Faculty of Bioscience Engineering

Academic year 2014 – 2015

The Impact of Competition between

Local NGOs for Funding(A case study in local NGOs implementing nutrition interventions in Kismayu, Somalia)

Mohamed Jelle Adan

Promoter: Prof. dr. ir. Joost Dessein

Master’s dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirementsfor the degree of Master of Science in Nutrition and Rural Development

Main subject: Human Nutrition – Major in Public Health Nutrition

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CERTIFICATION AND DECLARATION

I, Mohamed Jelle Adan, declare that this is the result of my own work and that no previous

submission for a degree has been made here or elsewhere. Works by others, which served as

source of information, have been duly acknowledged by references to the authors.

Permission is given for consulting and copying parts of this work for personal use by the author

and the promoter. Any other use is under the limitation of copyrights law; especially it is

obligatory to specify the source when using finding from this master’s dissertation after having

obtained a written permission.

Ghent, January 2015

Prof. Dr. Joost Dessein Mohamed Jelle Adan

(Promoter) (Master Dissertation author)

Email: joost.dessein@ugent Email: jellesenior@hotmail.com

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ABSTRACT

Background: Competition between non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially for

funding among other resources is not a new phenomenon. This has been the case even for bigger

and reputable international NGOs (INGOs) as they compete for donations through their

fundraising activities.

More than ever, many developed countries have in the recent past increasingly relied on NGOs,

which has seen between one-quarter to almost a half of their official development funds being

channelled through NGOs (USAID, 2002). As a result, NGO have been rapidly mushrooming

and the boom in the sector continues.

Objectives: The general objective of the study is to assess the competition for funding and its

impact, between the local NGOs, on the implementation of nutritional interventions in Kismayu -

Somalia

Method: The study used here was a grounded theory methodology in which data was collected

between February-September, 2014 during my internship period with nutrition cluster, UNICEF,

Somalia. Both Snowball and convenience sampling were used. A total of 35 humanitarian

workers and one TPMG senior manager participated in this study. 27 of them were from

LNGOs, 5 from INGOs, 4 from UN and 1 from TPMG. There were 2 FGDs and 8 in-depth

interviews.

Results: The result showed that because of stiff competition there was no community

participation, no coordination and no enough funding. In addition to that there is serious tribal

rivalry, bribery and corruption as well as low capacity of local NGOs. However, the study

showed because of the competition and mushrooming of LNGOs, there is access to almost all

parts of the country.

Conclusion: Competition disrupts coordination and timely delivery or services, results to lack of

cooperation, undermines the long-term capacity of indigenous aid organizations and

compromises the quality of services provided.

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DEDICATION

To my late father,

May the Almighty God rest his soul in JANNAH.

Ameen.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like first of all to thank the Almighty God for being my strength during my stay in

Belgium.

To Prof. dr. Joost Dessein, I would like to express my sincere and heartfelt gratitude for your

tireless supervision, guidance and financial support for data collection.

Special thanks to the NuRuDe course co-coordinator; ir. Anne-Marie Remaut-De Winter for her

support and encouragement during my study time and during the last two renewals of my

residence. I would also like to thank Marian Mareen for her role in the coordination office.

To my mother, for your unconditional love and support throughout my life. Without your tireless

encouragement and belief in me, I wouldn’t have come this far.

Thanks and appreciations are also extended to my lovely friends in Belgium, Ibrahim Mohamed

and Lien De Keyser, without whom my stay in Belgium would have been difficult.

Finally, this study would not have been possible without the help of nutrition cluster team,

UNICEF Somalia and all the LNGO, INGO, UN agencies and TPMG staff that participated in it.

Thank you for your cooperation, understanding and patience

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATION AND DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................ I

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................................. III

DEDICATION .........................................................................................................................................................IV

ACKNOWLEDGMENT..............................................................................................................................................V

TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................................VI

LIST OF FIGURES..................................................................................................................................................VIII

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....................................................................................................................................VIII

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 1

1.1 BACKGROUND..................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM............................................................................................................................................ 3

1.3 OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................................................ 4

1.3.1 General objective .................................................................................................................................. 4

1.3.2 Primary objectives................................................................................................................................. 4

1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES ........................................................................................................................................ 4

1.5 THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH ............................................................................................................................. 5

1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION..................................................................................................................... 5

2 LITERATURE REVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 6

2.1 THE CONFLICT AND SECURITY SITUATION IN SOMALIA.................................................................................................. 6

2.2 COMPETITION FOR FUNDING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................................... 7

2.3 NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF SOMALIA ....................................................................................................................... 12

2.4 THE SITUATION IN KISMAYO................................................................................................................................. 14

3 METHODOLOGY.......................................................................................................................................... 17

3.1 STUDY AREA ..................................................................................................................................................... 17

3.2 STUDY POPULATION ........................................................................................................................................... 19

3.3 STUDY DESIGN, SAMPLING TECHNIQUE AND SAMPLE SIZE........................................................................................... 19

3.4 STUDY PROCEDURE ............................................................................................................................................ 20

3.4.1 Confidentiality ..................................................................................................................................... 20

3.4.2 Data collection .................................................................................................................................... 20

3.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 21

3.6 DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS...................................................................................................................... 21

3.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ................................................................................................................................. 21

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4 RESULTS...................................................................................................................................................... 22

4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................................22

4.2 NEED AND MOTIVATION FOR PROGRAMS ................................................................................................................23

4.3 AVAILABILITY OF FUNDING ...................................................................................................................................25

4.4 COORDINATION .................................................................................................................................................26

4.5 TRIBAL RIVALRY OR DESTRUCTIVE RIVALRY ...............................................................................................................27

4.6 MISUSE OF FUNDS/BRIBERY .................................................................................................................................28

4.7 CAPACITY OF LNGOS..........................................................................................................................................29

5 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................................ 31

5.1 EMERGENCY LEVELS OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION .........................................................................................................31

5.2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE THEMES ...................................................................................................................35

6 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................38

6.1 SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND NGO INTERVENTION OUTCOMES ...................................................................................38

6.2 CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................................................38

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................................................................................................................................39

REFERENCES.........................................................................................................................................................41

APPENDICES...........................................................................................................................................................1

APPENDIX 1: DRAFT QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................................1

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF ELIGIBLE CHF PARTNERS.....................................................................................................................3

APPENDIX 3: NODES FROM NVIVO....................................................................................................................................5

APPENDIX 4: 2013-2015 SOMALIA CAP PAPER ...............................................................................................................14

APPENDIX 5: CHF ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK..............................................................................................................15

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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 2-1 MAP OF NUTRITIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA ............................................................................................... 11

FIGURE 2-2 GAM TRENDS IN DIFFERENT REGIONS IN SOMALIA................................................................................................. 14

FIGURE 2-3 KISMAYU ADMISSION TRENDS ............................................................................................................................ 16

FIGURE 3-1 MAP OF LOWER JUBA ...................................................................................................................................... 18

FIGURE 5-1 SNAPSHOT OF 2015 POPULATION IN SOMALIA..................................................................................................... 32

FIGURE 5-2 CAP 2013 FUNDING STATUS............................................................................................................................. 33

FIGURE 5-3 HUMANITARIAN ACCESS MAPS ........................................................................................................................... 36

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CHF Common Humanitarian Fund

FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit

GAM Global Acute Malnutrition

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

IOA International Aid Organization

LNGO Local Non-Governmental Organization

MAM Moderate Acute Malnutrition

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

SAM Severe Acute Malnutrition

TPMG Third Party Monitoring Group

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Competition between non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially for funding among

other resources is not a new phenomenon. This has been the case even for bigger and reputable

international NGOs (INGOs) as they compete for donations through their fundraising activities.

This has greatly been influenced by the tremendous increment of NGO popularity among the

international aid community in the last few decades, which has seen more donors implementing

bigger projects through the NGOs (Hudock, 1999). Moreover, the governments of developed

countries have increasingly relied on NGOs, which has seen between one-quarter to almost a half

of their official development funds being channelled through NGOs (USAID, 2002). As a result,

NGO have been rapidly mushrooming and the boom in the sector continues. According to the

Union of International Associations, there are around 33,500 international NGOs in the world

(UIA, 2002). Local NGO have grown even faster than that and are created on daily basis. In

Kenya for example an estimated 240 NGO are now created every year (The Economist, 2000).

This rapid mushrooming of NGOs has led to competition amongst themselves for resources.

Such competition has led to internationalization of such INGOs as competition for donors in

their mother countries tightened (Aldashev & Verdier, 2009). This has been achieved through the

establishment of affiliates in other developed countries with prospective donors. The strategy

enabled such INGOs to aggressively tackle new markets as well as reduce the cost of recruiting

new donors. However, this globalization of the NGO sector has eventually led to competition for

donations at an international level. For instance, Hancock (1989) elaborates how local NGOs can

be ruthless in dealing with competition especially from the affiliates of INGOs. This was the case

in Australia in December 1984 when World Vision (American NGO) broke an explicit

understanding with the Australian Council of Churches (ACC) of not running television

spectaculars that competed with the ACC’s traditional Christmas Bowl appeal (Hancock, 1989).

Similarly, competition also exists between local NGOs found in foreign aid recipient countries

but in a different form. Local NGOs in many aid recipient countries greatly depend on funding

from different international donor agencies (IDAs) and INGOs (Mohamed, 1997). Furthermore,

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Mohamed (1997) characterized such African (local) NGOs by their rapid ad hoc growth and

having structures similar to their Western associates. According to Hammond et al. (2011) the

local NGOs are still largely uncoordinated. In Somalia, the number of such local NGOs has been

on the rise as they seek to partner with INGOs and IDAs in the implementation of humanitarian

and development projects.

The existence of local humanitarian NGOs in Somalia is linked to the arrival of international aid

organizations1 (IAOs) in the country conducting relief and other development activities. They

first emerged in the early 1980s together with the first wave of increased presence of IAOs in

Somalia in response to the 1977-1978 Ogaden war (Tsitrinbaum, 2012; Mohamed, 1997). A

second wave of a large presence of IAOs in the country came after the fall of Siyad Barre’s rule.

The second wave ended in 1995 when all IAOs withdrew from Mogadishu and shifted all their

coordination and management systems to Kenya. The withdrawal of international agencies saw

the numbers of local NGOs greatly increase (Mohamed, 1997). Furthermore, the continued state

of insecurity and instability has led IAOs to increasingly depend on local NGOs on the delivery

of humanitarian assistance to those in need. This was as a result of the opposition forces

perceiving IAOs as being partial and having a political aim and affiliation since they were

identified with the Global North (Tsitrinbaum, 2012).

Aid agencies in Somalia implement a wide range of programmes in response to the complex and

protracted humanitarian crisis, with nutritional intervention being one of the main forms of

assistance provided to the needy. The levels of malnutrition is still high in the country with the

most affected being children (FSNAU & FEWS NET, 2014). This has been as a result of

widespread food insecurity, extreme poverty, the extreme political environment, conflict and

1 International aid organizations (IAOs) are composed of both international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and international donor agencies (IDAs).

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instability (UNICEF, 2011). With a large proportion of the population still in need of

humanitarian assistance and the increased involvement of local NGOs in the delivery of aid,

there is need to better understand the factors that may affect the effectiveness of the implemented

programmes. Therefore, this study seeks to explore the competition for funding between local

NGOs and other stakeholders and elaborate on its implications as well as determine its impact on

the implementation of nutritional interventions in Somalia.

1.2 Research Problem

Competition amongst NGOs especially for funds among other resources is an occurrence that has

been observed both in the donor and aid recipient countries (Aldashev & Verdier, 2009; Kemp,

2013). In Somalia, local NGOs greatly depend on external funding especially from IAOs. The

prolonged humanitarian crisis faced in the country coupled with a growing insecurity has led

IAOs to increasingly rely on local NGOs in the implementation of their programmes to the

needy. Similarly, the amount of funds being channelled through local NGOs by IAOs has also

been on the increase. There has been an overdependence on the external funding by local NGOs

which is erratic and insufficient to build their capacities (CAFOD, 2013). This has contributed to

the rapid mushrooming of local NGOs which seek to partner with the IAOs. Eventually, there

has been an increase in the level of competition amongst the local NGOs for funding from the

IAOs.

However, competition for funds and other resources among NGOs can have detrimental effects

on their operations (Aldashev & Verdier, 2009). According to different studies, increased

fundraising activities by the NGOs amidst a competitive environment may lead to a reduction in

their focus on providing aid to the needy (Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2010). Aid agencies in Somalia

have poor collaborations, especially amongst the local NGOs, and the level of coordination of

their activities is still quite low. As a result, they end up providing similar interventions to the

same communities and regions. This may reduce coverage and the effectiveness of the

interventions being implemented by different local NGOs targeting the same needs and

individuals.

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Nutritional intervention is one of the major humanitarian programmes being implemented by aid

agencies in Somalia. The country still has the highest rates of malnutrition globally and the food

security is still adversely affected (UNICEF, 2011). With the increasing involvement of more

local NGOs in the implementation of humanitarian and development projects, the impact of their

competition for funding on such interventions needs to be determined. Therefore, this study aims

to evaluate the competition for funding among local NGOs. The study will assess the

competition and its implication amongst the local NGOs and determine its impact to the

nutritional interventions being implemented.

1.3 Objectives

1.3.1 General objective

To assess the competition for funding and its impact, between the local NGOs and other

stakeholders, on the implementation of nutritional interventions in Kismayo - Somalia

1.3.2 Primary objectives

To assess the competition for funding and its implications between local NGOs and other

stakeholders.

To assess the impact of competition for funding between local NGOs and other

stakeholders involved in the implementation of nutritional interventions.

To determine the relationship between the number of nutritional interventions and the

nutritional status of an area.

1.4 Research hypotheses

There is high competition for funds between local NGOs and other stakeholders involved

in nutritional interventions.

The competitive environment disrupts timely delivery and compromises the quality of

services provided.

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The competition disrupts coordination, results to lack of cooperation and undermines the

long-term capacity of indigenous aid organizations.

1.5 The purpose of the research

The study will attempt to elaborate why the competition for funding is what it is between local

NGOs and stakeholders involved in providing nutritional interventions and its effects. The study

will focus on possible explanatory factors such as tribal and geographical location; economic

activity, socio-cultural attitudes and political dynamics as well as the ongoing conflicts.

Moreover, the impact of the competition on the implementation of nutritional interventions will

also be assessed. This will help in determining the impact that competition for funds between

local NGOs has on the implementation of such interventions.

1.6 Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter one is an introduction of the study

including the study rationale, study objectives and the structure of the dissertation.

Chapter two is literature review on competitions between Aid organizations and its impacts,

particularly in emergence settings, studies on program relevance, coordination, funding, tribal

rivalry, capacity of LNGOs and misuse of funding in humanitarian settings with inaccessibility

constrains due to insecurity issues are focused. This review is intended not only to provide a

background against which discussion of the findings can be made but also to compare our

findings with other studies on the same.

Chapter three describes the methodology used in the field to collect data. It indicates the methods

and research techniques that were employed. It also highlights statistical methods that were used

to analyse data.

In chapter four, the results of the study are described.

In chapter five, the general discussion is presented based on the study and relevant literature.

Chapter six gives the general conclusions and recommendations and possible areas for further

research.

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2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The conflict and security situation in Somalia

Somalia has endured over two decades of conflict and instability since the collapse of Siyad

Barre’s government in 1991, leading to the current failed state. Different clans have been

contesting against each other for resources in most parts of the country including rangeland,

farmland, towns and cities among others. The unending debates and wars have been as a result of

different claims by the clans based on varied interpretations of historical settlement patterns,

demographics, power struggles and citizenship rights (Menkhaus, 2012). This is complicated by

the fact that as a country, Somalia has never settled issues surrounding land and community

settlement.

After Siyad Barre was overthrown, none of the competing factions managed to take control of

the entire country leading to a continued conflict that eventually divided the country into three

territories namely; Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia (Tsitrinbaum, 2012; Moller,

2009). Each territory has its own type of governance and is run independently. Both Somaliland

and Puntland have a functioning form of government and has seen relative stability, compared to

South Central Somalia which has experienced instability up to date (Tsitrinbaum, 2012;

Hammond et al., 2011). UNICEF (2011) refers to the South Central territory as the epicentre of

the crisis in Somalia, with more than 80% of those requiring humanitarian assistance living here.

The region is also responsible for the highest numbers of forcefully displaced persons (IDPs)

from the estimated 1.46million internally displaced persons in the country (UNICEF, 2011).

These conflicts took a toll on the food as well as on the aid provided by relief agencies. A large

number of people died and were displaced as a result of the direct fighting as well as due to

hunger and related diseases. The suffering of the civilian community was brought to the attention

of the international community calling for the much needed humanitarian assistance. However,

international interventions attempting to restore order have ever since failed and in most cases

have left the country in a worse of situation (Moller, 2009). This was the outcome in the early

1990’s when an intervention by both the United Nations and the United States exacerbated the

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problems. Similarly, the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 had more or less the same effect that caused

chaos and a severe humanitarian crisis.

Efforts of state-building and the war on terror have led to the deterioration of the security

situation in the whole of Somalia since 2006 due to the conflict between the Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) and opposition forces (Moller, 2009). This is as a result of an extremely

politicized environment in which the opposing factions view activities of IAOs as being biased

and a weapon targeting them directly. As a result more international aid workers have been

targeted making it difficult for IAOs to maintain a presence on the ground, (Tsitrinbaum, 2012).

This was worsened in 2010 when the Al-Shabaab banned the operation of some IAOs in the

areas which they controlled (UNICEF, 2011). An access crisis was ensued, prompting

international humanitarian organizations to adapt the use of remote management strategies. Some

opted to operate where their access was allowed by directly carrying out prioritized programme

implementation through their international or Somali staff. However, others saw it best to work

with the local NGOs in the implementation of their activities (Tsitrinbaum, 2012).

2.2 Competition for funding and its implications

The country has faced a prolonged humanitarian crisis in conjunction with growing insecurity,

which has greatly contributed to the recent challenges of accessing the affected populations in

need of humanitarian assistance. This has led the IAOs to strongly rely on local NGOs which are

better placed in the delivery of aid to the needy in Somalia (Tsitrinbaum, 2012). However, these

partnerships are largely determined by the requirements and needs of the IAOs despite their

increased reliance on local NGOs for aid delivery. Somalia received the largest increase of

humanitarian assistance of US $851 million from the year 2010 to 2011 (GHA, 2013). Moreover,

there has been an increase in funding being channeled through local NGOs in Somalia in the

recent past. For example, a report by the Global Humanitarian Assistance (2012) showed an

increase in funding to local Somali NGOs in 2011 from the common humanitarian funds (CHFs)

compared to the previous years starting from 2006 to 2010. A study by Tsitrinbaum (2012)

showed that a large portion of funds are being disbursed by IAOs to local NGOs in Somalia.

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This has led to overdependence by local NGOs on short-term project-based funding from the

IAOs. Different studies show that majority of local NGOs in Somalia are short-term

implementing partners of IAOs who provide the funding to the activities (Tsitrinbaum, 2012;

Kemp, 2013). However, the over dependence on international financing by local NGOs has

posed a major challenge since it is unpredictable, not easy to access and is not sufficient to

enable them strengthen and develop their capacity (CAFOD, 2013). This is because the INGOs

and IDA offer partnership to local NGOs who can align to their funding needs and conditions of

working on what the donor organizations perceives to be a priority (Tsitrinbaum, 2012). The

scenario above has created a competitive environment for the local NGOs and other stakeholders

who compete for funds from IAOs among other resources.

A number of studies have shown that competition for funds can have a negative effect on the

operations of an NGO; which is also referred to as “excessive fundraising problem” (Aldashev &

Verdier, 2009). In the quest to attract donations, NGOs may increase their resources, time and

effort in fundraising and pleasing the donor as opposed to focusing on finding solutions and

implementing projects to help the needy (Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2010). The increased

humanitarian access crisis and the unprecedented flow of funding, especially in South Central

Somalia, have been the major reasons behind the rapid growth and activity of local NGOs in

Somalia (Tsitrinbaum, 2012). However, this has led to competition amongst the local NGOs for

the funding and other resources being provided by the IAOs. Therefore, the availability and

access to the funding has become limited since most of the local NGOs depend solely on it and it

is only availed depending on the needs and terms of the donor IAOs.

According to Tsitrinbaum (2012) many local NGOs still had limited capacities, both at

institutional and technical levels, of delivering complex humanitarian programmes. This may

have been due to their limited experience since they were relatively new entities in the field,

lacked professional personnel with the requisite experience and they heavily depended on

external funding which was insufficient for capacity building. Most IAOs prefer the use of a sub-

contracting relationship in engaging the local NGOs mainly due to their capacities and

perceptions on motivations. This is usually characterized by short-term engagements, limited

capacity building and total control of funding mechanisms by IAOs. As a result, most local

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NGOs scale their operations as stipulated by the needs and funding conditions of the IAOs. This

mode of operation has eventually created a vicious cycle where local NGOs compete for funding

for the short-term projects being offered by IAOs. Such local NGOs end up having little

fundraising experience while being extremely dependent on project funds from IAOs. Therefore,

institutional capacities2 of these local NGOs are not strengthened; due to lack of strategic

investments, which is vital in improving their response capacity, preparedness and resilience to

disaster (CAFOD, 2013; Tsitrinbaum, 2012).

The trustworthiness and reputation of organizations is important in determining the design of

partnership models and in turn the allocation of funds between aid agencies (Tsitrinbaum, 2012).

The high level of competition and mistrust between aid agencies in Somalia has discouraged

open communication which has in turn affected the quality of collaboration and coordination,

despite its significance in boosting capacity and enhancing effectiveness of interventions as well

as increasing trust and accountability (Kemp, 2013; Bugingo, 2011). There is a perception that

with the absence of a functioning economy, the establishment of some local NGOs may have

been motivated by the potential financial gains from the increased international presence.

Moreover, the local NGO sector lacks a strong network which can be used for their advocacy as

well as improve information sharing and operational coordination (Tsitrinbaum, 2012). This has

eventually led to weak partnerships as well as poor collaboration and coordination of activities

amongst the competing local NGOs (Kemp, 2013).

Some local NGOs are clan based organizations and such local NGOs are known to be partial in

the implementation of their activities by not assisting communities in need other than the ones

they belong to (Tsitrinbaum, 2012). As a result, these organizations enforce territorial dominance

2 Institutional capacities refer to an NGO being self-sufficient with the ability of planning and executing both its short term and long term activities.

10

over regions which they control, and ensure other competing local NGOs cannot operate in those

areas. This has led to bitter rivalry amongst the local NGOs as some of them strive to be the sole

implementer of programmes in certain regions and to specific communities. The perception of

impartiality of local NGOs in their delivery of service has greatly contributed to the lack of trust

of IAOs in them. This has greatly affected the quality of their programmes, including their ability

of hiring professional staff which is usually compromised (Tsitrinbaum, 2012).

Moreover, Mohamed (1997) reported of the presence of a large number of local NGOs in

Mogadishu who have been recorded to be extremely corrupt. According to Tsitrinbaum (2012),

local NGOs and their staff are perceived to be more susceptible to misappropriation of aid and

fraud in the situation of extreme poverty, violence and limited future prospects. This is as a result

of the perception that financial interests drive some locals to set up and run NGOs which are

seen as a source of livelihood and employment in an economy with limited opportunities due to

the continued unrest. Some of the local NGOs are usually not fully dedicated to humanitarian

principles and offering service to the needy but are more focused on financial gains

(Tsitrinbaum, 2012). Therefore, they may be involved in corrupt or fraudulent activities like

bribery in order to beat competition and acquire funds from IAOs for their programmes and

activities.

Eventually, most of these local NGOs, international aid agencies and other stakeholders do target

the same people and regions while providing the same solutions. This is greatly due to the

reduced collaborations and poor coordination of implemented programmes, especially among the

local NGOs and stakeholders. This eventually leads to a compromise on the effectiveness of the

interventions and programmes implemented. This is illustrated in figure 1 (see next page) below

where there are many nutritional interventions within Somalia but the country is still faced by

food insecurity and adverse nutritional conditions. In one way or another, the competition for

funds amongst the local NGOs greatly affects the programmes being carried out. Therefore, it is

important to study the impacts that this competition has on such programmes and activities in

order to improve service delivery to those in need of assistance.

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Figure 2-1 Map of nutritional interventions in Somalia

Source: Somali Nutrition Cluster, 2014

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2.3 Nutritional status of Somalia

According to UNICEF (2011), Somalia has the highest rate of malnutrition worldwide as a result

of the prolonged state of unrest and instability accompanied by natural disasters (Moller, 2009;

KISIMA, 2013). FSNAU & FEWS NET (2014) estimated that over 1 million people were in

crisis of acute food insecurity and required urgent humanitarian assistance in July of 2014

through the end of the year, with IDPs being the most affected group of individuals (ICRC,

2014).

Other disadvantaged groups of individuals are pastoralists, the urban poor, girls and minority

groups. It was also estimated that over 2.1 million additional people were stressed3 and were

exposed to shocks that could easily push them back to food security crisis in the absence of

requisite support. Children were worst affected across the groups where it was estimated that

218,000 children below the age of five were acutely malnourished, with 43,800 being severely

acute malnourished and the numbers were expected to increase through the end of the year.

A survey conducted showed that the prevalence of acute malnutrition was critical4 for 21 out of

50 population groups studied, with 50% of the rural livelihoods having critical levels of global

acute malnutrition (GAM). South-Central Somalia had the highest levels of malnutrition

compared to the other regions as illustrated on figure 2 below. Moreover, over 74% of

malnourished children were living in the region (FSNAU & FEWS NET, 2014). The morbidity

of malnourished children from these regions was higher and they were more susceptible to

diseases. Thus, the regions with higher malnutrition rates had higher morbidity levels too.

3 These individuals may struggle to meet the minimal food requirements.

4 Critical levels of acute malnutrition are defined by GAM rates ≥15% (FSNAU & FEWS NET, 2014).

13

The figure below shows survey results carried from 2007-2013 by FSNAU. The surveys are

done twice a year i.e during the Gu5’ and Deyr6 rainy seasons. The high peak seen in 2010-2011

is because of the famine that hit the country during that time.

The situation especially in different regions of the southern part of the country is being fueled by

the military and insurgent activities as well as inter-clan conflicts and border disputes. They have

disrupted agricultural activities, trade and humanitarian access as well as causing displacement

of people and loss of lives. This has led to a decrease in availability of both imported and locally

produced foods. In addition to a poor harvest due to delayed and erratic rainfall, staple food

prices have sky-rocketed in several regions of the country due to the increased demand and low

supply (ICRC, 2014; FSNAU & FEWS NET, 2014). This has adversely affected the food

security situation in urban areas, whereas the livelihoods of pastoralists are being overstretched

placing them at risk too. Other causes of malnutrition in the country include morbidity, poor

feeding practices and reduced humanitarian assistance as compared to the recent past due to of

politicization of aid and donor policies (FSNAU & FEWS NET, 2014; Hedlund et al., 2013).

There is need of delivering immediate and direct nutritional intervention to these individuals in

order to reduce the risks of death.

5 Rainfall from April through August affecting Somalia's main harvest in September/October is called the "gu" rains. Sometimes these are also referred to as the "long rains."

6 Rainfall from October through January affecting Somalia's secondary harvest in January/February is called the "deyr" rains. Sometimes these are also called the "short rains".

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Figure 2-2 GAM trends in different regions in Somalia

Source: FSNAU & FEWS NET (2014)

2.4 The situation in Kismayo

The city of Kismayo is located in the Lower Juba region of southern Somalia, which borders the

republic of Kenya. The region has been heavily contested since 1991 making it highly unstable

(Menkhaus, 2012). The conflicts in this area have always been clan-based, with each one of them

seeking the control of the area and its resources. This has been worsened by political and militia

elites who have used mobilized and manipulated clanism in order to control key resources as

they seek to enrich themselves. The seaport of Kismayo is the main valuable resource at the

centre of the conflicts in the region; with each party seeking its control in order to enjoy the

customs revenue from commercial exports and imports. Kismayo is also considered to be the

‘capital’ of Jubaland and whoever controls it is considered to be the governing authority of the

17.9516.1

19.4

13.85

20.25 21.2

15.95

25.85

39.5

26.7

20.4 19.516.1

15.117.3

20.3 21.4

28.4

20.1

8.3

11.312.9

21.619.8 19.2

15.814

12.714.416.1 16.5

9.8 10.8

13.612.2

15 15.514.2

10.6 10

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

2007 Gu

2007 Deyr

2008 Gu

2008 Deyr

2009 Gu

2009 Deyr

2010 Gu

2010 Deyr

2011 Gu

2011 Deyr

2012 Gu

2012 Deyr

2013 Gu

2013 Deyr

Gu 2014

SC NE NW

15

region. Therefore, any group that believed it had been allocated an unfair share of the revenues

from the port joined the armed opposition. Most of the discontented groups ended up being

recruited or forming alliances with the Al-Shabaab7, which is known to take advantage of the

weaker clans’ grievances (Menkhaus, 2012). This greatly hampered humanitarian access in the

region, especially after the ban of many aid agencies from operating in Al-Shabaab controlled

areas (OCHA, 2012).

However, the military operation by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the

government forces saw Al-Shabaab withdraw from Kismayu and its environs after it was seized

on September of 2012 (OCHA, 2012). The battle for Kismayu wasn’t a protracted one, but it saw

large numbers of people being displaced in the entire district. This was as a result of the tension

from the uncertainty over the new Kismayu administration and retaliatory attacks from the

opposing militia and their allies. More temporary displacement was reported as rival political

groups engaged in occasional heavy fighting (OCHA, 2013). As a result, more individuals

moved into IDP camps which were located around Kismayu Township. Aid agencies who

continued operating in the area have been providing nutritional interventions and health services

to the needy. Many IDPs depended on humanitarian assistance in Kismayu since labour

opportunities were few and seasonal which greatly depended on the activity of the port

(KISIMA, 2013).

Recently, the region has been faced with an increase in the number of IDPs due to conflicts, loss

of livelihood and reduced humanitarian assistance (FSNAU & FEWS NET, 2014). In addition,

many IDP settlements have experienced rapid deterioration in their food security situations.

Assessments on nutrition and food security by FSNAU (2014) and its partners on large IDP

settlements showed that IDPs in Kismayo were in a state of emergency and required urgent

7 Al-Shabaab has been in control of Kismayo and most of the Juba region from 2008 (Menkhaus, 2012).

16

humanitarian assistance. According to the assessment, the prevalence of acute malnutrition in

Kismayo was critical; with GAM rates exceeded 15% in conjunction with Crude Death Rates

(CDR) of over one per 10,000 people per day (FSNAU & FEWS NET, 2014). The most

malnourished groups of individuals were young children and the aged (KISIMA, 2013). Figure 3

below shows the new admissions of malnourished children to outpatient therapeutic programs

(OTP) in Kismayu between January and September 2014. There is a sharp increase on the new

OTP admissions, indicating a rapid deterioration of the nutritional status of children within

Kismayo. The sharp decrease in July is not necessarily decrease in admissions but low reporting

rate from agencies.

Figure 2-3 Kismayu admission trendsSource: Somalia Nutrition Cluster, 2014

254242 234 235

206

182

12

76

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Sep

17

3 METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodology used in the field to collect data. It gives a brief

description of the study area, study population, research techniques, study procedure and

sampling techniques that were employed. It also highlights the statistical methods that were used

to analyze the data and the limitations of the study.

3.1 Study area

For security reasons, the study was conducted in Nairobi, Kenya during my time with the

nutrition cluster, UNICEF, Somalia between February-September, 2014.

The study was however focused on Kismayu, Lower Juba, Southern Somalia. Lower Juba

borders Middle Juba and Gedo to the north, Kenya to the west, Middle Juba to the northeast and

the Indian Ocean to the east. The region has four districts: Kismayu, Jamaame, Afmadow and

Badhaadhe. Kismayu is the HQ of the region and has total land area of about 61,000 km2

(Population statistics, 2001). Population Estimates Survey in 2014 by UNFPA showed that the

region has a population of 489,306(UNFPA, 2014). The majority of the population consists of

agro-pastoralists and riverine communities, while pastoralists live in the northern parts of

Afmadow and Badhaadhe districts.

The region was until mid-2012 under the control of Alshabaab when AMISOM/Kenyan Defense

Forces (KDF) and Somalia National Army took control of the town of Kismayo, in addition to

the districts of Afmadw and Badhaadhe, which were under their control since the start of 2012.

Al-Shabaab still controls Jamaame district.

The continuous conflict resulted in more insecurity, trade disruption, a restricted flow of

commodities and poor purchasing power of people in conflict-affected districts such as Kismayo,

Afmadow and Badhaadhe. There are about 31,000 IDPs in the region, of which approximately

10,002 people are displaced from Kismaayo alone. New IDP from January, 2014 reaches

11,668(UNHCR, 2014).

18

Figure 3-1 Map of Lower Juba

Source: OCHA, 2012

19

3.2 Study population

The study subjects are humanitarian workers and Third Party Monitoring Groups who are

routinely involved in the assessments, designs, implementations and evaluation of nutrition

programs in the field. The humanitarian workers were recruited from the nutrition cluster,

Somalia which is their coordination centre. They were from local non-governmental

organizations(LNGOs), international non-governmental organizations(INGOs), UN agencies and

Third Party Monitoring Group(TPMG).

A total of 35 humanitarian workers and one TPMG senior manager participated in this study. 27

of them were from LNGOs, 5 from INGOs, 4 from UN and 1 from TPMG. There were 2 focus

group discussions (FGDs) and 8 in-depth interviews.

3.3 Study design, sampling technique and sample size

The study used here was a grounded theory methodology in which data was collected between

February-September, 2014 during my internship period with nutrition cluster, UNICEF, Somalia.

Both Snowball and convenience sampling were used. First interviewees were selected from the

contact list of the nutrition cluster based on their experience and knowledge, and then they the

interviewees were asked to give a more knowledgeable person(s) with Somalia NGOs based on

their practical experience and knowledge on nutritional programming. Both methods are non-

probability sampling techniques where subjects are selected because of their convenient

accessibility and close proximity to the researcher in the case of convenience sampling or

because of their long experience and knowledge in the case of snowball sampling.

For the FGDs, the cluster forum was used to call Juba partners and the strategic advisory

group(SAG) for a focus group discussion. The SAG is composed of 3 LNGOs, 3 INGOs, 3 UN

agencies and the nutrition cluster coordinator. More than 15 LNGOs working in Lower Juba

were called for the FGD but only 15 people from 8 LNGOs attended the meeting.

20

3.4 Study procedure

At the cluster, partners were informed in advance that the study wasn’t part of UNICEF’s work

and that it was a master’s thesis research and only those who wanted, participated in the FGDs

and interviews. The only exception was the SAG meeting which was called to make strategy for

the common humanitarian fund (CHF) and during the meeting the cluster coordinator informed

the members of the study and they agreed to participate.

3.4.1 Confidentiality

Prior to the beginning of each FGD or interview, Informed consent was obtained and

confidentiality was guaranteed to interviewees. Therefore, comments in this report are not

attributed to specific persons or organizations. However, there was no need for formal written

consent as all those interviewed or participated in the FGDs didn’t see any need for

confidentiality.

3.4.2 Data collection

The study is based on a review of secondary sources and on primary data collection and analysis.

I reviewed a small selection of publications and internal organizational reports relating to the

relevance of programs, availability of funding, coordination, tribal rivalry, misuse of funds and

capacity of LNGOs to deliver aid. The primary data was collected through eight(8) semi-

structured key-informant interviews and two(2) FGDs with staff of international non-

governmental organizations (INGOs), Local NGOs (LNGOs), donor agencies and Third Party

Monitoring groups. The interviews and FGDs took place in Nairobi, Kenya between February-

September, 2014 except one with the nutrition cluster focal point who was based in Mogadishu

and who I interviewed through Skype.

The major discussions revolved around the motivations, effects and general impacts of such

competitions between local NGOs involved in providing nutritional interventions. The study

focuses on possible themes driven from my literature review like relevance of programs,

availability of funding, coordination, tribal rivalry, misuse of funds and capacity of LNGOs to

21

deliver aid. Interviewees were asked their knowledge and perceptions on these themes. The sem-

structured interview questions in appendix 1.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

Ethical approval was sought from the Social Policy & Planning Monitoring & Evaluation

(SPPME) Section, UNICEF to use the cluster forum to call partners for interviews and FGDs and

also use UNICEF facility during interviewing. Informed consent was obtained from those

selected for interviews and FGDs after explaining to them that this work isn’t part of UNICEF

cluster work.

3.6 Data management and Analysis

The data was first transcribed and separated into interviews and FGDs. Then it was fed into

NVIVO 10 sources under internals with the same names. The data was then coded under nodes

and six(6) nodes were created.

Words frequency query was run first to have a feel of what people were saying before creating

themes and categories. Text search queries were also run to get feel of how people were

expressing certain concepts.

3.7 Limitations of the study

The primacy focus of the study was South Central Somalia and contextual difference between

SC, Somaliland and Puntland wasn’t taken into consideration. This said, the normal

humanitarian conditions in the country are more less the same and the findings of this study may

be relevant to all parts of the country.

Insecurity in the country hampered my movement to visit the field and have a feel of what is

happening there in the field during my time with UNICEF which forced me to collect my data in

Nairobi, Kenya.

22

4 Results

4.1 Descriptive analysis

This study investigated the impact of competition between the local NGOs for funding using

LNGOs that are implementing nutrition interventions in Kismayu, Lower Juba, Somalia as case

study.

Based on these interviews, FGDs and observations, major constraints to successful

implementations of nutritional interventions will be discussed. The study will focus on three

objectives:

To assess the effects of competition between LNGOs for funding,

To study the motivation of mushrooming of LNGOs,

Determine the impact of the above effects of competition between LNGO on nutrition

interventions.

The six themes that will be discussed here are as follows:

Need and motivation for programs: This means the need for nutrition programs to be carried

for the needy communities. Is there a really felt need established through needs assessments with

community participation or just cooked up need meant to get funding? If real, is the program

tailored towards addressing those needs or we just design at Nairobi level without consulting

them? This study will investigate all that.

Availability of funding: In this section the study will investigate how competition between

LNGOs affects the availability of funding in particular and in general if there is enough funding

for LNGOs. The study will look into whether there is transparency in fund allocation or there are

some other factors that will play, other than the set eligibility criteria when applying for funding.

Coordination: Here the study will look at the working relationship between LNGOs. In an ideal

situation all NGOs should coordinate their work in order to share information and avoid

overlapping of their operations. The study will therefore look if there is a new dimension that the

23

working relationship of LNGOs working in Somalia takes due to the stiff competition that exists

here.

Tribal rivalry or destructive rivalry: Due to the fact that the Somali government failed because

of civil war mainly tribal ones and because of the fact that this theme came out uniquely during

my literature review, this study will therefore unearth how this components plays a role in

humanitarian aid work and if at all it has an influence on the power and political games of

humanitarian actors of the Somali elites.

Misuse of funds/bribery: Very rarely seen in literature because of its assumed sensitivity to talk

about it loudly for fear of backlash and its difficulty to prove, this study will try to investigate if

there is corruption in the humanitarian fund management in Somalia and how this affects service

delivery and who are the main perpetrators.

Capacity of LNGOs: Finally, this study will also look into the capacity of LNGOs in Somalia

and if the perception that many donor agencies and INGOs have regarding the lack of capacity

by LNGOs is true or not.

4.2 Need and motivation for programs

A guiding question for this part of the study – What is the motivation of LNGOs to start

programs and how are these programs relevant to the needs of the target community lead me to

develop new interview questions about NGOs motivations, community participation, program

relevance, knowledge of target community about their shares and inclusion and exclusion

criteria.

Both interviews and focus group discussions revealed that LNGOs were motivated by various

reasons. According to the study findings local NGOs are either motivated to help their

community and others are committed to get financial gains. This is in line with the hypothetical

study objective that LNGOs are either humanitarian or just out to getting funding. One of the

respondents indicated that NGOs establish some running programs to get money for themselves

while others are committed to make changes for the communities

24

The interviews reveal that most briefcase NGOs are based in Nairobi and do not come to the

field. One senior LNGO staff had this to say ‘Business, yeah NGOs are just like shops for

individual owners and most of them are there to make money and do nothing for the people’.

Another one said: “Many LNGOs are motivated in sieving money meant to help the needy

communities”

According to the findings, some humanitarian workers are driven by the fact that Somalia has

been without government for past 25 years and hence there is high need for humanitarian work

since there are a lot of needy communities. South central is one of the worst parts in terms of

neediness for food and nutrition and health

LNGOs mostly do no consult local communities about their work. One of the reasons is the

assumption that need can easily be seen and understood. This is what a senior LNGO staff said:

‘This is something you need just to see with your normal eyes and realize that there is after all a

need’. Another one when asked whether communities are consulted had this to say: “But in

Somalia……. does it happen? I don’t think it happens. First of all most local NGOs don’t do the

needs assessments”

In addition to that, another senior staff with LNGO revealed that some of the reports from the

field like evaluation reports are written in Nairobi and the money consumed in Nairobi too and

this is what he said: “Yes, yes, yes ..the reports are mostly done here and there is little needs

assessment done, the proposal is just written here, you go after INGOs or donors agencies, you

get the fund and again most of the money may still be consumed here so everything is ran here in

Nairobi”. Depending on the credibility of the NGO there is only a 50-50 chance that the local

community’s rightful share is guaranteed. A UN staff when asked whether or NOT beneficiaries

receive their rightful share replied: “Depends on the credibility of that organization. Most likely I

can say 50-50”.

The interviews revealed that the organizations set some criteria for inclusion into programs and

most of the time they (LNGOs) are in line with the criteria but sometimes it happens that they are

not based on the criteria. This compromises the quality of programs as it violates the basic

25

principle of inclusion. For health you can only come if you are sick. For nutrition, there are

criteria like SAM, MAM but for things like food distribution or cash transfer, they can easily

favour some people as long as they have common interest as this respondent suggested:

“Yeah...the community here in the last instance, I don’t mean the beneficiaries but the gate

keepers of the community, the leaders of the community. If you are in good terms with the

leaders and may be you give them something or they are from your tribe then you will stay

relevant...I don’t mean the beneficiaries”

4.3 Availability of funding

Based on the interviews with the respondents, the following issues on funding by stakeholders

were mentioned. The most common model for funding was where INGOs get funding from

donors and they appoint a local implementing partner and there is also common humanitarian

funding (CHF). There is a list of eligible partners that can apply for the CHF. Previously they

were 72 but now they are 65, most of them being INGOs. The list of eligible NGOs is in

appendix (3).

Most respondents admitted that the money that comes definitely is not enough. A senior UN staff

said this: “I will talk on the part of funding number one. As you know there is this donor fatigue

all over the world and that does not exclude Somalia”. Another senior LNGO staff said: “First of

all LGOs are so many and I don’t think whether they will ever be any funds that will be enough

for them….”. And another one said: “There is no funding for local NGOs these days. I don’t

know if the funding is just for the INGOs or there is no totally funding for the whole country”.

This is just but a few responses in order to show the dilemma facing the LNGOs when it comes

to availability of funding..

Funding is usually very competitive so local NGOs are gauged through their performances and

quality programs. However some local NGOs may get funding by paying bribes sometimes or

using their connection and influences. There is no competitive recruitment in LNGOs either. It is

who you know mostly. Even semi-e literate from their families may be recruited. The following

quotes explain these points: “First donor agencies give preference to international NGOs who

26

work in Somalia but still there are very active local NGOs with some guys with good networks

within the international NGOs or donor agencies who get funds. Mostly it depends with the

activeness of the person, his connections with donor agencies and whether he is ready to part

with some of the money. It is given as a kick-back”

“No, there is nothing like competitive recruitment in LNGOs. It is who you know mostly. Even

semi-illiterate from his families may be recruited”

As far as the distribution of funds is concerned there is no transparency. Some agencies have

declared the process as unfair. Some LNGOs aren’t happy with the eligible list of partners that

CHF uses as they claim that they were never audited or assessed. Others say donors want the

humanitarian work to be handled by INGOs only. Manipulation rate is very high. Some people

may get a lot of funding because they are favoured for example USAID gives priority to US

agencies while ECHO gives priority to European owned NGOs. Sometimes some of the officials

working with the donors may have their own NGOs or may have close friends or family

members with NGOs hence favour them. Or sometimes bribe can be used to get funding:

“Mostly it depends with the activeness of the person, his connections with Donor agencies and

whether he is ready to part with some of the money. It is given as a kick-back”

4.4 Coordination

The study findings also show that there is limited coordination or no coordination at all. What is

there between LNGOs is mostly competition for funds and for also area of program

implementation. This has created overlapping of programs:

“I don’t think there is much coordination between them. What is there between is mostly

competition for funds and for also area of program implementation. Yeah I don’t think there is

any. And sometimes you will find same programs being repeated in the same area because 2

different NGOs are getting funds from 2 different donors and they are carrying out the same

thing in the same area. So there is no coordination, if there was coordination there wouldn't be

such overlapping of activities”.

27

Participants from Lower Juba who attended the FGD agreed that the only coordination that exists

is the cluster coordination: “It’s true the only coordination that exists is the cluster level”

In an ideal situation, coordination spearheaded by the clusters plays the following four important

roles:

Overall effectiveness at improving humanitarian response,

Creating predicable leadership,

Enhancing partnership between humanitarian actors, and

Increasing the accountability of relief efforts

Now there that is no coordination all these are missing and the clusters’ roles are not felt as such.

4.5 Tribal rivalry or destructive rivalry

The interviews reveal that the problem with LNGOs is that there is destructive tribal rivalry

between them. All the NGOs that work in Somalia are clan-based and work only where their clan

lives: “Yes, it is something that is very true. It is not in the capital city but in the rural area. The

residents have to come from the same clan as the owners of the NGO otherwise they may be in

trouble” that is what a senior UN staff had to say on that but INGO can work anywhere on

condition that local people from the area work for them. This brings about a tribal barrier.

The rivalry is mainly for two reasons: for scarce resources and for area of implementation as the

more area you cover the more your chances are of getting funding: “Yeah....if you are competing

with NGOs from the dominant tribe actually you have no place there, ehhh …anything can

happen, you can even be killed or your staff may be like abducted...”

According to the study, being tribal-based NGO helps as people of the same communities

understand each well and know their needs better than foreigners: “To some extent it has to be

true because the clan itself understands themselves best and know their own problems”

28

Normally the rivalry doesn’t start directly with the clan saying to an NGO that they can’t work

there. Most of the time they are incited to revolt against a LNGO by another NGO of their own.

May be the director is in competition with the said NGO so he tries to set the community of on

fire and tell them to chase the other NGO as one of the respondents said: “Again regarding this

man(he means R2). He did the same thing he did to SAF. He took food there too. He incited the

community against them. He told them this man got money with your name so get your money

from him. Let me tell you something if you can do something about this man, e will have peace.

He has issues with all”.

4.6 Misuse of funds/bribery

The study reveals that the funding application process is full of intrigues. An NGO that never

exists on the ground takes money in their name and you never know where that money goes to.

These are the so-called brief-case NGOs as one UN staff put it: “That name is not new to me and

it is something that I have always been hearing from the Somali community that there are

briefcase NGOs based in Nairobi and not coming to the field for all and using their expenses in

Nairobi without conducting any kind of implementation”. For this reason many LNGOs pay

bribes to get funding. One senior LNGO staff said this: “LNGOs when given money have to part

with some of the money they are given which are meant for the program they have to give it back

to some of the individuals working for donor agencies who have a say in who is to be given the

funds....may be the fund manager ...”

The respondents also indicated that despite the competitive funding process many LNGOs don’t

stay relevant because of their programs’ quality but because of kick-backs or because of their

good connections with influential individuals in the donor agencies as one respondent put it:

“They stay relevant by what I just term as a kick-back. If you have good connection with

individuals working for the donor agencies or international NGOs and you are ready to give

back some of the money you are given then you will be on the list of those NGOs who will be

funded.

29

The findings also indicate that most beneficiaries don’t receive their rightful share especially if

they aren’t from the tribe of the NGO owners as another UN staff explained when asked about

whether beneficiaries receive their rightful: “Depends on the credibility of that organization.

Most likely I can say 50-50”. Also revealed by the study is that most LNGOs employees don’t

get their full payments as shown on the proposal as this respondent put it: “If you give the

employees the same amount indicated in the proposal, what will the owner get? So you give less

to make money out of it”. However there are some LNGOs that give full payment as this other

respondent mentioned: “Most of the time that doesn’t happen, what happens is if they are given

200 for a staff they give 100 but there are some local NGOs who pay better than INGOs”.

4.7 Capacity of LNGOs

The study showed the most LNGOs don’t have the capacity to handle all the money they get or

the technical capacity to do the implementation of the projects. One senior UN staff had this to

say regarding capacity of LNGO: “I would like before I respond to that to look at the concept of

Somalia when we are talking about Somalia we are also talking about low capacity level of

masses in the knowledge because we have organization in Somalia, we have staff on the ground

and the staff don’t have may be the education level is up to certificate or you just find up to a

primary level”. One senior LNGO staff who is privy to what is going on also said this: “No,

there is nothing like competitive recruitment in LNGOs. It is who you know mostly. Even semi-e

literate from his families may be recruited”.

Capacity is also hampered by the fact that LNGO don’t do competitive recruitment as nepotism

is too much rampant. This is what one respondent said about this: “Most LNGO don’t do

advertisement so they are using tribalism or something like that”. However some LNGO have

the relevant capacity and do competitive recruitment process as revealed by the study: “Some

local NGOs normally advertise. Some they take based on tribe or face recognition”.

LNGOs are also classified based on where they work as those in big cities like Mogadishu have

people who are well trained because of the presence of educational institutes and the willingness

of elites to work there unlike outskirts where there are no educational institutions and those who

are learned are not willing to go as this UN staff explained: “Let me classify this into two: local

NGO based in cities like Mogadishu and those based in the districts where there are no training

30

centers so most educated people are in the cities so NGOs in Mogadishu have very educated

people”.

Another reason why many LNGOs don’t have competent and qualified individuals is because

they don’t give enough salary since as seen early they rarely give the full amount of salary

indicated on the proposals. This compromised their capacity as many people aren’t willing to

work with them as this respondent put it: “If you give the employees the same amount indicated

in the proposal, what will the owner get? So you give less to make money out of it”.

31

5 DISCUSSION

Competition between non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially for funding among

other resources is not a new phenomenon. This has been the case even for bigger and reputable

international NGOs (INGOs) as they compete for donations through their fundraising activities.

More than ever, many developed countries have in the recent past increasingly relied on NGOs,

which has seen between one-quarter to almost a half of their official development funds being

channelled through NGOs (USAID, 2002). As a result, NGO have been rapidly mushrooming

and the boom in the sector continues.

This chapter illustrates the connections between the results and the literature, revisits the themes

of the study and their usefulness in understanding the theories that emerge from the study

findings. The findings of this study provided insights into the various effects of competition

between LNGO for funding and they confirmed partly some of what is already known. To begin

with competition has always been there and documented but what is hardly seen in literatures is

effects of competition between LNGOs. This is mainly for two reasons: first, some of the themes

that emerged from the study like bribery, nepotism, briefcase NGOs and misuse of funds are too

sensitive to be discussed and many donor agencies would rather keep it in low profile than speak

about it loudly for fear of backlash and stopping of funding. Secondly, they are too hard to be

proved since they mostly take place in remote, insecure area where many monitors from donor

agencies can’t access.

5.1 Emergency levels of acute malnutrition

According OCHA’s 2015 Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview, one in seven Somali children

under the age of 5 or 218,000 children is estimated to be acutely malnourished. About 44,000 of

them are severely malnourished and are at risk of death if they do not receive urgent medical

treatment and therapeutic food. Three in four acutely malnourished children are in southern and

central Somalia. This is just but the nutritional crisis situation in Somalia. Food insecurity,

critical levels of malnutrition, disease outbreaks, displacement of people, violations against

32

civilians – including GBV and sexual exploitation and abuse – and the absence of educational

opportunities remain the core humanitarian issues in Somalia.

Figure 5-1 Snapshot of 2015 population in Somalia

Source: OCHA, 2014

To address all these challenges effectively and efficiently, enough funding is needed. Below is

just an example of the consolidated appeal process (CAP) which is humanitarian system’s

concerted action plan for humanitarian financing, in which projects managed by the United

Nations, NGOs and other stakeholders come together to approach the donor community funding

international development activities.

33

Figure 5-2 CAP 2013 funding status

Source: OCHA, 30th April, 2013

The figure above shows that by 30th April, the CAP was only 14% funded which is equal to

$0.1862 billion. This is much below than the requested figure $1.33billion hence the needs of

those people in crisis in Somalia will not be addressed. The situation will further be more

complicated by the fact that higher number of NGOs and UN agencies(177) applied for it.

Therefore, the study finding consolidates this previously known information that LNGOs have to

compete between themselves and with INGOs and UN agencies for scarce resources and because

of donor agencies’ perception about LNGOs’ low capacity to deliver services of good quality,

they will for sure stand less chance in securing funds than INGOs.

One unique theme that came out from the study but is rarely found in literature is relevance of

programs. The findings of this study revealed that community participation is never taken into

account during the design of many programs ran by LNGOs as their program designs and

proposal writings take place at Nairobi. This will result in programs that aren’t tailored towards

the needs of the target communities. Most of the time program designs and proposal writings are

done by consultant hired within Nairobi who may not be of even Somali origin let alone being

from the target community hence their knowledge and understanding of the target community is

very limited. This is because of the stiff competition between LNGOs doesn’t allow them time to

spend in the field and collect those information. They rather write a beautiful proposal written by

an experienced consultant and pay him huge amounts of money. This will ensure that their

proposal will get consideration as many of these consultants are Nairobi based and will never go

to the field. A number of studies have shown that competition for funds can have a negative

effect on the operations of an NGO; which is also referred to as “excessive fundraising problem”

34

(Aldashev & Verdier, 2009). In the quest to attract donations, NGOs may increase their

resources, time and effort in fundraising and pleasing the donor as opposed to focusing on

finding solutions and implementing projects to help the needy (Nunnenkamp & Ohler, 2010).

If we look at 2013-2015 Somalia Consolidated Appeal (Appendix 4), we will see that strategic

objective number 4 is about capacity and coordination of NGO and a lot of money is spent on

this. The kind of capacity building that the nutrition cluster for example does is just cluster

coordination and nutrition in emergence (NiE) trainings and this happens every year. As can be

seen from the CHF accountability framework (appendix 5), capacity assessment is based on

systematic review of the institutional, technical, management, and financial capacities. However,

what the cluster does so is more of technical capacity building and neglects the rest. In fact there

is big question to the effectiveness of this technical capacity development as well. They are

short intensive courses and many of the people trained are selected by the NGOs without any

eligibility criteria of their previous education hence many times LNGOs end up training semi-

illiterate people who might not learn from the course despite spending a lot of money on the

course. The rest 3 areas: institutional, management and financial capacities remain unfocused.

There are several cluster coordination mechanisms among them the nutrition cluster

coordination, however the study findings show that instead of coordination there is competition

and rivalry between LNGOs and very little or no coordination at all. Lack of coordination and

information sharing will lead overlapping of programs and wastages of scarce resources. This is

because almost all the nutrition cluster team is based in Nairobi except one focal point based in

Mogadishu. They created sub-zonal focal points that are selected from other agencies voluntarily

but since the cluster work is additional work for them, none of them gives priority to it.

Therefore competition and rivalry replaced the coordination.

Tribal rivalry is another theme that was uniquely highlighted by the study findings. According

Tsitrinbaum, 2012 some local NGOs are clan based but what they didn’t explain is how they clan

based affect NGOs’ operations. This study shades light on how the factor plays a big role in the

LNGO world and how clan control is very prominent in Somalia. As a result, these organizations

enforce territorial dominance over regions which they control, and ensure other competing local

35

NGOs cannot operate in those areas. This has led to bitter rivalry amongst the local NGOs as

some of them strive to be the sole implementer of programmes in certain regions and to specific

communities. The perception of impartiality of local NGOs in their delivery of service has

greatly contributed to the lack of trust of IAOs in them. This has greatly affected the quality of

their programs, including their ability of hiring professional staff which is usually compromised

(Tsitrinbaum, 2012).

Mohamed (1997) reported of the presence of a large number of local NGOs in Mogadishu who

have been recorded to be extremely corrupt, however, they didn’t reveal how money exchanges

hands in order to get funds. A senior LNGO CEO who is privy to what is going on and who has

himself done the same told me that many LNGOs pay certain percentage for any fund secured.

For example if a LNGO is given any amount of funds, they have to give back some money as a

kickback between 5-10% of the total secretly through gentleman agreement; otherwise they

won’t get the funds. This is assumingly mainly done by the briefcase NGOs that the respondents

mentioned previously. The study also revealed some forms of misuse of funds also occur like

giving local staff less salaries than expected and giving beneficiaries none or less than their

rightful shares.

However, all INGO, LNGO and UN staff were unanimous that the biggest advantage of using

LNGO is their ability to access inaccessible areas. Were it not for the LNGOs almost all the

inaccessible areas shown on the map below wouldn’t be accessed.

5.2 Relationships between the themes

As seen from the figures below these themes are inter-related. To start with lack of sufficient

funding will lead to low capacity of both LNGOs and local communities and irreverent programs

that aren’t tailored to address the exact needs of the target communities. Low capacity also

brings about funding shortages as donor confidences fades with low capacity hence the inability

to secure funding for future programs. It also causes irrelevant programs since LNGOs lack the

capacity to do good quality needs assessment or design programs on their own. Lastly as

irrelevant programs won’t have the desired impact on the target community, they curtail future

36

funding as well as block the way to community empowerment and LNGOs capacity

development.

Figure 5-3 Humanitarian access mapsSource: OCHA, 2013

Inavailability of funding

Irrelevant programs

Low capacity of LNGOs

37

On the same note, lack of coordination leads to bribery and destructive/tribal rivalry. This is

because uncoordinated efforts to help the needy people will lead to power brokering and fight for

funds and areas of program implementation. Both factors precipitate both bribery and tribal

rivalry as LNGOs.

Are these themes related personality or structural/institutional aspects?

Some of these aspects can be said to be purely either personal or structural/institutional whereas

others have both aspects i.e are both personal and structural. For instance irreverent programs,

unavailability of funds and low capacity of LNGOs are said to be structural, while

destructive/tribal rivalry is more personal since the catalysts are mainly the CEOs of LNGOs and

finally lack of coordination and bribery/corruption are said to be both personal and structural.

This is because, although there are some corrupt people who may pay bribes or receive them,

there was consensus that the system in place also allowed the vice to thrive.

Lack of coordination

Destructive/tribal rivalry

Bribery/corruption

38

6 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This chapter integrates the objectives of this study, with the literature review in chapter two, and

findings in chapter four by comparing the findings with literature adopted for the study. Based on

the study objectives, this chapter will discuss the extent and characteristics of high competition

for funds between local NGOs and other stakeholders involved

Based on the literature review, factors related to poverty, security and gender inequality can limit

a people’s ability to engage in social development programs and gain benefit from it. This study

reveals that there are a large number of NGOs within Juba. However, based on the case study

and evidence from key informants, they (NGOs) lack access to resources and assets, have limited

skills and social/cultural knowledge, and lack connections to donors. The findings show discord

between the social and nutritional needs, the players and the donor community in Somalia

6.1 Social embeddedness and NGO intervention outcomes

NGOS and donor agencies play a big role in terms of economic intervention for nutritional

programs in Somalia. However, findings indicate complex and tribal powered patterns of social-

cultural and clan influence which play a big role within Juba land. This reflects on the Peoples

patterns of interactions within themselves and is further compounded by the roles that NGOS

play in terms of empowerment and economic involvement. Power bases are seen to be sustained

in the NGOs either by intent or default, and this further marginalizes the really needy people’s

involvement in the intervention programs. However, it is recognized that there are opportunities

of honest nutritional intervention and mobilization in networking but this remains to be seen.

6.2 Conclusion

According to the study findings, local NGOs are formed for mainly two reasons; the first reason

is the need by a local community to have an avenue for her humanitarian needs owing to the

situation in Somalia and secondly they are formed by groups and individuals out to have

financial gain.

39

From the study findings it can be concluded that competition for NGO funding has been fuelled

by the mushrooming of uncoordinated NGOs most of which are motivated by individual

financial gains. This competitive scenario has led to some NGOs paying bribes to get funding.

This conclusion is similar to that by Hammond et al. (2011) who posit that local NGOs are still

largely uncoordinated, besides the number of such local NGOs has been on the rise.

The success of Nutritional interventions for example cannot be effective owing to the bitter

rivalry between LNGOs which mostly are clan based. A large percentage of the organisations are

formed on the basis of who and which clan. Genuine LNGOs seeking to provide humanitarian

assistance to clans across the board are hampered by this tribal barrier. This is why the country

has faced prolonged humanitarian crisis.

Corruption is so rife that many LNGOs pay bribes to obtain funding. This is exemplified by the

fact that the proposals for the formation and funding for the NGOs is done in Nairobi a capital

city of a neighbouring country. All the monies obtained this way ends up being misused. The

main reason for this is because in Somalia there is lack of security, lack of government systems

and lack of accountability.

In summary we can conclude that competition disrupts coordination and timely delivery of

services, results to lack of cooperation, undermines the long-term capacity of indigenous aid

organizations and compromises the quality of services provided.

This findings is similar to literature reviewed elsewhere where a number of studies have shown

that competition for funds can have a negative effect on the operations of an NGO; which is also

referred to as “excessive fundraising problem” (Aldashev&Verdier, 2009).

6.3 Recommendations

In the mainstream development circles, empowerment is one of the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs) set by the United Nations and it has become part of development strategy of

international organizations including the World Bank.

40

This study found out that empowerment was limited among the people of Juba land and that they

are largely constrained by contextual social-cultural and power influences being played out by

LNGOs which are tribe based. It is recommended that development process owners such as

NGOS and the government provide channels for social development and provides successful

routes which people can gain access to funding, information and training as well as market

access. This means that the NGOS need to collaborate and communicate between themselves

first.

In Juba Land limited bargaining power of the poor and the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis

renders them to accept asymmetric structures of tribal power distribution as trade-off for little

benefit or no benefit, because they are concerned with immediate survival needs. The implication

of this is that the local poor who should be beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance accept the

influence position from LNGO for as long as they can attain 'some benefit', even when the

outcome is that their group and economic objectives are largely unmet. Such influence position

has implications on 'who benefits' as seen from the findings; it is the NGO operators and the

local tribal leaders. It is recommended that INGOs and the donor community should asses the

capacity and authenticity of any local NGO before disbursing funds in corroboration.

This study recommends that now that there is a semblance of national government in Somalia

security should be provided in humanitarian hotspots to ensure that through monitoring and

evaluation of programs are done.

The study further recommends that the government at least for now can form an agency to

coordinate and audit the NGOs.

Finally the study recommends that strict risk management measures be put in place not only for

the fund recipients but also for funds managers so that bribery and irregular assistance are

stopped.

41

REFERENCES

1. Aldashev, G., & Verdier, T., (2009). When NGOs go global: Competition on international

markets for development donations. Journal of international economics 79 (2009) 198-210.

2. Bugingo, L., (2011). Collaboration between the Somali Organizations based in the

Netherlands and Development Organizations based in Kenya with focus on Somalia.

Netherlands, Utrecht University.

3. CAFOD (2013, July). Funding at the sharp end: Investing in national NGO response

capacity. London, United Kingdom. Retrieved November 15, 2014 from CAFOD website:

http://caford.org.uk

4. FSNAU & FEWS NET (2014). Somalia Post-Gu Food Security and Nutrition Outlook

Report/Technical Release. Over one million people in Somalia face acute food insecurity as

food crisis worsens. Retrieved November 20, 2014 from http://www.fsnau.org/

5. GHA (2012, March). Common Humanitarian Funds. Somerset, United Kingdom. Retrieved

November 15, 2014 from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org

6. GHA (2013). Global Humanitarian Assistance Annual Report. Somerset, United Kingdom.

Retrieved November 16, 2014 from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org

7. Hammond, L., Awad, M., Dagane, A. I., Hansen, P., Horst, C., Menkhaus, K., and Obare, L.,

(2011). Cash and compassion: the role of the Somali diaspora in relief, development and

peace-building. UNDP. Vol. 1.

8. Hancock, G., (1989). Lords of Poverty. London, UK. Mandarin Paperbacks.

9. Hedlund, K., Majid, N., Maxwell, D., and Nicholson, N., (2013). Final evaluation of the

unconditional cash and voucher response to the 2011–12 crisis in southern and central

42

Somalia. UNICEF - Humanitarian Outcomes. Retrieved November 20, 2014 from

www.unicef.org/Somalia

10. Hudock, A., (1999). NGOs and civil society: Democracy by proxy? Cambridge, Polity press.

11. ICRC (2014). Executive Brief on Somalia – Food Security Crisis. ICRC Economy Security

Unit, Nairobi – Kenya.

12. Kemp, E., (2013, Mar). NGO voice in the humanitarian response in Somalia: challenges and

ways forward. The NGOs humanitarian reform project, phase II.

13. KISIMA (2013). Multi-cluster joint assessment report in Kismayo IDPs. Led by KISIMA

peace and development organization. Somalia.

14. Menkhaus, K., (2012, Jan). After the Kenyan intervention in Somalia. The Enough Project.

Washington. Retrieved November 22, 2014 from www.enough.org

15. Mohamed, S. A., (1997). Somaliland NGOs: Challenges and Opportunities. Building

Partnerships for Peace and Development Workshop – Hargeisa, Somaliland. ICD - CIIR

publication, London.

16. Moller, B., (2009). The Somali conflict: the role of external actors. Danish Institute for

International Studies Report: 03. Copenhagen.

17. Nunnenkamp, P., and Ohler, H., (2010). Funding, Competition and the Efficiency of NGOs:

An Empirical Analysis of Non-charitable Expenditure of US NGOs Engaged in Foreign Aid.

Kiel Working Paper No.1640.

18. OCHA (2012). Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin. Issue 12(1-30 Sept). Retrieved November

17, 2014 from http://fts.unocha.org

43

19. OCHA (2013). Clashes in Kismayo, Lower Juba. Somalia situation update. Issue 1(14 June).

Retrieved November 18, 2014 from http://fts.unocha.org

20. Ramalingam, B., Gray, B., & Cerruti, G., (2013). Missed opportunities: the case for

strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses. Commissioned

by ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam GB and Tearfund. United Kingdom.

21. Tsitrinbaum, Y., (2012, Sep). Aid partnerships: A vehicle to strengthen NGOs in Somalia?

The NGOs humanitarian reform project, phase II. Nairobi.

22. The Economist (2000). Sins of secular missionaries. 27th Jan. Retrieved November 23, 2014

from http://www.economist.com/node/276931

23. USAID (2002). Foreign aid in the national interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and

Opportunity. Washington D.C.

24. UNICEF (2011). Eastern and Southern Africa: Somalia. UNICEF humanitarian action for

children. Retrieved November 20, 2014 from http://www.unicef.org/hac2011

25. OCHA (2014). 2015 HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW, Somalia, prepared by

OCHA team on behalf of humanitarian country team. Retrieved in December, 2014 from

https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Somalia

26. OCHA (2013). SOMALIA - Humanitarian Access Map. Retrieved in December, 2014 from

http://www.unocha.org/somalia/maps-graphics/humanitarian-access-maps

27. OCHA (2013). Somalia: Humanitarian Funding Snapshot. Retrieved in December, 2014

from https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Somalia/Fundin

1

Appendices

Appendix 1: Draft questions for interviews

1. Need for programs

What motivates your actions?

Are recipients consulted?

Do they know what their rightful share is?

Are they treated fairly same?

Are there set criteria for inclusion/exclusion in the program?

2. Funding

How do you get funding?

If there is a call for funding, what would you do?

Is it competitive? If yes, how do you stay relevant?

Which Local NGOs are your competitors for funding?

Is the distribution of funds transparent? If no, Why?

3. Coordination

Is there good coordination between your NGO and others?

How do you describe good coordination?

Which NGO do you/do you not have good coordination with? Why?

4. Territorial dominance

Are there many NGOs in your area of operations? If yes, which ones?

Who are the owners? Are they Locals from the area?

Do they implement the same projects?

2

Can NGOs owned by non-locals work here?

5. Corruption

Is the funding application process transparent?

Are there NGOs you feel get more funds? If yes, why?

Do you know of any NGO paying bribes to get funding? Give example……

Do beneficiaries receive their rightful share?

Do you of any misused funds? If yes, how much? When?

6. Capacity of LNGOs

Are recruitments done through competitive process?

Are employees paid their right salaries are shown on the proposals?

Are many capacity building activities for your staff?

3

Appendix 2: List of eligible CHF partners

4

5

Appendix 3: Nodes from Nvivo

Coding Summary By Node

MSc prpject

12/14/2014 4:28 AM

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Nodes\\Availabity of funding

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Internals\\Interviews\\Ahmed Southern Aid

No 0.0603 2

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:22 AM

First of all LGOs are so many and I don’t think whether they will ever be any funds that will be enough for them all but still funds are available

though it depends on a number of things. First donor agencies give preference to international NGOs who work in Somalia but still there are

very active local NGOs with some guys with good networks within the international NGOs or Donor agencies who get funds. Mostly it depends

with the activeness of the person, his connections with Donor agencies and whether he is ready to part with some of the money. It is given as a

kick-back

2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:23 AM

Q: And that also brings about another question on the same note: does that mean the funding process isn’t as transparent as it should be?

Internals\\Interviews\\Frankt-CEDA

No 0.0035 1

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:02 AM

well with others, some of them we know they are not all that transparent

Internals\\Interviews\\Hassan CESVI

No 0.0941 2

1 MJ 12/14/2014 12:34 AM

6

R: Through our performances because we deliver quality programs. Although some local NGOs may get funding by paying bribes sometimes or

using their connection and influences

12/14/2014 4:28 AM

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2 MJ 12/14/2014 12:36 AM

No, distribution is not transparent. Manipulation rate is very high. Some people may get a lot of funding because they are favored for example

USAID gives priority to US agencies while ECHO gives priority to European owned NGOs. Sometimes some of the officials working with the

donors may have their own NGOs or may have close friends or family members with NGOs hence favor them. Or sometimes bribe can used to

get funding.Nodes\\Capacity of LNGOs

Document

Internals\\Interviews\\Ahmed Southern Aid

No 0.0399 3

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:28 AM

Surely some have. Some can do the work and all local NGOs aren’t the same. But majority of them are NGOs registered to get few coins and

don’t care about quality. All they need is to say is we are present there.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:28 AM

No, there is nothing like competitive recruitment in LNGOs. It is who you know mostly. Even semi-e literate from his families may be recruited

3 MJ 12/14/2014 1:28 AM

If you give the employees the same amount indicated in the proposal, what will the owner get? So you give less to make money out of it.

Internals\\Interviews\\Frankt-CEDA

No 0.0116 2

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:16 AM

Tribalism is there because you have to understand that from the local perspective this is a local NGO so difference between local and

international.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:17 AM

And those are the ones who might not pay the money as it appears on the proposal.

Internals\\Interviews\\Hassan CESVI

No 0.0465 6

1 MJ 12/14/2014 12:53 AM

Some local NGOs normally advertise. Some they take based on tribe or face recognition.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 12:54 AM

No, they will not get.They wil diffet=rent amount.

7

Reports\\Coding Summary By Node Report Page 2 of 8

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3 MJ 12/14/2014 12:54 AM

lesser than what is written.

4 MJ 12/14/2014 12:55 AM

Let’s say if you are an officer and in the proposal its written u will get 1000 USD, u may get about 600

5 MJ 12/14/2014 12:55 AM

yes it is

6 MJ 12/14/2014 12:55 AM

Almost all

Nodes\\Coordination

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Internals\\Interviews\\Ahmed Southern Aid

No 0.0834 3

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:25 AM

I don’t think there is much coordination between them. What is there between is mostly competition for funds and for also area of program

implementation. Yeah I don’t think there is any. And sometimes you will find same programs being repeated in the same area because 2

different NGOs are getting funds from 2 different donors and they are carrying out the same thing in the same area. So there is no coordination,

if there was coordination there wouldn't be such overlapping of activities.2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:26 AM

Yes and No, because once they reduce the number from hundreds or tens to eight that is good but still the eight will be competing among

themselves so if one NGO that will be doing the activities, will not be that corrupt, will have good rapport with the community, then that will

be good but eight is still many

3 MJ 12/14/2014 1:27 AM

The cluster coordination is good in a way because it is a coordinating-like center but if the coordination itself is within the people who do funny

things, who have connections with local NGOs it will be problem Internals\\Interviews\\Frankt-CEDA

No 0.0551 2

8

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:05 AM

well to some extent I would like to say it is really doing a lot but yet there’s more effort to be put in place especially when it comes to

facilitating this country that the community is just coming up from difficulty situation and they are also trying to mobilizing themselves

9

12/14/2014 4:28 AM

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2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:06 AM

well to me....what I would put in place....I would ensure that....because there is a lack of interlinkage between the programs and beneficiaries...I

mean there is a gap whereby majority of these people who are supposed to benefit from these nutrition programs majority of them aren’t aware

of their rights so yes, like a woman may be having a malnourished child but she isn’t aware that UNICEF and the partner ….. are there to

share….. provide health to this child....so there is small gap that has been left and a large number of the population are suffering not knowing

that their problems can be attended to by UNICEF so if am given that position, I would make sure I start going sensitizing the need of working

together between the woman and UNICEF and the partners organization I mean we would identify where there is high malnutrition.Internals\\Interviews\\Hassan CESVI

No 0.0416 1

1 MJ 12/14/2014 12:37 AM

Yes, there is coordination between local NGOs and the nutrition cluster is one of them but because of the scarcity of funding and the high

number of NGOs working in Somalia there is competition and obviously less coordination as each NGO wants to get more funding.

Nodes\\Misuse of funds

Document

Internals\\Interviews\\Ahmed Southern Aid

No 0.0972 5

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:19 AM

Business, yeah NGOs are just like shops for individual owners and most of them are there to make money and do nothing for the people.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:22 AM

LNGOs when given money have to part with some of the money they are given which are eat for the program they have to give it back to some

of the individuals working for donor agencies who have a say in who is to be given the funds....may be the fund manager so if am looking for

funds, I will give some of the money back...

3 MJ 12/14/2014 1:23 AM

They stay relevant by what I just term as a kick-back. If you have good connection with individuals working for the donor agencies or

international NGOs and you are ready to give back some of the money you are given then you will be on the list of those NGOs who will be

funded.

4 MJ 12/14/2014 1:24 AM

Yeah...the community here in the last instance, I don’t mean the beneficiaries but the gate keepers of the community, the leaders of the

community. If you are in good terms with the leaders and may be you give them something or they are from your tribe then you will stay

relevant...I don’t mean the beneficiaries

5 MJ 12/14/2014 1:28 AM

If you give the employees the same amount indicated in the proposal, what will the owner get? So you give less to make money out of it.

10

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No 0.0455 4

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:14 AM

R: The funding issue is really practically transparent....the only issue that we may like to highlight is that sometimes there is misunderstanding

between funding and grants and majority of the people who receive funding don’t understand the terms so sometimes whenever they are given

funding it finds them unaware of what they were supposed to implement? Which results were supposed to be realized? So you find there is

misunderstanding in Somalia that they don’t realize the background of the funding....they take it as a relief that is supposed to be coming,

2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:14 AM

Yes, majority of them haven’t been enlightened.

3 MJ 12/14/2014 1:14 AM

Are there local NGO that you feel get more funding than others?

4 MJ 12/14/2014 1:15 AM

You know in this field doesn’t lack elements and elements are there. What we mean by elements is that there is no way people can be pure. Like

majority of these small local NGOs that are coming up try to get their way through these way.

Internals\\Interviews\\Hassan CESVI

No 0.0788 4

1 MJ 12/14/2014 12:51 AM

I haven’t seen but I heard rumors.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 12:52 AM

It says most local NGOs pay bribes to get funding from the donors.

3 MJ 12/14/2014 12:52 AM

Yes. Actually....it was that I worked in Ethiopia with some local NGO. There is, may be due to their lack of capacity or what, I don’t know. Their

mechanism of accountability...they have no clear accountability that you can be able to see everything. At the end of projects when audit comes,

you will not see most of the document which is you can see there is misuse there

yes very high. About 70%

11

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Internals\\Interviews\\Ahmed Southern Aid

No 0.1205 5

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:19 AM

reports by consultancy firms and others mostly say there is no community participation. Even there are allegations that are some of the NGOs

don’t take the funds to intended persons so I surely can’t tell you the percentage of community involvement but I think it is very low.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:20 AM

Yes yes yes the reports are mostly done here and there is little needs assessment done, the proposal is just written here, you go after INGOs or

donors agencies, you get the fund and again most of the money may still be consumed here so everything is ran here in Nairobi.

3 MJ 12/14/2014 1:23 AM

They stay relevant by what I just term as a kick-back. If you have good connection with individuals working for the donor agencies or

international NGOs and you are ready to give back some of the money you are given then you will be on the list of those NGOs who will be

funded.

4 MJ 12/14/2014 1:24 AM

Yes, it doesn’t always depend on the program quality but sometimes it also depends on your connection with the community ehhhh may be you

work in Kismayu, the people there if they so decide to close your NGO they can because they have connection or they can get contacts of the

donor agencies then you may do nothing there

5 MJ 12/14/2014 1:24 AM

Yeah...the community here in the last instance, I don’t mean the beneficiaries but the gate keepers of the community, the leaders of the

community. If you are in good terms with the leaders and may be you give them something or they are from your tribe then you will stay

relevant...I don’t mean the beneficiaries

Internals\\Interviews\\Frankt-CEDA

No 0.0575 5

1 MJ 12/14/2014 12:58 AM

Well probably, It depends, but the need also can be seen by normal eyes so when you look at the need…

2 MJ 12/14/2014 12:58 AM

We wouldnt like to put as percentage...ehh atleast about 25%.

3 MJ 12/14/2014 12:59 AM

Well that one also has little bit of barriers because you know there are barriers to let’s say like education, cultural barriers but according to what

we usually distribute they are made aware of their share even most of them benefit more than what they should

4 MJ 12/14/2014 1:04 AM

12

.so we share...apart from these small organization that are trying to come up and that is where the problems come because majority of them have

no experience and they not know what they are doing...and ehhh I would like to put that they take......they don’t have any relationship with the

beneficiaries.

12/14/2014 4:28 AM

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5 MJ 12/14/2014 1:04 AM

Yes the new organization that is coming because they don’t understand the problem of the community. Like you can come up, or me ....I have

several friends may be who proposed that we come up with an NGO and we implement something in particular area let us say like Dadaab or

particular area like Bulla Hawa, Beledweyn and yet u realize this organization that we have come up with there is no tangible relationships

between me and the communityInternals\\Interviews\\Hassan CESVI

No 0.0303 2

1 MJ 12/14/2014 12:32 AM

Although many local NGOs are motivated in sieving money meant to help the needy communities.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 12:33 AM

But again you will find many NGOs that just write their proposals in Nairobi without consultations

Nodes\\Tribal supremacy or rivalary

DocumentInternals\\Interviews\\Ahmed Southern Aid

No 0.0460 2

1 MJ 12/14/2014 1:27 AM

yes, that is exactly what happens in Somalia. Most of the regions which I had personally access and opportunity to go, NGO owned by the

dominant tribes mostly thrive because some can even have militia which are based in that region ehhhh some just because the NGO is owned by

one of their own would like support the individual ehhh without regard to the work the NGO is doing.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 1:28 AM

Yeah....if you are competing with NGOs from the dominant tribe actually you have no place there, ehhh anything can happen, you can even be

killed or your staff may be like abducted...

Internals\\Interviews\\Frankt-CEDA

No 0.0194 2

To some extent it has to be true because the clan itself understands themselves best and know their own problems because these…

That is very true but I would say it is advantageous because it keeps... even though we may not put.....for example in Kenya someone from the

Kikuyu cannot go to the Lou community and begin an NGO there as much as Kenya is developed....because there is tribal barrier.

13

12/14/2014 4:28 AM

Aggregate Classification Coverage Number Of

Coding

References

Reference

Number

Coded By

Initials

Modified On

Internals\\Interviews\\Hassan CESVI

No 0.0241 2

1 MJ 12/14/2014 12:43 AM

Yes if there is an interested NGO from the same community, he cant work peacefully.

2 MJ 12/14/2014 12:47 AM

They community will be inticed against him and he will have to leave.

Internals\\Interviews\\NGO CEOs FGD

No 0.2188 7

1 MJ 12/14/2014 2:32 AM

There is someone by the name(name withheld). Myself, I don’t do nutrition programs in Dhoobleey and Afmadow but I do food security and

livelihood. Now they both ended. You know that my staff was kidnapped?

2 MJ 12/14/2014 2:33 AM

They say staf was kidnapped by Alshabaab. It was not Alshabaab but some men hired Mr X(name withheld). Do you understand me?

3 MJ 12/14/2014 2:33 AM

: I do food security in Dhoobley and he does it there too but we never meet in nutrition. SAF and him, they have a big fight too. Because in the

rationalization plan Diif is covered by SAF and he went there and distributed food.

4 MJ 12/14/2014 2:33 AM

He told the community to chase the SAF guys because they aren’t doing anything there. The second day, their car was captured and it was not

Alshabaab. He was behind the incident.

5 MJ 12/14/2014 2:34 AM

XYZ) who was running NGOs before us all who was always working in Dhoobleey was told to stop his work there. The guy gave money to some

elders and some bandits and told them to stop his operations.

6 MJ 12/14/2014 2:34 AM

Again regarding this man(he means R2). He did the same thing he did to SAF. He took food there too. He incited the community against them.

He told them this man got money with your name so get your money from him. Let me tell you something if you can do something about this

man, e will have peace. He has issues with all. Like…………….(names withheld)

No one can stop him. Let me cut long story short. This man is the only problem that we have so far. He already had issues with nutrition partners.

Now he graduated to food security group like me. All he wants is just to have all Dhoobleey, Afmadow and Diif are hos areas of operations.

14

Appendix 4: 2013-2015 Somalia CAP paper

15

Appendix 5: CHF accountability framework