the history of the special adviser in the department of an taoiseach 1993-2013: a critical...

7/27/2019 The History of the Special Adviser in the Department of An Taoiseach 1993-2013: A Critical Analysis into their Role

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The History of the Special Adviser in the Department

of An Taoiseach 1993-2013:

A Critical Analysis into their Role and Influence

MA Public Affairs and Political Communication

Keith Hoare

28/08/2013


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION I

ABSTRACT II

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS III

INTRODUCTION .. 1The Context. 1Special Advisers- A Brief Outline.. 2Terminological Clarification............... 3Research Focus 3

` Outline of Dissertation Chapters......... 4

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 61.1 Defining Special Advisers.. 6

1.2 The Emergence of Special Advisers.. 71.3 The Irish Case: The Programme Manager System............ 101.4 The Role and Functions of Special Advisers. 12The role of the Special Adviser in the UK; from Wilson to Blair 12The Irish Context.. 141.5 Special Advisers & the Civil Service; A conflictual relationship? 151.6 The Influence of Special Advisers. 171.7 Summary 19

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 20

2.1 Introduction 202.2 Research Methods Used. 202.3 Difficulties Encountered. 222.4 Data Collection and Triangulation.. 232.5 Countering Participant and Respondent Bias. 242.6 Research Ethics.. 25

CHAPTER 3: THE PROGRAMME MANAGER SYSTEM 263.1 The Reynolds/Spring Coalition 1993-1994 263.2 The Rainbow Coalition: The Programme Manager System Lives


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On. 313.3 Summary of Research Findings. 34

CHAPTER 4: THE INFLUENCE OF SPECIAL ADVISERS.. 36

4.1 The Influence of Advisers.. 364.2 Summary of Research Findings 39

CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF SPECIAL ADVISERS.. 415.1 Introduction 415.2 A Multi-Dimensional Role 425.3 The Growth in Political Communication 455.4 Summary of Research Findings. 48

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.. 50

Research Conclusions... 50History of Special Advisers.. 50The Influence of Special Advisers 51The Role of Special Advisers... 51Recommendations for Future Research 52

BIBLIOGRAPHY 54


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DECLARATION

I hereby cer ti fy that this mater ial, which I now submit for

assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of

Master's Degree (MA) in Public Affairs and Political

Communication

I s enti rely my own work and has not been submi tted for assessment

for any academic purpose other than in partial ful f i lment for that

stated above.

Signed . (Student)

Date .


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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the history of the special adviser in Irish politics

from 1993-2013. With a specific focus being placed on the current and former special

advisers who have served in the Department of An Taoiseach over the last two decades, their

stories, insights and reflections will provide an insider knowledge that, with few exceptions,

have been recorded and presented in the public domain. This study provides a greater

empirical and practical understanding into the role of these advisers, who represent a

mysterious yet fascinating area of politics.

The paper begins with a brief outline of the history of special advisers and sets the context of

the subject matter. Chapter one contains an extensive academic critique of the political

theories and empirical data surrounding special advisers. It features a comparison of advisers

in the UK and Ireland. Chapter two discusses the research methodology used in collecting the

data through primary and secondary sources. Chapters three, four and five critically analyse

the research findings, which are followed by the authors concluding remarks and

recommendations for future research.


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to sincerely thank my thesis supervisor, Kevin Hora, for his unwavering support and

direction over the past few months and whose teaching continues to inspire all those who

walk through his door. I also want to express my deep thanks to all those who kindly afforded

me their time and for sharing their personal and professional insights and reflections with me.

A special word of gratitude must go to my parents, Noel and Josephine, who have put me

through four years of college, and especially to my father for his weekly words of wisdom; I

hope to be able to pay it all back someday!

And finally, I want to dedicate this thesis to my late grandparents, Eddie James and Peggy,

whose memories remain vibrant and who continue to be the source of my motivation.


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INTRODUCTION

The Context

The use of external advice in Irish politics has been closely aligned with the increasing

formation of coalition government that has characterised the past half century. The

Cosgrave/Corish Fine Gael-Labour coalition of 1973-1977 appointed six ministerial advisers

to provide ministers with non-departmental advice (Connaughton 2010: 349). Appointments

also occurred under the administrations led by Jack Lynch and Garrett Fitzgerald (OMalley

1996: 5-7).

Michael ORegan, parliamentary correspondent with The Irish Times, gives an account of the

political atmosphere then and now:

Jack Lynch appointed an economic advisor from outside the civil service in 1970, MartinODonoghue, then a professor of economics from Trinity College, which was quite unique atthe time. In the post-arms ard fheis speech, Lynch had nobody to draft a script for him withinthe party structure; he had civil servants as Taoiseach but, as party leader, he couldnt involve

them. He asked David Marcus, literary editor of The Irish Press to draft the speech. Timemoves on, and Lynch appoints Frank Dunlop in 1973 as the partys first press officer. Thegrowth of special advisers and press officers since those days has been enormous. Dr. PatrickHillery had no one but a civil servant to take press queries, now Michael D Higgins has twopress officers.

(Interview with Michael ORegan)

The programme manager system that was introduced by the Fianna Fil-Labour coalition

government of 1993-1994 witnessed the greatest move towards the institutionalisation of thepresence of outside political advisers in Irish politics. However, the mixed results that it

brought to both parties have affected the special adviser system that has emerged since. The

Public Service Management Act of 1997, brought in under Bertie Ahern, significantly

reduced the number of special advisers to one per minister, with the exception of the

Taoiseach and the Tnaiste, who each kept a programme manager.


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The Travers Report of 2005, which investigated the illegal charges for nursing home

residents, highlighted shortcomings at a political level, with bold recommendations on how

special advisers ought to operate when dealing with the civil service:

Special advisors to the minister, appointed to the department for no longer than the ministersterm of office in the department, are not part of the line management system of thedepartment. The briefing of special advisors by department officials and the fact that specialadvisors attend particular meetings should not be considered, and should not be accepted as,an alternative to the direct briefing of the minister on important areas of policy and operation.

(Travers Report 2005: 85)

Over time, there has been a perception that the role of these advisers has become more

political than policy focused. Claims of spin-doctoring and kite-flying have become part of

the modern view of special advisers. In 2002, an Irish Independent story that featured a

number of stories on Bertie Aherns special advisers, including Gerry Hickey, his programme

manager, highlighted the view of advisers from the outside:

At a basic salary of172,982, Gerry Hickey is head of Bertie Aherns hidden government,

the highly paid coterie of advisers, political strategists and spin-doctors who live and work inthe secret world of briefings, leaks and off-the-record denials.

(Collins & Reilly,Irish Independent, 2002)

The economic and financial crisis has also contributed to the growing scrutiny of the type of

advice that ministers and Taoisigh receive. Despite this attention, very little is known about

their role, place and influence within the central decision-making mechanisms of our

democracy.

Special Advisers- A Brief Outline

This paper seeks to lift the uncertainty surrounding the role and place of the special adviser in

Irish politics. Their coverage in the press has been largely restricted to their salaries. But,


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given the centrality of these advisers in the centre of power, surely it is reasonable to advance

the idea that there is a much more substantive issue worthy of academic attention.

There is no doubt that public perception today towards advisers is rather negative and,arguably, has been helped in no small part by the roles played by both Alastair Campbell and

Jonathan Powell under Tony Blairs reign as British Prime Minister. For these two advisers,

their position of influence was so great that they were awarded executive powers over an

independent civil service. Much of the academic discussion on political advisers has thus

concentrated on the United Kingdom. In Ireland, there is little academic and far less public

understanding of their place in our democracy.

Terminological Clarification

As will be evident from chapter one, there is little academic grounding for a robust and

inclusive definition of the special adviser. Many terms such as special adviser,

ministerial adviser/confidant, programme manager and political adviser have been

used interchangeably by academics and media commentators. For the purposes of consistency

and in line with interview respondents, the author has chosen to use the word special

adviser and adviser interchangeably. Other references, including to the term programme

manager, will be specific to a particular period in time and is distinct from the special

adviser, as will be explained.

Research Focus

The central research aim of this study is to provide a greater empirical and, equally, practical

understanding of the role of the special adviser in Irish politics. This objective will be realised

by focusing on a selection of the special advisers who have served in the Department of An

Taoiseach and within the wider government from 1993-2013. This time period has been


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purposely chosen to widen the scope of the research across various administrations. It also

marks the two decades that have seen the greatest growth in the prominence of outside

political advisers in the history of the State. Furthermore, by analysing the role of these

advisers within a specific defined period, it is hoped that any trends and changes can be

objectively examined and identified.

While the time period of the research focus is considerable, the author has, where practicable,

interviewed special advisers who have served in the Department of An Taoiseach in order to

give the research a more defined and pinpoint focus.

Outline of Dissertation Chapters

The remainder of this paper will be structured into several distinct chapters. Chapter one

contains an extensive academic analysis of the political theories and empirical data on special

advisers. To give the reader a true and contextual understanding of the key issues involved in

a discussion on special advisers, the author has chosen to compare and contrast the special

adviser in the UK and Ireland. The key issues touched on include the emergence of special

advisers, a definition of the special adviser, their perceived influence, their relationship with

the civil service and crucially their role in the day-to-day operation of government.

Chapter two includes a full breakdown of the research approach taken. It features the various

primary and secondary sources that have been used to gather the research that underpins this

study, as well as the ethical guidelines such research requires. Additionally, it will include a

personal evaluation of the difficulties encountered during the research process, as well as the

academic reasoning for choosing a qualitative approach. Chapter three will analyse the

programme manager system that spanned the period 1993-1997. The influence of special

advisers in Ireland will be examined in chapter four, while chapter five presents an analysis


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of their role. Finally, the papers concluding remarks will be presented, which include the

authors recommendations for the appropriate direction of future research on special advisers.


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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Defining Political Advisers

Descriptions of political advisers are quite interchangeable depending on which jurisdiction

one is referring to. In Canada, they are referred to as exempt staff; in the UK, they are known

as special advisers; while in Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, they are recognised as

ministerial advisers. Regardless of their titles, these advisers have become an established and

essential part of the executive branch of government in the community of Westminster

political systems (Shaw & Eichbaum 2012: 1). Maley refers to their prominence as one of

the most significant examples of institutional innovation within Westminster political

systems (2011: 1469).

Andrew Blicks work is an exception in the literature, in that it addresses who these special

advisers are, what it is they do, and how their effectiveness can be improved. Blick

distinguishes special advisers from earlier ministerial confidants by defining them as

temporary civil servants of party political association, drawn from beyond the civil service

but employed within it (2004: 64). The temporary nature of special advisers is derived from

their loyalty to one individual minister, as Connaughton points out in her survey of Irish

ministerial advisers in the 2002-2007 Fianna Fil-led administration;

83.3 percent of advisers surveyed had worked with only one minister. The practice offollowing one minister to departments conjures an image of a bodyguard, but the notion of aminder type role demonstrates the reality that ministers need help with their responsibilitiesand wish to receive assistance and support from individuals they know and trust.

(Connaughton 2010: 356)

However, there remains the need for a more rigorous and narrow definition of special

advisers, and it is from here that the literature can develop a comprehensive analysis of their


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role and functions (Lowe 2005: 501). While Blicks definition implies a sense of partisanship

on the special advisers part (2004: 64), it does not explain the many non-partisan advisers

that have emerged in cabinet systems like that of Belgium, where recent trends have shown a

demand for greater technical advice. The use of non-partisan advisers also had its place in

Ireland. Some programme managers have served Taoisigh and ministers from different

parties. Similarly, the literature does not provide a definition of special advisers that

distinguishes the expert special adviser, the non-expert political adviser, and the disinterested

expert (Lowe 2005: 502).

Lowe draws attention to another significant weakness in the literature: the absence of any

distinction between the special adviser appointed by an individual minister and the Prime

Ministers special adviser(2005: 502). This is particularly relevant to the United Kingdom,

where the No. 10 Policy Unit was established to increase the central capacity of government

which prime minister required to maintain, let alone increase, their effectiveness (Lowe

2005: 502). This paper seeks to shed light on this disparity by critically examining the

evolving role of the special adviser in the Department of the Taoiseach.

1.2 The Emergence of Special Advisers

The arrival of special advisers in Ireland can be associated with a number of significant

developments in the structure of modern government. The introduction of junior ministers in

1978 proved to be a significant departure from the status quo of using parliamentary

secretaries to support the work of senior ministers. A number of other variables have played

no small part in creating a greater demand for special advisers, including a greater

personalisation of politics and a centralisation of decision making within political parties. The

demands of new media have resulted in a move away from traditional methods of political

communication adopted by parties to one where the leader is the principal projector of a


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partys image (Mughan & Bean 1989: 1165). With the intense focus on political leaders by

the media especially through television, where politics is presented as more personalised

(Aarts et al. 2011:19-21) the argument that there has been a greater personalisation of

politics in Ireland is credible. It is within this space that the communications role for advisers

has developed.

As pointed out by Connaughton (2010: 348): The traditional Westminster model of

government and administration has come under pressure due to the changing socio-economic

and political environment within which prime ministers and ministers must perform.

For OMalley and MacCartaigh (2005: 13), the introduction and development of cabinet

government has allowed for the emergence of media briefing systems and spin-doctoring.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, non-constitutional actors drew the attention of

many scholars. They cited the importance of the core executive that incorporated all those

organisations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate centralgovernment policies, or act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between

different elements of the government machine (Dunleavy & Rhodes 1990: 4). The increasing

delegation of government has elevated the status of special advisers within the core

executive:

A minister may delegate to a civil servant the task of devising a policy to achieve X, but theminister may not know that the civil servant has his or her own interests in pursuing anotherpolicy principals want to choose agents whose interests accord as much as possible withtheir own, and they want to structure incentives to ensure that agents will be better offfollowing the interests of the principal.

(OMalley & MacCartaigh 2005: 8)


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The growing complexity of issues and the ever-increasing demands of non-traditional sources

of media have also influenced the need for ministers and prime ministers to appoint special

advisers, with the majority of these coming from outside the civil service. While their original

purpose was to enhance civil service advice, more recently it has been to supplant it (Lowe

2005: 502). As Blick points out, the emergence of these advisers has been triggered by the

apolitical character of the civil service, as they addressed the need for ministers to have

greater expert and political support. In Britain, Bernard Donoghue was the architect of Harold

Wilsons No. 10 Policy Unit. Donoghue, as an academic with extensive research skills,

orchestrated an injection of expertise into the centre of government while acting as

Wilsons eyes and ears in Whitehall (Lowe 2005: 504).

Two decades later, and the special adviser has become a highly central and, at times,

controversial branch of the British government. It was noted in a recent study of advisers by

the London School of Economics (LSE) that:

The election of the Blair administration in 1997 is likely to be considered a significant turningpoint in the career of the institution of the special adviser. Most obviously, the number ofspecial advisers nearly doubled from 38 under John Major to 72 under Blair and has remainedhigh since.

(LSE GV314 Group 2012: 715-16)

Service as a special adviser in British politics has been seen as a prerequisite to senior

political office. Current Prime Minister David Cameron served as a special adviser to Stephen

Dorrell before advising Michael Howard. Camerons current Chancellor of the Exchequer,

George Osbourne, also served as a special adviser. It is no surprise, therefore, that more than

79% of UK special advisers surveyed had been party members for more than five years

before they were appointed (LSE GV314 Group 2012: 720). This practice raises questions as

to the appropriateness of party members whose aspirations are to hold public office situating


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themselves into the central mechanics of government decision-making (Connaughton 2010:

349).

The most significant advancement in the special advisers institutionalisation was through the

routinisationof the position under New Labours tenure at Downing Street:

Special adviser contracts were regularised and standardised. The influence of special adviserswas not limited to whispering in the ears of ministers, but having a direct role inpolicymaking and implementation in government Yet we do not know much about themore routine contribution of special advisers to the contemporary world of policymaking inWhitehall.

(LSE GV314 Group 2012: 716).

Quoted in the same study (p727), one respondent touched on the extent to which a special

adviser can exert extreme influence:

If special advisers establish themselves as having the backing of the Secretary of State, theycan become very powerfulfor instance, Ed Balls ended up being like a chief executiveof the Treasury. Because he could deal with the civil servants on a level that Brown could notmanage, once the civil servants realised that his decisions were backed, he became verypowerful.

1.3 The Irish Case: The Programme Manager System

Along with the other variables discussed thus far, the emergence of coalition government has

also contributed to the growth of special advisers in Ireland. It was under the Fianna Fil-

Labour coalition of 1993-94 that political advisers became formally introduced into the

workings of government. This came about not just through the new demands of coalition

government, but specifically through the Labour Partys unhappy experience in the Cosgrave

coalition from 1973 to 1977 and in the FitzGerald coalitions of 1981-2 and of 1983-7

(OHalpin 1996: 4). The partys anxiety during its experience in coalition government

resulted from a lack of focus on policy and thus recognition something they were

determined to reverse:


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The Labour leadership did not wish to be sucked into a Fianna Fail dominated coalitionwithout a well-articulated programme for action and a mechanism for securing itsimplementation. Such a mechanism would, it was hoped, enable the party to maximise itsstrength in a coalition and to exercise influence across a range of issues, including thosewhere Labour ministers had no direct responsibility but on which the party itself had someviews or definite policy position.

(O Halpin 1996: 4-5)

The idea of incorporating programme managers into Irish government was also intended to

assist ministers in making more informed decisions. According to O Halpin (1997: 1), the

introduction of programme managers under this administration reflected a new force in Irish

government, with Martin (2010: 9) referring to this development as having significantly

evolved the mechanisms by which Irish parties in government monitor each other. These

programme managers distinguished themselves from special advisers through their focus on

policy implementation and oversight, as opposed to giving ministers political advice. As

OHalpin (1997: 5) notes:

Programme managers had a political role in the sense that they would be expected to ensure

that the government kept to policy promises made in the negotiations leading to its formation the programme managers would ensure that old-style coalitions would be succeeded by agenuine interparty partnership where both parties would make it their business to deliver ontheir agreed programme.

In the UK, a number of authors have cited a connection between special advisers and the

success of policies (for example, Donoghue 2003 and Blick 2004). However, analysis of the

legislative cycle in the two years of the Reynolds/Spring coalition of 1993-94 showed that,

although there was a 40% increase in the number of bills passed in their first year in office

and slightly less in 1994, there was little evidence that it was the programme managers

themselves that made any great impact on the pace of legislation (OHalpin 1996: 9).

Furthermore, the publics dissatisfaction with the coalition grew, amid fears that the parties

were not working effectively together. This is despite the very reasoning behind introducing


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programme managers to oversee policy implementation and achieve greater cross-

departmental cooperation between the two parties:

Following the publication of the budget a majority of two electors in three held the viewthat unemployment was not being reduced because the parties were not working togethertowards solving the problem the new partnership government had a very poor take off,probably the worst in history; one of the most damaging aspects being that criticism was wideranging and extensive, and came from all directions.

(Jones 2001: pp. 143-144)

There have been notable references to the importance of programme managers by insiders

who served in the 1993-1994 coalition government, including Ruairi Quinn, who famously

described them as political gladiators (Quinn 2005: 297).

1.4 Role and Functions of Special Advisers

The role ofthe special adviser in the UK: from Wilson to Blair

In contrast to Ireland, special advisers in the UK have enjoyed significantly more power but,

with it, an attendant increase in controversy. According to Lowe (2005: 498), they were

overtly introduced in the 1960s to make good a perceived lack of expertise within the

permanent civil service in two particular areas: economics and public relations. Harold

Wilsons government of 1964-70 was the first to appoint such individual advisers in

Whitehall. Upon his return to Downing Street in 1974, Wilson actively encouraged the

employment of special advisers throughout Whitehall. The result was some thirty

departmental appointments, as well as the establishment of the Policy Unit (Lowe 2005:

499). Despite a commitment to reducing the cost of government and her initial disapproval,

the Thatcher governmentas a radical one seeking both to counter conservative Whitehall

advice and to project new policies boldly found special advisers indispensable (Lowe

2005: 499). Similar u-turns have been undertaken by the current Conservative-Liberal


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Democrat coalition. Political parties while in opposition have tapped into public and media

unease over the number and cost of special advisers by promising to reduce their numbers,

only to maintain and even increase their numbers when in office.

According to Lowe (2005: 497), the prominence of special advisers under Tony Blairs

administration was so significant in the period from 1997-2003 that the national press

referred to them as rent boys and Hitler youth. Other labels have been attached to these

advisers, including people who live in the dark and the sand in the machine of government

(Blick 2004: pp4-7). Many authors, including Gay, share this viewpoint:

The various formalisations of their [special advisers] roles generally has seen them offeringassistance directly to the minister; the model contract operative in the early years of theBlair administration had their role as to advise the minister in the development ofgovernment policy and its effective presentation.

(Gay 2000 cited in LSE GV314 Group 2012: 718)

The 2009 UK Code of Conduct for Special Advisers has succeeded in institutionalising a

more subtle role for the British adviser that has served to increase the transparency

surrounding their activities. The first ever study of British special advisers identified two

main roles for this group of professionals; thepolitical commissarrole and thepolitical fixer:

Political commissar: advisers serve as the eyes, ears and mouth of the politician who appointsthem in an executive organisation, which is otherwise hard for him or her to control, e.g. theFrench cabinet The essence is that he or she is integrated in the policymaking structurewithin the minister or agency. The political fixer is not.

Political fixer: the person does political jobs for the politician that civil servants could not dodealing with party colleagues, legislators and writing political speeches

(LSE GV314 Group 2012: 719)

As has been noted by the authors of the study, however, the background and behaviour of the

advisers are two important factors when applying these two classifications. However, special

advisers can serve both as commissars and fixers (LSE GV314 Group 2012; 720).


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In terms of the functions of the special adviser, the London School of Economics found that

New Labour special advisers spent most of their time on communication that includes spin-

doctoring, with a slightly less focus on policy design; 34 percent of special advisers spent all

or most of their time on policy delivery and implementation, with 42 per cent devoting little

or no time to policy delivery (LSE GV314 Group 2012: 721).

The Irish context

Connaughton has classified four role profiles for ministerial advisers: the expert, partisan,

coordinator, and minder. The expert works in isolation or as part of the government machine,

assisting with, contesting and promoting policy advice in a specific sector. Partisan advisers

are appointed predominantly for their political association with the minister. These advisers

are responsive and are sometimes best placed to anticipate the demands of the minister and,

as a result, typically undertake work of a politically partisan nature. The coordinator monitors

the programme for government, liaising with various groups and offices to facilitate the

oversight of the ministers departmental agenda. Finally, the minder emphasises the

importance of loyalty in the relationship between minister and adviser. The minder should be

looking to identify issues that may be potentially harmful to ministers, both politically and in

terms of reputation.

Connaughton asserts that the role of the ministerial adviser in Irish politics is quite

interchangeable:

Ministerial advisers come from a mix of backgrounds and as a result having differinginterpretations of the role. The adviser brief ranges from overtly political activities (assistingwith electoral activities or coalition management) to the nuts and bolts of policymakingwithin the department (budgetary matters, meetings, discussing policy advice and newinitiatives).

Connaughton (2010: 358)


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In terms of their day-to-day duties and responsibilities, Connaughton finds that advisers

either very frequently or frequently broker meetings with interest groups and liaise with

backbench TDs and party colleagues to manage relationships, facilitate communication flow

and resolve disputes (Connaughton 2010: 359). The main duties of advisers included

assisting with speech writing (100 percent of advisers engaged in this), involvement with

press statements (86 percent), dealing with parliamentary questions (79 percent), with a

specific focus on the political dimensions of policy rather than the technical details, which are

dealt with civil servants by in large.

(Connaughton 2010: 361)

1.5 Special Advisers and the Civil Service: a conflictual relationship?

A significant proportion of the literature on political advisers is concentrated on the

relationship between these advisers and officials, particularly with regard to the risk that

advisers may pose to the impartiality of the civil service (for example, Shaw & Eichbaum

2012; Connaughton 2007; Connaughton 2010; Lowe 2005; Blick 2004, Martin 2010;

OMalley & MacCartaigh 2010). With special advisers dedicating a significant proportion of

their time to the shaping and delivery of policy across whole departments and being involved

in cross-departmental work, there exists the possibility of conflict between civil servants and

their political counterparts. Furthermore, the surge in the numbers of advisers being

appointed may give rise to claims of politicisation (Connaughton 2010: 350).

In May 2002, the then Secretary of State for Transport, Stephen Byers, resigned because of

the actions of his special adviser Jo Moore, who told a departmental civil servant that what

happened on September 11, 2001, would be a good day to bury bad news (BBC 2004).

Other scandals involving the resignation of Charlie Whelan have highlighted the fine line that


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special advisers must walk when dealing with an impartial civil service (LSE GV314 Group

2012 726). Such scandals have brought public, media, and political attention to how best to

limit the power of advisers and protect the neutrality of the civil service, so much so that the

UK Committee on Standards in Public Life has launched a number of investigations into their

status. However, there is little academic evidence to support claims of a conflictual

relationship being present. In the UK, Blick argues that cabinet government has been

improved because of greater cross-departmental policy awareness and the consideration of

wider political implications of decisions, with the political neutrality of the civil service

being preserved rather than jeopardised (Blick in Lowe 2005: 501).

Without appropriate regulatory changes, the insider access that political advisers enjoy with

their ministers enables these privileged few to exert a funnelling effecton officials advice

(Walters 2006: 22). Yet it has been argued that the programme manager system in Ireland,

although void of any stringent statutory underpinning, resulted in a strongly positive

relationship between these advisers and officials. Ruairi Quinn, who served as Minister for

Enterprise & Employment during the Reynolds/Spring coalition, shares a number of thoughts

on how he evaluated the programme manager system from an insider perspective:

The departments of state got to understand the role of the programme managers and advisers.The civil servants became allies and not competitors. Over time, genuinely held differences ofpolicy could be resolved, leaving just a few net points for determination at the cabinet table. Itwas not only more efficient, but less bruising on the collective solidarity that a cabinet must

maintain.(Quinn 2005: 301)

The 2012 study of UK special advisers by the LSE GV314 Group concluded that dealing

with civil servants from the advisers own department was the most frequent of their contacts.

In fact, the addition of special advisers to the echelons of government departments may be

seen as an aid to civil servants rather than an obstacle:


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Civil servants spend a lot of time trying to work out what a ministers wishes might be Foran official putting together a policy, a quick reply from a special adviser certainly speeds upthe policymaking process; makes it easier, even, than having to get the ministers attention.

(LSE GV314 Group 2012: 730)

In Ireland, no special advisers possess executive powers that would allow them to direct the

actions of civil servants, as had been the case with Jonathan Powell and Alastair Campbell in

Britain. The significant influence over the civil service that Campbell and Powell enjoyed is a

rare exception across Westminster political systems.

Two advisers were even given powers to issue direct commands to civil servants. Advisers

could be public figures in their own right and they weathered some very severe controversiesthat damaged the careers of several advisers, ministers and civil servants, but left theinstitution of the special adviser largely unscathed.

(LSE GV314 Group 2012: 716)

It is these very controversies, although limited to a select few, that have attached a dark

cloud to the public and media perception of political advisers.

1.6 The Influence of Special Advisers

The degree to which special advisers yield power and influence has formed much of the

academic debate on advisers. In the UK, while there is no doubt that the role and functions of

special advisers have extended within government over time, there is little evidence ascribing

them a powerful role in shaping policy and decisions. Blairs decision to grant two of his

advisers executive powers has been reversed, and their perceived influence has fallen back

within international norms:

Special advisers lack direct executive authority: their power is second-hand from the minister,and their abilities to help shape policy derive from their ability to speak for the minister andachieve what their ministers want them to achieve. The closer they stick to what the ministerwants, the more effective they can be as commissars.


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(LSE GV314 Group 2012; 728)

Despite the increased focus, albeit celebrity-like at times, special advisers, to a large extent,

do not attain executive powers. Similarly, appointees in Ireland, Australia, Canada, NewZealand and the EU Commissions cabinet system do not attain executive powers (Eichbaum

and Shaw 2010: 2012). Instead, special advisers can be viewed as additional players but

are not necessarily independent shapers of policy (LSE GV314 Group 2012; 728). In

comparison to the thickening of government in the United States, the addition of political

appointees in the UK can be best described as a thin sprinkling (LSE GV314 Group 2012:

729).

There has been limited academic work on the influence of special advisers in the Irish

political system. Connaughtons work, which surveyed ministerial advisers, is most advanced

in determining the self-perceived influence of these advisers. Her study found that advisers

stressed that five years is a short time to leave a mark in policy and that special advisers can

be effectively used to drive elements of the policy agenda (Connaughton 2010: 359).

Another possible measure of effectiveness is ministerial satisfaction with the adviser. This is

difficult to assess, not least because a minister is unlikely to publicly admit that he has made a

bad appointment particularly so, given the personal ties that result in an adviser being

appointed.

Perhaps the best indicator of success is survival. A high proportion of innovations in themachinery of government do not last long. Political advisors, as a species, are a relativelyrecent innovation in most countries and have usually endured where they have been tried.

(Viorescu and Pedreira 2008: 235-236)


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1.7 Summary

Advisers have received a somewhat mixed welcome from academics with some authors

seeing them as threats and others as an opportunity for the pursuit of effective, modern

government. In terms of the relationship between special advisers and civil servants, the

literature presents general consensus that the relationship is non-conflictual albeit from the

special advisers viewpoint.

The author has observed that, while much of the academic discussion to date has been on the

activities of advisers and their relationship with different stakeholders, little attention has

been paid to formulating a robust definition. As chapter five will show, there is a fundamental

difference between the adviser in a line department and an adviser in the Department of An

Taoiseach, for example.

The academic discussion on the role and functions of Irish special advisers suggest that they

have a multidimensional function. While some advisers are appointed solely for policy or

press purposes, the vast majority play both a policy, political and communications function.

The weight of the literature favours a more flexible role determined by political events, as

opposed to a formal, structured position.


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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

The deficiency within the current literature regarding special advisers in Ireland leads the

author to hypothesise that the development of an informed empirical understanding is at an

early stage. The need for a more informed understanding of special advisers from an Irish

perspective has been reflected in the research approach adopted in this paper.

2. 2 Research Methods Used

A qualitative approach from a phenomenological angle has been taken in conducting research

for this project. The author has adopted this methodology type in order to gain a critical view

into the role and place of the special adviser in Irish politics, which, crucially, comes from the

key insights of interview respondents. According to Lester, such an approach can empower

the research:

Epistemologically, phenomenological approaches are based in a paradigm of personalknowledge and subjectivity, and emphasise the importance of personal perspective andinterpretation. As such they are powerful for understanding subjective experience, gaininginsights into peoples motivations and actions, and cutting through the clutter of taken-for-granted assumptions and conventional wisdom.

(Lester 1999: 1)

Due to the limited literature on Irish special advisers and to meet the authors objective of

gaining critical insights, the core element of the research is in the form of semi-structured

interviews. As Berg notes, questions used in a semi-standardised interview can reflect an

awareness that individuals understand the world in varying ways. Researchers thus approach

the world from the subjects perspective (Berg 1989: 63). McCracken (1988: 9) also

comments that in-depth interviews are one of the most powerful methods in the qualitative


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armoury and goes as far to say that in some cases no instrument of inquiry is more

revealing.

The primary data was gathered by recording all in-person interviews and, where it was notpossible to meet interviewees, respondents answered a series of semi-structured interview

questions via email. Particular care was taken to ensure such questions encouraged the

respondent to give considerable thought and reflection. As Mabry notes (2008: 218), semi-

structured interviews allow for the investigator to ask follow-up questions and, similarly, sow

seeds of thought for respondents to revert to with greater insight at a subsequent stage.

To achieve the maximum variation sample, a number of individuals were selected who can

provide insider knowledge. The sample was chosen to include a number of key stakeholders,

including a former Taoiseach, current and former advisers, as well as a senior political

correspondent. To analyse the potential differences in the role and influence of special

advisers over a chosen period of time, the research methods will test the data within the

parameters of a specific case study that includes advisers from each administration from

1993-2013, with a particular emphasis on those who have served in the Department of An

Taoiseach. Analysing the data was essential, as it challenges the literatures general finding

and, as a result, can help develop a more robust understanding of the particular research area.

Confirming or challenging the literatures treatment of the Irish special adviser is critical in

fostering future research.

As George and Bennett note (2005: X), it is with the adoption of a case study that one can

garner a greater insight into the failure or success of theories in political science, and this

thesis sets out such an approach. According to Mabry (2008: 214), a case study allows the

researcher to scrutinise even more closely the experiences and perceptions of participants . It

is only the use of a case study for this paper that permits the author to acquire the relevant


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information. However, there is a risk in case studies of participant bias, and this will be

addressed below. This case study spans a reference period from 1993-2013. This period was

chosen in order to allow for the collection of both observations from the past as well as

present observations from interview respondents.

2.3 Difficulties Encountered

Prior to the research taking place, the author was acutely aware that he was dealing with an

underdeveloped area in political science. While this gave the author much room for

developing a better empirical understanding of special advisers, it also presented many

challenges. Due to the restricted literature on special advisers, the scope of available research

was concentrated among a small number of academics. As a result, the author chose to widen

the scope of the literature review by providing a comparative analysis on the attributes of

special advisers both from an Irish and UK context. The small cluster of academic research

available also reflected the limited sample of respondents available for interview.

Furthermore, the authors research findings have been analysed by comparing the accounts

given by different respondents and, where possible, this has been compared and contrasted

with other sources.

Although the time period being analysed in this study is 20 years, the availability of advisors

from the Department of An Taoiseach was very restricted. As a result, the author widened the

sample of special advisers beyond the Taoiseachs Department where needed. This broader

sample of advisers also helped to negate any perceived bias on the part of advisors towards

particular Taoisigh.


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2.4 Data Collection and Triangulation

Primary Sources:

Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with former and current

special advisers, as well as other key stakeholders. Primary respondents include:

Taoiseach John Bruton, 1994-1997 Gerard Howlin, former special advisor to Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, 1999-2007, Liam Cahill, programme manager to David Andrews, 1993-1994, Roy Dooney, political adviser to John Bruton, 1994-1999, Feargal Purcell, Government Press Secretary, 2011 to present, Mark Kennelly, chief of staff to Taoiseach Enda Kenny, 2011 to present, Joe Lennon, special adviser and Government Press Secretary to Taoiseach Bertie

Ahern, 1997-2006, and programme manager to Taoiseach Brian Cowen, 2008-2011,

Deirdre Gillane, former special adviser to Taoiseach Brian Cowen 2010-2011, Professor Gerry Boyle, economic adviser to Taoiseach John Bruton, 1994-1997, Michael O Regan,parliamentary correspondent ofThe Irish Times.

The author took field notes after each interview to go beyond the literal interpretation of the

interview transcript and map out a broader, contextual evaluation of the responses. According

to Stake (1995), qualitative data analysis is an iterative and reflexive process that begins

during the collection process, as opposed to after data gathering has ceased.

The primary data will be triangulated through a critical analysis. The most insightful

comments are selected and applied to the relevant research themes, which the author is

analysing in chapters three, four and five. As Stake notes, triangulation has been generally


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considered a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the

repeatability of an observation or interpretation triangulation serves also to clarify

meaning by identifying different ways the case is being seen (Stake 2000: 454). This

primary data is compared and contrasted between respondents as well with the secondary

data.

The authors research findings have also been strengthened by additional information that

respondents provided that went beyond the scope of the main themes this paper seeks to

address. This has been used to contextualise the political events and culture that these

advisers operated within and that has nurtured the special adviser system over the past twenty

years. Additional primary data was also sourced through relevant academic journals and

empirical studies to date.

Secondary Sources

Additional secondary sources that feature in the research include extracts from biographies of

senior stakeholders who were centrally involved in the administrations from 1993 onwards,

as well as relevant newspaper articles and Dil debates. These additional sources are

important in setting the political context. Other sources, including newspaper articles, aid in

challenging participant bias, as their findings were compared and contrasted with the primary

data.

2.5 Countering Participant and Respondent Bias

Prior to the commencement of the research for this project, the author had greater than typical

exposure to special advisers, having interacted with such people in both the European

Parliament and Seanad ireann. Therefore, a sample of non-personally affiliated respondents

was chosen for this project. Similarly, participants from a number of administrations were


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selected to counter any perceived bias to one political party, individual or government.

Dealing with participant bias did serve to be particularly challenging, with the nature of such

research involving descriptive as opposed to quantitative statements. To reduce any excessive

perception of respondent bias, all interview questions were designed in an open way to

broaden the scope of the participants responses.

Furthermore, the author has deliberately relied on primary and secondary sources to

distinguish between bias and objective fact. Consideration has been applied in analysing

research from biographies. Regarding any perceived bias in political biographies, those

authors full backgrounds and affiliations have been mentioned. Furthermore, a deliberate

effort has been made to interview Michael ORegan, an objective and well-respected political

correspondent to further tackle participant bias.

2.6 Research Ethics

The author is aware of the ethical obligations that come with conducting interviews with

current and former officials. All interviews with respondents took place within the

appropriate ethical parameters.

Great care has been taken in ensuring that interview respondents are quoted accurately, and

this is particularly important given the discussions with senior stakeholders that form the core

of this qualitative approach. The author will not act in any way to jeopardise the

confidentiality or exclusivity of all relevant documentation that the author has received

through interview respondents and his own research. The author is also mindful of the need

not to abuse the privileged access that he has to Leinster House and to ensure that any

interviews done inside the grounds are carried out with the permission of the Superintendent

of the Oireachtas.


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CHAPTER 3 THE PROGRAMME MANAGER SYSTEM

3.1 Reynolds/Spring Coalition 1993-1994

The Fianna Fil-Labour government of 1993-1994 was short lived, yet it marked a pivotal

point in the development of a special adviser system. According to former Taoiseach John

Bruton:

The goal was to invigilate the implementation of an agreed programme between the parties. Itwas an outgrowth of coalition government becoming the norm where previously single partygovernment had become the norm under Fianna Fil dominance. They were in office for so

long, the civil service may have become in viewed with their geist, and therefore Fianna Filministers didnt need outside political advisers because the civil service were perhapsunconsciously on their wavelength anyway.

The background of programme managers differed quite considerably among the two coalition

parties. The Labour Party made a conscious decision to appoint programme managers from

both the public and private sector who were all personally identified with the Labour Party

(OHalpin 1996: 6). Fianna Fil hired all but one of its programme managers from the senior

ranks of the civil service.

Professor Gerry Boyle, who was appointed as economic advisor to John Bruton in 1994,

highlights an important distinction:

Its important to distinguishprogramme managers and special advisers, although there was a

close connection between the two. Programme managers worked as a group in thegovernment interest. Special advisers worked for the minister/Taoiseach on specific topics. Iwas impressed by the system, in that it placed the political implications of all decisions aheadof ministers, which wouldnt or (shouldnt?) always have been done by the civil servants.Hence the system worked to smooth decision-making and head off conflict.


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Joe Lennon, who served as a special adviser to Bertie Ahern and programme manager to

Brian Cowen, also believes that the programme manager and special adviser are two separate

roles:

In the Fine Gael/Labour/Democratic Left government that preceded the Fianna Fil/PDcoalition government that took office in 1997, there were three people who ranked asprogramme manager, namely Sean Donlon, Greg Sparks and Pat Nolan, who worked for JohnBruton, Dick Spring and Proinsias de Rossa respectively. Because the system was stillrelatively new at that stage, other ministerial special advisers often used the title programmemanager but, in an historical context, I would not regard them as such.

David Andrews, a Fianna Fil minister at the time, later recalled the reasoning for his

decision to be the sole Fianna Fil cabinet member to appoint a non-civil servant adviser in

Liam Cahill:

I have the height of respect for civil servants, but I decided I didnt want one as myprogramme manager I wanted someone from outside the department with independentviews. I never regretted my decision. Ironically, for a time afterwards, Liam becamecommunications director for the Labour Party.

(Andrews 2007: 229)

This need for an additional voice was echoed by Cahill: Andrews didnt have the more

traditional Fianna Fil view that you had to have out-and-out party people in; he had his own

voice, the civil service voice, and he wanted a third outside voice.

In his 2005 (pp297-298) political biography, Ruairi Quinn, who served as Minister for

Employment and Enterprise during the Reynolds/Spring coalition, highlighted the need to

introduce programme managers with particular expertise and knowledge:

Given the turmoil in the economy, I knew that I needed a person who would be acceptable tothe business community; there was still a suspicion abroad about Labours ability to manage

the economy Greg Sparks proposed Dr. Frank Roche, a major figure in the UCD SmurfitSchool of Business and a respected consultant. When we met, I knew he was the man Iwanted I require a trusted and innovative technocrat who would be creative and reassuring.


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One central research finding is that the difference in the background of both parties

programme managers had significantly contributed their varied role and performance. As

Liam Cahill recalled, the Labour programme managers ran rings around their Fianna Fil

counterparts:

In prior governments, the mechanism whereby you influenced what was coming intogovernment was by exchange of civil service memoranda between departments, but Labourinitiated in this system face-to-face conversations of advisors of the same party; they decidedon red-line issues, tactical approaches and so on. They came into the cabinet much betterturned and prepared than Fianna Fil ministers There was nothing like that of the Labour

programme managers structure.

Labour programme managers always stayed with their initial aim of looking out not only for

their individual ministers but, crucially, for the party itself. According to Michael ORegan,

parliamentary correspondent with The Irish Times, while the Labour programme managers

were watching policy in theirrelevant department, they were also watching Labours interests

within the coalition and the interests of their particular ministers.

This was also evident not only through the extensive communications role played by Fergus

Finlay and others, but also in how they briefed and prepared their ministers prior to cabinet:

The cabinet papers went out on the Friday before a Tuesday meeting. All of the Labourprogramme managers got access on the Friday. They then met on a Monday morning andwent through the papers from a Labour point of view The cabinet papers are the crownjewels of our civil service system. Access to those papers has to be closely guarded.

(Interview with Liam Cahill)

On a much broader level, the Labour programme managers, despite having little experience

in government, worked the system particularly well. Even when it came to the minute details


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of their pay and conditions, they were able to negotiate a 10% premium on their salaries. As

Liam Cahill concludes, they had thought of everything in advance.

Public attitude at the time was sceptical towards programme managers, as highlighted in a

Dil exchange with Taoiseach Albert Reynolds on March 2, 1993 (Dil debates):

Deputy Jim Higgins: Does the Taoiseach realise the justifiable public anger and revulsion atthese appointments, particularly the naked hypocrisy, extravagance and nepotism of theLabour Party? Does he realise that this will be heightened by virtue of the fact that theprogramme managers will receive 40,500 each and that annually they will cost 500,000and, despite the fact that the Government has been in office for two months, they have not hadone solitary coordinating meeting until today?

Taoiseach: There is nothing wrong with having a good mix of public and private sectorpeople ensuring that the programme for government is carried through. That is the priority forthe government and that is the priority for the people outside.

Deputy Enda Kenny: Is the Taoiseach aware that the direct involvement of civil servants inthe political process by their appointment as programme managers is causing a great deal ofunease in the Civil Service? How does he view this in terms of the workings of the CivilService and the responsibilities of civil servants?

Taoiseach: I do not regard the appointment of programme managers and the duties they carryout as part of the political process. It is a matter of monitoring, organising and getting theprogramme up and running in each department and to meet at regular intervals to ensure that

that is happening.

Ruairi Quinn also recognises that there was deep hostility towards Labour during this time:

The new system of programme managers and advisers, combined with the establishment of a

separate office for the Tnaiste, soon generated much media criticism from those journalists

who felt betrayed by Labours entry into government with Fianna Fil(Quinn 2005: 298).

While OHalpin acknowledges that some officials had reservations about these political

imports into departments, most senior civil servants came to see that programme manager

innovation as a good means of providing an effective coordinating mechanism between

departments (2006: 6). This emphasis on cohesion was touched upon by Liam Cahill:

I saw myself going into that job as a bridging influence of cohesion within the government ...

I made contact with Gregg Sparks [Tnaistes programme manager] and said, look Greg, I


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want to make it clear that Im not going to behave in an adversarial way in this group ofprogramme managers; my background is Labour, my background is trade union, that doesntmean Im going to be an extra Labour programme manager,but it means Im going to try totake a view on how we can reach agreement/consensus, on how we can keep the show on theground.

Fianna Fil programme managers who were drawn from the civil service didnt see it as their

function to deal with the media, whereas, for Labour appointees, some consciously did.

Furthermore, Labour programme managers met weekly as a group to discuss policy progress,

while Fianna Fils agents did not (O Halpin 1996: 7). The lack of collaboration among

Fianna Fil programme managers was a standout feature in how advisers from the two parties

operated. Liam Cahill pleaded with his colleagues that they ought to meet more frequently

and finally got his opportunity to pitch his suggestion to the civil servant programme

managers in the summer of 1994, after Labour had suffered big losses in two by-elections and

the European elections:

I said, listen folks, a very significant change has happened; with the new arithmetic in the

Dil, theres now sufficient seats for an alternative government to be formed without theinconvenience of a general election. There is a woman sitting in ras an Uachtarin, and shehas a big red button on the dashboard, her hand is just poised over it. She would love to pressthat. We need to start at least avoiding a situation where we give Labour cause to ask thePresident to push that red button. I might as well have talked to the wall it was the oneoccasion we met collectively.

Within six months, Cahills scenario had become true and the government collapsed.

For some programme managers on the Labour side, including Fergus Finlay, communications

and interactions with the media constituted a sizable proportion of their duties. Liam Cahill

referred to Finlay as the spin-meister supreme. The overwhelming view of advisers, both

current and former, is that the programme manager system worked effectively. As Liam

Cahill and other advisers have pointed out in this research, success in a line department is

measured by ones success in maximising the available budget. An analysis of government


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spending for 1993 showed Fianna Fil-led departments receiving 60% of total government

spending, with Labour receiving 40%. Taking this 60/40 into the share of the 8 billion

National Development Plan between 1994 and 1999, Fianna Fil-led departments should

have received 6.48billion and Labour led departments 4.32 billion. Instead, Fianna Fil led

departments only received 107 million more than Labour. Despite Bertie Ahern being

Minister for Finance, Labour took an extra billion from the Fianna Fil side. As Liam Cahill

notes, Labour won.

Gerard Howlin, former special adviser to Bertie Ahern from 1999-2007, describes how

Fianna Fil cabinet members felt about the programme manager system on joining the

opposition benches in 1994:

They felt that the programme manager system had somehow undermined, diminished,subverted, taken from the plenitude of power that should, and dignity and sense of occasionthat should probably be enjoyed by a cabinet minister, and it is quite evident that they werenot up for having it again. After 1997, it did never happen again. There was a sense amongthe elected that the unelected had got too long a leash, too high a pedestal, and they wouldntbe doing that again.

3.2 The Rainbow Coalition: The Programme Manager System Lives On

The programme manager system was largely continued by John Brutons Rainbow

Coalition of 1994-1997. Bruton outlined the reasoning for Fine Gaels new departure in

appointing advisers from outside the civil service:

I saw the value of bringing in new blood from the outside. The Irish Civil Service had becomerather set in its ways; there was a lot of silo-bound thinking. People thought only of their owndepartment or their own section within a department, to the extent that departments werenegotiating from a departmental point of view rather than a national interest point of view. Ifelt, therefore, bringing outsiders into the process on the Fine Gael side as well as the existingones on the Labour side would bring in an additional layer of imaginative thinking.


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John Bruton appointed a team of four special advisers: Roy Dooney as political advisor,

Shane Kenny as Government Press Secretary, Sen Donlon as principal programme manager

and Gerry Boyle as economic advisor. For Bruton, an experience in government and political

savvy was crucial in his selection:

I wanted someone, in Sen Donlon, who would understand the government machine becausehe was going to be the principal programme manager In Roy Dooney, his role wasprincipally to deal with the party because, its important to recall, the Taoiseach is a leader ofa party as well, and I needed someone to devote time and provide an access point formembers of the parliamentary party in particular.

However, Professor Gerry Boyle believes that Fine Gael failed to fully embrace the

programme manager system as Labour had done in the previous administration:

Fine Gael were not prepared for the operation of the programme manager system. Labour hada head start, and some would say quite categorically that they had an upper hand in theoperation of government for that reason. I wouldnt go that far, certainly as far as economicmatters were concerned. Labour essentially used the system to shadow governmentdepartments. The separate Office of the Tnaiste allowed them to do this more effectively. Allgovernment decisions were reviewed by the Labour programme managers and, if not to their

liking, their ministerial colleagues would seek matters to be reviewed. I dont think this everhappened with Fine Gael.

The role of Sen Donlon in the Rainbow government was critical. His knowledge of the civil

service as a senior diplomat would be paramount in establishing and maintaining a positive

relationship with Fine Gaels coalition partners. As Roy Dooney observes:

When Fine Gael ministers brought in their programme managers, they came from all over theplacethere wasnt an obvious sign of collegiality, and thats where Sen Donlon wasimportant. He commanded enormous respect because he had the authority as former generalsecretary of the department. He was a big beast in the public service jungle, but he had alsoworked outside of it as well.

The role of programme managers in the Rainbow Coalition of 1994-1997 continued to be

very focused on policy, but the appointment of Fine Gael programme managers with a


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political and private sector background also allowed for a more political role. This is evident

in the role played by Dooney:

I did everything that was political in terms of relations with the party. I was the interfacebetween John and ministers and the party on appointments to State boards. I would have had avery big input into what John did and where he went and the management of constituencytours. If something had to be dealt with, I would write a note on top of the file asking John tomake a decision, and he would work methodically through it and write his decision ordirection.

The literature has failed to coherently address is the question of what the skills and qualities

are that make a good adviser. According to John Bruton, the ideal adviser will be:

Good at absorbing detailed and [especially] on technical questions, have a goodunderstanding of public administration, the law, and have ideas about how policy can beimplemented better. An adviser giving purely political advice who doesnt concernthemselves with the content isnt really much use. They have to be able to bring bothcharacteristics to bear. Appetite for work is very important, and temperament is exceptionallyimportant. One has to be aware that one is an adviser, one isnt anything more than an adviserthat was never a problem in my government, but it might be a temptation for some that hadpolitical ambitions of their own. Theyre only there to advise, not to promote their agenda.

Under Bertie Aherns reign as Taoiseach, which began in 1997, the number of special

advisers was drastically reduced. Joe Lennon, who served as a special adviser to Bertie

Ahern, described the political nature ofAherns decision:

The number of outside special advisers was significantly reduced because Bertie Ahernbelieved that the public were dismayed at the rising cost of too numerous political advisers, sohe reduced the overall number and encouraged ministers to utilise civil servants as specialadvisers or press spokespersons. He was cognisant of the Public Service Management Bill,which had been going through the Oireachtas before the election, and would also have beenwary of the capacity for too many unelected advisers to cause resentment amonggovernment backbenchers because of perceived undue influence.

The role of special advisers since 1997 has been claimed to have changed, where, according

to Ruairi Quinn, the emphasis appears to have been more on presentation and less on content

or efficient government (2005: 300). A similar diversion, albeit on a much greater scale,


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took place under New Labour in Britain, where the role of the special adviser departed from

resolving political problems to spin-doctoring (Blick 2004: XVI). Quinns assertion of a new

adviser system is supported by Gerard Howlin:

The programme manager system was very much initiated and architected by the Labour sideof that government. What came subsequently wasnt the same, there was a huge difference.With those programme managers, there was a pre-clearance system up to cabinet. What wasthere then was never replicated, it was never repeated, and every edition of the system sincehas been pretty hail by comparison to what was a full on, fully architected programmemanager system.

3.3 Summary of Research Findings

Based on the responses from interviewees, it is clear that the programme manager system was

a fundamental moment in the institutionalisation of appointing political and non-civil servant

advisers in Irish politics. Another important finding is that the system is thought of as having

been extremely effective both from the point of meeting the programme for governments

policy objectives, and also in the added value that political advisers brought to their ministers

and Taoisigh.

What is also evident from the research is that the programme manager system, albeit

effective, brought very mixed results to both coalition parties, something which may have

heavily influenced Bertie Aherns decision to reduce their numbers. Many advisers, including

Mark Kennelly, have argued that the special adviser system today still represents strong

features of the programme manager system, while others including Gerard Howlin have put

forward the view that its core elements remains very much in the 1990s.

An additional research finding is that the role of programme managers and special advisers

differed greatly in the Reynolds/Spring coalition, something that the author believes is

explained by their different backgrounds. The 1994-1997 Rainbow Coalition employed many


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more non-civil servant advisers and, as expected, the research has shown much less

divergence in the roles carried out by special advisers and programme managers.


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CHAPTER 4 INFLUENCE OF SPECIAL ADVISERS

4.1 Influence of Advisers

As has been pointed out by OMalley and MacCartaigh (2006) among others, there is a sense

that politics has become more centralised over time and with it, a more prominent role for the

special adviser. Liam Cahill believes the post-1997 programme manager system has

developed unexpectedly into a smaller and more centralised group. Therefore, this paper

discusses the influence of special advisers at a critical juncture.

Despite special advisers in the Irish system having no executive power over civil servants,

many former advisers who participated in this research believed they had significant

influence on their office-holders. This is an interesting and noteworthy finding to have

emerged from the research. Although he agrees that this potential exists, Gerard Howlin notes

that there is a fine line which advisers must be aware of:

The fact that you are in the physical space of the office-holder, that is almost unequal, ispotentially highly significant Its extremely important to note that youre never elected,you never have a mandate, and once a decision is taken, it is over. Occasionally, civil servantsand advisers have trouble accepting this, but thats wrong. Politicians are the deciders,uniquely and exclusively; they have the mandate.

Looking back at his time as Taoiseach, John Bruton agrees with Roy Dooney, who says that,

although special advisers have a significant influence, it is not excessive:The minister is

the one responsible for making decisions. Most decisions of government now have to go to

cabinet; theres collective responsibility for decisions, and that is taking place at a much

higher level than the special adviser. Mark Kennelly, Feargal Purcell and others agree that

such influence is not undue or excessive. They cite politicians as being capable of making

independent decisions and judgments:


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Politicians dont become ministers, Tnaiste and Taoisigh unless they know their own mindand are strong, good judges of any situationthats the top of the pyramid dynamic. When anadvisor is appointed, it makes sense that they are detached from having to be elected to beingemployed. I do see an important role to make sure the correct advice is given in a cool andcalm way. I dont believe there to be an undue influence by advisors; politicians are strong

people.

(Interview with Feargal Purcell)

Deirdre Gillane, who now serves as a special adviser to Mcheal Martin, also believes that

claims of advisers being too influential are somewhat exaggerated:

All special advisors like to believe they have more influence than they actually in fact do Ifirmly believe that Taoisigh and ministers who are worth their salt make up their own minds,but only after listening and considering the advice given by advisers and civil servants. Civilservants tend to have more influence than advisers.

Joe Lennon, who served alongside Deirdre Gillane, observes that the degree to which

advisers have influence is highly dependent on a number of variables:

The relationship between the individuals concerned, the trust that exists between them, andthe level of respect each has for the others expertise, experience and judgement. The degreeof influence can also vary depending on the issue that is involved. Advisers tend to have moreinfluence when it comes to the politics of the situation, whereas senior civil servants would berelied upon in the areas of legislation and diplomacy

Respondents were split as to whether a line department or the Taoiseachs department

allowed for advisers to be most influential. Some, including Roy Dooney, believed that

advisers in the Taoiseachs department had significantly more power, given the large degreeof oversight and political involvement they had across government. However, other advisers

stressed that, due to the increased numbers of stakeholders in the Taoiseachs department,

their influence was stronger in a line department. This debate is reflected in Gerard Howlin s

observations:


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Theres an enormous amount of time in the mans company , multiples of what civil servantsdid. That is power. In the Taoiseachs office,theres a much bigger scene, youve much morepeople. That extraordinary degree of access that a ministers advisor may have is significantand dilutedhes far busier, in and out of so many spaces. Bertie was in the business of shortdiscussions. You had to be very focused in your five, ten minutes in what you wanted to sayand what he wanted off you.

The focus on the influence of advisers stems not only from the media but from politicians

themselves. The Economic Management Council (EMC), which is made up of the Taoiseach,

the Tnaiste, the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform,

recently received criticism from a cabinet minister, criticism directed at the influence of civil

servants and advisers. Joan Burton said:

My major fear about the EMC, to be honest, is not the four ministers who are there, eventhough I think there could be a broader participation. I certainly would be concerned that,given the more limited participation of the number of ministers in it, that it would bedominated by civil servants and policy advisers.

(The Irish Times, 29 July 2013: Online)

Another key stakeholder is the parliamentary party. Michael ORegan believes that there has

always been a tension between special advisers and the parliamentary party:

Rank-and-file Labour members felt Fergus Finlay had way too much influence and wasinfluencing Spring in the wrong direction. They forgot Finlay was also a good script writer;every politician needs one. Politicians are sometimes very bitter against the unelected andwould brief journalists privately and give out, especially when the party is in trouble.

This tension was highlighted recently over Fine Gaels struggle to avoid losses over the

Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill. Mark Kennelly, who attends weekly meetings of

the Fine Gael parliamentary party, commented that, contrary to claims in the media, he and

other advisers opened up a channel of communication for TDs and Senators who were

worried about the Bill. The Taoiseach of the day is responding to multiple issues and pressure


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points and requires a loyal adviser to help manage the concerns of party members. This

practice was also evident during Roy Dooneys time as a special adviser.

John Bruton observes that this strain is even more prominent when there is a large

government majority:

There is a tensionits a risk, particularly when you have a very large parliamentary partyand a government majority. There are lots of backbenchers that have little outlet, this is one ofthe problems the current government is likely to face. The fact that the whip system is beingapplied with such extreme severity means that backbenchers have far less outlet politicallyspeaking than backbenchers have in almost any other EU country.

4.2 Summary of Research Findings

The research findings give a definitive answer that advisers feel they are not excessively

influential, but that a significant degree of influence is present. The degree to which special

advisers can influence their ministers and Taoisigh is dependent on a number of factors,

including the disposition of the office-holder and the adviser, as well as the advisers role. It

is also heavily dependent on the type of political situation for which advice is being sought

and, crucially, the department the adviser is operating within.

Interestingly, most advisers believe their influence has grown over the past two decades. This

is a point supported by Michael ORegan:

Advisers have grown in influence. At times they have considerable influence, there is nodoubt about that. If youre a Taoiseach or a minister and youre wrestling with decisions andpolicy, its a lonely place if you dont have advice. In terms of strategy, they have a lot ofinfluence.

Claims that spin and political communication have become a core part in the activities of

most special advisers today has played no small part in elevating the belief that advisers have

grown in influence. This perception will be dealt with in the following chapter.


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However, measuring influence is extremely difficult and this is an additional limit on the

current academic literature.

Few advisers can be described as having been involved in serious controversies where theirrole and influence was seriously questioned. This is an interesting point of distinction

between Irish special advisers and their counterparts in the UK. Furthermore, in tandem with

the literature, there is little ev

the history of the special adviser in the department of an taoiseach 1993-2013: a critical...

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