the holy see and the first hague peace conference (1899)

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THE HOLY SEE AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE (1899)Author(s): DAVID ALVAREZSource: Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, Vol. 26 (1988), pp. 431-438Published by: GBPress- Gregorian Biblical PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23564272 .

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DAVID ALVAREZ

THE HOLY SEE AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE (1899)

Summarium. — Cum Nicolaus II, imperator Russiae, prò anno 1899 Hagae conventum inter nationalem de pace tractanda convocavit, S. Sedes minime dubitavit fore ut ipsa simul cum aliis Statibus eidem interesset. Cardinalis enim Marianus Rampolla, secretarius status, confidebat S.

Sedem, prorsus munere auctricis ordinis moralis et pacis, quod a saeculis exercebat, sibi ad prae dictum conventum invitationem vindicare posse. Sed Italia eiusque ex Triplici Foedere socii, impri mis Germania, minitabantur se adunationi non participaturas esse, si S. Sedes eidem interesset. De facto, cardinalis Rampolla, etsi nullam diplomaticam viam intentatam reliquit, tamen non va luit illam oppositionem superare, siquidem nullus Status ausus est conventus felicem exitum causa S. Sedis in discrimen vocare.*

On August 30, 1898, the Russian minister to the Holy See, Alexander Isvolsky,

called on the Cardinal Secretary of State, Mariano Rampolla, with a communication

from his government. One week earlier, on August 24, the Foreign Ministry in St.

Petersburg had distributed to the local diplomatie corps an imperiai rescript in which

Czar Nicholas II proposed an international conférence to consider ways to limit world

armaments and secure a just and durable peace. In the absence of a papal

représentative at the imperiai court, Isvolsky had been instructed to deliver the rescript

to Pope Leo XIII and express the Czar's sincere hope that the Holy Father would lend

the proposai his moral authority

Any initiative concerning arms control and world peace would naturally interest the

Vatican. Within a day of his meeting with the Russian diplomat, Cardinal Rampolla

instructed the nuncios in Austria, France, and Germany to report the reactions of their

host governments to the Russian proposai. The responses were not encouraging. From

Paris Monsignor Eugenio Clari indicated that the Czar's proposai would probably

receive little support from the French who were currently distracted by the Dreyfus

Affair and, furthermore, reluctant to allow anything to interfere with their préparations

to avenge the defeat by Germany in 1871. The nuncio in Vienna, Monsignor Emidio

Taliani, reported that Austrian officiais applauded the idealism of the young Czar but

were so skeptical about the prospect for any concrete action to limit armaments that

* Abbreviation:

ASV, SS = Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Segreteria di Stato.

1 Isvolsky to Rampolla, 30 August 1898: ASV, SS 1900 rubr. 242 fase. 1, ff. 12r-13v. On the

origins of the imperiai rescript see, Dan L. Morrill, Nicholas li and the Cali for the First Hague

Conférence: Journal of Modem History 46 (1974) 296-313. While Russia accredited a minister to

the Holy See, there was no papal représentative at the Russian court. See Adrien Boudou, Le

Saint-Siège et la Russie: Leur relations diplomatiques au XIX' siècle II, Paris 1925, 543. 2 Clari to Rampolla, 1 September 1898 and 8 September 1898; Taliani to Rampolla, 30 Au

gust 1898; and Lorenzelli to Rampolla, 2 September 1898: ASV, SS 1900 rubr. 242 fase. 1,

ff. 46r-47r, 58r-59v, 39r-40r, 42r-43r.



432 DAVID ALVAREZ

they might decline an invitation to the proposed conférence. According to the papal

représentative in Munich, Monsignor Benedetto Lorenzelli, there was similar

skepticism among Bavarian officiais2.

Lorenzelli's dispatch, however, contained an intriguing item. During a conversation

with a senior Bavarian officiai, the nuncio had commented that the necessary basis for a

just world peace required récognition of international rights and equity including the

politicai rights and sovereignty of the Holy See currendy denied by the Kingdom of

Italy. The papal diplomai spoke on his own initiative, but since the Roman Question

had long been the central concern of Vatican diplomacy his commente were

unexceptional. More noteworthy, however, was the response of the Bavarian officiai

who had assured the nuncio that Bavaria supported the vindication of the Papacy and

suggested that the proposed international conférence might provide an opportunity to

résolve the Roman Question3.

Here was news to capture the attention of Cardinal Rampolla. In his rescript the

Czar had proposed a conférence to discuss armaments, but he had placed arms control

in the broader context of a quest for a secure and just world order. The conférence was

stili in the earliest stages of considération and no formai agenda had yet been proposed. With care and préparation the conférence might evolve into a forum for discussion of

more general issues hearing upon international peace, justice, and stability; issues

which, in the view of Rampolla, necessarily included the Roman Question. The Cardinal

Secretary of State again requested the nuncios to forward ali information concerning the proposed meeting. Rampolla was especially eager to learn whether the Powers

were inclined to take any action to regulate the status of the Pope, and whether Italy, in

its response to the Czar, would make any réservations concerning the Roman Question.

Meanwhile, the Vatican's position would be that no efforts to secure a just and stable

peace would succeed so long as Catholics were disturbed by the intolérable situation of

the Pope4.

Throughout the autumn papal diplomate worked assiduously to align the proposed conférence with the concerne of the Papacy. Despite their initial skepticism, the Powers

eventually endorsed the Russian initiative rather than appear to their citizens and the world insensitive to the problems of armaments and war. Stili, the Powers, each for its own reasons, were reluctant to allow any assembly to consider «politicai» questions (such as Alsace-Lorraine or the Roman Question) which might disturb the international status quo. Moreover, reports circulating in diplomatie circles suggested that Italy would oppose any discussion of the Roman Question at a conférence, and would receive

support for its opposition from its partners in the Triple Alliance, Austria and Germany. By the end of the year, it was clear that further efforts to bring the Roman Question before the proposed conférence would be futile and would only alienate the Powers. The nuncios were instructed to curtail their efforts. For the moment, the Holy See would limit its activity to endorsing the Russian initiative5.

With the new year, however, the Vatican was again involved in discussions

concerning the conférence. On January 16, 1899, Isvolsky delivered to Rampolla

3 Lorenzelli to Rampolla, 2 September 1898: ibid., ff. 42r-43r. 4

Rampolla to Lorenzelli, 5 September 1898; Rampolla to Taliani, 6 September 1898: ibid., ff. 44r-v, 54r-55v.

5 Taliani to Rampolla, 12 September 1898; Lorenzelli to Rampolla, 17 September 1898 and 21 October 1898: ibid. ff. 13r-16v, 61r-62r, 72r-73v; Rampolla to Lorenzelli, 31 December 1898: ASV, SS 1900 rubr. 242 fase. 2, f. 15r.



THE HOLY SEE AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 433

another communication from his government. Encouraged by the positive response to

the Czar's proposai, the Russian government, on January 11, had issued a second

statement which suggested spécifie topics for discussion at a fortheoming conférence. In

addition to arms control the agenda would also include prévention of armed conflict

through the use of such pacifie instruments as arbitration, médiation, and good offices6.

The second Russian note raised again the possibility of the Holy See's participation

in the proposed conférence. Even with a prohibition on any discussion of the Roman

Question the Holy See could legitimately claim a place in an assembly convened to

develope pacifie means of conflict resolution. The Papacy's traditional rôle as a mediator

among nations had been strongly affirmed by the current pontiff. Since the start of his

pontificate in 1878, Pope Leo XIII, at the invitation of concerned parties, had

intervened several times to secure the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Papal arbitration of the dispute between Spain and Germany over the Caroline Islands

in 1895 and the vigorous but futile effort to prevent war between Spain and the United

States in 1898 were only the best-known of Leo's many actions on behalf of peace.

Indeed, in récognition of his tireless efforts the World Peace Conférence, meeting in

Budapest in 1896, had addressed a special letter to the Pope gratefully acknowledging

his contributions to world peace7.

Cardinal Rampolla saw in the latest Russian note a new opportunity for the

Vatican. Since the loss of the Papal States the Papacy had been especially concerned

with defending its independent standing in the international community. An invitation

to an international conférence would be a clear acknowledgment of that independent

standing. It would also allow the Holy See to demonstrate the moral and humanitarian

contributions it could make to the resolution of serious world problems.

On the grounds of both principle and procedure the Cardinal Secretary of State

believed that the Holy See would receive an invitation to the conférence which, it had

been announced, would convene in The Hague in the spring of 1899. No one could

deny the pope's legitimate concern as a moral leader with questions of médiation and

arbitration. Moreover, Rampolla felt that the fact that the Russian government

communicated both circulars to the Holy See indicated an explicit acknowledgment of

the Vatican's interest in the conférence and an implicit expectation of the Vatican's

participation. Indeed, Minister Isvolsky informed the Cardinal Secretary of State that his government preferred The Hague as the site for the meeting not merely because it

was a neutral capital but also because the presence there of a papal internunciature

would encourage participation by the Holy See8.

Italy, however, remained an obstacle. In early February 1899 the Italian Foreign

Ministry warned the diplomatie missions accredited to the Quirinal that Italy would not

participate in any conférence to which the Holy See was a party. By the middle of the

month Italy formally notified the Dutch government that it would boycott the meeting

if the Vatican received an invitation'. For support Rome appealed to its partners in the

8 Isvolsky to Rampolla, 16 January 1899: ASV, SS 1900 rubr. 242 fase. 1, f. lOr.

7 Heribert Franz KOck, Papsttum, Weltfriede und Vôlkerbund, 1899-1918: Der Kampf um

eine institutionelle Sicherung des Friedens: Romische Historische Mitteilungen 15 (1973)

148-149. 8

Rampolla to nuncios in Paris, Vienna, Madrid, Lisbon and Brussels, and internimelo in The

Hague, 14 February 1899: ASV, SS 1900 rubr. 242 fase. 2, ff. 33r-35v; Rampolla to Tamassi, 15

February 1899: ibid., fase. 1, f. 31r-v. ' David Betez, France, Germany, and The Hague Peace Conférences of 1899 and 1907

(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1982), p. 31.



434 DAVID ALVAREZ

Triple Alliance. Austria was reluctant to align itself with Italy for fear of alienating its

own Catholic population, thereby adding religious controversy to the politicai

grievances nurtured by the various nationalities of the diverse empire. Germany,

however, was more receptive to its ally's appeal. Berlin was concerned that

participation by the Holy See in the conférence would compromise the status and

authority of the Italian regime, sharpen the conflict between the Quirinal and the

Vatican, and encourage internai turmoil in Italy. Politicai instability in Italy at the very time that Austria faced increasing problème with its nationalities would seriously weaken the Triple Alliance, the pillar of German foreign policy. Germany, therefore,

informed the European powers of its support for Italy and warned Holland that an

invitation to the Holy See would offend Berlin as well as Romel0.

In response to Italian maneuvers, Cardinal Rampolla adopted a dual pohcy. To

counter Italian press reports that the Vatican was desperately seeking an invitation to

the conférence, he assured visitors that, while the Holy See was interested in the broad

humanitarian goals of the conférence, the agenda was primarily "technical" and, as

such, beyond the spécifie concern of the Vatican. Privately, however, the cardinal

believed that an invitation was a "vital question" for the Holy See and he ordered

nuncios to work for its successful resolution11.

The principal burden for asserting the interests of the Papacy fell upon the

internuncio in The Hague, Monsignor Francesco Tarnassi. On February 11, as soon as

it was certain that the Duth capital would host the international gathering, he raised

the issue of papal représentation with the foreign minister, Baron William de Beaufort.

Using arguments that he would tirelessly reiterate over the ensuing weeks, the

internuncio reminded the foreign minister that the Russian government had

deliberately communicated to the Holy See ali statements concerning the conférence,

indicating thereby its intention that the Holy See receive considération and treatment

the equal of other states. Tarnassi also argued that the Holy Father "as the

représentative of the Prince of Peace and as a moral force of the highest authority" was

necessarily and legitimately concerned with the work of the conférence1J.

Baron de Beaufort was in an awkward situation from which he could discern no

way of extricating himself. The arguments of the internuncio were compelling, but the

foreign minister could not ignore the opposition of Italy and Germany to any rôle for

the Holy See at the conférence. The sélection of The Hague as the site of the assembly was a gesture of trust and respect by the international community. The collapse of the

conférence due to a boycott by one or more of the Great Powers would be a blow to Dutch esteem and a personal and politicai disaster for the foreign minister. At first Beaufort sought to escape his predicament by disclaiming ali responsibility, assuring Monsignor Tarnassi that, while Holland would issue the invitations, Russia retained final authority for determining the list of participantsl3. Later, when Italy had clearly indicated its intention to boycott any conférence that included papal représentation, the

foreign minister reversed his position, admitting to Tarnassi that he did have final re

sponsibility for the invitations and that the Holy See should not expect to receive one. In vain the papal diplomai repeated the arguments on behalf of the Holy See, adding,

10 KOck, Papsttum (above n. 7), pp. 148-149.

" Rampollato Lorenzelli, 13 February 1899; Rampolla to Tarnassi, 1 March 1899: ASV, SS

1900 rubr. 242 fase. 2, ff. 28r-29v, 46r-47r. 12 Tarnassi to Rampolla, 11 February 1899: ibid., fase. 1, ff. 25r-26v. 13 Ibid.




without effect, his assurances that Italy had no reason to fear that a conférence

including papal delegates would raise issues embarrassing to the Quirinal. In a search

for a compromise the internimelo went so far as to suggest that after receiving an

invitation the Vatican might be content with indicating its support and goodwill

through a formai statement without its delegates actually participating in the

discussions. The Dutch foreign minister remained unmovedI4.

At the Vatican Cardinal Rampolla was determined to overcome the reticence at The

Hague. He instructed Tarn assi to maintain a firm stance with Beaufort and indicated

that, if not invited, the Holy See would make a formai protest to the Dutch

government The Cardinal Secretary of State realized, however, that in the face of

Italian opposition or in the absence of any countervailing pressure, Baron de Beaufort

would not reverse his position. On its own Italy was unlikely to withdraw its opposition to papal participation in the conférence. More promising was the prospect of removing or at least weakening German support for Italy. Standing alone, Rome might reconsider its position. At the very least Beaufort might be convinced that a boycott by

Italy alone posed no threat to the success of the conférence. Thus, Rampolla asked

George Cardinal Kopp, the Prince Bishop of Breslau and a prelate with access to the

highest levels of the German government, to approach Emperor Wilhelm II in an effort

to lessen Germany's support for Italy. Cardinal Kopp acted as requested but without

success. Germany would do nothing to weaken the Triple Alliance ".

If the force of Italian opposition could not be reduced, then a countervailing force

might be introduced. On March 1, the day he learned of the failure of Cardinal Kopp's

mission, Rampolla instructed Tarnassi to meet with the Catholic deputies from the

Dutch parliament. The internimelo was to remind them that the current controversy concerned ali Catholics and that the failure to invite the Holy See to the conférence

would be an offense against Catholics everywhere. The Cardinal Secretary of State

expected the deputies to adopt this position publicly and threaten to walk out of

parliament in the absence of an invitation17.

Dutifully, Monsignor Tarnassi called a sériés of meetings with the leaders of the

Catholic parliamentary faction. The deputies were pessimistic about the ability of their

group to influence events, but they agreed to speak with the foreign minister and, if

necessary, organize a walkout by Catholic deputies. On March 10 the leaders met

Beaufort. The hapless minister informed the deputies that the Council of Ministers had

decided to decline absolutely any responsibility for invitations and to return the task to

the Russian government18. The well-meaning Dutch were finding the matter of

invitations to be increasingly entangled: Italy objected to the Holy See; Turkey objected

to Bulgaria; Britain objected to the Boer states.

The décision by the Council of Ministers undercut the anticipated protest by

Catholic deputies since the government could simply déclaré in parliament that it had

no responsibility for the matter. The indefatigable Tarnassi quickly sought out the

Russian minister in The Hague to indicate that the Holy See had every expectation that

Russia would continue to respect its rights and that it awaited an invitation. The

14 Tarnassi to Rampolla, 19 February 1899: ibid., ff. 41r-43v. 15

Rampolla to Tarnassi, 20 February 1899: ibid., f. 39r-v. "

Rampolla to Kopp, 18 February 1899 and Kopp to Rampolla, 1 March 1899: ibid., ff. 45r-48r.

" Rampolla to Tarnassi, 1 March 1899: ASV, SS 1900 rubr. 242 fase. 2, ff. 46r-47r.

" Tarnassi to Rampolla, 5 March 1899 and 10 March 1899: ASV, SS 1902 rubr. 242 fase. 1, ff. 74r-75v, 89r-90v.



436 DAVID ALVAREZ

Russian diplomat assured the internimelo of his government's goodwill and expressed

his confidence that an invitation was fortheoming

The position of the Holy See appeared secure since ffom the start the Vatican had

assumed that Russia desired papal représentation at the conférence. It was no small

surprise, therefore, when, on March 14, two days after Tarnassi's reassuring

conversation with his Russian counterpart, the Cardinal Secretary of State received a

cable from the internuncio reporting that the list of states to be invited had arrived

from St. Petersburg and that the Holy See was not included. When Rampolla asked the

Russian légation to the Holy See for confirmation he was told that the internuncio's

information was incorrect; Russia had transmitted no list to Holland. Confused and

more than a little annoyed, the cardinal cabled a curt message to Tarnassi indicating that a clarification was required. Upon receipt of this message the papal diplomat went

immediately to the residence of the foreign minister where a gala ball was in progress. He managed a hurried conversation with Baron de Beaufort who explained that the

invitation list had been obtained informally by the Dutch légation in St. Petersburg. The

list was not an officiai communication of the Russian government which had not

authorized its release20.

Officiai or not, the news from St. Petersburg was ominous since it suggested that

even Russia was prepared to dispense with a papal role in the conférence. Within a

fortnight Rampolla's fears were confirmed. Monsignor Tarnassi reported that

invitations would go out on Aprii 6 and the Holy See would definitely not be

included21.

Refusing to abandon hope, Cardinal Rampolla worked to salvage some role for the

Vatican. He was encouraged by reports from Paris and The Hague that the powers were interested in a compromise that would allow a role for the Papacy without

alienating Italy and Germany. France, perhaps as much from a desire to embarrass the

Triple Alliance as from respect for the Papacy, was active in this regard. Moreover,

"Pierre, "

a confidential source in Paris with contacts in the French government and the

Russian embassy, informed the Vatican that Russia remained sympathetic to papal interests and that the Dutch were the obstacle22.

The Cardinal Secretary now approved a pian by the Catholic deputies in The

Hague to begin public criticism of the décision to exclude the Holy See. Baron de

Beaufort and Italy would be the targete of this criticism, but, as Rampolla advised, Russia would be treated with courtesy and respect23. Agitation by Catholic deputies alarmed Beaufort who feared that the Catholics in league with other disgruntled factions in parliament might bring down the government. Seeking some expedient to

placate Catholic opinion, the foreign minister proposed that Queen Wilhemina address

a letter to Pope Leo requesting his benevolent support for the conférence while

avoiding any phrase that might suggest an invitation. Dutifully, Tarnassi forwarded this

proposai to the Vatican but without any illusions as to its significance. The frustrât ed

internuncio warned his superiors that "In view of the malevolence of this Protestant,

19 Tarnassi to Rampolla, 12 March 1899: ibid., f. 98r. 20 Tarnassi to Rampolla, 14 March 1899 and 18 March 1899: ibid., ff. lOlr, 110r-l 1 lv. 21 Tarnassi to Rampolla, 29 March 1899 and 2 Aprii 1899: ibid., ff. 130r-131v, 149r. The invi

tations were dispatched on Aprii 7. 22 Tarnassi to Rampolla, 11 Aprii 1899; "Pierre" to Burtin, n.d. (received at the Vatican on

Aprii 11): ibid., ff. 161r-163v. 23 Tarnassi to Rampolla, 11 Aprii 1899; Rampolla to Tarnassi, 15 Aprii 1899: ibid.,

ff. 165r-166r, 180r.




Calvinist government towards the Holy See, its lack of ability, its vain fear, its artifice in

disclaiming ali responsibility, ... it is not realistic to put faith in the goodwill of Minister Beaufort.."24.

Cardinal Rampolla was not pleased with Beaufort's proposai. The foreign minister

clearly considered a royal letter an alternative to an invitation. By accepting the proposai

the Holy See would implicitly acknowledge its exclusion from the conférence. The Cardinal

Secretary concluded that a letter would be an empty gesture that would not assuage the

"offense" given to the Holy See by its exclusion25. In a rather cool interview with Beaufort

on May 3 Monsignor Tarnassi reported the Vatican's position. The foreign minister refused

to accept any reference to an "offense," maintaining that it was not his responsibility to

anticipate the possible offense of concemed parties (conveniently forgetting his recent

anxiety over Italy's reaction to a papal invitation). Pursuant to his policy of disclaiming

responsibility for anything, he insisted that if the Holy See was offended it would be the

fault of Italy or, perhaps, Russia but certainly not Holland. He ended the discussion by

informing the internuncio that the royal letter would be addressed shortly and that the

Dutch government expected that it would receive a courteous reply

It was, of course, inconceivable that the Pope would ignore a communication from

a reigning monarch. The arrivai of the letter, therefore, would reduce the Vatican's

options to two: respond courteously to the queen and quietly accept exclusion from the

conférence, or respond courteously to the queen and firmly protest to her government

against exclusion. Neither option was attractive since each represented a failure of

Vatican diplomacy. There remained, however, one other possibility. In Paris the French

Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé, had been working for a compromise that would

allow a papal représentative to attend only those conférence délibérations concerned

with arbitrai ion of international disputes. By late Aprii he was expecting the support of

Russia, Spain, and Portugal and hoping for support from Britain. As for Germany,

Delcassé believed that Berlin would find it difficult to oppose this compromise since

Germany had recognized the value of papal arbitration in the Caroline Islands

dispute27. On May 5 he reported that Belgium would support the compromise and that

discussions with Russia were continuing. Desperately seeking time for the French

initiative to mature, Cardinal Rampolla urged Monsignor Tarnassi to secure a delay of

a few day s in the dispatch of the royal letter28.

Unfortunately, events overtook Delcassé's negotiations. On May 9 Queen Wilhemina

signed a letter to Pope Leo acknowledging his concern for peace and requesting his blessing

on the conférence. Delivery of this letter was delay ed until May 12 when Beaufort

informed Tarnassi that his government could wait no longer. The next day, as a protest

against its exclusion from the conférence, the Vatican recalled Monsignor Tarnassi, leaving

the internunciature in the charge of a junior officiai who was instructed to have no contact

with the délégations attending the meeting which convened on May 18, 18992'.

24 Tarnassi to Rampolla, 27 Aprii 1899: ASV, SS 1900 rubr. 242 fase. 2, ff. 12r-v, 15r. "

Rampolla to Tarnassi, 1 May 1899: ibid., f. 62r-v. " Tarnassi to Rampolla, 3 May 1899: ibid., ff. 65r-66v. 27 Granito di Belmonte to Rampolla, 24 Aprii 1899: ibid., ff. 27r-29v. 28 Granito di Belmonte to Rampolla, 5 May 1899; Rampolla to Tarnassi, 6 May 1899: ibid.,

ff. 81r-82r, 83r. "

Pope Leo politely acknowledged the royal letter on May 20. Relations between the Holy See and the Netherlands were not normalized until 1911 when an internimelo returned to The

Hague. Rampolla to Tarnassi, 13 May 1899: ibid., f. 104r; Queen Wilhelmina to Pope Leo XIII, 9

May 1899 and Pope Leo XIII to Queen Wilhelmina, 20 May 1899: ASV, SS 1900 rubr. 242 fase.

3, ff. 23r-24r, 25r-v.



438 DAVID ALVAREZ

The Vatican's effort to secure a place at the First Hague Peace Conférence failed for

lack of international support. The opposition of Italy was predictable. With the Roman

Question unresolved Italy could not allow the Holy See to receive, let alone accept, an

invitation to the conférence for such would represent explicit acknowledgment of the

Papacy's separate and sovereign standing in the international community. For its part,

Germany could not support any initiative that would embarrass Rome and undermine

its commitment to the Triple Alliance.

A boycott by Italy and Germany would have been a mortai blow to the conférence

especially if Austria, as was likely, followed its allies. In the face of such a threat only the strongest représentations by other powers could have salvaged some rôle for the

Holy See. Such représentations were not forthcoming. Belgium, Portugal, and Spain were sympathetic to the Vatican but in the politicai balance they could not outweigh the

major powers. Among the latter Britain tacitly supported Italy in order to avoid a situa tion which might open the door to participation in the conférence by the irksome Boer

Republics. France actively pursued a compromise that would accommodate ail parties, but it could do nothing alone. Russia was the key, but its attitude was enigmatic.

From their contacts with Czarist diplomate Cardinal Rampolla and Monsignor Tarnassi concluded that Russia firmly supported the Holy See. St. Petersburg, however, was reluctant to press its support. Indeed, Russian assurances which seemed so clear at the Vatican appeared strangely muted in the chancelleries of Berlin, Rome, and Vienna. In fact, Russia's support was probably never as firm as the Vatican believed. While open to papal participation in the conférence. St. Petersburg would not allow the issue to jeopardize an initiative to which the Czar had committed his name and personal prestige. Nor would it allow the issue to disturb unduly its foreign or domestic affairs. In the end, for Russia as for the other powers, the anticipated costs of

papal participation in the peace conférence outweighed the possible benefits. Against such calculations Vatican diplomacy could not prevail.



the holy see and the first hague peace conference (1899)

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