Religion (1983) 13, 345-358

THE INCORPOREALITY OF GOD

CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS OF ORIGEN S

POSITION

Gedaliahu Stroumsa

Among second century Middle-Platonists, apophatic language seems to have

been a most common way of expressing God's transcendence. Apuleius,

Maximus Tyrius, Celsus, Numenius, the Chaldaean Oracles, all develop, in

rather similar ways, the Platonic doctrine of God's ineffability . )

One of the attributes which can in no way be predicated of God is cor-

poreality. In the tenth chapter of the Didaskalikos, for instance, Albinus seeks to

demonstrate that the simplicity, the perfect unity of God, implies his incor-

poreality . 2

In this absolute denial of God's corporeality, the Middle Platonists were not

only pursuing a centuries-long argument with Stoicism. They were also the

heirs of a long chain of philosophical, rationalist criticism of traditional

religion-which contested, in particular, anthropomorphic conceptions of the

Gods . 3

When the Christian theologian Origen asserts, in the first half of the third

century, the incorporeality of God, he is therefore in no way original . Parallels

between him and Albinus, in particular, have long been noted . 4 Earlier

Christian writers, such as Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian and Clement of

Alexandria, had already made use of the word asbmatos . Yet, with the exception

of Clement, these writers had not used this term in a rigorous way . Clement's

Platonism is more cogent : God is noetos, and therefore asSmatos . 5

What is peculiar to Origen, and deserves, I think, more attention than it

thus far has been given, is the context in which Origen develops his view, and

the central role that God's incorporeality plays in the overall structure of his

thought .

I shall attempt to show that Origen here faces a major tension (one might

almost say an antinomy) inherent within biblical tradition, a tension which

leads to the double temptation of anthropomorphism and dualism . Origen's

0048-721 X/83/040345 + 14 $ 0 2 .00/0 1983 Academic Press Inc

. (London) Ltd .

346 G. Stroumsa

solution to this tension succeeded to resolve the implicit conflict between the

personal creator God and his absolute incorporeality; it has had momentous

implications upon subsequent Christian exegesis, theology and mysticism .

Those implications hopefully will be enlightened by an analysis of the place of

God's incorporeality in Origen's thought .

Origen deals with the problem in various places : in the Contra Celsum, in his

Homilies on Genesis, 6 and in particular in his Commentary on John . 7 Yet nowhere

do its context and implications appear as clearly as in the Peri Archon, and it

might be legitimate to focus the analysis on this last text . Written before 230,

the Peri Archon is both one of Origen's first works, and no doubt his major

theological opus . It has no known literary predecessors;$ contemporary

philosophers did seek the essence of the archai 9-which the Academy, in

opposition to the Stoa, affirmed to be incorporeal . On this issue, of course,

Origen stands on the side of the Academy, and his works-especially the

Contra Celsum-contribute much to our doxographic evidence on Stoic

doctrines .10

The whole orientation of Origen's system, however, is fundamentally

different from the inquiries peri archo"n of contemporary pagan philosophers .

For it is a Christian system, in which the only arche, essentially, is God-in his

three aspects, but mainly as the Father."

The Pen' Archon opens with a polemic against anthropomorphicropomorphic conceptions

of God :

I am aware that there are some who will try to maintain that even according to our

scriptures God is a body, since they find it written in the books of Moses : "Our

God is a consuming fire" (Deut4:24), and in the Gospel according to John : "God is

spirit, and they who worship him must worship in spirit and in truth" (In 4:24) .

Now these men will have it that fire and spirit are body and nothing else . 12

Although Origen does not explicitly name his opponents here, they are,

obviously, Christians (quoniam inueniunt scriptum esse apud Moysen) . Moreover,

they do not seem to be those unsophisticated anthropomorphists whom

Origen calls the akeriotatoi, or simpliciores, whose opinions he attacks elsewhere .

Rather, it is Christians influenced by Stoic conceptions-'des Chretiens

stoicisants', as it has been suggested to call them 13-whom he has in mind,

and this assertion can be easily proven . Indeed, it is in consequence of the

saying `God is Spirit' Un 4:24) that these people think God to be a body . Now

the Stoics' corporealism has been mentioned above . For them, there can be no

incorporeal being, since existence is defined by the body . God, therefore, being

a spirit, is only the purest of all bodies . As Celsus says, when the Christians

`say God is spirit, there is in this respect no difference between [them] and the

Stoics among the Greeks who affirm that God is spirit that has permeated all

things and contains all things within himself .' 14 To which Origen replies that

The Incorporeality of God 347

`the oversight and providence of God does permeate all things, but not like the

spirit of the Stoics', for whom `the first principles are corporeal', and `the

supreme God himself destructible'

.15

Had Origen sought, in the Peri Archon, to confront individuals, rather than

trends, we could have seen in its first chapter an answer to the rhetorical

question of Tertullian, the best known exponent of Stoic influences among the

Fathers: 'Quis enim negabit deum corpus esse, etsi dens spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus

sui generis in sua effigie .'

16

As a Platonist, Origen strongly contests this conception : there is no possi-

bility of conceiving a non-material body . Therefore any attribution of cor-

poreality to God implies his materiality and his corruptibility :

And if God is declared to be a body, then, since every body is made of matter, we

shall find that God is made of matter too ; and if so, then, since matter is

undoubtedly corruptible, God will according to them be corruptible . 17

Moreover, the corporeality of God also implies his divisibility as Origen

notes in the Peri Euches:

in order to remove a mean conception of God held by those who consider that he is

locally "in heaven", and to prevent anyone from saying that God is in a place after

the manner of a body (from which it follows that he is a body)-a tenet which leads

to the most impious opinions, namely, to suppose that he is divisible, material,

corruptible. For every body is divisible, material, corruptible . 18

The corporeality of God, Origen says, is thus not simply a mistaken con-

ception, it is, in a very basic sense, dangerous for the Christian faith . In his

Commentary on John (XIII .2 1), the Stoic tenet is condemned because it misleads

simple Christians . Indeed, it can give a theoretical support to those who are

capable of only a literal reading of the Bible (kata ton recon), which would imply

that God has not only a body, but also wings!

19

Origen understandably opposes such tendencies, which would deny any

intellectual respectability to Christianity . Even so, the Peri Archon opens

precisely with a polemic against those Christians who admitted with the Stoics

that God, being a Spirit, had a body-this striking fact demands our

attention . 20

For, if the system developed in the Peri Archon is established like so many

other theological patristic works-upon a polemical basis, it is mainly a

polemic against dualism . 21 Although some passages seek to refute specific

Valentinian or Marcionite doctrines, Origen usually speaks of the `heretics',

meaning the Gnostics in general, 22 also referring to `Marcion, Valentinus and

Basilides', en bloc . 23 It is the very foundations upon which Gnostic dualist

thought is established that Origen seeks to confront and overthrow .

Now the Gnostics partake, with Origen, in the basic Platonic conception of

3 48 G. Stroumsa

the archai as incorporeal. Moreover, I think it can be shown-and I have tried

to do so elsewhere24-that the urge to avoid a literal reading of the biblical

anthropomorphisms, which would attribute them to God-was a significant

factor in the origins of dualist Gnosticism .

Textual evidence confirms that the various gnostic trends held a lofty

conception of the Deity, beyond body, and even essence . The Gnostics, like the

second-century Platonists, used apophatic language when they spoke about

the supreme Deity . On this, the Nag Hammadi texts support descriptions of

Patristic heresiologists ; 25 for our purposes, a few quotations will suffice .

In the tractate Marsanes, the Spirit, i .e . the unbegotten one, `does not have

being'. It is also said to be incorporeal . 26 The Apocryphon of John goes even

further, in declaring that the invisible Spirit is `completely perfect, illimitable,

. . . unsearchable immeasurable, invisible, . . ineffable, . . . not corporeal

[nor] incorporeal .' 27 Such a theologia negatiua is attested further by other new

texts, like Zostrianos28 orAllogenes, 29 or the Tripartite Tractate. 30 Prior to the Nag

Hammadi discovery, the strongest known Gnostic proponent of apophatic

language was Basilides-who denied of God even existence . 31

Now according to Origen's testimony, it is the Gnostics' emphasis on the

invisibility of God-a doctrine different from, but, as we shall see, closely

related to his incorporeality-which is at the source of their rejection of the

Old Testament God :

But since the supporters of this heresy are sometimes wont to beguile the hearts of

very simple people by certain fallacious sophistries, I think it is not unreasonable to

bring forward the points raised in their arguments and to refute their deceit and

falsehoods . They say that it is written : "No man hath seen God at any time" (John

1 :18); yet the God whom Moses proclaims was seen by Moses himself and before

that by the patriarchs, whereas the God who is announced by the Saviour has been

seen by no one at all .32

This text shows that the Gnostic heretics reject the God of the Old Testament

on the basis that he can be seen-which cannot be said of the true God . In

other words, they insist on a literal reading of such biblical verses which

describe God as visible .

Elsewhere, Origen states that the heretics slander the God of the Old

Testament, when they attribute to him literally the passions mentioned in

Scripture .33

In Origen's view, therefore, the transcendent middle-Platonist theology of the

Gnostics is not less dangerous for the simple believers than Stoic corporealism .

Both conceptions, while they lead simple minds to basically different theo-

logical errors, do so on the basis of the same principle : taking the biblical

anthropomorphisms literally . In this respect, both attitudes are wrong, and

dangerous, because they refuse to exegete the biblical text-or, more precisely,

its anthropomorphic passages .

In both attitudes, the lack of an exegetical approach leads to the confron-

The Incorporeality of God349

tation between scripture and philosophy-a confrontation in which one

element is necessarily subdued : philosophy for the anthropomorphists, and

scripture for the Gnostics . In any case, both attitudes can lead to the same

theological problems .

The prolation (probole) of the Son by the Father, for instance, a typically

gnostic doctrine, developed in order to emphasize the complete distinction

between God and all creatures, implies, according to strict logic, that both the

generator and generated one be bodies . 34 Similarly, any conception of God's

corporeality implies His divisibility-and therefore, here too, the Father

generates the Son in a pro bole. Origen unhesitantly opposes such a position,

which implies a dangerous mythologisation of Christian thought, and there-

fore leads to heresy .

The exegetical methods developed by the ancient Greek grammarians and

philosophers in order to make decent sense of Greek mythology-and in

particular of the Homeric writings 35-had been first applied to the biblical

text by Aristobulos and Philo . In the second and third centuries C.E ., most

pagan philosophers, who did not hesitate to allegorize mythological texts of

various origins, still considered the allegorical reading of the Bible to be

illegitimate . Celsus himself is a good example of this attitude in the second

century . He refused to the Bible what he readily granted to the myths of other

nations, and found fault with `those who treat[ed the Mosaic history] allegori-

cally ' .36

The only example that Origen is able to bring against Celsus is Numenius

the Pythagorean :

In the first book of his work on The Good where he speaks of the nations that believe

God to be incorporeal, he also included the Jews among them, and did not hesitate

to quote the sayings of the prophets in his book and to give them an allegorical

interpretation. 37

For Porphyry, as for Celsus, allegorical exegesis of the Bible was an

absurdity, developed by Origen himself-since it is in order to understand

properly the Greek mysteries that the philosophers had developed this

method; it is from them that Origen would have learnt it, then applying it

fraudulently to `foreign fables' . 38

As we have seen, however, it is at least in good part as a reaction against the

implications, for Christians, of the Stoic or the Platonic conceptions of God

that Origen developed his exegetical method . Both conceptions, indeed,

heighten the immanent double danger of Biblical tradition-which only

allegorical reading may prevent-anthropomorphism and dualism . The

principles of this method are specifically stated in the preface of the Peri Archo"n,

which constitutes one of Origen's most carefully weighed theological state-

ments, as says H. Chadwick, `perhaps Origen's most important statement

about the nature of Christian doctrine .. . 139

3 50G. Stroumsa

In this preface, Origen enumerates the various components of the regulafidei,

i .e . the beliefs clearly stated in scripture and transmitted by the apostolic

tradition . 40 By definition, these beliefs are true, and ought not to be discussed .

There is one, and only one God, both just and good . He created and establi-

shed all, ex nihilo, gave the Law, and sent to the world, after the prophets, his

son Jesus Christ, born of Him before all creation . Jesus Christ, although being

God, took a body similar to our body, suffered and died, then was resurrected

and rose to heaven .41 Yet, Origen adds, some questions are neither expressly

stated in scripture, nor dealt with by apostolic tradition . For instance, it is not

clear whether the Holy Spirit, too, must be considered as a Son of God, or what

is the exact nature of the Devil and his angels.42

One of the most serious questions not answered by apostolic predication is

whether God himself (and also the Son and the Holy Spirit) are corporeal or

not. To this problem Origen devotes a rather long paragraph-usually termed

`digression' by scholars . The scriptures themselves, Origen observes, do not

know the word asomatos .

The passage ends thus :

Nevertheless, we shall inquire whether the actual thing which Greek philosophers

call asomaton or incorporeal is found in the holy scriptures under another name . We

must also seek to discover how God himself is to be conceived, whether as corporeal

and fashioned in some shape, or as being of a different nature from bodies, a point

which is not clearly set forth in the teaching .. .43

Origen does, in due course, come back to this cardinal question, stating his

opinion (arbitror) that corporeal beings are called by scripture visible, whereas

the incorporeal and substantial powers it calls invisible (for instance in Col

1 :16 f .) . 44 It is this equivalence, throughout the book, between biblical

invisibility and philosophical incorporeality which constitutes the core of

Origen's exegetical system . According to this system, theological research

should investigate points upon which the apostolic tradition is silent,45

exegeting biblical passages in the light of philosophical concepts . Here is the

great intellectual achievement of Origen, which demarcates between him and

the earlier Fathers .'

The principles of the rule of faith themselves, however, should not be

investigated; Origen, therefore, does not raise the problem of the Incarnation

in philosophical terms . These principles Origen compares (Praef. 10) to the

foundations of the whole building which is `the body of doctrine' . 47

We see now that the question-raised by modern scholarship since

the days of de Faye and Volker-whether Origen is principally a systematic

thinker or a biblical exegete, is a mistaken one . 48 Origen builds a daring, and

completely new system of Christian thought established upon biblical exegesis ;

allegorical exegesis is the ultimate criterion of true Christianity . On the other

The Incorporeality of God 3 5 1

hand, the common ground of heresies (together with Judaism) is their rejection

of exegesis, their literal reading of the biblical text-or, rather, of Old Testament

anthropomorphisms. Towards the end of the Peri Archon, Origen states :

Now the reason why all those we have mentioned (i .e . the Jews and the Gnostics)

hold false opinions and make impious or ignorant assertions about God appears to

be nothing else but this, that scripture is not understood in its spiritual sense, but is

interpreted according to the bare letter . ..49

It may be worth noting that this bare letter (to psilon gramma) Origen often

calls the corporeal (somatikon) sense of scripture50-following in this a well-

established tradition of Alexandrian exegesis . 51 Beyond this, however, Origen

may be seeking to emphasize the fact that it is the lack of ability to see the real,

spiritual sense of the revealed texts which is at the root of the attribution of

corporeality to God .52

We have seen how Origen took those verses (such as Jn 1 :18) which mention

the invisibility of God to indicate His incorporeality . But what does Origen do

with those other verses, which seem to have played a crucial role in the Gnostic

rebellion, and which implied in some sense, God could be seen (for example

Ex. 33 :23 : `You will not see my face, but my back')?53

Origen states that seeing can apply only to bodies . Since God is absolutely

incorporeal, one cannot see him with one's physical eyes, but one can know him

and such is the meaning of the verb `to see' when used about God (or, rather,

the Trinity) :

. . . what is called `seeing' and `being seen' in the case of bodily existences is with

the Father and the Son called `knowing' and `being known' through the faculty of

knowledge and not through our frail sense of sight.54 .

God, indeed, cannot be seen-but he can be known ; he is incorporeal, but

not agnostos as the Gnostic God is . Origen reached this solution to the problem

of God's incorporeality in his first major treatise . It remains, obviously, of

central importance for a proper understanding of his later writings, and

mainly his exegetical and homiletical works . By his acceptance of a main tenet

of Platonism and its integration into a basically Christian epistemology,55

Origen was thus able to develop what could be called an intellectualist

mysticism-for which any oisio of God is a cognitio, the incorporeal soul

knowing, by nature, its likeness, the incorporeal God .56

Like Clement, Origen knew that revealed truth needed philosophical

vocabulary in order to be meaningfully expressed . Yet, unlike Clement, he also

knew that the relationship between philosophy and scripture was inherently

problematic, and that equations between the two could not be made at

random, or at will . More deeply than Clement, he recognized that the accept-

352 G. Stroumsa

ance of even the best of Greek philosophies, Platonism, could lead to the most

severe deformations of Christian truth, if unchecked by strict hermeneutical

rules. This is why Origen's Platonism remains limited within the frame of

dogma which he himself carefully draws .

I have hinted above that this qualified Platonism permitted Origen to do

much more than to offer an ad hoc solution to occasional opponents . Rather, it

empowered him to confront and overcome a basic antinomy-or a permanent

double temptation-of biblical monotheism .

In order to support this claim, we may cast a brief glance at Augustine's case

against Manichaean dualism . According to his trustworthy testimony, exten-

sive use of anti-anthropomorphic arguments was made by Manichaean

propaganda in fourth-century North Africa . We may quote here, at some

length, from the Confessions :

For, other than this, that which really is I knew not; and was, as it were, through

sharpness of wit, persuaded to assert to foolish deceivers, when they asked me :

`Whence is evil?', `Is God bounded by a bodily shape (et utrum forma corporea deus

finiretur), and has hair and nails?' . . .

I, in my ignorance, was much troubled, and, departing from the truth, seemed to

myself to be making towards it ; because as yet I know not that evil was nothing but

a privation of good . . . And I know not God to be a spirit, not one who hath parts

extended in length and breadth, or whose being was bulk . . . And what that should

be in us by which we were like to God, and might in Scripture be rightly said to be

`after the Image of God', I was altogether ignorant. 57

To Augustine's own avowal, therefore, he had been deeply impressed by the

Manichaean arguments against the anthropomorphism of the Biblical God,

because he was, in his own words `unable of conceiving another substance

than that which is visible to our eyes' . 58 It is only his encounter with Latin

translations of the Platonists' writings-in Milan, under the influence of

Ambrosius'-which permitted him to break the spell of Manichaean

argumentation. Only after he had discovered, in these writings, the possibility

of a purely spiritual-i .e. totally immaterial invisible and incorporeal-being,

only then could he recognize the Scriptures as true .59 For him, as for Origen,

vision meant knowledge .

60

As he movingly tells in a famous chapter of the Confessions, only on one

point-albeit a central one-did Platonic metaphysics disagree with biblical

teaching: the incarnation of the Logos . 61 (Let us remember here that in the Peri

Archon, similarly, Incarnation which is part of the regula fidei, is not to be

discussed in philosophical terms .)

It is this conception of a purely incorporeal being which permitted

Augustine to reject at once Manichaean dualism and simplistic anthro-

pomorphism. Such an anthropomorphism, which he says he had always

The Incorporeality of God 353

instinctively rejected 62 could still be encountered among contemporary

Christians . He mocked those people who could not conceive of allegorical

language in the Bible . 63 Yet, he adds, these carnal men do, in a sense,

recognize a dignity in God . The Manichaeans, who claimed to criticize the

anthropomorphism of the Biblical God, failed lamentably to offer a spiri-

tualized God . Indeed, Augustine insists, one should laugh, too, at their

mythological conception of a God essentially limited in space (by the kingdom

of the prince of evil), and therefore unable to transcend matter . 64

Augustine adds that of the two evils, anthropomorphism is the lesser one :

simple people-who did not leave the Catholic church-can still be educated

and understand that biblical anthropomorphisms, when properly allegorized,

do not refer to God himself, but to his attributes . Manichaean dualists, on the

other hand, are unable to offer a spiritual interpretation of their myths, since

Mani himself presented his teaching as the final, and complete, exegesis of

former revelations .

The striking parallel between Origen's and Augustine's confrontations with

both anthropomorphism and anti-anthropomorphic dualism illustrates the

fact that Origen's selective use of Platonism opened the way to a major trend of

Christian spirituality, which could very broadly be called intellectualist

mysticism . 65 Of this great chain of mystics, such towering figures as Evagrius

and the Pseudo-Dionysius, after the Cappadocians, were the early theoreti-

cians . One may note, in particular, that the aniconic conception of the Deity

affirmed, in the wake of Origen, by Eusebius, had some bearing upon the

origins of the iconoclastic controversy .66

This type of intellectualist, aniconic mysticism has been characterized by G .

Quispel as a Seinsmystik . 67 Side by side with it, Quispel adds, there is a long

Christian tradition of a Gestaltmystik. For this kind of mysticism, God indeed

does have a body (as the `simple' anthropomorphists claim) but this body is

visible only to the mystic . This mystical anthropomorphism is already attested

in the Pseudo Clementine Homilies (17 .7) : God has a morphe which only the pure of

heart can see. The similarity of the doctrine of God's body in the Sht ur Qomah

fragments or in the Hekhalot Zutreti (where the mystic R. Aqiba is presented as

their proponent) strongly suggests a Jewish origin for this Gestaltmystik . 68 It

seems, indeed, that mystical anthropomorphism may have been an alternative

solution to the above-mentioned antinomy between `simple' anthro-

pomorphism and dualism-for a religious thought which did not, as did

Alexandrian Christianity, encounter Platonism .

The corporeality or incorporeality of God indeed seems to occupy a central

place in the structure of Late Antique thought; it delineates a fundamental

demarcation among basic religious attitudes, as well as among major philoso-

phical schools .69

As is well known, Origen's stand on this issue was to encounter strong

3 54G

. Stroumsa

opposition .Those monks who fought Origenism so violently in the fourth

century Egyptian desert are known as 'anthropomorphists' . By scholarly

consensus, they are considered to have been primitivefellahin, who understood

thebiblical anthropomorphisms literally . 70 Further research, however, might

investigate the possibility that they rather were, like the above-mentioned

Palestinian rabbis, the bearers of mystical conceptions of God's morphe.

An earlier version of this paper was read at the Symposium on Philosophy and Religion in

Late Antiquity, held at the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem,16-18

March 1981 . I wish to thank the Very Reverend Prof. Henry Chadwick for kindly

reading and commenting upon this paper .

NOTES

1 See mainly A. J. Festugiere, La Revelation d' Hermes Trismegiste, IV : Le Dieu inconnu et

la gnose (Etudes Bibliques ; Paris: Gabalda, 1954), p . 94 ff. Cf. also H . A . Wolfson,

`Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes', HTR 45 (1952), pp . 115-30, and, id.,

`Answers to Criticisms of my Discussions of the Ineffability of God', HTR 67

(1974), pp. 186-90. In `Negative Attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic

Basilides ;' HTR 50 (1957), pp . 145-56, Wolfson notes that, dealing with God, both

Albinus and Plotinus (as well as Gregory of Nyssa), use the term aphairesis as the

equivalent of apophasis. (p . 148) .For the continued use ofapophatic terminology in

Origen's time and later, see M . Harl, Origin et la fonction revelatrice du Verbe incarne

(Patristica Sorbonensia, 2 ; Paris : Le Seuil, 1958), pp . 88-90, esp . p . 89, n . 77 .

2 This chapter has been translated and studied by Festugiere, op. cit., pp . 95-102.

See also the analysis ofJ . Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, N.Y . : Cornell Univ .

Press, 1977), pp. 282--85, who notes that this chapter is one of the most original

parts of the work (p. 268) . For an edition and translation of the whole text, see P.

Louis, Albinus, Eisagoge-Didaskalikos (Paris : Les Belles Lettres, 1945) .

3 See the very useful article of Harold W. Attridge, `The Philosophical Critique of

Religion under the Early Empire',Aufstieg and Niedergang des romischen Reiches 16 .2

(Berlin : De Gruyter, 1980), pp . 45-78.

4 See mainly H. Koch, Pronoia and Paideusis: Studien uber Origenes and sein Verhaltnis zum

Platonismus (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, 22 ; Berlin-Leipzig : de Gruyter,

1932), pp. 256-58, esp. p. 258 .

5 See R . P. Casey, `Clement ofAlexandria and the Beginnings ofChristian Platonism',

HTR 18 (1925), pp. 39-101, esp. pp. 78-80 .

6 Hom Gen 1 .13, 56 Doutreleau (SC7 bis) . The context there is `the image ofGod' (Gen

1 :26) . In Peri Archon (= PA) 1 .2 .6, Origen says he intends to deal with the image

and the likeness of God in his commentary on Genesis, now lost for the main part . I

shall quote the PA according to Crouzel and Simonetti's edition, translation and

commentary (SC 252-253 : books I and II, and SC 268-269 : Books III and IV) .

Here: vol. I, p. 120 (SC 252) . Cf. N. de Lange, Origen and the Jews: Studies in

Jewish-Christian Relations in Third Century Palestine (Cambridge: University Press,

1976), 126 . Unfortunately, de Lange does not pay sufficient attention to the

polemical context (against Jewish views) in which Origen formulates its opposition

to any corporeality of God. See G. Stroumsa, `The Hidden Closeness : On the

Church Fathers and Judaism', Mehkarei Yerushalaim be-Mahshevet-Ysrael 2 (1982),

pp. 170-175(in Hebrew) .

7 In Joh. XIII .21 .123-22.131 (C . Blanc, ed ., trans ., tome III ; SC 222, pp .94f).

See

also Contra Celsum VI, 63; VII, 27 ; Dialogue with Heraclides (p . 81 Scherer) .

The Incorporeality of God 355

8 See G. Dorival, "La forme du Peri Archon", in Origeniana (Quaderni di Vetera

Christianorum, 12 ; Bari : Istituto di Letteratura Cristiana Antica, 1975), pp. 33-45 .

9 See for instance Albinus, Didaskalikos, VIII, 1 .

10 For Origen's criticism of the Stoic corporealist conception of the archai, see C . Cels .

VI . 71 ; cf. VII . 37 . In respect with Stoic doctrine, it may be more precise to speak of

corporealism than of materialism . See E . Weil, "Remarques sur Ie materialisme

des Stoiciens", in L'Aventure de l'Esprit, Melanges A . Koyre, II (Paris : Hermann,

1964), pp. 556-572 .

The best analysis of Origen's polemic against Stoicism is that of H . Chadwick,

'Origen, Celsus and the Stoa',JTS, N .S. 48 (1947), 34-49 . As Chadwick notes, the

corporeality of God is one of the two main Stoic doctrines criticized by Origen, the

other being the doctrine of heimarmene. On Origen's rejection of Stoic terminology

on the soma, see also E . Elorduy, S . J ., `El Influjo estofco en Orfgenes', Origeniana,

pp. 277-288, esp. p . 279 .

11 See B. Steidle, 'Neue Untersuchungen zu Origenes' zrepi &pX&v', ZNW 40 (1941),

pp. 236-243 . Steidle argues that in the title of his work, Origen directly refers to its

main opponents, the Marcionites, who, as is known, used to speak of the two (or

three) archai . See references there, p. 240 . See also the discussion of E . von Ivanka,

Plato Christianus (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964), p . 110 ff., as well as J .

Rius-Camps, 'Origenes y Marcion Caracter preferentemente antimarcionita del

prefacio y del segundo ciclo del Peri Archon, Origeniana ; 297-312 ; and R. Cadiou,

Introduction au systeme d'Origene (Paris : Belles Lettres, 1932), p . 95 fl:, on Marcionism in

Origen's time. Clement, who stated the First Principles, the archai, to be un-

demonstrable (Strom. 11 .4 .13-14) never realized his intention of discussing them at

length (Strom . 111 .13 .1 ; 21 .2 ; IV .2 .1 ; V .140 .3 ; VI .4 .2 ; Quis dives 26) . Chadwick,

who refers to these texts, suggests that 'Origen may have wished to fill the gap

when he wrote his own fateful treatise "On First Principles"' . . . (Early Christian

Thought and the Classical Tradition, p . 72 .

12 PA 1 .1 .1 (1, 91 Crouzel-Simonetti) . I quote Butterworth's translation (reprint New

York: Harper and Row, 1966) . On the meaning ofpneuma/spiritus in early Christian

literature, see A . H . Armstrong, `The Self-Definition of Christianity in Relation to

Later Platonism', in E . P. Sanders, ed ., Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, I

(London: SCM Press, 1980), p. 89 ff.

13 By A. Beckaert, `L'evolution de l'intellectualisme grec vers la pensee religieuse et la

releve de la philosophic par la pensee chretienne', Rev . Et . Byz . 19 (1961), p . 59. The

classic work on the topic, M . Spanneut, Le Stoicisme des Peres de l'Eglise (Patristica

Sorbonensia ; Paris : Le Seuil, 1957) does not pursue its systematic investigation

beyond Clement of Alexandria .

14 C. Celsum VI.71 I quote Chadwick's translation (Cambridge : Cambridge

University Press, 19803 ), p. 385 .

15 Ibid., ibid . Cf. ibid ., 1 .21, or IV.1 .4 : ` . . . the God of the Stoics, in that He is

corporeal . . .' See also ibid . VIII.49, in finem, and Origen, Peri EuchIs 27 .8, to be

read in parallel with C. Cels . 111 .47, according to which the Stoa, which regards

`material and corporeal things as fundamental', and asserts `that all ultimate

realities are corporeal' is implicitly condemned, and belongs (together with

Epicureanism) to `the wisdom of the earth' (I Cor 1 :26-29) .

16 Adv. Prax . 7 . Tertullian similarly considers the soul to be corporeal-he calls it `an

inner man' (De Anima IX.7-8) ; see Spanneut's analysis, op . cit., p . 164 f Tertullian,

of course, is not fully conscious of the extent of Stoic influences upon his thought,

and occasionally attacks Stoicism, together with the other philosophical schools-

356 G. Stroumsa

even claiming that it is from Stoic tenets that Marcion developed his own con-

ceptions (Praescr. Haer. VII .6) .

17 PA 11 .4 .3 (I, p . 284 Crouzel-Simonetti) .

18 Peri Euches 23 .3 . I quote Chadwick's translation in Alexandrian Christianity, ed . J . E . L.

Oulton and H . Chadwick (Philadelphia: Westminster,1954) .

19 As implied, for instance, in Ex 19:4. C. Cels . IV .37 . Here again, Origen reflects an

accusation made by Celsus upon Christians in general .

20 Indeed, incorporeity is not an independent question, distinct from that of the

scriptures,as

Harl remarks ("Structure et coherence du Peri Archon", Origeniana,

24, n. 38) against Chadwick . The strategic place of the discussionsofGod's incorpo-

reality in the Peri Archon has been duly noted by M. Alexandre, `Le statut des

questions concernant la matiere dans le Peri Archon', Origeniana, pp. 63-81,

esp . p .

64 .

21 This fact is recognized also by scholars who do not go as faras Steidle . See for

instance Chadwick, op .cit . (n . 10 supra), for whom the Peri Archon consists "in the

main of an elaborate refutation of gnostic dualism and determinism directed

against Marcion, Valentine and Basilides, and a pioneer attempt to lay down rules

for the right interpretation ofthe Bible." See especially A . Le Boulluec, `La place

de la polem que antignostique clans lePeri Archon d'Origene', Origeniana, pp .

47-61 : ` . . . la polemique antignostique . . . constitue l'un des axes fondamentaux

de l'ouvrage' (p. 53) .

22 Except, may be, in I I1 .3 .3, where 'haereseos principes' might refer to the leaders of

the philosophical schools, as Le Boulluec thinks (ibid . p . 53). Cf. Crouzel-

Simonetti, vol . IV, 76, n . 16 . As Le Boulluec notes, moreover, the bearers of

corporeal conceptions of God are never called heretics (ibid . p . 54) .

23 For instance in 11 .9 .5.On polemical allusions to Gnostic doctrines in other works of

Origen, see M. Harl, 'Pointes antignostiques d'Origene : le questionnement impie

des Ecritures', in R. van den Broek and M . J. Vermaseren, eds

.,Studies in Gnosticism

and Hellenistic Religions (EPROER 91; Leiden: Brill, 1981), pp. 205-217 .

24 See `Le couple de I'Ange et de I'Esprit: traditions juives et chretiennes', RB 88

(1981), pp . 42-61 .

25See for instance the apophatic terms used by Marcos the Gnostic about the higher

God, the Propator, in Iranaeus, Adv. Haer. 1 . 14.1 (1, 129 Harvey) .

26 NHC X,1 ; 4 :14-19 ; 6 :3-5. Cf. the Teachings ofSilvanus, CG VII,

4;100 :7 ff.: `For it is

not right for us to say that God is a body', on which see W. E. Schoedel,

'Topological Theology and Some Monistic Tendencies in Gnosticism', in M.

Krause, ed., Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour ofA. Bohlig (NHS 3 ; Leiden :

Brill, 1972), pp. 88-108 .

27 NHC II, 1 ; 3, passim. The puzzling double negation (1 . 23)

has been explained. by

Wolfson, `Answers to Criticisms . . .', p . 190 .See the text in M. Krause-P. Labib,

Die drei Versionen des Apokryphon desJohannes(Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz, 1962), pp.

115-116 .

28 NHC VIII, 1 ; 3:11-13 .

29 NHC XI, 3; 47 :10-11; 62

:23.

30 NHC 1,5; 133 :20-21 .

31See Wolfson, `Negative Attributes', quoted n . 1 .

supra .

32 PA 11.4.3 .

33 PA IV.2 .1 .

34 PA IV.4 .1 .

35 See J. Pepin, Mythe et Allegorie(Paris : Aubier-Montaigne, 1958). Cf. esp

. Eusebius,

Praep. Evang. VIII . 10.On Philo's use of allegory, see for instance Wolfson,

Philo I

The Incorporeality of God 357

(Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard U.P., 1957), pp. 115-137.In

Immut . 11 .54, Philo

states that the biblical anthropomorphisms, which must not be taken literally,

serve for the education of the many .

36 C. Cels . 1 .17 .Beyond anti Judaism-or anti-Christianity-the reasons for this

attitude remain unclear. It may have been this self-avowed, nay proclaimed

historical and anti-mythical character of the Hebrew scriptures which prevented

the pagan philosophers from applying to them methods developed for mytho-

logical texts .

37 Ibid. 1 .15 .On Numenius's theology, see H.-C . Puech, `Numenius d'Apamee et les

theologies orientales au second siecle', in Puech, En quite dela Gnose I (Paris:

Gallimard, 1978), pp. 25--54. On Numenius's view ofJudaism, see M

. Stern, Greek and

Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism II(Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and

Humanities,1980), pp . 206-216 .

38 Quoted by Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. VI .19.5-8 .

39 Early Christian Thought, p. 79 .

40 On this topic, see R.-C . Baud, S . J ., `Les `regles' de la theologie d'Origene', Rev . Sc.

Rel. 55 (1967), pp. 161-206, and J . Fr. Bonnefoy, `Origene theoricien de la methode

theologique', Melanges . . . Cavallera(Bibliotheque de 1'Institut Catholique de

Toulouse, 1948), pp. 87-145. (non vidi) . The concept of a regula fidei also appears,

as is known, in such early theologians as Irenaeus, Tertullian or Hippolytus . See

for instance D . van den Eynde, Les normes de l'enseignement chretien (Gembloux, Paris:

Duculot, Gabalda ; 1553), pp. 281-313 .

41 PA, Preface,4.

42Ibid ., 6.

43 Ibid ., 9 . The discussion of the meaning of asdmatosbegins in 8 .

44 PA 1 .7 .1,in finem (vol . I, 208 Crouzel-Simonetti) : sine uisibilia, quae sunt corporalia,

sine inuisibilia, quae non alia esse arbitror quam incorporeal substantiasque uirtutes. Cf. 11 .3 .6

in finem . See also C. Cels . VI .64, in finem, about Col 1 :15 : semainetai de ek tis aoratou

phones ho asomatos.The identification invisibility = incorporeality is already made

by Philo (Opif. 29) and is found in the Extracts of Theodotos, 47 (p . 159 Sagnard) .

45 See for instance PA, Preface,4 ; in finem (on the Holy Spirit) .

46 Such as Irenaeus, for whom `heresy comes of following the itch to speculate where

scripture has given no clear guidance' (Chadwick,Early Christian Thought, p . 81) .

Tertullian had established (De Anima 2,4) the new idea of a constant reference to

the evangelical regula in the relationships between Christianity and Philosophy-

but his goal was completely different from that of Origen. For Tertullian, this

reference permitted, in each case, to check the respective positions of the two great

adversaries . See the analysis of this text by A . Labhardt, 'Tertullien et la philoso-

phie ou la recherche d'une "position pure",'Museum Helveticum 7 (1950), pp .

159-180 .

47 PA, Preface, 10 .

48 See for instance the partisan attitude of Crouzel,Origin et la philosophie (Theologie,

52 ; Paris : Aubier, 1962), p. 179 ff

.

49 PA, IV.2 .2 . Cf. H. De Lubac, Histoire et Esprit: l'intelligence de l'Ecriture d'apres Origin

(Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1950), pp . 48-49 .

50 In PA IV.2.8-9 for instance.

51See already Philo, de migr. Abr. 83-93 ; cf. Clement, Strom. VI .15 .

52See also Hom Gen 1 .13 (p . 56

Doutreleau) .

53 These verses also provided, of course, the scriptural basis for anthropomorphist

conceptions of God ; see PA 11 .4 .3 (vol . I, p . 286 Crouzel-Simonetti) where Origen

mocks such conceptions .

358 G. Stroumsa

54 PA 1 .1 .8 ; cf. ibid. 11 .4.3 and also C. Cels. VII.43 . In their commentary, Crouzel and

Simonetti note that in practice, Origen does not always make a difference between

seeing and knowing (vol . II, p. 29, n . 36) .

55 "Entre le platonisme et Origene, it y a tout I'Evangile", De Lubac, op . cit., p . 238.

56 This principle comes from Empedocles and Plato . Crouzel and Simonetti state that

this is the fundamental axioma of Origenian mysticism, and refer to some texts

(PA, vol . II, 26, n . 29) . For the incorporeality of the soul-as of all created rational

natures-see PA 1 .7 .1 .Origen notes, however, that only God (the Trinity) can be

said to be incorporeal in the absolute sense of the word .

57 Conf. 111 .7. I quote W . Watts' translation, repr. in the LCL edition. Cf. De Gen .

contr. Man 1 .27 .

58 Ibid. VII . 1 .

59 In Epist. 148 (PL 33, 622), Augustine notes that God is incorporeal for Patristic

tradition .

60 See the texts quoted by R . Jolivet and M . Jourjon, Six Traites Anti-Manicheens

(Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, 17 ; Paris : Desclee, 1961), p . 762, note complementaire

2. Cf. De Civ. Dei X .13, where he states that Biblical mentions of God's visible form

should be understood as metaphors .

61 Conf. VII.9; cf. VII .19 in finem .

62 Conf. VII . 1 .

63 C. Epist. Fund. XXIII:25. Cf. Haer. 50.

64 Ibid., ibid .

65 On this trend in early Christian spirituality see A . J . Festugiere, "Ascese et

Contemplation", in L'Enfant d'Agrigente (Paris : Plon, 1950), pp. 134-148 and pp .

185-186 (notes). Cf. A . Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford :

Clarendon, 1981), on which see my review in Numen 29 (1982), pp. 278-282 .

66 Cf. G. Florovsky, "Origen, Eusebius and the Iconoclastic Controversy", Church

History 19 (1950), pp. 77-96 .

67 In "Sein and Gestalt", Studies in Mysticism and Religion presented to Gerschom G . Scholem

(Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967), pp. 191-195 .

68 See G. Stroumsa, "Form(s) of God : Some Notes on Metatron and Christ", HTR 76

(1983), to appear . On early Jewish mystical literature, see I . Grunewald, Apoca-

lyptic and Hekhalot Mysticism (AGUWJ 14; Leiden-Koln-Brill, 1980) . See esp . p . 148

on Hekhalot Zutreki .

69 In his 'Origen, Celsus and the Resurrection of the Body', HTR 41 (1948),

pp. 83-102 . Chadwick shows that Origen takes over (and slightly adapts) for his

own purpose (can the resurrected body have a shape?) arguments used by the

Academy in the polemic against Epicurean anthropomorphism-according to

which the Gods had a shape (p . 94) .

70 See for instance A. Guillaumont, Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Evagre le Pontique et

l'histoire de l'origenisme chez les Grecs et les Syriens (Patristica Sorbonensia 5; Paris : Le

Seuil, 1962), p . 59 ff.

GEDALIAHU STROUMSA teaches in the Department of Comparative

Religion in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is currently spending a

period of study leave at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D .C .