the imperialism of thrasylubus - cawkwell

8/9/2019 The Imperialism of Thrasylubus - Cawkwell

1/9


2/9

THE

IMPERIALISMOF

THRASYBULUS

The achievement of Thrasybulus1 on his last voyage has been variously estimated.

Busolt2

saw no

more than a series

of

strong-arm

acts

that added

up

to

very

little.

Beloch3

spoke

of the Second Athenian

Empire.

For

others

there were mere

renewals

of

friendship.

This note

has as

its

starting-point

that

Thrasybulus

sought

to

restore the

fifth-century

empire.

If one looks

merely

at the list

of

places explicitly

mentioned,

the

sum

is

not

large.

Thasos and its

peraea,

Samothrace and

possibly

its

peraea, Byzantium,

Chalcedon,

Abydos

possibly, Mytilene,

Methymna,

Eresus, Antissa, Chios,

Hali-

carnassus,

Aspendus.4

But

Xenophon implies

a

great

deal

more. He

remarked

(4.

8.

26)

that

Thrasybulus thought

that

by reconciling

the Thracian

kings

he

would make the Greek cities along the sea-board

(&- Vind

T

epqK?3lKo7oac

'EXXr7vi6ac

dhetc)

pay

more heed to the

Athenians,

and it is clear

from his

account

shortly

afterwards

(4.

8.

32

ff.)

that

when

Iphicrates

confronted

Anaxibius

on

the

Hellespont

Athens was in a

strong

position, apparently

in

full

control

of the Chersonese while

on the

Asiatic

shore a number of cities

were

cam-

paigning

against

the

Spartan

bastion,

Abydus.

So in the

Hellespontine

area at

least

Thrasybulus'

achievement

was

very

considerable.

Elsewhere one is less sure.

The

Lycian corpus

chances

to

preserve

a

speech

(27,

Against

Ergocles)

with

allusion

to

intervention

in Halicarnassus.

Xenophon

alludes

to

collection

of

money

(ip-yvpoX6yet

4.

8.

30)

from 'other cities' as

well as from

Aspendus,

and

there is no way of knowing how many: since Thrasybulus was in a hurry, per-

haps only

a few. But it is

tell-tale that intervention

in

Lesbos resulted in a naval

contingent

joining

his

fleet,

and

even more so that without

intervention

Chios

followed

suit. Both

by

his actions

and

merely

at

his

approach

alliances

flourished.

But was this

empire?

One must note that

nowhere is there

any

suggestion

of

the

delays

which

the formal

making

of alliances

would have

required:

alliances,

existing

but

dormant,

were

being

revived,

and these can

have been

none other

than the

alliances

of the

empire.5s

Further,

the financial institutions

of

Thrasybu-

lus,

viz.

the

tithe on

the Pontic traffic

(Xen.

4.

8.

27;

Dem.

20.

60)

and

the

5-

per-cent

tax

(IG

ii2

24;

Tod,

GHI

114)

imply

imperial

control

of

the

seas and

imperial control of the allied cities. It would be perverse to regardThrasybulus

as

other than

a full-blooded

would-be restorer

of the

fifth-century

empire.6

I wish

to

thank Mr.

David Thomas of

Corpus

Christi

College,

Oxford,

for

helpful

criticism

of

this

paper.

Two

important

articles

concerning

Thrasybulus

have

appeared

in

recent

years-

R.

Seager,

'Thrasybulus,

Conon,

and

Athenian

Imperialism

396-386

B.C.'

JHS

87

(1967),

95-115

is

a

major

contribution

on which

this

note draws so extensively that explicit refer-

ence

will be

made

only

on

points

crucial

to

the

argument,

and

S.

Perlman,

'Athenian

democracy

and the

revival

of

imperialistic

expansion

at

the

beginning

of

the

Fourth

Century

B.C.'

CPb 63

(1968),

257-67,

to

which this note offers

a modification.

All

references are

to

Xenophon,

Hellenica,

unless

otherwise

stated.

2

Busolt,

Der zweite

atbeniscbe

Bund,

675 f.

3

Beloch,

GG

iii2.

1. 150 n. 2.

4

4. 8.

26-30;

5.

1.

7;

Diod. 14.

94

and

99.

4

f.;

Dem.

20.

59,

60;

Lys.

28.

12

and

17. For

Abydus,

Dem.

57.

38,

but

the

Thrasy-

bulus

there referred

to

is more

probably

not

the

Stirian,

cf. 5.

1. 26 f.

s Cf. the phrase of the inscription set up

in

honour

of

Conon

(Dem.

20.

69).

The

oriXat &vc7ur?r6eot

of the fifth

century

had

to

be

destroyed

in 377

(Tod.

GHI

123,

1.

34).

6

Accame,

Ricerche

intorno

alla

guerra

corinzia,

147

speaks

of

Thrasybulus'

'pro-

gramma

politico,

di

un

impero

ateniese

rispettoso

dei diritti delle

singole

poleis'.

He

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3/9

THE IMPERIALISMOF THRASYBULUS 271

Nor did

his death mark

a

change

of

policy.7

As

the Clazomenae decree

of

387/6

(Tod,

GHI

114)

shows,

5-per-cent

tax continued and the

import

of

corn

to

the cities

was

under Athens'

control;

there

could even be

question

of

a

garrison and an archon. So Agyrrhius undid nothing and had, in principle, nothing

more

to

do.8

Thrasybulus,

the

imperialist,

was not

deposed

for excess or

defect

of

imperialism.

The

explanations

of the recall of the

generals

must lie

elsewhere.

Thrasybulus

had

been sent out to

help

the

Rhodian

demos

(Xen.

4. 8.

25

Tr)q

e~c Pd6ov or07Oeiac)9

ith

forty

new

ships,

and

had

lost

twenty-three

of them

in

a

storm

(Diod.

14.

94.

3),

while

Rhodes had been taken over

by

the

party

hostile

to Athens.10 All this suffices to

explain why

the Athenians

turned

against

Thrasybulus.

There

was

no

crisis

of

imperial policy.

All this has

recently

been

adequately

remarked. But it raises the

question

of

the difference between

Conon

and

Thrasybulus.

Both were

imperialists.

Why

then do they see-saw in popular favour?

Questions

of

chronology

cannot

be

shirked. On

the

conventional

view there

is

a hiatus between the

departure

of

Conon

to

Sardis

(4.

8.

13)

and the

re-emergence

of

Thrasybulus.

Beloch took a

mention of the name in the

Plutus

(550)

as a

sign

that

Thrasybulus

was

still

alive in

389/8,

and

put

the

voyage

in that

year,

in

which

case one has to

explain

what

Thrasybulus

had been

doing

in the

interim.

But

Aristophanes

may

be

referring

to

Thrasybulus

of

Collytus,

and Beloch's

whole

argument

is

unsound.

Seager12

has

roundly

refuted

this,

but without

ex-

plicit argument

places

the

voyage

of

Thrasybulus

the

Stirian

in

390/89,

which

leaves quite a long gap in which Sparta was left to her own devices. Is this date

correct?

After the

peace

negotiations

of

392/113

the

Spartans

resumed hostilities in

the

cites

no

evidence,

but

from

'II

problema

della

nazionaliti

greca

nella

politica

di Pericle

e di

Trasibulo',

Paideia

11

(1956), 250,

it

emerges

that

he

is

basing

himself

on the

terms

of

the Eretrian

alliance of

394

(Tod,

GHI

103,

and cf.

Cloche,

REA

21,

1919,

167),

as

if what happened in the early days of the

Grand Alliance were

at

all

relevant

to

the

mood

of

391

after

the

diplomatic experience

of

392/1.

7

Cf.

Perlman,

art.

cit.,

266,

and

Cloche,

art.

cit.,

187.

8

It is

notable that

Xenophon

names

Agyrrhius

once

only

(4.

8.

31),

but that

is

merely

a

reflection of

the

sketchy

nature

of

the

account of the naval

war.

His

deme was

Collytus

which

thus

was

doubly represented

by

him

and

Thrasybulus

of

Collytus.

Pre-

sumably Agyrrhius was the 'senior man'. His

policies

perhaps

accorded

with

those

of

his

nephew,

Callistratus

(Dem.

24.

135),

both

financially

and in

foreign

affairs

(Philoch.

F.

149).

(For

his

career,

see

J.K. Davies,

Ath.

Prop.

Fam.,

278.)

His

long

imprisonment

reflects the discredit into which

he

fell,

after

the

King's

Peace was

produced

by

his

imper-

ialist activities

(v.i).

9

Cf.

esp.

Seager,

art.

cit.,

109.

10

Cf.

Diod.

14.

99.

5

and

5. 1. 5.

Lysias

28.

1

speaks

of the

betrayal

of

cities,

and

while

this

may

refer to

no more

than Hali-

carnassus

(cf.

?

17),

the cities

of Rhodes

also

may

be

in

mind.

GG

iii2.

2. 224. For the

nauarchies,

cf.

below,

n.

14.

12

Cf.

Seager,

art.

cit., 109,

n.

127.

'3

The date of

the

negotiations

at

Sparta

is

sure,

both

from

the

references

in

Andocides

3

(the

Boeotianshave

fought

for

four

years,

?

20,

the

war

having

begun

in

395/4,

and

Sparta

has

captured

Lechaeum,

? 18,

the

event

of

early

392

described

by Xenophon,

3. 4.

1

ff.)

and

from

the

archon

date

given

by

Philochorus,

F.

149

(see

below,

note

25 for Bruce's

mishandling

of this

passage,

but he does not challenge the

dating).

Conon's

recall and the

congress

at Sardis

(4.

8.

12

f.)

may

fall

in

the

first

half of

392,

not

long

after the

capture

of Lechaeum

(cf.

PW

vi.

1

col. 1052

s.v.

'Eukleios' for

probable

dating

of

the

Eucleia

early

in

the

Julian

year).

This

would allow

enough

time for

him

to alarm

the

Spartans

(4.

8.

12)

and

to send

off

the

embassy

to

Syracuse,

which

checked

the dis-




4/9

272

G.

L. CAWKWELL

summer

of

391

with an attack

on

the

Argolid

by

Agesilaus,

ollowed im-

mediately

by

a combinedassault

on

Corinth,

Agesilaus eizing

the

newly

rebuilt

Long

Wallsand

Teleutiaswith

a

naval

force of

about

12

ships

capturing

he

shipsand the docksof the Lechaeum 4. 4. 19). SinceAgesilausravagedwidely

in

the

Argolid

(4.

4.

19;

4. 7.

5),

the date

of

his

campaign

s

likely

to have

been

early

summer

when

the corn was

ripe.

At this time Teleutiaswas

probably

nauarch.

The

only

fleet

Sparta

had at

sea

in

392/1

was the fleet

in

the Corinthian

Gulf. Podanemushad commanded

t as

nauarch

n

393/2, and,

when

in the

course

of

his

year

of

office

he

was

killed,

Pollis the

epistoleus

took over and

being

wounded was

replacedby Herippidas, resumably

or the remainder f the

year.

Teleutias

then

'came to the

ships

of

Herippidas'

efore the abortive

peace negoti-

ations

of

392/1

(4.

8.

11, 12),

and

presumably

as

nauarch;14

or

where else at

patchof a Syracusanleet inspring392 (Lys.

19.

19

f.),

and

as

much time

as

possible

or

the

Congress

f

Sparta,

which was in

two

stages,

orty days

apart

Andoc.

3.

33,

40).

There

s,

however,

no

need

to

postulate

a

long

delay

between

the

Congress

f

Sardis

and the

Congress

f

Sparta,

or,

as

Barbieri,

Conone,

179,

argued,

he Persian hareof

the second

was

probably

due

to

Tiribazus,

who

was later tried

for

his

presumption

(Diod.

15.

10).

He

perhaps

ssued

a

rescript

in the

name

of the

King

cf.

Andoc.

3.

14

o're PgaOLthXEndPhiloch.F. 149) before

'going

up'

to see

him

(4.

8.

16),

and

about

six

months

before

Strouthas

appeared

n

Ionia

to

resume

he

war

(4.

8.

17).

This

note

presumes

hat

Sparta

ollowed

Sardis

pace

Momigliano,

Ann.

Sc.

Norm.

Sup.

Pisa

2nd

Ser.

v,

1936).

The

reason

why

Andocides

does

not deal

explicitly

with

the

question

of

the

statusof the Greeksof Asia

in the

proposed

peace-terms

s

that,

when

he was

speaking,

heir abandonmento the

King

was

still the

axiom,

albeit

uneasy,

of

Athenianpolicy,and it wasnot untilCallis-

tratusattacked

he

ambassadorsn this

very

issue

(Philoch.

F.

149)

that the new

policy

was,

in the

manner

characteristic f Athenian

political

ife,

proclaimed:

fter their condem-

nation

negotiations

of

the sort

conducted

at

Sardis

were

not

conceivable.

Further,

pace

Bruce

(below,

note

25),

Philochorus

makes t

certain hat

the

peace proposed

at

Sparta

was a

Royal

peace,

and to

suppose

that at

Sparta

Athens'

claimto Lemnosetc.

was conceded

(Andoc.

3.

14),

then at Sardis

retracted, nd hen in387/6, whenAthenswas

at the

King's

mercy

5.

1.28),

again

conceded,

makesa

senseless

progression.

Cf.

Seager,

art.

cit., 105,

n.

92.

Ryder,

Koine

Eirene,

Appen-

dix

XII,

discusses

he

chronology

of

these

years:

on

p.

31

he

envisages

hat

the

Congress

of

Sparta

may

have

followed

the arrival f

Strouthas

n

Ionia,

because

he

rejects

he

evidence

of

Philochorus,

perilousprocedure

for the fourth century.

14

The

nauarchy

could

be

held

once

only

(2.

1.

7).

The

only

exception

commonly

ad-

mitted

is

Pollis,

nauarch

in

396/5

according

to

Hell.

Oxy.

19.

1

and

in

376 at the battle

of Naxos

(5.

4.

61),

but

proof

is

wanting

that it was the

same

man

on each occasion.

Certainly

Teleutias is

unlikely

to

have

been

nauarch in

387,

despite

the

doubtful

text of

5. 1.

13;

Antalcidas

was nauarch

in

388/7

(5.

1.

6)

and was back from

the

King

in time

to

blockade

the corn

ships coming

from the

Pontus (5. 1. 28), i.e. in autumn (cf. Dem.

50.

4,

19),

but Teleutias had

by

then come

to the

ships

on

Aegina

(5.

1.

13;

cf. his

allu-

sions to Antalcidas'

quest

for

money

in

the

speech

he delivered to

the

fleet, ? ?

14-17).

So

there is no

obstacle

there to

his

being

nauarch

in

392/1.

Xenophon

names

no one

nauarch

between

Ecdicus,

391/0

(4.

8.

20),

and

Hierax,

the

immediate

predecessor

of Antalcidas

(5.

1.

3,

5

f.),

therefore

389/8.

Who

was nauarch in

390/89?

Teleutias was

operating

in that

year in command of the fleet (5. 1. 3) but,

for

the

reason

given

above,

not

as nauarch.

Can

it have been

the

mysterious

Chilon,

the

nauarch of

Aesch. 2.

78,

against

whom

De-

maenetus

fought

a sea battle?

Ed.

Meyer,

Theopomps

Hellenica, 42,

jumped

to the

pre-

sumption

that Aeschines

was

really talking

about

Milon,

the

harmost

on

Aegina,

who

pursued

Demaenetus

in

Hell.

Oxy.

6 and

8.

But that is wanton.

Aeschines'

use

of

the

word,

oovyKarevavidXnloe

mplies

both

more

than the

skirmish

of

Hell.

Oxy.

8

and

more

than a single ship. Further, Chilon is a well-

known

Spartan

name,

a bearer

of

which is

to

be

met

at 7.

4.

23.

There is no

justification

for

changing

the

name

in Aeschines and

scrapping

the office

assigned.

Demaenetus

was

a

general

in

388/7

(5.

1.

10)

and

could

have

been,

for

all

we

know,

previously,

and

the

sea-battle

in which

he

shared

in

defeat-

ing

the nauarch

could have

been

part

of the




5/9

THE

IMPERIALISM

OF THRASYBULUS

273

that moment

could

the nauarch

be?

By

the time

his

nauarchy

ended in

autumn

391,

the

scene

had

shifted

to

the east

Aegean

and his successor

as

nauarch,

Ecdicus,

was

assigned

the

task

of

saving

Rhodes

(4.

8.

20

f.)

probably

as soon

as

he took office. Thibron's last campaign was probably short, to judge by the short

range

of

his

ravaging

(4.

8.

17,

Diod.

14.

99),

and his

death

probably

fell in

later

summer

391;

Sparta

must have sent his

replacement,

Diphridas,

who

went

out

with

Ecdicus

(4.

8.

21),

at

no

great

interval;

so

Ecdicus

probably

sailed

east

in

autumn

391.

He

was

replaced

by

Teleutias,

who

'sailed round'

with

'the

twelve

ships'-i.e.

the

ships

of

the raid

on the Lechaeum

of summer

391

(4.

8.

23

and

4.

4.

19).

When

was

this

replacement?

Ecdicus

found

that

his

eight ships

were

in-

sufficient to

face a

Rhodian

demos

controlling

the seas with

twice that

number

(4.

8.

22),

and

he

must

have

found out

the

facts

of

the

situation

fairly quickly.

So it is

likely

that

his

appeal

for

help

came

in

latish

391

and,

since

Sparta

could

hardly leave Ecdicus unreinforced any longer than absolutely necessary, nor for

that matter her

allies on

Rhodes

unsupported,

Teleutias would have

been sent

in

late

391.

(For

in

time

of

crisis fleets could

sail late

in

the

year.

In

352

it

was

proposed

to

send 40

ships

to

the

Hellespont

in

November,15

and

evidently

in

361

a naval

force came

out

from

Athens to

Thasos

very

late.16

So there

is

nothing

preposterous

in

having

Teleutias sail

east

in late

391.)

When

then was

Thrasybulus

sent

out? In the

narrative of

Xenophon

he went

out after

Teleutias

had

arrived

in

Rhodes

(4.

8.

25)

and if

that

is

correct

his

voyage

may

well

have

begun

in the

course of

390.

But there

is some

reason

to

put

it too

into late

391.

First,

the

appeal

to

Sparta

and the

dispatch

of

Ecdicus

with eight ships (4. 8. 20) is not likely to have remained a secret in Rhodes for

very

long,

and

a

counter

appeal

to

Athens

would

naturally

enough

have

followed.

But even if

the

Rhodian

democrats decided

that Ecdicus'

few

ships

were

nothing

to

worry

about,

the

arrival

of

Teleutias with

thirty-seven

ships

(4.

8.

24),

if

they

had

not

appealed

to

Athens

earlier,

must

have

stirred them

promptly

to

appeal,

for fear of

naval

blockade of

their new

city

of

Rhodes.

So

an

appeal

in

391

is

probable

enough.

Secondly,

Thrasybulus

was sent out to

help

Rhodes

(cf.

r7e

eit

'P66ovpor0e7iaq

4. 8.

25).

Why

did

he

decide not

to do

so?

Presumably

the

situation had

changed

since the

decision of the

Athenian

assembly,

and,

although

the

events of

the

war on

Rhodes are so

little

attested,

one

inevitably suspects

that for Thrasybulus the new factor in the situation was the arrival of Teleutias

which

made

it

difficult to

get

at the

Laconizers in

their

fortress.

So

it

may

well

be

that

Thrasybulus

went

out

at much

the same

time

as

Teleutias sailed

round

and the

news of the

latter's

presence

gave

Thrasybulus

the

excuse to

be on

with

other

matters.

Thirdly,

there

is

much to

be

said for

placing

Thrasybulus'

work in

the

Hellespontine

region

in

a

winter.

If

Teleutias

was

in

Rhodes

with

twenty-seven

ships,

having captured

ten

Athenian

ships

as

well,

Thrasybulus

had

a

prime

duty

to

prevent

a

further

build-up

of

naval

power

off

Rhodes,

and

his

leaving

Rhodes

suggests

that he

expected

no

reinforcements to be

sent

out

to

Teleutias.

Again,

he

would

have

felt

bound

to seek

to

engage

the

Spartan

fleet in

battle,

if he

possibly

could: that he felt free to

neglect

it

suggests

the lull in

operations

of winter. So

one

must

choose

between

winter

391/0 and

winter

390/89,

and,

if

Teleutias did

operations

Xenophon

does not

notice

(see

below).

So

Chilon

may

well

be

the

missing

name.

There is

a

convenient

table of

the evidence

for

Spartan

commands in

the

Corinthian

War in

L.

Pareti,

Ricerche

sulla

potenza

marit-

tima

degli Spartani,

157 f.

Franke,

PW xvi.

2,

col.

1890

f.,

refers to

the main

discussions.

'5

Dem.

3.

4.

16

Dem. 50.

29.




6/9

274

G.

L. CAWKWELL

go

out in

391,

a whole

year

is too

long

an

interval.

391

is

the

year

for

Thrasybulus

to leave Athens.

There

are

two

objections

to

this

chronology.

First,

Hierax,

nauarchof

389/8,

took

over

Teleutias'

navy

in

Aegina(5.

1.

3), presumably

n

autumn

389,

and if

Teleutias

went out in

391

he

must

have remained n

command

of the

Spartannavy

for

almost two

whole

years

after his

nauarchy

of

392/1,

i.e.

the

majorpart

of

Ecdicus'

year

and

390/89.

But

Teleutias

was

very

popular

n the fleet in

this

period

(cf.

his

departure

at 5.

1.

3

and

his

return

at

5.

1.

13)

and

perhaps

oo

at

home,

where his

step-brother,Agesilaus,

could

laud his

success in

Rhodes.

So

a

long

command

s not

surprising.

His

position

in

391/0

was

odd

anyway

and

a

second

year

without

a

nauarch

appearing

n

Xenophon's

narrative s

perhaps

equally

to be

explained

in terms

of

Agesilaus'

nfluence. Nor

need one

deny

Teleutias

a

second

year

of

extraordinary

ommandbecause one

hears

of

nothing

of whathe wasengagedon during t. Of two of the centres of the navalwar,

Aegina

and the

Hellespont,Xenophon

gives

only

the

most

sketchy

information

for the

period

after

the death

of

Thrasybulus

down

to

the

King's

Peace,

and of

the other

centre,

Rhodes,

to which

Hieraxaddressedhimself in

389/8,

he

says

practicallynothing.

But no doubt the war went on

there and

provided

Teleutias

with useful

employment.

The

second

objection

concerns

Evagoras.

Xenophon

(4.

8.

24)

remarkedon

the

paradox

of

Teleutias

on his

way

to Rhodes

capturing

en Athenian

ships

bound

for

Evagoras,

who

was at war

with the

Great

King.

The

Cyprian

war was

yet

another

'ten-year

war',

so

favoured

of

the

Greeks:

n

Isocrates

9.

64)

it

was

'10 years',in the Ephoran radition t was 'about ten years'(Diod. 15. 9. 2).

Since

it

was

still

in

progress,

hough nearing

ts

end,

in

380

(Isoc.

4.

135,

141),

an exact calculation

of

ten

years

would

suggest

that the Athenians

sent the

ships

in

390

at the earliest. But exact insistence

on

ten

years

is

out

of

place,

and the

war

may

well

have

begun

in

391/0.17

Furthermore,

ne should be cautious

about

Xenophon'sparadox.

The warlike

ambitions

of

Evagoras

ook some

time to break

out

in

open hostility

to the

Great

King

(Diod.

14.

98),

and the

ten

ships

called

for

under the recent

alliance

with Athens

may

have been

for

the

preliminary per-

ations'8

but

thought

of

by Xenophon

as

part

of

the war

against

Persia.19

So it is

not

necessarily

he

case

that the ten

ships

were

sent out no

earlier

han

390.

The hypothesisis thereforeadvanced hat Thrasybulus' oyagebegannot in

390

or

later,

but in

391

within six months

of the

resumption

of hostilities.

If

it

is

correct,

it has

the

advantage

f

getting

rid

of

the

awkwardhiatus

between the

resumption

of hostilities in

Greeceon

Sparta's

part

and

any

sort of action

on

the

part

of

Athens.

If

the

war

resumed n

May/June

391,

Athens'

first

action

will

7

The

chronology

of

the

war is

discussed

by

Beloch,

GG

iii2.

2.

226

ff.

Cf.

K.

Spyri-

dakis,

Euagoras

I

von

Salamis,

54 ff.

8

Cf. Lys. 19. 21. The ambassadors, who

requested

help

from

Athens,

hired

peltasts

and

bought

arms.

Perhaps

these

were for the

preliminary

land

operations

on

Cyprus.

9

If

Theopompus

(F. 103)

is

to be

trusted,

the

Great

King

took no action

against

Evagoras

until

Autophradates

was

satrap

of

Lydia,

who was

appointed

with

Hecatomnus

(for

whom

cf. Diod.

14.

98.

3)

to conduct

the

war

against

Evagoras.

Presumably

Auto-

phradates

succeeded Strouthas

(pace

Tod,

GHI

113,

which

makes

him

satrap

of

Ionia),

and, unless Strouthas had a very short period

as

satrap,

the order to

Autophradates

and

Hecatomnus

must have been

later. The

date

of

Tiribazus'

return to

Ionia

(5.

1.

28)

is

quite

unsure, but,

since it

probably

betokened

a

change

of mood

in

Susa,

was

probably

not

long

before

Antalcidas went

out

as nauarch

to

seek

the

help

of Persia.




7/9

THE IMPERIALISMOF THRASYBULUS 275

have

been to decree

the

building

of a

fleet,20

which

happened

to be

ready

when

the

moment came for

Thrasybulus

to be sent to Rhodes but which had

been

ordered

for

another

more

general

purpose.

How

long

it took to build

these

ships

is a matter of conjecture, but the five months or so the hypothesis just advanced

allows seems about

right.

Thus while

Sparta

resumed

operations

in the

northern

Peloponnese,

and

then sent

Thibron out to Asia to take

up

where

Agesilaus

had

been

forced three

years

before to leave

off,21

Athens

prepared

to make

a

bold

bid

with her

navy.

That

Thrasybulus

was the

chief

inspiration

of this

policy

is nowhere

stated,

but

may

perhaps

be

guessed

from

Lysias' speech

Against Ergocles.

At

?4

the

speaker

declares

'I

think

you

could all

agree

that,

if

Thrasybulus

had

been

promising

you

that

he would

sail

out with triremes and return them

as old

ships

in place of new ..., none of you would have allowed him to sail out with the

ships

...'

This

suggests

that

Thrasybulus

had

promised

something,

and

that that

something

had

been more

general

than

the

narrow

end

of

supporting

the Rhodian

demos.

Later,

at

?14,

the

speaker

says

'You entrusted

yourselves

to these

men

(i.e.

Thrasybulus,

Ergocles,

etc.)

in order that

they

might

make

the

city

powerful

and

free'.

So

perhaps

it is not

wildly astray

to

suppose

that

when

the

peace

negotiations

came to

nothing

Thrasybulus proposed

the

building

of

a fleet

and a

plan

to

make

the

city powerful

and

free,

i.e. to

restore

the

empire;

before

the

fleet

was

ready,

the

call

from

Rhodes

came,

and

Thrasybulus

went out on

a

mission

which he

was

happy

to

neglect

while

he

pursued

his

original

aim. But

this is all

conjecture.

The

important

question,

to which a more solid answer is

here

sought,

concerns

Thrasybulus

and Conon.

In

what

did

they

differ?

Before

the

peace

negotiations

of

392/1

Thrasybulus

was

clearly

the

man

responsible

for the Boeotian

alliance. Not

only

did

he

propose

the decree

(3.

5.

16)

but also it

was he who

led

the

Athenian

contingent

to

Haliartus

(Plut.

Lys.

29.

1)

and

later to

Nemea

(Lys.

16.

15).

Earlier

however,

as

the

Oxyrhynchus

historian

describes

(ch.

6),

Thrasybulus

had

opposed

a

move

to

help

Conon's

preparations,

and it is not

satisfactory

to

ascribe his

opposition

merely

to

a

cautious

feeling

that the time

was not

ripe

for bold

steps.

First of

all,

the

Theban

alliance,

as

Thrasybulus

declared in his

speech

(3.

5.

16),

was

indeed

a hazardous

affair:

the

Peiraeus was without

walls,

and unless the

Thebans succeeded

(which

they

might

well

not

have

done

had

Pausanias

kept

his

rendezvous with

Lysander)

Athens would be

as much

at

Sparta's

mercy

as she could

possibly

be. Also

war

was

inevitable,

once

the

alliance

was made.

Although

we

tend,

under

the

influence

of

Xenophon,

to

speak

of

the

Theban

alliance,

it

was,

as the

stone

recording

it

shows

(Tod,

GHI

101),

an

alliance with

Boeotia

and at the

moment

it

was made

Lysander

was

already

on

Boeotian

territory

at

Orchomenus

(3.

5.

6,

17).

So the

alliance was

in no

sense

precautionary.

It

plainly

meant

war,

a bold

step

indeed.

The man

whose

action

in

sending

a

ship

to Conon

Thrasybulus

had

opposed,

Demaenetus,

had

been

seeking

to have

Persia

and the

Persian

navy fight Athens'

war of

liberation

for

her.

No

such

caution could

be

claimed in

the

alliance with

Thebes.

Secondly,

that there

was a real

difference in

policy

between

Conon

and

Thrasybulus

is

strongly suggested by

the

eclipse

of

the latter

by

the former

and

20

It

is

to be

suspected

that

the ten

ships

that

were sent

to

Cyprus

(4.

8.

24)

were not

new

ships,

but

the

remnants

of

the

fifth-

century

navy,

which

Athens had

been allowed

to

keep.

21

Cf. the size of

Thibron's

army,

Diod.

14.

99.

2,

which

equalled

that of

Agesilaus

(3.

4.

2,

Diod. 14.

79.

1

f.).




8/9

276

G. L.

CAWKWELL

his

supporters

once the battle of

Cnidushad

been

fought

and won

until

the

col-

lapse

of the

negotiations

of

392/1

(cf.

Ar.

Eccl.

193-203).

If

it

had been the

case

that

Thrasybulus

had

been

prepared

o

ventureon the

Theban

alliance

only

afterConon'sfirst success n the Aegean,afterthe democraticrevolutionhad

taken

place

in

Rhodes',22

he

success

of

the one

should not

so

completely

have

displaced

he

other.

Thrasybulus'policy

cannot have been so

much

ancillary

as

alternative o

that

of

his

opponents.23

The

explanation

here

proposed

s

that the issue

between the

two concerned

relations

with

Persia.

Both

were

resolved

o restore

Athens'

imperialpower,

but

their methods differed.

Thrasybulus

proceeded

n

391/0

with

his

plans regardless

of

Persian

eelings.

Conon was more

circumspect.Outwardly

he

was the

liberator,

as

the

inscription

on his statue showed

(Dem.

20.

69);

clandestinely

he

was

doing

all

he could to

restoreAthenian

power,

as the

Spartan

denunciation

of him

at

Sardissuggested 4. 8. 12;Nepos, Con.5. 2). Hisactionsweredefensibleenough

for

him to

answer he summonsof

Tiribazus

and

suspect

enough

for him

to be

put

into

prison

(11. .;

Diod.

14.

85.

4).

But

Conon continued

to believe in the

necessity

of the

Persian

riendship,

and

he

remaineda

Persian

admiral;

Tiribazus

recalled

him

to

Sardis

under the

pretence

that

he

wished

to send

him

up

to

the

Great

King

on

business

Nep.

Con. 5.

3).

Conon

obeyed.

The

differing

attitudes

are illuminated

by

the

differingresponses

o the sum-

mons to a Persian-dictated

eace.

WhenConon

went

to

Sardis,

he

was accom-

panied

by

four

Athenian

ambassadors

o

what was

essentially

a

peace congress,

and

although

one

can

hardly

determineConon's

attitude

merely by

his not

having

opposedthe city sendingambassadors,he roleof his associate,Epicrates,n the

consequent

congress

at

Sparta

does show that the

opponents

of

Thrasybulus

were

prepared

o

accept

the

limitations

of

a

King's

Peace.

Epicrates,

who with

Cephalus

had

been

responsible

or

the clandestine

help

for Conon when he

was

assembling

his

fleet

(Hell.

Oxy.

7.

2),

had

already

hared

with Phormisios

an

embassy

to

Persia24 nd

the

fact

that

they

were

accused

of

accepting

bribes

during

t

from

the

Great

King

shows

that

they

were

working

or concord between Athens

and

Persia

Plato,

fr.

119,

K.

1.

633).

Similarly,Epicrates

and

Cephalus

were

credited

with

accepting

money

from

Timocrates

n

395

(Hell.

Oxy.

7.

2),

again

a

sign

of

their

policy.

So

it is

no

surprise

hat

Epicrates

was

one

of

the four

ambassadors

exiled for being readyto assent to a King'sPeacein 392-1 (Philoch.F.

149).25

22

Perlman,

art.

cit.,

261.

23

As

Seager pointed

out,

art.

cit.,

98

f.,

there

seems to have been considerable

dis-

illusionment

by

late

394

with

the

policy

of

Thrasybulus,

but his share

in

the creation

of the

Grand

Alliance,

which

safeguarded

Athens

against

Spartan

invasion,

was much

to his credit.

His

eclipse requires

fuller ex-

planation.

24

Cf.

J.K.

Davies,

Ath.Prop.Fam.,

181.

25

I.A.F. Bruce, 'Athenian Embassies in

the

Early

Fourth

Century

B.C.'

Historia

15

(1966),

rejects

Philochorus

F.

149

in

favour

of

Aristides,

Panath.

172.

10

ff.

(with

Scholiast)

and

supposes

that

Epicrates

was

tried for

his

part

in

the

embassy

which

made

the

King's

Peace

in

387/6.

Assuming

that the

four ambassadors of Philochorus were

to-

gether

on some

occasion,

one

may

assert

confidently

enough

that it was not

in

387/6.

Callias in his

speech

at the

congress

before

Leuctra

(6.

3.

4)

asserted that

he had

on two

previous

occasions been

on

embassies

to

Sparta

which had

succeeded

in

making

a

peace:

the

probable

occasions are 375 and

387/6;

404

is

possible,

if

Callias

was indeed

born in

the

middle

of the fifth

century

(Davies,

Ath.Prop.Fam.,

263),

but the

manner

in which he

alludes to

his

peace-

making

missions (6. 3. 4)

hardly

suits a 33-

year

interval

(and

since

his own

generalships,

to

which he

refers,

included that of

4.

5.

13

and

Philoch. F.

150,

he has

in mind

the

period

of

the

King's

Peace).

In

any

case,

to

reject

Philochorus

in

favour

of

Aristides

is

a

wholly

unsatisfactory

procedure

(cf.

Jacoby,

FGH

iii b.

1.

227

f. and 230

f. for the

standing

of

Philochorus),

nor is

it

likely

that

Didymus




9/9

THE IMPERIALISMOF

THRASYBULUS

277

By

contrast,

Thrasybulus,

if

Seager

is

right

in his

interpretation

of line 356 of the

Ecclesiazusae,26

opposed

the

peace.

He was

opposed,

that

is,

to

accepting

the

limitations

of

Persian

peace.

In

defending

submission

to the

peace

Andocides

(3. 13 ff.) had argued that Athens had no good reason for fighting on, and con-

cluded

by dismissing

the idea of

recovering

the assets of the

fifth-century

empire.

'Well,

it

might

be

suggested,

we

should

fight

on to

get

back

the

Chersonese,

and

the

colonies,

and

our

holdings

(&yKr~jLara)

and

investments

(Xp&a).

But neither

the

Great

King

nor

our

allies

agree

with us with whose

help

we must

fight

to

get

them.'

It

was this

very

idea

which moved

Thrasybulus

first to

oppose

the

peace,

and

shortly

after

to

demand

the fleet to realize

it.

After

the

exiling

of

Epicrates,

no

more is heard

of his

partner

of

396

and

395,

Cephalus

(see

above),

until after the

King's

Peace

he

re-emerges,

first as

critic

of the

discredited

board

of

generals

headed

by

Agyrrhius

(Tod,

GHI

116),

then as architect of policy in the formation of the Chian alliance (ibid. 118, line

40)

and of

the

aid

to

Thebes

at

the

Liberation

(Din.

1.

38).

Agyrrhius

and his

fellow

generals,

who

had carried

on the

imperialist

plans

of

Thrasybulus,

had,

by

contrast,

to

bear

the

blame

for

the new

concord

between

Sparta

and

Persia,

and

prosecutions

followed.

In

the

long

run

the

prudence

of

Conon

had

showed

itself

right.

Athenian

imperialist hopes

continued to

thrive,

but never

again

will

the

city

dare

the Great

King's

displeasure,

save

momentarily

during

the Social

War

when

repentance swiftly followed.28

When

the

Chian

alliance

is

made in

384,

the

sanctity

of the

King's

Peace

is

carefully

spelled

out

(Tod,

GHI

118 1.

9).

The

folly

of

Thrasybulus

will not be

repeated.

The

attitude of

Xenophon

to

Thrasybulus may

in

part

reflect this

antipathy

to

concord

of

any

sort with Persia.

According

to the

Oxyrhynchus

historian

(7.

2),

Epicrates

and

Cephalus

received

money

from

the

envoy

Timocrates,

a tradition

which

emerges perhaps

in

Pausanias

(3.

9.

7).

Xenophon

(3.

5.

2)

exempts

Athens

from this

charge,

and the

explanation may

be

advanced

that,

because

this

was the

period

when

Thrasybulus

was influential

and

Athens

entered

the

war

by

way

of

the Theban

alliance

of

which

Thrasybulus

was the

architect,

no

suspicion

of

Persian

gold

could fall on

Athens.

Thrasybulus

could

least

of

all be

suspect

of such

medism.

When

his

death was

recorded,

he

received final

commendation

(4. 8. 31). No one who had had

any

share in

using

Persia to

destroy Spartan

power

in

Greece could

have

had that

from

Xenophon.

University

College,

Oxford

G.

L. CAWKWELL

in

quoting

at

length

as

he

does for F.

149

turned

up

the

wrong

archon.

Philochorus

re-

ferred

to the

peace

of

392/1

not

just

as

the

Peace

of Antalcidas

but as

Triv

eipIjavVy

T?7v

nr'

'AvrtaXhKiov

..

~

'AOrlvalot

tK

'56?avro-a

just

designation

if

392/1

was

essentially

the

King's

Peace

manqud.

26

Art.

cit.,

107 f.

27

5.

1.

26;

Dem.

19.

180

and 24.

134;

Lys.

19.

50. and 26. 23.

28

Cf.

Diod. 16.

22

etc.

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the imperialism of thrasylubus - cawkwell

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