the influence of sea power on the punic wars
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The Influence of Sea Power on the Punic Wars
INTRODUCTION
European history, and likewise, that of Western
Civilization, is inextricably bound in Greco-Roman tradition.
This is primarily due to two series of events. First is the
Greco-Persian War, appropriately titled "The Battle for the
West" by historian Ernle Bradford, in which the Greek victory
over King Xerxes of the Persians firmly established the place of
Greece in the history of the Occident.1 The second was the Punic
Wars, a series of three wars fought between Rome and Carthage
which saw the emergence and permanence of Roman tradition in
Western Civilization.
This discussion will focus on the least-appreciated aspect
of the conflict between Rome and Carthage, the influence of sea
power on an essentially land-based war, the Second Punic War.
Despite this, we will discuss the First Punic War, as its result
is a key factor in influencing the outcome of the Second Punic
War. To briefly introduce the historical context, the First
Punic War was a series of naval battles fought for the control
of Sicily from 264-241 B.C. The Second Punic War, on the other
hand, was essentially a series of campaigns on land, from 218-
201 B.C., with little overt significance of naval matters. The
1 Ernle Bradford, Thermopylae: The Battle for the West (NY: Da Capo
Press, 1993).
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Third Punic War was a uneven match fought between 149-146 B.C.
that saw the ultimate destruction of Carthage.
Scholarly debate about the influence of sea power on the
Second Punic War is hardly an issue that has been seriously
academically attempted. Likewise, it seems particularly ripe as
a subject of further discussion, given the circumstances. Dutch
historian J.H. Thiel provides the most succinct understanding of
the reason the influence of sea power provokes an intellectual
call-to-arms:
The problem, what was the function and importance of
sea-power in the second Punic war, how far the Romans
during this war really ruled the waves, and if, so,
whether or not this fact decisively influenced the
course and result of the war as a whole, remains as
yet a question brlante, which is judged in the most
diverging ways and consequently cries for a thorough
discussion.2
Thiel briefly discusses these diverging views not only as an
introduction to his own work, but as a means of suggesting
further scholarly work on an issue that suffers from remarkable
neglect.3
Given the fact that the Second Punic War was a land-based
war fought primarily in Spain and the Italian peninsula, it
2 J.H. Thiel, Studies on the History of Roman Sea Power in Republican
Times (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1946), p. 32.3 Ibid., p. 33.
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might seem peculiar to suggest that sea power was a primary, if
not the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the war.
As Boris Rankov notes,"[t]he war at sea has to a certain extent
been seen as a sideshow," and thus it is not surprising to see
little historical attention paid to the influence of sea power
in this second engagement between Rome and Carthage from 218-201
B.C.4 Likewise, the military geniuses Hannibal and Scipio
Africanus and the historic land battles in which their armies
fought overshadow the significance of the decisive role of sea
power. This paper will seek to explain how the outcome of the
First Punic War, which resulted in decisive Roman sea power,
played an important role in the Second Punic War. Roman command
of the seas thus gave it an important tool in terms of a
"competitive advantage" against Carthage. The concept of
competitive advantage, as an analytic tool used as a means of
understanding the war's outcome, will be briefly discussed.
Furthermore, this paper will then seek to demonstrate that
Rome's survival was due to the exploitation of this competitive
advantage. Finally, it will conclude that Roman sea power was
in fact the decisive factor in rendering the outcome of the
Second Punic War.
4 Boris Rankov, "The Second Punic War at Sea," in The Second Punic War:
A Reappraisal. eds. Tim Cornell, Boris Rankov, and Philip Sabin (London:
Institute of Classical Studies, 1996), pp. 49-57.
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CARTHAGE
At the dawn of the third century B.C., Carthage possessed
"undisputed command at sea" in the western Mediterranean Sea.5
It should be little surprise that Carthage, as a colony of the
sea-faring Phoenicians, should take to the sea in the western
Mediterranean. As Arthur Shepard writes, "the Carthaginians
inherited and transmitted in full measure the Phoenician
propensity for a seafaring life and commercial adventure..."6
This seafaring life, combined with threats on all sides ("by the
hostile native tribes of Africa, by the Etruscans to the north,
and by the everpressing westward tide of Greek migration...")
forced Carthage "by sheer self-preservation to adopt a strong
military policy."7 The consolidation of Carthaginian naval
power took place between 550 B.C., when the Carthaginian king
Malchus invaded Sicily, and 500 B.C.8,9 Despite occasional
battles with the Greeks, Carthaginian command of the sea was not
seriously challenged for nearly two centuries.10 In 264 B.C.,
the inevitable clash between two growing empires, Carthage and
Rome, flared when both islands sought to control the island of
5
J.F. Lazenby, The First Punic War(Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 1996), p. 29.
6 Arthur MacCartney Shepard, Sea Power in Ancient History (Boston, MA:
Little, Brown. and Co., 1924), 131.7 Ibid.8 Ibid., p. 133.9 Lionel Casson, The Ancient Mariners (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1991), p. 143.10 Chester G. Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History(NY:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 54.
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Sicily. The result was the First Punic War (264-241 B.C.).
ROME
The Roman civilization is not one that any historian, past,
present, or future, will ever likely succeed in suggesting that
it was regarded as one of the worlds leading thalossocratic
powers. Despite centuries of Mediterranean dominance, Rome has
always been regarded, first and foremost, as a land-based
empire. The Dutch historian J.H. Thiel asserts:
that the Romans were born land-lubbers has much of a
truism and of course it is not my intention to
overthrow it. But even a truism may stand in some
need of elucidation, the rather, because by most
people it is thoughtlessly taken for granted: the
supposed land-lubberism of the Romans is not so
simple a matter as it looks and it fully deserves the
interest of the historian.11
What Thiel is suggesting is that, without questioning the
truism of Roman land-lubberism, it is still necessary to
understand and appreciate that as a matter of course every
nation which borders upon the sea is always of a mixed
character: it contains large groups of land-lubbers as well as
seafaring and waterside folk.12 Thus, the concept of Roman
11 Thiel, Studies, p. 1.12 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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land-lubberism can be properly appreciated as a true; however,
it must be rationalized as a simplistic notion upon which
further understanding can be achieved.
Roman sea power as the beginning of the third century B.C.
was negligible. At this period in its history, Rome did not
maintain a standing navy, preferring instead ex tempore
methods in times of war.13 Besides, Roman extension southward
had barely reached the southern shores of the Italian peninsula
and had not yet crossed over the short stretch of water to the
largely Greek and Carthaginian-controlled island of Sicily.
Rome only gained control of Tarentum in 272 B.C. and suppressed
the Sallentini and Messapii on Italy's "heel" as recently as 266
B.C.14 Therefore, it is not difficult to understand Romes
reason for such an ex tempore policy: Rome did not yet have
any significant overseas territories to defend. The beginning
of Romes entry onto the world stage began in 264 B.C., when the
Mamertimes (of Messana) looked to Rome and Carthage after being
defeated by Hiero and the Syracusans.15
THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
Before we can fully understand the influence of sea power
in the conflicts between Rome and Carthage, it is necessary to
13 Ibid., p. 16.14 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 38.15 T.A. Dorey and D.R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage (London: Secker &
Warburg, 1971), p. 1.
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depart momentarily from the historical context and move to
establish a firm grounding in a measure of effectiveness which
will help us to grasp the importance of sea power. The concept
of competitive advantage is one that is taken from business
applications, yet it does not exclude itself from elucidation as
a potential military concept. The most succinct understanding
of competitive advantage is Michael E. Porters The Competitive
Advantage of Nations.16 While Porters article is largely
geared toward explaining competitive advantage as a business
tool, the military net assessment community has embraced
competitive advantage as potential tool for military
applications and as a measure of effectiveness.
What is Competitive Advantage?
Competitive advantage is a concept which seeks to
demonstrate why some businesses (or nations or militaries) are
more prosperous than others. Based on a variety of situations,
environments, and responses, some businesses move forward while
others fall back. A competitive advantage is a national or
business superiority specific market, or industry. For example,
the Japanese ability to mass produce televisions and VCRs, or
the Swedish ability to anticipate concerns for product safety
16 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Harvard
Business Review, March-April 1990, pp. 73-93.
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(i.e. Volvo), could be considered competitive advantages.17
However, understanding this concept is only the first step in
taking advantage of its usefulness as a potential measure of
effectiveness.
The most important questions about competitive advantage
are: How is it achieved? How is it sustained?
Competitive advantage is achieved through innovation.
Perceiving new market opportunities, embracing technological
breakthroughs, or just finding new ways of doing old things are
good examples of acts of innovation.18 As Porter explains:
...innovation is the result of unusual effort. The
company that successfully implements a new or better
way of competing pursues its approach with dogged
determination, often in the face of harsh criticism
and tough obstacles. In fact, to succeed, innovation
usually requires pressure, necessity, and even
adversity: the fear of loss often proves more
powerful than the hope of gain.19 [Emphasis added]
As we will see, this adversity is precisely the key to Roman
innovation in the First Punic War. How is it sustained? The
only way to sustain a competitive advantage is to upgrade it
to move to more sophisticated types.20 In other words,
17 Ibid., pp. 74-75.18 Ibid.19 Ibid., p. 75.20 Ibid.
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competitive advantage can often be imitated therefore, the
competitive advantage of one time period may disappear quickly.
Only continuous effort and improvement, and ultimately upgrading
is the only way to maintain a competitive advantage.
The Diamond of National Advantage
The concept which we will use to understand how competitive
advantage is achieved is called the Diamond of National
Advantage. It seeks to demonstrate why innovation is possible.
As shown in the diagram, there are four components of the
diamond. First, factor conditions, the necessary infrastructure
to compete; demand conditions, demand for the product; related
and supporting industries, the presence or absence of related
industries; and finally firm strategy, structure, and rivalry.
Each point on the diamond - and the diamond as a system -
affects essential ingredients for achievingcompetitive
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success.21 As we will see shortly, this concept is well-suited
to describe the situation in which Rome was faced when the First
Punic War erupted.
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
A discussion about the influence of sea power on the Second
Punic War would be incomplete without a brief understanding of
the First Punic War. For, as T.A. Dorey and D.R. Dudley write,
"[t]he seeds of The Second Punic War were sown at the end of the
First."22 Furthermore, it is during the First Punic War that we
see Rome faced with adversity, a key ingredient to feed Roman
innovation.
Origins
Despite the growing power of both Carthage and Rome, J.F.
Lazenby notes that "relations between the two powers...seem to
have been reasonably cordial...as long as their interests did
not seriously clash."23 The two powers maintained a series of
treaties protecting each others' interests and spheres of
influence. However, the two expanding empires, clamoring for
Mediterranean supremacy, were bound to meet, literally, as Rome
expanded southward and Carthage solidified its hold on its
21 Ibid., p. 77.22 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, p. 29.23 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 35.
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Sicilian possessions.
These empires collided in the northeast Sicilian town of
Messana (Messina), occupied since the 280's by Campanian
mercenaries who called themselves the Mamertines.24 The
Syracusan tyrant Hiero attacked Messana, and the Mamertines
sought assistance from both Carthage and Rome.25 Carthage
immediately came to the aid of the Mamertines, placing a
garrison in Messana and sending ships to defend it.26,27 However,
Rome responded as well, crossing the strait and expelling the
Carthaginians.28 Carthage regarded this as a casus belli for
violating a treaty protecting its influence in Sicily. Polybius
disputes this, yet some modern scholars have supported the
Carthaginian claim.29
Innovation Discovered: The Corvus
For the first three years of the First Punic War, Rome had
little success against Carthage as a result of Carthaginian
strongholds on Sicily's western coast. With command of the sea,
Carthage was able to reinforce and resupply its troops and
fortifications in Sicily. Casson demonstrates the situation
Rome faced:
24 Ibid.25 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, pp. 54-55.26 Ibid., p. 55.27 Lazenby, The First Punic War, pp. 36-37.28 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 55.29 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, pp. 3-4.
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In 264 B.C. Rome's statesmen and generals faced a
dismaying reality: sooner or later they had to take
the plunge and create a navy; David had to fight
Goliath but not with a slingshot, with the giant's
own weapons.30 [Emphasis added]
The emphasized sentence illustrates the
strategy Rome would have to follow: first,
they would have to neutralized Carthaginian
control of the sea, which was clearly a
Carthaginian competitive advantage.
Secondly, to prevail Rome would have to
seize command of the seas and use it as an
offensive competitive advantage against
Carthage.31
The adversity which Rome faced was exactly what it needed
to spur an important innovation - the corvus. The corvus was a
boarding ramp which allowed Roman legionnaires to cross over to
an enemy ship and "turn a sea fight into a land fight..." 32 In
260 B.C. off the north shore of Sicily, the Roman commander
Caius Duilius routed the Carthaginians. In the next eight
years, a number of small engagements took place. But Rome, when
faced with adversity, achieved an important innovation which
30 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, p. 144.31 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, p. 8.32 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, p. 146.
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effectively neutralized Carthaginian competitive advantage in
sea power.33 Now Rome had to seize that advantage.
Seizing the Competitive Advantage
We return again to the Diamond of National Advantage to
understand how Rome captured the competitive advantage from
Carthage. The first attribute is factor conditions, or the
necessary infrastructure to compete against Carthage naval
mastery. In 260 B.C., the Roman Senate authorized the
construction of 120 vessels. With Greek and Syracusan allies,
Rome found the necessary resources to compete. The second
attribute is demand conditions; the Roman David facing the
Carthaginian naval giant provided the necessary demand for
achieving naval mastery. The third attribute is related and
supporting industries, of which Rome's naval allies Syracuse
(with a sizable navy) and Greek shipbuilders are roughly
comparable. Rome relied heavily on the loyalty of these allies
for their success.34 The fourth attribute is firm strategy,
structure, and rivalry. Given Rome's dedicated shipbuilding
program and the military rivalry they faced against Carthage, it
is not difficult to see how this attribute is easily met.
Rome's innovation in the corvus neutralized Carthaginian
sea power as a competitive advantage; a dedicated shipbuilding
33 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 28.34 Ibid., p. 163.
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program supported by the necessary conditions seized the
competitive advantage for themselves. "Each point on the
diamond - and the diamond as a system - affects essential
ingredients for achieving...success."35 Thus, the Diamond of
National Advantage provides an excellent tool to analyze how
Rome was able to effectively respond to Carthaginian command of
the seas. By 241 B.C. near the Aegates Islands:
the tables were now turned: the Romans had the better
ships and crews and, as usual, superior numbers (200
to 170)...Carthage, the ertswhile naval power, went
into the last round with old vessels and raw crews;
Rome, the nation of lubbers, ended with a navy of two
hundred of the finest war galleys afloat, manned by
veterans.36
Rome had seized command of the seas for
itself.37 Yet it remained until the next
conflict between Rome and Carthage for the
Romans to employ their newly-gained command
of the seas as an offensive competitive
advantage.
THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
Origins
35 Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, p. 77.36 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, p. 151.37 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 29.
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The end of the First Punic War was not so much a permanent
piece as is was an armistice agreed to when Hamilcar asked the
Roman consul Catulus for terms of peace. Hamilcar resisted a
number of "obnoxious conditions...declar[ing] he would rather
fight then accept [them]."38 The result was that Hamilcar
withdrew, having never been defeated.
Polybius identifies three main causes of the Second Punic
War. The first, as Dorey and Dudley explain, was "the attitude
of Hamilcar himself...he felt that if he could face the Romans
again on equal terms he would have little difficulty in
reversing the decision, and he was eager for an opportunity to
renew the struggle."39 The second cause was Rome's seizure in
238 B.C. of the island of Sardinia and the unjust demand of a
twelve hundred talent indemnity.40,41 The third was Carthaginian
conquests in Spain, which culminated in Hannibal's attack on the
Spanish town of Saguntum. Rome claimed Saguntum was under its
protection and later called Hannibal's siege a casus belli for
violating the peace treaty between Rome and Carthage, despite
the fact that the treaty contained no such clause and was not
even ratified by the Roman Senate or approved by the Roman
people.42 De Beer describes the famous scene which decided the
38 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, p. 26.39 Ibid., p. 29.40 Ibid., p. 30.41 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 174.42Sir Gavin de Beer, Hannibal: Challenging Rome's Supremacy(NY: The
Viking Press, 1969), p. 113.
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result of the dispute:
The Carthaginians then invited the Romans to state
what was really in their minds, and Quintus Fabius
Maximus gathered his toga into a fold over his chest,
saying, 'Here we bring you peace or war. Choose
which you prefer.' The Carthaginians replied thatthe Romans could choose. Fabius said 'War', and the
Carthaginians added 'So be it.' The Second Punic War
had been declared.43
Hannibals Route
Most written material about the Second Punic War focuses
primarily on the remarkable Alpine journey undertaken by
Hannibal and the subsequent land battles fought against Rome on
the Italian peninsula. Hannibal's routing of the Romans during
the battles at Lake Trasimene and Cannae, in particular, are
often the center of attention for most scholars. However,
little mention is made of the circumstances that precipitated
Hannibal's treacherous journey and the reasons why he chose this
route.
As we have seen, by the end of the First Punic War, Rome
had seized command of the sea away from the Carthaginians first
through the neutralization of superior Carthaginian naval
tactics (by means of the corvus) and secondly by developing
mastery of naval tactics themselves. When Carthage sued for
peace at the end of the First Punic War, its naval advantage was
gone: severe restrictions were put on future naval activity, and
they now had only about 50 ships as compared to Rome's 220
43 Ibid.
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quinqueremes.44,45 Thus, Carthage began the Second Punic War at a
considerable naval disadvantage.
When attention has been paid to Hannibal's choice of a
treacherous overland route as compared to a amphibious invasion,
scholars have divided themselves about the reasons why. Thiel
and Mayan both place a great deal of emphasis on the importance
of naval superiority not only in Hannibal's choice of the
overland route but also in the war's outcome.46,47 Casson reaches
the same conclusion, although less convincingly.48 Starr
contends that "the real explanation was of a different order,
not directly connected to sea power," and suggests along with de
Sanctis that it was due to the difficulty in transporting large
numbers of cavalry and elephants.49,50 Finally, Mommsen's History
of Rome proffers the dull explanation that Hannibal's reasons
were "not entirely obvious."51
The most plausible explanation, however, given the
evidence, is made by Rankov:
The naval strategy of the Second Punic War was, in
essence, determined by the control of a number of key
bases and coastlines. Possibly the most spectacular
44 Ibid., p. 88.45 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 58.46 Thiel, Studies, p. 186.47 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 3.48 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, p. 151.49 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 58.50 G. de Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1917) III.2,
12, in Rankov, "The Second Punic War at Sea," p. 52.51 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 3.
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example of this is the fact that Hannibal chose
to...invade Italy through the Alps, rather than...a
passage by sea. De Sanctis [and Starr] argued that
this choice was dictated by the Carthaginians'
inability to transport horses (and presumably
elephants) by sea, but this was rightly rejected by
Thiel on the grounds that they were able to do
precisely this on other occasions.52
The logical conclusion to Rankov's
elucidation of Hannibal's choice is that a
combination of factors were at play: not
only did sea power play an important role in
the choice of routes, but the lack of
control of key bases in Sicily and Sardinia
(which, of course, were lost in the naval
battles of the First Punic War) made
Hannibal's choice a fait accompli. The
results of successful naval warfare during
the First Punic War and the command of the
sea possessed by the Romans at the beginning
of the Second Punic War were the decisive
factors in forcing Hannibal to march by
land.
52 Rankov, "The Second Punic War at Sea," p. 52.
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The Roman Invasion
"In the spring of 204 B.C., Scipio [Africanus]
set sail from Lilybaeum with thirty thousand men and
landed near Utica at Promontorium Pulchrum west of Cap
Bon."53
In 204 B.C., Rome did to Carthage exactly what Carthage
wanted to do to Rome all along. Little doubt remains that,
would Carthage have been able to invade Rome from the sea and
provide Hannibal with a constant flow of reinforcements and
supplies, Rome would have fallen. Yet Roman command of the seas
and the seizure of important Sicilian ports allowed Scipio
Africanus to use Rome's competitive advantage in sea power,
gained in the First Punic War, against Carthage. Despite Rome's
command of the seas, this marked the first time that sea power
as a competitive advantage was effectively applied in an
offensive manner. Against Carthage's now-inferior fleet and
battle-weary troops, with supply lines from Sicily and recently
conquered Spain, Roman sea power as a competitive advantage
spelled impending doom for the Carthaginians.
The battle at Zama marked the first and only time Scipio
and Hannibal faced each other. For the first time, Hannibal was
at a considerable disadvantage in cavalry. After Hannibal's
53 de Beer, Hannibal, p. 280.
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cavalry was driven off by Masinissa's Numidian cavalry, Scipio
closed the gaps in his line. According to de Beer, "[t]he
fighting became desperate, and Laelius and Masinissa, having
driven the Carthaginian cavalry from the field, now came back
and charged into the flanks and read of the wreck of Hannibal's
army. The battle was irretrievably lost."54
T.A. Dorey and D.R. Dudley, in Rome Against Carthage,
provide a succinct explanation of how, despite the Carthaginian
defeat on land at Zama, other factors prevailed:
It may seem a paradox to assert that it was Roman
sea-power that defeated Hannibal. Those who fought
at Zama would scarcely agree. But it was respect for
Roman sea-power that conditioned his strategy of
invading Italy from Spain; it was Roman sea-power
that prevented adequate reinforcements from reaching
him in southern Italy; it was that same sea-power
that made it impossible for him to concert and
offensive against Rome with the power of Macedon.55
Finally, it was that same Roman sea power
which allowed Rome to invade northern Africa
and defeat Carthage.
THE THIRD PUNIC WAR
54 Ibid., p. 289.55 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, p. 152.
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Fifty-two years after the peace treaty of 201
B.C., the third war broke out between Rome and
Carthage. This time the contestants were unevenly
matched. Rome was by now the dominant power in the
Mediterranean world. Carthage commanded no more than
the resources of a powerful city state. Once war had
begun, a Roman victory was inevitable, and in the end
Carthage was totally destroyed.56
In 149 B.C., a Carthaginian army under the command of
Carthalo and Hasdrubal invaded Numidia, which violated the peace
treaty of 201 B.C. and gave the opportunity for Rome to
intervene militarily against Carthage and gain decisive control
of northern Africa. Rome took an army of 80,000 infantry and
4,000 cavalry, larger than any previous Roman invasion force.57
The result, of course, was a foregone conclusion. By 146 B.C.,
Rome had besieged Carthage and physically destroyed the city.
The result that is most important to us, of course, is the
sustained ability of Rome to use its dominant sea power across
the Mediterranean for invasion forces and resupply missions. It
would be stretching to conclude that sea power was the decisive
factor in this third and final conflict. Roman victory was
already assured before the war even began. However, the key
56 Ibid., p. 153.57 Ibid., p. 160.
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point is that certainly the influence of sea power was important
and hastened the ultimate collapse of Carthage.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper has been to explain, first of all,
how the outcome of the First Punic War, which resulted in
decisive Roman sea power, played an important role in the Second
Punic War. Command of the seas thus gave Rome an important tool
in terms of a "competitive advantage" against Carthage. The
concept of competitive advantage, as a means of understanding
the war's outcome, was explained and applied as tool of
analysis, or measure of effectiveness. Furthermore, this paper
sought to demonstrate that Rome's survival was due to the
exploitation of this competitive advantage.
The final conclusion of this paper is to resolve that
Roman sea power was in fact the decisive factor in rendering the
war's outcome. Based on Roman innovation in a time of crisis,
Rome gained an important tool (the corvus) which effectively
neutralized Carthaginian command of the sea for a time
sufficient to develop successful naval tactics. The result of
The First Punic War saw Rome seize command of the seas from
Carthage through the achievement of competitive advantage.
The Second Punic War demonstrated the influence of sea
power by understanding how Romes newly-gained competitive
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advantage was successfully applied to war-fighting. As it has
been shown, the choice of Hannibals route (and its subsequent
resupply missions) and Roman invasion of northern Africa were
directly linked to this competitive advantage. J.H. Thiel
suggests what the likely outcome would have been given
Carthaginian, rather than Roman, command of the seas. To quote
liberally (given the circumstances) seems appropriate:
For what would have been the end, if Carthage instead
of Rome had commanded the sea? In other words, if
Rome had not been able to launch an offensive in
Spain and consequently Hasdrubal had made his
appearance in Italy at the time of the battle of
Cannae instead of in 207, when it was too late, if at
the same time Philip had landed considerable forces
in Italy and Carthage had found ample opportunity of
providing Hannibal directly by sea with all he
wanted, and if - again last, but not least - she had
profited by her naval supremacy to wrest Sicily and
Sardinia from the Romans and starve Italy by doing
so? There is but one answer: Rome wouldnt have had
the slightest chance of winning the war, on the
contrary she would have lost it within half the time.
This means that in reality naval supremacy decisively
contributed to the Roman victory, though in a
somewhat latent way; the maxim that he wins who has
the sea is certainly applicable to this war.58
58 Thiel, Studies, p. 186.
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[Emphasis added]
The Third Punic War, as we have seen, was of little
military and/or naval importance given the lopsided nature of
the conflict. The result was the ultimate destruction of
Carthage.
Thiel was speaking directly about The Second Punic War.
But it is appropriate to extend his analysis to the Punic Wars
in general. Given the evidence, it can be reasonably concluded
that the influence of sea power as a competitive advantage was
the decisive factor in the struggle between Rome and Carthage.
The Greek victory over the Persians firmly established the place
of Greece in the history of Western civilization. The gallant
defense at Thermopylae, Bradfords Battle for the West,
defined this conflict. Likewise, the Roman triumph over the
Carthaginians did the same for Romes influence. It was defined
by influence of sea power as a competitive advantage,
particularly in The Second Punic War, which ultimately made this
possible.
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