistoFrenchstrategy,theMiddleEastiscertainlythetheatermostimmediatelyconnectedtothedomesticthreatinFrance.Eversincean internationalanti-ISIScoalitionwasformedunderAmericanpatronageoverthe summer of 2014, France has participated in air operations over Iraq. AcouplemonthsbeforetheNovember2015attacks,PresidentHollandereceivedintelligenceregardingterrorcellsplanningtoattackFrancefromIS-heldgroundinSyria.HethenunilaterallydecidedtoextendthestrikestoAl-Raqqah,invokingits right of self-defense. After theNovember attacks, the number of air strikesnearly doubled for the FrenchRafalesdeployed in Jordan and theUAE. As theCharlesdeGaullecarrierbattlegroupisdeployedinthePersianGulf,over3,500French soldiers are directly involved in the fight against the “Islamic State”organization. The French operation includes up to 40 jet fighters as well asapproximately500soldiersontheground,conductingartilleryfiresupportandtrainingmissionswiththeIraqiarmyinBaghdadandwithKurdishPeshmergainErbil.Butofallmilitarymissions,homelandsecurityhasbeenthemostconsuminginterms of personnel. A few days after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, FrançoisHollandedecidedtolaunchtheSentinelleoperation.Thisledtothedeploymentof 10,000 soldiers – 15% of the French Army’s operational land force – toperform internalsecuritymissions.Over time,Sentinellehashada tremendousimpactoncapabilities.Tomakeupforthenumbers, theHighCommandhadtoreduce training time by up to 30%. Although the government adapted quickly

310Conditionsd’emploidesarméeslorsqu’ellesinterviennentsurleterritoirenationalpourprotégerlapopulation,ReportoftheMinistryofDefensetotheParliament,March2016.

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andhadtheParliamentvoteonnewcredits for theArmy,additionalresourceswillonlypartiallyfillthegap.Beyond this numbers game, there have been recurring debates around thegenuine purpose of the mission. Due to judicial constraints, soldiers are notallowed to conduct intelligence missions, make arrests, or engage in kineticcounter-terroroperationsonmetropolitanterritory.Whatisleftoftheirmissionis lenientstreetpatrolling,andoccasionalstaticguardduties.Thishasbeenallthe more frustrating because the police, on its part, has become increasinglymilitarized.This,inturn,generatedthestrangefeelingofrolereversalwithinthemilitary.The police is certainly the one French institution that has attracted the mostpolitical attention since the anti-terror campaign started.While the institutionhad been reducing its numbers under former President Nicolas Sarkozy, thepolice has again become a priority for the current socialist president. AfterNovember2015,PresidentHollandecommittedtosafeguardthe“securitypact”– labeled after his own pre-electoral “growth pact” promise – by hiring 5,000new personnel to join the 240,000 French gendarmes and police personnelalreadyemployed.Special interventionteams(RAID,GIGNandBRI)havebeenontheriseastheywere allocated additional resources and are now distributed throughout thecountry. They should be able to get anywhere within less than 20 minutes.Regularpoliceunitsarenowalsobeingequippedwithassaultriflesandbullet-proofvests.Thismilitarization trend iswell-known in theUnitedStates,but isquitenewtoacountrylikeFrancewheretherearestrictregulationsonfirearmsales.AnewlawwaspassedinJune2016thatextendsthesecurityforces’rightto use deadly force beyond self-defense in the specific circumstances of aterroristattack.

The most spectacular transformation, however, has happened within theintelligencecommunity,whichhasgrown10%inthepastthreeyears.Thesectorhasfinallyrecoveredfromthe2008reformthatseriouslyharmeditsefficiency.Frenchdomesticintelligencehasparticularlysufferedfromthe2008disbandingof the century-old Renseignements Généraux, the police intelligence institutionwhichretainedathoroughknowledgeofFrenchcivilsociety.Itwasre-foundedin 2014 under the label of Renseignement Territorial. Its mission consists ofestablishingatightsurveillancegridthroughouttheterritory.Overall,theFrenchintelligencecommunityhasbeenpaying increasingattention toearlywarningsand weak signals detection. In the counter-terrorism field, these are usuallytagged under the “radicalization” banner. France’smajor domestic intelligenceagency, the DGSI has also benefitted from extended surveillance powers onpersonal data thanks to a law passed in July 2015. To many human rightsactivists,thislawamountedtoa“FrenchPatriotAct.”Thenumberofpreventiveactionsskyrocketedafterthestateofemergencywasdeclared. Born out of the Algerian war, this regime of exception temporarilytransfersjudicialattributionstotheexecutivepower.Althoughitrenouncedtheauthority topress censorship (present in the1955version), theupdated2015law gave authorities the right to summon suspects to house arrest, and orderpolicesearcheswithoutjudicialwarrant.Initsfirstsixmonthsofapplication,the

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stateofemergencyauthorizednearly3,500searches,400housearrestsandtheclosure of a dozen mosques. These measures have led to nearly 600 legalproceedings. However, only 5 individuals were charged with terrorism.Emergencyprocedureshavenot only been criticizedbyhuman rights activistsbutalsobytheNationalOmbudsmanJacquesToubon.Thelatter,whoisaformerMinister of Justice, claims that these measures encroach on civil liberties andjeopardize“socialcohesioninthecountry.”Operational efficiency has also been an issue. It would seem that emergencymeasures have a destabilizing impact on Jihadi networks in France, however,their efficiency has been rapidly dwindling because the terror cells theyweretargeting quickly adapted to the new context. 311 Doubts regarding theireffectiveness grew bigger as people found out that Adel Kermiche, one of theauthorsoftheJuly28attack,wasunderbothhousearrestandelectronictaggingbutwasstillfreetocomeandgoatcertaintimesoftheday.

Despitetheseshortfalls,Frenchdomesticintelligenceserviceshavethwartedatleast15terrorplotssince January2015.Oneshouldalsonotethat69counter-terrorismoperationshavebeen conducted fromabroad since January2013byFrance’sexternal intelligenceservice, theDGSE.Manyof theseoperationshavehelpedpreventattacksonFrenchsoil.312And,Franceisnotaloneinthefight.Itcoordinates closely with the United States, especially since the signing of abilateral agreement regarding intelligence sharing inFebruary2016.Europeancooperation is also improving. Europol has been empowered and created newdatabases regrouping Foreign Fighters. Though slow in its enactment, theEuropean Union is adopting the European Passenger Name Record. WithhundredsofthousandsofpeopleillegallycrossingtheEuropeanUnion’sbordersin2015,thecurrentrefugeecrisisalsopresentsaformidablesecuritychallenge,whichFrancecannotdealwithalone.

However,counter-terrorismmeasures inademocracycannotsolelydependonpolice and intelligence operations. To counter the current Jihadiwave, Francealso needs to cope with its judicial issues. Terrorism as a criminal offenseenteredFrenchlawin1986.Aspecializedpublicprosecutionoffice,responsiblefor leading investigations, was also created at that time. Although this anti-terrorist section was sufficient to handle a relatively scarce quantity of casesuntil 2012, it is nowoverwhelmedbecauseof themassively increasingFrenchJihadithreat.Thenumberofcaseshasquintupledsince2012,andlawsuitshavebecome increasingly complex. For example, the lawsuit pertaining to theNovember attacks already has a list of 500 plaintiffs. The saturation hasworsenedwiththeseriesofanti-terroristlaws,allofwhichcreatednewchargesandmodified others such as “individual terrorism” (specially directed at “lonewolf” profiles), “apology of terrorism” (especially online), or even “repeatedvisits to terrorist websites.” This piling up of new offenses contributed to thesaturationoftheunder-resourcedjudicialsystemthatcomprisesonlynineanti-terrorismjudgesforthewholecountry.

311SébastienPietrasanta,RapportfaitaunomdelaCommissiond’Enquêterelativeauxmoyensmisenœuvrepar l’Étatpour luttercontre le terrorismedepuis le7 janvier2015, National Assembly,July5,2016,p.263.312BernardBajolet(headoftheDGSE),hearingbeforetheNationalAssembly,May24,2016.

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Relatedly,prisonsmay in factbe theweakest link in thesecuritychain.Frenchjailsarefacedwithnewchallengeswithmorethan260terrorismconvictsandatleast1,500“radicalized”inmatesincarcerated.Beyondthepreviouslymentionedproblem tied to the length of sentences, the penitentiary system is confrontedwith a major radicalization problem due to the wide circulation of pro-Jihadimediacontentwithinpenitentiaryestablishmentsandtheproselytizingbehaviorofsomeconvicts.ThelattertrytoconvertpettycriminalsintoJihadiswithintheprisons.Therefore,FrenchprisonsareincreasinglyperceivedasthenumberoneincubatorofJihad.

Tocurtailthistrend,theMinistryofJusticehasengineeredanevaluationgridtohelpdetectconvictsthathavealreadybeen,orarebeing,“radicalized.”Afterthisstage,prisonersaretobecloselymonitoredbyspecialpenitentiaryintelligenceservices that received additional resources since January2015. Small teamsofsocialworkers, psychologists and imams acting asMuslim chaplains have alsobeen hired to help deal with these convicts. The Ministry of Justice is alsoconductinganexperimentinfiveprisons,whichconsistsofseparatingterrorismconvicts so they can no longer preach their extremist views to other inmates.Some convicts are also invited to attend a tailored program made up ofindividual interviews and thematic seminars intended to help them questiontheirviewsregardingissuessuchasfaith,geopolitics,citizenship,etc..Althoughtheprogramwaslaunchedrecently, ithasalreadybeenseverelycriticized.InaJune 2016 report, the chief prison inspector stressed the great disparitiesbetweenthedifferentprogramsandthefailuretoeffectivelyisolatethetargetedconvicts. 313 At the end of October, the Minister of Justice announced thesuspensionofthisexperiment.Despite these shortcomings, prisons seem to have served as laboratories of“deradicalization”forpoliciesappliedtotherestofsociety.InMay2016,PrimeMinister Manuel Valls announced a new “anti-radicalization plan,” whichannounced the inauguration of 10 “reinsertion centers” by the end of 2017.These facilities were created for individuals who are not subject toimprisonment,because theyeitherdidnotcommitanycrimeoragainstwhomno reliable evidence was found. In the future, they might also serve as an“airlock”forex-convictsattheendoftheirsentencetime.Thefirstpilotfacilityopened lastsummer in Indre-et-Loire. Itshouldbeable tohost,onavoluntarybasis, around thirty former aspiring Jihadis who sought to join Jihad in Syria.Anothercentershouldbeoperationalbefore theendof theyear,whichshouldhost individuals returning from foreign theaters of operation who were notfoundtohavetakenpartincombatorviolatinghumanrights.This almost “medicalized” approach to counter-radicalization is heavilyinfluenced by a long history of French anti-cult policies. It has already beenvigorously criticized for being a naïve, patronizing and hopeless attempt to“cure”–somemaysay“brainwash”–Jihadisasiftheyweretheabusedvictimsofsome sort of mental indoctrination. Specialists on Islam and some securityexpertshavecalled,onthecontrary,toacknowledgetheideologicalconsistencyof the Jihadi discourse. They have advised their audience to consider

313 Radicalisation islamiste en milieu carcéral, Rapport du Contrôleur général des lieux deprivationdeliberté,June7,2016.

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radicalization as a serious challenge for Western democracies. Such aperspectivewouldgivewaytoamoretraditionalviewof“ideologicalstruggle”ora“warofideas”aswitnessedinthepast.314

Agoodexampleofthismorepoliticalapproachisstop-dJihadisme.fr,whichwaslaunched at the end of January 2015. It is a governmental website aimed atdeconstructing the Jihadi discourse. It has used video clips to target a wideraudiencethroughsocialmedia.Civilsocietyand/orclandestineserviceactivitiesmay be participating in this new psychological warfare by engaging in morecovert forms of “grey” and “black” counter-propaganda. Moderate Muslimleadersarealsobeingsolicitedtojointhefightagainstviolentextremism.This ideological approach to counter-radicalization also raises concerns aboutthepossiblecontinuumbetween Jihadismandotherrigoristbranchesof Islam,andespeciallytheSalafischoolofthought.ThereisariskinfightingJihadiideasthat may overlap with those of other non-violent fundamentalist movements.ThismayfurthermarginalizeawiderspectrumofFrenchMuslimswhoalreadyfeel stigmatized by an allegedly anti-Muslim climate. With this perspective inmind, “radicalization” may become a central political issue, functioning asmultiplierofexistingsocialtensions.

ConclusionThecurrentFrenchAdministrationhascertainlybeenthemostactiveinfightingterrorism. However, the threats originating from both within and outside thecountry remain extremelyhigh.As the “Islamic State” organization in Iraq andSyriaisslowlydwindling,theflowofreturningJihadiswilllikelyincrease.ISmaybetemptedtomakeupforitsterritoriallossbycommittingspectacularattacksin theWest. France is also challenged internally. Itmustdealwithunrelentingsocialandreligioustensions,butalso,morepragmatically;itmustdealwiththefact that80%of terrorismconvictswillbereleasedover thenext fiveyears.315Thisundoubtedlycastsanominousshadowoverthefuture.

Jihadis intend to trigger a spiral of violence that will allow them to convinceFrenchMuslimsthattheyhavebeenrejectedbytheirveryowngovernmentandsociety. This spiraling scenario has been pointed out by the head of France’smain domestic intelligence agency. He fears that the next attack will fosterviolent reaction on the part of far-right hate groups. At the other end of thespectrum,thefar-lefthasalsobecomeincreasinglyviolent,astheyareupsetbytheemergencymeasuresandobsessedwiththeirfearofarising“police-state”inthecountry.Theanswer to thesechallengesobviously lies ina strongnationalresilience. However, given the upcomingMay 2017 presidential election, withthe far-rightontheriseandthedivisionswithinparties,nationalcohesionwillbeseriouslytested.

314Philippe-Joseph Salazar, Paroles armées: Comprendre et combattre la propagande terroriste,Paris:Lemieux,2015.315DidierLeBret(NationalIntelligenceCoordinator),hearingbeforetheNationalAssembly,May18,2016.

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BuildingLocalCapacityonaGlobalScale:CollaborationthroughtheStrongCitiesNetwork

JonathanBirdwellThispapersetsoutanargumentforcollaborationbetweenlocalauthoritiesandpractitioners topreventandcounterviolentextremismonaglobal scale.Aftermorethanadecadeofpoliciesandapproachesto tacklerecruitment toviolentextremism, theviewamongexpertsandpolicymakers inEuropehas coalescedaround the importance of locally coordinated, multi-agency approaches topreventingandcounteringviolentextremism.

This paper outlines the role of local authorities, focusing on the UK as a casestudy.Localauthoritieshaveplayedacriticalrole inthe implementationoftheUK’s ‘Prevent Strategy’ for nearly a decade. Local authorities lead thegovernment’s ‘Channel’ program, in which a multi-agency team that receivesreferralsofpeople thought toberadicalized,makesanassessmentof risk,anddesignsandimplementsinterventionsthatofteninvolveone-on-onementoring.WhiletheexperienceoftheUKmaynotbedirectlycomparable,theexperienceandlessonslearnedbyUKlocalauthoritiesoverthepastdecadeofPreventcanstillholdvalueformunicipalitiesacrosstheworld.Itiswiththisneedforglobalcollaboration at the municipal level that the Strong Cities Network wasestablishedin2015.The Strong Cities Network is the first ever global network of local politicalleaders and practitioners working together on the prevention of violentextremism.TheNetworkisrunbytheInstituteforStrategicDialogueandseekstoincreaseon-the-ground,activecollaborationbetweenmunicipalitiesacrossallglobalregions.Asanexampleof this, theStrongCitiesNetwork is facilitatingatwo-year pilot project currently in its initial stages, which will establishpartnerships and exchanges between municipalities in Denmark andmunicipalities in Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia, in the effort to support thedevelopment of municipality-coordinated, multi-agency approaches toprevention.

TheThreat:GlobalandLocal

Recruitmenttoviolentextremismcontinuestobetheprimarysecurityconcernofgovernmentsaroundtheworld.Al-Qaeda,al-Shabaab,BokoHaram,andmostrecently the “Islamic State” organization (IS or Da’esh) are differentmanifestationsofthesameviolent ideologywhichhasseducedthousandsfromallregionsoftheworld.TheSoufanGrouphasestimatedthatattheendof2015,between27,000and31,000people fromat least86countries traveledtoSyriaand Iraq to join IS and other violent extremist groups.While Tunisia (6,000),Saudi Arabia (2,500), Russia (2,400), Turkey (2,100) and Jordan (2,000)wereidentifiedasthelargestsourcecountriesforforeignfighters,over10,000peoplefromWestern Europe and the former Soviet Republics have travelled to Syriaand Iraq to join IS as foreign fighters, and it isbelieved that20-30per centof

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these individualshave returned to theirhome countries, presenting a complexsecuritychallenge.316In addition to threats from IS attacks, Europe is also contending withxenophobic,farrightextremistindividualsandgroups.Whiletherehasyettobethesamelevelofterroristviolencefromthefarright,withtheexceptionoftheattackinNorwayin2011byAndersBreivik,socialmediaisfullofviolent,racistpropagandaand‘echochambers’espousingviolencetowardsMuslims,Jewsandother ethnic and religious groups; andhate crimes, violence and arson attacksareontheriseacrossEurope.Thishasbeenexacerbatedbytheso-calledrefugee/ migrant crisis in Europe emanating from the wars in Syria and Iraq. TheinterplaybetweenIslamistextremismandfarrightextremismhaspromptedtheconceptof ‘cumulativeextremism’,withbothgroupsand ideologiesreinforcingandexacerbatingtheother.

The challenge of extremist groups and foreign fighters is not evenly spreadthroughoutcountriesandmunicipalities.Somemunicipalitieshavesignificantlyhigher levelsofextremistgroupsandnumbersof foreign fighters.Socialmediahasenabledtherecruitmentof isolatedindividuals,butthemajoritytendtobeclustered in physical areas – often communities on the outskirts of largemunicipalities. The Soufan Group points to ‘hotbeds of recruitment’, includingtheLislebydistrictofFredrikstadinNorway,BizerteandBenGardaneinTunisia,Derna in Libya, the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, and the district ofMolenbeek inBrussels.317

Thisunderlinestheneedfordevelopinglocalapproaches–withinthecontextofa national framework and strategy – in areas of high concern. In particular,acrossEuropethereareexamplesofmulti-agencypreventionteamsoperatingatalocallevel,oftencoordinatedbythelocalgovernmentandinvolvingeducation,social services, youth services and community police officers. Known as SSP(StabilizationandSecurityPolicyDepartment)inDenmarkorChannel‘panels’intheUK,theseteamstrainfrontlineworkers–includingteachers,socialworkers,youthworkers,andcommunitygroups–onhowtospotsignsofvulnerabilitytoradicalizationandwhat todo if thereareconcerns.Onceareferral is received,the local multi-agency team makes an assessment, decides whether anintervention or further support or action is required, and helps to design andmanagethatinterventionifitisdeemednecessary.Interventionsoftentaketheformofone-on-onementoring,butcanalsoincludeholisticapproachesthatcanincludesupportineducation,employmentandhousing.In the UK, the Conservative Government introduced a new Prevent statutorydutyforall frontlineworkerstoreportconcernsaboutradicalizationaspartoftheirsafeguardingrequirements.ThishasledtoariseinthenumberofreferralstoChannel,andarguably,moreindividualsreceivingsupportbeforethey’vebeendrawn into an extremist ideology. TheGovernment contends that Channel has

316The Soufan Group (2015) Foreign Fighters – An updated assessment of the flow of foreignfightersintoSyriaandIraq.December2015.Online:http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.317TheSoufanGroup,ForeignFighters:AnUpdatedAssessmentoftheFlowofForeignFightersintoSyriaandIraq,TSG,December2015,availableat:http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate_FINAL.pdf

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turned around the lives of hundreds of people at risk of being drawn intoradicalization.Below is an outline of the evolutionof theUKPrevent Strategy,includingChannelandtheroleoflocalauthoritiesintheUK.

CaseStudy:UK‘Prevent’andChannel

The UK was the first country to launch a national strategy to prevent‘homegrown’ violent extremism, introduced by the Labour Governmentfollowing the attacks on the London Underground on 7th July 2005. TheGovernment’scounter-terrorismstrategy,knownasCONTEST,waspublishedin2006withvariousmeasuresaimedatprevention.This included thePreventingViolentExtremism:WinningHeartsandMinds strategy,whichwas institutedbythe Department for Communities and Local Government, a police PreventStrategy and Delivery Plan, and the introduction of Channel, a multi-agencyapproach to ‘identify thoseat risk fromviolent extremismandprovidehelp tothem’. The Prevent Strategy was revised in 2007 ‘based on a morecomprehensiveunderstandingofthefactorsdrivingradicalizationintheUKandoverseas’, and included efforts to challenge the ideology, disrupt those whopromote it, support individuals vulnerable to the ideology, increase theresilienceofvulnerablecommunities,andaddressrealorperceivedgrievances,both international and local. These changes were outlined in the revisedCONTEST strategy, published under then Prime Minister Gordon Brown’sGovernmentin2009.318

Since its inception, the Prevent Strategy has been controversial and facedaccusations of treating all British Muslims as ‘suspects’ and being used as avehicle for spying. The inclusion of programs aimed at social cohesion – or‘buildingtheresilienceofvulnerablecommunities’,asthethen-governmentputit in the 2009 CONTEST strategy – led to criticism that the strategy wassecuritizing issues of integration and social cohesion and damaging relationsbetweenthegovernmentandBritishMuslims.

In2010, theCoalitionGovernment initiatedareviewofthePreventStrategy.ArevisedPreventStrategywaspublishedin2011.Thisversionaimedtoaddressprevious criticisms by removing social cohesion and non-violent extremismprograms from Prevent. According to the 2011 Strategy, ‘Prevent must notassumecontroloforallocatefundingtointegrationprojectswhichhaveavaluefar wider than security and counter terrorism: the Government will notsecuritizeitsintegrationstrategy’.319Conservative policy makers also instituted further changes to the PreventStrategy.TheycriticizedPreventforworkingwithindividualsandorganizationswithquestionableviews,forexampleregardinggendersegregationandattitudes 318HerMajesty’sGovernment,PursuePreventProtectPrepare:TheUnitedKingdom’sStrategyforCounteringInternationalTerrorism,HMG,March2009,availableat:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228644/7547.pdf319HerMajesty’sGovernment,PreventStrategy,PresentedtoParliamentbytheSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,June2011,availableat:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

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towards homosexuals and other groups. The 2011 Strategy thus instituted arequirement for organizations working under ‘Prevent’ to abide by ‘values ofuniversal human rights, equality before the law, and democracy and fullparticipation in our society’. Therewas also a greater emphasis placed on theneed for organizations receiving government funds for ‘prevention’ and‘deradicalization’todemonstrateevidenceoftheimpactoftheirprograms.

TheguidingprinciplesofPreventasoutlinedin2011include:

• Theneedtoaddressallformsofterrorismandviolentextremism,buttoallocateresourcesproportionatetothethreat.

• Commitmenttofreedomofspeech,butalsoeffortstochallengeextremist– including non-violent extremist – ideas that are seen as part of aterroristideology.

• Policies to deal with non-violent extremism, as well as issues ofintegration, are not part of Prevent and are coordinated by a separategovernmentdepartment.

• Community and local authorities have a key role to play, but must becoordinated with central government departments due to violentextremismbeinganationalsecurityissue.

• There are three main areas of Prevent expenditure, including localprojects (coordinated by local authorities), policing and Prevent workoverseas.

• Localprojects fundedbyPreventneed tobemore rigorouslyevaluated,andshouldnotinvolveorganizationswithextremebeliefsandviews.

The2011Strategyalso focusedon threecorepillarsofwork:1)responding tothe ideologicalchallengeand thosewhopromote it;2)preventingpeople frombeingdrawnintoterrorism;and3)workingwithsectorsandinstitutionswheretherearerisksofradicalization.The work of the first strategic aim is led by the Research, Information andCommunicationUnit(RICU)withintheOfficeofSecurityandCounter-Terrorismwithin the Home Office. It was recently revealed publicly that RICU has beensupportingcommunityorganizations inproducingandrunningcommunicationcampaigns involving ‘counter-narratives’ and ‘alternative-narratives’ thatexplicitly and implicitly undermine the arguments of extremist groups.According to theGovernment, communitygroupsproducinganddisseminatingcounter-narrativeswith the assistanceofRICUhave generatedover25millionviewssinceJanuary2014.

In terms of the second and third strategic aims of Prevent, the Governmentintroducedanewstatutoryduty for all frontlineworkers– including teachers,social workers, psychologists and doctors – to report individuals who wereperceived to be at risk of radicalization. With their election in 2015, theConservative Government introduced the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act2015,includingthisnewdutyonpublic-facingbodiestohave‘dueregardtotheneedtopreventpeoplefrombeingdrawnintoterrorism’.In the UK, frontline workers including teachers, childcare providers, socialworkers,youthworkersandmentalhealthspecialistshavelegalrequirementsto‘safeguard’ children by reporting concerns regarding physical or sexual abuse,

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for example. The Prevent statutory duty requires public institutions andfrontlineworkerstoincluderadicalizationintotheirsafeguardingdutiesandtoundergotrainingontheriskindicatorsofradicalization.AccordingtotheHomeOffice,450,000frontlineworkershavebeentrainedtodate inspottingsignsofradicalization. The Home Office has also produced an e-learning tool and anonlineportalcalled‘EducateAgainstHate’withadviceandcurriculummaterialsforteachersatwww.educateagainsthate.com.WhilesomecriticsofPreventhavearguedthatthenewstatutorydutyhashadachilling effect on free speech and debate on these issues in schools, thegovernmentexplicitlystatesintheirstrategythatschoolsshouldbesafespaceswherechildrenandyoungpeoplecanunderstand,discussanddebatesensitivetopics,includingterrorismandextremism.TherehasbeennoresearchreleasedpubliclytodateabouttheimpactofthePreventdutyonfreespeechanddebateinschools.

IsPreventWorking?

Preventionofrecruitmenttoviolentextremismisanewandcontroversialpolicyarea.Measuringtheimpactofpoliciesandprogramsinthisareaanddeterminingiftheyare‘working’isextremelydifficult.

AsidefromisolatedinstancessuchasthekillingofArmyDrummerLeeRigbyin2013, the UK has not suffered a large-scale attack since the 7/7 bombings.Multipleplotshavebeendisruptedandhundredsofpeoplehavebeenarrestedand charged with terrorism offenses. However, estimates suggest thatapproximately700peoplehavetravelledfromtheUKtofightandlivewiththe“IslamicState”andotherviolentextremistgroupsinSyriaandIraq.WhilesomecriticsusethesefigurestosuggestthatPreventisnotworking,itispossiblethatthenumberofforeignfighterscouldhavebeensubstantiallyhigherifnotfortheactionsundertakenthroughPrevent.PartofthedifficultyofdeterminingwhetherPreventiseffectiveisthatmuchofthedataishighlysensitiveandisthustightlycontrolledbytheUKHomeOffice.FreedomofInformationrequestshaverecentlyrevealedthenumberofreferralsthat have been received by Channel, the UK’s multi-agency program forsupportingthosevulnerabletoradicalization,andhowthishasbeenaffectedbythestatutoryduty.

The data provided by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in response to aFreedom of Information Request shows that a total of 4,007 people werereferredtotheChannelprogramin2015.Thenumberofreferrals,includingagebreakdowns,ispresentedinTable1below.Thedataalsorevealsthenumberofreferralswhoweredeemedtoneedsupportoranintervention.

ThedatashowsanotableincreaseinthenumberofreferralsreceivedafterthestatutorydutywasmadelawinJune2015:suggestinga50percentincreaseinreferrals.However,thedataalsorevealsthatwhilethenumberofreferralsrosesubstantially, thenumberdeemedasneedingsupportdecreased– from116to91.

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Table1.DatafromtheChannelProgramfor2015,providedbytheNationalPoliceChiefs’Councilon10May2016inresponsetoFreedomofRequestofInformation. Numberofreferrals Number of referrals assessed as

needingsupport

Jan–Jun2015

Jun–Dec2015

Total Jan–Jun2015

Jun–Dec2015

Total

Total 1,602 2,405 4,007 116 91 207

Total under-18

819 1,251 2,070 N/A N/A N/A

0-9 93 169 262 N/A N/A N/A

10-14 296 575 1,133 N/A N/A N/A

15-17 430 507 937 N/A N/A N/A

Overall, only 5 per cent of those referred to Channel in 2015 were deemedsufficiently radicalized or at risk of radicalization in order to receive support.While government sourceshave recognized that there are effortsunderway toimprovethisconversionrate,thegovernmentalsoarguesthatitisproofthatthesystemisworkingandissufficientlycarefulanddiscerning:thatChannelexpertswhoassesscasesarenotover-prescribingradicalizationinterventions.While the low conversion rate suggests that more work is needed to trainfrontlineworkersinspottingthesignsofradicalizationcorrectly,itcouldbethat,withaphenomenonascomplexasradicalization,anexpertmulti-agencypanelisinevitablybetterplacedtomakeanin-depthassessment.

More data is needed tomake a full assessment of Channel’s effectiveness andimpact.Forexample, further research isneeded into the impacton individualswho are falsely referred to Channel – that is, the 95 per cent assessed as notneeding further support. However, often due to age, the details of theseindividualsareunderstandablyhighlysensitiveandnotavailabletoresearchers.

The2015datadoeshoweverpresentapotentiallyusefulbaselinefromwhichtomeasuretheUK’sapproachovertime.Datafrom2016willshedfurtherlightontheeffectofthestatutorydutyandtheoperationofChannelanditseffectiveness.

Nonetheless, while there is a limit to what data can be released publicly,facilitating local authorities in theUK to share their experiences regarding theoperation of Channel directly with local authorities from other countries andregionsisessentialtobuildingcapacityforpreventionofviolentextremismonaglobalscale.

The experience in the UK highlights the need for strong coordination andcollaboration–bothbetweennationalandlocalgovernments,butalsobetweenagencies and stakeholders at the local level that may have little experienceworking together.Theseexperiences canhelpothermunicipalitiesaddress thefollowingissues:

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• How do you create and encourage multi-agency work, across agenciesincluding social services, employment and education, housing, mentalhealth and police? What potential cultural clashes exist across thesedifferentagencies,andwhoshouldlead?

• Howdoyoucreateareferralsystemforthosewhomaybevulnerabletoradicalization that has the confidence of frontline workers, as well ascommunitygroupsandparents?

• What are themost effective approaches to building trust between localauthorities and communities, which may feel marginalized andmistrustful towards government policies – particularly with respect toprevention?

• What do real-world examples and case studies, derived from theexperiences of local authorities, reveal about the phenomenon ofradicalizationandwhattypesofinterventionsaremosteffective?

While thepowerand roleof local authoritiesmaybe radicallydifferent acrossdifferentculturesandglobalregions,thebelief intheneedforlocal,preventiveapproaches – tailored to the context and the local threat – is beginning to bemorewidelyspread.

Building Local, Multi-Agency Approaches through the Strong CitiesNetwork

Experiences in the UK and elsewhere have led to the firm belief that localgovernments must play a key role in preventing and countering violentextremism in all its forms.While the work of police, security and intelligenceservices is indispensable, increasing investment in ‘soft’ preventive measurescanultimatelyreducetheneedfor ‘harder’,morecoerciveinterventionsbylawenforcementandintelligenceserviceswhichareultimatelymoreexpensiveandcoulddofurtherharmtotherelationshipbetweenthestateanditscitizens.‘Soft’ prevention efforts often involve everything from engagement with faithcommunities and NGOs, to government strategic communications, and one-to-oneinterventionswiththosealreadyradicalizedorintheinitialstages,aswiththe Channel Program. While there is a consensus on the need for preventionstrategies,fundamentalargumentsremainontopicssuchas:theroleofideologyand religion in the radicalization and deradicalization processes; whether‘deradicalization’orthechangingofone’sbeliefs ispossibleandsomethingthegovernment should try to do, rather than emphasizing ‘disengagement’ frompotentialharmfulactivities;whethercommunicationsandcounter-narrativestodissuadeindividualsbygovernmentsorNGOsareeffective;andhowtoprovidesupportforNGOsandgrassrootsorganizationstoworkontheseissueswithoutunderminingtheircredibility.Nonetheless,thereisagreatdealthatallcountriesandcitiescanlearnfromeachotherinthisfight.In recent years, a variety of international networks have been established tofacilitate a process of global information exchange on countering violentextremismbetweennationalgovernments,suchastheGlobalCounter-TerrorismForum(GCTF).320Yet, it isvital that informationandexpertise sharedbetween 320https://www.thegctf.org/home

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nation-states trickles down to the cities and municipalities which are beingincreasingly tasked with designing, implementing and measuring localpreventiveapproaches.

TheStrongCitiesNetworkwaslaunchedtoprovideadirectnetworkforsharingandcapacity-buildingbetweencitiesandlocalauthoritiesonaglobalscale.Withacurrentmembershipoffiftycitiesandregions,theStrongCitiesNetworkdrawson a diversity of local experience dealing with everything from Islamistextremismandforeignfighterstoleft-andright-wingextremism,gangviolence,ethnicandinter-communalconflict,animalrightsandotherformsofsingle-issueviolent extremism. Across these challenges, the focus of the Strong CitiesNetwork is on ‘soft’ prevention measures that can build social cohesion andresiliencetoviolentandharmfulactivities.WhiletheNetworkonlylaunchedinSeptember2015,lessonslearnedfromthiscollaborationarealreadystartingtoemerge.

Forexample,ourinterviewswithothercitymemberssuggestthatmunicipality-driven prevention efforts are most successful when they are able to harnessexisting institutional knowledge, whether from crime prevention, health,education or social work sectors. While there may be need for specialistknowledgeabouttheideologyattheheartofaviolentextremistgroup,effectiveinterventionswith individualsat riskof radicalizationcandeliveredby trainedmentors,psychologists,youthworkers,religiousleadersandsocialworkers.Themost important thing is developing a trusting relationshipwith the individualidentifiedasneedingsupport,andfindingtherightsupportpackageto fit theircircumstance.

A second insight to emerge is that building trust within communities, andproducing effective local communications strategies is a challenge almostubiquitous to local and municipal efforts to prevent and counter violentextremism.Oftencitieshaveparticularcommunitieswherethisismostsensitive,andevencitieswithwell-establishedstrategiesstillconsideralackoftrusttobeasignificantbarriertoimplementation.Thisiswherelocalapproachesareoftenbest placed to change attitudes and build positive and inclusive messaging.Insightsfromcitiesandregionsacrosstheworldsuggestthatengagementmustfirst begin by addressing the grievances ofmarginalized communities throughtangibleandvisibleprograms.Onlyoncetrustingrelationshipsarebuiltcanthemoredifficultconversationsaroundpreventionofviolentextremismbefruitful.

A third challenge concerns the relationship between national and localgovernment stakeholders. Cities have varying levels of political autonomy inpreventing violent extremism, but it is important to recognizewhere nationalpolicy can impede localpracticeasmuchas it is todemonstratehow it canbesupportive. To this end, the Strong Cities Network provides the space forempowering cities to take the initiative and better understand how they canadaptnationalorinternationaldemandstotheirlocalsettingsandinturninformnationalpolicymakingontheseissues.

It remains to be seen how far approaches now accepted as best practice inEurope–forexample,involvingtheroleofmunicipality-led‘multi-agencyteams’,such as Channel in the UK or the SSPmodel in Denmark – can be adapted toregionsliketheMiddleEastorNorthAfrica,wherethepowersofmunicipalities

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tendtobemore limited.Effortsareunderway,suchasaStrongCitiesNetworktwo-yearpilotprojectsupportedby theDanishMinistryofForeignAffairs thatwillfacilitateon-the-groundexchangesofbestpracticebetweenmunicipalitiesinLebanon,JordanandTunisia,andmunicipalitiesinDenmark.The aim of the Strong Cities Network is not to provide a ‘one-size-fits-all’blueprint to prevention at the local level. Rather, the aim is to enable andgalvanize cities to learn from one another and be better placed to tailor theirown approaches to the needs and challenges facing their respectivecommunities.

For more information on the Strong Cities Network, including how your city ortowncanbecomeamember,pleasevisitwww.strongcitiesnetwork.org.

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CollaboratingagainstTerrorisminEuropeKristianBartholin

In2015and2016,countriesintheMiddleEast,NorthAfricaandEuropefacedaseries of extremely violent terrorist attacks perpetrated on the orders of, orinspiredby, the so-called “Islamic State”, andmainlydirected at “soft”, civiliantargets.Manymoreterroristattackswereunderpreparation,butwerestoppedin their tracksbeforebeingbrought to fruitionthroughthe interventionof lawenforcementagenciesofvariouscountries.Theinstinctiveandunderstandableresponsetoterroristattacksonthisscaleisacallforvisiblyincreasedsecurityatborders,onthestreetsofcities,andinpublictransportation, but even though such measures may provide an immediatefeeling of security, there is no real guarantee that they will prevent futureterrorist attacks from being carried out by determined assailants, prepared todie.However, if imposed indefinitely and taken to their extreme, such securitymeasures will gradually restrict the freedoms of everyone and profoundlychangesociety.Balancing the legitimate need for the state to provide security for its citizenswith the equally legitimate need to protect fundamental human rights andsafeguardtheprincipleofruleoflawisasdifficultasitisvitaltoanycountry.Terrorismconstitutesoneofthemostseriousthreatstothepeacefulenjoymentof human rights and, through its destabilizing effects, to the veryworkings ofdemocracy.The response to terrorism should therefore be firm, but targeted andproportionate.Terroristsmust,wheneverpossible,bebroughttojustice.Onlybyobservinghumanrightsstandardsandscrupulouslyapplyingtheruleof lawinthe fight against terrorism can the fallacies of terrorismbe exposed and thoseforces that want to intimidate people into submission to their apocalyptictyrannybedefeated.

Terrorismhasbeenaroundforalongtime,andtheCouncilofEuropehasbeenactiveinthecounter-terrorismfieldsincethemid-1970s.In1978theEuropeanConvention on the Suppression of Terrorism entered force. It is essentially atechnicaltreatyontheprovisionofmutuallegalassistanceinterrorismcases.In 2002, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted“Guidelinesonhuman rights and the fight against terrorism.”These guidelinesdealwithallaspectsofcounter-terrorismmeasures,fromdetentionofsuspectstoasylumlaw,andarestill thecornerstoneof theCouncilofEurope’scounter-terrorismpolicy.2005sawtheadditionofthreenewinstruments,namelytheCouncilofEuropeConventiononthePreventionofTerrorism;theCouncilofEuropeConventiononLaundering,Search,SeizureandConfiscationoftheProceedsfromCrimeandonthe Financing of Terrorism; and Recommendation Rec(2005)10 of theCommittee of Ministers to member states on the use of “special investigationtechniques” in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism. The

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conventionon thepreventionof terrorismand therecommendationonspecialinvestigationtechniquesaretheonlylegalinstrumentsintheirfieldglobally,andareassuchbeingwidelyreferredtoandusedasinspirationinotherpartsoftheworld.The convention on the prevention of terrorism deals with national andinternational measures to prevent terrorism, protect and compensate victims,the provision of mutual legal assistance in terrorism cases, the exchange ofinformation between Parties, and equally important, the criminalization of theacts of “public provocation to commit a terrorist offense,” “recruitment [ofothers] for terrorism,” and “training [of others] for terrorism.”The conventionalso provides for human rights safeguards to be observed by Parties in itsapplication.OnOctober22nd,2015, theCouncilofEuropeopenedanAdditionalProtocol totheCouncilofEuropeConventiononthePreventionofTerrorismforsignatureinRiga,Latvia.Sofar,22statesandtheEuropeanUnionhavesignedthisProtocol.The European Union, at this occasion, also signed the Council of EuropeConventiononthePreventionofTerrorismitself.

The additional protocol supplements the mother convention with a series ofprovisions criminalizing acts related to the phenomenon of “foreign terroristfighters,” in particular the acts of “travelling abroad for the purpose ofterrorism,” “funding travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism,” and“organizing or otherwise facilitating travelling abroad for the purpose ofterrorism.”AllofthesecriminallawprovisionsarebasedontheUNSCR2178ofSeptember24th,2014.However,unliketheUNSCR2178,theprovisionsarenotaimed only at travel to particular regions or conflict zones, but to all travelundertakenforthepurposeofterrorism.

Moreover,theadditionalprotocolprovidesforthecriminalizationoftheactsof“participating in an association or group for the purpose of terrorism” and“receiving of training for terrorism,” thereby closing a loophole in theinternationallegalframeworkgoverningcounter-terrorismmeasures.

Like themother convention, the additional protocol obliges Parties to observehumanrightssafeguardswhenapplyingtheprotocol.

Theadditionalprotocolalsoforeseestheestablishmentofanetworkofcontactpoints operated on a 24/7 basis for the exchange of police informationconcerning confirmed or suspected “foreign terrorist fighters.” The aim is tostrengthentheabilityofPartiestointerceptsuchpersonsbeforetheyreachtheirdestination,andtoobtainduewarningoftheirreturn.

In dealingwith the danger posed by “foreign terrorist fighters,” time is of theessence, and the entry into force and subsequent application of the additionalprotocol must be considered as a conditio sine qua non for dealing effectivelywith the threats to all European and neighboring states posed by the criminalactivitiesof“foreignterroristfighters.”

On May 19th, 2015, The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Council of EuropememberstatesadoptedanActionPlan for the “fightagainstviolentextremismandradicalizationleadingtoterrorism”coveringtheperiod2015-2017.

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The Action Plan enumerates a series of targetedmeasures that the Council ofEurope will take to assist its member states in preventing and suppressingradicalization,violentextremismandterrorismwhilerespectinghumanrights.

First among these measures is the additional protocol, described above, butothermeasuresareforeseen:

Closelyrelated to the issueof “foreign terrorist fighters” is thephenomenonof“terrorists acting alone.” The recent terror attacks in Europe and in the USperpetrated by persons affiliated with the “Islamic State” organization amplydemonstrateachangeintacticsamongJihadigroupsfromtraditionalcell-basedactivities to attacks carried out by more loosely connected groups or evencouplesorindividuals.

Terrorists operating outside of traditional cell structures are obviously moredifficult to detect at an early stage (this was also the case for the right-wingterrorist,AndersBehringBreivik, inNorwayin2011).TheCouncilofEuropeiscommitted to assist its member states in providing guidelines on how toefficientlypreventandsuppressthisparticularmodusoperandiofterrorism.TheCouncil of Europe Steering Committee on counter-terrorism matters, theCODEXTER,willat itsnextmeetinginMay2016discussthetermsofreferencefor a drafting group to be established with a view to elaborating arecommendationonterroristsactingalone.Asdoctorsproverbiallysay,anounceofpreventionisworthapoundofcure!Inaddition to criminal law measures, there is need to increase the focus onpreventingradicalizationinthefirstplace.For example, European prisons are considered hotbeds of radicalization, andexperts stress the urgent need to involve prison and probation services inidentifyinganddealingwithradicalizedoffenderssusceptible to joiningviolentmovementsandideologies.

TheCouncilofEuropehasaccordinglydevelopedasetof“Guidelinesforprisonandprobationservicesregardingradicalizationandviolentextremism”aimedatproviding a framework for member states to devise appropriate counter-radicalization policies in conformitywith the Council of Europe standards andprinciplesrelatedtotheruleoflawandhumanrightsprotection.

TheGuidelines,whichareexpectedtobeadoptedbytheCommitteeofMinistersin March 2016, contain definitions of the terms “radicalization,” “violentextremism,” and “dynamic security.” They also state that inadequate detentionconditions and overcrowding can be factors that increase the risk ofradicalizationinprison.

WhileimplementingthemeasuresforeseenintheCouncilofEuropeActionPlan,theCODEXTER is simultaneouslyundertakinga seriesofother complementaryactionsfortheyears2016and2017.

Firstly, the CODEXTER is currently engaged in revising the 2005 Council ofEurope recommendation on the use of “special investigation techniques” inrelationtoseriouscrimes,includingterrorism.Therevisionwilllookintotheuseof new technologies and special investigation techniques on the Internet,

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includingonfinancialmatters.Theworkisexpectedtobefinalizedbytheendofthisyear.Indeed,theabuseoftheInternetandsocialmediaforterroristpurposesisarealproblem,whichrequiresacomprehensiveapproachthattakesintoaccountboththe need to provide security and the need to protect privacy and freedom ofexpression. The CODEXTER intends to examine these issues in depth andattemptto identifyequitablesolutions.Amongthe issuestobecoveredaretheproblemspertainingtoencryption,theblockingandtakingdownofwebsitesorsocialmedia accounts usedby terrorist groups, aswell as how to identify andbringtojusticethepersonsbehindtheIPaddressesusedforterrorismpurposes.Obviously, the successful outcome of this exercise will depend on bringingtogether all interested parties to discuss how best to overcome the manyproblemscurrentlybeingexperienced.

Secondly, the CODEXTER will examine the problems related to the lack of aninternationallyagreeduponlegaldefinitionofterrorism.Experienceshowsthatnot having an agreed legal definition of terrorism is a huge obstacle forinternational cooperation on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters andextraditionofsuspects.Finally, another legal problem concerns the application of criminal lawprovisions on terrorism and international humanitarian law, in tandem, insituationswherea terroristgroupoperates in thecontextofanarmedconflict.Themodus operandi of the “Islamic State” organization, al-Shabaab and BokoHaramhasbrought thisproblemto the fore,blurring the linesbetweenarmedconflict and terrorism.TheCODEXTER intends toexamine thisproblemwithaview to ensuring that asmany avenues of prosecution as possible are open toStates,andthat“foreignterroristfighters”willnotbeabletohidefromcriminalprosecution behind the privileges of combatant status. The aim, as always,remainstoensurethatterroristsarebroughttojustice.

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AbouttheAuthors

AhmedZaghloulShalata isan independentEgyptianresearcher in the fieldofIslamist movements. He has worked as a media editor for the websitesIslamOnline and Islamiyun.net websites. He also worked as an associateresearcherfortheCenterofStudiesandEconomic,Legal,andSocialDocuments(Centre d'études et de documentation économiques, juridiques et sociales,CEDEJ) in Egypt (2011-2014), and the WAFAW Program of the EuropeanResearchCouncilinFranceinMay2015.Shalatahasnumerouspublications andstudies,including:“TheCaseofContemporarySalafisminEgypt,”“IslamistsandtheRevolution,”and“TheAlexandriaSalafistCall:ThePathsoftheOrganizationandImpactofPolitics.”

AwadhAl-Badi,Ph.D.,isanAdvisorandSeniorScholaratKingFaisalCenterforResearchandIslamicStudiesinRiyadh,SaudiArabia.HeservedastheDirectorofResearchat thesamecenter from1999to2010.He isa lecturerand facultymemberattheInstituteofDiplomaticStudiesoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsinRiyadh, Saudi Arabia. His research and publications focus on the history ofdiplomacy in the Middle East, international and regional politics, regionalsecurity,andSaudiArabia’sforeignpolicy.BelindaHoffmannisaSpecialAdvisorfortheCrimePreventionStrategyattheMinistryoftheInteriorofBaden-WürttemberginGermany.SheistheDirectoroftheCoordinationCenterforthePreventionNetworkagainst(Islamic)Extremismin Baden-Württemberg (KPEBW). She holds a B.A. in “Police Law and PoliceAdministration”fromthePoliceUniversityofBaden-Württemberg,Germany. Elie Tenenbaum is coordinator of IFRI’s Defense Research Unit. His researchfocuses on guerrilla and irregularwarfare aswell as onmilitary interventionsand expeditionary forces. He is a member of the editorial board of the RevueDéfenseNationale.HeholdsaPh.D.inHistoryfromSciencesPoParis.

Eric Rosand is a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Program atBrookingsanditsProjectonUSRelationswiththeIslamicWorld.Heisalsothedirector of “The Prevention Project: Organizing against Violent Extremism”based at the Global Center on Cooperative Security in Washington, DC. Hisresearch focuses on countering violent extremism (CVE) and strengtheninginternationalcooperationagainstterrorism.Hewasformerlyaseniorofficialinthe US Department of State where he served as the Department’s policycoordinator for the White House CVE Summit and its follow-up process, andhelpedspearheadthedesignandestablishmentoftheGlobalCounter-TerrorismForum and its related institutions, including Hedayah Center and the GlobalCommunityEngagementandResilienceFund.

HassanAbuHanieh isaresearcherspecializing in Islamicmovementsandhasauthorednumerousbooksandpublications in the field, including “WomenandPolitics:FromthePerspectiveofIslamicMovementsinJordan,”“SufismandSufiOrders: God’s Spiritual Paths – Adaptation and Renewal in the Context ofModernization,” and he co-authored “The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordanafter Al-Zarqawi: Identity, Leadership Crisis, and Obscured Vision,”“Conservative Salafism: A Strategy for the ‘Islamization of Society’ and an

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Ambiguous Relationship with the State,” “The ‘Islamic Solution’ in Jordan:Islamists, the State, and the Ventures of Democracy and Security,” and “The‘Islamic State’ Organization: The Sunni Crisis and the Struggle of GlobalJihadism.”Hussein al-Rawashdeh is a columnist with the Jordanian Ad-Dustour dailynewspaper.

JonathanBirdwell isHeadofPolicyandResearchat the Institute forStrategicDialogue (ISD), London, United Kingdom.He holds anM.Sc. in Philosophy andPublicPolicy fromtheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience(LSE),United Kingdom, and a B.A. in Philosophy and a B.A. in Political Science fromTulaneUniversity,NewOrleans,Louisiana.HepreviouslyworkedasaresearcheratDemos inLondon,andsubsequentlyasHeadof theCitizenshipandPoliticalParticipationProgramandSeniorResearcher.Hewrotenumerousarticles andreports on populism in Europe, radicalization among Muslims in the UK, andmanyothertopics. Khalid Chegraoui, Ph.D., is a professor at the African Studies Institute atMohammedVUniversityinRabat,andisanexpertinAfricansecurityaffairs.

KristianBartholinhasbeenDeputyHeadoftheCounter-TerrorismDivisionatthe Council of Europe since 2012. He focuses on international cooperation –primarilyat theEuropean level.Hisprofessionalspecialization is intheareaofinternal security (integrated border management, criminal law, counter-terrorism) and in human rights law. He has been working for the Council ofEuropesince2007,andhadpreviouslyworkedwiththeEuropeanCommissionand the Danish Government. He holds an M.A. in Law and a B.A. in ClassicalPhilologyfromtheUniversityofCopenhagen,Denmark. Marc Hecker is the Director of Publications at the French Institute ofInternationalRelations(IFRI,Paris)andEditor-in-ChiefofPolitiqueétrangère.HeisaresearchfellowatIFRI’sCenterforSecurityStudiesandteachesacourseonterrorism at Sciences Po Paris. He wrote several books including War 2.0(Praeger, 2009 with Thomas Rid) and Intifada française? (Ellipses, 2012). Heholds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

MohammadAbuRumman isa researcherspecializing inpolitical thoughtandIslamicmovementsattheCenterforStrategicStudiesattheUniversityofJordan.HeholdsaPh.D.inPoliticalTheoryfromtheFacultyofEconomicsandPoliticalScienceatCairoUniversity.AbuRummanisacolumnist fortheJordaniandailynewspaperal-Ghad,andhasauthorednumerousbooksandpublications.

Nabil Al-Bakiri is a Yemeni journalist and researcher specializing in Islamicmovements and thought and international strategies, and has worked with anumber of international think tanks. From 2012 to 2015, he headed the ArabForumforStudiesinSana’a.HeholdsaMaster’sdegreeinPoliticalSocietyandaBachelor’sdegreeinArabicLanguageandTranslationfromSana’aUniversity,anAdvancedDiploma in Political Society from theUniversity of Damascus, and aDiploma in Journalismwith the BBC. He has numerous publications, including“Political Sectarianism: A Reading into the Yemeni Situation,” and the

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forthcomingbook“PoliticalArgumentsandReligionintheExperienceoftheAl-IslahIslamistParty.”NikolaySukhov,Ph.D., isaresearcherattheInstituteofOrientalStudiesattheRussianAcademyofSciencesandAssociateProfessoratthePeoples’FriendshipUniversity of Russia. His research focuses on Russian-Arab humanitarian andintercultural communication, Russian-speaking communities inArab countries,interrelationsoftribesandclans,structuresofself-governance,theirimportanceand influence, the relationships between local and central authorities,modernsociopolitical transformations in Arab countries as well as security andpeacemaking issues.Heauthoredstudieson the theoryof the “Caliphatestate”andthehistoryofRussian-Arabhumanitarianandinterculturalrelations.Healsopublishedseveralarticlesonthe“ArabSpring”anddraftedgovernmentreports. Sami Brahem is a researcher in Islamicmovements. Heworked in the “SalafiPhenomenon” Unit of the Geopolitical Division at the Tunisian Institute forStrategicStudiesfrom2012-2014,andcontributedto JihadiSalafisminTunisia:Present and Future, a collection of research studies on the Jihadi Salafistphenomenonpublishedin2014.HeholdsaMaster’sdegreefromtheFacultyofArts and Humanities at Manouba University (2005). He also served as aconsultantfortheUnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforWesternAsia (ESCWA) from 2011 to 2013. He is the author of many books andpublications,mostnotably“ReligionandPolitics.”

Yassir Abd Al-Hussein Al-Darweesh heads the Biladi Center for StrategicStudies and Research in Baghdad, Iraq and is the Editor-in-Chief ofAl-Mas’alaStrategic Studies Journal. He holds a Ph.D. in International Studies from theUniversityofBaghdad,withadissertationentitled“TheRoleofLeadershipinUSForeign Policy 1991-2013” and a Master’s degree in Political Science, with athesis entitled “The US Homeland Security Council and Its Role in Decision-Making.” He authored numerous articles and publications, including: “TurkishForeignPolicy in theEraofAhmetDavutoğlu:A Studyof Future Iraqi-TurkishRelations,”“TheRoleofDiplomacyinForeignPolicy,”“IraqiElections2014,”“USNationalSecurityCouncilbetweenBushandObama,” and “Terrorism,NationalSecurity,andTheoreticalFoundations,”amongothers.