TheIntelligenceTrap

WhySmartPeopleMakeStupidMistakes–andHowtoMakeWiserDecisions

DavidRobson

www.hodder.co.uk

Tomyparents,andtoRobert

ContentsIntroduction

Part1-Thedownsidesofintelligence1TheriseandfalloftheTermites2Entangledarguments3ThecurseofknowledgePart2-Escapingtheintelligencetrap4Moralalgebra5Youremotionalcompass6AbullshitdetectionkitPart3-Theartofsuccessfullearning7Tortoisesandhares8ThebenefitsofeatingbitterPart4-Thefollyandwisdomofthecrowd9Themakingsofa‘dreamteam’10StupidityspreadinglikewildfireEpilogueAppendix:TaxonomiesofStupidityandWisdomNotesAcknowledgementsPictureCredits

Introduction

Venture into thedarker recessesof the internet, andyoumaycomeacross theviewsofamannamedKary.Ifheistobebelieved,hehassomeuniqueinsightsthatcouldchangetheworldorder.1Hesuspectshewasabductedbyanaliennear theNavarroRiver,California,

forinstance,afterencounteringastrangebeingwhotooktheformofaglowingraccoon with ‘shifty black eyes’. He can’t actually remember what happened‘afterthelittlebastard’gavehima‘courteousgreeting’;therestofthenightisacompleteblank.Buthestronglysuspectsitinvolvedextra-terrestriallife.‘Therearealotofmysteriesinthevalley’,hewrites,cryptically.He’salsoadevotedfollowerofastrology.‘Most[scientists]areunderthefalse

impressionthat it isnon-scientificandnotafitsubjectfor theirseriousstudy’,hehuffs ina longrant.‘Theyaredeadwrong.’Hethinksit’s thekeytobettermental health treatment and everyone who disagrees has ‘their heads firmlyinserted in their asses’. Besides these beliefs in ET and star signs, Kary alsothinksthatpeoplecantravelthroughtheetherontheastralplane.ThingstakeadarkerturnwhenKarystartstalkingaboutpolitics.‘Someofthe

bigtruthsvotershaveacceptedhavelittleornoscientificbasis’,heclaims.Thisincludes ‘thebelief thatAIDS iscausedbyHIVvirus’and ‘thebelief that thereleaseofCFCsintotheatmospherehascreatedaholeintheozonelayer’.Needlesstosay,theseideasarealmostuniversallyacceptedbyscientists–but

Karytellshisreadersthattheyarejustoutformoney.‘TurnoffyourTV.Readyourelementarysciencetextbooks’,heimplores.‘Youneedtoknowwhattheyareupto.’IhopeIdon’thavetotellyouthatKaryiswrong.Thewebisfullofpeoplewithgroundlessopinions,ofcourse–butwedon’t

expect astrologersandAIDSdenialists to represent thepinnacleof intellectualachievement.YetKary’sfullnameisKaryMullis,andfarfrombeingyourstereotypically

ill-informedconspiracytheorist,heisaNobelPrize-winningscientist–placinghimalongsidethelikesofMarieCurie,AlbertEinsteinandFrancisCrick.Mullis was awarded the prize for his invention of the polymerase chain

reaction–atoolthatallowsscientiststocloneDNAinlargequantities.Theideaapparentlycametohimduringaflashof inspirationontheroadinMendocinoCounty, California, and many of the greatest achievements of the last few

decades–includingtheHumanGenomeProject–hingedonthatonemomentofpure brilliance.Thediscovery is so important that some scientists evendividebiologicalresearchintotwoeras–beforeandafterMullis.TherecanbelittledoubtthatMullis,whoholdsaPhDfromtheUniversityof

California,Berkeley,isincrediblyintelligent;hisinventioncanhaveonlycomefromalifetimededicatedtounderstandingtheextraordinarilycomplexprocessesinsideourcells.But could the same genius that allowed Mullis to make that astonishing

discoveryalsoexplainhisbeliefs inaliensandhisAIDSdenialism?Couldhisgreatintellecthavealsomadehimincrediblystupid?

Thisbookisaboutwhyintelligentpeopleactstupidly–andwhyinsomecasestheyareevenmoreprone toerror than theaverageperson. It isalsoabout thestrategies thatwecanall employ toavoid the samemistakes: lessons thatwillhelpanyonetothinkmorewiselyandrationallyinthispost-truthworld.Youdon’tneedtobeaNobelPrizewinnerforthistoapplytoyou.Although

wewilldiscoverthestoriesofpeoplelikeMullis,andPaulFrampton,abrilliantphysicist who was fooled into carrying two kilograms of cocaine across theArgentinianborder,andArthurConanDoyle,thefamedauthorwhofellfortwoteenagers’ scams, we will also see how the same flaws in thinking can leadanyoneofmorethanaverageintelligenceastray.Likemostpeople,Ioncebelievedthatintelligencewassynonymouswithgood

thinking. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, psychologists havemeasured a relatively small range of abstract skills – factual recall, analogicalreasoning and vocabulary – in the belief that they reflect an innate generalintelligencethatunderliesallkindsof learning,creativity,problemsolvinganddecision making. Education is then meant to build on that ‘raw’ brainpower,furnishinguswithmore specialised knowledge in the arts, the humanities andthesciencesthatwillalsobecrucialformanyprofessions.Thesmarteryouare–accordingtothesecriteria–themoreastuteyourjudgement.ButasIbeganworkingasasciencejournalist,specialisinginpsychologyand

neuroscience,Inoticedthelatestresearchwasrevealingsomeseriousproblemswith these assumptions. Not only do general intelligence and academiceducationfail toprotectusfromvariouscognitiveerrors;smartpeoplemaybeevenmorevulnerabletocertainkindsoffoolishthinking.Intelligentandeducatedpeoplearelesslikelytolearnfromtheirmistakes,for

instance,ortakeadvicefromothers.Andwhentheydoerr,theyarebetterable

tobuildelaborateargumentstojustifytheirreasoning,meaningthattheybecomemoreandmoredogmaticintheirviews.Worsestill,theyappeartohaveabigger‘biasblindspot’,meaningtheyarelessabletorecognisetheholesintheirlogic.Intrigued by these results, I began looking further afield. Management

scientists, for example, have charted the ways that poor corporate cultures –aimedtoincreaseproductivity–canamplifyirrationaldecisionmakinginsportsteams, businesses and government organisations. As a result, you can havewhole teams built of incredibly intelligent people, who nevertheless makeincrediblystupiddecisions.The consequences are serious. For the individual, these errors can influence

our health, wellbeing and professional success. In our courts it is leading toseriousmiscarriagesofjustice.Inhospitals,itmaybethereasonthat15percentof all diagnoses arewrong,withmore people dying from thesemistakes thandiseaseslikebreastcancer.Inbusiness,itleadstobankruptcyandruin.2The vast majority of these mistakes cannot be explained by a lack of

knowledge or experience; instead, they appear to arise from the particular,flawed mental habits that come with greater intelligence, education andprofessionalexpertise.Similarerrorscanleadspaceshipstocrash,stockmarketstoimplode,andworldleaderstoignoreglobalthreatslikeclimatechange.Although they may seem to be unconnected, I found that some common

processes underlie all these phenomena: a pattern that I will refer to as theintelligencetrap.3Perhaps the best analogy is a car. A faster engine can get you placesmore

quicklyifyouknowhowtouseitcorrectly.Butsimplyhavingmorehorsepowerwon’tguaranteethatyouwillarriveatyourdestinationsafely.Withouttherightknowledgeandequipment– thebrakes, thesteeringwheel, thespeedometer,acompassandagoodmap–afastenginemayjustleadtoyoudrivingincircles–orstraightintooncomingtraffic.Andthefastertheengine,themoredangerousyouare.Inexactlythesameway,intelligencecanhelpyoutolearnandrecallfacts,and

process complex information quickly, but you also need the necessary checksand balances to apply that brainpower correctly. Without them, greaterintelligencecanactuallymakeyoumorebiasedinyourthinking.Fortunately, besides outlining the intelligence trap, recent psychological

research has also started to identify those additional mental qualities that cankeep us on track. As one example, consider the following deceptively trivialquestion:

JackislookingatAnnebutAnneislookingatGeorge.JackismarriedbutGeorgeisnot.Isamarriedpersonlookingatanunmarriedperson?Yes,No,orCannotBeDetermined?

The correct answer is ‘yes’ – but the vast majority of people say ‘cannot bedetermined’.Don’tfeeldisheartenedifyoudidn’tinitiallygetit.ManyIvyLeaguestudents

getitwrong,andwhenIpublishedthistestinNewScientistmagazine,wehadanunprecedentednumberoflettersclaimingthattheanswerwasamistake.(Ifyoustillcan’tseethelogic,I’dsuggestdrawingadiagram,orseep.270.)Thetestmeasuresacharacteristicknownascognitivereflection,whichisthe

tendencytoquestionourownassumptionsandintuitions,andpeoplewhoscorebadly on this test are more susceptible to bogus conspiracy theories,misinformationandfakenews.(We’llexplorethissomemoreinChapter6.)Besidescognitivereflection,otherimportantcharacteristicsthatcanprotectus

from the intelligence trap include intellectual humility, actively open-mindedthinking, curiosity, refined emotional awareness and a growth mindset.Together, theykeepourmindson trackandpreventour thinkingfromveeringoffaproverbialcliff.This research has even led to the birth of a new discipline – the study of

‘evidence-basedwisdom’.Onceviewedwithscepticismbyotherscientists,thisfield has blossomed in recent years, with new tests of reasoning that betterpredict real-life decision-making than traditional measures of generalintelligence.Wearenowevenwitnessing thefoundationofnewinstitutions topromote this research – such as the Center for Practical Wisdom at theUniversityofChicago,whichopenedinJune2016.Althoughnoneofthesequalitiesaremeasuredonstandardacademictests,you

don’tneedtosacrificeanyofthebenefitsofhavinghighgeneralintelligencetocultivate these other thinking styles and reasoning strategies; they simply helpyoutoapplyyourintelligencemorewisely.Andunlikeintelligence,theycanbetrained.WhateveryourIQ,youcanlearntothinkmorewisely.

This cutting-edge science has a strong philosophical pedigree. An earlydiscussionoftheintelligencetrapcanevenbefoundatSocrates’trialin399bc.According to Plato’s account, Socrates’ accusers claimed that he had been

corrupting Athenian youth with evil ‘impious’ ideas. Socrates denied thecharges,andinsteadexplainedtheoriginsofhisreputationforwisdom–andthejealousybehindtheaccusations.Itstarted,hesaid,whentheOracleofDelphideclaredthattherewasnoonein

AthenswhowaswiserthanSocrates.‘Whatcanthegodbesaying?It’sariddle:whatcanitmean?’Socratesaskedhimself.‘I’venoknowledgeofmybeingwiseinanyrespect,greatorsmall.’Socrates’ solution was to wander the city, seeking out the most respected

politicians,poetsandartisanstoprovetheoraclewrong–buteachtime,hewasdisappointed.‘Becausetheywereaccomplishedinpractisingtheirskill,eachoneofthemclaimedtobewisestaboutotherthingstoo:themostimportantonesatthat – and this error of theirs seemed to me to obscure the wisdom they didpossess...‘Thosewiththegreatestreputations,’headded,‘seemedtomepracticallythe

most deficient, while others who were supposedly inferior seemed betterendowedwhenitcametogoodsense.’His conclusion is something of a paradox: he is wise precisely because he

recognised the limits of his own knowledge. The jury found him guiltynonetheless,andhewassentencedtodeath.4Theparallelswiththerecentscientificresearcharestriking.ReplaceSocrates’

politicians,poetsandartisanswith today’sengineers,bankersanddoctors,andhis trial almost perfectly captures the blind spots that psychologists are nowdiscovering.(AndlikeSocrates’accusers,manymodernexpertsdonotliketheirflawsbeingexposed.)But as prescient as they are, Socrates’ descriptions don’t quite do the new

findings justice.Afterall,noneof the researcherswoulddeny that intelligenceandeducationareessentialforgoodthinking.Theproblemisthatweoftendon’tusethatbrainpowercorrectly.For this reason, it is René Descartes who comes closest to the modern

understandingoftheintelligencetrap.‘Itisnotenoughtopossessagoodmind;themost important thingis toapply itcorrectly’,hewrote inhisDiscourseontheMethodin1637.‘Thegreatestmindsarecapableofthegreatestvicesaswellasthegreatestvirtues;thosewhogoforwardbutveryslowlycangetfurther,iftheyalwaysfollowtherightroad,thanthosewhoareintoomuchofahurryandstrayoffit.’5Thelatestscienceallowsustomovefarbeyondthesephilosophicalmusings,

with well-designed experiments demonstrating the precise reasons that

intelligencecanbeablessingandacurse,andthespecificwaystoavoidthosetraps.

Beforewebeginthisjourney,letmeofferadisclaimer:thereismuchexcellentscientific research on the theme of intelligence that doesn’t find a place here.Angela Duckworth at the University of Pennsylvania, for instance, hascompletedground-breakingworkontheconceptof‘grit’,whichshedefinesasour ‘perseverance and passion for long-term goals’, and she has repeatedlyshownthathermeasuresofgritcanoftenpredictachievementbetterthanIQ.It’sa hugely important theory, but it’s not clear that it could solve the particularbiasesthatappeartobeexaggeratedwithintelligence;nordoesitfallunderthemore general umbrella of evidence-based wisdom that guides much of myargument.WhenwritingTheIntelligenceTrap,I’verestrictedmyself tothreeparticular

questions.Whydo smart people act stupidly?What skills anddispositions aretheymissing thatcanexplain thesemistakes?Andhowcanwecultivate thosequalities to protect us from those errors?And I have examined them at everylevelofsociety,startingwiththeindividualandendingwiththeerrorsplaguinghugeorganisations.Part 1 defines the problem. It explores the flaws in our understanding of

intelligence and the ways that even the brightest minds can backfire – fromArthurConanDoyle’sdoggedbeliefsinfairiestotheFBI’sflawedinvestigationinto the Madrid bombings of 2004 – and the reasons that knowledge andexpertiseonlyexaggeratethoseerrors.Part2presentssolutions to theseproblemsbyintroducingthenewdiscipline

of ‘evidence-based wisdom’, which outlines those other thinking dispositionsand cognitive abilities that are crucial for good reasoning,while also offeringsome practical techniques to cultivate them.Along theway, wewill discoverwhyour intuitionsoften fail and thewayswecancorrect thoseerrors to fine-tuneour instincts.Wewillalsoexplorestrategies toavoidmisinformationandfakenews,sothatwecanbesurethatourchoicesarebasedonsolidevidenceratherthanwishfulthinking.Part3turnstothescienceoflearningandmemory.Despitetheirbrainpower,

intelligentpeoplesometimesstruggletolearnwell,reachingakindofplateauintheirabilitiesthatfailstoreflecttheirpotential.Evidence-basedwisdomcanhelpto break that vicious cycle, offering three rules for deep learning. Besideshelping us to meet our own personal goals, this cutting-edge research also

explainswhyEastAsianeducationsystemsarealreadysosuccessfulatapplyingtheseprinciples,andthelessonsthatWesternschoolingcanlearnfromthemtoproducebetterlearnersandwiserthinkers.Finally,Part4expandsourfocusbeyondtheindividual,toexplorethereasons

thattalentedgroupsactstupidly–fromthefailingsoftheEnglandfootballteamtothecrisesofhugeorganisationslikeBP,NokiaandNASA.Thegreatnineteenth-centurypsychologistWilliamJamesreportedlysaidthat

‘agreatmanypeoplethinktheyarethinkingwhentheyaremerelyrearrangingtheir prejudices’. The Intelligence Trap is written for anyone, like me, whowants to escape thatmistake – a user’s guide to both the science, and art, ofwisdom.

PART1

Thedownsidesofintelligence:HowahighIQ,educationandexpertisecan

fuelstupidity

1

TheriseandfalloftheTermites:Whatintelligenceis–andwhatitisnot

Astheynervouslysatdownfortheirtests,thechildreninLewisTerman’sstudycan’thaveimaginedthattheirresultswouldforeverchangetheirlives–orworldhistory.*Yeteach,intheirownway,wouldcometobedefinedbytheiranswers,forgoodandbad,andtheirowntrajectorieswouldpermanentlychangethewayweunderstandthehumanmind.*Thestoriesofthefollowingfourchildrenaretoldinmuchgreaterdetail,alongwiththelivesoftheother‘Termites’,inShurkin,J.(1992),Terman’sKids:TheGroundbreakingStudyofHowtheGiftedGrowUp,Boston,MA:Little,Brown.OneofthebrightestwasSaraAnn,asix-year-oldwithagapbetweenherfront

teeth, and thick spectacles.When she had finished scrawling her answers, shecasuallyleftagumdropinbetweenherpapers–asmallbribe,perhaps,fortheexaminer. She giggled when the scientist asked her whether ‘the fairies’ haddropped it there. ‘A little girl gave me two,’ she explained sweetly. ‘But IbelievetwowouldbebadformydigestionbecauseIamjustwellfromtheflunow.’ShehadanIQof192–attheverytopofthespectrum.6JoiningherintheintellectualstratospherewasBeatrice,aprecociouslittlegirl

whobeganwalkingandtalkingatsevenmonths.Shehadread1,400booksbytheageof ten,andherownpoemswereapparentlysomature thata localSanFrancisco newspaper claimed they had ‘completely fooled an English class atStanford’,whomistookthemfortheworksofTennyson.LikeSaraAnn,herIQwas192.7Then there was eight-year-old Shelley Smith – ‘a winsome child, loved by

everyone’; her face apparently glowed with suppressed fun.8 And JessOppenheimer – ‘a conceited, egocentric boy’ who struggled to communicatewithothersand lackedanysenseofhumour.9Their IQshoveredaround140–just enough tomake it intoTerman’s set,but still far aboveaverage, and they

weresurelydestinedforgreatthings.Uptothatpoint,theIQtest–stillarelativelynewinvention–hadbeenused

mostly to identify people with learning difficulties. But Terman stronglybelievedthatthesefewabstractandacademictraits–suchasmemoryforfacts,vocabulary, and spatial reasoning skills – represent an innate ‘generalintelligence’ that underlies all your thinking abilities. Irrespective of yourbackgroundoreducation, this largely innate trait representedarawbrainpowerthatwould determine how easily you learn, understand complex concepts andsolveproblems.‘ThereisnothingaboutanindividualasimportantashisIQ,’hedeclaredatthe

time.10‘Itisofthehighest25%ofourpopulation,andmoreespeciallytothetop5%,thatwemust lookfor theproductionof leaderswhowilladvancescience,art,government,education,andsocialwelfaregenerally.’By tracking the course of their lives over the subsequent decades, he hoped

thatSaraAnn,Beatrice,JessandShelleyandtheother‘Termites’weregoingtoprove his point, predicting their success at school and university, their careersand income, and their health and wellbeing; he even believed that IQ wouldpredicttheirmoralcharacter.The results of Terman’s studies would permanently establish the use of

standardised testing across the world. And although many schools do notexplicitlyuseTerman’s exam to screenchildren today,muchofour educationstillrevolvesaroundthecultivationofthatnarrowbandofskillsrepresentedinhisoriginaltest.Ifwearetoexplainwhysmartpeopleactfoolishly,wemustfirstunderstand

how we came to define intelligence in this way, the abilities this definitioncaptures, and some crucial aspects of thinking that it misses – skills that areequallyessential forcreativityandpragmaticproblemsolving,butwhichhavebeencompletelyneglectedinoureducationsystem.Onlythencanwebegintocontemplatetheoriginsoftheintelligencetrap–andthewaysitmightalsobesolved.We shall see thatmany of these blind spotswere apparent to contemporary

researchers as Terman set about his tests, and theywould become evenmoreevidentinthetriumphsandfailuresofBeatrice,Shelley,Jess,SaraAnn,andthemany other ‘Termites’, as their lives unfolded in sometimes dramaticallyunexpectedways.ButthankstotheenduranceofIQ,weareonlyjustgettingtogripswithwhatthismeansandtheimplicationsforourdecisionmaking.Indeed, the story of Terman’s own life reveals how a great intellect could

backfirecatastrophically,thankstoarrogance,prejudice–andlove.

As with many great (if misguided) ideas, the germs of this understanding ofintelligenceemergedinthescientist’schildhood.Terman grew up in rural Indiana in the early 1880s. Attending a ‘little red

schoolhouse’,asingleroomwithnobooks,thequiet,red-headedboywouldsitand quietly observe his fellow pupils. Thosewho earned his scorn included a‘backward’ albino child who would only play with his sister, and a ‘feeble-minded’ eighteen-year-old still struggling to grasp the alphabet. Anotherplaymate,‘animaginativeliar’,wouldgoontobecomeaninfamousserialkiller,Termanlaterclaimed–thoughheneversaidwhichone.11Terman,however,knewhewasdifferent from the incuriouschildrenaround

him.Hehadbeenabletoreadbeforeheenteredthatbooklessschoolroom,andwithinthefirsttermtheteacherhadallowedhimtoskipaheadandstudythird-gradelessons.Hisintellectualsuperioritywasonlyconfirmedwhenatravellingsalesman visited the family farm. Finding a somewhat bookish household, hedecided to pitch a volume on phrenology. To demonstrate the theories itcontained, he sat with the Terman children around the fireside and beganexamining their scalps.Theshapeof theboneunderneath,heexplained,couldreveal their virtues and vices. Something about the lumps and bumps beneathyoung Lewis’s thick ginger locks seemed to have particularly impressed him.Thisboy,hepredicted,wouldachieve‘greatthings’.‘Ithinkthepredictionprobablyaddedalittletomyself-confidenceandcaused

metostriveforamoreambitiousgoalthanImightotherwisehaveset’,Termanlaterwrote.12BythetimehewasacceptedforaprestigiouspositionatStanfordUniversity

in1910,Termanwouldlonghaveknownthatphrenologywasapseudoscience;therewasnothinginthelumpsofhisskullthatcouldreflecthisabilities.Buthestill had the strong suspicion that intelligence was some kind of innatecharacteristicthatwouldmarkoutyourpathinlife,andhehadnowfoundanewyardsticktomeasurethedifferencebetweenthe‘feeble-minded’andthe‘gifted’.The object of Terman’s fascinationwas a test developed byAlfredBinet, a

celebratedpsychologistinfindesiècleParis.InlinewiththeFrenchRepublic’sprincipleofégalitéamongallcitizens, thegovernmenthadrecently introducedcompulsoryeducationforallchildrenbetweentheagesofsixandthirteen.Somechildrensimplyfailedtorespondtotheopportunity,however,andtheMinistryof Public Instruction faced a dilemma. Should these ‘imbeciles’ be educated

separatelywithin the school?Or should they bemoved to asylums? TogetherwithThéodoreSimon,Binetinventedatestthatwouldhelpteacherstomeasureachild’sprogressandadjusttheireducationaccordingly.13Toamodern reader, someof thequestionsmay seem rather absurd.Asone

testofvocabulary,Binetaskedchildrentoexaminedrawingsofwomen’sfacesand judge which was ‘prettier’ (see image below). But many of the taskscertainlydidreflectcrucialskillsthatwouldbeessentialfortheirsuccessinlaterlife.Binetwouldreciteastringofnumbersorwords,forexample,andthechildhadtorecalltheminthecorrectordertotesttheirshort-termmemory.Anotherquestionwouldaskthemtoformasentencewiththreegivenwords–atestoftheirverbalprowess.

Binet himselfwas under no illusions that his test captured the full breadth of‘intelligence’;hebelievedour‘mentalworth’wassimply tooamorphous tobemeasuredona single scaleandhebaulkedat the idea that a lowscore shouldcometodefineachild’sfutureopportunities,believingthatitcouldbemalleableacrossthelifetime.14‘Wemustprotestandreactagainstthisbrutalpessimism,’hewrote;‘wemusttrytoshowthatitisfoundedonnothing.’15But other psychologists, including Terman, were already embracing the

concept of ‘general intelligence’ – the idea that there is some kind ofmental‘energy’serving thebrain,whichcanexplainyourperformance inallkindsofproblemsolvingandacademiclearning.16Ifyouarequickeratmentalarithmetic,for instance,youarealsomore likely tobeable to readwelland to rememberfactsbetter.TermanbelievedthattheIQtestwouldcapturethatrawbrainpower,predetermined by our heredity, and that it could then predict your overallachievementinmanydifferenttasksthroughoutlife.17And so he set about revising an English-language version of Binet’s test,

adding questions and expanding the exam for older children and adults, withquestionssuchas:If2pencilscost5cents,howmanypencilscanyoubuyfor50cents?

And:Whatisthedifferencebetweenlazinessandidleness?

Besides revising the questions, Terman also changed the way the result wasexpressed, using a simple formula that is still used today. Given that olderchildrenwoulddobetterthanyoungerchildren,Termanfirstfoundtheaveragescore foreachage.Fromthese tables,youcouldassessachild’s ‘mentalage’,which,whendividedby their actual age andmultipliedby100, revealed their‘intelligence quotient’. A ten-year-old thinking like a fifteen-year-old wouldhave an IQ of 150; a ten-year-old thinking like a nine-year-old, in contrast,wouldhaveanIQof90.Atallages,theaveragewouldbe100.*

* For adults, who, at least according to the theory of general intelligence, have stopped developingintellectually, IQ is calculated slightly differently. Your score reflects not your ‘mental age’ but yourpositiononthefamous‘bellcurve’.AnIQof145,forinstance,suggestsyouareinthetop2percentofthepopulation.Many of Terman’s motives were noble: he wanted to offer an empirical

foundation to the educational system so that teaching could be tailored to achild’sability.Butevenatthetest’sconception,therewasanunsavourystreakinTerman’sthinking,asheenvisagedakindofsocialengineeringbasedonthescores.Havingprofiledasmallgroupof‘hoboes’,forinstance,hebelievedtheIQtestcouldbeusedtoseparatedelinquentsfromsociety,beforetheyhadevencommitted a crime.18 ‘Morality’, he wrote, ‘cannot flower and fruit ifintelligenceremainsinfantile.’19

Thankfully Terman never realised these plans, but his research caught theattentionoftheUSArmyduringtheFirstWorldWar,andtheyusedhisteststoassess1.75millionsoldiers.Thebrightestweresentstraighttoofficertraining,while the weakest were dismissed from the army or consigned to a labourbattalion. Many observers believed that the strategy greatly improved therecruitmentprocess.Carriedby thewindof thissuccess,Termansetabout theproject thatwould

dominate the rest of his life: a vast survey of California’smost gifted pupils.Beginning in 1920, his team set about identifying the crème de la crème ofCalifornia’s biggest cities. Teachers were encouraged to put forward theirbrightestpupils,andTerman’sassistantswouldthentesttheirIQs,selectingonlythose children whose scores surpassed 140 (though they later lowered thethresholdto135).Assumingthatintelligencewasinherited,histeamalsotestedthese children’s siblings, allowing them to quickly establish a large cohort ofmorethanathousandgiftedchildrenintotal–includingJess,Shelley,BeatriceandSaraAnn.Overthenextfewdecades,Terman’steamcontinuedtofollowtheprogressof

thesechildren,whoaffectionatelyreferredtothemselvesasthe‘Termites’,andtheirstorieswouldcometodefinethewaywejudgegeniusforalmostacentury.TermiteswhostoodoutincludethenuclearphysicistNorrisBradbury;DouglasMcGlashanKelley,whoservedasaprisonpsychiatristintheNurembergtrials;and the playwright Lilith James. By 1959, more than thirty had made it intoWho’s Who in America, and nearly eighty were listed in American Men ofScience.20NotalltheTermitesachievedgreatacademicsuccess,butmanyshoneintheir

respective careers nonetheless. Consider Shelley Smith – ‘the winsome child,loved by everyone’. After dropping out of Stanford University, she forged acareerasaresearcherandreporteratLifemagazine,whereshemetandmarriedthe photographer Carl Mydans.21 Together they travelled around Europe andAsia reporting on political tensions in the build-up to theSecondWorldWar;shewouldlaterrecalldaysrunningthroughforeignstreetsinakindofreverieatthesightsandsoundsshewasabletocapture.22Jess Oppenheimer, meanwhile – the ‘conceited, egocentric child’ with ‘no

senseofhumour’–eventuallybecameawriterforFredAstaire’sradioshow.23Soonhewasearningsuchvastsumsthathefoundithardnottogigglewhenhementioned his own salary.24 His luck would only improve when he met thecomedianLucilleBall,andtogethertheyproducedthehitTVshowILoveLucy.

In between the scriptwriting, he tinkeredwith the technology of film-making,filingapatentfortheteleprompterstillusedbynewsanchorstoday.Those triumphs certainly bolster the idea of general intelligence; Terman’s

testsmayhaveonly examined academic abilities, but theydid indeed seem toreflectakindof‘raw’underlyingbrainpowerthathelpedthesechildrentolearnnew ideas, solveproblemsand thinkcreatively, allowing them to live fulfilledandsuccessfullivesregardlessofthepaththeychose.AndTerman’sstudiessoonconvincedothereducators.In1930,hehadargued

that ‘mental testing will develop to a lusty maturity within the next halfcentury...withinafewscoreyearsschoolchildrenfromthekindergartentotheuniversitywillbesubjectedtoseveraltimesasmanyhoursoftestingaswouldnowbethoughtreasonable’.25Hewasright,andmanynewiterationsofhistestwouldfollowinthesubsequentdecades.Besides examining vocabulary and numerical reasoning, the later tests also

includedmoresophisticatednon-verbalconundrums,suchasthequadrantonthefollowingpage.Theanswer reliesonyoubeingable to thinkabstractlyandsee thecommon

ruleunderlying theprogressionof shapes–which is surely reflectiveof somekind of advanced processing ability. Again, according to the idea of generalintelligence,thesekindsofabstractreasoningskillsaremeanttorepresentakindof‘rawbrainpower’–irrespectiveofyourspecificeducation–thatunderliesallourthinking.Our education may teach us specialised knowledge in many different

disciplines, but each subject ultimately relies on those more basic skills inabstractthinking.

Whatpatterncompletesthisquadrant?

Attheheightofitspopularity,mostpupilsintheUSandtheUKweresortedaccording to IQ.Today, theuseof the test toscreenyoungschoolchildrenhasfallenoutoffashion,butitsinfluencecanstillbefeltthroughouteducationandtheworkplace.IntheUSA,forinstance,theScholasticAptitudeTest(SAT)usedforcollege

admissionswasdirectly inspiredbyTerman’swork in the1920s.The styleofquestioningmay be different today, but such tests still capture the same basicabilities to remember facts, followabstract rules, build a largevocabulary andspotpatterns,leadingsomepsychologiststodescribethemasIQtestsbyproxy.Thesameistrueformanyschoolanduniversityentranceexamsandemployee

recruitment tests – such as Graduate Record Examinations (GREs) and theWonderlicPersonnelTestusedforselectingcandidatesintheworkplace.Itisasign of Terman’s huge influence that even quarterbacks in the US NationalFootballLeaguetaketheWonderlictestduringrecruitment,basedonthetheorythatgreaterintelligencewillimprovetheplayers’strategicabilitiesonthefield.This isnot just aWesternphenomenon.26Standardised tests, inspiredby IQ,

canbefoundineverycorneroftheglobeandinsomecountries–mostnotablyIndia,SouthKorea,HongKong,Singapore andTaiwan– awhole industryof‘cramschools’hasgrownuptocoachstudentsforexamsliketheGREthatarenecessary to enter themostprestigiousuniversities.27 (Togivean ideaof theirimportance,inIndiaalonethesecramschoolsareworth$6.4billionannually.)Justasimportantastheexamsthemselves,however,isthelingeringinfluence

ofthesetheoriesonourattitudes.EvenifyouarescepticaloftheIQtest,manypeoplestillbelieve that thoseabstract reasoningskills, socrucial foracademicsuccess, represent an underlying intelligence that automatically translates tobetterjudgementanddecisionmakingacrosslife–atwork,athome,infinanceor in politics. We assume that greater intelligence means that you areautomatically better equipped to evaluate factual evidence before coming to aconclusion, for instance; it’s thereasonwefind thebizarreconspiracy theoriesofsomeonelikeKaryMullistobeworthyofcomment.Whenwe do pay lip service to other kinds of decisionmaking that are not

measuredinintelligencetests,wetendtousefuzzyconceptslike‘lifeskills’thatareimpossibletomeasureprecisely,andweassumethattheymostlycometousthrough osmosis, without deliberate training. Most of us certainly haven’tdevotedthesametimeandefforttodevelopthemaswedidtoabstractthinkingandreasoningineducation.Sincemostacademictestsaretimedandrequirequickthinking,wehavealso

been taught that the speed of our reasoning marks the quality of our minds;hesitationandindecisionareundesirable,andanycognitivedifficultyisasignofourownfailings.Byandlarge,werespectpeoplewhothinkandactquickly,andtobe‘slow’issimplyasynonymforbeingstupid.Aswe shall see in the following chapters, these are allmisconceptions, and

correcting themwillbeessential ifweare to findwaysoutof the intelligencetrap.

Before we examine the limits of the theory of general intelligence, and thethinking styles and abilities that it fails to capture, let’s be clear: mostpsychologists agree that these measures – be they IQ, SATs, GREs, orWonderlicscores–doreflectsomethingveryimportantaboutthemind’sabilitytolearnandprocesscomplexinformation.Unsurprisingly,giventhattheyweredevelopedpreciselyforthisreason,these

scoresarebestatpredictinghowwellyoudoatschoolanduniversity,buttheyarealsomodestlysuccessfulatpredictingyourcareerpathaftereducation.Thecapacity to juggle complex information will mean that you find complexmathematical or scientific concepts easier to understand and remember; thatcapacity tounderstandandrememberdifficultconceptsmightalsohelpyou tobuildastrongerargumentinahistoryessay.Particularly if you want to enter fields such as law, medicine or computer

programmingthatwilldemandadvancedlearningandabstractreasoning,greatergeneral intelligence is undoubtedly an advantage. Perhaps because of thesocioeconomicsuccessthatcomeswithawhite-collarcareer,peoplewhoscorehigheronintelligenceteststendtoenjoybetterhealthandlivelongerasaresult,too.Neuroscientists have also identified some of the anatomical differences that

mightaccountforgreatergeneralintelligence.28Thebark-likecerebralcortexisthicker andmore wrinkled in more intelligent people, for example, and thesealso tend to have bigger brains overall.29 And the long-distance neuralconnectionslinkingdifferentbrainregions(called‘whitematter’,sincetheyarecoated in a fatty sheath) appear to be wired differently too, forging moreefficientnetworks for the transmissionof signals.30Together, thesedifferencesmay contribute to faster processing and greater short-term and long-termmemorycapacitythatshouldmakeiteasiertoseepatternsandprocesscomplexinformation.It would be foolish to deny the value of these results and the undoubtedly

importantrolethatintelligenceplaysinourlives.Theproblemscomewhenweplace toomuch faith in thosemeasures’ capacity to represent someone’s totalintellectual potential31 without recognising the variation in behaviour andperformancethatcannotbeaccountedforbythesescores.32Ifyouconsidersurveysoflawyers,accountantsorengineers,forinstance,the

average IQmay lie around 125 – showing that intelligence does give you anadvantage.Butthescorescoveraconsiderablerange,betweenaround95(belowaverage)and157(Termiteterritory).33Andwhenyoucomparetheindividuals’successinthoseprofessions,thosedifferentscorescan,attheverymost,accountforaround29percentofthevarianceinperformance,asmeasuredbymanagers’ratings.34 That is certainly a very significant chunk, but even if you take intoaccountfactorssuchasmotivation,itstillleavesavastrangeinperformancethatcannotbeaccountedforbytheirintelligence.35Foranycareer, thereareplentyofpeopleof lowerIQwhooutperformthose

withmuchhigherscores,andpeoplewithgreater intelligencewhodon’tmakethemostoftheirbrainpower,confirmingthatqualitiessuchascreativityorwiseprofessional judgement just can’t be accounted for by that one number alone.‘It’sabit likebeing tallandplayingbasketball,’DavidPerkinsof theHarvardGraduateSchoolofEducationtoldme.Ifyoudon’tmeetaverybasicthreshold,youwon’tgetfar,butbeyondthatpointotherfactorstakeover,hesays.Binethadwarnedusofthisfact,andifyoulookcloselyatthedata,thiswas

apparent in the lives of the Termites.As a group, theywere quite a bitmoresuccessfulthantheaverageAmerican,butavastnumberdidnotmanagetofulfiltheir ambitions. The psychologist David Henry Feldman has examined thecareersof the twenty-sixbrightestTermites,eachofwhomhada stratosphericIQ score of more than 180. Feldman was expecting to find each of thesegeniusestohavesurpassedtheirpeers,yetjustfourhadreachedahighlevelofprofessional distinction (becoming, for example, a judge or a highly honouredarchitect);asagroup,theywereonlyslightlymoresuccessfulthanthosescoring30?40pointsfewer.36ConsiderBeatriceandSaraAnn–thetwoprecociousyounggirlswithIQsof

192 whom we met at the start of this chapter. Beatrice dreamed of being asculptor and writer, but ended up dabbling in real estate with her husband’smoney–a starkcontrast to thecareerofOppenheimer,whohadscoredat thelower endof the group.37 SaraAnn,meanwhile, earned aPhD, but apparentlyfoundithardtoconcentrateonhercareer;byherfiftiesshewaslivingasemi-nomadic life, moving from friend’s house to friend’s house, and briefly, in a

commune. ‘I think Iwasmade, as a child, to be far too self-conscious ofmystatusasa“Termite”...andgivenfartoolittletoactuallydowiththismentalendowment’,shelaterwrote.38Wecan’tneglect thepossibility thatafewof theTermitesmayhavemadea

consciousdecisionnottopursueahigh-flying(andpotentiallystressful)career,butifgeneralintelligencereallywereasimportantasTermaninitiallybelieved,youmighthavehopedformoreofthemtohavereachedgreatscientific,artisticor political success.39 ‘When we recall Terman’s early optimism about hissubjects’potential...thereisthedisappointingsensethattheymighthavedonemorewiththeirlives,’Feldmanconcluded.

The interpretation of general intelligence as an all-powerful problem-solving-and-learningabilityalsohastocontendwiththeFlynnEffect–amysteriousriseinIQoverthelastfewdecades.To findoutmore, ImetFlynnat his son’shouse inOxford,duringa flying

visit from his home in New Zealand.40 Flynn is now a towering figure inintelligence research, but itwas onlymeant to be a short distraction, he says:‘I’mamoralphilosopherwhodabbles inpsychology.AndbydabblingImeanit’stakenoverhalfmytimeforthepastthirtyyears.’Flynn’sinterestinIQbeganwhenhecameacrosstroublingclaimsthatcertain

racial groups are inherently less intelligent. He suspected that environmentaleffects would explain the differences in IQ scores: richer and more educatedfamilieswillhaveabiggervocabulary,forinstance,meaningthattheirchildrenperformbetterintheverbalpartsofthetest.Asheanalysedthevariousstudies,however,hecameacrosssomethingeven

morepuzzling: intelligence– forall races–appeared tohavebeen risingoverthedecades.Psychologistshadbeenslowlyaccountingforthisbyraisingthebaroftheexam–youhadtoanswermorequestionscorrectlytobegiventhesameIQ score. But if you compare the raw data, the jump is remarkable, theequivalent of around thirty points over the last eighty years. ‘I thought, “Whyaren’tpsychologistsdancinginthestreetoverthis?Whatthehellisgoingon?”’hetoldme.Psychologists who believed that intelligence was largely inherited were

dumbfounded.Bycomparing the IQ scoresof siblings and strangers, theyhadestimatedthatgeneticscouldexplainaround70percentofthevariationbetweendifferent people. But genetic evolution is slow: our genes could not possiblyhavechangedquicklyenoughtoproducethegreatgainsinIQscorethatFlynn

wasobserving.Flynn instead argues that we need to consider the large changes in society.

EventhoughwearenotschooledinIQtestsexplicitly,wehavebeentaughttoseepatternsandthinkinsymbolsandcategoriesfromayoungage.Justthinkoftheelementaryschool lessonsthat leadustoconsider thedifferentbranchesofthetreeoflife,thedifferentelementsandtheforcesofnature.Themorechildrenare exposed to these ‘scientific spectacles’, the easier they find it to think inabstracttermsmoregenerally,Flynnsuggests,leadingtoasteadyriseinIQovertime.OurmindshavebeenforgedinTerman’simage.41Other psychologists were sceptical at first. But the Flynn Effect has been

documented across Europe, Asia, the Middle East and South America (seebelow) – anywhere undergoing industrialisation andWestern-style educationalreforms. The results suggest that general intelligence depends on theway ourgenes interactwith the culture aroundus.Crucially– and in linewithFlynn’stheoryof‘scientificspectacles’–thescoresinthedifferentstrandsoftheIQtesthadnot all risenequally.Non-verbal reasoninghas improvedmuchmore thanvocabularyornumericalreasoning,forinstance–andotherabilitiesthatarenotmeasured by IQ, like navigation, have actually deteriorated.We have simplyrefinedafewspecificskillsthathelpustothinkmoreabstractly.‘Societymakeshighlydifferentdemandsonusover time,andpeoplehavetorespond.’In thisway, theFlynnEffectshowsthatwecan’t just trainone typeofreasoningandassume that all the useful problem-solving abilities that we have come toassociatewithgreaterintelligencewillfollowsuit,assometheorieswouldhavepredicted.42

Thisshouldbeobviousfromeverydaylife.IftheriseofIQreallyreflecteda

profound improvement inoverall thinking, theneven the smartest eighty-year-old(suchasFlynn)wouldseemlikeaduncecomparedtotheaveragemillennial.Nor dowe see a rise in patents, for example, which youwould expect if theskills measured by general intelligence tests were critical for the kind oftechnologicalinnovationthatJessOppenheimerhadspecialisedin;43nordowewitnessapreponderanceofwiseandrationalpoliticalleaders,whichyoumightexpect if general intelligence alone was critical for truly insightful decisionmaking.WedonotliveintheutopianfuturethatTermanmighthaveimagined,hadhesurvivedtoseetheFlynnEffect.44

Clearly, the skills measured by general intelligence tests are one importantcomponent of our mental machinery, governing how quickly we process andlearncomplexabstractinformation.Butifwearetounderstandthefullrangeof

abilitiesinhumandecisionmakingandproblemsolving,weneedtoexpandourviewtoincludemanyotherelements–skillsandstylesof thinkingthatdonotnecessarilycorrelatestronglywithIQ.Attempts to define alternative forms of intelligence have often ended in

disappointment, however. One popular buzzword has been ‘emotionalintelligence’,forinstance.*Itcertainlymakessensethatsocialskillsdeterminemanyofourlifeoutcomes,thoughcriticshavearguedthatsomeofthepopulartestsof‘EQ’areflawedandfailtopredictsuccessbetterthanIQormeasuresofstandardpersonalitytraitssuchasconscientiousness.45

* Despite these criticisms, updated theories of emotional intelligence do prove to be critical for ourunderstandingofintuitivereasoning,andcollectiveintelligence,aswewillfindoutinChapters5and9.In the 1980s, meanwhile, the psychologist Howard Gardner formulated a

theory of ‘multiple intelligences’ that featured eight traits, includinginterpersonalandintrapersonalintelligence,bodily-kinaestheticintelligencethatmakesyougoodatsport,andeven‘naturalisticintelligence’–whetheryouaregoodatdiscerningdifferentplantsinthegardenorevenwhetheryoucantellthebrandof car from the soundof its engine.Butmany researchers consider thatGardner’s theory is toobroad,withoutofferingprecisedefinitions and testsorany reliable evidence to support his conjectures, beyond the common-sensenotionthatsomepeopledogravitatetosomeskillsmorethanothers.46Afterall,we’ve always known that some people are better at sport and others excel atmusic,butdoesthatmakethemseparateintelligences?‘Whynotalsotalkaboutstuffing-beans-up-your-noseintelligence?’Flynnsaid.Robert Sternberg at Cornell University offers a middle ground with his

Triarchic Theory of Successful Intelligence, which examines three particulartypes of intelligence – practical, analytical and creative – that can togetherinfluencedecisionmakinginadiverserangeofculturesandsituations.47When I called himone afternoon, he apologised for the sound of his young

children playing in the garden outside. But he soon forgot the noise as hedescribedhisfrustrationwitheducationtodayandtheoutdatedtoolsweuse tocalculatementalworth.Hecomparesthelackofprogressinintelligencetestingtotheenormousleaps

made inother fields, likemedicine: it isas ifdoctorswerestillusingoutdatednineteenth-centurydrugstotreat life-threateningdisease.‘We’reat thelevelofusingmercurytotreatsyphilis,’hetoldme.‘TheSATdetermineswhogetsintoagooduniversity,andthenwhogetsintoagoodjob–butallyougetaregood

technicianswithnocommonsense.’LikeTermanbeforehim,Sternberg’s interest took root inchildhood.Today,

thereisnoquestioninghisbrainpower:theAmericanPsychologicalAssociationconsidered Sternberg the sixtieth most eminent psychologist in the twentiethcentury(twelveplacesaboveTerman).48Butasasecond-gradechildfacinghisfirst IQ test, his mind froze. When the results came in, it seemed clear toeveryone–histeachers,hisparentsandSternberghimself–thathewasadunce.Thatlowscoresoonbecameaself-fulfillingprophecy,andSternbergiscertainhewouldhavecontinuedonthisdownwardspiral,haditnotbeenforhisteacherinthefourthgrade.49‘ShethoughttherewasmoretoakidthananIQscore,’hesaid.‘Myacademicperformanceshotupjustbecauseshebelievedinme.’Itwasonly under her encouragement that his young mind began to flourish andblossom.Slipperyconceptsthathadonceslidfromhisgraspbegantostick;heeventuallybecameafirst-classstudent.AsafreshmanatYale,hedecidedtotakeanintroductoryclassinpsychology

tounderstandwhyhehadbeenconsidered‘sostupid’asachild?aninterestthatcarried him to post-graduate research at Stanford, where he began to studydevelopmentalpsychology.IfIQtestsweresouninformative,hewondered,howcouldwebettermeasuretheskillsthathelppeopletosucceed?Asluckwouldhaveit,observationsofhisownstudentsstartedtoprovidethe

inspirationheneeded.Heremembersonegirl,Alice,whohadcometoworkinhis lab. ‘Her test scoreswere terrific, shewas amodel student, butwhen shecamein,shejustdidn’thaveanycreativeideas,’hesaid.Shewasthecompleteopposite of another girl, Barbara, whose scores had been good but not‘spectacular’,butwhohadbeenburstingwithideastotestinhislab.50Another,Celia,hadneithertheamazinggradesofAlice,northebrilliantideasofBarbara,butshewasincrediblypragmatic–shethoughtofexceptionalwaystoplanandexecuteexperiments,tobuildanefficientteamandtogetherpaperspublished.InspiredbyAlice,BarbaraandCelia,Sternbergbegantoformulateatheoryof

human intelligence,whichhedefinedas ‘theability toachieve success in life,according to one’s personal standards, within one’s sociocultural context’.Avoiding the (perhaps overly) broad definitions of Gardner’s multipleintelligences,heconfinedhistheorytothosethreeabilities–analytical,creativeandpractical–andconsideredhowtheymightbedefined,testedandnurtured.Analytical intelligence is essentially the kind of thinking that Terman was

studying; it includes the abilities that allowedAlice toperformsowell onherSATs. Creative intelligence, in contrast, examines our abilities ‘to invent,

imagine and suppose’, as Sternberg puts it. While schools and universitiesalready encourage this kind of thinking in creative writing classes, Sternbergpointsout thatsubjectssuchashistory,scienceandforeignlanguagescanalsoincorporateexercisesdesignedtomeasureandtraincreativity.AstudentlookingatEuropeanhistory,forinstance,mightbeasked,‘WouldtheFirstWorldWarhave occurred, had Franz Ferdinand never been shot?’ or, ‘What would theworld look like today, if Germany had won the Second World War?’ In ascience lesson on animal vision, it might involve imagining a scene from theeyesofabee.‘Describewhatabeecansee,thatyoucannot.’51Respondingtothesequestions,studentswouldstillhaveachancetoshowoff

their factual knowledge, but they are also being forced to exercise counter-factual thinking, to imagine events that have never happened – skills that areclearly useful in many creative professions. Jess Oppenheimer exercised thiskindofthinkinginhisscriptwritingandalsohistechnicaldirection.Practicalintelligence,meanwhile,concernsadifferentkindofinnovation:the

ability to plan and execute an idea, and to overcome life’s messy, ill-definedproblems in the most pragmatic way possible. It includes traits like‘metacognition’ –whether you can judge your strengths and yourweaknessesand work out the best ways to overcome them, and the unspoken, tacitknowledgethatcomesfromexperienceandallowsyoutosolveproblemsonthefly.Italsoincludessomeoftheskillsthatothershavecalledemotionalorsocialintelligence–theabilitytoreadmotivesandtopersuadeotherstodowhatyouwant. Among the Termites, Shelley Smith Mydans’ quick thinking as a warreporter, and her ability to navigate her escape from a Japanese prison camp,maybestpersonifythiskindofintelligence.Ofthethreestylesofthinking,practicalintelligencemaybethehardesttotest

orteachexplicitly,butSternbergsuggeststherearewaystocultivateitatschooland university. In a business studies course, this may involve rating differentstrategiestodealwithapersonnelshortage;52inahistorylessononslavery,youmightaskastudenttoconsiderthechallengesofimplementingtheundergroundrailroad for escaped slaves.53Whatever the subject, thecore idea is todemandthat students think of pragmatic solutions to an issue they may not haveencounteredbefore.Crucially, Sternberg has sincemanaged to test his theories inmany diverse

situations. At Yale University, for example, he helped set up a psychologysummer programme aimed at gifted high-school students. The children weretested according to his different measures of intelligence, and then divided

randomlyintogroupsandtaughtaccordingtotheprinciplesofaparticularkindof intelligence. After a morning studying the psychology of depression, forinstance, somewereasked to formulate theirown theoriesbasedonwhat theyhad learnt – a task to train creative intelligence; others were asked how theymight apply that knowledge to help a friend who was suffering from mentalillness–atasktoencouragepracticalthinking.‘Theideawasthatsomekidswillbe capitalising on their strengths, and others will be correcting theirweaknesses,’Sternbergtoldme.The results were encouraging. They showed that teaching the children

accordingtotheirparticulartypeofintelligenceimprovedtheiroverallscoresinafinalexam–suggestingthateducationingeneralshouldhelpcaterforpeoplewith amore creativeorpractical styleof thinking.Moreover,Sternberg foundthat the practical and creative intelligence tests hadmanaged to identify a fargreater range of students fromdifferent ethnic and economic backgrounds – arefreshing diversity that was apparent as soon as they arrived for the course,Sternbergsaid.In a later study, Sternberg recruited 110 schools (with more than 7,700

students in total) to apply the same principles to the teaching ofmathematics,scienceandEnglishlanguage.Again,theresultswereunequivocal–thechildrentaught todevelop theirpracticalandcreative intelligenceshowedgreatergainsoverall, and even performed better on analytical, memory-based questions –suggestingthatthemoreroundedapproachhadgenerallyhelpedthemtoabsorbandengagewiththematerial.Perhapsmostconvincingly,Sternberg’sRainbowProjectcollaboratedwiththe

admissions departments of various universities – including Yale, BrighamYoungandtheUniversityofCaliforniaIrvine–tobuildanalternativeentranceexam that combines traditional SAT scores with measures of practical andcreativeintelligence.Hefoundthatthenewtestwasroughlytwiceasaccurateatpredicting the students’GPA (gradepoint average) scores in their first year atuniversity, compared to their SAT scores alone, which suggests that it doesindeed capture different ways of thinking and reasoning that are valuable forsuccessinadvancededucation.54Away from academia, Sternberg has also developed tests of practical

intelligenceforbusiness,andtrialledtheminexecutivesandsalespeopleacrossindustries, from local estate agents to Fortune 500 companies. One questionaskedtheparticipantstorankpotentialapproachestodifferentsituations,suchashow to deal with a perfectionist colleague whose slow progress may prevent

your group from meeting its target, using various nudge techniques. Anotherscenariogot them toexplainhow theywouldchange their sales strategywhenstocksarerunninglow.Ineachcase,thequestionstestpeople’sabilitytoprioritisetasksandweighup

thevalueofdifferentoptions,torecognisetheconsequencesoftheiractionsandpre-empt potential challenges, and to persuade colleagues of pragmaticcompromises that arenecessary tokeep aprojectmovingwithout a stalemate.Crucially, Sternberg has found that these tests predicted measures of successsuchasyearlyprofits,thechancesofwinningaprofessionalaward,andoveralljobsatisfaction.In the military, meanwhile, Sternberg examined various measures of

leadershipperformanceamongplatooncommanders,companycommandersandbattalion commanders. They were asked how to deal with soldierinsubordination, for instance – or the bestway to communicate the goals of amission. Again, practical intelligence – and tacit knowledge, in particular –predicted their leadership ability better than traditional measures of generalintelligence.55Sternberg’smeasuresmaylacktheeleganceofaone-size-fits-allIQscore,but

they are a step closer to measuring the kind of thinking that allowed JessOppenheimer and Shelley Smith Mydans to succeed where other Termitesfailed.56 ‘Sternberg’s on the right track,’ Flynn toldme. ‘Hewas excellent intermsofshowingthatitwaspossibletomeasuremorethananalyticskills.’Disappointingly,acceptancehasbeenslow.Althoughhismeasureshavebeen

adopted at Tufts University andOklahoma State University, they are still notwidespread.‘Peoplemaysaythingswillchange,butthenthingsgobacktothewaytheywerebefore,’Sternbergsaid.Justlikewhenhewasaboy,teachersarestilltooquicktojudgeachild’spotentialbasedonnarrow,abstracttests–afacthehaswitnessed in the educationofhisownchildren,oneofwhom isnowasuccessfulSiliconValleyentrepreneur.‘Ihavefivekidsandallofthematonetimeoranotherhavebeendiagnosedaspotential losers,’hesaid, ‘and they’vedonefine.’

WhileSternberg’sresearchmaynothaverevolutionisededucationinthewayhehad hoped, it has inspired other researchers to build on his concept of tacitknowledge–includingsomeintriguingnewresearchontheconceptof‘culturalintelligence’.Soon Ang, a professor of management at the Nanyang Technological

UniversityinSingapore,haspioneeredmuchofthiswork.Inthelate1990s,shewasactingasaconsultanttoseveralmultinationalcompanieswhoaskedhertopulltogetherteamofprogrammers,frommanydifferentcountries,tohelpthemcopewiththe‘Y2Kbug’.The programmers were undeniably intelligent and experienced, but Ang

observed that they were disappointingly ineffective at working together: shefoundthatIndianandFilipinoprogrammerswouldappeartoagreeonasolutiontoaproblem,forinstance,onlyforthememberstothenimplementitindifferentandincompatibleways.Althoughtheteammemberswereallspeakingthesamelanguage,Angrealisedthattheywerestrugglingtobridgetheculturaldivideandcomprehendthedifferentwaysofworking.Inspired, in part, by Robert Sternberg’s work, she developed a measure of

‘cultural intelligence’ (CQ) that examines your general sensitivity to differentculturalnorms.Asonesimpleexample:aBritorAmericanmaybesurprisedtopresent an idea to Japanese colleagues, only to bemetwith silence. Someonewithlowculturalintelligencemayinterpretthereactionasasignofdisinterest;someonewith high cultural intelligencewould realise that, in Japan, youmayneed to explicitly ask for feedback before getting a response – even if thereactionispositive.Orconsidertheroleofsmalltalkinbuildingarelationship.In someEuropeancountries, it’smuchbetter tomovedirectly to thematter athand, but in India it is important to take the time to build relationships – andsomeonewithhighculturalintelligencewouldrecognisethatfact.Angfoundthatsomepeopleareconsistentlybetteratinterpretingthosesigns

thanothers.Importantly,themeasuresofculturalintelligencetestnotonlyyourknowledgeofaspecificculture,butalsoyourgeneralsensitivitytothepotentialareas of misunderstanding in unfamiliar countries, and how well you wouldadapttothem.AndlikeSternberg’smeasuresofpracticalintelligence,thesetacitskillsdon’tcorrelateverystronglywithIQorothertestsofacademicpotential–reaffirming the idea that they are measuring different things. As Ang’sprogrammers had shown, you could have high general intelligence but lowculturalintelligence.‘CQ’has nowbeen linked tomanymeasures of success. It can predict how

quickly expats will adapt to their new life, the performance of internationalsalespeople, andparticipants’ abilities tonegotiate.57Beyondbusiness, culturalintelligence may also determine the experiences of students studying abroad,charityworkersindisasterzones,andteachersatinternationalschools–orevenyoursimpleenjoymentofaholidayabroad.

My conversations with Flynn and Sternberg were humbling. Despite havingperformedwellacademically,IhavetoadmitthatIlackmanyoftheotherskillsthat Sternberg’s tests have been measuring, including many forms of tacitknowledgethatmaybeobvioustosomepeople.Imagine,forinstance,thatyourbossisamicromanagerandwantstohavethe

lastsayoneveryproject–aproblemmanyofuswillhaveencountered.Havingspoken to Sternberg, I realised that someonewith practical intelligencemightskilfully massage the micromanager’s sense of self-importance by suggestingtwosolutionstoaproblem:thepreferredanswer,andadecoytheycouldrejectwhilefeelingtheyhavestilllefttheirmarkontheproject.It’sastrategythathadneveronceoccurredtome.Orconsideryouareateacher,andyoufindagroupofchildrensquabblingin

theplayground.Doyouscoldthem,ordoyoucomeupwithasimpledistractionthatwillcausethemtoforgettheirquarrel?TomyfriendEmma,whoteachesinaprimaryschoolinOxford,thelatterissecondnature;hermindisfullofgamesandsubtlehintstonudgetheirbehaviour.ButwhenItriedtohelpheroutintheclassroom one day, I was clueless, and the children were soon running ringsaroundme.I’m not unusual in this. In Sternberg’s tests of practical intelligence, a

surprisingnumberofpeoplelackedthispragmaticjudgement,evenif, likeme,they score higher than average on othermeasures of intelligence, and even iftheyhadyearsofexperienceinthejobathand.Thestudiesdonotagreeontheexact relation, though. At best, the measures of tacit knowledge are verymodestly linked to IQ scores; at worst, they are negatively correlated. Somepeople just seem to find it easier to implicitly learn the rules of pragmaticproblem solving – and that ability is not very closely related to generalintelligence.For our purposes, it’s also worth paying special attention to counter-factual

thinking – an element of creative intelligence that allows us to think of thealternative outcomes of an event or to momentarily imagine ourselves in adifferentsituation.It’sthecapacitytoask‘whatif...?’andwithoutit,youmayfindyourselfhelplesswhenfacedwithanunexpectedchallenge.Withoutbeingabletoreappraiseyourpast,you’llalsostruggletolearnfromyourmistakestofind better solutions in the future. Again, that’s neglected on most academictests.In this way, Sternberg’s theories help us to understand the frustrations of

intelligent people who somehow struggle with some of the basic tasks ofworking life – such as planning projects, imagining the consequences of theiractionsandpre-emptingproblemsbeforetheyemerge.Failedentrepreneursmaybeoneexample:aroundnineoutoftennewbusinessventuresfail,oftenbecausethe innovator has found a good idea but lacks the capacity to deal with thechallengesofimplementingit.If we consider that SATs or IQ tests reflect a unitary, underlying mental

energy – a ‘rawbrainpower’ – that governs all kinds of problem solving, thisbehaviourdoesn’tmakemuchsense;peopleofhighgeneralintelligenceshouldhave picked up those skills. Sternberg’s theory allows us to disentangle thoseother components and then define and measure them with scientific rigour,showingthattheyarelargelyindependentabilities.These are important first steps in helping us to understand why apparently

cleverpeoplemaylackthegoodjudgementthatwemighthaveexpectedgiventheiracademiccredentials.Thisisjustthestart,however.Inthenextchapterswewilldiscovermanyother essential thinking styles andcognitive skills thathadbeen neglected by psychologists – and the reasons that greater intelligence,ratherthanprotectingusfromerror,cansometimesdriveustomakeevenbiggermistakes.Sternberg’stheoriesonlybegintoscratchthesurface.

Inhindsight,LewisTerman’sownlifeexemplifiesmanyofthesefindings.Fromearly childhood he had always excelled academically, rising from his humblebackground to become president of the American Psychological Association.Nor shouldwe forget the fact that hemasterminded one of the first andmostambitiouscohortstudieseverconducted,collectingreamsofdatathatscientistscontinued to study four decades after his death. He was clearly a highlyinnovativeman.Andyetitisnowsoeasytofindglaringflawsinhisthinking.Agoodscientist

should leave no stone uncovered before reaching a conclusion – but Termanturnedablindeyetodatathatmighthavecontradictedhisownpreconceptions.Hewassosureofthegeneticnatureofintelligencethatheneglectedtohuntfortalented children in poorer neighbourhoods. And he must have known thatmeddling in his subjects’ lives would skew the results, but he often offeredfinancial support and professional recommendations to his Termites, boostingtheirchancesofsuccess.Hewasneglectingthemostbasic(tacit)knowledgeofthescientificmethod,whicheventhemostinexperiencedundergraduateshouldtakeforgranted.

This is not to mention his troubling political leanings. Terman’s interest insocialengineeringledhimtojointheHumanBettermentFoundation–agroupthat called for the compulsory sterilisation of those showing undesirablequalities.58Moreover,when readingTerman’s earlypapers, it is shockinghoweasily he dismissed the intellectual potential of African Americans andHispanics,basedonamerehandfulofcase-studies.DescribingthepoorscoresofjusttwoPortugueseboys,hewrote:‘Theirdullnessseemstoberacial,oratleastinherentinthefamilystocksfromwhichtheycame.’59Furtherresearch,hewas sure, would reveal ‘enormously significant racial differences in generalintelligence’.Perhaps it is unfair to judge the man by today’s standards; certainly, some

psychologistsbelieve thatweshouldbekind toTerman’s faults,productashewasofadifferenttime.ExceptthatweknowTermanhadbeenexposedtootherpoints of view; he must have read Binet’s concerns about the misuse of hisintelligencetest.A wiser man might have explored these criticisms, but when Terman was

challenged on these points, he responded with knee-jerk vitriol rather thanreasoned argument. In 1922, the journalist and political commentator WalterLippmann wrote an article in the New Republic, questioning the IQ test’sreliability.‘Itisnotpossible’,Lippmannwrote,‘toimagineamorecontemptibleproceeding than to confront a childwith a set of puzzles, and after an hour’smonkeyingwiththem,proclaimtothechild,ortohisparents,thathereisaC-individual.’60Lippmann’s scepticism was entirely understandable, yet Terman’s response

wasanadhominemattack:‘NowitisevidentthatMrLippmannhasbeenseeingred; also, that seeing red is not very conducive to seeing clearly’, hewrote inresponse. ‘Clearly, something has hit the bulls-eye of one ofMr Lippmann’semotionalcomplexes.’61EventheTermiteshadstartedtoquestionthevaluesoftheirtestresultsbythe

endsof their lives.SaraAnn– thecharming littlegirlwithanIQof192,whohad‘bribed’herexperimenterswithagumdrop–certainlyresentedthefactthatshehadnotcultivatedothercognitiveskills thathadnotbeenmeasured inhertest. ‘My great regret is thatmy left-brain parents, spurred on bymyTermangroup experience, pretty completely bypassed any encouragement ofwhatevercreativetalentImayhavehad’,shewrote.‘Inowseethelatterareaasofgreatersignificance, and intelligence as its hand-maiden. [I’m] sorry I didn’t becomeawareofthisfiftyyearsago.’62

Terman’sviewssoftenedslightlyovertheyears,andhewouldlateradmitthat‘intellectandachievementarefarfromperfectlycorrelated’,yethis testscorescontinued todominatehisopinionsof thepeoplearoundhim; theyevencastashadow over his relationships with his family. According to Terman’sbiographer,HenryMinton,eachofhischildrenandgrandchildrenhadtakentheIQ test, and his love for them appeared to vary according to the results. Hisletters were full of pride for his son, Fred, a talented engineer and an earlypioneerinSiliconValley;hisdaughter,Helen,barelymeritedamention.Perhaps most telling are his granddaughter Doris’s recollections of family

dinners,duringwhichtheplacesettingswerearrangedinorderof intelligence:FredsatattheheadofthetablenexttoLewis;HelenandherdaughterDorissatattheotherend,wheretheycouldhelpthemaid.63Eachfamilymemberplacedaccordingtoatesttheyhadtakenyearsbefore–atinyglimpse,perhaps,ofthewayTermanwouldhavelikedtoarrangeusall.

2

Entangledarguments:Thedangersof‘dysrationalia’

Itis17June1922,andtwomiddle-agedmen–oneshortandsquat,theothertalland lumberingwith awalrusmoustache – are sitting on the beach inAtlanticCity,NewJersey.TheyareHarryHoudiniandArthurConanDoyle1–andbytheendoftheevening,theirfriendshipwillneverbethesameagain.It ended as it began – with a séance. Spiritualism was all the rage among

London’swealthyelite,andConanDoylewasafirmbeliever,attendingfiveorsix gatherings a week. He even claimed that his wife Jean had some psychictalent,and thatshehadstarted tochannelaspiritguide,Phineas,whodictatedwheretheyshouldliveandwhentheyshouldtravel.Houdini,incontrast,wasasceptic,buthestillclaimedtohaveanopenmind,

andonavisittoEnglandtwoyearspreviously,hehadcontactedConanDoyletodiscuss his recent book on the subject.Despite their differences, the twomenhadquicklystruckupafragilefriendshipandHoudinihadevenagreedtovisitConanDoyle’s favouritemedium,who claimed to channel ectoplasm throughhermouthandvagina;hequicklydismissedherpowersassimplestagemagic.(I’llspareyouthedetails.)NowConanDoylewasinthemiddleofanAmericanbooktour,andheinvited

HoudinitojoinhiminAtlanticCity.The visit had begun amicably enough. Houdini had helped to teach Conan

Doyle’s boys to dive, and the groupwere resting at the seafrontwhenConanDoyledecidedtoinviteHoudiniuptohishotelroomforanimpromptuséance,withJeanasthemedium.HeknewthatHoudinihadbeenmourningthelossofhismother,andhehoped thathiswifemightbeable tomakecontactwith theotherside.AndsotheyreturnedtotheAmbassadorHotel,closedthecurtains,andwaited

forinspirationtostrike.Jeansatinakindoftrancewithapencilinonehandasthemensatbyandwatched.Shethenbegantostrikethetableviolentlywithher

hands–asignthatthespirithaddescended.‘DoyoubelieveinGod?’sheaskedthespirit,whorespondedbymovingher

handtoknockagainonthetable.‘ThenIshallmakethesignofthecross.’Shesatwithherpenpoisedoverthewritingpad,beforeherhandbegantofly

wildlyacrossthepage.‘Oh,mydarling,thankGod,atlastI’mthrough,’thespiritwrote.‘I’vetriedoh

sooften–nowIamhappy.Why,ofcourse,Iwanttotalktomyboy?myownbelovedboy.Friends,thankyou,withallmyheartforthis–youhaveansweredthecryofmyheart?andofhis?Godblesshim.’By theendof the séance, Jeanhadwrittenaround twentypages in ‘angular,

erraticscript’.Herhusbandwasutterlybewitched.‘Itwasasingularscene–mywife with her hand flying wildly, beating the table while she scribbled at afuriousrate,Isittingoppositeandtearingsheetaftersheetfromtheblockas itwasfilledup.’Houdini,incontrast,cutthroughthecharadewithanumberofquestions.Why

had his mother, a Jew, professed herself to be a Christian? How had thisHungarian immigrant written her messages in perfect English – ‘a languagewhichshehadneverlearnt!’?Andwhydidshenotbothertomentionthatitwasherbirthday?HoudinilaterwroteabouthisscepticisminanarticlefortheNewYorkSun.It

was thestartofan increasinglypublicdisputebetween the twomen,and theirfriendshipneverrecoveredbeforetheescapologist’sdeathfouryearslater.2Eventhen,ConanDoylecouldnot let thematter rest.Eggedon,perhaps,by

his‘spiritguide’Phineas,heattemptedtoaddressanddismissallofHoudini’sdoubts inanarticle forTheStrandmagazine.His reasoningwasmore fancifulthananyofhisfictionalworks,notleastinclaimingthatHoudinihimselfwasincommandofa‘dematerialisingandreconstructingforce’thatallowedhimtoslipinandoutofchains.‘Isitpossibleforamantobeaverypowerfulmediumallhislife,tousethat

power continually, and yet never to realise that the gifts he is using are thosewhichtheworldcallsmediumship?’hewrote. ‘If thatbe indeedpossible, thenwehaveasolutionoftheHoudinienigma.’

Meeting these two men for the first time, you would have been forgiven forexpectingConanDoyletobethemorecriticalthinker.Adoctorofmedicineandabest-sellingwriter,heexemplifiedtheabstractreasoningthatTermanwasjustbeginning to measure with his intelligence tests. Yet it was the professional

illusionist, a Hungarian immigrant whose education had ended at the age oftwelve,whocouldseethroughthefraud.SomecommentatorshavewonderedwhetherConanDoylewassufferingfrom

aformofmadness.Butlet’snotforgetthatmanyofhiscontemporariesbelievedinspiritualism–includingscientistssuchasthephysicistOliverLodge,whoseworkonelectromagnetismbroughtustheradio,andthenaturalistAlfredRusselWallace,acontemporaryofCharlesDarwinwhohad independentlyconceivedthe theory of natural selection. Both were formidable intellectual figures, buttheyremainedblindtoanyevidencedebunkingtheparanormal.We’ve already seenhowourdefinitionof intelligence couldbe expanded to

include practical and creative reasoning. But those theories do not explicitlyexamineourrationality,definedasourcapacity tomake theoptimaldecisionsneeded to meet our goals, given the resources we have to hand, and to formbeliefsbasedonevidence,logicandsoundreasoning.*

*CognitivescientistssuchasKeithStanovichdescribetwoclassesofrationality.Instrumentalrationalityisdefinedas‘theoptimisationofsomeone’sgoalfulfilment’,or,lesstechnically,as‘behavingsothatyougetexactlywhatyouwant,given the resourcesavailable toyou’.Epistemic rationality,meanwhile,concerns‘howwell your beliefsmap onto the actual structure of theworld’. By falling for fraudulentmediums,ConanDoylewasclearlylackinginthelatter.While decades of psychological research have documented humanity’smore

irrational tendencies, it isonly relatively recently that scientistshavestarted tomeasurehowthatirrationalitybetweenindividuals,andwhetherthatvarianceisrelated tomeasures of intelligence.They are finding that the two are far fromperfectly correlated: it is possible to have a very high SAT score thatdemonstrates good abstract thinking, for instance,while still performingbadlyonthesenewtestsofrationality–amismatchknownas‘dysrationalia’.Conan Doyle’s life story – and his friendship with Houdini, in particular –

offers the perfect lens through which to view this cutting-edge research.3 Icertainlywouldn’tclaimthatanykindoffaithisinherentlyirrational,butIaminterestedinthefactthatfraudsterswereabletoexploitConanDoyle’sbeliefstofool him time after time. He was simply blind to the evidence, includingHoudini’stestimonies.Whateveryourviewsonparanormalbeliefingeneral,hedidnotneedtobequitesogullibleatsuchgreatpersonalcost.ConanDoyleisparticularlyfascinatingbecauseweknow,throughhiswriting,

thathewasperfectlyawareofthelawsoflogicaldeduction.Indeed,hestartedtodabbleinspiritualismatthesametimethathefirstcreatedSherlockHolmes:4he

wasdreamingupliterature’sgreatestscientificmindduringtheday,butfailedtoapply those skills of deduction at night. If anything, his intelligence seems tohave only allowed him to come up with increasingly creative arguments todismiss the sceptics and justify his beliefs; he was bound more tightly thanHoudiniinhischains.BesidesDoyle,manyother influential thinkersof thelasthundredyearsmay

have also been afflicted by this form of the intelligence trap. EvenEinstein –whose theoriesareoften taken tobe thepinnacleofhuman intelligence–mayhave suffered from this blinkered reasoning, leading him to waste the lasttwenty-fiveyearsofhiscareerwithastringofembarrassingfailures.Whateveryourspecificsituationandinterests, thisresearchwillexplainwhy

somanyofusmakemistakesthatareblindinglyobvioustoallthosearoundus–andcontinuetomakethoseerrorslongafterthefactshavebecomeapparent.Houdinihimselfseemstohaveintuitivelyunderstoodthevulnerabilityof the

intelligentmind.‘Asarule, Ihavefoundthat thegreaterbrainamanhas,andthe better he is educated, the easier it has been tomystify him,’ he once toldConanDoyle.5

A true recognition of dysrationalia – and its potential for harm – has takendecadestoblossom,buttherootsoftheideacanbefoundinthenowlegendarywork of two Israeli researchers, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, whoidentifiedmanycognitivebiasesandheuristics(quick-and-easyrulesofthumb)thatcanskewourreasoning.Oneof theirmoststrikingexperimentsaskedparticipants tospina‘wheelof

fortune’, which landed on a number between 1 and 100, before consideringgeneral knowledge questions – such as estimating the number of AfricancountriesthatarerepresentedintheUN.Thewheeloffortuneshould,ofcourse,havehadnoinfluenceontheiranswers–buttheeffectwasquiteprofound.Thelowerthequantityonthewheel,thesmallertheirestimate–thearbitraryvaluehadplantedafigureintheirmind,‘anchoring’theirjudgement.6Youhaveprobablyfallenforanchoringyourselfmanytimeswhileshoppingin

the sales. Suppose you are looking for a new TV. You had expected to payaround £100, but then you find a real bargain: a £200 item reduced to £150.Seeingtheoriginalpriceanchorsyourperceptionofwhatisanacceptablepricetopay,meaningthatyouwillgoaboveyourinitialbudget.If,ontheotherhand,youhadnotseentheoriginalprice,youwouldhaveprobablyconsideredit tooexpensive,andmovedon.

Youmayalsohavebeenpreytotheavailabilityheuristic,whichcausesustoover-estimate certain risks based on how easily the dangers come to mind,thanks to their vividness. It’s the reason that many people are more worriedaboutflying thandriving–becausereportsofplanecrashesareoftensomuchmoreemotive,despitethefactthatitisactuallyfarmoredangeroustostepintoacar.Thereisalsoframing:thefactthatyoumaychangeyouropinionbasedonthe

wayinformationisphrased.Supposeyouareconsideringamedicaltreatmentfor600peoplewithadeadlyillnessandithasa1in3successrate.Youcanbetoldeitherthat‘200peoplewillbesavedusingthistreatment’(thegainframing)orthat‘400peoplewilldieusingthistreatment’(thelossframing).Thestatementsmeanexactlythesamething,butpeoplearemorelikelytoendorsethestatementwhenitispresentedinthegainframing;theypassivelyacceptthefactsastheyaregiventothemwithoutthinkingwhattheyreallymean.Advertisershavelongknown this: it’s the reason thatwe are told that foods are 95per cent fat free(ratherthanbeingtoldtheyare‘5percentfat’).Othernotablebiasesincludethesunkcostfallacy(ourreluctancetogiveupon

a failing investment even if we will lose more trying to sustain it), and thegambler’sfallacy–thebeliefthatiftheroulettewheelhaslandedonblack,it’smorelikelythenexttimetolandonred.Theprobability,ofcourse,staysexactlythesame.Anextremecaseofthegambler’sfallacyissaidtohavebeenobservedinMonteCarloin1913,whentheroulettewheelfelltwenty-sixtimesonblack–and the visitors lost millions as the bets on red escalated. But it is not justwitnessed in casinos; it may also influence family planning. Many parentsfalselybelievethatiftheyhavealreadyproducedalineofsons,thenadaughteris more likely to come next.With this logic, they may end up with a wholefootballteamofboys.Given these findings,many cognitive scientists divide our thinking into two

categories: ‘system1’, intuitive, automatic, ‘fast thinking’ thatmaybeprey tounconscious biases; and ‘system 2’, ‘slow’, more analytical, deliberativethinking. According to this view – called dual-process theory – many of ourirrationaldecisionscomewhenwerelytooheavilyonsystem1,allowingthosebiasestomuddyourjudgement.Yetnoneof the early studiesbyKahnemanandTverskyhad testedwhether

ourirrationalityvariesfrompersontoperson.Aresomepeoplemoresusceptibleto these biases, while others are immune, for instance? And how do thosetendenciesrelate toourgeneral intelligence?ConanDoyle’sstory issurprising

because we intuitively expect more intelligent people, with their greateranalytical minds, to act more rationally – but as Tversky and Kahneman hadshown,ourintuitionscanbedeceptive.Ifwewant to understandwhy smart people do stupid things, these are vital

questions.During a sabbatical at the University of Cambridge in 1991, a Canadian

psychologist called Keith Stanovich decided to address these issues head on.Withawifespecialising in learningdifficulties,hehad longbeen interested inthewaysthatsomementalabilitiesmaylagbehindothers,andhesuspectedthatrationalitywouldbenodifferent.Theresultwasaninfluentialpaperintroducingtheideaofdysrationaliaasadirectparalleltootherdisorderslikedyslexiaanddyscalculia.It was a provocative concept – aimed as a nudge in the ribs to all the

researchersexaminingbias. ‘Iwanted to jolt the field into realising that ithadbeenignoringindividualdifferences,’Stanovichtoldme.Stanovich emphasises that dysrationalia is not just limited to system 1

thinking. Even if we are reflective enough to detect when our intuitions arewrong, and override them, we may fail to use the right ‘mindware’ – theknowledgeandattitudesthatshouldallowustoreasoncorrectly.7Ifyougrowupamongpeoplewhodistrustscientists,forinstance,youmaydevelopatendencyto ignore empirical evidence, while putting your faith in unproven theories.8Greaterintelligencewouldn’tnecessarilystopyouformingthoseattitudesinthefirstplace,andit isevenpossible thatyourgreatercapacityfor learningmightthencauseyoutoaccumulatemoreandmore‘facts’tosupportyourviews.9Circumstantial evidence would suggest that dysrationalia is common. One

studyofthehigh-IQsocietyMensa,forexample,showedthat44percentofitsmembersbelievedinastrology,and56percentbelievedthattheEarthhadbeenvisited by extra-terrestrials.10 But rigorous experiments, specifically exploringthelinkbetweenintelligenceandrationality,werelacking.Stanovichhasnowspentmorethantwodecadesbuildingonthosefoundations

withaseriesofcarefullycontrolledexperiments.Tounderstandhisresults,weneedsomebasicstatisticaltheory.Inpsychology

andothersciences, the relationshipbetween twovariables isusuallyexpressedasacorrelationcoefficientbetween0and1.Aperfectcorrelationwouldhaveavalueof1–thetwoparameterswouldessentiallybemeasuringthesamething;this is unrealistic formost studies of human health and behaviour (which aredetermined by so many variables), but many scientists would consider a

‘moderate’correlationtoliebetween0.4and0.59.11Using these measures, Stanovich found that the relationships between

rationality and intelligence were generally very weak. SAT scores revealed acorrelationofjust0.1and0.19withmeasuresoftheframingbiasandanchoring,forinstance.12Intelligencealsoappearedtoplayonlyatinyroleinthequestionofwhetherwearewillingtodelayimmediategratificationforagreaterrewardinthe future – a tendency known as ‘temporal discounting’. In one test, thecorrelation with SAT scores was as small as 0.02. That’s an extraordinarilymodestcorrelationforatraitthatmanymightassumecomeshandinhandwithagreateranalyticalmind.ThesunkcostbiasalsoshowedalmostnorelationshiptoSATscoresinanotherstudy.13Gui Xue and colleagues at Beijing Normal University, meanwhile, have

followedStanovich’s lead, finding that thegambler’s fallacy isactuallya littlemore common among the more academically successful participants in hissample.14That’sworthremembering:whenplayingroulette,don’tthinkyouaresmarterthanthewheel.Even trained philosophers are vulnerable. Participants with PhDs in

philosophy are just as likely to suffer from framing effects, for example, aseveryoneelse–despite thefact that theyshouldhavebeenschooled in logicalreasoning.15Youmightatleastexpectthatmoreintelligentpeoplecouldlearntorecognise

these flaws. In reality, most people assume that they are less vulnerable thanotherpeople,andthisisequallytrueofthe‘smarter’participants.Indeed,inoneset of experiments studying some of the classic cognitive biases, Stanovichfound that people with higher SAT scores actually had a slightly larger ‘biasblindspot’thanpeoplewhowerelessacademicallygifted.16‘Adultswithmorecognitiveabilityareawareof their intellectual statusandexpect tooutperformothers on most cognitive tasks,’ Stanovich told me. ‘Because these cognitivebiases are presented to them as essentially cognitive tasks, they expect tooutperformonthemaswell.’FrommyinteractionswithStanovich,Igettheimpressionthatheisextremely

cautious about promoting his findings,meaning he has not achieved the samekindoffameasDanielKahneman,say–butcolleagueswithinhisfieldbelievethatthesetheoriescouldbetrulygame-changing.‘Theworkhehasdoneissomeof the most important research in cognitive psychology – but it’s sometimesunderappreciated,’ agreedGordonPennycook, a professor at theUniversity ofRegina,Canada,whohasalsospecialisedinexploringhumanrationality.

Stanovichhasnowrefinedandcombinedmanyofthesemeasuresintoasingletest,whichisinformallycalledthe‘rationalityquotient’.Heemphasisesthathedoesnotwishtodevalueintelligencetests–they‘workquitewellforwhattheydo’–buttoimproveourunderstandingoftheseothercognitiveskillsthatmayalsodetermineourdecisionmaking,andplacethemonanequalfootingwiththeexistingmeasuresofcognitiveability.‘Ourgoalhasalwaysbeen togive theconceptof rationalitya fairhearing–

almostasifithadbeenproposedpriortointelligence’,hewroteinhisscholarlybook on the subject.17 It is, he says, a ‘great irony’ that the thinking skillsexplored in Kahneman’s Nobel Prize-winning work are still neglected in ourmostwell-knownassessmentofcognitiveability.18After years of careful development and verification of the various sub-tests,

thefirstiterationofthe‘ComprehensiveAssessmentofRationalThinking’waspublishedattheendof2016.Besidesmeasuresofthecommoncognitivebiasesandheuristics,italsoincludedprobabilisticandstatisticalreasoningskills–suchas the ability to assess risk – that could improve our rationality, andquestionnairesconcerningcontaminatedmindwaresuchasanti-scienceattitudes.For a taster, consider the following question, which aims to test the ‘belief

bias’.Your taskis toconsiderwhether theconclusionfollows, logically,basedonlyontheopeningtwopremises.Alllivingthingsneedwater.Rosesneedwater.Therefore,rosesarelivingthings.

Whatdidyouanswer?AccordingtoStanovich’swork,70percentofuniversitystudentsbelievethatthisisavalidargument.Butitisn’t,sincethefirstpremiseonlysaysthat‘alllivingthingsneedwater’–notthat‘allthingsthatneedwaterareliving’.If you still struggle to understand why that makes sense, compare it to the

followingstatements:Allinsectsneedoxygen.Miceneedoxygen.Thereforemiceareinsects.

Thelogicofthetwostatementsisexactlythesame–butitisfareasiertonoticethe flaw in the reasoning when the conclusion clashes with your existingknowledge. In the first example, however, you have to put aside your

preconceptionsand think,carefullyandcritically,about thespecificstatementsathand–toavoidthinkingthattheargumentisrightjustbecausetheconclusionmakessensewithwhatyoualreadyknow.19That’sanimportantskillwheneveryouneedtoappraiseanewclaim.When combining all these sub-tests, Stanovich found that the overall

correlation with measures of general intelligence, such as SAT scores, wasmodest: around0.47onone test.Someoverlapwas tobeexpected, especiallygiven the fact that several of thesemeasures, such as probabilistic reasoning,wouldbeaidedbymathematicalabilityandotheraspectsofcognitionmeasuredbyIQ testsandSATs. ‘But that still leavesenoughroomfor thediscrepanciesbetweenrationalityand intelligence that lead tosmartpeopleacting foolishly,’Stanovichsaid.Withfurtherdevelopment,therationalityquotientcouldbeusedinrecruitment

toassessthequalityofapotentialemployee’sdecisionmaking;Stanovichtoldme that he has already had significant interest from law firms and financialinstitutions,andexecutivehead-hunters.Stanovich hopes his test may also be a useful tool to assess how students’

reasoningchangesoveraschooloruniversitycourse.‘This,tome,wouldbeoneof the more exciting uses,’ Stanovich said. With that data, you could theninvestigatewhich interventionsaremostsuccessfulatcultivatingmorerationalthinkingstyles.

Whilewewaittoseethatworkinaction,cynicsmayquestionwhetherRQreallydoesreflectourbehaviourinreallife.Afterall,theIQtestissometimesaccusedof being too abstract. Is RQ – based on artificial, imagined scenarios – anydifferent?SomeinitialanswerscomefromtheworkofWändiBruinedeBruinatLeeds

University. InspiredbyStanovich’s research,her teamfirstdesigned theirownscale of ‘adult decision-making competence’, consisting of seven tasksmeasuringbiaseslikeframing,measuresofriskperception,andthetendencytofall for the sunk cost fallacy (whether you are likely to continue with a badinvestment or not). The team also examined over-confidence by asking thesubjectssomegeneralknowledgequestions,andthenaskingthemtogaugehowsuretheywerethateachanswerwascorrect.Unlikemanypsychological studies,which tend to use university students as

guineapigs,BruinedeBruin’sexperimentexaminedadiversesampleofpeople,aged eighteen to eighty-eight, with a range of educational backgrounds –

allowinghertobesurethatanyresultsreflectedthepopulationasawhole.AsStanovichhasfoundwithhistests,theparticipants’decision-makingskills

were only moderately linked to their intelligence; academic success did notnecessarilymakethemmorerationaldecisionmakers.ButBruinedeBruin thendecided to seehowbothmeasureswere related to

their behaviours in the realworld. To do so, she asked participants to declarehowoftentheyhadexperiencedvariousstressfullifeevents,fromtherelativelytrivial(suchasgettingsunburntormissingaflight),totheserious(catchinganSTDorcheatingonyourpartner)andthedownrightawful(beingputinjail).20Althoughthemeasuresofgeneralintelligencedidseemtohaveasmalleffectontheseoutcomes,theparticipants’rationalityscoreswereaboutthreetimesmoreimportantindeterminingtheirbehaviour.Thesetestsclearlycaptureamoregeneraltendencytobeacareful,considered

thinkerthatwasnotreflectedinmorestandardmeasuresofcognitiveability;youcanbeintelligentandirrational–asStanovichhadfound–andthishasseriousconsequencesforyourlife.BruinedeBruin’sfindingscanofferussomeinsightsintootherpeculiarhabits

of intelligent people. One study from the London School of Economics,published in 2010, found that people with higher IQs tend to consume morealcohol andmaybemore likely to smokeor take illegal drugs, for instance –supporting the idea that intelligence does not necessarily help us toweigh upshort-termbenefitsagainstthelong-termconsequences.21PeoplewithhighIQsarealsojustas likelytofacefinancialdistress,suchas

missingmortgagepayments,bankruptcyorcreditcarddebt.Around14percentofpeoplewithanIQof140hadreachedtheircreditlimit,comparedto8.3percentofpeoplewithanaverageIQof100.Norweretheyanymorelikelytoputmoneyawayinlong-terminvestmentsorsavings;theiraccumulatedwealtheachyearwasjustatinyfractiongreater.Thesefactsareparticularlysurprising,giventhatmore intelligent (andbetter educated) people do tend to havemore stablejobs with higher salaries, which suggests that their financial distress is aconsequenceoftheirdecisionmaking,ratherthan,say,asimplelackofearningpower.22The researchers suggested that more intelligent people veer close to the

‘financial precipice’ in the belief that theywill be better able to dealwith theconsequence afterwards.Whatever the reason, the results suggest that smarterpeoplearenotinvestingtheirmoneyinthemorerationalmannerthateconomistsmightanticipate;itisanothersignthatintelligencedoesnotnecessarilyleadto

betterdecisionmaking.

Asonevividexample,considerthestoryofPaulFrampton.AbrilliantphysicistattheUniversityofNorthCarolina,hisworkrangedfromanewtheoryofdarkmatter (the mysterious, invisible mass holding our universe together) to thepredictionofasubatomicparticlecalledthe‘axigluon’,atheorythatisinspiringexperimentsattheLargeHadronCollider.In2011,however,hebeganonlinedating,andsoonstruckupafriendshipwith

a former bikini model named Denise Milani. In January the next year, sheinvited him to visit her on a photoshoot inLaPaz,Bolivia.When he arrived,however, he found amessage – she’d had to leave forArgentina instead.Butshe’dleftherbag.Couldhepickitupandbringittoher?Alas, he arrived in Argentina but there was still no sign ofMilani. Losing

patience,hedecidedtoreturntotheUSA,wherehecheckedinhersuitcasewithhisownluggage.Afewminuteslater,anannouncementcalledhimtomeettheairportstaffathisgate.Unlessyousufferfromseveredysrationaliayourself,youcan probably guess what happened next. He was subsequently charged withtransportingtwokilogramsofcocaine.Fraudsters, it turnedout,hadbeenposingasMilani–whoreally isamodel,

but knew nothing of the scheme and had never been in touchwith Frampton.Theywouldhavepresumablyinterceptedthebagoncehehadcarrieditovertheborder.Framptonhadbeenwarnedabouttherelationship.‘Ithoughthewasoutofhis

mind, and I told him that,’ John Dixon, a fellow physicist and friend ofFrampton’s, said in theNewYorkTimes. ‘Buthe reallybelieved thathehadaprettyyoungwomanwhowantedtomarryhim.’23Wecan’t reallyknowwhatwasgoing throughFrampton’smind.Perhapshe

suspectedthat‘Milani’wasinvolvedinsomekindofdrugsmugglingoperationbutthoughtthatthiswasawayofprovinghimselftoher.Hisloveforherseemstohavebeenreal,though;heeventriedtomessageherinprison,afterthescamhad been uncovered. For some reason, however, he just hadn’t been able toweighuptherisks,andhadallowedhimselftobeswayedbyimpulsive,wishfulthinking.

If we return to that séance in Atlantic City, Arthur ConanDoyle’s behaviourwouldcertainlyseemtofitneatlywiththeoriesofdysrationalia,withcompelling

evidence that paranormal and superstitious beliefs are surprisingly commonamongthehighlyintelligent.According to a survey ofmore than 1,200 participants, people with college

degreesarejustaslikelytoendorsetheexistenceofUFOs,andtheywereevenmore credulous of extrasensory perception and ‘psychic healing’ than peoplewithaworseeducation.24 (Theeducationlevelhere isanimperfectmeasureofintelligence,butitgivesageneralideathattheabstractthinkingandknowledgerequiredtoenteruniversitydoesnottranslateintomorerationalbeliefs.)Needless tosay,allof thephenomenaabovehavebeenrepeatedlydisproven

bycrediblescientists–yetitseemsthatmanysmartpeoplecontinuetoholdontothemregardless.Accordingtodual-process(fast/slowthinking)theories,thiscould just be down to cognitive miserliness. People who believe in theparanormalrelyontheirgutfeelingsandintuitionstothinkaboutthesourcesoftheirbeliefs,ratherthanreasoninginananalytical,criticalway.25Thismaybe trueformanypeoplewithvaguer, lesswell-definedbeliefs,but

therearesomeparticularelementsofConanDoyle’sbiographythatsuggesthisbehaviourcan’tbeexplainedquitesosimply.Often,itseemedasifhewasusinganalytical reasoning from system 2 to rationalise his opinions and dismiss theevidence.Ratherthanthinkingtoolittle,hewasthinkingtoomuch.ConsiderhowConanDoylewasonceinfamouslyfooledbytwoschoolgirls.In

1917–afewyearsbeforehemetHoudini–sixteen-year-oldElsieWrightandnine-year-old Frances Griffith claimed to have photographed a population offairies frolicking around a stream in Cottingley, West Yorkshire. Through acontact at the local Theosophical Society, the pictures eventually landed inConanDoyle’shands.Manyofhisacquaintanceswerehighlysceptical,buthefellforthegirls’story

hook,lineandsinker.26‘Itishardforthemindtograspwhattheultimateresultsmaybeifwehaveactuallyprovedtheexistenceuponthesurfaceofthisplanetofapopulationwhichmaybeasnumerousasthehumanrace,’hewroteinTheComing of Fairies.27 In reality, they were cardboard cut-outs, taken fromPrincessMary’sGiftbook28 – a volume that had also included someofConanDoyle’sownwriting.29What’sfascinatingisnotsomuchthefactthathefellforthefairiesinthefirst

place,buttheextraordinarylengthsthathewenttoexplainawayanydoubts.Ifyoulookatthephotographscarefully,youcanevenseehatpinsholdingoneofthe cut-outs together. But where others saw pins, he saw the gnome’s bellybutton – proof that fairies are linked to their mothers in the womb with an

umbilicalcord.ConanDoyleeventriedtodrawonmodernscientificdiscoveriestoexplainthefairies’existence,turningtoelectromagnetictheorytoclaimthattheywere‘constructedinmaterialwhichthrewoutshorterorlongervibrations’,renderingtheminvisibletohumans.AsRayHyman,aprofessorofpsychologyattheUniversityofOregon,putsit:

‘Conan Doyle used his intelligence and cleverness to dismiss allcounterarguments...[He]wasabletousehissmartnesstooutsmarthimself.’30Theuseofsystem2‘slowthinking’torationaliseourbeliefsevenwhenthey

are wrong leads us to uncover the most important and pervasive form of theintelligencetrap,withmanydisastrousconsequences;itcanexplainnotonlythefoolish ideas of people such as Conan Doyle, but also the huge divides inpoliticalopinionaboutissuessuchasguncrimeandclimatechange.

Sowhat’sthescientificevidence?Thefirstcluescamefromaseriesofclassicstudiesfromthe1970sand1980s,

whenDavidPerkinsofHarvardUniversityaskedstudentstoconsideraseriesoftopical questions, such as: ‘Would a nuclear disarmament treaty reduce thelikelihoodofworldwar?’Atrulyrationalthinkershouldconsiderbothsidesofthe argument, but Perkins found that more intelligent students were no morelikelytoconsideranyalternativepointsofview.Someoneinfavourofnucleardisarmament,forinstance,mightnotexploretheissueoftrust:whetherwecouldbesurethatallcountrieswouldhonourtheagreement.Instead,theyhadsimplyused their abstract reasoning skills and factual knowledge to offer moreelaboratejustificationsoftheirownpointofview.31This tendency is sometimes called the confirmation bias, though several

psychologists–includingPerkins–prefertousethemoregeneralterm‘mysidebias’todescribethemanydifferentkindsoftacticswemayusetosupportourviewpoint and diminish alternative opinions. Even student lawyers, who areexplicitly trained to consider the other side of a legal dispute, performed verypoorly.Perkins later considered this to be one of his most important discoveries.32

‘Thinking about the other side of the case is a perfect example of a goodreasoningpractice,’hesaid.‘Why, then,dostudent lawyerswithhighIQsandtraining in reasoning that includesanticipating theargumentsof theoppositionprovetobeassubjecttoconfirmationbiasormysidebias,asithasbeencalled,as anyone else? To ask such a question is to raise fundamental issues aboutconceptionsofintelligence.’33

Later studiesonly replicated this finding,and thisone-sidedwayof thinkingappears to be a particular problem for the issues that speak to our sense ofidentity.Scientiststodayusetheterm‘motivatedreasoning’todescribethiskindof emotionally charged, self-protective use of our minds. Besides themyside/confirmation bias that Perkins examined (wherewe preferentially seekandremembertheinformationthatconfirmsourview),motivatedreasoningmayalsotake theformofadisconfirmationbias–akindofpreferentialscepticismthattearsdownalternativearguments.And,together,theycanleadustobecomemoreandmoreentrenchedinouropinions.ConsideranexperimentbyDanKahanatYaleLawSchool,whichexamined

attitudes to gun control. He told his participants that a local government wastryingtodecidewhethertobanfirearmsinpublic–anditwasunsurewhetherthiswouldincreaseordecreasecrimerates.Sotheyhadcollecteddataoncitieswithandwithoutthesebans,andonchangesincrimeoveroneyear:

Kahanalsogavehisparticipantsastandardnumeracytest,andquestionedthemontheirpoliticalbeliefs.Tryitforyourself.Giventhisdata,dothebanswork?Kahanhaddeliberatelyengineeredthenumberstobedeceptiveatfirstglance,

suggestingahugedecreaseincrimeinthecitiescarryingtheban.Togettothecorrectanswer,youneedtoconsider theratios,showingaround25percentofthecitieswiththebanhadwitnessedanincreaseincrime,comparedwith16percentofthosewithoutaban.Thebandidnotwork,inotherwords.Asyoumighthope,themorenumerateparticipantsweremorelikelytocome

tothatconclusion–butonlyiftheyweremoreconservative,Republicanvoterswho were already more likely to oppose gun control. If they were liberal,Democratvoters,theparticipantsskippedtheexplicitcalculation,andweremorelikely to go with their (incorrect) initial hunch that the ban had worked, nomatterwhattheirintelligence.Inthenameoffairness,Kahanalsoconductedthesameexperiment,butwith

thedatareversed,sothatthedatasupportedtheban.Now,itwasthenumerateliberals who came to the right answer – and the numerate conservatives who

were more likely to be wrong. Overall, the most numerate participants werearound45percentmorelikelytoreadthedatacorrectlyifitconformedtotheirexpectations.The upshot, according to Kahan and other scientists studying motivated

reasoning,isthatsmartpeopledonotapplytheirsuperiorintelligencefairly,butinsteaduse it ‘opportunistically’ topromote theirown interestsandprotect thebeliefs thataremost important to their identities. Intelligencecanbea tool forpropagandaratherthantruth-seeking.34It’s a powerful finding, capable of explaining the enormous polarisation on

issues such as climate change (see graph below).35 The scientific consensus isthat carbonemissions fromhumansourcesare leading toglobalwarming,andpeoplewith liberalpoliticsaremore likely toaccept thismessage if theyhavebetternumeracyskillsandbasicscientificknowledge.36Thatmakessense,sincethesepeopleshouldalsobemorelikelytounderstandtheevidence.Butamongfree-market capitalists, the opposite is true: themore scientifically literate andnumeratetheyare,themorelikelytheyaretorejectthescientificconsensusandtobelievethatclaimsofclimatechangehavebeenexaggerated.

Thesamepolarisationcanbeseenforpeople’sviewsonvaccination,37fracking38and evolution.39 In each case, greater education and intelligence simply helpspeopletojustifythebeliefsthatmatchtheirpolitical,socialorreligiousidentity.

(Tobeabsolutelyclear,overwhelmingevidenceshowsthatvaccinesaresafeandeffective,carbonemissionsarechangingtheclimate,andevolutionistrue.)Thereisevensomeevidencethat,thankstomotivatedreasoning,exposureto

theoppositepointofviewmayactuallybackfire;notonlydopeoplereject thecounterarguments,buttheirownviewsbecomeevenmoredeeplyentrenchedasa result. Inotherwords, an intelligent personwith an inaccuratebelief systemmaybecomemoreignorantafterhavingheardtheactualfacts.Wecouldseethiswith Republicans’ opinions about Obamacare in 2009 and 2010: people withgreater intelligence were more likely to believe claims that the new systemwouldbringaboutOrwellian ‘deathpanels’ todecidewho livedanddied,andtheirviewswereonly reinforcedwhen theywerepresentedwithevidence thatwasmeanttodebunkthemyths.40Kahan’s research has primarily examined the role ofmotivated reasoning in

politicaldecisionmaking–wheretheremaybenorightorwronganswer–buthesaysitmaystretchtootherformsofbelief.HepointstoastudybyJonathanKoehler, then at the University of Texas at Austin, who presentedparapsychologists and sceptical scientists with data on two (fictional)experimentsintoextrasensoryperception.The participants should have objectivelymeasured the quality of the papers

and the experimental design. ButKoehler found that they often came to verydifferentconclusions,dependingonwhethertheresultsofthestudiesagreedordisagreedwiththeirownbeliefsintheparanormal.41

Whenweconsider thepowerofmotivated reasoning,ConanDoyle’sbelief infraudulentmediumsseemslessparadoxical.Hisvery identityhadcometorestonhisexperimentswiththeparanormal.Spiritualismwasthefoundationofhisrelationship with his wife, and many of his friendships; he had investedsubstantialsumsofmoneyinaspiritualistchurch42andwrittenmorethantwentybooks and pamphlets on the subject. Approaching old age, his beliefs alsoprovided him with the comforting certainty of the afterlife. ‘It absolutelyremovesall fearofdeath,’hesaid,andthebeliefconnectedhimwith thosehehadalreadylost43?surelytwoofthestrongestmotivationsimaginable.Allofthiswouldseemtochimewithresearchshowingthatbeliefsmayfirst

arisefromemotionalneeds–anditisonlyafterwardsthattheintellectkicksintorationalisethefeelings,howeverbizarretheymaybe.ConanDoylecertainlyclaimedtobeobjective.‘Inthese41years,Ineverlost

anyopportunityofreadingandstudyingandexperimentingonthismatter,’44he

boastedtowardstheendofhislife.Buthewasonlylookingfortheevidencethatsupportedhispointofview,whiledismissingeverythingelse.45It did notmatter that thiswas themind that created SherlockHolmes – the

‘perfect reasoning and observing machine’. Thanks to motivated reasoning,Conan Doyle could simply draw on that same creativity to explain awayHoudini’sscepticism.AndwhenhesawthephotosoftheCottingleyFairies,hefelt he had found the proof that would convince the world of other psychicphenomena. In his excitement, his mind engineered elaborate scientificexplanations – without seriously questioning whether it was just a schoolgirljoke.When they confessed decades after ConanDoyle’s death, the girls revealed

that they simplyhadn’t bargained for grown-ups’ desire to be fooled. ‘I nevereventhoughtofitasbeingafraud,’oneofthegirls,FrancesGriffiths,revealedin a 1985 interview. ‘It was just Elsie and I having a bit of fun and I can’tunderstandtothisdaywhytheyweretakenin–theywantedtobetakenin.’46Followingtheir increasinglypublicdisagreement,Houdini lostall respectfor

Conan Doyle; he had started the friendship believing that the writer was an‘intellectual giant’ and ended it by writing that ‘one must be half-witted tobelieve some of these things’. But given what we know about motivatedreasoning, the very opposite may be true: only an intellectual giant could becapableofbelievingsuchthings.*

*InhisbookTheRationalityQuotient,KeithStanovichpointsoutthatGeorgeOrwellfamouslycametomuchthesameconclusionwhendescribingvariousformsofnationalism,Orwellwritingthat:‘Thereisnolimittothefolliesthatcanbeswallowedifoneisundertheinfluenceoffeelingsofthiskind...Onehastobelongtotheintelligentsiatobelievethingslikethat:Noordinarymancouldbesuchafool.’

Many other great intellects may have lost their minds thanks to blinkeredthinking.Theirmistakesmaynotinvolveghostsandfairies,buttheystillledtoyears of wasted effort and disappointment as they toiled to defend theindefensible.Consider Albert Einstein, whose name has become a synonym for genius.

Whilestillworkingasyoungpatentclerk in1905,heoutlined the foundationsfor quantum mechanics, special relativity, and the equation for mass?energyequivalence (E=MC2) – the concept forwhich he ismost famous.47 A decadelaterhewouldannouncehistheoryofgeneralrelativity–tearingthroughIsaacNewton’slawsofgravity.Buthisambitionsdidnotstopthere.Fortheremainderofhislife,heplanned

to build an even grander, all-encompassing understanding of the universe thatmeldedtheforcesofelectromagnetismandgravityintoasingle,unifiedtheory.‘IwanttoknowhowGodcreatedthisworld.Iamnotinterestedinthisorthatphenomenon, in the spectrum of this or that element, I want to know histhoughts’,hehadwrittenpreviously–andthiswashisattempttocapturethosethoughtsintheirentirety.After a period of illness in 1928, he thought he had done it. ‘I have laid a

wonderfulegg...Whetherthebirdemergingfromthiswillbeviableandlong-livedliesinthelapofthegods’,hewrote.Butthegodssoonkilledthatbird,andmanymore dashed hopes would follow over the next twenty-five years, withfurtherannouncementsofanewUnifiedTheory,onlyforthemalltofalllikeadead weight. Soon before his death, Einstein had to admit that ‘most of myoffspringendupveryyounginthegraveyardofdisappointedhopes’.Einstein’s failures were no surprise to those around him, however. As his

biographer,thephysicistHansOhanian,wroteinhisbookEinstein’sMistakes:‘Einstein’sentireprogramwasanexerciseinfutility...Itwasobsoletefromthestart.’Themoreheinvestedinthetheory,however,themorereluctanthewastolet it go. Freeman Dyson, a colleague at Princeton, was apparently soembarrassedbyEinstein’sfoggythinking thathespenteightyearsdeliberatelyavoidinghimoncampus.TheproblemwasthatEinstein’sfamousintuition–whichhadservedhimso

wellin1905–hadledhimseriouslyastray,andhehadbecomedeafandblindtoanythingthatmightdisprovehistheories.Heignoredevidenceofnuclearforcesthatwereincompatiblewithhisgrandidea,forinstance,andcametodespisetheresultsofquantumtheory–afieldhehadoncehelpedtoestablish.48Atscientificmeetings,hewouldspendallday trying tocomeupwith increasingly intricatecounter-examples to disprove his rivals, only to have been disproved by theevening.49Hesimply‘turnedhisbackonexperiments’andtriedto‘ridhimselfofthefacts’,accordingtohiscolleagueatPrinceton,RobertOppenheimer.50Einsteinhimselfrealisedasmuchtowardstheendofhislife.‘Imustseemlike

anostrichwhoforeverburiesitsheadintherelativisticsandinordernottofacethe evil quanta’, he once wrote to his friend, the quantum physicist Louis deBroglie. But he continued on his fool’s errand, and even on his deathbed, hescribbledpagesofequationstosupporthiserroneoustheories,asthelastembersof his genius faded. All of which sounds a lot like the sunk cost fallacyexacerbatedbymotivatedreasoning.Thesamestubbornapproachcanbefoundinmanyofhisotherideas.Having

supported communism,he continually turnedablind eye to the failingsof theUSSR,forinstance.51Einstein,atleast,hadnotlefthisdomainofexpertise.Butthissingle-minded

determination to prove oneself right may be particularly damaging whenscientists stray outside their usual territory, a fact that was noted by thepsychologistHansEysenck.‘Scientists,especiallywhentheyleavetheparticularfield in which they are specialized, are just as ordinary, pig-headed, andunreasonable as everybody else’, hewrote in the 1950s. ‘And their unusuallyhigh intelligence only makes their prejudices all the more dangerous.’52 Theirony is that Eysenck himself came to believe theories of the paranormal,showingtheblinkeredanalysisofevidenceheclaimedtodeplore.Somesciencewritershaveevencoinedaterm–NobelDisease–todescribe

the unfortunate habit ofNobel Prizewinners to embrace dubious positions onvarious issues. The most notable case is, of course, KaryMullis, the famousbiochemistwiththestrangeconspiracytheorieswhowemetintheintroduction.Hisautobiography,DancingNakedintheMindField,isalmostatextbookinthecontorted explanations the intelligent mind can conjure to justify itspreconceptions.53OtherexamplesincludeLinusPauling,whodiscoveredthenatureofchemical

bonds between atoms, yet spent decades falsely claiming that vitaminsupplementscouldcurecancer;54andLucMontagnier,whohelpeddiscovertheHIVvirus, butwhohas since espoused somebizarre theories that evenhighlydiluted DNA can cause structural changes to water, leading it to emitelectromagnetic radiation. Montagnier believes that this phenomenon can belinkedtoautism,Alzheimer’sdiseaseandvariousseriousconditions,butmanyother scientists reject these claims, leading to a petition of 35 other Nobellaureatesasking forhim tobe removed fromhisposition inanAIDSresearchcentre.55AlthoughwemaynotbeworkingonaGrandUnifiedTheory,thereisalesson

hereforallofus.Whateveryourprofession,thetoxiccombinationofmotivatedreasoningandthebiasblindspotcouldstillleadustojustifyprejudicedopinionsaboutthosearoundus,pursuefailingprojectsatwork,orrationaliseahopelessloveaffair.

Astwofinalexamples,let’slookattwoofhistory’sgreatestinnovators:ThomasEdisonandSteveJobs.Withmorethanathousandpatentstohisname,ThomasEdisonwasclearlyin

possessionofanextraordinarilyfertilemind.Butoncehehadconceivedanidea,hestruggledtochangehismind–asshowninthe‘battleofthecurrents’.Inthelate1880s,havingproducedthefirstworkingelectriclightbulb,Edison

soughttofindawaytopowerAmerica’shomes.Hisideawastosetupapowergridusingasteady‘directcurrent’(DC),buthisrivalGeorgeWestinghousehadfound a cheaper means of transmitting electricity with the alternating current(AC)weusetoday.WhereasDCisaflatlineofasinglevoltage,ACoscillatesrapidlybetweentwovoltages,whichstopsitlosingenergyoverdistance.EdisonclaimedthatACwassimplytoodangerous,sinceitmoreeasilyleads

todeathbyelectrocution.Althoughthisconcernwaslegitimate,theriskcouldbereduced with proper insulation and regulations, and the economic argumentswere just too strong to ignore: it really was the only feasible way to provideelectricitytothemassmarket.The rational response would have been to try to capitalise on the new

technologyandimproveitssafety,ratherthancontinuingtopursueDC.OneofEdison’sownengineers,NikolaTesla,hadalreadytoldhimasmuch.Butratherthantakinghisadvice,EdisondismissedTesla’s ideasandevenrefusedtopayhim for his research intoAC, leadingTesla to takehis ideas toWestinghouseinstead.56Refusingtoadmitdefeat,EdisonengagedinanincreasinglybitterPRwarto

try to turn public opinion against AC. It began with macabre publicdemonstrations, electrocuting stray dogs and horses. And when Edison heardthataNewYorkcourtwas investigating thepossibilityofusingelectricity forexecutions,hesawyetanotheropportunitytoprovethatpoint,asheadvisedthecourton thedevelopmentof theelectricchair– in thehope thatACwouldbeforever associated with death. It was a shocking moral sacrifice for someonewhohadoncedeclaredthathewould‘joinheartilyinanefforttototallyabolishcapitalpunishment’.57Youmayconsiderthesetobesimplytheactionsofaruthlessbusinessman,but

thebattlereallywasfutile.Asonejournalstatedin1889:‘Itisimpossiblenowthat anyman, or body of men, should resist the course of alternating currentdevelopment. . .Joshuamaycommandthesuntostandstill,butMrEdisonisnot Joshua.’58 By the 1890s, he had to admit defeat, eventually turning hisattentiontootherprojects.ThehistorianofscienceMarkEssigwrites that ‘thequestion isnot somuch

why Edison’s campaign failed as why he thought it might succeed’.59 But anunderstandingofcognitiveerrorssuchasthesunkcosteffect,thebiasblindspot

and motivated reasoning helps to explain why such a brilliant mind maypersuadeitselftocontinuedownsuchadisastrouspath.The co-founder of Apple, Steve Jobs, was similarly a man of enormous

intelligence and creativity, yet he too sometimes suffered from a dangerouslyskewed perception of the world. According to Walter Isaacson’s officialbiography, his acquaintances described a ‘reality distortion field’ – ‘aconfounding mélange of charismatic rhetorical style, indomitable will, andeagernesstobendanyfacttofitthepurposeathand’,inthewordsofhisformercolleagueAndyHertzfeld.Thatsingle-mindeddeterminationhelpedJobstorevolutionisetechnology,but

it also backfired in his personal life, particularly after hewas diagnosedwithpancreatic cancer in 2003. Ignoring his doctor’s advice, he instead opted forquackcuressuchasherbalremedies,spiritualhealingandastrictfruitjuicediet.According toall thosearoundhim,Jobshadconvincedhimself thathiscancerwas something he could cure himself, and his amazing intelligence seems tohaveallowedhimtodismissanyopinionstothecontrary.60Bythetimehefinallyunderwentsurgery,thecancerhadprogressedtoofarto

betreatable,andsomedoctorsbelieveJobsmaystillhavebeenalivetodayifhehadsimplyfollowedmedicaladvice.Ineachcase,weseethatgreaterintellectisusedforrationalisationandjustification,ratherthanlogicandreason.

We have now seen three broad reasons why an intelligent person may actstupidly. Theymay lack elements of creative or practical intelligence that areessentialfordealingwithlife’schallenges;theymaysufferfrom‘dysrationalia’,using biased intuitive judgements to make decisions; and they may use theirintelligence to dismiss any evidence that contradicts their views thanks tomotivatedreasoning.Harvard University’s David Perkins described this latter form of the

intelligence trap tomebestwhenhe said itwas like ‘puttingamoat aroundacastle’.ThewriterMichaelShermer,meanwhile,describesitascreating‘logic-tight compartments’ inour thinking.But I personallyprefer to thinkof it as arunaway car,without the right steering or navigation to correct its course.AsDescarteshadoriginallyput it: ‘thosewhogoforwardbutveryslowlycangetfurther,iftheyalwaysfollowtherightroad,thanthosewhoareintoomuchofahurryandstrayoffit’.Whatevermetaphoryouchoose,thequestionofwhyweevolvedthiswayisa

seriouspuzzleforevolutionarypsychologists.Whentheybuildtheirtheoriesof

humannature,theyexpectcommonbehaviourstohavehadaclearbenefittooursurvival.Buthowcoulditeverbeanadvantagetobeintelligentbutirrational?Onecompellinganswercomes from the recentworkofHugoMercierat the

FrenchNationalCentreforScientificResearch,andDanSperberattheCentralEuropeanUniversityinBudapest.‘Ithinkit’snowsoobviousthatwehavethemysidebias,thatpsychologistshaveforgottenhowweirditis,’Merciertoldmeinan interview. ‘But if you lookat it fromanevolutionarypointofview, it’sreallymaladaptive.’Itisnowwidelyacceptedthathumanintelligenceevolved,atleastinpart,to

dealwiththecognitivedemandsofmanagingmorecomplexsocieties.Evidencecomes from the archaeological record, which shows that our skull size didindeed grow as our ancestors started to live in bigger groups.61 We needbrainpower to keep trackof others’ feelings, to knowwhoyou can trust,whowill take advantage and who you need to keep sweet. And once languageevolved,weneededtobeeloquent,tobeabletobuildsupportwithinthegroupand bring others to our way of thinking. Those arguments didn’t need to belogicaltobringusthosebenefits;theyjusthadtobepersuasive.Andthatsubtledifference may explain why irrationality and intelligence often go hand inhand.62Consider motivated reasoning and the myside bias. If human thought is

primarily concerned with truth-seeking, we should weigh up both sides of anargumentcarefully.Butifwejustwanttopersuadeothersthatwe’reright,thenwe’regoingtoseemmoreconvincingifwecanpullasmuchevidenceforourview together. Conversely, to avoid being duped ourselves, we need to beespeciallyscepticalofothers’arguments,andsoweshouldpayextraattentiontointerrogatingandchallenginganyevidencethatdisagreeswithourownbeliefs–justasKahanhadshown.Biased reasoning isn’t just an unfortunate side effect of our increased

brainpower,inotherwords–itmayhavebeenitsraisond’être.In the face-to-face encounters of our ancestors’ small gatherings, good

arguments should have counteracted the bad, enhancing the overall problemsolvingtoachieveacommongoal;ourbiasescouldbetemperedbyothers.ButMercier and Sperber say these mechanisms can backfire if we live in atechnological and social bubble, and miss the regular argument andcounterargument that could correct our biases. As a result, we simplyaccumulatemoreinformationtoaccommodateourviews.Before we learn how to protect ourselves from those errors, we must first

exploreonemoreformoftheintelligencetrap–‘thecurseofexpertise’,whichdescribes the ways that acquired knowledge and professional experience (asopposedtoourlargelyinnategeneralintelligence)canalsobackfire.AsweshallseeinoneoftheFBI’smostnotoriousmix-ups,youreallycanknowtoomuch.

3

Thecurseofknowledge:Thebeautyandfragilityoftheexpertmind

One Friday evening in April 2004, the lawyer Brandon Mayfield made apanickedcalltohismother.‘Ifweweretosomehowsuddenlydisappear.. .ifagents of the government secretly sweep in and arrest us, I would like yourassurance thatyoucouldcome toPortlandon the first flightand take thekidsbacktoKansaswithyou,’hetoldher.1Anattorneyand formerofficer in theUSArmy,Mayfieldwasnotnormally

prone toparanoia,butAmericawasstill reeling from the falloutof9/11.AsaMuslimconvert,marriedtoanEgyptianwife,Mayfieldsensedanatmosphereof‘hysteria and islamophobia’, and a series of strange events now led him tosuspectthathewasthetargetofinvestigation.OnedayhiswifeMonahad returnedhome fromwork to find that the front

doorwasdouble-lockedwith a topbolt,when the familynevernormallyusedthe extra precaution. Another day, Mayfield walked into his office to find adustyfootprintonhisofficedesk,underaloosetileontheceiling,eventhoughno one should have entered the room overnight. On the road, meanwhile, amysterious car, driven by a stocky fifty-or sixty-year-old, seemed to havefollowedhimtoandfromthemosque.Given thepolitical climate, he fearedhewasunder surveillance. ‘Therewas

this realisation that it could be a secret government agency,’ he toldme in aninterview.BythetimeMayfieldmadethatimpassionedphonecalltohismother,hesaid,hehadbegun to feelan ‘impendingdoom’abouthis fate,andhewasscaredaboutwhatthatwouldmeanforhisthreechildren.At around 9:45 a.m. on 6 May, those fears were realised with three loud

thumps on his office door. Two FBI agents had arrived to arrestMayfield inconnectionwiththehorrendousMadridbombings,whichhadkilled192peopleandinjuredaroundtwothousandon11Marchthatyear.Hishandswerecuffedbehindhisback,andhewasbundledintoacarandtakentothelocalcourthouse.

Hepleadedthatheknewnothingoftheattacks;whenhefirstheardthenewshe had been shocked by the ‘senseless violence’, he said. But FBI agentsclaimed to have found his fingerprint on a blue shopping bag containingdetonators, left in a van inMadrid.TheFBIdeclared itwas a ‘100%positivematch’;therewasnochancetheywerewrong.Ashedescribes inhisbook, ImprobableCause,Mayfieldwasheld inacell

while the FBI put together a case to present to the Grand Jury. He washandcuffedandshackledinlegironsandbellychains,andsubjectedtofrequentstripsearches.Hislawyerspaintedableakpicture:iftheGrandJurydecidedhewasinvolved

in theattacks,hecouldbeshippedtoGuantanamoBay.As the judgestated inhis first hearing, fingerprints are considered the gold standard of forensicevidence:peoplehadpreviouslybeenconvictedformurderbasedonlittlemorethanasingleprint.Thechancesoftwopeoplesharingthesamefingerprintwereconsideredtobebillionstoone.2Mayfield tried to conceive how his fingerprint could have appeared on a

plastic carrier bag more than 5,400 miles away – across the entire Americancontinent andAtlanticOcean.But therewasnoway.His lawyerswarned thattheveryactofdenyingsuchastrong lineofevidencecouldmean thathewasindictedforperjury.‘I thoughtIwasbeingframedbyunnamedofficials–thatwastheimmediatethought,’Mayfieldtoldme.His lawyers eventually persuaded the court to employ an independent

examiner,KennethMoses,tore-analysetheprints.LikethoseoftheFBI’sownexperts, Moses’ credentials were impeccable. He had served with the SanFrancisco Police Department for twenty-seven years, and had garnered manyawardsandhonoursduringhisservice.3ItwasMayfield’slastchance,andon19May–afternearly twoweeks inprison–he returned to the tenth floorof thecourthouse,tohearMosesgivehistestimonybyvideoconference.As Moses’ testimony unfurled, Mayfield’s worst fears were confirmed. ‘I

comparedthelatentprintstotheknownprintsthatweresubmittedonBrandonMayfield,’Mosestoldthecourt.‘AndIconcludedthatthelatentprintistheleftindexfingerofMrMayfield.’4Littledidheknowthataremarkable turnofevents takingplaceontheother

sideoftheAtlanticOceanwouldsoonsavehim.Thatverymorning,theSpanishNationalPolicehadidentifiedanAlgerianman,OuhnaneDaoud,connectedwiththe bombings.Not only could they show that his finger better fitted the printpreviouslymatchedtoMayfield–includingsomeambiguousareasdismissedby

theFBI?buthisthumbalsomatchedanadditionalprintfoundonthebag.Hewasdefinitelytheirman.Mayfieldwasfreedthenextday,andbytheendofthemonth,theFBIwould

havetoreleaseahumiliatingpublicapology.What went wrong? Of all the potential explanations, a simple lack of skill

cannotbetheanswer:theFBI’sforensicsteamsareconsideredtobethebestintheworld.5Indeed,acloserlookattheFBI’smistakesrevealsthattheydidnotoccurdespiteitsexaminers’knowledge–theymayhaveoccurredbecauseofit.

Thepreviouschaptershaveexaminedhowgeneralintelligence–thecapacityforabstractreasoningmeasuredbyIQorSATs–canbackfire.Theemphasishereshouldbeonthewordgeneral, though,andyoumighthopewecouldmitigatethose errors through more specialised knowledge and professional expertise,cultivatedthroughyearsofexperience.Unfortunately,thelatestresearchshowsthatthesecanalsoleadustoerrinunexpectedways.Thesediscoveriesshouldnotbeconfusedwithsomeof thevaguercriticisms

that academics (such asPaulFrampton) live in an ‘ivory tower’ isolated from‘real life’. Instead, the latest researchhighlightsdangers in theexact situationswheremostpeoplewouldhopethatexperienceprotectsyoufrommistakes.If you are undergoing heart surgery, flying across the globe or looking to

invest anunexpectedwindfall,youwant tobe in thecareof adoctor,pilotoraccountant with a long and successful career behind them. If you want anindependent witness to verify a fingerprint match in a high-profile case, youchooseMoses.Yettherearenowvarioussocial,psychologicalandneurologicalreasonsthatexplainwhyexpertjudgementsometimesfailsatthetimeswhenitismostneeded–andthesourcesoftheseerrorsareintimatelyentwinedwiththeveryprocessesthatnormallyallowexpertstoperformsowell.‘Alotofthecornerstones,thebuildingblocksthatmaketheexpertanexpert

andallowthemtodotheirjobefficientlyandquickly,alsoentailvulnerabilities:youcan’thaveonewithouttheother,’explainsthecognitiveneuroscientistItielDror atUniversityCollegeLondon,whohas been at the forefront ofmuchofthis research. ‘Themore expert you are, themorevulnerableyou are inmanyways.’Clearly experts will still be right the majority of times, but when they are

wrong,itcanbedisastrous,andaclearunderstandingoftheoverlookedpotentialforexperterrorisessentialifwearetopreventthosefailings.As we shall soon discover, those frailties blinded the FBI examiners’

judgement – bringing about the string of bad decisions that led toMayfield’sarrest.Inaviationtheyhaveledtotheunnecessarydeathsofpilotsandcivilians,andinfinancetheycontributedtothe2008financialcrisis.

Before we examine that research, we first need to consider some coreassumptions. One potential source of expert error could be a sense of over-confidence. Perhaps experts over-reach themselves, believing their powers areinfallible?Theideawouldseemtofitwiththedescriptionsofthebiasblindspotthatweexploredinthelastchapter.Until recently, however, the bulk of the scientific research suggested the

opposite was true: it’s the incompetents who have an inflated view of theirabilities. Consider a classic study by David Dunning at the University ofMichiganandJustinKrugeratNewYorkUniversity.DunningandKrugerwereapparently inspired by the unfortunate case of McArthur Wheeler, whoattempted to rob twobanks inPittsburgh in1995.Hecommitted thecrimes inbroad daylight, and the police arrested him just hours later. Wheeler wasgenuinelyperplexed.‘ButIworethejuice!’heapparentlyexclaimed.Wheeler,itturnedout,believedacoatingoflemonjuice(thebasisofinvisibleink)wouldmakehimimperceptibleontheCCTVfootage.6Fromthisstory,DunningandKrugerwonderedifignoranceoftencomeshand

in hand with over-confidence, and set about testing the idea in a series ofexperiments. They gave students tests on grammar and logical reasoning, andthenaskedthemtoratehowwelltheythoughttheyhadperformed.Mostpeoplemisjudgedtheirownabilities,but thiswasparticularly truefor thepeoplewhoperformed the most poorly. In technical terms, their confidence was poorlycalibrated–theysimplyhadnoideajusthowbadtheywere.Crucially,Dunningand Kruger found that they could reduce that over-confidence by offeringtraining in the relevant skills. Not only did the participants get better at whatthey did; their increased knowledge also helped them to understand theirlimitations.7SinceDunningandKrugerfirstpublishedtheirstudyin1999,thefindinghas

been replicated many times, across many different cultures.8 One survey ofthirty-fourcountries–fromAustraliatoGermany,andBraziltoSouthKorea–examinedthemathsskillsoffifteen-year-oldstudents;onceagain,theleastablewereoftenthemostover-confident.9Unsurprisingly, the press have been quick to embrace the ‘Dunning?Kruger

Effect’, declaring that it is the reasonwhy ‘losershavedelusionsofgrandeur’

and ‘why incompetents think they are awesome’ and citing it as the cause ofPresidentDonaldTrump’smoreegotisticalstatements.10TheDunning-KrugerEffect shouldhaveanupside, though.Although itmay

bealarmingwhensomeonewho ishighly incompetentbutconfident reachesapositionofpower,itdoesatleastreassureusthateducationandtrainingworkaswewould hope, improving not just our knowledge but ourmetacognition andself-awareness.Thiswas, incidentally,BertrandRussell’s thinking in an essaycalled ‘TheTriumph of Stupidity’ inwhich he declared that ‘the fundamentalcauseofthetroubleisthatinthemodernworldthestupidarecocksurewhiletheintelligentarefullofdoubt’.Unfortunately,thesediscoveriesdonotpaintthewholepicture.Inchartingthe

shakyrelationshipbetweenperceivedandactualcompetence,theseexperimentshad focusedongeneral skills andknowledge, rather than themore formal andextensive study that comeswith auniversitydegree, for example.11Andwhenyoudoinvestigatepeoplewithanadvancededucation,amoreunsettlingvisionoftheexpertbrainbeginstoemerge.In2010,agroupofmathematicians,historiansandathleteswere taskedwith

identifying certain names that represented significant figures within eachdiscipline. They had to discern whether Johannes de Groot or Benoit Theronwerefamousmathematicians, for instance,and theycouldanswer,Yes,No,orDon’tKnow.Asyoumighthope,theexpertswerebetteratpickingouttherightpeople(suchasJohannesdeGroot,whoreallywasamathematician)iftheyfellwithintheirdiscipline.Buttheywerealsomorelikelytosaytheyrecognisedthemade-up figures (in this case,Benoit Theron).12When their self-perception ofexpertisewasunderquestion, theywould rather take aguess and ‘over-claim’theextentoftheirknowledgethanadmittheirignorancewitha‘don’tknow’.MatthewFisher atYaleUniversity,meanwhile, quizzeduniversity graduates

ontheircollegemajorforastudypublishedin2016.Hewantedtochecktheirknowledgeof the core topicsof thedegree, sohe first asked them to estimatehowwelltheyunderstoodsomeofthefundamentalprinciplesoftheirdiscipline;a physicist might have been asked to gauge their understanding ofthermodynamics;abiologist,todescribeKreb’sCycle.Unbeknown to the participants, Fisher then sprung a surprise test: they now

had to write a detailed description of the principles they claimed to know.Despite having declared a high level of knowledge, many stumbled andstruggledtowriteacoherentexplanation.Crucially,thiswasonlytruewithinthetopic of their degree. When graduates also considered topics beyond their

specialism,ormoregeneral,everydaysubjects, their initialestimates tended tobefarmorerealistic.13One likely reason is that the participants simply had not realised howmuch

theymight have forgotten since their degree (a phenomenon that Fisher callsmeta-forgetfulness). ‘People confuse their current level of understanding withtheirpeaklevelofknowledge,’Fishertoldme.Andthatmaysuggestaseriousproblemwith our education. ‘Themost cynical reading of it is thatwe’re notgivingstudentsknowledgethatstayswiththem,’Fishersaid.‘We’rejustgivingthemthesensetheyknowthings,whentheyactuallydon’t.Andthatseemstobecounter-productive.’The illusion of expertise may also make you more closed-minded. Victor

Ottati at LoyolaUniversity in Chicago has shown that priming people to feelknowledgeablemeansthattheywerelesslikelytoseekorlistentotheviewsofpeoplewhodisagreedwiththem.*Ottatinotesthat thismakessensewhenyouconsider the social norms surrounding expertise; we assume that an expertalready has the credentials to stick to their opinions, which he calls ‘earneddogmatism’.14

*TheJapanese,incidentally,haveencodedtheseideasinthewordshoshin,whichencapsulatesthefertilityofthebeginner’smindanditsreadinesstoacceptnewideas.AstheZenmonkShunryuSuzukiputitinthe1970s:‘Inthebeginner’smindtherearemanypossibilities;intheexpert’s,therearefew.’Inmanycases,ofcourse,expertsreallymayhavebetterjustificationstothink

whattheydo.Butiftheyover-estimatetheirownknowledge–asFisher’sworkmightsuggest–andthenstubbornlyrefusetoseekoracceptanother’sopinion,theymayquicklyfindthemselvesoutoftheirdepth.Ottati speculates that this fact could explain why some politicians become

more entrenched in their opinions and fail to update their knowledge or seekcompromise–astateofmindhedescribesas‘myopicover-self-confidence’.Earned dogmatism might also further explain the bizarre claims of the

scientists with ‘Nobel Disease’ such as Kary Mullis. SubrahmanyanChandrasekhar, the Nobel Prize-winning Indian-American astrophysicist,observedthistendencyinhiscolleagues.‘Thesepeoplehavehadgreatinsightsandmadeprofounddiscoveries.Theyimagineafterwardsthatthefactthattheysucceededsotriumphantlyinoneareameanstheyhaveaspecialwayoflookingatsciencethatmustberight.Butsciencedoesn’tpermitthat.Naturehasshownoverandoveragain that thekindsof truthwhichunderlienature transcendthemostpowerfulminds.’15

Inflatedself-confidenceandearneddogmatismare just thestartof theexpert’sflaws, and to understand the FBI’s errors, we have to delve deeper into theneuroscienceofexpertiseandthewaysthatextensivetrainingcanpermanentlychangeourbrain’sperception–forgoodandbad.ThestorybeginswithaDutchpsychologistnamedAdriaandeGroot,whois

sometimesconsideredthepioneerofcognitivepsychology.Beginninghiscareerduring the SecondWorldWar, deGroot had been something of a prodigioustalent at school and university – showing promise inmusic,mathematics andpsychology–butthetensepoliticalsituationontheeveofthewarofferedfewopportunities to pursue academia after graduation. Instead, de Groot foundhimself scraping together a living as a high-school teacher, and later, as anoccupationalpsychologistforarailwaycompany.16DeGroot’s realpassionwaschess,however.Aconsiderably talentedplayer,

hehadrepresentedhiscountryataninternationaltournamentinBuenosAires,17anddecidedtointerviewotherplayersabouttheirstrategiestoseeiftheycouldreveal the secrets of exceptional performance.18 He began by showing them asamplechessboardbeforeaskingthemtotalkthroughtheirmentalstrategiesastheydecidedonthenextmove.DeGroothad initially suspected that their talentsmight arise from thebrute

forceoftheirmentalcalculations:perhapstheyweresimplybetteratcrunchingthepossiblemovesandsimulatingtheconsequences.Thisdidn’tseemtobethecase,however: theexpertsdidn’treporthavingcycledthroughmanypositions,andtheyoftenmadeuptheirmindswithinafewseconds,whichwouldnothavegiventhemenoughtimetoconsiderthedifferentstrategies.Follow-upexperimentsrevealedthattheplayers’apparentintuitionwasinfact

anastonishingfeatofmemory,achievedthroughaprocessthatisnowknownas‘chunking’. The expert player stops seeing the game in terms of individualpieces and instead breaks the board into bigger units – or ‘complexes’ – ofpieces.Inthesamewaysthatwordscanbecombinedintolargersentences,thosecomplexes can then form templates or psychological scripts known as‘schemas’, each of which represents a different situation and strategy. Thistransforms the board into somethingmeaningful, and it is thought to be thereasonthatsomechessgrandmasterscanplaymultiplegamessimultaneously–evenwhileblindfolded.Theuseofschemassignificantlyreducestheprocessingworkloadfortheplayer’sbrain;ratherthancomputingeachpotentialmovefromscratch,expertssearchthroughavastmentallibraryofschemastofindthemove

thatfitstheboardinfrontofthem.DeGrootnotedthatover timetheschemascanbecomedeeply‘engrainedin

the player’, meaning that the right solution may come to mind automaticallywith just a mere glance at the board, which neatly accounts for thosephenomenal flashes of brilliance that we have come to associate with expertintuition. Automatic, engrained behaviours also free up more of the brain’sworking memory, which might explain how experts operate in challengingenvironments. ‘If this were not the case,’ de Groot later wrote, ‘it would becompletely impossible to explain why some chess players can still playbrilliantlywhileundertheinfluenceofalcohol.’19DeGroot’sfindingswouldeventuallyofferawayoutofhistediousjobsatthe

high school and railway, earning him a doctorate from the University ofAmsterdam.Andithassinceinspiredcountlessotherstudiesinmanydomains–explaining the talent of everyone from Scrabble and poker champions to theastonishing performances of elite athletes like SerenaWilliams, and the rapidcodingofworld-classcomputerprogrammers.20Although theexactprocesseswilldifferdependingon theparticular skill, in

eachcasetheexpertisbenefitingfromavastlibraryofschemasthatallowsthemtoextractthemostimportantinformation,recognisetheunderlyingpatternsanddynamics,andreactwithanalmostautomaticresponsefromapre-learntscript.21Thistheoryofexpertisemayalsohelpustounderstandlesscelebratedtalents,

such as the extraordinary navigation ofLondon taxi drivers through the city’s25,000 streets. Rather than remembering the whole cityscape, they have builtschemas of known routes, so that the sight of a landmark will immediatelysuggest thebestpath fromA toB,dependingon the traffic at hand–withoutthemhavingtorecallandprocesstheentiremap.22Even burglars may operate using the same neural processes. Asking real

convicts to take part in virtual reality simulations of their crimes, researchershave demonstrated that more experienced burglars have amassed a set ofadvancedschemasbasedonthefamiliarlayoutsofBritishhomes,allowingthemtoautomaticallyintuit thebestroutethroughahouseandtoalightonthemostvaluable possessions.23As one prison inmate told the researchers: ‘The searchbecomesanaturalinstinct,likeamilitaryoperation–itbecomesroutine.’24There is no denying that the expert’s intuition is a highly efficient way of

workinginthevastmajorityofsituationstheyface–anditisoftencelebratedasaformofalmostsuperhumangenius.Unfortunately,itcanalsocomewithcostlysacrifices.

One is flexibility: the expert may lean so heavily on existing behaviouralschemas that they struggle to cope with change.25 When tested on theirmemories,experiencedLondontaxidriversappearedtostrugglewith therapiddevelopmentofCanaryWharfattheendofthetwentiethcentury,forinstance;they just couldn’t integrate the new landmarks and update their old mentaltemplatesofthecity.26Similarly,anexpertgameschampionwillfindithardertolearnanewsetofrulesandanaccountantwillstruggletoadapttonewtaxlaws.Thesamecognitiveentrenchmentcanalsolimitcreativeproblemsolvingiftheexpert fails to look beyond their existing schemas for new ways to tackle achallenge.Theybecomeentrenchedinthefamiliarwaysofdoingthings.Thesecondsacrificemaybeaneyefordetail.Astheexpertbrainchunksup

therawinformationintomoremeaningfulcomponents,andworksatrecognisingbroadunderlyingpatterns,itlosessightofthesmallerelements.Thischangehasbeenrecordedinreal-timescansofexpertradiologists’brains:theytendtoshowgreater activity in the areas of the temporal lobe associated with advancedpattern recognition and symbolic meaning, but less activity in regions of thevisualcortexthatareassociatedwithcombingoverfinedetail.27Theadvantagewillbetheabilitytofilteroutirrelevantinformationandreducedistraction,butthisalsomeanstheexpertislesslikelytoconsideralltheelementsofaproblemsystematically, potentially causing them tomiss important nuances that donoteasilyfittheirmentalmaps.Itgetsworse.Expertdecisions,basedongistratherthancarefulanalysis,are

alsomoreeasilyswayedbyemotionsandexpectationsandcognitivebiasessuchas framing and anchoring.28 The upshot is that training may have actuallyreduced their rationalityquotient. ‘The expert’smindset –basedonwhat theyexpect,whattheyhope,whethertheyareinagoodmoodorbadmoodthatday–affects how they look at the information,’ Itiel Dror told me. ‘And the brainmechanisms – the actual cognitive architecture – that give an expert theirexpertiseareespeciallyvulnerabletothat.’The expert could, of course, override their intuitions and return to a more

detailed, systematic analysis. But often they are completely unaware of thedanger–theyhavethebiasblindspotthatweobservedinChapter2.29Theresultis a kind of ceiling to their accuracy, as these errors become more commonamong experts than those arising from ignorance or inexperience. When thatfallible, gist-based processing is combined with over-confidence and ‘earneddogmatism’, it gives us one final form of the intelligence trap – and theconsequencescanbetrulydevastating.

TheFBI’shandlingoftheMadridbombingsofferstheperfectexampleoftheseprocesses in action. Matching fingerprints is an extraordinarily complex job,withanalysesbasedonthreelevelsofincreasinglyintricatefeatures,frombroadpatterns,suchaswhetheryourprintshavealeft-orright-facingswirl,awhorloranarch,tothefinerdetailsoftheridgesinyourskin–whetheraparticularlinesplits in two, breaks into fragments, forms a loop called an ‘eye’ or endsabruptly.Overall,examinersmayaimtodetectaroundtenidentifyingfeatures.Eye-trackingstudiesrevealthatexpertexaminersoftengothroughthisprocess

semi-automatically,30chunkingthepictureinmuchthesamewayasdeGroot’schessgrandmasters31toidentifythefeaturesthatareconsideredthemostusefulforcomparison.Asaresult,thepointsofidentificationmayjustjumpoutattheexpertanalyst,whileanovicewouldhave tosystematically identifyandcheckeachone–makingitexactlythekindoftop-downdecisionmakingthatcanbeswayedbybias.Sure enough,Dror has found that expert examiners are prone to a range of

cognitiveerrorsthatmayarisefromsuchautomaticprocessing.Theyweremorelikelytofindapositivematchiftheyweretoldasuspecthadalreadyconfessedto the crime.32 The same was true when they were presented with emotivematerial,suchasagorypictureofamurdervictim.Althoughitshouldhavehadnobearingontheirobjective judgement, theexaminerswereagainmorelikelyto link the fingerprints, perhaps because they felt more motivated anddeterminedtocatchtheculprit.33Drorpointsoutthatthisisaparticularproblemwhen the available data is ambiguous and messy – and that was exactly theproblem with the evidence from Madrid. The fingerprint had been left on acrumpledcarrierbag;itwassmearedandinitiallydifficulttoread.The FBI had first run the fingerprint through a computer analysis to find

potentialsuspectsamongtheirmillionsofrecordedprints,andMayfield’snameappeared as the fourth of twenty possible suspects. At this stage, the FBIanalystsapparentlyhadno ideaofhisbackground–hisprintwasonlyon filefromateenagebrushwiththelaw.Butitseemslikelythattheywerehungryforamatch,andoncetheysettledonMayfieldtheybecamemoreandmoreinvestedintheirchoice–despiteserioussignsthattheyhadmadethewrongdecision.While theexaminershad indeed identifiedaroundfifteenpointsofsimilarity

in the fingerprints, they had consistently ignored significant differences.Mostspectacularly,awholesectionofthelatentprint–theupperleft-handportion–failedtomatchMayfield’sindexfinger.Theexaminershadarguedthatthisarea

might have come from someone else’s finger, who had touched the bag atanother time; or maybe it came fromMayfield himself, leaving another printsuper-imposed on the first one to create a confusing pattern. Eitherway, theydecidedtheycouldexcludethatanomaloussectionandsimplyfocusonthebitthatlookedmostlikeMayfield’s.If theanomaloussectionhadcomefromanotherfinger,however,youwould

expecttoseetell-talesigns.Thetwofingerswouldhavebeenatdifferentangles,for instance,meaning that the ridgeswould be overlapping and criss-crossing.Youmight also expect that the two fingerswould have touched the bagwithvarying pressure, affecting the appearance of the impressions left behind; onesectionmighthaveseemedfainterthanthefirst.Neithersignwaspresentinthiscase.FortheFBI’sstorytomakesense,thetwopeoplewouldhavegrippedthebag

with exactly the same force, and their prints would have had tomiraculouslyalign.Thechancesof thathappeningwere tiny.Themuch likelier explanationwasthattheprintcamefromasinglefinger–andthatfingerwasnotMayfield’s.These were not small subtleties but glaring holes in the argument. A

subsequent report by theOfficeof the InspectorGeneral (OIG) found that thecomplete neglect of this possibility was completely unwarranted. ‘Theexplanation required the examiners to accept an extraordinary set ofcoincidences’, the OIG concluded.34 Given those discrepancies, someindependent fingerprint examiners reviewing the case concluded thatMayfieldshouldhavebeenruledoutrightaway.35NorwasthistheonlyexampleofsuchcircularreasoningintheFBI’scase:the

OIG found that across thewhole of their analysis, the examiners appeared farmorelikelytodismissor ignoreanypointsof interest thatdisagreedwiththeirinitialhunch,whileshowingfarlessscrutinyfordetailsthatappearedtosuggestamatch.

The twomarked-up prints above, taken from the freely available OIG report,show just how many errors they made. The Madrid print is on the left;Mayfield’sisontheright.Admittedlytheerrorsarehardtoseeforacompletenovice,but ifyou lookverycarefullyyoucanmakeoutsomenotable featuresthatarepresentinonebutnottheother.TheOIG concluded that this was a clear case of the confirmation bias, but

givenwhatwe have learnt from the research on top-down processing and theselective attention that comeswith expertise, it is possible that the examinersweren’t even seeing those details in the first place.Theywere almost literallyblindedbytheirexpectations.These failings couldhavebeenuncoveredwith a truly independent analysis.

Butalthoughtheprintsmovedthroughmultipleexaminers,eachoneknewtheircolleague’s conclusions, swaying their judgement. (Dror calls this a ‘biascascade’.36)ThisalsospreadtotheofficersperformingthecovertsurveillanceofMayfield andhis family,whoevenmistookhisdaughter’sSpanishhomeworkfortraveldocumentsplacinghiminMadridatthetimeoftheattack.Those biases will only have been strengthened once the FBI looked into

Mayfield’spastanddiscoveredthathewasapractisingMuslim,andthathehadoncerepresentedoneofthePortlandSeventerroristsinachildcustodycase.Inreality,ithadnobearingonhispresumedguilt.37TheFBI’sconfidencewassogreatthattheyignoredadditionalevidencefrom

Spain’sNationalPolice(theSNP).Bymid-ApriltheSNPhadtriedandfailedtoverifythematch,yettheFBIlabquicklydisregardedtheirconcerns.‘Theyhadajustification for everything,’ Pedro LuisMélida Lledó, head of the fingerprintunit for the SNP, told the New York Times shortly after Mayfield wasexonerated.38‘ButIjustcouldn’tseeit.’

Records of the FBI’s internal emails confirm that the examiners wereunshakenbythedisagreement. ‘Ispokewith the lab thismorningandtheyareabsolutely confident that they have the match to the print ? No doubt aboutit!!!!!’ one FBI agent wrote. ‘They will testify in any court you swear theminto.’39ThatcompleteconvictionmayhavelandedMayfieldinGuantanamoBay–or

deathrow–iftheSNPhadnotsucceededinfindingtheirownevidencethathewasinnocent.Afewweeksafter theoriginalbombings, theyraidedahouseinsuburbanMadrid.Thesuspectsdetonatedasuicidebombratherthansubmittingto arrest, but the police managed to uncover documents bearing the name ofOuhnaneDaoud:anAlgeriannational,whoseprintshadbeenonrecordforanimmigration event. Mayfield was released, and within a week, he wascompletely exonerated of any connection to the attack. Challenging thelawfulnessofhisarrest,heeventuallyreceived$2millionincompensation.Thelessonhereisnotjustpsychological,butsocial.Mayfield’scaseperfectly

illustrates the ways that the over-confidence of experts themselves, combinedwithourblind faith in their talents, canamplify theirbiases–withpotentiallydevastatingeffect.ThechainoffailureswithintheFBIandthecourtroomshouldnot have been able to escalate so rapidly, given the lack of evidence thatMayfieldhadevenleftthecountry.

With this knowledge inmind,we can begin to understandwhy some existingsafetyprocedures–althoughoftenhighlyeffective–neverthelessfailtoprotectusfromexperterror.Consider aviation. Commonly considered to be one of the most reliable

industriesonEarth,airportsandpilotsalreadymakeuseofnumeroussafetynetstocatchanymomentarylapsesofjudgement.Theuseofchecklistsasremindersofcriticalprocedures–nowcommoninmanyothersectors–originatedinthecockpittoensure,forinstance,safertake-offsandlandings.Yet these strategies do not account for the blind spots that specifically arise

fromexpertise.Withexperience,thesafetyproceduresaresimplyintegratedintothe pilot’s automatic scripts and shrink from conscious awareness. The result,according to one study of nineteen serious accidents, is ‘an insidious movetowards less conservative judgement’ and it has led to people dyingwhen thepilot’sknowledgeshouldhaveprotectedthemfromerror.40ThiswasevidentatBlueGrassAirportinLexington,Kentucky,on25August

2007at6a.m.inthemorning.ComairFlight5191hadbeenduetotakeofffrom

runway22around6a.m.,butthepilotlineduponashorterrunway.Thankstothebiasesthatcamewiththeirextensiveexperience,boththepilotandco-pilotmissed all the warning signs that they were in the wrong place. The planesmashed through the perimeter fence, before ricocheting off an embankment,crashingintoapairoftrees,andburstingintoflames.Forty-sevenpassengers–andthepilot–diedasaresult.41Thecurseofexpertiseinaviationdoesn’tendthere.AswesawwiththeFBI’s

forensicscientists,experimentalstudieshaveshownthatapilot’sexpertisemayeven influence their visual perception – causing them to under-estimate thedepthofcloudinastorm,forinstance,basedontheirpriorexpectations.42The intelligence trap shows us that it’s not good enough to be fool proof;

proceduresneedtobeexpertprooftoo.Thenuclearpowerindustryisoneofthefewsectors toaccount for theautomatisation thatcomeswithexperience,withsomeplantsroutinelyswitchingtheorderofproceduresintheirsafetycheckstopreventinspectorsfromworkingonauto-pilot.Manyotherindustries,includingaviation,couldlearnthesamelesson.43

Agreaterappreciationofthecurseofexpertise–andthevirtuesofignorance–canalsoexplainhowsomeorganisationsweatherchaosanduncertainty,whileotherscrumbleinthechangingwind.Consider a study by Rohan Williamson of Georgetown University, who

recently examined the fortunes of banks during financial crises. He wasinterestedintherolesof‘independentdirectors’–peoplerecruitedfromoutsidetheorganisationtoadvisethemanagement.Theindependentdirectorismeanttoofferaformaself-regulation,whichshouldrequireacertainlevelofexpertise,and many do indeed come from other financial institutions. Due to thedifficulties of recruiting a qualified expert without any other conflictinginterests,however,someoftheindependentdirectorsmaybedrawnfromotherareasofbusiness,meaningtheymaylackthemoretechnicalknowledgeof theprocessesinvolvedinthebank’scomplextransactions.BodiessuchastheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment

(OECD) had previously argued that this lack of financial expertise may havecontributedtothe2008financialcrisis.44But what if they’d got it the wrong way around, and this ignorance was

actually a virtue? To find out, Williamson examined the data of 100 banksbefore and after the crisis. Until 2006, the results were exactly as youmightexpectifyouassumethatgreaterknowledgealwaysaidsdecisionmaking:banks

with an expert board performed slightly better than those with fewer (or no)independent directors holding a background in finance since they were morelikelytoendorseriskystrategiesthatpaidoff.Theirfortunestookadramaticturnafterthefinancialcrash,however;nowit

wasthebankswiththeleastexpertisethatperformedbetter.The‘expert’boardmembers,sodeeplyembeddedintheiralreadyriskydecisionmaking,didn’tpullback and adapt their strategy, while the less knowledgeable independentdirectorswere less entrenched andbiased, allowing them to reduce thebanks’lossesastheyguidedthemthroughthecrash.45Althoughthisevidencecomesfromfinance–anareanotalwaysrespectedfor

its rationality– the lessonscouldbeequallyvaluable foranyareaofbusiness.When the going gets tough, the less experiencedmembers of your teammaywellbethebestequippedtoguideyououtofthemess.

In forensic science, at least, there has been some movement to mitigate theexperterrorsbehindtheFBI’sinvestigationsintoBrandonMayfield.‘BeforeBrandonMayfield, the fingerprintcommunity really liked toexplain

any errors in the language of incompetence,’ says the UCLA law professorJenniferMnookin. ‘BrandonMayfieldopenedupa space for talkingabout thepossibilitythatreallygoodanalysts,usingtheirmethodscorrectly,couldmakeamistake.’46ItielDrorhasbeenattheforefrontoftheworkdetailingthesepotentialerrors

in forensic judgements, and recommending possible measures that couldmitigate the effects. For example, he advocates more advanced training thatincludes a cognitively informed discussion of bias, so that every forensicscientist is aware of the ways their judgement may be swayed, and practicalways to minimise these influences. ‘Like an alcoholic at an AA meeting,acknowledgingtheproblemisthefirststepinthesolution,’hetoldme.Another requirement is that forensic analystsmake their judgements ‘blind’,

withoutanyinformationbeyondthedirectevidenceathand,sothattheyarenotinfluencedbyexpectationbutseetheevidenceasobjectivelyaspossible.Thisisespeciallycrucialwhenseekinga secondopinion: the secondexaminer shouldhavenoknowledgeofthefirstjudgement.The evidence itself must be presented in the right way and in the right

sequence,usingaprocessthatItielDrorcalls‘LinearSequentialUnmasking’toavoidthecircularreasoningthathadafflictedtheexaminers’judgementaftertheMadridbombings.47For instance, theexaminersshouldfirstmarkupthelatent

printleftonthescenebeforeevenseeingthesuspect’sfingerprint,givingthempredetermined points of comparison. And they should not receive anyinformationaboutthecontextofacasebeforemakingtheirforensicjudgementof the evidence. This system is now used by the FBI and other agencies andpolicedepartmentsacrosstheUnitedStatesandothercountries.Dror’s message was not initially welcomed by the experts he has studied;

during our conversation at London’sWellcome Collection, he showedme anangry letter,published ina forensics journal, fromtheChairof theFingerprintSociety,whichshowedhowincensedmanyexaminerswereattheveryideathatthey may be influenced by their expectations and their emotions. ‘Anyfingerprint examinerwho comes to a decision on identification and is swayedeither way in that decision-making process under the influence of stories andgoryimagesiseithertotallyincapableofperformingthenobletasksexpectedofhim/her or is so immature he/she should seek employment atDisneyland’, hewrote.Recently,however,Drorhas found thatmoreandmore forcesare takinghis

suggestionsonboard.‘Thingsarechanging...butit’sslow.Youwillstillfindthatifyoutalktocertainexaminers,theywillsay“Ohno,we’reobjective.”’Mayfieldretainssomedoubtsaboutwhethertheseweregenuineunconscious

errors,ortheresultofadeliberateset-up,buthesupportsanyworkthathelpstohighlightthefrailtiesoffingerprintanalysis.‘Incourt,eachpieceofevidenceislikeabrickinawall,’hetoldme.‘Theproblemisthattheytreatthefingerprintanalysisas if it is thewholewall–but it’snotevenastrongbrick, letaloneawall.’Mayfieldcontinuestoworkasalawyer.Heisalsoanactivecampaigner,and

has co-written his account of the ordeal, called Improbable Cause, with hisdaughterSharia,inabidtoraiseawarenessoftheerosionofUScivillibertiesinthefaceofmorestringentgovernmentsurveillance.Duringourconversation,heappearedtoberemarkablystoicabouthisordeal.‘I’mtalkingtoyou–I’mnotlocked inGuantanamo, insomeKafkaesquesituation . . .So in thatsense, thejustice systemmust haveworked,’ he toldme. ‘But theremay bemanymorepeoplewhoarenotinsuchanenviableposition.’

With this knowledge inmind, we are now ready to start Part 2. Through thestoriesoftheTermites,ArthurConanDoyle,andtheFBI’sforensicexaminers,wehaveseenfourpotentialformsoftheintelligencetrap:

Wemaylackthenecessarytacitknowledgeandcounter-factualthinkingthatareessentialforexecutingaplanandpre-emptingtheconsequencesofyouractions.Wemaysufferfromdysrationalia,motivatedreasoningandthebiasblindspot,whichallowustorationaliseandperpetuateourmistakes,withoutrecognisingtheflawsinourownthinking.Thisresultsinusbuilding‘logic-tightcompartments’aroundourbeliefswithoutconsideringalltheavailableevidence.Wemayplacetoomuchconfidenceinourownjudgement,thankstoearneddogmatism,sothatwenolongerperceiveourlimitationsandover-reachourabilities.Finally,thankstoourexpertise,wemayemployentrenched,automaticbehavioursthatrenderusoblivioustotheobviouswarningsignsthatdisasterislooming,andmoresusceptibletobias.

Ifwereturntotheanalogyofthebrainasacar,thisresearchconfirmstheideathat intelligence is the engine, and education and expertise are its fuel; byequippinguswith thebasic abstract reasoning skills and specialistknowledge,they put our thinking inmotion, but simply addingmore powerwon’t alwayshelpyoutodrivethatvehiclesafely.Withoutcounter-factualthinkingandtacitknowledge–youmayfindyourselfupadeadend;ifyousufferfrommotivatedreasoning, earned dogmatism, and entrenchment, you risk simply driving incircles,orworse,offacliff.Clearly,we’veidentifiedtheproblem,butwearestillinneedofsomelessons

to teach us how to navigate these potential pitfallsmore carefully. Correctingthese omissions is now the purpose of a whole new scientific discipline –evidence-basedwisdom–whichweshallexploreinPart2.

PART2

Escapingtheintelligencetrap:Atoolkitforreasoninganddecision

making

4

Moralalgebra:Towardsthescienceofevidence-basedwisdom

WeareinthestuffyStateHouseofPennsylvania,inthesummerof1787.It isthemiddleofastiflingheatwave,butthewindowsanddoorshavebeenlockedagainstthepryingeyesofthepublic,andthesweatingdelegates–manydressedinthickwoollensuits1–arearguingfiercely.TheiraimistowritethenewUSConstitution – and the stakes could not be higher. Just eleven years after theAmerican colonies declared independence from England, the country’sgovernmentisunderfundedandnearlyimpotent,withseriousinfightingbetweenthestates.It’sclearthatanewpowerstructureisdesperatelyneededtopullthecountrytogether.Perhaps the thorniest issue concerns how the public will be represented in

Congress.Wouldtherepresentativesbechosenbyapopularvote,orselectedbylocalgovernments?Should largerstateshavemoreseats?Orshouldeachstatebe given equal representation – regardless of its size? Smaller states such asDelawarefeartheycouldbedominatedbylargerstatessuchasVirginia.2Withtempersashotastheswelteringweather,theclosedStateHouseproves

tobetheperfectpressurecooker,andbytheendofthesummertheConventionlooks set to self-combust. It falls to Benjamin Franklin – Philadelphia’s owndelegate–torelievethetension.At eighty-one, Franklin is the oldest man at the Convention, and the once

robust and hearty man is now so frail that he is sometimes carried into theproceedings on a sedan chair. Having personally signed the Declaration ofIndependence,hefearsthatAmerica’sreputationintheeyesoftheworldhingesontheirsuccess.‘Ifitdoesnotdogooditwilldoharm,asitwillshowthatwehavenotthewisdomenoughamongustogovernourselves’,hehadpreviouslywrittentoThomasJefferson,whowasabroadatthetime.3Franklinplaystheroleofthepragmatichost:aftertheday’sdebatingisover,

he invites thedelegates toeatanddrink inhisgarden, justa fewhundred feet

from the Convention, where he may encourage calmer discussion under thecooling shade of his mulberry tree. He sometimes brings out his scientificcollection,includingaprizedtwo-headedsnake–whichheusesasametaphorforindecisionanddisagreement.In the StateHouse itself, Franklin is often silent, and largely influences the

discussionsthroughpre-writtenspeeches.Butwhenhedoesintervene,hepleadsforcompromise.‘Whenabroadtableistobemade,andtheedgesofplanksdonot fit, the artist takes a little from both, andmakes a good joint,’ he arguesduringoneheateddebateinJune.4This pragmatic ‘carpentry’ eventually presents a solution for the issue of

states’ representation – a problem that was fast threatening to destroy theConvention. The idea came from Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, twodelegatesfromConnecticut,whoproposedthatCongresscouldbedividedintotwo houses, each voted for with a different system. In the Lower House,representativeswouldbeapportionedaccordingtopopulationsize(pleasingthelarger states) while the Senate would have an equal number of delegates perstate,regardlessofsize(pleasingthesmallerstates).The ‘GreatCompromise’ isat first rejectedby thedelegates–untilFranklin

becomesitschampion.Herefinestheproposal?arguingthattheHousewouldbe in charge of taxation and spending; the Senatewould dealwithmatters ofstatesovereigntyandexecutiveorders–anditisfinallyapprovedinaroundofvoting.On 17September, it is time for the delegates to decidewhether to put their

names to the finished document. Even now, success is not inevitable untilFranklinclosestheproceedingswitharousingspeech.‘I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do not at

presentapprove,butIamnotsureIshallneverapprovethem,’hedeclares.5‘Forhavinglivedlong,Ihaveexperiencedmanyinstancesofbeingobligedbybetterinformation, or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on importantsubjects,which I once thought right, but found tobeotherwise. It is thereforethattheolderIgrow,themoreaptIamtodoubtmyownjudgment,andtopaymorerespecttothejudgmentofothers.’Itisonlyright,hesays,thatagroupofsuchintelligentanddiversemenshould

comealongwiththeirownprejudicesandpassions–butheendsbyaskingthemto consider that their judgementsmight bewrong. ‘I cannot help expressing awishthateverymemberoftheConventionwhomaystillhaveobjectionstoit,wouldwithme, on this occasion, doubt a little of his own infallibility, and to

makemanifestourunanimity,puthisnametothisinstrument.’Thedelegatestakehisadviceand,onebyone,themajoritysignthedocument.

Relieved,FranklinlookstoGeorgeWashington’schair,withitsengravingofthesunon thehorizon.Hehas longpondered thedirectionof itsmovement. ‘Butnowat lengthIhave thehappiness toknowthat it isa risingandnotasettingsun.’

Franklin’s calm, stately reasoning is a stark contrast to the biased, myopicthinking that so often comes with great intelligence and expertise. He was,according tohisbiographerWalter Isaacson, ‘allergic toanythingsmackingofdogma’. He combined this open-minded attitude with practical good sense,incisive social skills and astute emotional regulation – ‘an empiricaltemperamentthatwasgenerallyaversetosweepingpassions’.6Hewasn’talwaysenlightenedoneveryissue.Hisearlyviewsonslavery,for

instance, are indefensible, although he later came to be the president of thePennsylvaniaAbolitionSociety.Butingeneral–andparticularlyinlaterlife–he managed to navigate extraordinarily complex dilemmas with astonishingwisdom.This same mindset had already allowed him to negotiate an alliance with

France,andapeacetreatywithBritain,duringtheWarofIndependence,leadinghim to be considered, according to one scholar, ‘the most essential andsuccessful American diplomat of all time’.7 And at the signing of theConstitution,itallowedhimtoguidethedelegatestothesolutionofaninfinitelycomplexandseeminglyintractablepoliticaldisagreement.Fortunately,psychologistsarenowbeginningtostudythiskindofmindsetin

thenewscienceof‘evidence-basedwisdom’.Providingadirectcontrasttoourpreviously narrow understanding of human reasoning, this research gives us aunifying theory thatexplainsmanyof thedifficultieswehaveexploredso far,whilealsoprovidingpracticaltechniquestocultivatewiserthinkingandescapetheintelligencetrap.As we shall see, the same principles can help us think more clearly about

everythingfromourmostpersonaldecisionstoimportantworldevents;thesamestrategiesmayevenliebehindtheastonishingpredictionsoftheworld’s‘super-forecasters’.

First,somedefinitions.Inplaceofesotericorspiritualconceptsofwisdom,this

scientific research has focused on secular definitions, drawn from philosophy,includingAristotle’sviewofpracticalwisdom– ‘the setof skills,dispositionsandpoliciesthathelpusunderstandanddeliberateaboutwhat’sgoodinlifeandhelpsus tochoose thebestmeansforpursuing those thingsover thecourseofthelife’,accordingtothephilosopherValerieTiberius.(Thiswas,incidentally,much the same definition that Franklin used.8) Inevitably, those skills andcharacteristics could include elements of the ‘tacit knowledge’we explored inChapter1,andvarioussocialandemotionalskills,aswellasencompassingthenewresearchonrationality.‘Nowifyouwanttobewiseit’simportanttoknowwehavebiaseslikethatandit’simportanttoknowwhatpoliciesyoucouldenacttogetpastthosebiases,’Tiberiussaid.9Evenso,itisonlyrelativelyrecentlythatscientistshavedevotedthemselvesto

the study of wisdom as its own construct.10 The first steps towards a moreempirical framework came in the 1970s,with ethnographic research exploringhow people experience wisdom in their everyday lives, and questionnairesexamining how elements of thinking associated with wisdom – such as ourabilitytobalancedifferentinterests–changeoveralifetime.Sureenough,wisereasoningdidseemtoincreasewithage.RobertSternberg(whohadalsobuiltthescientificdefinitionsofpracticaland

creativeintelligencethatweexploredinChapter1)wasaprominentchampionof this early work and helped to cement its credibility; the work has eveninspiredsomeofthequestionsinhisuniversityadmissiontests.11An interest in a scientifically well-defined measure of wisdom would only

grow following the 2008 financial crash. ‘There was a kind of socialdisapprobation for “cleverness” at the expense of society,’ explains HowardNusbaum,aneuroscientistattheUniversityofChicago–leadingmoreandmorepeopletoconsiderhowourconceptsofreasoningcouldbeextendedbeyondthetraditionaldefinitionsofintelligence.Thankstothiswaveofattention,wehaveseen the foundationofnew institutionsdesigned to tackle the subjectheadon,such as Chicago’s Center for Practical Wisdom, which opened in 2016 withNusbaumasitshead.Thestudyofwisdomnowseemstohavereachedakindoftippingpoint,withaseriesofexcitingrecentresults.IgorGrossmann,aUkrainian-bornpsychologistattheUniversityofWaterloo,

Canada,hasbeenatthecuttingedgeofthisnewmovement.Hisaim,hesays,isto provide the same level of experimental scrutiny – including randomisedcontrolledtrials–thatwehavecometoexpectfromotherareasofscience,likemedicine. ‘You’re going to need that baseline work before you can go and

convincepeoplethat“ifyoudothisitwillsolveallyourproblems’’,’hetoldmeduring an interview at his Toronto apartment. For this reason, he calls thediscipline ‘evidence-based wisdom’ – in the same way that we now discuss‘evidence-basedmedicine’.Grossmann’s first task was to establish a test of wise reasoning, and to

demonstratethatithasreal-worldconsequencesthatareindependentofgeneralintelligence, education and professional expertise. He began by examiningvarious philosophical definitions of wisdom, which he broke down into sixspecific principles of thinking. ‘I guess you would call them metacognitivecomponents – various aspects of knowledge and cognitive processes that canguide you towards amore enriched complex understanding of a situation,’ hesaid.Asyouwouldhope, this includedsomeoftheelementsofreasoningthatwe

havealreadyexamined,includingtheabilityto‘considertheperspectivesofthepeople involved in the conflict’,which takes into considerationyour ability toseekandabsorbinformationthatcontradictsyourinitialview;and‘recognisingthewaysinwhichtheconflictmightunfold’,whichinvolvesthecounter-factualthinking thatSternberghad studied inhismeasuresof creative intelligence, asyoutrytoimaginethedifferentpossiblescenarios.Buthismeasurealsoinvolvedsomeelementsofreasoningthatwehaven’tyet

explored,includinganabilityto‘recognisethelikelihoodofchange’,‘searchforacompromise’and‘predictconflictresolution’.Last,butnotleast,Grossmannconsideredintellectualhumility–anawareness

of the limits of our knowledge, and inherent uncertainty in our judgement;essentially,seeinginsideyourbiasblindspot.It’sthephilosophythathadguidedSocrates more than two millennia ago, and which also lay at the heart ofFranklin’sspeechatthesigningoftheUSConstitution.Having identified these characteristics, Grossmann asked his participants to

think out loud about various dilemmas – from newspaper articles concerninginternationalconflicts toasyndicated‘DearAbby’agonyauntcolumnaboutafamily disagreement, while a team of colleagues scored them on the varioustraits.Togetaflavourofthetest,considerthefollowingdilemma:DearAbby,Myhusband,‘Ralph’,hasonesister,‘Dawn’,andonebrother,‘Curt’.Theirparentsdiedsixyears

ago,withinmonthsofeachother.Eversince,Dawnhasonceayearmentionedbuyingaheadstonefortheirparents.I’mallforit,butDawnisdeterminedtospendabundleonit,andsheexpectsher

brotherstohelpfootthebill.Sherecentlytoldmeshehadput$2,000asidetopayforit.RecentlyDawncalledtoannouncethatshehadgoneahead,selectedthedesign,writtentheepitaphandorderedtheheadstone.NowsheexpectsCurtandRalphtopay‘theirshare’backtoher.Shesaidshewentaheadandordereditonherownbecauseshehasbeenfeelingguiltyalltheseyearsthatherparentsdidn’thaveone.IfeelthatsinceDawndidthisallbyherself,herbrothersshouldn’thavetopayheranything.IknowthatifCurtandRalphdon’tpayherback,they’llneverheartheendofit,andneitherwillI.

The response of a participant scoring low on humility looked something likethis:Ithinktheguysprobablyendupputtingtheirsharein. . .orshewillneverheartheendofit.Iamsuretheyhavehardfeelingsaboutit,butIamsureattheendtheywillbreakdownandhelppayforit.12

The following response, which acknowledges some crucial but missinginformation,earnedahigherscoreforhumility:Dawnapparentlyisimpatienttogetthisdone,andtheothershavebeendraggingitoutfor6yearsorat least nothing’sbeendone for 6years. It doesn’t sayhowmuch she finallydecidedwouldbe theprice...Idon’tknowthatthat’showithappened,justthatthatseemsthereasonablewayforthemtogoaboutit.Itreallydependsonthepersonalitiesofthepeopleinvolved,whichIdon’tknow.

Similarly, for perspective taking, a less sophisticated responsewould examinejustonepointofview:I can imagine that it was a sour relationship afterward because let’s just say that Kurt and Ralphdecidednottogoaheadandpayfortheheadstone.Thenitisgoingtocreateagapofcommunicationbetweenhersisterandherbrothers.

Awiserresponseinsteadbeginstolookmoredeeplyintothepotentialrangeofmotives:Somebodymightbelievethatweneedtohonourparents like this.Anotherpersonmight thinkthereisn’t anything that needs to be done. Or another personmight not have the financialmeans to doanything.Or itcouldalsomean that itmightnotbe important to thebrothers. Itoftenhappens thatpeoplehavedifferentperspectivesonsituationsimportanttothem.

Thehighscorercouldalsoseemorepossibilitiesforthewaytheconflictmightberesolved:Iwouldthinktherewouldprobablybesomecompromisereached,thatKurtandRalphrealizethatit’simportant to have some kind of headstone, and althoughDawnwent ahead and ordered itwithout

themconfirming that they’dpitch in, theywouldprobablypitch in somehow, even if notwhat shewantedideally.Buthopefully,therewassomekindofcontribution.

As you can see, the responses are very conversational – they don’t demandadvancedknowledgeofphilosophicalprinciples,say–butthewiserparticipantsaresimplymorewillingtothinktheirwayaroundthenuancesoftheproblem.After the researchers had rated the participants’ thinking, Grossmann

compared these scores to different measures of wellbeing. The first results,publishedin2013intheJournalofExperimentalPsychology,foundthatpeoplewithhigherscoresforwisereasoningfaredbetterinalmosteveryaspectoflife:they were more content and less likely to suffer depression, and they weregenerallyhappierwiththeircloserelationships.Strikingly,theywerealsoslightlylesslikelytodieduringafive-yearfollow-

upperiod,perhapsbecausetheirwiserreasoningmeanttheywerebetterabletojudgethehealthrisksofdifferentactivities,orperhapsbecausetheywerebetterabletocopewithstress.(Grossmannemphasisesthatfurtherworkisneededtoreplicatethisparticularfinding,however.)Crucially, the participants’ intelligence was largely unrelated to their wise

reasoningscores,andhadlittlebearingonanyofthesemeasuresofhealthandhappiness.13Theideathat‘IamwisebecauseIknowthatIknownothing’mayhavebecomesomethingofacliché,butitisstillratherremarkablethatqualitiessuch as your intellectual humility and capacity to understand other people’spointsofviewmaypredictyourwellbeingbetterthanyouractualintelligence.This discovery complements other recent research exploring intelligence,

rationaldecisionmaking,and lifeoutcomes.Youmayrecall, for instance, thatWändiBruinedeBruinfoundverysimilarresults,showingthathermeasureof‘decisionmakingcompetence’wasvastlymoresuccessfulthanIQatpredictingstresseslikebankruptcyanddivorce.14‘Wefindagainandagainthatintelligenceisalittlebitrelatedtowisereasoning–itexplainsperhaps5%ofthevariance,probablyless,anddefinitelynotmorethanthat,’saidGrossmann.Strikingly, Grossmann’s findings also converge with Keith Stanovich’s

research on rationality.One of Stanovich’s sub-tests, for instance,measured atraitcalled‘activelyopen-mindedthinking’,whichoverlapswiththeconceptofintellectual humility, and which also includes the ability to think aboutalternativeperspectives.Howstronglywouldyouagreewiththestatementthat‘Beliefsshouldalwaysberevisedinresponsetonewinformationorevidence’,for instance? Or ‘I like to gather many different types of evidence before Idecide what to do’? He found that participants’ responses to these questions

often proved to be a far better predictor of their overall rationality than theirgeneral intelligence – which is reassuring, considering that unbiased decisionmakingshouldbeakeycomponentofwisdom.15Grossmann agrees that a modest level of intelligence will be necessary for

some of the complex thinking involved in these tasks. ‘Someone with severelearningdifficultieswon’tbeabletoapplythesewisdomprinciples.’Butbeyondacertain threshold, theothercharacteristics– suchas intellectualhumilityandopen-mindedthinking–becomemorecrucialforthedecisionsthattrulymatterinlife.Since Grossmann published those results, his theories have received

widespread acclaim from other psychologists, including a Rising Star AwardfromtheAmericanPsychologicalAssociation.16His later researchhasbuiltonthoseearlierfindingswithsimilarlyexcitingresults.WithHenriCarlosSantos,forinstance,heexaminedlongitudinaldatafromprevioushealthandwellbeingsurveys thathad,bygood fortune, includedquestionson someof thequalitiesthatareimportanttohisdefinitionofwisdom,includingintellectualhumilityandopen-mindedness.Sureenough,hefoundthatpeoplewhoscoredmorehighlyonthesecharacteristicsatthestartofthesurveytendedtoreportgreaterhappinesslateron.17He has also developed methods that allow him to test a greater number of

people.Onestudyaskedparticipantstocompleteanonlinediaryforninedays,with details about the problems they faced and questionnaires examining theirthinking in each case. Although some people consistently scored higher thanothers, their behaviourwas still highly dependent on the situation at hand. Inother words, even the wisest person may act foolishly in the wrongcircumstances.18This kind of day-to-day variation can be seen in personality traits such as

extraversion,Grossmannsays,aseachperson’sbehaviourvariesfromafixedsetpoint; a mild introvert may still prefer to be quietly alone at work, but thenbecomemore gregarious around the people she trusts. Similarly, it’s possiblethatsomeonemaybefairlywisewhendealingwithaconfrontationalcolleague–butthenlosetheirheadwhendealingwiththeirex.Thequestionis,howcanwelearntochangethatsetpoint?

Benjamin Franklin’s writings offer anecdotal evidence that wisdom can becultivated.Accordingtohisautobiography,hehadbeena‘disputatious’youth,butthatchangedwhenhereadanaccountofSocrates’trial.19Impressedbythe

Greek philosopher’s humble method of enquiry, he determined to alwaysquestionhisownjudgementandrespectotherpeople’s,andinhisconversation,herefusedtousewordssuchas‘certainly,undoubtedly,oranyothersthatgivetheairofpositivenesstoanopinion’.Soonitbecameapermanentstateofmind.‘Forthesefiftyyearspastnoonehaseverheardadogmaticalexpressionescapeme,’hewrote.Theresultwasthekindofhumbleandopenmindthatprovestobesocritical

for Grossman’s research on evidence-based wisdom. ‘I find a frankacknowledgementofone’signoranceisnotonlytheeasiestwaytogetridofadifficulty,butthelikeliestwaytoobtaininformation,andthereforeIpracticeit,’Franklinwrote in1755,whilediscussinghisconfusionovera recent scientificresult.‘Thosewhoaffecttobethoughttoknoweverything,andsoundertaketoexplaineverything,oftenremainlongignorantofmanythingsthatotherscouldandwouldinstructthemin,iftheyappearedlessconceited.’20Unfortunately,thescientificresearchsuggeststhatgoodintentionsmaynotbe

sufficient.AclassicpsychologicalstudybyCharlesLordinthelate1970sfoundthat simply telling people to be ‘as objective and unbiased as possible’madelittle to no difference in counteracting the myside bias. When consideringarguments for the death penalty, for instance, subjects still tended to come toconclusions that suited their preconceptions and still dismissed the evidenceopposing theirview,despiteLord’swarnings.21Clearly,wanting tobefairandobjective alone isn’t enough; you also need practicalmethods to correct yourblinkeredreasoning.Luckily,Franklinhadalsodevelopedsomeofthosestrategies–methodsthat

psychologistswouldonlycometorecognisecenturieslater.HisapproachisperhapsbestillustratedthroughalettertoJosephPriestleyin

1772.TheBritishclergymanandscientisthadbeenofferedthejobofoverseeingthe education of the aristocrat Lord Shelburne’s children. This lucrativeopportunitywouldoffermuch-neededfinancialsecurity,butitwouldalsomeansacrificinghisministry,apositionheconsidered‘thenoblestofallprofessions’–andsohewrotetoFranklinforadvice.‘In the affair of somuch importance to you,where-in you askmy advice, I

cannot, forwant of sufficient premises, counsel youwhat to determine, but ifyouplease,Iwilltellyouhow,’Franklinreplied.Hecalledhismethodakindof‘moralalgebra’,anditinvolveddividingapieceofpaperintwoandwritingtheadvantagesanddisadvantagesoneitherside–muchlikeamodernprosandconslist.Hewould then think carefully about each one and assign them a number

basedonimportance;ifaproequalledacon,hewouldcrossthembothoffthelist.‘ThusproceedingIfindatlengthwherethebalancelies;andif,afteradayor two of farther consideration, nothing new that is of importance occurs oneitherside,Icometoadeterminationaccordingly.’22Franklin conceded that the values he placed on each reason were far from

scientific, but argued that when ‘each is thus considered separately andcomparatively,andthewholeliesbeforeme,IthinkIcanjudgebetter,andamlessliabletomakearashstep.’Asyoucansee,Franklin’sstrategyismoredeliberativeandinvolvedthanthe

quick lists of advantages and disadvantages most of us may scribble in anotebook.Ofparticularimportanceisthecarefulwaythatheattemptstoweighup each item, and his diligence in suspending his judgement to allow histhoughtstosettle.Franklinseemstohavebeenespeciallyawareofourtendencyto leanheavilyonthereasons thataremosteasilyrecalled.Ashedescribedinanotherletter,somepeoplebasetheirdecisionsonfactsthatjust‘happenedtobepresent in themind’, while the best reasonswere ‘absent’.23 This tendency isindeedanimportantsourceofbiaswhenwetrytoreason,whichiswhyit’ssoimportanttogiveyourselfthetimetowaituntilalltheargumentsarelaidoutinfrontofyou.24WhetherornotyoufollowFranklin’smoralalgebratotheletter,psychologists

havefoundthatdeliberatelytakingtimeto‘considertheopposite’viewpointcanreducearangeofreasoningerrors,25suchasanchoring,26andover-confidence,27and,of course, themysidebias.Thebenefits appear tobe robust acrossmanydifferentdecisions–fromhelpingpeople tocritiquedubioushealthclaims28 toforming an opinion on capital punishment and reducing sexist prejudice.29 Ineachcase,theaimwastoactivelyargueagainstyourself,andconsiderwhyyourinitialjudgementmaybewrong.30*

* The thirteenth-century philosopher Thomas Aquinas, incidentally, used similar techniques in his owntheologicalandphilosophicalinquiries.AsthephilosopherJasonBaehr(amodernchampionofintellectualhumility,whowe’llmeetinChapter8)pointsout,Aquinasdeliberatelyarguedagainsthisinitialhypothesisonanyopinion,doing‘hisbesttomaketheseobjectionsasforcefulorstrongaspossible’.Hethenarguesagainstthosepointswithequalforce,untileventuallyhisviewreachessomekindofequilibrium.Depending on the magnitude of the decision, you may benefit from

undergoingafewiterationsofthisprocess,eachtimereachingforanadditionalpieceof information thatyouoverlookedonyour firstpass.31Youshouldalsopayparticularattentiontothewayyouconsidertheevidenceopposingyourgut

instinct,sinceyoumaystillbetemptedtodismissitoutofhand,evenafteryouhaveacknowledgeditsexistence.Instead,youmightaskyourself:‘WouldIhavemade the same evaluation, had exactly the same evidence produced results ontheothersideoftheissue?’Supposethat,likePriestley,youareconsideringwhethertotakeanewjoband

youhavesoughttheadviceofafriend,whoencouragesyoutoaccepttheoffer.You might then ask: ‘Would I have given the same weight to my friend’sjudgement had she opposed the decision?’32 It sounds convoluted, but Lord’sstudies suggested this kind of approach really can overcome our tendency todismisstheevidencethatdoesn’tfitourpreferredpointofview.You might also try to imagine that someone else will examine your

justifications,oreventrytopresentthemtoafriendorcolleague.Manystudieshaveshownthatweconsidermorepointsofviewwhenwebelievethatwewillneedtoexplainourthinkingtoothers.33

We can’t know if Franklin applied hismoral algebra in all situations, but thegeneral principle of deliberate open-minded thinking seems to have dictatedmanyof his biggest decisions. ‘All the achievements in the public’s interest ?getting a fire department organised, the streets paved, a library established,schools for the poor supported, andmuchmore ? attest to his skill in readingothers and persuading them to do what he wanted them to do’, writes thehistorianRobertMiddlekauf.34‘Hecalculatedandmeasured;heweighedandheassessed. There was a kind of quantification embedded in the process of histhought . . . This indeed describes what was most rational about Franklin’smind.’Thiskindof thinkingisnotalwaysrespected,however.Particularlyincrisis,

wesometimesrevere‘strong’,single-mindedleaderswhowillstaytruetotheirconvictions,andevenFranklinwasonceconsideredtoo‘soft’tonegotiatewiththeBritishduringtheWarofIndependence.Hewaslaterappointedasoneofthecommissioners,however,andprovedtobeashrewdopponent.Andthereissomeevidencethatamoreopen-mindedapproachmayliebehind

manyothersuccessfulleaders.Oneanalysis,forinstance,hasexaminedthetextsof UN General Assembly speeches concerning theMiddle East conflict from1947to1976,scoringthecontentforthespeakers’considerationandintegrationof alternative points of view – the kind of open-minded thinking that was soimportantforGrossmann’smeasureofwisdom.Theresearchersfoundthatthisscoreconsistentlydroppedintheperiodsprecedingawar,whereashigherscores

seemedtosustainlongerintervalsofpeace.Itwouldbefoolishtoreadtoomuchintopost-hocanalyses–afterall,people

would naturally become more closed-minded during times of heightenedtension.35 But lab experiments have found that people scoring lower on thesemeasuresaremorelikelytoresorttoaggressivetactics.AndtheideadoesfindfurthersupportinanexaminationoftheUS’smostimportantpoliticalcrisesinthe last100years, includingJohnF.Kennedy’shandlingof theCubanmissilecrisis, andRobertNixon’s dealingswith theCambodian invasionof 1970 andtheYomKippurWarof1973.Textual analyses of the speeches, letters and official statements made by

presidents and their Secretaries of State show that the level of open-mindedthinkingconsistentlypredicted the lateroutcomeof thenegotiations,with JFKscoring highly for his successful handling of the Cuban missile crisis, andDwight Eisenhower for theway he dealtwith the twoTaiwan Strait conflictsbetweenMainlandChinaandTaiwaninthe1950s.36Inmorerecentpolitics, theGermanChancellorAngelaMerkel is famousfor

her ‘analytical detachment’, as she famously listens to all perspectives beforemaking a decision; one senior government official describes her as ‘the bestanalystofanygivensituationthatIcouldimagine’.The Germans have even coined a new word –merkeln (to Merkel) – that

captures this patient, deliberative stance, though it’s not always meantflatteringly,sinceitcanalsoreflectfrustratingindecision.37‘Iamregardedasapermanent delayer sometimes,’ she has said herself, ‘but I think it is essentialand extremely important to take people along and really listen to them inpolitical talks.’ And it has served her well, helping her to remain one of thelongest-servingEuropeanleadersdespitesomeseriouseconomiccrises.Ifwerecalltheideathatmanyintelligentpeoplearelikeacarspeedingalong

the road without guidance or caution, then Merkel, Eisenhower and Franklinrepresent patient, careful drivers: despite their formidable engines, they knowwhentohitthebrakesandchecktheterrainbeforedecidingontheirroute.38

Franklin’smoralalgebraisjustoneofmanypotentialwaystocultivatewisdom,and further insights come from a phenomenon known as Solomon’s Paradox,whichGrossmannnamedafterthelegendarykingofIsraelinthetenthcenturybc.According to biblical accounts, God appeared to Solomon in a dream and

offeredtogivehimaspecialgiftatthestartofhisreign.Ratherthanchoosing

wealth, honour or longevity, he chose wisdom of judgement. His insight wassoonputtothetestwhentwoharlotsappearedbeforehim,bothclaimingtobethemotherofaboy.Solomonorderedforthechildtobecutintwo–knowingthatthetruemotherwouldratherrenounceherclaimthanseehersonkilled.Thedecision is often considered the epitome of impartial judgement – and peoplesoon travelled from across the land to receive his counsel.He led the land torichesandbuiltJerusalem’sTemple.YetSolomonissaidtohavestruggledtoapplyhisfamouslywisejudgementin

his personal life, whichwas ruled by intemperate passions. Despite being thechiefJewishpriest,forinstance,hedefiedtheTorah’scommandmentsbytakinga thousand wives and concubines, and he amassed huge personal wealth. Hebecamearuthlessandgreedytyrant,andwassoembroiledinhisaffairsthatheneglectedtoeducatehissonandpreparehimforpower.Thekingdomultimatelydescendedintochaosandwar.39Threemillennialater,Grossmannhasfoundthissame‘asymmetry’inhisown

testsofwisdom.LikeSolomon,manypeoplereasonwiselyaboutotherpeople’sdilemmas,butstruggletoreasonclearlyabouttheirownissues,astheybecomemorearrogantintheiropinions,andlessabletocompromise–anotherformofthebiasblindspot.40Thesekindsoferrorsseemtobeaparticularproblemwhenwefeelthreatened,triggeringso-called‘hot’emotionalprocessingthatisnarrowandclosed-minded.The good news is that we can use Solomon’s Paradox to our advantage by

practisingaprocesscalled‘self-distancing’.Togetaflavourofitspower,thinkofarecenteventthatmadeyoufeelangry.Now‘takeafewstepsback’,almostasifyouwerewatchingyourselffromanotherpartoftheroomoronacinemascreen,anddescribetheunfoldingsituationtoyourself.Howdidyoufeel?In a series of experiments, Ethan Kross at the University of Michigan has

shown that this simple process encourages people to take a more reflectiveattitude towards theirproblems–using ‘cool’ rather than ‘hot’processing.Hefound, for instance, that they were more likely to describe the situation withmoreneutralwords,andtheybegantolookfortheunderlyingreasonsfortheirdiscontent,ratherthanfocusingonthepettydetails.41Consider these two examples. The first is from an ‘immersed’, first-person

perspective.‘Iwas appalled thatmy boyfriend toldme he couldn’t connectwithme because he thought Iwasgoing to hell. I cried and sat on the floor ofmy dorm hallway and tried to prove to him thatmyreligionwasthesameashis...’

Andthesecondisfromthedistancedviewpoint:‘Iwasabletoseetheargumentmoreclearly. . .IinitiallyempathizedbetterwithmyselfbutthenIbegantounderstandhowmyfriendfelt.ItmayhavebeenirrationalbutIunderstandhismotivation.’

You can see how the event became less personal, and more abstract, for thesecondparticipant–andheorshebegantolookbeyondtheirownexperiencetounderstandtheconflict.Kross emphasises that this is not just another form of avoidance, or

suppression.‘Ourconceptionwasnottoremovethemfromtheeventbuttogivethemasmallamountofdistance,holdthembackalittlebit,andthenallowthemto confront the emotion from a healthier stance,’ he toldme in an interview.‘Whenyoudothisfromanimmersedperspective,peopletendtofocusonwhathappened to them. Distancing allows them to shift into this meaning-makingmodewheretheyputtheeventintoabroaderperspectiveandcontext.’Hehas since repeated the findingmany times, usingdifferent formsof self-

distancing. Youmay imagine yourself as a fly on thewall, for instance, or awell-intentioned observer. Or you may try to imagine your older, wiser selflooking back at the event from the distant future. Simply talking about yourexperiencesinthethirdperson(‘DavidwastalkingtoNatasha,when.. .’)canalsobringaboutthenecessarychangeofperspective.Kross points out that many people naturally self-distance to process

unpalatableemotions.Hepoints toan interview inwhich thebasketballplayerLeBronJamesdescribedhischoice to leave theClevelandCavaliers (whohadnurturedhiscareer)andmovetotheMiamiHeat.‘OnethingIdidn’twanttodowasmakeanemotionaldecision.Iwantedtodowhat’sbestforLeBronJamesand to do what makes LeBron James happy.’ Malala Yousafzai, meanwhile,used a similar approach to bolster her courage against the Taliban. ‘I used tothinkthat theTali[ban]wouldcomeandhewouldjustkillme.But thenIsaid[to myself], if he comes, what would you doMalala? Then I would reply tomyself,Malalajusttakeashoeandhithim.’Peoplewhospontaneouslytakeanewperspectiveinthiswayenjoyarangeof

benefits, including reduced anxiety and rumination.42 Adopting that distancedperspectiveevenhelpedonegroupof studyparticipants toconfrontoneof themostfearedeventsinmodernlife:publicspeaking.Usingself-distancingastheypsyched themselvesupforaspeech, theyshowedfewerphysiologicalsignsofthreat,andreportedlessanxiety,thanacontrolgrouptakingtheimmersed,first-

person perspective. The benefits were also visible to observers judging theirtalks,too,whothoughttheygavemoreconfidentandpowerfulspeeches.43In each case, self-distancing had helped the participants to avoid that self-

centred‘hot’cognition that fuelsourbias,so that their thinkingwasno longerservingtheiranger,fear,orthreatenedego.Sureenough,Grossmannhasfoundthat self-distancing resolvedSolomon’sParadoxwhen thinking about personalcrises (such as an unfaithful partner),meaning that peopleweremore humbleand open to compromise, and more willing to consider the conflictingviewpoints.44 ‘If you become an observer, then right away you get into thisinquisitivemode and you try tomake sense of the situation,’Grossmann toldme. ‘It almost always co-occurswith being intellectually humble, consideringdifferentperspectivesandintegratingthemtogether.’Andthatmayhaveaseriousimpactonyourrelationships.AteamledbyEli

FinkelatNorthwesternUniversitytracked120marriedcouplesoveraperiodoftwoyears.Theinitialarcoftheirrelationshipswasnotpromising:overthefirsttwelvemonths,mostofthecouplesfacedadownwardspiralintheirrelationshipsatisfaction, as disappointment and resentments started to build. After a year,however,Finkelgavehalfofthecouplesashortcourseonself-distancing–suchasimaginingadisputethroughtheeyesofamoredispassionateobserver.Comparedtotypicalrelationshipcounselling,itwasatinystep–thelessonin

self-distancing lasted about twenty minutes in total. But it transformed thecouples’ lovestories, resulting ingreater intimacyand trustover the followingyear,astheyconstructivelyworkedthroughtheirdifferences.Thecontrolgroup,in contrast, continued their steady decline for the next year, as resentmentcontinuedtobuild.45Thesearehighlyintimateproblems,buttakingadistantviewpointalsoseems

toremedybiasonlesspersonalsubjects.Whentoldtoimaginehowcitizensinother countries would view forthcoming elections, for instance, Grossmann’sparticipants became more open-minded to conflicting views. After theexperiment,hefoundthattheywerealsomorelikelytotakeupanoffertosignup for abipartisandiscussiongroup–offering further, objective evidence thattheywerenowmoreopentodialogueasaresultoftheintervention.46Astheresearchevolves,Grossmannhasnowstartedtoexaminetheconditions

of the effect more carefully, so that he can find even more effective self-distancing techniques to improve people’s reasoning. One particularly potentmethodinvolvesimaginingthatyouareexplainingtheissuetoatwelve-year-oldchild.Grossmannspeculates that thismayprimeyou tobemoreprotective,so

thatyouavoidanybiasthatcouldswaytheiryoungandnaïvemind.47His team call this phenomenon the ‘Socrates Effect’ – the humble, Greek

philosophercorrectingtheegocentricpassionsofthemightyIsraeliteking.

If you still doubt that these principles will help you make better decisions,consider theachievementsofMichaelStory,a ‘super-forecaster’whose talentsfirst came to light through the Good Judgment Project – a US government-fundedinitiativetoimproveitsintelligenceprogramme.TheGood JudgmentProjectwas the brainchild ofPhilipTetlock, a political

scientist who had already caused shockwaves among intelligence analysts.WheneverweturnontheTVnewsorreadanewspaper,wemeetcommentatorswhoclaimtoknowwhowillwinanelectionorifaterroristattackisimminent;behindcloseddoors,intelligenceanalystsmayadvisegovernmentstogotowar,directNGOs’rescueeffortsoradvisebanksonthenextbigmerger.ButTetlockhad previously shown that these professionals often perform no better than ifthey had been making random guesses – and many performed consistentlyworse.Laterresearchhasconfirmedthattheirrapid,intuitivedecisionmakingmakes

manyintelligenceanalystsmoresusceptibletobiasessuchasframing–scoringworsethanstudentsontestsofrationality.48ItwasonlyaftertheUS-ledinvasionofIraqin2003–andthedisastroushunt

forSaddamHussein’s‘WeaponsofMassDestruction’–thattheUSintelligenceservices finally decided to take action. The result was the founding of a newdepartment–IntelligenceAdvancedResearchProjectsActivity.Theyeventuallyagreedtofundafour-yeartournament,beginningin2011,allowingresearcherstoarrangetheparticipantsinvariousgroupsandtesttheirstrategies.Example questions included: ‘Will North Korea detonate a nuclear device

beforetheendoftheyear?’‘Whowillcometopofthe2012Olympicsmedalstable?’And,‘HowmanyadditionalcountrieswillreportcasesoftheEbolavirusin the next eight months?’ In addition to giving precise predictions on thesekinds of events, the forecasters also had to declare their confidence in theirjudgements – and they would be judged extra harshly if they were overlyoptimistic(orpessimistic)abouttheirpredictions.Tetlock’steamwascalledtheGoodJudgmentProject,andafterthefirstyear

hesiphonedoffthetop2percent,whomhecalledthe‘super-forecasters’,toseeiftheymightperformbetterinteamsthanbythemselves.Michael joined the tournament midway through the second year, and he

quickly rose tobeoneof themost successful.Havingworked invarious jobs,includingdocumentaryfilm-making,hehadreturnedtoacademiaforaMaster’sdegree,whenhe sawanadvert for the tournamentonaneconomicsblog.Theideaofbeingabletotestandquantifyhispredictionsinstantlyappealed.Michaelcanstillremembermeetingother‘supers’forthefirsttime.‘Thereare

loadsofweirdlittlethingsaboutusthatareverysimilar,’hetoldme;theysharean inquisitive,hungrymindwitha thirst fordetail andprecision, and thiswasreflectedintheirlifedecisions.OneofhisfriendscomparedittotheendingofET,‘wherehegoesbacktohishomeplanet,andhemeetsalltheotherETs’.Theirobservations tallywithTetlock’smore formal investigations.Although

the super-forecasterswere all smart onmeasures of general intelligence, ‘theydid not score off-the-charts high and most fall well short of so-called geniusterritory’,Tetlocknoted.Instead,hefoundthattheirsuccessdependedonmanyotherpsychologicaltraits–includingthekindofopen-mindedthinking,andtheacceptanceofuncertainty, thatwassoimportant inGrossmann’sresearch.‘It’sbeing willing to acknowledge that you have changed your mind many timesbefore–andyou’llbewillingtochangeyourmindmanytimesagain,’Michaeltoldme.Thesuper-forecasterswerealsohighlyprecisewiththeirdeclarationsofconfidence–specifying22percentcertainty,asopposedto20percent,say–whichperhapsreflectsanoverallfocusondetailandprecision.Tetlockhadalreadyseensignsof this inhisearlierexperiments, findingthat

theworstpunditstendedtoexpressthemselveswiththemostconfidence,whilethebestperformersallowedmoredoubttocreepintotheirlanguage,‘sprinklingtheir speechwith transitionmarkers suchas “however”, “but”, “although”and“ontheotherhand”’.Remember Benjamin Franklin’s determination to avoid ‘certainly,

undoubtedly, or any other [phrases] that give the air of positiveness to anopinion’?More than twohundredyears later, the super-forecasterswere againprovingexactlythesamepoint:itpaystoadmitthelimitsofyourknowledge.In linewithGrossmann’s research, the super-forecasters also tended to look

for outside perspectives; rather than getting stuck in the fine details of thespecific situation at hand, theywould readwidely and look for parallelswithother (seeminglyunconnectedevents).Someone investigating theArabSpring,for instance, may look beyond Middle Eastern politics to see how similarrevolutionshadplayedoutinSouthAmerica.Interestingly,manyof the super-forecasters – includingMichael – had lived

andworkedabroadatsomepointintheirlife.Althoughthismayhavejustbeen

acoincidence, there issomegoodevidence thatadeepengagementwithothercultures can promote open-minded thinking, perhaps because it demands thatyou temporarily put aside your preconceptions and adopt new ways ofthinking.49Themostexcitingresult,however,wasthefactthattheseskillsimprovedwith

training. With regular feedback, many people saw their accuracy slowlyclimbingover thecourseof the tournament.Theparticipantsalsorespondedtospecific lessons. An hour-long online course to recognise cognitive bias, forinstance, improved the forecasters’ estimates by around 10 per cent over thefollowingyear.Often, the simplest way to avoid bias was to start out with a ‘base rate’:

examiningtheaveragelengthoftimeittakesforanydictatortofallfrompower,for instance – before you then begin to readjust the estimate. Another simplestrategy was to examine the worst-and best-case scenarios for each situation,offeringsomeboundariesforyourestimates.Overall,thesuper-forecastersprovidedtheperfectindependentdemonstration

that wise decision making relies on many alternative thinking styles, besidesthose that aremeasured on standardmeasures of cognitive ability.AsTetlockputsitinhisbookSuperforecasting:‘Abrilliantpuzzle-solvermayhavetherawmaterial for forecasting,but ifhedoesn’talsohaveanappetite forquestioningbasic,emotionallychargedbeliefs,hewilloftenbeatadisadvantagerelativetoalessintelligentpersonwhohasagreatercapacityforself-criticalthinking.’50Grossmann says that he has only just come to appreciate these parallels. ‘I

thinkthereisquiteabitofconvergenceinthoseideas,’hetoldme.Michael nowworks for a commercial spin-off, Good Judgment Inc., which

offerscoursesintheseprinciples,andheconfirmsthatperformancecanimprovewith practice and feedback. However you perform, it’s important not to fearfailure.‘Youlearnbygettingitwrong,’Michaeltoldme.

Before I finished my conversation with Grossmann, we discussed one final,fascinatingexperimentthattookhiswisereasoningteststoJapan.AsinGrossmann’spreviousstudies,theparticipantsansweredquestionsabout

news articles and agony aunt columns, and were then scored on the variousaspects ofwise reasoning, such as intellectual humility, the ability to take onboardanotherviewpoint,andtheirabilitytosuggestacompromise.Theparticipantsrangedfromtwenty-fivetoseventy-fiveyearsold,andinthe

USA,wisdomgrewsteadilywithage.That’sreassuring:themoreweseeoflife,

the more open-minded we become. And it’s in line with some of the othermeasures of reasoning, such as Bruine de Bruin’s ‘adult decision-makingcompetencescale’,inwhicholderpeoplealsotendtoscorebetter.But Grossmann was surprised to find that the scores from Tokyo took a

completely different pattern. There was no steep increase in age, because theyoungerJapanesewerealreadyaswiseas theoldestAmericans.Somehow,bytheageoftwenty-five,theyhadalreadyabsorbedthelifelessonsthatonlycometotheAmericansafterdecadesmoreexperience.51ReinforcingGrossmann’s finding,EmmanuelManuelo,TakashiKusumi and

colleagues recently surveyed students in the Japanese cities of Okinawa andKyoto,andAucklandinNewZealand,onthekindsofthinkingthattheythoughtwere most important at university. Although all three groups recognised thevalueofhavinganopen-mindedoutlook,it’sstrikingthattheJapanesestudentsreferred to some specific strategies that sound verymuch like self-distancing.OnestudentfromKyotoemphasisedthevalueof‘thinkingfromathirdperson’spointofview’,forinstance,whileaparticipantinOkinawasaiditwasimportantto‘thinkflexiblybasedontheoppositeopinion’.52What could explain these cultural differences? We can only speculate, but

manystudieshavesuggestedthatamoreholisticandinterdependentviewoftheworldmaybeembeddedinJapaneseculture;Japanesepeoplearemorelikelytofocusonthecontextandtoconsiderthebroaderreasonsforsomeone’sactions,andlesslikelytofocusonthe‘self’.53GrossmannpointstoethnographicevidenceshowingthatchildreninJapanare

taught toconsiderothers’perspectivesandacknowledge theirownweaknessesfromayoungage. ‘You just openan elementary school textbookandyou seestories about these characterswho are intellectually humble,who think of themeaningoflifeininterdependentterms.’Other scholars have argued that this outlook may also be encoded in the

Japanese language itself. The anthropologist Robert J. Smith noted that theJapanese language demands that you encode people’s relative status in everysentence,while the language lacks ‘anything remotely resembling thepersonalpronoun’.Althoughtherearemanypossiblewaystorefertoyourself,‘noneofthe options is clearly dominant’, particularly among children. ‘Withoverwhelmingfrequency,theyusenoself-referentofanykind.’Even thepronunciationofyourownnamechangesdependingon thepeople

with whom you are speaking. The result, Smith said, is that self-reference inJapan is ‘constantly shifting’ and ‘relational’ so that ‘there is no fixed centre

fromwhichtheindividualassertsanon-contingentexistence’.54Beingforcedtoexpress your actions in this way may naturally promote a tendency for self-distancing.Grossmannhasnotyetappliedhiswisereasoningteststoothercountries,but

convergingevidencewouldsuggestthatthesedifferencesshouldbeconsideredpartofbroadergeographicaltrends.Thanks, in part, to the practical difficulties inherent in conducting global

studies,psychologistsoncefocusedalmostentirelyonWesternpopulations,withthe vast majority of findings emerging from US university students – highlyintelligent, oftenmiddle-class people.But during the last ten years, they havebeguntomakeagreaterefforttocomparethethinking,memoryandperceptionof people across cultures. And they are finding that ‘Western, Educated,Industrialised, Rich, Democratic’ (WEIRD, for short) regions like NorthAmericaandEuropescorehigheronvariousmeasuresofindividualismandtheegocentricthinkingthatappearstoliebehindourbiases.In oneof the simplest ‘implicit’ tests, researchers ask participants to drawa

diagramof theirsocialnetwork, representing their familyandfriendsand theirrelationshipstoeachother.(Youcouldtryitforyourself,beforeyoureadon.)InWEIRD countries like the USA, people tend to represent themselves as

biggerthantheirfriends(byabout6mmonaverage)whilepeoplefromChinaorJapantendtodrawthemselvesasslightlysmallerthanthepeoplearoundthem.55This isalsoreflected in thewords theyuse todescribe themselves:Westernersaremorelikelytodescribetheirownpersonalitytraitsandachievements,whileEast Asian people describe their position in the community. This lessindividualistic,more‘holistic’wayofviewingtheworldarounduscanalsobeseeninIndia,theMiddleEastandSouthAmerica,56andthereissomeemergingevidence that people in more interdependent cultures find it easier to adoptdifferent perspectives and absorb other people’s points of view – crucialelementsofwisdomthatwouldimprovepeople’sthinking.57Considermeasures of over-confidence, too.Aswe have seen,mostWEIRD

participants consistently over-estimate their abilities: 94 per cent ofAmericanprofessorsratethemselvesas‘betterthanaverage’,forinstance,and99percentof cardrivers think theyaremorecompetent than theaverage.58Yet countlessstudies have struggled to find the same tendency in China, Korea, Singapore,Taiwan,MexicoorChile.59Of course, that’s not to say that everyone in thesecountrieswillalways behumble,wise thinkers; it almost certainlydependsonthecontext,aspeoplenaturallyflipbetweendifferentwaysofthinking.Andthe

general characteristics may be changing over time. According to one ofGrossmann’s recent surveys, individualism is rising across the globe, even inpopulationsthattraditionallyshowedamoreinterdependentoutlook.60Nevertheless,weshouldbereadytoadoptthemorerealisticviewofourown

abilities that is common in East Asian and other cultures, as it could directlytranslatetoasmaller‘biasblindspot’,andbetteroverallreasoning.

Wehavenowseenhowcertaindispositions–particularly intellectualhumilityandactivelyopen-mindedthinking–canhelpustonavigateourwayaroundtheintelligencetrap.AndwithFranklin’smoralalgebraandself-distancing,wehavetwosolid techniques thatcan immediately improveourdecisionmaking.Theyaren’tasubstituteforgreaterintelligenceoreducation,buttheyhelpustoapplythat brainpower in a less biased fashion, so thatwe can use itmore fruitfullywhileavoidinganyintellectuallandmines.Thescienceofevidence-basedwisdomisstillinitsinfancy,butoverthenext

few chapters we will explore convergent research showing how cutting-edgetheoriesof emotionand self-reflectioncan reveal furtherpractical strategies toimproveourdecisionmaking inhigh-stakesenvironments.We’llalsoexaminethe ways that an open-minded, humble attitude, combined with sophisticatedcritical thinkingskills,canprotectusfromformingdangerousfalsebeliefsandfrom‘fakenews’.

Benjamin Franklin continued to embody intellectual humility to the very end.ThesigningoftheConstitutionin1787washisfinalgreatact,andheremainedcontentwithhiscountry’sprogress.‘Wehavehadamostplentifulyearforthefruits of the earth, and our people seem to be recovering fast from theextravagant and idle habits which the war had introduced, and to engageseriously in the contrary habits of temperance, frugality, and industry, whichgive the most pleasing prospects of future national felicity’, he wrote to anacquaintanceinLondonin1789.61In March 1790, the theologian Ezra Stiles probed Franklin about his own

beliefsinGodandhischancesofanafterlife.Hereplied:‘Ihave,withmostoftheDissenters inEngland, some doubts as to [Jesus’s] divinity, though it is aquestionIdonotdogmatiseupon,havingneverstudiedit,andthinkitneedlesstobusymyselfwithitnow,whenIexpectsoonanopportunityofknowingthetruthwithlesstrouble.

‘Ishallonlyadd,respectingmyself,that,havingexperiencedthegoodnessofthatBeinginconductingmeprosperouslythroughalonglife,Ihavenodoubtofitscontinuanceinthenext,thoughwithoutthesmallestconceitofmeritingsuchgoodness.’62Hediedlittlemorethanamonthlater.

5

Youremotionalcompass:Thepowerofself-reflection

Ashehungrilyatehisburgerandfries,Rayhadalreadybeguntosketchouthisbusiness plan. The fifty-two-year-old salesman was not a gambling man, butwhenhegotthisintensevisceralfeelinginhis‘funnybone’,heknewhehadtoact–andhehadneverbeforefeltanintuitionthisstrong.Thoseinstinctshadn’tledhimastrayyet.Hehadmadehiswayfromplaying

jazzpianoinbarsandbordellostoasuccessfulcareerinthepapercupindustry,becominghiscompany’smostsuccessfulsalesman.Then,soonaftertheSecondWorldWar, he had seen the potential in milkshake mixers, and he was nowmakingatidysumsellingthemtodiners.Buthismindwasalwaysopentonewpossibilities.‘Aslongasyou’regreen

you’re growing; as soon as you’re ripe you start to rot,’ he liked to say.Andalthoughhisbodymayhavebeentellinghimotherwise–hehaddiabetesandthebeginningsofarthritis–hestillfeltasgreenaspeoplehalfhisage.So when he noticed that new clients were flocking to him on the

recommendation of one particular hamburger joint, owned by two brothers inSanBernadino,California,heknewhehadtotakealook.Whatwassospecialabout this one outlet that had inspired somany others to pay out for a bettershakemaker?Enteringthepremises,hewasstruckfirstbythecleanlinessoftheoperation:

everyone was dressed in pristine uniforms, and unlike the typical roadsiderestaurant, itwasn’t swarmingwith flies.And although themenuwas limited,the service was quick and efficient. Each step of the food production wasstrippeddownto itsessence,andbypayingwith theorder,youcouldcomeinand go outwithout even having towait around tippingwaitresses.Then therewas the tasteof theFrench fries, cut from Idahopotatoes thatwere cooked toperfectioninfreshoil,andtheburgers,friedallthewaythroughwithasliceofcheeseononeside.Youcould,thesignoutsideread,‘buy’embythebag’.

Rayhadneverbeentoaburgerjointlikeit;itwassomewherehewouldhavehappilytakenhiswifeandchildren.Andhesawthattheoperationcouldeasilybeupscaled.Hisexcitementwasvisceral;hewas‘wounduplikeapitcherwithano-hittergoing’.HeknewhehadtobuytherightstofranchisetheoperationandspreaditacrossAmerica.1Withinthenextfewyears,Raywouldriskallhissavingstobuyoutthetwo

brotherswhoownedit.Hewouldkeeptheemblemofitsgoldenarches,though,anddespitetheacrimonioussplit,thebrothers’name–McDonald–wouldstillbeemblazonedoneveryrestaurant.His lawyers apparently thought he was mad; his wife’s reaction was so

negative that theygotdivorced.ButRaywasnever inanydoubt. ‘I felt inmyfunnybonethatitwasasurething.’2

History may have proven Ray Kroc’s instincts correct; McDonald’s servesnearly70millioncustomerseveryday. In lightof thescienceofdysrationalia,however, it’snatural tofeelmorethana littlescepticalofamanwhogambledeverythingonthewhimsofhisfunnybone.Surely instinctual reasoning like this is theantithesisofFranklin’sslow-and-

carefulmoral algebraand IgorGrossmann’s studyof evidence-basedwisdom?We’ve seen somany examples of peoplewho have followed their hunches totheirdetriment;Krocwouldseemtobetheexceptionwhoprovestherule.Ifwewant to apply our intelligencemore rationally,we should always try to avoidlettingouremotionsandgutfeelingsruleouractionsinthisway.Thiswouldbeagravemisunderstandingof the research,however.Although

our gut reactions are undoubtedly unreliable, and over-confidence in thosefeelings will lead to dysrationalia, our emotions and intuitions can also bevaluable sources of information, directing our thinking in impossibly complexdecisions and alerting us to details that have been accidentally overlookedthroughconsciousdeliberation.The problem is that most people – including those with high general

intelligence, education and professional expertise – lack the adequate self-reflectiontointerpretthevaluablesignalscorrectlyandidentifythecuesthataregoing to lead them astray.According to the research, bias doesn’t come fromintuitionsandemotionsperse,butfromaninabilitytorecognisethosefeelingsfor what they really are and override them when necessary; we then use ourintelligenceandknowledgetojustifyerroneousjudgementsmadeonthebasisofthem.

Cutting-edgeexperimentshavenowidentifiedexactlywhatskillsareneededtoanalyseourintuitionsmoreeffectively,suggestingyetmoreabilitiesthatarenotcurrentlyrecognisedinourtraditionaldefinitionsofintelligence,butwhichareessentialforwisedecisionmaking.AnditturnsoutthatKroc’sdescriptionsofhisphysical‘funny-bonefeelings’perfectlyillustratethisnewunderstandingofthehumanmind.The good news is that these reflective skills can be learnt, and when we

combine themwith other principles of evidence-basedwisdom, the results arepowerful. These strategies can improve the accuracy of yourmemories, boostyoursocialsensitivitysothatyoubecomeamoreeffectivenegotiator,andlightthesparkofyourcreativity.Byallowingustode-biasourintuitions,theseinsightsresolvemanyformsof

theintelligencetrap,includingthecurseofexpertisethatweexploredinChapter3. And some professions are already taking notice. In medicine, for instance,these strategies are being applied by doctors who hope to reduce diagnosticerrors– techniques thatcouldpotentiallysave tensof thousandsof liveseveryyear.

Like much of our knowledge about the brain’s inner workings, this newunderstanding of emotion comes from the extreme experiences of peoplewhohavesustainedneurologicalinjurytoaspecificpartofthebrain.In this case, the area of interest is the ventromedial area of the prefrontal

cortex, located just above the nasal cavity – whichmay be damaged throughsurgery,stroke,infection,oracongenitaldefect.Superficially, peoplewith damage to this area appear to emerge from these

injuries with their cognition relatively unscathed: they still score well onintelligence tests, and their factual knowledge is preserved. And yet theirbehaviour is nevertheless extremely bizarre, veering between incessantindecisionandrashimpulsiveness.They may spend hours deliberating over the exact way to file an office

document,forinstance,onlytotheninvestalloftheirsavingsinapoorbusinessventureor tomarryastrangeronawhim.It’sas if theysimplycan’tcalibratetheirthinkingtotheimportanceofthedecisionathand.Worsestill,theyappearimmune to feedback, ignoring criticismwhen it comes their way, so they arestuckmakingthesameerrorsagainandagain.‘Normal and intelligent individuals of comparable educationmakemistakes

and poor decisions, but not with such systematically dire consequences,’ the

neurologistAntonioDamasiowroteofoneofthefirstknownpatients,Elliot,intheearly1990s.3Damasio was initially at a loss to explain why damage to the frontal lobe

wouldcausethisstrangebehaviour.ItwasonlyaftermonthsofobservationwithElliot that Damasio uncovered another previously undiscovered symptom thatwouldeventuallyholdthekeytothepuzzle:despitethefactthathiswholelifewasunravellinginfrontofhim,Elliot’smoodneveroncefalteredfromaneeriecalmness.WhatDamasiohadoriginallytakentobeastiffupperlipseemedlikean almost complete lack of emotion. ‘Hewas not inhibiting the expression ofinternalemotionalresonanceorhushinginnerturmoil’,Damasiolaterwrote.‘Hesimplydidnothaveanyturmoiltohush.’Those observations would ultimately lead Damasio to propose the ‘somatic

markerhypothesis’of emotionanddecisionmaking.According to this theory,any experience is immediately processed non-consciously, and this triggers aseriesofchangeswithinourbody–suchasfluctuationsinheartrate,aknotinthe stomach, or build-up of sweat on the skin. The brain then senses these‘somaticmarkers’and interprets themaccording to thecontextof thesituationand its knowledge of emotional states.Only then dowe become conscious ofhowwearefeeling.This process makes evolutionary sense. By continually monitoring and

modifyingbloodpressure,muscletensionandenergyconsumption,thebraincanpreparethebodyforaction,shouldweneedtorespondphysically,andmaintainsits homeostasis. In this way, the somaticmarker hypothesis offers one of thebest, biologically grounded, theories of emotion. When you feel the rush ofexcitementflowingtothetipsofyourfingers,ortheunbearablepressureofgriefweighingonyourchest,itisduetothisneurologicalfeedbackloop.Of even greater importance for our purposes, however, the somatic marker

hypothesis can also explain the role of intuition during decision making.AccordingtoDamasio,somaticmarkersaretheproductofrapidnon-consciousprocessing which creates characteristic bodily changes before our consciousreasoning has caught up. The resulting physical sensations are the intuitivefeelingswecallgut instinct,givingusa senseof thecorrectchoicebeforewecanexplainthereasonswhy.The ventromedial prefrontal cortex,Damasio proposed, is one of the central

hubs that is responsible for creating bodily signals based on our previousexperiences,explainingwhypatientslikeElliotfailedtofeelemotions,andwhytheywouldoftenmakebaddecisions;theirbraindamagehadcutofftheiraccess

tothenon-consciousinformationthatmightbeguidingtheirchoices.Sure enough, Damasio found that people like Elliot failed to show the

accompanying physiological responses – such as sweating – when viewingdisturbing images (such as a photo of a horrific homicide).To further test histheory, Damasio’s team designed an elegant experiment called the IowaGambling Task, inwhich participants are presentedwith four decks of cards.Eachcardcancomewithasmallmonetaryreward,orapenalty,buttwoofthedecks are subtly stacked against the player, with slightly bigger rewards butmuchbigger penalties.The participants don’t initially know this, though: theyjusthavetotakeagamble.Formosthealthyparticipants, thebodystarts showingcharacteristicchanges

inresponsetoaparticularchoice–suchassignsofstresswhentheparticipantissettochoosethedisadvantageousdeck–beforetheplayerisconsciouslyawarethatsomedecksarestackedfororagainstthem.Andthemoresensitivesomeoneistotheirbodilyfeelings–asensecalledinteroception–thequickertheylearnhowtomakethewinningchoices.AsDamasioexpected,braininjurysurvivorssuchasElliotwereespeciallybad

at the Iowa Gambling Task, making the wrong choices again and again longafterothershavestartedhominginontherightcarddecks.Thiswascausedbytheir lackof thecharacteristicsomaticchangesbefore theymadetheirchoices.Unlikeotherplayers,theydidnotexperienceareliablevisceralresponsetothedifferentdecksthatwouldnormallywarnpeoplefromriskinghugelosses.4Youdon’t need to have endured a brain injury to have lost touchwith your

feelings, though. Even among the healthy population, there is enormousvariationinthesensitivityofpeople’sinteroception,afactthatcanexplainwhysomepeoplearebetteratmakingintuitivedecisionsthanothers.Youcaneasilymeasurethisyourself.Simplysitwithyourhandsbyyoursides

andaskafriendtotakeyourpulse.Atthesametime,trytofeelyourownheartin your chest (without actually touching it) and count the number of times itbeats;then,afteroneminute,comparethetwonumbers.Howdidyoudo?Mostpeople’sestimatesareoutbyatleast30percent,5but

some reach nearly 100 per cent accuracy – and your place on this scale willindicatehowyoumakeintuitivedecisionsinexercises liketheIowaGamblingTask, with the higher scorers naturally gravitating to the most advantageousoptions.6Yourscoreontheheartbeatcountingtestcantranslatetoreal-worldfinancial

success,withonestudyshowingthatitcanpredicttheprofitsmadebytradersin

an English hedge fund, and how long they survived within the financialmarkets.7 Contrary to what wemight have assumed, it is the people who aremost sensitive to their visceral ‘gut’ feelings – those with the most accurateinteroception–whomadethebestpossibledeals.Its importance doesn’t end there. Your interoceptive accuracy will also

determineyoursocialskills:ourphysiologyoftenmirrorsthesignalsweseeinothers–averybasicformofempathy–andthemoresensitiveyouaretothosesomaticmarkers,themoresensitiveyouwillbeofothers’feelingstoo.8Tuningintothosesignalscanalsohelpyoutoreadyourmemories.Itisnow

wellknownthathumanrecall ishighlyfallible,butsomaticmarkerssignal theconfidence ofwhat you think you know9 –whether you are certain or simplyguessing.AndastudyfromKeioUniversityinTokyofoundtheycanalsoactasreminders when you need to remember to do something in the future – aphenomenonknownasprospectivememory.10Imagine,forinstance,thatyouareplanningtocallyourmumintheeveningto

wishher ahappybirthday. If youhavemore attuned interoception, youmightfeelaknotofuneaseinyourstomachduringtheday,oratinglinginyourlimbs,thattellsyouthere’ssomethingyouneedtoremember,causingyoutorackyourbrain until you recall what it is. Someonewhowas less aware of those bodysignalswouldnotnoticethosephysiologicalremindersandwouldsimplyforgetallaboutthem.OrconsideraTVquizshowlikeWhoWantstoBeaMillionaire.Yoursuccess

willundoubtedlydependonyour intelligenceandgeneralknowledge,butyoursensitivity to somatic markers will also determine whether you are willing togambleitallonanansweryoudon’treallyknow,orwhetheryoucancorrectlygaugeyouruncertaintyanddecidetousealifeline.In each case, our non-conscious mind is communicating, through the body,

somethingthattheconsciousmindisstillstrugglingtoarticulate.Wetalkabout‘followingtheheart’whenwearemakingimportantlifechoices–particularlyinlove – but Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis shows that there is a literalscientifictruthtothisromanticmetaphor.Ourbodilysignalsareaninescapableelementofalmosteverydecisionwemake,andastheexperiencesofpeoplelikeElliotshow,weignorethematourperil.

WhenKroc described the uncanny feeling in his funny bone and the sense ofbeing ‘wound up like a pitcher’, hewas almost certainly tapping into somaticmarkers generated by his non-conscious mind, based on a lifetime’s sales

experience.Thosefeelingsdeterminedwhoherecruited,andwhohefired.Itwasthecause

of his decision to first buy into the McDonald’s franchise and after theirrelationshiphadturnedsour,itledhimtobuyoutthebrothers.Evenhischoicetokeeptheburgerbar’soriginalname–whenhecouldhavesavedmillionsbystarting his own brand – was put down to his gut instincts. ‘I had a strongintuitivesensethatthenameMcDonald’swasexactlyright.’11Kroc’sdescriptionsoffersomeofthemostvividexamplesofthisprocess,but

he is far fromalone in this. Increative industries, inparticular, it’sdifficult toimagine how you could judge a new idea purely analytically, without someinstinctualresponse.ConsiderCocoChanel’sdescriptionsofhernosefornewdesigns.‘Fashionis

intheair,bornuponthewind.Oneintuitsit.Itisintheskyandontheroad.’OrBobLutz,whooversawtheconstructionofChrysler’siconicDodgeViperthathelped save the company from ruin in the 1990s. Despite having no marketresearch to back up his choice, he knew that the sports car –waybeyond theprice range of Chrysler’s usual offerings – would transform the company’ssomewhatdourimage.‘Itwasthissubconsciousvisceralfeeling. . . it justfeltright,’hesaysofhisdecisiontopursuetheradicalnewdesign.12Damasio’s theory, and the broaderwork on interoception, gives us a strong

scientificfoundationtounderstandwherethosevisceralfeelingscomefromandthe reasons that somepeople appear to havemore finely tuned intuitions thanothers.Thiscannotbe thewholestory,however.Everydayexperiencewould tellus

that for every Kroc, Chanel or Lutz, you will find someone whose intuitionshavebackfiredbadly,andtomakebetterdecisionswestillneedtolearnhowtorecogniseandoverridethosedeceptivesignals.Todoso,weneedtwoadditionalelementstoouremotionalcompass.Lisa Feldman Barrett, a psychologist and neuroscientist at Northeastern

University inBoston, has ledmuchof thiswork, exploringboth thewaysourmoodsandemotionscanleadusastrayandpotentialwaystoescapethoseerrors.Asoneexample,sherecallsadayatgraduateschoolwhenacolleagueaskedherout on a date. She didn’t really feel attracted to him, but she’d beenworkinghardandfelt likeabreak, sosheagreed togo to the localcoffeeshop,andastheychatted, she felt flushedandher stomach fluttered– thekindsof somaticmarkersthatyoumightexpecttocomewithphysicalattraction.Perhapsitreallywaslove?

By the time she’d left the coffee shop, she had already arranged to go onanotherdate,anditwasonlywhenshewalkedintoherapartmentandvomitedthatsherealisedthe trueoriginsof thosebodilysensations:shehadcaught theflu.13Theunfortunatefactisthatoursomaticmarkersaremessythings,andwemay

accidentallyincorporateirrelevantfeelingsintoourinterpretationsoftheeventsathand–particularlyiftheyrepresent‘backgroundfeelings’thatareonlyonthefringesofourawareness,butwhichmayneverthelessdetermineouractions.Ifyouhavea jobinterview,for instance,you’dbetterhopeit’snotraining–

studiesshowthatrecruitersarelesslikelytoacceptacandidateiftheweatherisbad when they first meet them.14When researchers spray the smell of a fart,meanwhile,theycantriggerfeelingsofdisgustthatswaypeople’sjudgementsofmoralissues.15AndthejoythatcomesfromaWorldCupwincaneveninfluencea country’s stockmarket – despite the fact that it has nothing to dowith theeconomy’sviability.16In each case, the brain was interpreting those background feelings and

responding as if they were relevant to the decision at hand. ‘Feeling,’ saysFeldmanBarrett,‘isbelieving’–aphenomenoncalled‘affectiverealism’.17Thiswouldseemtopourcoldwateronanyattemptstouseourintuition.But

FeldmanBarretthasalsofoundthatsomepeopleareconsistentlybetterabletodisentanglethoseinfluencesthanothers–anditalldependsonthewordstheyusetodescribetheirfeelings.Perhaps the best illustration comes from a month-long investigation of

investors taking part in an online stockmarket.Contrary to the popular beliefthat a ‘cooler head always prevails’ – and in agreementwith the study of thetraders at the London hedge fund – Feldman Barrett found that the bestperformersreportedthemostintensefeelingsduringtheirinvestments.Crucially,however,thebiggestwinnersalsousedmoreprecisevocabulariesto

describethosesensations.Whilesomepeoplemightusethewords‘happy’and‘excited’ interchangeably,forexample, thesewordsrepresentedaveryspecificfeeling for some people – a skill that Feldman Barrett calls ‘emotiondifferentiation’.18Itwasn’tthatthepoorerperformerslackedthewords;theysimplyweren’tas

careful to apply them precisely to describe the exact sensations they werefeeling; ‘content’ and ‘joyful’ both just meant something pleasant; ‘angry’ or‘nervous’ described their negative feelings.They seemednot to be noting anycleardistinctionsintheirfeelings–andthatultimatelyimpairedtheirinvestment

decisions.Thismakes sense given some of the previous research on affective realism,

whichhadfoundthattheinfluenceofirrelevantfeelingsduetotheweatherorabadsmell,say,onlylastsaslongastheylingerbelowconsciousawareness,andtheirpoweroverourdecisionsevaporatesassoonastheextraneousfactorsarebroughttoconsciousattention.Asaconsequence,thepeoplewhofinditeasiertodescribetheiremotionsmaybemoreawareofbackgroundfeelings,andtheyarethereforemorelikelytodiscountthem.Bypinningaconceptonafeeling,itiseasiertoanalyseitmorecriticallyandtodisregardifitisirrelevant.19The benefits of emotion differentiation don’t end there. Besides beingmore

equipped todisentangle thesourcesof their feelings,peoplewithmorepreciseemotionalvocabulariesalsotendtohavemoresophisticatedwaysofregulatingtheirfeelingswhentheythreatentogetoutofhand.Astockmarket trader,forinstance,wouldbebetterable togetbackon their feetaftera stringof losses,ratherthansinkingintodespairorattemptingtowinitallbackwithincreasinglyriskygambles.Sensibleregulationstrategiesincludeself-distancing,whichweexploredinthe

lastchapter,andreappraisal,whichinvolvesreinterpretingthefeelingsinanewlight.Itcouldalsoinvolvehumour–crackinga joketobreakthetension;orachangeofscene.Perhapsyousimplyrealisethatyouneedtogetawayfromthetable and take a deep breath. But whatever strategy you use, you can onlyregulatethosefeelingsonceyouhavealreadyidentifiedthem.For these reasons, people with poor interoception,20 and low emotional

differentiation,arelesslikelytokeeptheirfeelingsunderwrapsbeforetheygetout of hand.*Regulation is therefore the final cog in our emotional compass,and, together, those three interconnected components – interoception,differentiationandregulation–canpowerfullydirectthequalityofourintuitionanddecisionmaking.21

*ItisriskytoreadtoomuchintoKroc’sautobiography,GrindingItOut.Buthecertainlyseemstodescribesomesophisticatedstrategiestoregulatehisemotionswhentheygetoutofhand,whichheclaimedtohavepickedupearlierinhiscareer.Asheputit(pp.61-2):‘Iworkedoutasystemthatallowedmetoturnoffnervoustensionandshutoutnaggingquestions...Iwouldthinkofmymindasbeingablackboardfullofmessages,most of themurgent, and I practiced imagining a handwith an eraserwiping that blackboardclean.Imademymindcompletelyblank.Ifathoughtbegantoappear,zap!I’dwipeitoutbeforeitcouldform.’

I hope you are now convinced that engaging with your feelings is not adistraction from good reasoning, but an essential part of it. By bringing our

emotions to themind’s surface, and dissecting their origins and influence,wecantreatthemasanadditionalandpotentiallyvitalsourceofinformation.Theyareonlydangerouswhentheygounchallenged.Some researchers call these skills emotional intelligence, but although the

description makes literal sense, I’ll avoid that term to reduce confusion withsomeofthemorequestionableEQteststhatwediscussedinPart1.Instead,I’lldescribe them as reflective thinking, since they all, in some ways, involveturning your awareness inwards to recognise and dissect your thoughts andfeelings.Likethestrategiesthatweexploredinthelastchapter,theseabilitiesshouldn’t

be seen as some kind of rival to traditional measures of intelligence andexpertise,butascomplementarybehavioursthatensureweapplyourreasoningin the most productive way possible, without being derailed by irrelevantfeelingsthatwouldleadusofftrack.Crucially–andthisfactisoftenneglected,eveninthepsychologicalliterature

–thesereflectiveskillsalsooffersomeofthebestwaysofdealingwiththeveryspecific cognitive biases thatKahneman andTversky studied.They protect usfromdysrationalia.Considerthefollowingscenario,fromastudybyWändiBruinedeBruin(who

designedoneofthedecision-makingteststhatweexploredinChapter2).Youhavedrivenhalfwaytoavacationdestination.Yourgoalistospendtimebyyourself–butyoufeelsick,andyounowfeelthatyouwouldhaveamuchbetterweekendathome.Youthinkthatitistoobadthatyoualreadydrovehalfway,becauseyouwouldmuchratherspendthetimeathome.

Whatwouldyoudo?Stickwithyourplans,orcancelthem?Thisisatestofthesunkcostfallacy–andlotsofpeoplestatethattheywould

prefer not towaste the drive they’ve already taken. They keep on ruminatingaboutthetimetheywouldlose,andsotheytryinvaintomakethebestofit–even though the scenario makes it pretty clear that they’ll have to spend thevacationindiscomfortasaresult.BruinedeBruin,however,hasfoundthatthisisnottrueofthepeoplewhocanthinkmorereflectivelyabouttheirfeelingsinthewaysthatFeldmanBarrettandothershavestudied.22ARomanianstudyhasfoundsimilarbenefitswiththeframingeffect.Ingames

ofchance,forinstance,peoplearemorelikelytochooseoptionswhentheyarepresented as a gain (i.e. 40 per cent chance ofwinning) comparedwithwhenthey are presented as a loss (60 per cent chance of losing) – evenwhen theymean exactly the same thing. But people with more sophisticated emotion

regulationareresistanttotheselabellingeffectsandtakeamorerationalviewoftheprobabilitiesasaresult.23Being able to reappraise our emotions has also been shown to protect us

againstmotivatedreasoninginhighlychargedpoliticaldiscussions,determiningagroupofIsraelistudents’capacitytoconsiderthePalestinianviewpointduringaperiodofheightenedtension.24Itshouldcomeaslittlesurprise,then,thatanemotionalself-awarenessshould

beseenasaprerequisitefortheintellectuallyhumble,open-mindedthinkingthatwestudiedinthelastchapter.AndthisisreflectedinIgorGrossmann’sresearchonevidence-basedwisdom,whichhasshownthatthehighestperformersonhiswise reasoning tests are indeed more attuned to their emotions, capable ofdistinguishing their feelings in finer detailwhile also regulating andbalancingthoseemotionssothattheirpassionsdonotcometoruletheiractions.25This idea is,ofcourse,nonewstophilosophers.ThinkersfromSocratesand

PlatotoConfuciushavearguedthatyoucannotbewiseabouttheworldaroundyou ifyoudonot firstknowyourself.The latest scientific researchshows thatthis is not some lofty philosophical ideal; incorporating some moments ofreflectionintoyourdaywillhelpde-biaseverydecisioninyourlife.

Thegoodnewsisthatmostpeople’sreflectiveskillsnaturallyimproveoverthecourse of their lifetime; in ten years’ time you’ll probably be slightly betterequippedtoidentifyandcommandyourfeelingsthanyouaretoday.Butarethereanymethodstoacceleratethatprocess?Oneobviousstrategyismindfulnessmeditation,whichtrainspeopletolisten

to their body’s sensations and then reflecton them in anon-judgementalway.There is now strong evidence that besides its many, well-documented healthbenefits, regular practise of mindfulness can improve each element of youremotionalcompass–interoception,differentiationandregulation–meaningthatitisthequickestandeasiestwaytode-biasyourdecisionmakingandhoneyourintuitive instincts.26 (If you are sceptical, or simply tired of hearing about thebenefitsofmindfulness,bearwithme–youwill soon see that there areotherwaystoachievesomeofthesameeffects.)Andrew Hafenbrack, then at the Institut Européen d’Administration des

Affaires inFrance,wasoneof the first to document these cognitive effects in2014. Using Bruine de Bruin’s tests, he found that a single fifteen-minutemindfulness session can reduce the incidence of the sunk cost bias by 34 percent. That’s amassive reduction – of a very common bias – for such a short

intervention.27By allowing us to dissect our emotions from a more detached perspective,

mindfulnesshasalsobeenshowntocorrectthemysidebiasesthatcomefromathreatened ego,28meaning people are less defensivewhen they are facedwithcriticism29 and more willing to consider others’ perspectives, rather thandoggedlystickingtotheirownviews.30Meditators are alsomore likely tomake rational choices in an experimental

task known as the ‘ultimatum game’ that tests how we respond to unfairtreatmentbyothers.Youplayitinpairs,andonepartnerisgivensomecashandoffered theoption to share asmuchof themoneyas theywantwith theotherparticipant.Thecatch is that the receivercanchoose to reject theoffer if theythinkit’sunfair–andifthathappens,bothpartiesloseeverything.Manypeopledo reject small offers out of sheer spite, even though itmeans

they are ultimately worse off – making it an irrational decision. But acrossmultipleroundsofthegame,themeditatorswerelesslikelytomakethischoice.Forexample,whentheopponentofferedameasly$1outofapossible$20,only28percentofthenon-meditatorsacceptedthemoney,comparedto54percentof themeditatorswho could set their anger aside tomake the rational choice.Crucially,thistolerancecorrelatedwiththemeditator’sinteroceptiveawareness,suggestingthattheirmorerefinedemotionalprocessinghadcontributedtotheirwiserdecisionmaking.31Commandingyourfeelingsinthiswaywouldbeparticularlyimportantduring

businessnegotiations,whenyouneedtoremainalerttosubtleemotionalsignalsfromotherswithoutgettingsweptawaybystrongfeelingswhenthediscussionsdon’tgotoplan.(Alongtheselines,aTurkishstudyhasfoundthatdifferencesinemotion regulation can account for 43 per cent of the variation in simulatedbusinessnegotiations.32)HavingstartedmeditatingtodealwiththestressatINSEAD,Hafenbracksays

thathehasnowwitnessedallthesebenefitshimself.‘I’mabletodisconnecttheinitial stimulus frommy response – and that second or two canmake a hugedifference in whether you overreact to something or if you respond in aproductiveway,’he toldme from theCatólica-LisbonSchoolofBusiness andEconomicsinPortugal,whereheisnowaprofessoroforganisationalscience.‘Itmakesiteasiertothinkwhat’sreallythebestdecisionrightnow.’If mindfulness really isn’t your thing, there may be other ways to hone

intuitive instincts and improve your emotion regulation. A series of recentstudies has shown that musicians (including string players and singers) and

professionaldancershavemorefine-tunedinteroception.33Thescientistsbehindthesestudiessuspectthattraininginthesedisciplines–whichallrelyonprecisemovements guided by sensory feedback – naturally encourages greater bodilyawareness.You don’t need to actively meditate to train your emotion differentiation

either.Participantsinonestudywereshownaseriesoftroublingimagesandtoldtodescribe their feelings to themselveswith themostprecisewordspossible.34Whenshownapictureofachildsuffering,forexample,theywereencouragedtoquestionwhether theywere feeling sadness, pityor anger, and to consider thespecificdifferencesbetweenthosefeelings.After just six trials, the participants were already more conscious of the

distinctions between different emotions, and this meant that they weresubsequently less susceptible to priming during a moral reasoning task. (Byimproving their emotion regulation the same approach has, incidentally, alsohelpedagroupofpeopletoovercometheirarachnophobia.35)Theeffectsareparticularlystriking,since,likethemindfulnessstudies, these

interventions are incredibly short and simple, with the benefits of a singlesessionenduringmorethanaweeklater;evenalittlebitoftimetothinkaboutyourfeelingsinmoredetailwillpaylastingdividends.Attheverybasiclevel,youshouldmakesurethatyoupickapartthetangled

threads of feeling, and routinely differentiate emotions such as apprehension,fear and anxiety; contempt, boredom and disgust; or pride, satisfaction andadmiration.Butgiventhesefindings,FeldmanBarrettsuggeststhatwealsotryto learn new words – or invent our own – to fill a particular niche on ouremotionalawareness.Just think of the term ‘hangry’ – a relatively recent entry into the English

language that describes the particular irritability when we haven’t eaten.36Althoughwe don’t necessarily need psychological research to tell us that lowblood sugarwill cause an accompanying dip in yourmood and a dangerouslyshortfuse,namingtheconceptmeansthatwearenowmoreawareofthefeelingwhen it does happen, and better able to account for the ways it might beinfluencingourthinking.InhisDictionaryofLostSorrows,thewriterandartistJohnKoenigshowsjust

thekindof sensitivity thatFeldmanBarrettdescribes, inventingwordssuchas‘liberosis’, thedesire to care less about things, and ‘altschmerz’– awearinesswiththesameoldissuesyou’vealwayshad.Accordingtothescientificresearch,enrichingourvocabularyinthiswayisn’tjustapoeticexercise:lookingfor,and

thendefining,thosekindsofnuanceswillactuallychangethewayyouthinkinprofoundways.37Ifyouare really seriousabout fine-tuningyouremotionalcompass,manyof

the researchers also suggest that you spend a few minutes to jot down yourthoughts and feelings from the day and the ways theymight have influencedyour decisions. Not only does the writing process encourage deeperintrospection and the differentiation of your feelings, which should naturallyimprove your intuitive instincts; it also ensures you learn and rememberwhatworkedandwhatdidn’t,soyoudon’tmakethesamemistakestwice.Youmaybelieveyouaretoobusyforthiskindofreflection,buttheresearch

suggests that spending a fewminutes in introspection will more than pay foritself in the long run. A study by Francesca Gino at Harvard University, forinstance, asked trainees at an IT centre in Bangalore to devote just fifteenminutes a day to writing and reflecting on the lessons they had learnt, whiledrawingout themoreintuitiveelementsof theirdailytasks.Afterelevendays,shefoundthattheyhadimprovedtheirperformanceby23percent,comparedtoparticipantswhohadspentthesametimeactivelypractisingtheirskills.38Yourdailycommutemaybetheobviousperiodtoengageyourmindinthisway.

Comprenez-vous cette phrase? Parler dans une langue étrangère modifiel’attitudedel’individu,lerendantplusrationneletplussage!Wewill shortlyseehowreflective thinkingcanpotentiallysave lives.But if

youareluckyenoughtobebilingual–orwillingtolearn–youcanaddonefinalstrategy to your new decision-making toolkit – called the foreign languageeffect.The effect hinges on the emotional resonances within the words we speak.

Linguists and writers have long known that our emotional experience of asecondlanguagewillbeverydifferentfromthatofourmothertongue;VladimirNabokov,forinstance,claimedtofeelthathisEnglishwas‘astiffish,artificialthing’comparedtohisnativeRussian,despitebecomingoneof the language’smostproficientstylists:itsimplydidn’thavethesamedeepresonanceforhim.39Andthisisreflectedinoursomaticmarkers, likethesweatresponse:whenwehearmessagesinanotherlanguage,theemotionalcontentislesslikelytomovethebody.AlthoughthatmaybeafrustrationforwriterssuchasNabokov,BoazKeysar

at theUniversity ofChicago’sCenter for PracticalWisdom has shown that itmayalsoofferusanotherwaytocontrolouremotions.

The first experiment, published in 2012, examined the framing effect, usingEnglish speakers studying Japanese andFrench, andKorean speakers learningEnglish. In their native languages, the participants were all influenced bywhether the scenarios were presented as ‘gains’ or ‘losses’. But this effectdisappearedwhen theyused theirsecond language.Now, theywere lesseasilyswayedbythewordingandmorerationalasaresult.40The ‘foreign language effect’ has sincebeen replicatedmany times inmany

other countries, including Israel and Spain, and with many other cognitivebiases, including the‘hothand illusion’– thebelief, insportorgambling, thatsuccessatonerandomeventmeanswearemore likely tohavesimilar luck inthefuture.41In each case, peopleweremore rationalwhen theywere asked to reason in

theirsecondlanguage,comparedwiththeirfirst.Ourthinkingmayfeel‘stiffish’,asNabokov put it, but the slight emotional distancemeans that we can thinkmorereflectivelyabouttheproblemathand.42Besidesofferingthisimmediateeffect,learninganotherlanguagecanimprove

youremotiondifferentiation,asyoupickupnew‘untranslatable’termsthathelpyou see more nuance in your feelings. And by forcing you to see the worldthroughanewculturallens,itcanexerciseyouractivelyopen-mindedthinking,whilethechallengeofgrapplingwithunknownphrasesincreasesyour‘toleranceofambiguity’,arelatedpsychologicalmeasurewhichmeansthatyouarebetterequipped to cope with feelings of uncertainty rather than jumping to aconclusiontooquickly.Besidesreducingbias,that’salsothoughttobeessentialforcreativity;toleranceofambiguityislinkedtoentrepreneurialinnovation,forinstance.43Given the effort involved, no one would advise that you learn a language

solely to improveyour reasoning–but if youalready speakoneorhavebeentempted to resuscitate a language you left behind at school, then the foreignlanguageeffectcouldbeoneadditional strategy to regulateyouremotionsandimproveyourdecisionmaking.If nothing else, you might consider the way it influences your professional

relationships with international colleagues; the language you use coulddeterminewhethertheyareswayedbytheemotionsbehindthestatementorthefacts. As NelsonMandela once said: ‘If you talk to a man in a language heunderstands,thatgoestohishead.Ifyoutalktohiminhislanguage,thatgoestohisheart.’

Oneof themost exciting implications of the research on emotional awarenessandreflectivethinkingisthatitmayfinallyofferawaytoresolvethe‘thecurseofexpertise’.AswesawinChapter3,greaterexperiencecanleadexpertstorelyon fuzzy, gist-based intuitions that often offer rapid and efficient decisionmaking,butcanalsoleadtoerror.Theimplicationmighthaveseemedtobethatwewouldneed to losesomeof thatefficiency,but the lateststudiesshowthatthere are ways to use those flashes of insight while reducing the needlessmistakes.Thefieldofmedicinehasbeenattheforefrontoftheseexplorations–forgood

reason. Currently, around 10?15 per cent of initial diagnoses are incorrect,meaningmanydoctorswillmake at least one error for every sixpatients theysee.Often these errors canbe correctedbeforeharm is done, but it is thoughtthat inUShospitals alone, aroundone in ten patient deaths – between40,000and80,000perannum–canbetracedtoadiagnosticmistake.44Couldasimplechangeofthinkingstylehelpsavesomeofthoselives?Tofind

out, I met Silvia Mamede in the hubbub of Rotterdam’s Erasmus MedicalCentre. Mamede moved to the Netherlands from Ceará, Brazil, more than adecade ago, and she immediately offersme a strong cup of coffee – ‘not thewaterystuffyounormallygethere’–beforesittingoppositemewithanotebookin hand. ‘You organise your ideas better if you have a pencil and paper,’ sheexplained.(Psychologicalresearchdoesindeedsuggestthatyourmemoryoftenfunctionsbetterifyouareallowedtodoodleasyoutalk.45)Heraimistoteachdoctorstobesimilarlyreflectiveconcerningthewaysthey

make their decisionmaking.Like themedical checklist,which the doctor andwriter Atul Gawande has shown to be so powerful for preventing memoryfailuresduringsurgery, theconcept is superficiallysimple: topause, thinkandquestion your assumptions. Early attempts to engage ‘system 2’ thinking hadbeen disappointing, however; doctors told to use pure analysis, in place ofintuition–by immediately listingall the alternativehypotheses, for instance–often performed worse than those who had taken a less deliberative, moreintuitiveapproach.46In light of the somatic marker hypothesis, this makes sense. If you ask

someone to reflect too early, they fail to draw on their experience, and maybecomeoverlyfocusedoninconsequential information.Youareblockingthemfromusingtheiremotionalcompass,andsotheybecomealittlelikeDamasio’sbraininjurypatients,stuckintheir‘analysisparalysis’.Youcan’tjustusesystem1orsystem2–youneedtouseboth.

Forthisreason,Mamedesuggeststhatdoctorsnotedowntheirgutreactionasquicklyaspossible;andonlythenshouldtheyanalysetheevidencefortheirgutreaction and compare it to alternative hypotheses. Sure enough, she has sincefoundthatdoctorscanimprovetheirdiagnosticaccuracybyupto40percentbytaking this simple approach – a huge achievement for such a small measure.Simply telling doctors to revisit their initial hypothesis –without any detailedinstructions on re-examining the data or generating new ideas – managed toboostaccuracyby10percent,whichagainisasignificantimprovementforlittleextraeffort.Importantly,and in linewith thebroader researchonemotion, this reflective

reasoningalsoreduces the‘affectivebiases’ thatcanswayadoctor’s intuition.‘There are all these factors that could disturb “System 1” – the patient’sappearance, whether they are rich or poor, the time pressure, whether theyinterruptyou,’shesaid.‘Butthehopeisthatreflectivereasoningcanmakethephysiciantakeastepback.’Toexploreone such factor,Mamede recently testedhowdoctors respond to

‘difficult’ patients, such as those who rudely question the professionals’decisions. Rather than observing real encounters, which would be difficult tomeasure objectively,Mamede offered fictional vignettes to a group of generalpractitioners(familydoctors).Thetextmostlyoutlinedtheirsymptomsandtestresults,butitalsoincludedacoupleofsentencesdetailingtheirbehaviour.Manyof thedoctorsdidnoteven reportnoticing thecontextual information,

while others were perplexed at the reasons they had been given these extradetails.‘Theysaid,“Butthisdoesn’tmatter!Wearetrainedtolookpastthat,tonotlookatthebehaviour.Thisshouldmakenodifference,”’Mamedetoldme.In fact, as the research on emotion would suggest, it had a huge impact. Formore complex cases, thegeneral practitionerswere42per centmore likely tomakeadiagnosticerrorforthedifficultpatients.47Ifthedoctorsweretoldtoengageinthemorereflectiveprocedure,however,

theyweremorelikelytolookpasttheirfrustrationandgiveacorrectdiagnosis.It seems that the pause in their thinking allowed them to gauge their ownemotions and correct for their frustration, just as the theories of emotiondifferentiationandregulationwouldpredict.Mamede has also examined the availability bias, causing doctors to over-

diagnoseanillnessifithasrecentlyappearedinthemediaandisalreadyontheirmind.Again, she has shown that themore reflective procedure eliminates theerror–eventhoughsheofferednospecificinstructionsorexplanationswarning

themof that particular bias.48 ‘It’s amazing,whenyou see thegraphsof thesestudies. The doctors who weren’t exposed to the reports of disease had anaccuracyof71percent,andthebiasedonesonlyhadanaccuracyof50percent.Andthen,whentheyreflectedtheywentbacktothe70percent,’shetoldme.‘Soitcompletelycorrectedforthebias.’Theseareastonishingresultsforsuchsmallinterventions,buttheyallshowus

the power of greater self-awareness, when we allow ourselves to think morereflectivelyaboutourintuitions.Some doctorsmay resistMamede’s suggestions; the very idea that, after all

theirtraining,somethingsosimplecouldcorrecttheirmistakesisbruisingtotheego, particularly whenmany take enormous pride in the power of their rapidintuition.At conferences, for instance, shewillpresent a caseon theprojectorandwait for thedoctors togiveadiagnosis. ‘It’s sometimes twenty seconds–they just read four or five lines and they say ‘‘appendicitis’’,’ she told me.‘Thereiseventhisjokesayingthatifthedoctorneedstothink,leavetheroom.’Butthereisnowagrowingmomentumthroughoutmedicinetoincorporatethe

latestpsychologicalfindingsintothephysician’sdailypractice.PatCroskerryatDalhousie University in Canada is leading a critical thinking programme fordoctors–andmuchofhisadviceechoestheresearchwehaveexploredinthischapter,including,forinstance,theuseofmindfulnesstoidentifytheemotionalsourcesofourdecision, and,whenerrorshaveoccurred, the employmentof a‘cognitive and affective autopsy’ to identify the reasons that their intuitionbackfired. He also advocates ‘cognitive inoculation’ – using case-studies toidentify the potential sources of bias, which shouldmean that the doctors aremoremindfulofthefactorsinfluencingtheirthinking.Croskerry is still collecting the data from his courses to see the long-term

effects on diagnostic accuracy. But if thesemethods can prevent just a smallportionofthose40,000?80,000deathsperyear,theywillhavecontributedmorethanamajornewdrug.49

Althoughmedicineisleadingtheway,afewotherprofessionsarealsocomingaround to this way of thinking. The legal system, for instance, is notoriouslyplagued by bias – and in response to this research, the American JudgesAssociationhasnowissuedawhitepaperthatadvocatedmindfulnessasoneofthekeystrategiestoimprovejudicialdecisionmaking,whilealsoadvisingeachjudgetotakeamomentto‘readthedials’andinterrogatetheirfeelingsindetail,just as neuroscientists and psychologists such as Feldman Barrett are

suggesting.50Ultimately,thesefindingscouldchangeourunderstandingofwhatitmeansto

beanexpert.

Inthepast,psychologistshaddescribedfourdistinctstagesinthelearningcurve.Thecompletebeginnerisunconsciouslyincompetent–shedoesnotevenknowwhat she doesn’t know (potentially leading to the over-confidence of theDunning?KrugereffectwesawinChapter3).Afterashortwhile,however,shewillunderstandtheskillsshelacks,andwhatshemustdotolearnthem;sheisconsciously incompetent.With effort, she can eventually become consciouslycompetent– shecansolvemostproblems,but shehas to thinka lotabout thedecisions she is making. Finally, after years of training and on-the-jobexperience, those decisions become second nature – she has reachedunconsciouscompetence.Thiswastraditionallythepinnacleofexpertise,butaswehaveseen,shemaythenhitakindof‘ceiling’whereheraccuracyplateausasa resultof theexpertbiasesweexplored inChapter3.51Tobreak through thatceiling,wemayneedonefinalstage–‘reflectivecompetence’–whichdescribesthecapacitytoexploreourfeelingsandintuitions,andtoidentifybiasesbeforetheycauseharm.52AsRayKrochadfoundinthatCaliforniandiner,intuitioncanbeapowerful

thing–butonlyonceweknowhowtoreadthosefunny-bonefeelings.

6

Abullshitdetectionkit:Howtorecogniseliesandmisinformation

If you were online at the turn of the new millennium, you may rememberreadingaboutthemythofthe‘flesh-eatingbananas’.Inlate1999,achainemailbegantospreadacrosstheinternet,reportingthat

fruit imported from Central America could infect people with ‘necrotisingfasciitis’–ararediseaseinwhichtheskineruptsintolividpurpleboilsbeforedisintegratingandpeelingawayfrommuscleandbone.Theemailstatedthat:Recently this disease has decimated themonkey population inCostaRica . . . It is advised not topurchasebananasfor thenext threeweeksas this is theperiodof timeforwhichbananas thathavebeenshippedtotheUSwiththepossibilityofcarryingthisdisease.Ifyouhaveeatenabananainthelast 2–3 days and come down with a fever followed by a skin infection seek MEDICALATTENTION!!!The skin infection from necrotizing fasciitis is very painful and eats two to three centimeters of

fleshperhour.Amputationis likely,deathispossible.Ifyouaremorethananhourfromamedicalcenterburningthefleshaheadoftheinfectedareaisadvisedtohelpslowthespreadoftheinfection.TheFDAhasbeenreluctant toissueacountrywidewarningbecauseoffearofanationwidepanic.Theyhavesecretlyadmittedthattheyfeelupwardsof15,000Americanswillbeaffectedbythisbutthat theseare ‘acceptablenumbers’.Pleaseforward this toasmanyof thepeopleyoucareaboutaspossibleaswedonotfeel15,000peopleisanacceptablenumber.

By28 January 2000, public concernwas great enough for theUSCenters forDiseaseControlandPreventiontoissueastatementdenyingtherisks.Buttheirresponse only poured fuel on the flames, as people forgot the correction butrememberedthescary,vividideaoftheflesh-eatingbananas.Someofthechainemails even started citing theCDCas the source of the rumours, giving themgreatercredibility.Withinweeks, theCDCwas hearing from somany distressed callers that it

wasforcedtosetupabananahotline,anditwasonlybytheendoftheyearthatthepanicburneditselfoutasthefearedepidemicfailedtomaterialise.1

Thenecrotising-fasciitisemailsmayhavebeenoneofthefirstinternetmemes–butmisinformationisnotanewphenomenon.Astheeighteenth-centurywriterJonathanSwiftwroteinanessayontherapidspreadofpoliticallies:‘Falsehoodfliesandthetruthcomeslimpingafterit’.Today,so-called‘fakenews’ismoreprevalentthanever.Onesurveyin2016

foundthatmorethan50percentofthemostsharedmedicalstoriesonFacebookhad been debunked by doctors, including the claim that ‘dandelion weed canboostyour immunesystemandcurecancer’ and reports that theHPVvaccineincreasedyourriskofdevelopingcancer.2ThephenomenonisbynomeansrestrictedtotheWest–thoughtheparticular

mediummaydependonthecountry.InIndia,forinstance,falserumoursspreadlikewildfire throughWhatsAppacross its300millionsmartphones–coveringeverything from local salt shortages to political propaganda and wrongfulallegationsofmasskidnappings.In2018, theserumourseventriggeredaspateoflynchings.3Youwouldhopethattraditionaleducationcouldprotectusfromtheselies.As

the great American philosopher John Dewey wrote in the early twentiethcentury: ‘If our schools turn out their pupils in that attitude ofmindwhich isconducivetogoodjudgmentinanydepartmentofaffairsinwhichthepupilsareplaced,theyhavedonemorethaniftheysentouttheirpupilsmerelypossessedofvaststoresofinformation,orhighdegreesofskillinspecializedbranches.’4Unfortunately, theworkondysrationalia showsus this is far frombeing the

case. While university graduates are less likely than average to believe inpolitical conspiracy theories, they are slightly more susceptible tomisinformation about medicine, believing that pharmaceutical companies arewithholding cancer drugs for profit or that doctors are hiding the fact thatvaccines cause illnesses, for instance.5 They are also more likely to useunproven,complementarymedicines.6It is telling that one of the first people to introduce the flesh-eating banana

scare to Canada was Arlette Mendicino, who worked at the University ofOttawa’smedical faculty? someonewho shouldhavebeenmore sceptical.7 ‘Ithoughtaboutmyfamily,Ithoughtaboutmyfriends.Ihadgoodintentions,’shetoldCBCNewsafter she foundout she’dbeen fooled.Withina fewdays, themessagehadspreadacrossthecountry.Inourinitialdiscussionoftheintelligencetrap,weexploredthereasonswhy

having a higher IQmightmake you ignore contradictory information, so thatyou are even more tenacious in your existing beliefs, but this didn’t really

explain why someone like Mendicino could be so gullible in the first place.Clearly this involves yet more reasoning skills that aren’t included in thetraditionaldefinitionsofgeneralintelligence,butthatareessentialifwewanttobecomeimmunetothesekindsofliesandrumours.Thegoodnewsisthatcertaincriticalthinkingtechniquescanprotectusfrom

beingduped,but to learnhow toapply them,we firstneed tounderstandhowcertainformsofmisinformationaredeliberatelydesignedtoescapedeliberationandwhythetraditionalattemptstocorrectthemoftenbackfiresospectacularly.Thisnewunderstandingnotonlyteachesushowtoavoidbeingdupedourselves;itisalsochangingthewaythatmanyglobalorganisationsrespondtounfoundedrumours.

Beforewecontinue,firstconsiderthefollowingstatementsandsaywhichistrueandwhichisfalseineachpairing:

BeescannotrememberleftfromrightAnd

Crackingyourknucklescancausearthritis

Andnowconsiderthefollowingopinions,andsaywhichringstrueforyou:

WoesunitefoesStrifebondsenemies

Andconsiderwhichoftheseonlinesellersyouwouldshopwith:

rifo073Averageuserrating:3.2edlokaq8Averageuserrating:3.6

We’llexploreyourresponsesinafewpages,butreadingthepairsofstatementsyoumighthavehadahunchthatonewastruthfulormoretrustworthythantheother.And the reasonswhyarehelpingscientists tounderstand theconceptof‘truthiness’.ThetermwasfirstpopularisedbytheAmericancomedianStephenColbertin

2005 to describe the ‘truth that comes from the gut, not from the book’ as a

reactiontoGeorgeW.Bush’sdecisionmakingandthepublicperceptionofhisthinking.But it soon became clear that the concept could be applied tomanysituations8andithasnowsparkedseriousscientificresearch.NorbertSchwarzandErynNewmanhaveledmuchof thiswork,andtofind

outmore,IvisitedthemintheirlabattheUniversityofSouthernCaliforniainLos Angeles. Schwarz happens to have been one of the leaders in the newscience of emotional decisionmaking that we touched on in the last chapter,showing,for instance, thewaytheweatherswaysourjudgementofapparentlyobjectivechoices.Theworkontruthinessextendsthisideatoexaminehowweintuitivelyjudgethemeritsofnewinformation.According to Schwarz and Newman, truthiness comes from two particular

feelings: familiarity (whether we feel that we have heard something like itbefore) and fluency (how easy a statement is to process). Importantly, mostpeople are not even aware that these two subtle feelings are influencing theirjudgement–yet theycanneverthelessmoveus tobelievea statementwithoutquestioningitsunderlyingpremisesornotingitslogicalinconsistencies.Asasimpleexample,considerthefollowingquestionfromsomeofSchwarz’s

earlierstudiesofthesubject:

HowmanyanimalsofeachkinddidMosestakeontheArk?

Thecorrectansweris,ofcourse,zero.Mosesdidn’thaveanark?itwasNoahwhoweatheredtheflood.Yetevenwhenassessinghighlyintelligentstudentsatatopuniversity,Schwarzhasfoundthatjust12percentofpeopleregisterthatfact.9The problem is that the question’s phrasing fits into our basic conceptual

understandingof theBible,meaningwearedistractedby theredherring– thequantityofanimals–rather thanfocusingonthenameof thepersoninvolved.‘It’ssomeoldguywhohadsomethingtodowiththeBible,sothewholegistisOK,’ Schwarz toldme. The question turns us into a cognitivemiser, in otherwords–andeventhesmartuniversitystudentsinSchwarz’sstudydidn’tnoticethefallacy.Likemanyof the feelings fuellingour intuitions, fluencyandfamiliaritycan

beaccuratesignals.Itwouldbetooexhaustingtoexamineeverythinginextremedetail,particularly if it’soldnews;and ifwe’veheard somethinga few times,thatwouldsuggestthatit’saconsensusopinion,whichmaybemorelikelytobetrue. Furthermore, things that seem superficially straightforward often are

exactlythat;there’snohiddenmotive.Soitmakessensetotrustthingsthatfeelfluent.What’s shocking is just how easy it is to manipulate these two cues with

simplechangestopresentationsothatwemisscrucialdetails.Inoneiconicexperiment,Schwarzfoundthatpeoplearemorelikelytofallfor

theMosesillusionif thatstatement iswritteninapleasant,easy-to-readfont–making the reading more fluent – compared to an uglier, italic script that ishardertoprocess.Forsimilarreasons,wearealsomorelikelytobelievepeopletalkinginarecognisableaccent,comparedtosomeonewhosespeechishardertounderstand, andwe place our trust in online vendorswith easier-to-pronouncenames, irrespective of their individual ratings and reviews by othermembers.Even a simple rhyme can boost the ‘truthiness’ of a statement, since theresonatingsoundsofthewordsmakesiteasierforthebraintoprocess.10Wereyouinfluencedbyanyofthesefactorsinthosequestionsatthestartof

this chapter? For the record, bees really can be trained to distinguishImpressionistandCubistpainters(andtheydoalsoseemtodistinguishleftfromright); coffee can reduce your risk of diabetes, while cracking your knucklesdoesnot appear to cause arthritis.11But if you are likemost people, youmayhave been swayed by the subtle differences in the way the statements werepresented–withthefainter,greyinkanduglyfontsmakingthetruestatementshardertoread,andless“truthy”asaresult.Andalthoughtheymeanexactlythesamething,youaremorelikelytoendorse‘woesunitefoes’than‘strifebondsenemies’–simplybecauseitrhymes.Sometimes,increasingastatement’struthinesscanbeassimpleasaddingan

irrelevant picture. In one rather macabre experiment from 2012, Newmanshowedherparticipantsstatementsaboutaseriesoffamousfigures–suchasasentence claiming that the indie singer Nick Cave was dead.12 When thestatementwasaccompaniedbyastockphotoofthesinger,theyweremorelikelytobelievethatthestatementwastrue,comparedtotheparticipantswhosawonlytheplaintext.ThephotoofNickCavecould,ofcourse,havebeentakenatanypointinhis

life. ‘Itmakesno sense that someonewoulduse it asevidence– it just showsyou that he’s a musician in a random band,’ Newman told me. ‘But from apsychological perspective itmade sense.Anything thatwouldmake it easy topicture or easy to imagine something should sway someone’s judgement.’Newman has also tested the principle on a range of general knowledgestatements; theyweremore likely toagree that ‘magnesiumis the liquidmetal

insideathermometer’or‘giraffesaretheonlymammalthatcannotjump’ifthestatement was accompanied by a picture of the thermometer or giraffe. Onceagain, the photos added no further evidence, but significantly increased theparticipants’acceptanceofthestatement.Interestingly,detailedverbaldescriptions(suchasof thecelebrities’physical

characteristics)providedsimilarbenefits.Ifweareconcernedaboutwhetherheisaliveordead, itshouldn’tmatter ifwehear thatNickCaveisawhite,malesinger – but those small, irrelevant details really do make a statement morepersuasive.Perhapsthemostpowerfulstrategytoboostastatement’struthinessissimple

repetition. In one study, Schwarz’s colleagues handed out a list of statementsthat were said to come from members of the ‘National Alliance Party ofBelgium’ (a fictitious group invented for the experiment). But in some of thedocuments, there appeared to be a glitch in the printing, meaning the samestatementfromthesamepersonappearedthreetimes.Despitethefactthatitwasclearly providing no new information, the participants reading the repeatedstatement were subsequently more likely to believe that it reflected theconsensusofthewholegroup.Schwarz observed the same effect when his participants read notes about a

focus group discussing steps to protect a local park. Some participants readquotesfromthesameparticularlymouthypersonwhomadethesamepointthreetimes; others read a document inwhich three different peoplemade the samepoint, or a document inwhich three people presented separate arguments. Asyou might expect, the participants were more likely to be swayed by anargumentiftheyhearditfromdifferentpeopleallconvergingonthesameidea.Buttheywerealmostasconvincedbytheargumentwhenitcamefromasingleperson,multipletimes.13‘Itmadehardlyanydifference,’Schwarzsaid.‘Youarenottrackingwhosaidwhat.’To make matters worse, the more we see someone, the more familiar they

become,andthismakesthemappeartobemoretrustworthy.14Aliarcanbecomean ‘expert’; a lone voice begins to sound like a chorus, just through repeatedexposure.These strategies have long been known to professional purveyors of

misinformation.‘Themostbrilliantpropagandisttechniquewillyieldnosuccessunless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly and withunflaggingattention,’AdolfHitlernotedinMeinKampf.‘Itmustconfineitselftoafewpointsandrepeatthemoverandover.’

Andtheyarenolessprevalenttoday.Themanufacturersofaquackmedicineorafaddiet,forinstance,willdressuptheirclaimswithreassuringlytechnicaldiagrams that add little to their argument –with powerful effect. Indeed, onestudy found that themerepresenceofabrainscancanmakepseudo-scientificclaims seemmore credible – even if the photo ismeaningless to the averagereader.15The power of repetition, meanwhile, allows a small but vocal minority to

persuadethepublicthattheiropinionismorepopularthanitreallyis.Thistacticwasregularlyemployedbytobaccoindustrylobbyistsinthe1960sand70s.Thevice president of the Tobacco Institute, Fred Panzer, admitted as much in aninternalmemo,describingtheindustry’s‘brilliantlyconceivedstrategy’tocreate‘doubt about the health charge without actually denying it’, by recruitingscientiststoregularlyquestionoverwhelmingmedicalopinion.16The same strategies will almost certainly have been at play formany other

myths. It is extremely common formedia outlets to feature prominent climatechangedeniers (suchasNigelLawsonin theUK)whohavenobackgroundinthe science but who regularly question the link between human activity andrising sea temperatures. With repetition, their message begins to sound moretrustworthy–eventhoughitisonlythesamesmallminorityrepeatingthesamemessage. Similarly, youmay not remember when you first heard that mobilephonescausecancerandvaccinescauseautism,andit’squitepossiblethatyoumayhaveevenbeenhighlydoubtfulwhenyoudid.Buteachtimeyoureadtheheadline,theclaimgainedtruthiness,andyoubecamealittlelesssceptical.To make matters worse, attempts to debunk these claims often backfire,

accidentally spreading the myth. In one experiment, Schwarz showed someundergraduatestudentsaleafletfromtheUSCentersforDiseaseControl,whichaimedtodebunksomeofthemythsaroundvaccinations–suchasthecommonlyheld idea thatwemay become ill after getting the flu shot.Within just thirtyminutes,theparticipantshadalreadystartedtoremember15percentofthefalseclaimsasfacts,andwhenaskedabouttheirintentionstoactontheinformation,theyreportedthattheywerelesslikelytobeimmunisedasaresult.17Theproblemisthattheboringdetailsofthecorrectionwerequicklyforgotten,

whilethefalseclaimslingeredforlonger,andbecamemorefamiliarasaresult.Byrepeatingtheclaim–eventodebunkit–youareinadvertentlyboostingitstruthiness. ‘You’re literally turningwarnings into recommendations,’ Schwarztoldme.TheCDCobservedexactlythiswhentheytriedtoputthebananahoaxtorest.

It’slittlewonder.Theirheadline:‘FalseInternetreportaboutnecrotizingfasciitisassociatedwithbananas’wasfarlessdigestible–or‘cognitivelyfluent’,inthetechnicalterms–thanthevivid(andterrifying)ideaofaflesh-eatingvirusandagovernmentcover-up.In line with the work onmotivated reasoning, our broader worldviews will

almost certainly determine how susceptiblewe are tomisinformation – partlybecauseamessagethatalreadyfitswithourexistingopinionsisprocessedmorefluentlyand feelsmore familiar.Thismayhelp toexplainwhymoreeducatedpeople seem particularly susceptible to medical misinformation: it seems thatfears about healthcare, in general, are more common among wealthier, moremiddle-classpeople,whomayalsobemorelikelytohavedegrees.Conspiraciesaboutdoctors–andbeliefsinalternativemedicine–maynaturallyfit intothatbeliefsystem.Thesameprocessesmayalsoexplainwhypoliticians’liescontinuetospread

long after they have been corrected – including Donald Trump’s theory thatBarackObamawasnotbornintheUnitedStates.Asyoumightexpectfromtheresearchonmotivatedreasoning,thiswasparticularlybelievedbyRepublicans–buteven14percentofDemocratsheldtheviewaslateas2017.18We can also see this mental inertia in the lingering messages of certain

advertisingcampaigns.ConsiderthemarketingofthemouthwashListerine.Fordecades, Listerine’s adverts falsely claimed that the mouthwash could soothesorethroatsandprotectconsumersfromthecommoncold.Butafteralonglegalbattle in the late1970s, theFederalTradeCommission forced thecompany torun adverts correcting the myths. Despite a sixteen-month, $10-million-dollarcampaignretractingthestatements,theadvertswereonlymarginallyeffective.19

Thisnewunderstandingofmisinformationhasbeen the cause for serious soulsearchinginorganisationsthatareattemptingtospreadthetruth.Inaninfluentialwhitepaper,JohnCook,thenattheUniversityofQueensland,

andStephanLewandowsky,thenattheUniversityofWesternAustralia,pointedout thatmost organisations had operated on the ‘information deficitmodel’ –assuming that misperceptions come from a lack of knowledge.20 To countermisinformationontopicssuchasvaccination,yousimplyofferthefactsandtrytomakesurethatasmanypeopleseethemaspossible.Ourunderstandingoftheintelligencetrapshowsusthatthisisn’tenough:we

simply can’t assume that smart, educated people will absorb the facts we aregivingthem.AsCookandLewandowskyputit:‘It’snotjustwhatpeoplethink

thatmatters,buthowtheythink.’Their ‘debunking handbook’ offers some solutions. For one thing,

organisationshopingtocombatmisinformationshouldditchthe‘myth-busting’approachwheretheyemphasisethemisconceptionandthenexplainthefacts.AcursoryglanceatanNHSwebpageonvaccines,forinstance,liststhetenmyths,in bold, right at the top of the page.21 They are then repeated again, as boldheadlines, underneath. According to the latest cognitive science, this kind ofapproach places too much emphasis on the misinformation itself: thepresentationmeansitisprocessedmorefluentlythanthefacts,andthemultiplerepetitionssimplyincreaseitsfamiliarity.Aswehaveseen,thosetwofeelings–of cognitive fluency and familiarity – contribute to the sense of truthiness,meaningthatananti-vaccinationcampaignercouldhardlyhavedoneabetterjobinreinforcingtheview.Instead, Cook and Lewandowsky argue that any attempt to debunk a

misconceptionshouldbecarefultodesignthepagesothatthefactstandsout.Ifpossible,youshouldavoidrepeatingthemythentirely.Whentrying tocombatfears about vaccines, for instance, you may just decide to focus on thescientifically proven, positive benefits. But if it is necessary to discuss themyths,youcanatleastmakesurethatthefalsestatementsarelesssalientthanthe truth you are trying to convey. It’s better to headline your article ‘Fluvaccinesaresafeandeffective’than‘Myth:Vaccinescangiveyoutheflu’.Cook andLewandowsky also point out thatmany organisationsmay be too

earnestintheirpresentationofthefacts–tothepointthattheyover-complicatetheargument,againreducingthefluencyofthemessage.Instead,theyarguethatit is best to be selective in the evidence you present: sometimes two facts aremorepowerfulthanten.Formorecontroversialtopics,itisalsopossibletoreducepeople’smotivated

reasoninginthewayyouframetheissue.Ifyouaretryingtodiscusstheneedfor companies to pay for the fossil fuels they consume, for example, you aremorelikelytowinoverconservativevotersbycallingita‘carbonoffset’ratherthana‘tax’,whichisamoreloadedtermandtriggerstheirpoliticalidentity.Althoughmyownbrowseofvariouspublichealthwebsitessuggeststhatmany

institutions still have a longway togo, there are some signsofmovement. In2017, the World Health Organisation announced that they had now adoptedthese guidelines to deal with the misinformation spread by ‘anti-vaccination’campaigners.22

Buthowcanweprotectourselves?To answer that question,we need to explore another form ofmetacognition

called ‘cognitive reflection’,which, although related to the formsof reflectionwe examined in the previous chapter,more specifically concerns thewayswerespondtofactualinformation,ratherthanemotionalself-awareness.Cognitivereflectioncanbemeasuredwithasimpletestofjustthreequestions,

and you can get a flavour of what it involves by considering the followingexample:

Abatandaballcost$1.10intotal.Thebatcosts$1.00morethantheball.Howmuchdoestheballcost?_____centsInalake,thereisapatchoflilypads.Everyday,thepatchdoublesinsize.Ifittakes48daysforthepatchtocovertheentirelake,howlongwouldittakeforthepatchtocoverhalfofthelake?_____daysIfittakes5machines5minutestomake5widgets,howlongwouldittake100machinestomake100widgets?____minutes?

The maths required is not beyond the most elementary education, but themajority of people – even students at Ivy League colleges – only answerbetweenoneandtwoofthethreequestionscorrectly.23That’sbecausetheyaredesignedwithmisleadinglyobvious,butincorrect,answers(inthiscase,$0.10,24days,and100minutes).Itisonlyonceyouchallengethoseassumptionsthatyoucanthencometothecorrectanswer($0.05,47days,and5minutes).ThismakesitverydifferentfromtheIQquestionsweexaminedinChapter1,

whichmayinvolvecomplexcalculations,butwhichdonotaskyoutoquestionanenticingbutincorrectlure.Inthisway,theCognitiveReflectionTestoffersashortandsweetwayofmeasuringhowweappraiseinformationandourabilitiestooverridethemisleadingcuesyoumayfaceinreallife,whereproblemsareill-definedandmessagesdeceptive.24As youmight expect, people who score better on the test are less likely to

suffer from various cognitive biases – and sure enough scores on the CRTpredicthowwellpeopleperformonKeithStanovich’srationalityquotient.Intheearly2010s,however,aPhDstudentcalledGordonPennycook(thenat

theUniversityofWaterloo)begantoexplorewhethercognitivereflectioncouldalso influence our broader beliefs. Someone who stops to challenge theirintuitions, and think of alternative possibilities, should be less likely to takeevidence at face value, he suspected – making them less vulnerable tomisinformation. Sure enough, Pennycook found that people with this more

analytical thinking style are less likely to endorse magical thinking andcomplementarymedicine. Further studies have shown that they are alsomorelikelytorejectthetheoryofevolutionandtobelieve9/11conspiracytheories.Crucially, thisholdsevenwhenyoucontrol forotherpotential factors– like

intelligenceoreducation–underliningthefactthatit’snotjustyourbrainpowerthat really matters; it’s whether or not you use it.25 ‘We should distinguishbetweencognitiveabilityandcognitivestyle,’Pennycooktoldme.Or,toputitmore bluntly: ‘If you aren’t willing to think, you aren’t, practically speaking,intelligent.’Aswehaveseenwithothermeasuresofthinkingandreasoning,weareoftenfairlybadatguessingwherewelieonthatspectrum.‘Peoplethatareactuallylowinanalytic[reflective]thinkingbelievetheyarefairlygoodatit.’Pennycook has since built on those findings, with one study receiving

particularlywidespreadattention,includinganIgNobelAwardforresearch‘thatfirstmakesyou laugh, thenmakesyou think’.Thestudy inquestionexaminedthefauxinspirational,‘pseudo-profoundbullshit’thatpeopleoftenpostonsocialmedia.Tomeasurepeople’scredulity,Pennycookaskedparticipantstoratetheprofundity of various nonsense statements. These included random, made-upcombinations of words with vaguely spiritual connotations, such as ‘Hiddenmeaningtransformsunparalleledabstractbeauty’.Theparticipantsalsosawrealtweets by Deepak Chopra – a New Age guru and champion of so-called‘quantum healing’ with more than twenty New York Times bestsellers to hisname.Chopra’sthoughtsinclude:‘Attentionandintentionarethemechanicsofmanifestation’and‘Natureisaself-regulatingecosystemofawareness.’AlittleliketheMosesquestion,thosestatementsmightsoundasthoughthey

make sense; their buzzwords seem to suggest a kind of warm, inspirationalmessage – until you actually think about their content. Sure enough, theparticipants with lower CRT scores reported seeing greater meaning in thesepseudo-profound statements, compared to people with a more analyticalmindset.26Pennycookhassinceexploredwhetherthis‘bullshitreceptivity’alsoleavesus

vulnerabletofakenews–unfoundedclaims,oftendisguisedasrealnewsstories,that percolate through social media. Following the discussions of fake newsduring the2016presidential election,heexposedhundredsofparticipants toarangeofheadlines– someofwhichhadbeen independentlyverifiedand fact-checkedasbeingtrue,othersasfalse.Thestorieswerebalancedequallybetweenthose that were favourable for Democrats and those that were favourable toRepublicans.

Forexample, aheadline from theNewYorkTimes proclaiming that ‘DonaldTrump says he “absolutely” requiresMuslims to register’was supported by areal, substantiated news story. The headline ‘Mike Pence: Gay conversiontherapy saved my marriage’ failed fact-checking, and came from the siteNCSCOOPER.com.Crunching the data, Pennycook found that people with greater cognitive

reflectionwerebetter able todiscern the two, regardlessofwhether theyweretold thenameof thenewssource,andwhether it supported theirownpoliticalconvictions:theywereactuallyengagingwiththewordsthemselvesandtestingwhether they were credible rather than simply using them to reinforce theirpreviousprejudices.27Pennycook’s researchwould seem to imply that we could protect ourselves

from misinformation by trying to think more reflectively – and a few recentstudies demonstrate that even subtle suggestions can have an effect. In 2014,Viren Swami (then at the University of Westminster) asked participants tocompletesimplewordgames,someofwhichhappenedtorevolvearoundwordstodowithcognitionlike‘reason’,‘ponder’and‘rational’,whileothersevokedphysicalconceptslike‘hammer’or‘jump’.Afterplayingthegameswiththe‘thinking’words,participantswerebetterat

detectingtheerrorintheMosesquestion,suggestingthat theywereprocessingtheinformationmorecarefully.Intriguingly,theyalsoscoredloweronmeasuresofconspiracytheories,suggestingthattheywerenowreflectingmorecarefullyontheirexistingbeliefs,too.28Theproblemscomewhenweconsiderhowtoapplytheseresultstoourdaily

lives. Some of the mindfulness techniques should train you to have a moreanalytic point of view, and to avoid jumping to quick conclusions about theinformationyou receive.29One tantalisingexperimenthas even revealed that asinglemeditation can improve scores on theCognitiveReflectionTest,whichwould seem promising if it can be borne out through future research thatspecificallyexaminestheeffectonthewayweprocessmisinformation.30Schwarz is sceptical about whether we can protect ourselves from all

misinformation throughmere intention andgoodwill, though: the sheer delugemeans that it could be very difficult to apply our scepticism even-handedly.‘Youcouldn’tspendalldaycheckingeverydamnthingyouencounterorthatissaidtoyou,’hetoldme.*

*Pennycookhas,incidentally,shownthatreflectivethinkingisnegativelycorrelatedwithsmartphoneuse–themoreyoucheckFacebook,TwitterandGoogle,thelesswellyouscoreontheCRT.Heemphasisesthat

we don’t know if there is a causal link – orwhich direction that linkwould go – but it’s possible thattechnology hasmade us lazy thinkers. ‘It might make youmore intuitive because you are less used toreflecting–comparedtoifyouarenotlookingthingsup,andthinkingaboutthingsmore.’Whenitcomestocurrentaffairsandpolitics,forinstance,wealreadyhaveso

manyassumptionsaboutwhichnewssourcesaretrustworthy–whetherit’stheNewYorkTimes,FoxNews,Breitbart,oryouruncle–andtheseprejudicescanbehardtoovercome.Intheworstscenario,youmayforgettochallengemuchofthe information that agreeswithyour existingpointofview, andonly analysematerialyoualreadydislike.Asaconsequence,yourwell-meaningattempts toprotectyourselffrombadthinkingmayfallintothetrapofmotivatedreasoning.‘Itcouldjustaddtothepolarisationofyourviews,’Schwarzsaid.This caution is necessary: we may never be able to build a robust

psychologicalshieldagainstallthemisinformationinourenvironment.Evenso,there isnowsomegoodevidence thatwecanbolsterourdefences against themost egregious errors while perhaps also cultivating a more reflective, wisermindsetoverall.Wejustneedtodoitmoresmartly.Like Patrick Croskerry’s attempts to de-bias his medical students, these

strategiesoftencomeintheformofan‘inoculation’–exposingustoonetypeofbullshit,sothatwewillbebetterequippedtospototherformsinthefuture.Theaimistoteachustoidentifysomeofthewarningsigns,plantinglittleredflagsin our thinking, so that we automatically engage our analytical, reflectivereasoningwhenweneedit.JohnCook andStephanLewandowsky’swork suggests the approach canbe

very powerful. In 2017, Lewandowsky and Cook (who also wrote TheDebunking Handbook) were investigating ways to combat some of themisinformationaroundhuman-madeclimatechange–particularly theattemptstospreaddoubtaboutthescientificconsensus.Rather than tackling climate myths directly, however, they first presented

someof theirparticipantswitha factsheetabout theway the tobacco industryhadused‘fakeexperts’tocastdoubtsonscientificresearchlinkingsmokingtolungcancer.They then showed them a specific piece of misinformation about climate

change: the so-called Oregon Petition, organised by the biochemist Arthur B.Robinson, which claimed to offer 31,000 signatures of people with sciencedegrees, who all doubted that human release of greenhouse gases is causingdisruptionoftheEarth’sclimate.Inreality,thenameswereunverified–thelistevenincludedthesignatureofSpiceGirl‘Dr’GeriHalliwell31–andfewerthan

1percentofthosequestionedhadformallystudiedclimatescience.Previousresearchhadshownthatmanypeoplereadingaboutthepetitionfail

toquestion thecredentialsof theexperts, andareconvincedof its findings. Inlinewith theories ofmotivated reasoning, thiswasparticularly true for peoplewhoheldmoreright-wingviews.After learningabout the tobacco industry’s tactics,however,mostofCook’s

participants were more sceptical of the misinformation, and it failed to swaytheir overall opinions. Evenmore importantly, the inoculation had neutralisedthe effect of the misinformation across the political spectrum; the motivatedreasoning that so often causes us to accept a lie, and reject the truth, was nolongerplayinga role.32 ‘Forme that’s themost interesting result– inoculationworks despite your political background,’ Cook told me. ‘Regardless ofideology, no one wants to be misled by logical fallacies – and that is anencouragingandexcitingthought.’Equallyexcitingis thefact that theinoculationconcerningmisinformationin

one area (the link between cigarettes and smoking) provided protection inanother(climatechange).Itwasasifparticipantshadplantedlittlealarmbellsintheir thinking, helping them to recognise when to wake up and apply theiranalyticmindsmore effectively, rather than simply accepting any informationthatfelt‘truthy’.‘Itcreatesanumbrellaofprotection.’

The power of these inoculations is leading some schools and universities toexplorethebenefitsofexplicitlyeducatingstudentsaboutmisinformation.33Many institutions already offer critical thinking classes, of course, but these

are often dry examinations of philosophical and logical principles, whereasinoculationtheoryshowsthatweneedtobetaughtaboutitexplicitly,usingreal-lifeexamplesthatdemonstratethekindsofargumentsthatnormallyfoolus.34Itdoesnotseemtobeenoughtoassumethatwewill readilyapply thosecriticalthinking skills in our everyday lives without first being shown the sheerprevalenceofmisinformationandthewaysitcouldbeswayingourjudgements.Theresultssofarhavebeenencouraging,showingthatasemester’scoursein

inoculation significantly reduced the students’ beliefs in pseudoscience,conspiracy theories and fake news.Evenmore importantly, these courses alsoseem to improve measures of critical thinking more generally – such as theability to interpret statistics, identify logical fallacies, consider alternativeexplanations and recognise when additional information will be necessary tocometoaconclusion.35

Although these measures of critical thinking are not identical to the wisereasoning tests we explored in Chapter 5, they do bear some similarities –includingtheabilitytoquestionyourownassumptionsandtoexplorealternativeexplanationsforevents. Importantly, likeIgorGrossmann’sworkonevidence-basedwisdom,andthescoresofemotiondifferentiationandregulationthatweexplored in the last chapter, thesemeasuresof critical thinkingdon’t correlateverystronglywithgeneralintelligence,andtheypredictreal-lifeoutcomesbetterthanstandardintelligencetests.36Peoplewithhigherscoresarelesslikelytotryan unproven fad diet, for instance; they are also less likely to share personalinformationwith a strangeronlineor tohaveunprotected sex. Ifweare smartbutwanttoavoidmakingstupidmistakes,itisthereforeessentialthatwelearntothinkmorecritically.These results shouldbegoodnews for readersof thisbook:by studying the

psychologyof thesevariousmythsandmisconceptions,youmayhavealreadybegun to protect yourself from lies – and the existing cognitive inoculationprogrammesalreadyoffersomefurthertipstogetyoustarted.Thefirststepistolearntoasktherightquestions:

Whoismakingtheclaim?Whataretheircredentials?Andwhatmightbetheirmotivestomakemethinkthis?Whatarethepremisesoftheclaim?Andhowmighttheybeflawed?Whataremyowninitialassumptions?Andhowmighttheybeflawed?Whatarethealternativeexplanationsfortheirclaim?Whatistheevidence?Andhowdoesitcomparetothealternativeexplanation?

Whatfurtherinformationdoyouneedbeforeyoucanmakeajudgement?

Giventheresearchontruthiness,youshouldalsolookatthepresentationoftheclaims.Dotheyactuallyaddanyfurtherprooftotheclaim–ordotheyjustgivetheillusionofevidence?Isthesamepersonsimplyrepeatingthesamepoint–orareyoureallyhearingdifferentvoiceswhohaveconvergedonthesameview?Aretheanecdotesofferingusefulinformationandaretheybackedupwithharddata? Or do they just increase the fluency of the story? And do you trustsomeonesimplybecausetheiraccentfeelsfamiliarandiseasytounderstand?Finally,youshouldconsiderreadingaboutafewofthemorecommonlogical

fallacies,since thiscanplant those‘redflags’ thatwillalertyouwhenyouarebeing duped by ‘truthy’ but deceptive information. To get you started, I’vecompiledalistofthemostcommononesinthetablebelow.

These simple stepsmay appear to be stating the obvious, but overwhelmingevidence shows that many people pass through university without learning toapplythemtotheirdailylife.37Andtheover-confidencebiasshowsthatit’sthepeoplewhothinktheyarealreadyimmunewhoareprobablymostatrisk.

38

Ifyoureallywanttoprotectyourselffrombullshit,Ican’tover-emphasisethe

importanceofinternalisingtheserulesandapplyingthemwheneveryoucan,toyourownbelovedtheoriesaswellasthosethatalreadyarouseyoursuspicion.Ifyoufindtheprocessrewarding,thereareplentyofonlinecoursesthatwillhelpyoutodevelopthoseskillsfurther.Accordingtotheprinciplesofinoculation,youshouldstartoutbylookingat

relatively uncontroversial issues (like the flesh-eating bananas) to learn thebasicsofscepticalthought,beforemovingontomoredeeplyembeddedbeliefs(likeclimatechange)thatmaybeharderforyoutoquestion.Inthesecases,itisalways worth asking why you feel strongly about a particular viewpoint, andwhether it is really central to your identity, or whether youmight be able to

reframeitinawaythatislessthreatening.Simply spendinga fewminutes towritepositive, self-affirming thingsabout

yourself and the things that youmost value canmake youmore open to newideas. Studies have shown that this practice really does reduce motivatedreasoningbyhelpingyou to realise thatyourwholebeingdoesnotdependonbeingrightaboutaparticularissue,andthatyoucandisentanglecertainopinionsfromyouridentity.39(Beliefinclimatechangedoesnothavetoteardownyourconservative politics, for instance: you could even see it as an opportunity tofurtherbusinessandinnovation.)Youcanthenbegintoexaminewhyyoumighthavecometo thoseconclusions,and to lookat the information infrontofyouandtestwhetheryoumightbeswayedbyitsfluencyandfamiliarity.You may be surprised by what you find. Applying these strategies, I’ve

already changed my mind on certain scientific issues, such as geneticmodification. Like many liberal people, I had once opposed GM crops onenvironmentalgrounds–yetthemoreIbecameawareofmynewssources,themore I noticed that I was hearing opposition from the same small number ofcampaigngroupslikeGreenpeace–creatingtheimpressionthatthesefearsweremorewidespreadthantheyactuallywere.Moreover,theirwarningsabouttoxicsideeffectsandrunawayplaguesofFrankensteinplantswerecognitivelyfluentand chimedwithmy intuitive environmental views – but a closer look at theevidence showed that the risks are tiny (andmostly based on anecdotal data),while the potential benefits of building insect-resistant crops and reducing theuseofpesticidesareincalculable.Even the former leader of Greenpeace has recently attacked the

scaremongeringofhisex-colleagues,describingitas‘morallyunacceptable...putting ideology before humanitarian action’.40 I had always felt scornful ofclimatechangedeniersandanti-vaccinationcampaigners,yetIhadbeenjustasblinkeredconcerninganothercause.

For one final lesson in the art of bullshit detection, I met the writerMichaelShermer in his home town of Santa Barbara, California. For the past threedecades,Shermerhasbeenoneoftheleadingvoicesofthescepticalmovement,which aims to encourage the use of rational reasoning and critical thinking topublic life. ‘We initiallywent for the low-hanging fruit – television psychics,astrology, tarot card reading,’ Shermer told me. ‘But over the decades we’vemigrated to more “mainstream” claims about things like global warming,creationism,anti-vaccination–andnowfakenews.’

Shermerhasnotalwaysbeenthisway.Acompetitivecyclist,heonceturnedto unproven (though legal) treatments to boost his performance, includingcolonic irrigation to ease his digestion, and ‘rolfing’ – a kind of intense (andpainful)physiotherapywhichinvolvesmanipulatingthebody’sconnectivetissueto reinforce its ‘energy field’. At night, he had even donned an ‘Electro-Acuscope’ – a device, worn over the skull, that was designed to enhance thebrain’shealing‘alphawaves’.Shermer’s ‘road-to-Damascus moment’ came during the 1983 Race Across

America,fromSantaMonica,California,toAtlanticCity,NewJersey.Forthisrace,Shermerhiredanutritionist,whoadvisedhim to tryanew‘multivitamintherapy’–whichinvolvedingestingamouthfuloffoul-smellingtablets.Theendresultwasthe‘mostexpensiveandcolourfulurineinAmerica’.Bythethirdday,hedecidedthatenoughwasenough–andonthesteepclimbtoLovelandPass,Colorado,hespatoutthemouthfulofacridtabletsandvowednevertobedupedagain.‘Beingscepticalseemedalotsaferthanbeingcredulous’,helaterwrote.41Astark testofhisnewfoundscepticismcamea fewdays later,nearHaigler,

Nebraska.Itwasnearlyhalfwaythroughtheraceandhewasalreadysufferingfrom severe exhaustion. After waking from a forty-five-minute nap, he wasconvincedthathewassurroundedbyaliens,posingashiscrewmembers,tryingtotakehimtothemothership.Hefellbackasleep,andawokeclear-headedandrealisedthathehadexperiencedahallucinationarisingfromphysicalandmentalexhaustion. The memory remains vivid, however, as if it were a real event.Shermerthinksthatifhehadnotbeenmoreself-aware,hecouldhavegenuinelyconfusedtheeventforarealabduction,asmanyothersbeforehimhavedone.Asahistorianofscience,writerandpublicspeaker,Shermerhassincetackled

psychics,quackdoctors,9/11conspiracytheoristsandholocaustdeniers.Hehasseen how your intelligence can be applied powerfully to either discover orobfuscatethetruth.Youmight imagine thathewouldbeworld-wearyandcynicalaftersomany

years of debunkingbullshit, yet hewas remarkably affable onourmeeting.Agenialattitudeis,Ilaterfoundout,crucialforputtingmanyofhisopponentsofftheir guard, so that he can begin to understandwhatmotivates them. ‘Imightsocialise with someone like [Holocaust denier] David Irving, because after acoupleofdrinks,theyopenupandgodeeper,andtellyouwhattheyarereallythinking.’42Shermer may not use the term, but he now offers one of the most

comprehensive ‘inoculations’ available in his ‘Skepticism 101’ course at

ChapmanUniversity.43 The first steps, he says, are like ‘kicking the tyres andcheckingunderthehood’ofacar.‘Who’smakingtheclaim?What’sthesource?Has someone else verified the claim?What’s the evidence?How good is theevidence?Has someone tried to debunk the evidence?’ he toldme. ‘It’s basicbaloneydetection.’LiketheotherpsychologistsIhavespokento,heiscertainthatthevivid,real-

life examples of misinformation are crucial to teach these principles; it’s notenoughtoassumethatatypicalacademiceducationequipsuswiththenecessaryprotection. ‘Most education is involved in just teaching students facts andtheoriesaboutaparticularfield–notnecessarilythemethodologiesofthinkingscepticallyorscientificallyingeneral.’Togivemeaflavourofthecourse,Shermerdescribeshowmanyconspiracy

theoriesusethe‘anomalies-as-proof’strategytobuildasuperficiallyconvincingcase that something is amiss. Holocaust deniers, for instance, argue that thestructureofthe(badlydamaged)KremaIIgaschamberatAuschwitz-Birkenaudoesn’tmatcheye-witnessaccountsofSSguardsdroppinggaspellets throughtheholesintheroof.Fromthis,theyclaimthatnoonecouldhavebeengassedatKrema II, therefore no one would have been gassed at Auschwitz-Birkenau,meaning that no Jews were systematically killed by the Nazis – and theHolocaustdidn’thappen.If that kind of argument is presented fluently, it may bypass our analytical

thinking; never mind the vast body of evidence that does not hinge on theexistence of holes in Krema II, including aerial photographs showing massexterminations,themillionsofskeletonsinmassgraves,andtheconfessionsofmanyNazisthemselves.AttemptstoreconstructtheKremagaschamberhave,infact,foundthepresenceoftheseholes,meaningtheargumentisbuiltonafalsepremise – but the point is that even if the anomalyhadbeen true, itwouldn’thavebeenenoughtorewritethewholeofHolocausthistory.The same strategy is oftenusedbypeoplewhobelieve that the9/11 attacks

were ‘an inside job’. One of their central claims is that jet fuel from theaeroplanes could not have burned hot enough to melt the steel girders in theTwinTowers,meaningthebuildingsshouldnothavecollapsed.(Steelmeltsataround1510°C,whereasthefuelfromtheaeroplanesburnsataround825°C.)Infact,althoughsteeldoesnot turn intoa liquidat that temperature,engineershaveshownthat itnevertheless losesmuchof itsstrength,meaningthegirderswouldhaveneverthelessbuckledunder theweightof thebuilding.The lesson,then,istobewareoftheuseofanomaliestocastdoubtonvastsetsofdata,and

toconsiderthealternativeexplanationsbeforeyouallowonepuzzlingdetail torewritehistory.44Shermer emphasises the importance of keeping an open mind. With the

Holocaust,forinstance,it’simportanttoacceptthattherewillbesomerevisingoftheoriginalaccountsasmoreevidencecomestolight,withoutdiscountingthevastsubstanceoftheacceptedevents.He also advises us all to step outside of our echo chamber and to use the

opportunitytoprobesomeone’sbroaderworldviews;whentalkingtoaclimatechangedenier,forinstance,hethinksitcanbeusefultoexploretheireconomicconcernsaboutregulatingfossilfuelconsumption–teasingouttheassumptionsthat are shaping their interpretation of the science. ‘Because the facts aboutglobalwarmingarenotpolitical– theyarewhat theyare.’Theseare thesameprincipleswearehearingagainandagain:toexplore,listenandlearn,tolookforalternative explanations and viewpoints rather than the one that comes mosteasilytomind,andtoacceptyoudonothavealltheanswers.Byteachinghisstudentsthiskindofapproach,Shermerhopesthattheywillbe

abletomaintainanopen-mindedoutlook,whilebeingmoreanalyticalaboutanysource of new information. ‘It’s equipping them for the future, when theyencountersomeclaimtwentyyearsfromnowthatIcan’tevenimagine,sotheycanthink,wellthisiskindoflikethatthingwelearnedinShermer’sclass,’hetoldme. ‘It’s justa toolkit foranyone touse,atany time . . .This iswhatallschoolsshouldbedoing.’

Having first explored the foundations of the intelligence trap in Part 1,we’venow seen how the new field of evidence-based wisdom outlines additionalthinking skills and dispositions – such as intellectual humility, actively open-mindedthinking,emotiondifferentiationandregulation,andcognitivereflection– and helps us to take control of the mind’s powerful thinking engine,circumventingthepitfallsthattypicallyafflictintelligentandeducatedpeople.We’vealsoexploredsomepracticalstrategiesthatallowyoutoimproveyour

decision making. These include Benjamin Franklin’s moral algebra, self-distancing,mindfulnessandreflectivereasoning,aswellasvarioustechniquestoincreaseyouremotionalself-awarenessandfine-tuneyourintuition.Andinthischapter, we have seen how these methods, combined with advanced criticalthinkingskills,canprotectusfrommisinformation: theyshowus tobewareofthetrapofcognitivefluency,andtheyshouldhelpustobuildwiseropinionsonpolitics,health,theenvironmentandbusiness.

Onecommonthemeistheideathattheintelligencetraparisesbecausewefindit hard to pause and think beyond the ideas and feelings that aremost readilyaccessible,andtotakeastepintoadifferentvisionoftheworldaroundus;itisoftenafailureoftheimaginationataverybasiclevel.Thesetechniquesteachushowtoavoidthatpath,andasSilviaMamedehasshown,evenasimplepauseinourthinkingcanhaveapowerfuleffect.Evenmoreimportantthantheparticularstrategies,however,theseresultsare

an invaluable proof of concept. They show that there are indeed many vitalthinkingskills,besidesthosethataremeasuredinstandardacademictests, thatcanguideyour intelligencetoensure thatyouuse itwithgreaterprecisionandaccuracy.Andalthoughtheseskillsarenotcurrentlycultivatedwithinastandardeducation,theycanbetaught.Wecanalltrainourselvestothinkmorewisely.InPart3,wewillexpandonthisideatoexplorethewaysthatevidence-based

wisdomcanalsoboostthewayswelearnandremember–firmlyputtingtorestthe idea that the cultivation of these qualities will come at the cost of moretraditionalmeasuresof intelligence.Andfor that,we firstneed tomeetoneoftheworld’smostcuriousmen.

PART3

Theartofsuccessfullearning:Howevidence-basedwisdomcanimprove

yourmemory

7

Tortoisesandhares:Whysmartpeoplefailtolearn

Let’s return to the USA in the late 1920s. In California, Lewis Terman’sgeniuseshavejuststartedtoattendhighschool,thevisionofaglitteringfuturestillstretchingoutbeforethem,butwearemoreinterestedinayoungboycalledRitty,tinkeringawayinhishomelaboratoryinFarRockaway,NewYork.The ‘lab’ comprised an old wooden packing box, equipped with shelves, a

heater, a storage battery, and an electric circuit of light bulbs, switches andresistors.OneofRitty’sproudest projectswas ahome-madeburglar alarm, sothat a bell would sound whenever his parents entered his room. He used amicroscope to study the natural world and he would sometimes take hischemistrysetintothestreettoperformshowsfortheotherchildren.Theexperimentsdidnotalwaysendashehadplanned.Oneday,hebeganto

playwiththeignitioncoilfromaFordcar.Couldthesparkspunchholesthroughapieceofpaper,hewondered?Theydid,butbeforeheknewit thepaperwasablaze.Whenitbecametoohottohold,Rittydroppeditintoawastepaperbin–whichitselfcaughtlight.Consciousofhismotherplayingbridgedownstairs,hecarefullyclosed thedoor,andsmothered the firewithanoldmagazine,beforeshakingtheembersontothestreetbelow.1Noneof thisnecessarilymarksRittyasanythingoutof theordinary:myriad

childrenofhisgenerationwillhaveownedchemistrysets,playedwithelectriccircuits and studied the naturalworldwith amicroscope.Hewas, by his ownadmission,a‘goody-goody’atschool,butbynomeansremarkable:hestruggledwith literature, drawing and foreign languages. Perhaps because of his poorerverbal skills, he apparently scored 125 in a school IQ test, which is aboveaverage but nowhere near the level of the ‘geniuses’ in California.2 LewisTerman would not have given him much thought compared to the likes ofBeatriceCarter,withherastronomicalscoreof192.ButRittykeptlearninganyway.Hedevouredthefamilyencyclopaedia,andas

a young adolescent he soon took to teaching himself from a series ofmathematics primers – filling his notebooks with trigonometry, calculus andanalyticgeometry,oftencreatinghisownexercises tostretchhismind.3Whenhe moved to the Far Rockaway High School, he joined a physics club andenteredtheInterscholasticAlgebraLeague.HeeventuallyreachedthetopplaceinNewYorkUniversity’sannualmathschampionship–aheadofstudentsfromallthecity’sschools.Thenextyear,hebeganhisdegreeatMIT–andtherestishistory.Schoolchildrenwould later learn Ritty’s full name – Richard Feynman ? as

oneofthemostinfluentialphysicistsofthetwentiethcentury.Hisnewapproachto the fieldof quantumelectrodynamics revolutionised the studyof subatomicparticles4 – research that won him a Nobel Prize in 1965 with Sin-ItiroTomonaga and Julian Schwinger.5 (It was an accolade that none of Terman’scohort would achieve.) Feynman also helped uncover the physics behindradioactivedecay,andmadevitalcontributionstoAmerica’sdevelopmentoftheatomicbombduringtheSecondWorldWar,arolethathelaterdeeplyregretted.Other scientists believed that the depths of his thinking were almost

unfathomable. ‘There are two kinds of geniuses: the “ordinary” and the“magicians”’, thePolishmathematicianMarkKacwroteinhisautobiography.‘Anordinarygenius isa fellowthatyouandIwouldbe justasgoodas, ifwewere onlymany times better. There is nomystery as to howhismindworks.Oncewe understandwhat they have done,we feel certain thatwe, too, couldhavedoneit.Itisdifferentwithmagicians...theworkingoftheirmindsisforall intentsandpurposesincomprehensible.Evenafterweunderstandwhattheyhave done, the process by which they have done it is completely dark . . .RichardFeynmanisamagicianofthehighestcalibre.’6ButFeynman’sgeniusdidnotendwithphysics.Duringasabbaticalfromhis

physics research at Caltech, he applied himself to the study of genetics,discovering the ways that some mutations within a gene may suppress eachother.Despitehisapparentinaptitudefordrawingandforeignlanguages,helaterlearnt to be a credible artist, to speak Portuguese and Japanese, and to readMayanhieroglyphs–allwiththerelentlessnessthathaddrivenhiseducationasachild.Otherprojectsincludedastudyofantbehaviour,bongodrumming,andalong-standingfascinationwithradiorepair.Afterthe1986Challengerdisaster,itwas Feynman’s tenacious inquiringmind that exposed the engineering flawthathadcausedthespaceshuttletoexplode.AsFeynman’sbiographerJamesGleickwroteinaNewYorkTimesobituary:

‘Hewasnevercontentwithwhatheknew,orwhatotherpeopleknew . . .Hepursuedknowledgewithoutprejudice.’7

ThestoriesofLewisTerman’s‘geniuses’havealreadyshownushowpeopleofgreat general intelligence often fail to build on their initial potential. Despitetheir early promise, many of the Termites reached old age with the uneasyfeeling that they could have done more with their talents. Like the hare inAesop’smost famous fable, they beganwith a natural advantage but failed tocapitaliseonthatpotential.Feynman,incontrast,claimedtohavestartedoutwitha‘limitedintelligence’,8

buthe thenapplied it in themostproductivewaypossible, ashe continued togrowandexpandhismindthroughoutadulthood.‘Therealfunoflife’,hewrotetoafanin1986,justtwoyearsbeforehedied,‘isthisperpetualtestingtorealizehowfaroutyoucangowithanypotentialities.’9The latest psychological research on learning and personal development has

nowstartedtoseeanastonishingconvergencewiththetheoryofevidence-basedwisdomthatwehaveexploredsofarinthisbook,revealingadditionalcognitivequalitiesandmentalhabits,besidesintelligence,thatmaydeterminewhetherornotweflourishlikeFeynman.Byencouragingus toengageandstretchourminds, thesecharacteristicscan

boost our learning and ensure that we thrive when we face new challenges,ensuring that we make the most of our natural potential. Crucially, however,theyalsoprovideanantidotetothecognitivemiserlinessandone-sidedthinkingthatcontributestosomeformsoftheintelligencetrap–meaningthattheyalsoresultinwiser,lessbiasedreasoningoverall.Theseinsightsmaybeofparticularinterest toparentsandpeopleworkingin

education, but they can also empower anyone to apply their intelligencemoreeffectively.

Let’s first consider curiosity, a trait that appears common inmany other highachieversbesidesFeynman.CharlesDarwin, for instance, had failed to excel in his early education and,

like Feynman, he certainly didn’t consider himself to be of above averageintelligence, claiming that he had ‘no great quickness of apprehension or witwhichissoremarkableinsomeclevermen’.10‘WhenIlefttheschoolIwasformyageneitherhighnorlowinit,’hewrote

inanautobiographicalessay.AndIbelievethatIwasconsideredbyallmymastersandbymyfatherasaveryordinaryboy,ratherbelowthecommonstandardinintellect...LookingbackaswellasIcanatmycharacterduringmyschoollife,theonlyqualitieswhichatthisperiodpromisedwellforthefuturewerethatIhadstronganddiversifiedtastes,muchzealforwhateverinterestedme,andakeenpleasureinunderstandinganycomplexsubjectorthing.11

ItisdifficulttoimaginethatDarwincouldhaveeverconductedhispainstakingworkontheBeagle–andduringtheyearsafterwards–ifhehadnotbeendrivenbyahungerforknowledgeandunderstanding.Hecertainlywasn’t lookingforimmediate richesor fame: the research tookdecadeswith littlepayoff.Buthisdesiretolearnmorecausedhimtolookfurtherandquestionthedogmaaroundhim.Besideshisground-breakingworkonevolution,Darwin’sceaselessinterestin

theworldaroundhimwouldleadtosomeofthefirstscientificwritingsonthesubjectofcuriosity,too,describinghowyoungchildrennaturallylearnabouttheworldaboutthemthroughtirelessexperimentation.12Aslaterchildpsychologistsnoted,this‘needtoknowmore’wasalmostlikea

basic biological drive, or hunger, for a young infant. Despite this scientificpedigree,however,modernpsychologistshadlargelyneglectedtosystematicallyexplore its broader role in our later lives, or the reasons that some people arenaturally more curious than others.13 We knew that curiosity was crucial fortakingourfirstintellectualstepsintheworld–butlittleafterthat.Thatwaspartlyduetopracticaldifficulties.Unlikegeneralintelligence,there

are no definitive standardised tests, meaning that psychologists have insteadrelied onmore tangential indicators. You can observe how often a child asksquestions,forinstance,orhowintenselytheyexploretheirenvironment;youcanalso design toyswith hidden features and puzzles, andmeasure how long thechild engages with them. With adults, meanwhile, one can use self-reportedquestionnaires,orbehaviouralteststhatexaminewhethersomeonewillreadandprobe new material or if they are happy to ignore it. And when modernpsychologistshaveturnedtothesetools,theyhavefoundthatcuriositycanrivalgeneral intelligence in its importance over our development throughoutchildhood,adolescenceandbeyond.Much of that research on curiosity had examined its role in memory and

learning,14 showing that someone’s curiosity can determine the amount ofmaterial that is remembered, thedepthof theunderstanding, and the lengthof

timethatthematerialisretained.15Thisisn’tjustaquestionofmotivation:evenwhen their additional effort andenthusiasm is taken intoconsideration,peoplewithgreatercuriositystillappeartobeabletorememberfactsmoreeasily.Brain scans can now tell us why this is, revealing that curiosity activates a

networkof regionsknownas the ‘dopaminergic system’.Theneurotransmitterdopamineisusuallyimplicatedindesireforfood,drugsorsex–suggestingthat,at a neural level, curiosity really is a form of hunger or lust. But theneurotransmitteralsoappearstostrengthenthelong-termstorageofmemoriesinthe hippocampus, neatly explaining why curious people are not only moremotivatedtolearn,butwillalsoremembermore,evenwhenyouaccountfortheamountofworktheyhavedevotedtoasubject.16Themostinterestingdiscoveryhasbeentheobservationofa‘spill-overeffect’

–meaningthatoncetheparticipants’interesthasbeenpiquedbysomethingthatgenuinely interests them, and they have received that shot of dopamine, theysubsequentlyfinditeasiertomemoriseincidentalinformationtoo.Itprimesthebrainforlearninganything.Importantly, the research shows that some people are consistently more

interested in the world around them. And these individual differences incuriosityareonlymodestlyrelatedtogeneralintelligence.ThismeansthattwopeopleofthesameIQmayhaveradicallydifferenttrajectoriesdependingsolelyontheircuriosity,andagenuineinterestinthematerialwillbemoreimportantthanadeterminationtosucceed.For this reason, some psychologists now consider that general intelligence,

curiosity and conscientiousness are together the ‘three pillars’ of academicsuccess;ifyoulackanyoneofthesequalities,youaregoingtosuffer.Thebenefitsdonotendwitheducation.Atwork,curiosityiscrucialforusto

pickupthe‘tacitknowledge’thatweexploredinChapter1,anditcanprotectusfrom stress andburnout, helping us to remainmotivated evenwhen the goinggetstough.Italsopowersourcreativeintelligence,byencouragingustoprobeproblemsthatothershadnotevenconsidered,andbytriggeringcounter-factualthinkingasweaskourselves‘whatif...?’17Agenuineinterestintheotherperson’sneedsevenimprovesoursocialskills

andhelpsustouncoverthebestpotentialcompromise–boostingouremotionalintelligence.18Byencouragingustolookmoredeeplyforunspokenmotivationsinthisway,curiosityseemstoleadtobetterbusinessnegotiations.Theresultisaricherandmorefulfillinglife.Onelandmarkstudytrackedthe

livesofnearlyeighthundredpeopleover thecourseof twosix-monthperiods,

questioning themabout theirpersonalgoals.Usingself-reportedquestionnairesto measure ten separate traits – including self-control and engagement – theresearchers found that curiosity best predicted their ability to achieve thosegoals.19Ifyouarewonderinghowyouwouldcomparetotheseparticipants,consider

the following sample questions and score how accurately they reflect thewayyoufeelandbehave,from1(notatall)to5(extremely):

IactivelyseekasmuchnewinformationasIcaninnewsituations.EverywhereIgo,Iamoutlookingfornewthingsorexperiences.Iamthekindofpersonwhoembracesunfamiliarpeople,eventsandplaces.20

Thepeoplewhostronglyendorsedthesekindsofstatementsweremorelikelytosucceedatwhatevertheysettheirmindtoachieve.Curiositywasalsotheonlytrait that consistently boostedwellbeing during those twelvemonths. In otherwords, it didn’t just increase their chances of success; it made sure that theyenjoyedtheprocesstoo.All of which helps us to understand how people like Darwin and Feynman

couldachievesomuchintheirlives.Thehungertoexplorehadexposedthemtonew experiences and ideas that didn’t fit with the current orthodoxy; it thendrovethemtodigdeepertounderstandwhattheywereseeingandtofindnovelsolutionstotheproblemstheyuncovered.Someone with greater intelligence might have initially found it easier to

processcomplexinformationthaneitherofthesetwomen,butiftheylackedanaturalcuriositytheyareunlikelytohavebeenabletomaintainthatadvantage.It shows us, again, that general intelligence is one crucial ingredient of goodthinking–butitneedsmanyothercomplementarytraitstotrulyflourish.The real mystery is why so few of us manage to maintain that childlike

interest,withmany studies showing thatmost people’s curiosity drops rapidlyafterinfancy.Ifweareallbornwithanaturalhungertolearn,andthattraitcanbringussomanybenefitswell intoadulthood,whatcausessomanypeople toloseitasweage?Andhowcanwestopthatdecline?SusanEngel,atWilliamsCollege,Massachusetts,hasspentthebestpartofthe

lasttwodecadeslookingforanswers–andtheresultsareshocking.InherbookThe Hungry Mind, she points to one experiment, in which a group ofkindergartenchildrenwere allowed towatchoneof theirparents in a separate

room through one-way glass. The parents were either asked to play with theobjectsonatable,tosimplylookatthetable,ortoignoretheobjectscompletelyastheychattedtoanotheradult.Lateron,thechildrenweregiventheobjectstoinspect–and theywere farmore likely to touchandexplore them if theyhadseentheirparentsdoingthesame.Through the subtlest of actions, their parents’ behaviour had shown the

childrenwhetherexplorationwasdesiredordiscouraged,enhancingordampingtheir interest, and over time, these attitudes could become ingrained in theirminds.‘Curiosityiscontagious,andit’sverydifficulttoencouragecuriosityinkidsifyoudon’thaveanyexperienceofcuriosityinyourownlife,’Engelsaid.Aparent’sinfluencealsocomesthroughtheirconversation.Recordingtwelve

families’ dinner-table conversations, she noticed that some parents routinelyofferastraightanswertoachild’squestions.Therewasnothingactuallywrongwithwhat theysaid– theywerenotnotablyuninterested?butothersused theopportunity to open up the subject,whichwould inevitably lead to a chain offurtherquestions.Theresultwasafarmorecuriousandengagedchild.Engel’s research paints an even bleaker picture of our education systems.

Toddlersmayaskup to twenty-sixquestionsperhourathome(withonechildasking145duringoneobservation!)butthisdropstojusttwoperhouratschool.Thisdisengagementcanalsobeseeninotherexpressionsofcuriosity–suchashowwillingtheyaretoexplorenewtoysorinterestingobjects–anditbecomeseven more pronounced as the child ages. While observing some fifth-gradelessons, Engel would often go for a two-hour stretch without seeing a singleexpressionofactiveinterest.This may partly be due to teachers’ understandable concerns about

maintaining order andmeeting the demands of their syllabus. Even so, Engelbelievesthatmanyteachersareoftentoorigid,failingtoletstudentspursuetheirown questions in favour of adhering to a predefined lesson plan. WhenobservingoneclassontheAmericanRevolution,forinstance,shesawoneboypolitelyraisehishandafterfifteenminutesofnon-stoplecture.‘Ican’tanswerquestions right now,’ the teacher replied in a brisk tone. ‘Now it’s time forlearning.’Youcanseehowthatattitudecouldquicklyruboffonachild,sothatevensomeoneofgreater intelligence simply stops trying to find thingsout forthemselves.Darwin,incidentally,hadfoundthatrigidclassicaleducationalmostkilledhis

interest, as hewas forced to learnVirgil andHomer by heart. ‘Nothing couldhavebeenworseforthedevelopmentofmymind’,hewrote.Fortunately,hehad

atleastbeenencouragedtopursuehisinterestsbyhisparents.Butwithoutanynourishmentathomeoratschool,yourappetitetolearnandexploremayslowlydisappear.Engelpointsoutthatanxietyisalsoacuriositykiller,andverysubtlecuesmay

haveabigimpact;shehasevenfoundthattheexpressionofinterestisdirectlycorrelatedwiththenumberoftimesateachersmilesduringthelesson.In another experiment, she studied groups of nine-year-olds in a science

lesson. Their task was simple – they had to drop raisins into a mixture ofvinegar,bakingsodaandwater,toseeifthebubbleswouldmakethemfloat.Inhalfofthelessons,theteachersetouttheinstructionsandthenleftthechildrentogetonwiththeirwork,butinothers,theteacherdeviatedfromthelessonplanslightly.ShepickedupaSkittlesweetandsaid,‘Youknowwhat,IwonderwhatwouldhappenifIdroppedthisinstead.’Itwasa tiny step,buthavingobserved the teacher’s expressionof curiosity,

the children engaged more enthusiastically with the lesson – continuing theirendeavours evenwhen the teacher left the room. Itwas a stark contrast to thecontrol condition, in which the children were more easily distracted, morefidgety,andlessproductive.AlthoughEngel’sworkisstillongoing,sheisadamantthatit’stimetobring

theseinsightsintotheclassroom.‘There’salotwestilldon’tknowandthat’saveryexcitingthingforusasscientists.Butweknowenoughtosaythatschoolsshouldbe[actively]encouragingcuriosity...andthatitcanbeverypowerful.Akidwhoreallywants toknowthings–youpracticallycan’tstop themfromlearning.’

WewillsoondiscoverthewaysthatFeynmanmanagedtokeephiscuriositytoachieve his potential – and why this also contributes to better reasoning andthinking. Before we examine those ground-breaking discoveries, however, wealsoneedtoexamineoneotheressentialingredientforpersonalandintellectualfulfilment:acharacteristicknownasthe‘growthmindset’.This concept is the brainchild of Carol Dweck, a psychologist at Stanford

University, whose pioneering research first attracted widespread attention in2007withabest-sellingbook,Mindset.Butthiswasjustthebeginning.Overthelastdecade,aseriesofstrikingexperimentshassuggestedthatourmindsetscanalsoexplainwhyapparentlysmartpeoplefailtolearnfromtheirerrors,meaningthatDweck’stheoryisessentialforourunderstandingoftheintelligencetrap.LikeRobertSternberg,Dweckwasinspiredbyherownexperienceatschool.

Duringsixthgrade,Dweck’steacherseatedtheclassaccordingtoIQ–withthe‘best’atthefront,andthe‘worst’attheback.Thosewiththelowestscoreswerenot even allowed themenial tasks of carrying the flag or taking a note to theprincipal.Althoughshewasplacedinrowone,seatone,Dweckfeltthestrainoftheteacher’sexpectations.21‘SheletitbeknownthatIQforherwastheultimatemeasureofyourintelligenceandyourcharacter.’22Dweckfeltthatshecouldtripupatanymoment,whichmadeherscaredtotrynewchallenges.She would remember those feelings when she started her work as a

developmental psychologist. She began with a group of ten-and eleven-year-olds,settingthemanumberofstretchinglogicalpuzzles.Thechildren’ssuccessat the puzzleswas not necessarily linked to their talent; some of the brightestquicklybecamefrustratedandgaveup,whileotherspersevered.The difference instead seemed to lie in their beliefs about their own talents.

Thosewiththegrowthmindsethadfaiththattheirperformancewouldimprovewithpractice,while thosewith the fixedmindsetbelieved that their talentwasinnateandcouldnotbechanged.Theresultwas that theyoftenfellapartwiththemorechallengingproblems,believingthatiftheyfailednow,theywouldfailforever.‘Forsomepeople,failureistheendoftheworld,butforothers,it’sanexcitingnewopportunity.’23In experiments across schools, universities and businesses, Dweck has now

identified many attitudes that might cause smart people to develop the fixedmindset.Doyou,forinstance,believethat:

Afailuretoperformwellatthetaskathandwillreflectyouroverallself-worth?Learninganew,unfamiliartaskputsyouatriskofembarrassment?Effortisonlyfortheincompetent?Youaretoosmarttotryhard?

Ifyoubroadlyagreewiththesestatements,thenyoumayhavemoreofafixedmindset,andyoumaybeatriskofsabotagingyourownchancesoflatersuccessbydeliberatelyavoidingnewchallengesthatwouldallowyoutostretchbeyondyourcomfortzone.24At Hong Kong University, for instance, Dweck measured the mindset of

studentsenteringtheirfirstyearoncampus.AllthelessonsaretaughtinEnglish,soproficiencyinthatlanguageisvitalforsuccess,butmanystudentshadgrownupspeakingCantoneseathomeandwerenotperfectlyfluent.Dweckfoundthatstudentswith the fixedmindsetwere less enthusiastic about the possibility of

taking an English course, as theywere afraid itmight expose theirweakness,eventhoughitcouldincreasetheirlong-termchancesofsuccess.25Besidesdetermininghowyourespondtochallengeandfailure,yourmindset

also seems to influence your ability to learn from the errors youdomake– adifference that shows up in the brain’s electrical activity, measured throughelectrodesplacedon thescalp.Whengivennegativefeedback,peoplewith thefixedmindsetshowaheightenedresponseintheanteriorfrontallobe–anareaknown to be important for social and emotional processing, with the neuralactivity appearing to reflect their bruised egos.Despite these strong emotions,however,theyshowedlessactivityinthetemporallobe,associatedwithdeeperconceptualprocessingoftheinformation.Presumably,theyweresofocusedontheirhurtfeelings,theyweren’tconcentratingonthedetailsofwhatwasactuallybeing said and the ways it might improve their performance next time. As aresult, someonewith the fixedmindset is at riskofmaking the samemistakesagainandagain,leadingtheirtalentstofounderratherthanflourish.26In school, the consequencesmaybeparticularly important for children from

lessadvantagedbackgrounds.In2016,forinstance,Dweck’steampublishedtheresultofaquestionnairethatexaminedthemindsetsofmorethan160,000tenth-graders in Chile – the first sample across a whole nation. As the previousresearch would have predicted, a growth mindset predicted academic successacross the group, but the team also examined the way it benefited the lessprivileged children in the group.Although the poorest 10 per cent of childrenweremore likely tohaveafixedmindset, theresearchersfoundthosewith thegrowthmindsettendedtoperformaswellastherichestchildreninthesample,from families who earned thirteen timesmore money. Although we can onlyread so much from a correlational study, the growth mindset seemed to bedrivingthemtoovercomethemanyhurdlesassociatedwiththeirpoverty.27Beyond education, Dweck has also worked with racing car drivers,

professional football players and Olympic swimmers to try to change theirmindsetsandboosttheirperformance.28Evenpeopleattheheightoftheircareercanfindthemselvesconstrainedbya

fixed mindset. Consider the tennis player Martina Navratilova, the worldchampionwholosttothesixteen-year-oldItalianGabrielaSabatiniattheItalianOpen in 1987. ‘I felt so threatened by those younger kids,’ she later said, ‘Idaren’tgivethosematches100%.IwasscaredtofindoutiftheycouldbeatmewhenI’mplayingmybest.’29Navratilova identified and adjusted this outlook, and went on to win

Wimbledon and the US Open, but some people may spend their whole livesavoiding challenge. ‘I think that’s how people live narrow lives,’Dweck toldme. ‘You take thischance toplay itsafe,but ifyouaddupall thosemomentsyouarefarintothefutureandyouhaven’texpandedyourself.’Dweck’s research has gained widespread acclaim, but the attention is not

always well directed, with many people misreading and misinterpreting herwork.AGuardianarticlefrom2016,forinstance,describeditas‘thetheorythatanyone who tries can succeed’,30 which isn’t really a fair representation ofDweck’s own views: she is not claiming that a growth mindset can workmiracles where there is no aptitude, simply that it is one of many importantelements,particularlywhenwefindourselvesfacingnewchallengesthatwouldcauseustoquestionourtalents.Commonsensewouldsuggestthatthereisstillathresholdof intelligence that isnecessary for success,butyourmindsetmakesthe difference in whether you can capitalise on that potential when you areoutsideofyourcomfortzone.Some people also cite the growthmindset as a reason to rhapsodise over a

child’severyachievementandignoretheirflaws.Inreality,hermessageisquitethe opposite: over-praising a child for effort or success may be almost asdamagingasscoldingthemforfailure.Tellingachildthat‘you’resmart’afteragood result, for example, appears to reinforce a fixedmindset. The childmaybegintofeelembarrassediftheyputalotofeffortintotheirstudies–sincethatwould detract from their smartness. Or theymay avoid future challenges thatmight threaten to take them down off this pedestal. Ironically, EddieBrummelman at theUniversity ofAmsterdam has found that excessive praisecanbeparticularlydamagingtochildrenwithlowself-esteem,whomaybecomescaredoffailingtoliveuptoparentalexpectationsinthefuture.31We shouldn’t avoid showing pride in a child’s achievements, of course; nor

shouldweshyawayfromofferingcriticismwhentheyhavefailed.Ineachcase,theresearchersadvisethatparentsandteachersemphasisethejourneythatledtotheirgoal, rather thantheresult itself.32AsDweckexplains,‘It isabout tellingthe truth about a student’s current achievement and then, together, doingsomethingaboutit,helpinghimorherbecomesmarter.’Sara Blakely, the founder of the intimate clothes company Spanx, offers us

oneexampleof thisprinciple inaction.Describingherchildhood, she recalledthateveryeveningafterschoolher fatherwouldaskher, ‘Whatdidyoufailattoday?’Out of context, itmight sound cruel, butBlakely understoodwhat hemeant: if shehadn’t failedatanything, itmeant that shehadn’t steppedoutof

hercomfortzone,andshewaslimitingherpotentialasaresult.‘Thegifthewasgivingmeisthatfailureis[whenyouare]nottryingversus

the outcome. It’s really allowed me to be much freer in trying things andspreadingmywings in life,’ she toldCNBC. That growthmindset, combinedwith enormous creativity, eventually allowed her to ditch her job selling faxmachinestoinvest$5,000inherownbusiness.Thatbusinessisnowworthmorethanabilliondollars.33Dweckhasrecentlybeenexploringrelativelybriefmindset interventionsthat

could be rolled out on a large scale, finding that an online course teachingschoolchildren about neuroplasticity – the brain’s ability to rewire itself –reduces the belief that intelligence and talent are fixed, innate qualities.34 Ingeneral,however,theaveragelong-termbenefitsoftheseone-shotinterventionsaresignificantbutmodest,35andmoreprofoundchangewouldalmostcertainlyrequireregularremindersanddeliberateconsiderationfromeveryoneinvolved.Thegoal,ultimately,istoappreciatetheprocessratherthantheendresult–to

takepleasureintheactoflearningevenwhenit’sdifficult.Andthatitselfwilltake work and perseverance, if you have spent your whole life believing thattalentispurelyinnateandsuccessshouldcomequicklyandeasily.

In light of all these findings, Feynman’s astonishing personal development –fromtinkeringschoolboytoworld-classscientist–beginstomakealotofsense.Fromearlychildhood,hewasclearlyoverflowingwithanirrepressibledesire

to understand the world around him – a trait that he learnt from his father.‘Wherever we went there were always new wonders to hear about; themountains,theforests,thesea.’36With this abundant curiosity, he needed no othermotivation to study. As a

student, it would drive him to work all night on a problem – for the sheerpleasure of finding an answer – and as aworking scientist, it allowed him toovercomeprofessionalfrustrations.WhenfirstarrivingasaprofessoratCornell,forinstance,hebegantofearthat

he could never live up to his colleagues’ expectations; he began to sufferburnout, and the very thought of physics began to ‘disgust’ him. Then heremembered how he had once ‘played’ with physics as if it were a toy. Hedeterminedfromthatpointontoexperimentwithonlythequestionsthatactuallyinterestedhim–nomatterwhatothersmightthink.Justwhenmanywouldhavelosttheircuriosity,hehadreigniteditoncemore

–andthatcontinueddesireto‘play’withcomplexideaswouldultimatelyleadto

hisgreatest discovery. In the cafeteria ofCornell, hewatched aman throwingplatesintheairandcatchingthem.Feynmanwaspuzzledbytheirmovement–theway theywobbled, and how that related to the speed at which theywerespinning.Asheputthatmotionintoequationshebegantoseesomesurprisingparallelswithanelectron’sorbit,eventually leadingtohis influential theoryofquantum electrodynamics that won a Nobel Prize. ‘It was like uncorking abottle,’helatersaid.‘ThediagramsandthewholebusinessthatIgottheNobelPrizeforcamefromthatpiddlingaroundwiththewobblingplate.’37‘Imagination reaches out repeatedly trying to achieve some higher level of

understanding,until suddenly I findmyselfmomentarilyalonebeforeonenewcornerofnature’spatternofbeautyandtruemajestyrevealed,’headded.‘Thatwasmyreward.’38Along theway,hewasaidedbyagrowthmindset that allowedhim tocope

withfailureanddisappointment–beliefshepassionatelyexpressedinhisNobellecture. ‘Wehave a habit ofwriting articles published in scientific journals tomaketheworkasfinishedaspossible,tocoverallthetracks,tonotworryabouttheblindalleysortodescribehowyouhadthewrongideafirst,andsoon,’hesaid.Instead,hewantedtousethelecturetoexplainthechallengeshehadfaced,including ‘some of the unsuccessful things on which I spent almost as mucheffort,asonthethingsthatdidwork’.He describes how he had been blind to apparently fatal flaws in his initial

theory,whichwouldhaveresultedinphysicalandmathematicalimpossibilities,and he was remarkably candid about his disappointment when his mentorpointedout thesedefects. ‘I suddenlyrealizedwhatastupid fellowIam.’Nordid the resolution of these difficulties come from single flash of genius; themoments of inspiration were separated by long periods of ‘struggle’. (Herepeatedthewordsixtimesduringthespeech.)HiscolleagueMarkKacmayhaveconsideredhim‘amagicianofthehighest

calibre’,an‘incomprehensible’genius,buthetookanearthlierviewofhimself.Unlikemany other high achievers, he was willing to acknowledge the blood,sweatandtears,andsometimestediousdrudgery,thathehadfacedforthesheer‘excitement of feeling that possibly nobody has yet thought of the crazypossibilityyouarelookingatrightnow’.39

Byenhancingour learningandpushingus toovercomefailures in theseways,curiosityandthegrowthmindsetwouldalreadyconstitutetwoimportantmentalcharacteristics, independentofgeneral intelligence, thatcanchange thepathof

our lives. Ifyouwant tomake themostofyour intellectualpotential, theyareessentialqualitiesthatyoushouldtrytocultivate.But their value does not end here. In an astonishing convergence with the

theories of evidence-based wisdom, the very latest research shows that bothcuriosity and the growth mindset can also protect us from the dangerouslydogmatic, one-sided reasoning that we explored in earlier chapters. The samequalitiesthatwillmakeyoulearnmoreproductivelyalsomakeyoureasonmorewisely,andviceversa.Tounderstandwhy,wefirstneedtoreturntotheworkofDanKahanatYale

University. As you may recall, he found intelligence and education canexaggerate ‘motivatedreasoning’onsubjectssuchasclimatechange– leadingtoincreasinglypolarisedviews.Those experiments had not considered the participants’ natural interest,

however, and Kahan was curious to discover whether a hunger for newinformationmightinfluencetheabilitytoassimilatealternativeviewpoints.To find out, he first designed a scale that tested his participants’ science

curiosity,which includedquestionsabout theirnormal readinghabits (whethertheywouldreadaboutscienceforpleasure),whether theykeptuptodatewithscientific news, and how often they would talk about science with friends orfamily. Strikingly, he found that some people had a large knowledge but lowcuriosity–andviceversa.Andthatfindingwouldbecrucialforexplainingthenext stage of the experiment,whenKahan asked the participants to give theirviewsonpoliticallychargedsubjectssuchasclimatechange.As he had previously shown, greater knowledge of science only increased

polarisation between left and right. But this was not true for curiosity, whichreduced the differences. Despite the prevailing views of most conservativethinkers,more curious Republicansweremore likely to endorse the scientificconsensusonglobalwarming,forinstance.It seemed that their natural hunger for understanding had overcome their

prejudices, so that theywere readier to seek outmaterial that challenged theirviews. Sure enough, when given the choice between two articles, the morecuriousparticipantsweremorewillingtoreadapiecethatchallengedratherthanreinforced their ideology. ‘They displayed a marked preference for novelinformation,evenwhenitwascontrarytotheirpoliticalpredispositions’,Kahanwrote in theaccompanyingpaper.40 Inotherwords, their curiosity allowed theevidencetoseepthroughthose‘logic-tightcompartments’thatnormallyprotectthebeliefsthatareclosesttoouridentities.

Kahan admits to being ‘baffled’ by the results; he toldme that he had fullyexpected that the ‘gravitationalpull’ofour identitieswouldhaveoverpoweredthelureofcuriosity.Butitmakessensewhenyouconsiderthatcuriosityhelpsustotolerateuncertainty.Whereasincuriouspeoplefeelthreatenedbysurprise,curious people relish themystery. They enjoy being taken aback; finding outsomething new gives them that dopamine kick. And if that new informationraisesevenmorequestions,they’llrisetothebait.Thismakesthemmoreopen-minded and willing to change their opinions, and stops them becomingentrenchedindogmaticviews.Inongoingresearch,Kahanhasfoundsimilarpatternsforopinionson issues

suchasfirearmpossession,illegalimmigration,thelegalisationofmarijuanaandthe influenceofpornography. Ineachcase, the itch tofindoutsomethingnewandsurprisingreducedthepolarisationofpeople’sopinions.41Furthercutting-edgestudiesrevealthatthegrowthmindsetcanprotectusfrom

dogmatic reasoning in a similar way, by increasing our intellectual humility.Studying for a doctorate under the supervision of Carol Dweck at StanfordUniversity, Tenelle Porter first designed and tested a scale of intellectualhumility,askingparticipantstoratestatementssuchas‘IamwillingtoadmitifIdon’t know something’, ‘I actively seek feedback on my ideas, even if it iscritical’ or ‘I like to complimentotherson their intellectual strengths.’To testwhether their answers reflect their behaviour, Porter showed that their scoresalso corresponded to the way they react to disagreement on issues like guncontrol–whethertheywouldseekandprocesscontradictoryevidence.She then separated the participants into two groups. Half read a popular

sciencearticlethatemphasisedthefactthatourbrainsaremalleableandcapableof change, priming the growth mindset, while the others read a piece thatdescribed how our potential is innate and fixed. Porter then measured theirintellectualhumility.Theexperimentworkedexactlyasshehadhoped:learningaboutthebrain’sflexibilityhelpedtopromoteagrowthmindset,andthisinturnproduced greater humility, compared to those who had been primed with thefixedmindset.42Porterexplainedittomelikethis:‘Ifyouhavethefixedmindset,youareall

thetimetryingtofindoutwhereyoustandinthehierarchy;everyone’sranked.Ifyou’reatthetop,youdon’twanttofallorbetakendownfromthetop,soanysignorsuggestionthatyoudon’tknowsomethingorthatsomeoneknowsmorethan you– it’s threatening to dethrone you.’And so, to protect your position,youbecomeoverlydefensive.‘Youdismisspeople’sideaswiththenotionthat

“IknowbettersoIdon’thavetolistentowhatyouhavetosay.”’Inthegrowthmindset,bycontrast,you’renotsoworriedaboutprovingyour

positionrelativetothosearoundyou,andyourknowledgedoesn’trepresentyourpersonalvalue.‘What’smore,youaremotivatedtolearnbecauseitmakesyousmarter,soitisaloteasiertoadmitwhatyoudon’tknow.Itdoesn’tthreatentopullyoudownfromanykindofhierarchy.’IgorGrossmann, incidentally, has come to similar conclusions in one of his

most recent studies, showing that the growth mindset is positively correlatedwithhisparticipants’everydaywisereasoningscores.43Feynman,with his curiosity and growthmindset, certainly sawno shame in

admitting his own limitations – and welcomed this intellectual humility inothers. ‘I can live with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it’smuchmoreinterestingtolivenotknowinganythingthantohaveanswerswhichmight bewrong,’ he told theBBC in1981. ‘I have approximate answers, andpossiblebeliefs,anddifferentdegreesofcertaintyaboutdifferentthings,butI’mnotabsolutelysureofanything.’44This was also true of Benjamin Franklin. He was famously devoted to the

developmentofvirtues,seeingthehumanmindasamalleableobjectthatcouldbe moulded and honed. And his many ‘scientific amusements’ spanned theinventionoftheelectricbattery,thecontagionofthecommoncold,thephysicsof evaporation and the physiological changes that comewith exercise.As thehistorianEdwardMorganput it: ‘Franklinneverstoppedconsidering thingshecouldnotexplain.Hecouldnotdrinkacupof teawithoutwonderingwhy tealeaves gathered in one configuration rather than another.’45 For Franklin, likeFeynman,therewardwasalwaysinthediscoveryofnewknowledgeitself,andwithoutthatendlesslyinquisitiveattitude,hemayhavebeenlessopen-mindedinhispoliticstoo.AndDarwin?HishungertounderstanddidnotendwiththepublicationofOn

theOriginofSpecies,andhemaintainedalengthycorrespondencewithscepticsand critics. He was capable of thinking independently while also alwaysengagingwithandoccasionallylearningfromothers’arguments.Thesequalitiesmaybemorecrucial thanever in today’s fast-movingworld.

AsthejournalistTadFriendnotedintheNewYorker:‘Inthenineteen-twenties,anengineer’s“half-lifeofknowledge”—thetimeittookforhalfofhisexpertiseto become obsolete—was thirty-five years. In the nineteen-sixties, it was adecade. Now it’s five years at most, and, for a software engineer, less thanthree.’46

Porter agrees that children today need to be better equipped to update theirknowledge.‘Tolearnwellmaybemoreimportantthanknowinganyparticularsubject or having any particular skill set. People are moving in and out ofdifferentcareersa lot,andbecausewe’reglobalisingweareexposedto lotsofdifferentperspectivesandwaysofdoingthings.’Shepointsoutthatsomecompanies,suchasGoogle,havealreadyannounced

that they are explicitly looking forpeoplewhocombinepassionwithqualitieslike intellectual humility, instead of traditional measures of academic successlike a high IQ or Grade Point Average. ‘Without humility, you are unable tolearn,’LaszloBock, theseniorvicepresidentofpeopleoperations forGoogle,toldtheNewYorkTimes.47‘Successful bright people rarely experience failure, and so they don’t learn

how to learn from that failure,’ he added. ‘They, instead, commit thefundamentalattributionerror,whichisifsomethinggoodhappens,it’sbecauseI’m a genius. If something bad happens, it’s because someone’s an idiot or Ididn’tget the resourcesor themarketmoved . . .Whatwe’ve seen is that thepeoplewhoarethemostsuccessfulhere,whowewanttohire,willhaveafierceposition.They’llarguelikehell.They’llbezealotsabouttheirpointofview.Butthenyousay,“here’sanewfact”,andthey’llgo,“Oh,well,thatchangesthings;you’reright.”’Bock’s comments show us that there is now a movement away from

consideringSATscoresandthelikeasthesumtotalofourintellectualpotential.But the old and new ways of appraising the mind do not need to be inopposition, and in Chapter 8 we will explore how some of the world’s bestschools already cultivate these qualities and the lessons they can teach us allabouttheartofdeeplearning.

If you have been inspired by this research, one of the simplestways to boostanyone’scuriosityistobecomemoreautonomousduringlearning.Thiscanbeassimpleaswritingoutwhatyoualreadyknowaboutthematerialtobestudiedand then settingdown thequestionsyou reallywant to answer.The idea is tohighlight the gaps in your knowledge, which is known to boost curiosity bycreatingamystery thatneeds tobesolved,and itmakes itpersonallyrelevant,whichalsoincreasesinterest.It doesn’t matter if these are the same questions that would come up in an

exam,say.Thankstothespill-overeffectfromthedopaminekick,youaremorelikely to remember the other details too,with some studies revealing that this

smallattempttosparkyourengagementcanboostyouroverallrecallwhilealsomakingthewholeprocessmoreenjoyable.Youwillfindthatyouhavelearntfarmoreeffectivelythanifyouhadsimplystudiedthematerialthatyoubelievewillbemostuseful,ratherthaninteresting.The wonderful thing about this research is that learning seems to beget

learning: themore you learn, themore curious you become, and the easier itbecomes to learn, creating a virtuous cycle. For this reason, some researchershaveshownthat thebestpredictorofhowmuchnewmaterialyouwill learn–better thanyour IQ– ishowmuchyoualreadyknowabout a subject.Fromasmall seed, your knowledge can quickly snowball. As Feynman once said,‘everythingisinterestingifyougointoitdeeplyenough’.If you fear that you are too old to reignite your curiosity, you may be

interestedtohearaboutFeynman’slastgreatproject.AswithhisfamousNobelPrize-winning discoveries, the spark of interest came from a seemingly trivialincident. During a dinner in the summer of 1977, Feynman’s friend RalphLeightonhadhappenedtomentionageographygameinwhicheachplayerhadtonameanew,independentcountry.‘So you think you know every country in the world?’ Richard cheekily

responded. ‘Then whatever happened to Tannu Tuva?’ He rememberedcollectingastampfromthecountryasachild;itwas,hesaid,a‘purplesplotchonthemapnearOuterMongolia’.Aquickcheckinthefamilyatlasconfirmedhismemory.Itcouldhaveendedthere,butthelureofthisunknowncountrysoonbecame

somethingofanobsessionforthetwomen.TheylistenedtoRadioMoscowforanymentionsofthisobscureSovietregion,andscoureduniversitylibrariesforrecords of anthropological expeditions to the place,which offered them smallglimpses of the country’s beautiful saltwater and freshwater lakes in itscountryside,itshauntingthroatsingingandshamanicreligion.Theydiscoveredthatthecapital,Kyzyl,housedamonumentmarkingitasthe‘CentreofAsia’–though itwasunclearwhohadbuilt the statue– and that the countrywas thesourceoftheSovietUnion’slargesturaniumdeposit.Eventually Leighton and Feynman found a Russian?Mongolian?Tuvan

phrasebook, which a friend helped to translate into English, and they beganwritingletterstotheTuvanScientificResearchInstituteofLanguage,LiteratureandHistory, asking for a cultural exchange.However, each time they thoughtthey had a chance of reaching their goal, they were rebuffed by Sovietbureaucracy–buttheyperseveredanyway.

By the late 1980s,Feynman andLeightonbelieved theyhad finally found awayinto thecountry:ona trip toMoscow,LeightonmanagedtoarrangeforaSovietexhibitionofEurasiannomadicculturestovisittheUS,andaspartofhisrole as an organiser, he bargained a research and filming trip to Tuva. Theexhibitionopened at theNaturalHistoryMuseumofLosAngeles inFebruary1989,anditwasagreatsuccess,introducingmanymorepeopletoaculturethatremainslittleknownintheWest.Feynman, alas, never lived to see the country; hediedon15February1988

fromabdominalcancer,beforehislonged-fortripcouldbearranged.Rightuntiltheend,however,hispassioncontinuedtoanimatehim.‘Whenhebegantalkingabout Tuva, hismalaise disappeared’, Leighton noted in hismemoir,Tuva orBust.‘Hisfacelitup,hiseyessparkled,hisenthusiasmforlifewasinfectious.’LeightonrecallswalkingthestreetswithFeynmanafteroneroundofsurgery,astheytestedeachotheronTuvanphrasesandimaginedthemselvestakingaturnthroughKyzyl–awayofbuildingFeynman’sstrengthanddistractinghimfromhisdiscomfort.And in his last years, Feynman had piqued the interest of many others,

resultinginasmallorganisation,theFriendsofTuva,beingfoundedtosharehisfascination;Feynman’scuriosityhadbuiltasmallbridgeacrosstheIronCurtain.WhenLeightonfinallyreachedKyzylhimself,heleftasmallplaqueinmemoryof Feynman, and his daughterMichellewouldmake her own visit in the late2000s.‘Like[Ferdinand]Magellan,RichardFeynmancompletedhislastjourneyinourmindsandhearts’,Leightonwroteinhismemoir.‘Throughhisinspirationtoothers,hisdreamtookonalifeofitsown.’

8

Thebenefitsofeatingbitter:EastAsianeducationandthethreeprinciplesofdeep

learning

James Stigler’s heart was racing and his palmswere sweaty – and he wasn’teventheoneundergoingtheordeal.A graduate student at the University of Michigan, Stigler was on his first

research trip to Japan, and he was now observing a fourth-grade lesson inSendai.Theclasswerelearninghowtodrawthree-dimensionalcubes,ataskthatisnotaseasyasitmightsoundformanychildren,andastheteachersurveyedthe students’ work, she quickly singled out a boy whose drawings wereparticularlysloppyandorderedhimtotransferhiseffortstotheblackboard–infrontofeveryone.As a former teacher himself, Stigler found that his interest immediately

piqued.Whywould you choose the worst student – rather than the best – todemonstratetheirskills,hewondered?Itseemedlikeapublichumiliationratherthanausefulexercise.Theordealdidn’tendthere.Aftereachnewattempttheboymade,histeacher

wouldasktherestoftheclasstojudgewhetherhisdrawingswerecorrect–andwhen they shook theirheads,hehad to try again.Theboyendedup spendingforty-fiveminutes standing at that blackboard, as his failings continued to beexposedtoeveryonearoundhim.Stiglercouldfeelhimselfbecomingmoreandmoreuncomfortableforthepoor

child.‘Ithoughtitwasliketorture.’Hewassurethattheboywasgoingtobreakdownintearsanymoment.IntheUSA,Stiglerknewthatateachercouldevenbefiredfortreatingachildthisway.Theboywasonlyaroundnineorten,afterall.Wasn’titcrueltoexplorehisflawssopublicly?1

If youwere brought up in aWestern country, youwill have probably shared

Stigler’sreactionsasyoureadthisstory:inEuropeanandAmericancultures,itseems almost unthinkable to discuss a child’s errors so publicly, and only theveryworstteacherswoulddreamofdoingsuchathing.YoumayeventhinkthatitonlyunderlinessomeoftheseriousflawsinEastAsianeducationsystems.Itiswellknown,true,thatcountriessuchasJapan,MainlandChina,Taiwan,

HongKongandSouthKorea regularlyoutperformmanyWesterncountriesonmeasuresofeducation,suchasPISA(theProgrammeforInternationalStudentAssessment). But there is also a widely held suspicion among Westerncommentatorsthatthoseachievementsarelargelytheresultofsevereclassroomenvironments. East Asian schools, they argue, encourage rote learning anddiscipline,attheexpenseofcreativity,independentthinkingandthechild’sownwellbeing.2Stigler’s observation in Sendai would, at first, only seem to confirm those

suspicions. As he continued his studies, however, he found that theseassumptions about East Asian education are completely unfounded. Far fromrelyingondry,rotememorisation, it turnsout thatJapaneseteachingstrategiesautomatically encourage many of the principles of good reasoning, such asintellectualhumilityandactivelyopen-mindedthinking,thatcanprotectusfrombias, while also improving factual learning. In many ways it is the Westernsystem of education – particularly in the USA andUK – that stifles flexible,independentthinking,whilealsofailingtoteachthefactualbasics.Inthislight,itbecomesclearthattheteacher’sbehaviourinSendai–andthe

boy’sstrugglesattheblackboard–happentoreflecttheverylatestneuroscienceonmemory.Buildingon the researchweexplored in the lastchapter, thesecross-cultural

comparisons reveal some simple practical techniques that will improve ourmastery of any new discipline while also offering further ways that schoolscouldhelpyoungthinkerstoavoidtheintelligencetrap.

Beforewe return to that classroom inSendai, youmaywant to consider yourown intuitions about thewayyoupersonally learn, and the scientific evidencefororagainstthosebeliefs.Imagineyouarelearninganynewskill–piano,alanguage,oraprofessional

task–andthendecidewhetheryouagreeordisagreewitheachofthefollowingstatements:

ThemoreIimprovemyperformancetoday,themoreIwillhavelearnt.Theeasiermaterialistounderstand,themoreIwillmemorise.Confusionistheenemyofgoodlearningandshouldbeavoided.Forgettingisalwayscounter-productive.Toimprovequickly,weshouldonlylearnonethingatatime.IremembermorewhenIfeellikeIamstrugglingthanwhenthingscomeeasily.

Only the last statement is supported by neuroscience and psychology, and therestallreflectcommonmythsaboutlearning.Althoughthesebeliefsarerelated toCarolDweck’sworkon thegrowthand

fixedmindsets, they are alsoquitedifferent.Remember that agrowthmindsetconcernsthebeliefsaboutyourself,andwhetheryourtalentscanimproveovertime.Andwhile thatmaymean thatyouaremore likely toembracechallengewhennecessary,it’sperfectlypossible–andindeedlikely–thatyoucouldhavea growth mindset without necessarily thinking that confusion and frustrationwill,inandofthemselves,improveyourlearning.The latest neuroscience, however, shows that we learn best when we are

confused;deliberatelylimitingyourperformancetodayactuallymeansyouwillperformbettertomorrow.Andafailuretorecognisethisfactisanotherprimaryreason thatmany people – including thosewith high IQs – often fail to learnwell.One of the earliest studies to show this phenomenon was commissioned,

strangelyenough,bytheBritishPostOffice,whichinthelate1970saskedthepsychologistAlanBaddeleytodeterminethebestmethodstotrainitsstaff.*

*Baddeley,incidentally,isalsothereasonthatBritishpostcodescontainaroundsixorsevencharacters–whichisthemaximumspanofhumanworkingmemory.Healsoadvisedonthespecificpositioningofthenumbersandtheletterstomakethemasmemorableaspossible.ThePostOffice had just investedheavily inmachines that could sort letters

according topostcodes,but touse thesemachines, their10,000postalworkershadtolearnhowtotypeanduseakeyboard,andBaddeley’sjobwastodiscoverthemostefficientschedulefortraining.The assumption of many psychologists at the time had been that intensive

trainingwouldbebetter–thepostmenshouldbeallowedtodevoteafewhoursa day to mastering the skill. And this was indeed the way that the workersthemselvespreferred:theywereabletoseerealprogressduringthattime;attheendof their sessions, their typing feltmuchmore fluent thanat thebeginning,andtheyassumedthiscarriedoverintolong-termmemory.

For comparison, however,Baddeley also created a fewgroups that learnt inshorterstretches,overalongerperiodoftime:justonehouraday,comparedtofour.Theworkersinthisgroupdidn’tseemtoliketheapproach;theylackedthesense of mastery at the end of their session and didn’t feel like they wereprogressingasquicklyasthosetakingthelongersessions.But they were wrong. Although the sessions themselves felt unsatisfying

compared to those of the people who developedmore proficiency in a singleday,thesesubjectsendeduplearningandrememberingmuchmoreinrelationtothe amount of time they were putting into it. On average, a person with the‘spaced’approachmasteredthebasicswithinthirty-fivehours,comparedtofiftyhoursfortheintensivelearners–a30percentdifference.Individually,eventheslowestperson in theone-hour-a-daygrouphadmastered the skill in less timethan the quickest learner among those devoting four hours a day to the test.When the researchers followedup their studiesa fewmonths later, the spacedlearnerswerestillquickerandmoreaccuratethanthoselearninginblocks.3Today,thespacingeffectiswellknowntopsychologicalscientistsandmany

teachers,anditisoftenrepresentedasdemonstratingthebenefitsofrestandthedangers of cramming. But the true mechanism is more counter-intuitive, andhingesontheveryfrustrationthathadannoyedthepostmen.Bysplittingourstudiesintosmallerchunks,wecreateperiodsinwhichwecan

forgetwhatwe’velearnt,meaningthatatthestartofthenextsession,weneedtowork harder to remember what to do. That process – of forgetting, and thenforcingourselvestorelearnthematerial–strengthensthememorytrace,leadingustoremembermoreinthelongterm.Peoplewholearninlongerblocksmissout on those crucial steps – the intermediate forgetting and relearning – thatwouldpromotelong-termrecallpreciselybecauseitisharder.Inthisway,Baddeley’sstudygavesomeofthefirsthintsthatourmemorycan

beaidedby‘desirabledifficulties’–additionallearningchallengesthatinitiallyimpairperformance,butwhichactuallypromotelong-termgains.TheneuroscientistsRobertandElizabethBjorkattheUniversityofCalifornia,

Los Angeles, have pioneered much of this work, showing that desirabledifficulties can be powerful inmany different circumstances – frommaths toforeignlanguages,arthistory,musicalperformanceandsport.Consideraphysicsclass revising foranexam. In theWest, it’scommonfor

teacherstopresenttheprinciplesandthentogetstudentstorepeatendlessseriesof similarquestionsuntil they reachnearly100per cent accuracy.TheBjorkshaveshownthat, inreality, learning ismoreeffective if thestudentsolves just

enough problems to refresh their mind, before moving on to a new (perhapsrelated)subject,andonlylatershouldtheyreturntotheinitialtopic.Like the spacing effect, this process of switchingbetween tasks – known as

interleaving–canleadthestudenttofeelconfusedandoverburdened,comparedto lessons inwhich theyareallowed to focus solelyononesubject.Butwhentheyaretestedlater,theyhavelearntmuchmore.4Other desirable difficulties include ‘pre-testing’ or ‘productive failure’ – in

which students are quizzed on facts they haven’t yet learnt, or given complexproblemstheydon’tyetknowhowtosolve.Youcanseeitforyourself.Withoutlookingattheanswersbelow,trytomatch

thefollowingItalianwordstotheEnglishterms.•Ipantaloni •Tie•L’orologio •Trousers•Lafarfalla •Boot•Lacravatta •Bowtie•Lostivale •Watch

Nowlookatthefootnotebelowtoseetheanswers.**Ipantaloni–trousersL’orologio–watchLafarfalla–bowtieLacravatta–tieLostivale–bootYoumightbeabletoguessacouple,perhapsfromtheirsimilaritytoEnglish

orFrenchterms,orfrompreviousexposuretothelanguage.Butthesurprisingthingaboutpre-testingisthatitdoesn’tmatterifyourinitialanswersarerightorif you really don’t have a clue; it’s the act of thinking that will boost yourlearning.Likethefruitfulforgettingthatcomeswithspacedstudy,thefrustrationwefeelatnotunderstandingthesetermsleadsustoencodetheinformationmoredeeply,andeven ifyouarenotnormallyverygoodat learning languages,youshouldfindthatthisvocabularyultimatelysticksinyourmind.5(Thiswas,incidentally,thereasonthatIaskedyoutoguessthetruthofthose

statementsatthestartofthischapter.Bycausingyoutoquestionyourexistingknowledge, it should enable you to remember the subsequent information farmoreclearly.)Productivefailureseemstobeparticularlyfruitfulfordisciplineslikemaths,in

which teachers may ask students to solve problems before they’ve beenexplicitly taught the correct methods. Studies suggest they’ll learn more andunderstandtheunderlyingconceptsbetterinthelongrun,andtheywillalsobebetterabletotranslatetheirlearningtonew,unfamiliarproblems.6The introduction of desirable difficulties could also improve our reading

materials. Textbooks that condense concepts and present them in the mostcoherent and fluent way possible, with slick diagrams and bullet point lists,actually reduce long-term recall. Many students – particularly those who aremoreable–learnbetterifthewritingismoreidiosyncraticandnuanced,withagreater discussion of the potential complications and contradictionswithin theevidence.PeoplereadingthecomplexproseofOliverSacksrememberedmoreabout the visual perception than people looking at a slick, bullet-pointedtextbook,forinstance.7In each case, we can see how the elements of confusion that our whole

educationsystemisgearedtoavoidwouldleadtomoreprofoundthinkingandlearning,ifonlyweletstudentsfeelabitfrustrated.‘Currentperformanceisameasureofaccessibility[ofinformation]rightnow,

but learning is about more fundamental changes that will be reflected after adelay,ora transferof this learningtosomewhereelse,’Robert toldmewhenImethimandhiswifeinthefacultycentreofUCLA.‘Soifyouinterpretcurrentperformanceasameasureoflearning,youwillgetlotsofthingswrong.’Scientificallyspeaking,theseresultsarenolongercontroversial.Theevidence

is now unarguable: introducing desirable difficulties into the classroom –throughstrategiessuchasspacing, interleavingandproductive failure–wouldensurethateveryonelearnsmoreeffectively.Unfortunately, it is hard to persuade people to appreciate these effects; like

Baddeley’s postal workers, students, parents and even many teachers stillassumethat theeasieryoufind it to learnsomething today, thebetteryouwillperformtomorrow,eventhoughtheseassumptionsaredeeplyflawed.‘Wehavealltheseresultsshowingthatpeoplepreferthepoorerwaysoflearning,’Robertadded.8‘Soyou’renotgoingtomakeyourstudentshappierrightaway.’Elizabeth agreed. ‘They interpret [confusion] negatively, as opposed to

thinkingthatthisisanopportunitytolearnsomethingorunderstanditinabetterway.’It’sasifwewenttothegymhopingtobuildourmuscles,butthenonlyever

decided to lift the lightest weights. The Bjorks have found that these‘metacognitive illusions’ are surprisingly resilient even after people have seen

the evidence or experienced the benefits for themselves. The result is thatdisappointingly few schools try to make use of desirable difficulties, andmillionsofstudentsaresufferingasaresult,whentheycouldbelearningmuchmoreeffectively,ifonlytheyknewhowtoembraceconfusion.

Atleast,that’stheviewwegetfromtheUSAandtheUK.Butaswehaveseenpreviously,weshouldbewaryofassumingthatthebiases

documented among ‘WEIRD’ countries represent human universals, whenstudiesofEastAsianculturesoftenshowverydifferentattitudes.Rather than us feeling that learning should come easily, various surveys –

includingStigler’sownresearch–showthatstudentsincountriessuchasJapanappreciate that struggle is necessary in education. If anything, the students intheseculturesareconcernediftheworkisn’thardenough.Thesenotionscanbefoundintheparents’andteachers’attitudes,inpopular

sayingssuchas‘doryokinimasaru,tensainashi’(‘evengeniuscannottranscendeffort’)andinthecountry’sfolkstories.MostJapaneseschoolchildrenwillhaveheard the story of nineteenth-century scholarNinomiya Sontoku, for instance.Asapooryoungboy,hewassaidtouseeveryopportunityforstudy,evenwhencollecting firewood in the forest, andmanyschoolyards still contain statuesofSontokuwithabookinfrontofhisnoseandfirewoodonhisback.Fromearliestinfancy,children inJapanare immersed inaculture that toleratesstruggleandchallenge.Crucially,thisacceptanceofstruggleextendstotheirmindsetsabouttheirown

talents: Japanese students are more likely to see their abilities as a work inprogress,leadingtothegrowthmindset.‘It’snotthattheJapanesedon’tbelieveinindividualdifferences,’Stiglertoldme.‘It’sjustthattheydon’tviewthemaslimitationstotheextentthatwedo.’Asaresult,anerrorormistakeisnotseenas a sign of some kind of permanent, inevitable failure – it is, according toStigler,‘anindexofwhatstillneedstobelearned’.ThesebeliefshelptoexplainwhyEastAsianstudents,ingeneral,arewilling

to work longer hours, and even if they aren’t naturally gifted, they are morelikely to try to make up for that by studying harder. Just as importantly,however,thesebeliefsalsohaveconsequencesforthewaystheteachershandletheir lessons, allowing them to introduce more desirable difficulties into thecurriculum. The result is that their pedagogical methods regularly embraceconfusiontoenhancelearningandcomprehension.Whentacklinganewtopicinmathsorscience,forinstance,it’squitecommon

for Japanese teachers to begin their lessons by asking students to solve aproblem before they’ve been told the exact method to apply – the use of‘productivefailure’thatwediscussedafewpagesago.Thenextcoupleofhoursarethendevotedtoworkingtheirwaythroughthosechallenges–andalthoughtheteacherofferssomeguidance,thebulkoftheworkisexpectedtocomefromthestudents.AmericanorBritishstudentsbaulkattheconfusionthisproduces–andwhen

theybegintostruggle,theteacherwouldbetemptedtogiveinandtellthemtheanswer.9 But Stigler found that Japanese students relished the challenge.As aconsequence,theythinkmoredeeplyabouttheunderlyingcharacteristicsoftheproblem,increasingtheirultimateunderstandingandtheirlong-termrecall.Andwhenworking through problems, they are also encouraged to consider

alternative solutions, besides themost obvious one, and fully to explore theirmistakes (together with those of their classmates) to understand how oneapproach works and another doesn’t. From a very young age, they areencouragedtotakeamoreholisticviewofproblems,andtoseetheunderlyingconnections between different ideas. As one elementary maths teacher inStigler’sstudiesputit:‘Wefacemanyproblemseverydayintherealworld.Wehavetorememberthatthereisnotonlyonewaywecansolveeachproblem.’BritishorAmericanschools,incontrast,oftendiscouragethatexploration,for

fear that it might cause extra confusion; for each type of maths or scienceproblem,say,weareonlytaughtonepotentialstrategytofindasolution.Butthescientific research shows that comparing and contrasting different approachesgivesabetterunderstandingoftheunderlyingprinciples–evenifitdoesresultinmoreconfusionatthebeginning.‘They’ve created a classroom culture that tries to support the prolonged

extensionofconfusion,’Stiglersaid.‘TheJapanesefeel that ifyoucansustainthatintheclassroom,studentswilllearnmore.Whereaswe’reveryfocusedon[simply] getting the answer – and if you want the students to get the rightanswer,youthenmakeitaseasyaspossible.’Inthislight,ourreactionstoStigler’sstoryoftheJapaneseboystrugglingto

draw 3D cubes at the blackboard make more sense. Whereas Americans, orBrits,wouldseetheboy’sinitialtroublesasasignofweaknessorstupidity,hisJapaneseclassmatessawhisperseverance.‘Hiserrorswerenotamatterofgreatconcern;whatwouldbeworrisomewouldbe the child’s failure to expend theeffort necessary to correct them.’ The boy didn’t cry, as Stigler had initiallyexpected,becauseinthatculturalcontexttheresimplywasn’tanyreasontofeel

thesamelevelofpersonalshamethatwewouldexpect.On the contrary, Stigler says that as the lesson went on, he felt a wave of

‘kindnessfromhisclassmatesandtheteacher’.‘Noonewasgoingtocuthimabreaktosaythatwasgoodenoughuntilhe’daccomplishedthejob.Butontheotherhand,youhadthesensethattheywerealltheretohelphim,’Stiglertoldme.Theyallknewthatthestrugglewastheonlywaytheboywasgoingtolearnandcatchupwithhispeers.Itistruethatsomelessonsdoinvolveelementsofrotelearning,toensurethat

thebasic facts arememorised andeasily recalled,but this research shows thatJapaneseclassroomsprovidefarmoreroomforindependentthinkingthanmanyWesterncommentatorshaveassumed.Andthebenefitscanbeseennotonlyinthe PISA scores, but also in tests of creative problem solving and flexiblethinking, in which Japanese students also outperform the UK and USA,demonstrating that these students are also better equipped to transfer theirknowledgetonewandunexpectedtasks.10Although some of the strongest evidence comes from Japan, the value of

struggledoesseemtobecommontootherAsianteachingculturestoo,includingMainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. In Mandarin, for instance, theconceptofchikuor‘eatingbitterness’describesthetoilandhardshipthatleadstosuccess.AndStiglerhassinceexpandedhisfocustoexploreothercountries,such as the Netherlands, which has also outperformed the USA and UK.Althoughtheymayvaryonmanyfactors,suchastheclasssize,orthespecificmethodsthattheteachersusetodelivermaterial,thetop-performingschoolsallencouragestudentstogothroughthoseperiodsofconfusion.Stiglerhasnowbeenresearchingtheseideasfordecades,andhesuggestshis

findingscanbedistilledtothreestagesofgoodteaching:11

Productivestruggle:Longperiodsofconfusionasstudentswrestlewithcomplexconceptsbeyondtheircurrentunderstanding.

Makingconnections:Whenundergoingthatintellectualstruggle,studentsareencouragedtousecomparisonsandanalogies,helpingthemtoseeunderlyingpatternsbetweendifferentconcepts.Thisensuresthattheconfusionleadstoausefullesson–ratherthansimplyendinginfrustration.

Deliberatepractice:Oncetheinitialconceptshavebeentaught,teachersshouldensurethat

studentspractisethoseskillsinthemostproductivewaypossible.Crucially,thisdoesn’tinvolvesimplyrepeatingnearidenticalproblemsadnauseam,asyoumightfindintheWesternmathsclassroom,butmeansaddingadditionalvarietyandchallenges–andyetmoreproductivestruggle.

These are profound discoveries that offer some of the most robust ways ofimproving education and academic achievement, and in a fewpageswe’ll seehowanyonecanmakeuseofdesirabledifficultiestomasternewskills.But thesefindingsarenotonly interestingforwhat they tellusabouthuman

memory;Ibelievethattheyalsorevealsomeprofoundinsightsintotheculturaloriginsoftheintelligencetrap.IfyouconsiderclassroomsintheUKandUSA,forinstance,ourmentalworth

is often judged bywho can put their hand up quickest – giving us the subtlesignal that it’s better to go with an immediate intuitive response withoutreflecting on the finer details. And you are not going to be rewarded foradmitting that you don’t know the answer; intellectual humility is activelydiscouraged.Worsestill,thelessonsareoftensimplifiedsothatwecandigestthematerial

asquicklyaspossible– leadingus toprefer ‘fluent’ informationovermaterialthat might require deeper consideration. Particularly in earlier education, thisalso involves glossing over potential nuances, such as the alternativeinterpretations of evidence in history or the evolution of ideas in science, forinstance – with facts presented as absolute certainties to be learnt andmemorised.12 The assumption had been that introducing these complexitieswould be too confusing for younger students – and although the teachingmethodsdoallowmoreflexibilityathighschoolanduniversity,manystudentshavealreadyabsorbedamorerigidstyleofthinking.Evensomewell-meaningattemptsateducational reformfall into these traps.

Teachers have been encouraged to identify a child’s learning style – whetherthey are a visual, verbal, or kinaesthetic learner. The idea sounds progressive,but it only reinforces the idea that peoplehave fixedpreferences for thewaysthey learn, and that we shouldmake learning as easy as possible, rather thanencouraging them to wrestle with problems that aren’t immediatelystraightforward.It’s littlewonder that students in countries such as theUSAandUKdonot

tendtoscorewellonIgorGrossmann’stestsofevidence-basedwisdom,orthemeasuresofcriticalthinkingthatpredictoursusceptibilitytomisinformation.

Now compare those attitudes to the Japanese education system,where evenstudents inelementaryschoolareencouragedtowrestlewithcomplexityeveryday; theyare taught todiscovernewwaysof solvingproblems for themselvesand, when they have found one answer, to consider the other alternativesolutions. Ifyoudon’t immediatelyunderstandsomething, theanswer isnot toignore it and reinforceyourownbeliefs, but to look further and to explore itsnuances. And the extra thinking that involves is not a sign of weakness orstupidity;itmeansthatyouarecapableof‘eatingbitterness’tocometoadeeperunderstanding.Ifyouinitiallyfail,it’sfinetoadmityourmistakes,becauseyouknowyoucanimprovelater.The studentsare simplybetterprepared for themorecomplex,nuanced, and

ill-definedproblemstherealworldwillsetagainstthemduringadulthood.Andthis seems to be reflected in their higher scores onmeasures of open-minded,flexible reasoning.13Various studies, for instance,have found thatwhenaskedaboutcontroversialenvironmentalorpoliticalissues,peopleinJapan(andotherEast Asian cultures) tend to take longer to consider the questions withoutoffering knee-jerk reactions, and are more likely to explore contradictoryattitudesandtothinkaboutthelong-termconsequencesofanypolicies.14If we return to that idea of the mind as a car, the British and American

education systems are designed to offer as smooth a track as possible, so thateachpersoncandriveasfastastheirenginecanpossiblyletthem.TheJapaneseeducationsystem,incontrast,ismoreofanassaultcoursethanaracecourse;itrequires you to consider alternative routes to steer yourway around obstaclesand persevere even when you face rough terrain. It trains you to navigateeffectivelyratherthansimplyrevvingtheengine.Let’sbeclear:wearetalkingaboutaverageshere,andthereisahugeamount

ofvariationwithinanyculture.Buttheseresultsallsuggestthattheintelligencetrap is partly a cultural phenomenon born in our schools. And once yourecognisethesefacts,itbecomesclearthatevensmallinterventionscanbegintoencourage the thinking styleswehave explored in the rest of this book,whilealso improving the factual, academic learning that schools already try tocultivate.Evenasimplestrategicpausecanbeapowerfulthing.Having asked the class a question, the average American teacher typically

waits lessthanasecondbeforepickingachildtoprovideananswer–sendingout a strongmessage that speed is valued over complex thinking.But a studyfromtheUniversityofFloridahasfoundthatsomethingmagicalhappenswhen

theteachertakesalittlemoretime–justthreeseconds–towaittopickachild,andthenforthechildtothinkabouttheresponse.Themostimmediatebenefitwasseeninthelengthofthechildren’sanswers.

Thesmallamountofthinkingtimemeantthatthechildrenspentbetweenthreeandseventimesaslongelaboratingtheirthoughts,includingmoreevidencefortheirviewpointandagreaterconsiderationofalternativetheories.Theincreasedwaitingtimealsoencouragedthechildrentolistentoeachother’sopinionsanddevelop their ideas. Encouragingly, their more sophisticated thinking alsotranslatedtotheirwriting,whichbecamemorenuancedandcomplex.That’sanastonishingimprovementfromthesimpleactofexercisingteacherlypatience.15Astheresearcher,MaryBuddRowe,putitinheroriginalpaper:‘slowingdownmaybeawayofspeedingup’.The psychologist Ellen Langer at Harvard University, meanwhile, has

examined theway that complexmaterial is currently over-simplified to avoidany ambiguity, and the consequences of that for our thinking. In physics ormathematics,forinstance,theremaybemanydifferentwaystosolveaproblem–butwe are told just onemethod and discouraged from looking beyond that.The assumption had been that even a hint of complexity would only lead toconfusion–whichwas thought toharmlearning.Why let thechildpotentiallymixupthedifferentmethodsifjustonewoulddo?In reality,Langerhas found that subtlychanging thephrasingof a lesson to

introduce those ambiguities encourages deeper learning. In one high-schoolphysics lesson, the children were presented with a thirty-minute videodemonstratingsomebasicprinciplesandaskedtoanswersomequestionsusingthe information. In addition to the basic instructions, some of the participantswere told that ‘The video presents only one of several outlooks on physics,whichmayormaynotbehelpfultoyou.Pleasefeelfreetouseanyadditionalmethods you want to assist you in solving problems.’ This simple promptencouragedthemtothinkmorefreelyaboutthetopicathand,andtoapplythematerialmorecreativelytonovelquestions.16Inanotherexperiment,studentswereofferedastrategytosolveaspecifickind

ofmathematicalproblem.Thankstoachangeinasingleword,childrentoldthatthiswasjust‘onewaytosolvethisequation’performedbetterthanthosetolditwas‘thewaytosolvethisequation’–theywereabout50percentmorelikelytoget the correct answer. They also showed a deeper understanding of theunderlyingconceptandwerebetterable todeterminewhen thestrategywouldandwouldn’twork.17The sameapplies for thehumanitiesandsocial sciences.

Geography students told that ‘thismay be the cause of the evolution of cityneighbourhoods’showedagreaterunderstandinginasubsequenttestthanthosewhohadbeentaughtthematerialasabsolute,undeniablefacts.Thesubtlesuggestionofambiguity,farfromcreatingconfusion,invitesthem

to consider the other alternative explanations and explore new avenues thatwould have otherwise been neglected. The result is a more reflective andactivelyopen-mindedstyleofthinking,ofthekindthatweexploredinChapter4. Framing questions using conditional terms can also improve students’performanceoncreativethinkingtasks.Youmay remember that Benjamin Franklin deliberately avoided the use of

‘dogmatic’termsthatdemonstratedcompletecertainty,andthatthisacceptanceof uncertainty also improved the super-forecasters’ decisionmaking. Langer’swork offers further evidence that this kind of nuanced thinking can beencouragedfromayoungage.18Presentinguncertaintymightcreatealittlebitofconfusion – but that only improves engagement and ultimately increases thechild’slearning.Inadditiontothesesubtleprimes,studentsmightbeactivelyencouragedtotry

to imagineahistorical article fromvariousviewpoints and thearguments theymight raise, for instance.Or in science, theymight be given two case studiesrepresentingapparentlycontradictoryargumentsonthetopictheyarestudying,and then asked to evaluate the strength of the evidence and reconcile thedifferent views. Again, the prediction might have been that these exerciseswouldbecounter-productive,adistractionthatreducesstudents’overalllearningof the syllabus. In reality, they add another desirable difficulty that meanschildren actually remember more of the factual material than those who arespecificallytoldtomemorisethetext.19Ifyoucombinethesemethodswiththemeasureswehaveexploredpreviously,

such as the training in emotiondifferentiation thatwe examined inChapter 5,andthecritical thinkingskillswediscussedinChapter6, itbecomesclear thatschools could offer comprehensive training in all of the thinking skills anddispositionsthatareessentialforwiserreasoning.20Ineachcase,evidenceshowsthattheseinterventionswillimproveacademicachievementforpeopleoflowercognitive ability,21 while also discouraging the dogmatic, closed-minded andlazythinkingthatoftenplaguespeopleofhighintelligenceandexpertise.Thesebenefitshavebeendocumentedthroughouttheeducationsystem–from

elementary schoolchildren to university undergraduates. But we can onlycultivatewiserthinkingifweallowstudents–eventhosejuststartingschool–

to face occasional moments of confusion and frustration rather than spoon-feedingthemeasy-to-digestinformation.

You don’t need to be a teacher or a child to benefit from these findings. Forworkorforpleasure,mostofuscontinuetolearnintoadulthood,andbeingableto regulate our own studying is essential if we are to make the most of ourlearning opportunities. The research shows that most people – even those ofgreat intelligence–usepoor learning techniques; the strategicuseofdesirabledifficultiescanimproveyourmemorywhilealsotrainingyourbraintobebetterequippedtodealwithconfusionanduncertaintyinanycontext.22Youcan:

Spaceoutyourstudies,usingshorterchunksdistributedoverdaysandweeks.LikethepostmeninBaddeley’sinitialexperiment,yourprogressmayfeelslowcomparedwiththeinitialhead-startofferedbymoreintensivestudy.Butbyforcingyourselftorecallthematerialafterthedelaybetweeneachsession,youwillstrengthenthememorytraceandlong-termrecall.Bewareoffluentmaterial.Asdiscussedpreviously,superficiallysimpletextbookscanleadyoutobelievethatyouarelearningwell,while,infact,theyarereducingyourlong-termrecall.Sotrytostudymorenuancedmaterialthatwillrequiredeeperthinking,evenifitisinitiallyconfusing.Giveyourselfapre-test.Assoonasyoubeginexploringatopic,forceyourselftoexplainasmuchasyoualreadyknow.Evenifyourinitialunderstandingisabysmallywrong,experimentsshowthatthispreparesthemindfordeeperlearningandbettermemoryoverall,asyoucorrectforyourerrorsinyoursubsequentstudies.Varyyourenvironment.Ifyoutendtostudyinthesameplacefortoolong,cuesfromthatenvironmentbecomeassociatedwiththematerial,meaningthattheycanactasnon-consciousprompts.Byensuringthatyoualtertheplacesoflearning,youavoidbecomingtooreliantonthosecues–andlikeotherdesirabledifficulties,thisreducesyourimmediateperformancebutboostsyourlong-termmemory.Inoneexperiment,simplyswitchingroomsduringstudyingresultedin21percentbetterrecallonasubsequenttest.Learnbyteaching.Afterstudying–andwithoutlookingatyournotes–imaginethatyouareexplainingallthatyouhavecoveredtoanotherperson.Abundantevidenceshowsthatwelearnbestwhenwehavetoteachwhatwehavejustlearnt,becausetheactofexplanationforcesustoprocessthematerialmoredeeply.Testyourselfregularly.So-called‘retrievalpractice’isbyfarthemostpowerfulwayofboostingyourmemory.Butmakesureyoudon’tgiveinandlookattheanswerstooquickly.Thetemptationistolookuptheanswerifitdoesn’timmediatelycometomind,butyouneedtogiveyourselfabitoftimetoreallystruggletorecall,otherwiseyouwon’tbeexercisingyourmemoryenoughtoimprovelong-termrecall.Mixitup.Whentestingyourself,youshouldmakesureyoucombinequestionsfromdifferenttopicsratherthanonlyfocusingononesubject.Varyingthetopicforcesyourmemorytoworkhardertorecalltheapparentlyunrelatedfacts,anditcanalsohelpyoutoseeunderlyingpatternsinwhatyouarelearning.Stepoutsideyourcomfortzoneandtrytoperformtasksthatwillbetoodifficultforyour

currentlevelofexpertise.Andtrytolookformultiplesolutionstoaproblemratherthanasingleanswer.Evenifnoneofyoursolutionsisperfect,theseproductivefailureswillalsoincreaseyourconceptualunderstanding.Whenyouarewrong,trytoexplainthesourceoftheconfusion.Wheredidthemisconceptioncomefrom–andwhatwasthesourceoftheerror?Notonlydoesthispreventyoufrommakingthesamespecificerroragain;italsostrengthensyourmemoryofthetopicasawhole.Bewaretheforesightbias.AsRobertandElizabethBjorkhaveshown,wearebadatjudgingthelevelofourlearning,basedonourcurrentperformance–withsomestudiesshowingthatthemoreconfidentweareinourmemoryofafact,thelesslikelywearetorememberitlater.This,again,isdowntofluency.Wearemoreconfidentofthingsthatinitiallycometomindeasily–butweoftenhaven’tprocessedthosefluentfactsverydeeply.Sobesuretotestyourselfregularlyonthematerialthatyouthinkyouknowwell,inadditiontothematerialthatmayfeellessfamiliar.

Besidesaidingfactuallearning,desirabledifficultiescanalsohelpyoutomastermotorskills,likeplayingamusicalinstrument.Thecurrentdogmaisthatmusicpractice should be a disciplined but highly repetitive affair, where you spendlengthy sessions practising the same few bars again and again until you playthemtonearperfection.Instead,theBjorks’researchsuggeststhatyouwoulddofarbettertoalternate

afewdifferentexcerptsofmusic,spendingafewminutesoneachone.Thiswillcauseyoutorefreshyourmemoryeachtimeyoucomebackto theexerciseorexcerpt.23Youcanalsotrytoinjectsomevariabilityintotheperformanceofthemusic

itself. As part of her research on ‘conditional learning’, Ellen Langer told agroupofpianostudentsto‘changeyourstyleeveryfewminutesandnottolockintooneparticularpattern.Whileyoupractise,attendtothecontext,whichmayincludesubtlevariationsoranyfeelings,sensationsorthoughtsyouarehaving.’Independent judges considered their playing to be more proficient on asubsequent test than that of students who had instead practised in a moretraditionalmanner,aimedatrotememorisation.Langerhas since replicated this experiment in a large symphonyorchestra–

whereendlessrepetitivepracticeoftenleadstoburnout.Whenaskedtolookforthe subtlenuances in theirperformance, theplayers’ enjoyment increased, andtheir performance was also judged to be more enjoyable by an independentgroupofmusicians.24Theorchestramay seem tobe a verydifferent environment from the school

classroom,butthephilosophyofdeliberatelyembracingnuanceandcomplexityinlearningcanbeappliedtoanycontext.

AfterhavingmettheBjorksatUCLA,IvisitedanearbyschoolinLongBeach,California, that may be the most comprehensive attempt yet to apply all theprinciplesofevidence-basedwisdominasingleinstitution.TheschooliscalledtheIntellectualVirtuesAcademyandit is thebrainchild

of JasonBaehr, a professorof philosophy atLoyolaMarymountUniversity inLosAngeles. Baehr’swork focuses on ‘virtue epistemology’ – examining thephilosophical importance of character traits like intellectual humility, curiosityandopen-mindednessforgoodreasoning–andhehasrecentlycollaboratedwithsomeofthepsychologistsstudyingintellectualhumility.At the time of the IVA’s founding, Baehr’s interest had been purely

theoretical, but that changed with a phone call from his friend and fellowphilosopher Steve Porter, who heard a radio news programme about theObamas’ choice of school for their daughters.Thepiece happened tomentionthe availability of so-called ‘charter’ schools – state-funded schools that aremanagedprivatelyaccordingtotheirowneducationalvisionandcurriculum.The two philosophers both had young children of their own, so why not

attempttosetuptheirowncharterschool,Portersuggested.Theybegantomeetupregularlyincoffeeshopstodiscusshowtheymightapplyamodelofteachingthatdeliberatelycultivatesintellectualvirtueslikecuriosity–‘notasanadd-on,extra-curricular program, but rather where everything is oriented around thequestionofhowwecanhelpour students togrow in someof thesequalities,’Baehrtoldme.Thisvision isclear fromthemomentIstep into thebuilding.Writtenon the

wallsofeveryclassroomarethenine‘mastervirtues’thattheIVAconsiderstobecrucialforgoodthinkingandlearning,withaccompanyingslogans.Theyaredividedintothreecategories:Gettingstarted

Curiosity:adispositiontowonder,ponder,andaskwhy.Athirstforunderstandingandadesiretoexplore.Intellectualhumility:awillingnesstoownuptoone’sintellectuallimitationsandmistakes,unconcernedwithintellectualstatusorprestige.Intellectualautonomy:acapacityforactive,self-directedthinking.Anabilitytothinkandreasonforoneself.

Executingwell

Attentiveness:areadinesstobe‘personallypresent’inthelearningprocess.Keepsdistractionsatbay.Strivestobemindfulandengaged.

Intellectualcarefulness:adispositiontonoticeandavoidintellectualpitfallsandmistakes.Strivesforaccuracy.

Intellectualthoroughness:adispositiontoseekandprovideexplanations.Unsatisfiedwithmereappearancesoreasyanswers.Probesfordeepermeaningandunderstanding.

Handlingchallenges

Open-mindedness:anabilitytothinkoutsidethebox.Givesafairandhonesthearingtocompetingperspectives.Intellectualcourage:areadinesstopersistinthinkingorcommunicatinginthefaceoffear,includingfearofembarrassmentorfailure.Intellectualtenacity:awillingnesstoembraceintellectualchallengeandstruggle.Keepsits‘eyesontheprize’anddoesn’tgiveup.

As you can see, some of these virtues, including intellectual humility, open-mindedness,curiosity,areexactlythesameelementsofgoodthinkingthatIgorGrossmannhadincludedinhisinitialstudiesofwisereasoningabouteverydayevents, while others – such as ‘intellectual carefulness’ and ‘intellectualthoroughness’–aremorecloselylinkedtothecultivationofscepticismthatweexplored in Chapter 6; ‘intellectual courage’, ‘intellectual tenacity’ and‘intellectualautonomy’,meanwhile,enforce the ideaofstruggleandconfusionthatStiglerandtheBjorkshavestudiedsoextensively.Whether or not you are interested in the IVA’s educational model, that’s a

pretty good checklist for the kinds of mental qualities that are essential forindividualstoavoidtheintelligencetrap.The children are taught about these concepts explicitly with a weekly

‘advisory’session,ledbyteachersandparents.Duringmyvisit,forinstance,theadvisory sessions explored ‘effective listening’, in which the children wereencouraged to reflect on the way they talk with others. They were asked toconsider the benefits of some of the virtues, such as intellectual humility orcuriosity,duringconversationand,crucially, thekindsofsituationswheretheymay also be inappropriate. At the end of the session, the class listened to anepisodefromtheThisAmericanLifepodcast,aboutthereal-lifestoryofayounggirl, Rosie, who struggled to communicate with her workaholic father, aphysicist–arelatableexerciseinperspectivetaking.Theaim,inallthis,istogetthechildrentobemoreanalyticalandreflectiveabouttheirownthinking.Besides these explicit lessons, the virtues are also incorporated into the

teaching of traditional academic subjects. After the advisory session, for

instance, Iattendedaseventh-grade(consistingof twelve-to thirteen-year-olds)lesson led byCariNoble. The students therewere learning about theways tocalculate the interior angles of the polygon, and rather than teaching theprinciplesoutright,theclasshadtostrugglethroughthelogicofcomingupwiththeformulathemselves–astrategythatremindedmealotofStigler’saccountsoftheJapaneseclassroom.Lateron,IsawanEnglishclassinwhichthestudentsdiscuss music appreciation, which included a TED talk by the conductorBenjaminZander, inwhichhe discusses his owndifficultieswith learning thepiano – again promoting the idea that intellectual struggle is essential forprogress.Throughout the day, the teachers also ‘modelled’ the virtues themselves,

making sure to admit theirown ignorance if theydidn’t immediatelyknowananswer – an expression of intellectual humility – or their own curiosity ifsomethingsuddenlyledtheir interest inanewdirection.AsDweck,EngelandLanger have all shown, such subtle signals really can prime a child’s ownthinking.I only visited the school for one day, but my impression from my

conversations with the staff was that its strategy faithfully builds on robustpsychological research to ensure that more sophisticated reasoning isincorporated into every subject, and that this doesn’t sacrifice any of theiracademic rigour.As the principal, JacquieBryant, toldme: ‘Students couldn’tpractise the intellectual virtues if they were not up against a challenging andcomplexcurriculum.Andwecan’tgaugethedepthoftheirunderstandingunlesswehavethewritingandfeedback.Thetwogotogether.’Thechildren’smetacognition–theirawarenessofpotentialthinkingerrorsand

theircapacitytocorrectthem–appeared,frommyobservations,tobeincrediblyadvancedcomparedtotheaverageteenager.Theirparentscertainlyseemtobeimpressed.‘Thisisgreat.Alotofusdon’t

learnthisuntiladulthood–ifweeverlearnit,’NatashaHunter,oneoftheparentadvisors, told me during the advisory lesson. Hunter also teaches at a localcollege,andshewasexcitedtoseethechildren’ssophisticatedreasoningatsuchayoungage. ‘I think thatcritical thinkinghas tohappenat this level.Becausewhen theyget tome, afterpublic school education, theyaren’t thinkingat thelevelatwhichweneedthemtothink.’Thestudents’academicresultsspeakforthemselves.InitsfirstyeartheIVA

was scored as one of the top three schools in theLongBeachUnifiedSchoolDistrict.Andinastate-wideacademicachievementtestforthe2016?17school

year,more than70per cent of its students achieved the expected standards inEnglish,comparedtoa50percentaverageacrossCalifornia.25Wehave tobewaryof reading toomuch into this success.The IVAisonly

oneschoolwithhighlymotivatedstaffwhoarealldedicatedtomaintainingitsvision, andmany of the psychologists I’ve spoken to point out that it can bedifficulttoencourageeffective,widespreadeducationalreform.Evenso,theIVAofferedmeatasteofthewaythatWesterneducationcould

begin tocultivate thoseother thinkingstyles thatareso importantforeffectivereasoninginadultlife–producingawholenewgenerationofwiserthinkers.

PART4

Thefollyandwisdomofthecrowd:Howteamsandorganisationscan

avoidtheintelligencetrap

9

Themakingsofa‘dreamteam’:Howtobuildasupergroup

Accordingtomostpundits,Icelandshouldhavehadnoplaceat theEuro2016men’sfootballtournament.Justfouryearspreviously,theyhadranked131stintheworld.1Howcouldtheyeverhopetocompeteasoneofthetoptwenty-fourteamsenteringthechampionships?The first shock came during the qualifying rounds in 2014 and 2015,when

theyknockedouttheNetherlandstobecomethesmallestnationevertoreachthechampionships.ThencametheirsurprisedrawwithPortugalattheSaint-Etiennestadium in the first round. Their unexpected success was enough to rattlePortugal’sstarplayer,CristianoRonaldo,whosulkedaboutthetactics.‘Itwasaluckynightforthem,’hetoldreportersafterthematch.‘Whentheydon’ttrytoplayandjustdefend,defend,defend,thisinmyopinionshowsasmallmentalityandtheyarenotgoingtodoanythinginthecompetition.’The Icelanderswere undeterred. They drew their nextmatchwithHungary,

andbeatAustria2–1.Commentatorsweresurethatthetinynation’sluckwouldsoonrunout.Yettheydiditagain–thistimeagainstEngland,ateamcomposedalmostentirelyofplayersfromtheworld’s top-twentyelitefootballclubs.TheUK’sTVcommentatorswererenderedliterallyspeechlessbythefinalgoal;2theGuardian described the match as one of the most ‘humiliating defeats inEngland’shistory’.3Iceland’sdreamendedwhentheyfinallysuccumbedtothehometeaminthe

quarter-finals, but football pundits from across the globe were neverthelessgobsmackedbytheirsuccess.AsoneofTime’ssportswriters,KimWall,putit:‘Iceland’s very presence at the Championships came against all the odds. Avolcanic island blanketed by year-round glaciers, the nation has the world’sshortest soccer season: even the national stadium’s designer pitch grass,handpicked towithstandArcticwindsand snow,occasionally froze todeath.’4Andwithapopulationof330,000, theyhadasmallerpoolofpotentialplayers

thanmanyLondon boroughs; one of their coaches stillworked part time as adentist.5Inmanypeople’seyes,theywerethetrueheroesofthetournament,notPortugal,theultimatewinner.At the time of writing (in 2018) Iceland remained at around twenty in the

world rankings, and had become the smallest country ever to qualify for theWorldCup;contrarytoRonaldo’scriticisms,theirsuccesswasnotamereflukeafterall.Howhadthistinynationmanagedtobeatcountriesthatweremorethantwenty times its size, their teams composed of some of the sport’s greatestsuperstars?Isitpossiblethattheirunexpectedsuccesscamebecause–andnotinspite–of

thefactthattheyhadsofewstarplayers?

Thehistoryofsportisfullofsurprisingtwistsoffate.Perhapsthemostfamousupsetofallisthe‘MiracleonIce’–whenateamofAmericancollegestudentsbeat theaccomplishedSoviethockeyteamat the1980WinterOlympics.Morerecently, there was Argentina’s surprise gold medal in basketball at the 2004Olympics,wheretheythrashedtheUSA–thefirmfavourites.Ineachcase,theunderdogshadlessestablishedplayers,yetsomehowtheircombinedtalentwasgreater than the sumof their parts.But in termsof the sheer audacityof theirchallenge – and the teamwork that allowed them to punch so far above theirweight–Iceland’ssuccessisperhapsthemostinstructive.Sporting talent isverydifferent from thekindsof intelligencewehavebeen

exploring so far, but the lessons from such unexpected successesmay stretchbeyond the football pitch. Many organisations employ highly intelligent,qualified people in the assumption that they will automatically combine theircollective brainpower to producemagical results. Inexplicably, however, suchgroupsoftenfailtocashinontheirtalents,withpoorcreativity,lostefficiency,andsometimesoverlyriskydecisionmaking.Inthepasteightchapters,wehaveseenhowgreaterintelligenceandexpertise

can sometimes backfire for the individual, but the very same issues can alsoafflict teams, as certain traits, valued in high-performing individuals, maydamagethegroupasawhole.Youreallycanhave‘toomuchtalent’inateam.Thisistheintelligencetrapofnotonebrain,butmany,andthesamedynamics

thatallowedIceland tobeatEnglandcanalsohelpus tounderstandworkplacepoliticsinanyorganisation.

BeforewelookspecificallyatthedynamicsthatlinktheEnglandfootballteamto the corporate boardroom, let’s first consider some more general intuitionsaboutgroupthinking.6One popular idea has been the ‘wisdomof the crowd’ – the idea thatmany

brains,working together,cancorrect foreachother’serrors in judgements;wemake each other better.* Some good evidence of this view comes from ananalysisofscientists’ journalarticles,whichfinds thatcollaborativeeffortsarefarmorelikelytobecitedandappliedthanpaperswithjustoneauthor.Contrarytothenotionofalonegenius,conversationsandtheexchangeofideasbringoutthe best in the teammembers; their combined brainpower allows them to seeconnections that had been invisible previously.7 Yet there are also plenty ofnotoriousexampleswhereteamthinkingfails,sometimesatgreatcost.Opposingvoicesliketopointtothephenomenonof‘groupthink’,firstdescribedindetailby theYaleUniversity psychologist Irving Janis. Inspired by theBay of Pigsdisaster in 1961, he explored the reasons why the Kennedy administrationdecided to invade Cuba. He concluded that Kennedy’s advisors had been tooeager to reach a consensus decision and too anxious about questioning eachother’sjudgements.Instead,theyreinforcedtheirexistingbiases–exacerbatingeach other’s motivated reasoning. The individuals’ intelligence didn’t matterverymuchoncethedesiretoconformhadblindedtheirjudgement.

*AnargumentforthewisdomofthecrowdscanalsobetracedbacktoCharlesDarwin’scousin,FrancisGalton.ForanarticlepublishedinNaturejournalin1907,heaskedpassers-byatacountryfairtoestimatetheweightofanox.Themedianestimatecameinat1,198lb–just9 lb(or0.8percent)off thecorrectvalue.Andmore than50per cent of the estimateswerewithin around4per cent either sideof the truevalue.Buildingonthisfinding,somecommentatorshavearguedthatreachingagroupconsensusisoftenthe bestway to increase the accuracy of our judgements – and you’re probably going to be guaranteedgreatersuccessbyrecruitingasmanytalentedindividualsaspossible.Scepticsofcollectivereasoningmayalsopointtothemanytimesthatgroups

simply fail to agree on any decision at all, reaching an impasse, or theymayoverly complicate a problem by incorporating all the points of view. Thisimpasseisreallytheoppositeofthemoresingle-mindedgroupthink,butitcannonetheless be very damaging for a team’s productivity. You want to avoid‘designbycommittee’.Thelatestresearchhelpsustoreconcilealltheseviews,offeringsomeclever

new tools to determine whether a group of talented people can tap into theircombinedabilityorwhethertheywillfallvictimtogroupthink.

AnitaWilliamsWoolleyhasbeenattheforefrontofthesenewfindings,withtheinvention of a ‘collective intelligence’ test that promises to revolutionise ourunderstanding of group dynamics. I met her in her lab at Carnegie MellonUniversity in Pittsburgh, where she was conducting the latest round ofexperiments.Designing the testwas aHerculean task.One of the biggest challengeswas

designing a test that captured the full range of thinking that a group has toengagewith:brainstorming,forinstance,involvesakindof‘divergent’thinkingthatisverydifferentfromthemorerestrained,criticalthinkingyoumayneedtocome to a decision. Her team eventually settled on a large battery of tasks –lastingfivehoursintotal–thattogethertestedfourdifferentkindsofthinking:generating new ideas; choosing a solution based on sound judgement;negotiating to reach compromise; and finally, general ability at task execution(suchascoordinatingmovementsandactivities).Unlike an individual intelligence test, many of the tasks were practical in

nature.Inatestofnegotiationskills,forinstance,thegroupshadtoimaginethatthey were housemates sharing a car on a trip into town, each with a list ofgroceries–andtheyhadtoplantheirtriptogetthebestbargainswiththeleastdriving time. In a test ofmoral reasoning,meanwhile, the subjects played therole of a jury, describing how theywould judge a basketball player who hadbribedhisinstructor.Andtotesttheiroverallexecution,theteammemberswereeachsatinfrontofaseparatecomputerandaskedtoenterwordsintoasharedonline document – a deceptively simple challenge that tested how well theycould coordinate their activities to avoid repeatingwords orwritingover eachother’scontributions.8Theparticipantswerealsoaskedtoperformsomeverbalorabstract reasoning tasks thatmightbe included ina traditional IQ test–buttheyansweredasagroup,ratherthanindividually.Thefirstexcitingfindingwasthateachteam’sscoreononeoftheconstituent

taskscorrelatedwithitsscoreontheothertasks.Inotherwords,thereappearedto be an underlying factor (rather like the ‘mental energy’ that ismeant to bereflected in our general intelligence) that meant that some teams consistentlyperformedbetterthanothers.Crucially, and in line with much of the work we have already seen on

individualcreativity,decisionmakingandlearning–agroup’ssuccessappearedtoonlymodestlyreflectthemembers’averageIQ(whichcouldexplainjust2.25per cent of the variation in collective intelligence). Nor could it be stronglylinked to thehighest IQwithin thegroup(whichaccounted for3.6percentof

thevariationincollectiveintelligence).Theteamsweren’tsimplyrelyingonthesmartestmembertodoallthethinking.Since theypublished that firstpaper inScience in2010,Woolley’s teamhas

verified their test in many different contexts, showing that it can predict thesuccess of many real-world projects. Some were conveniently close to home.They studied students completing a two-month group project in a universitymanagementcourse,forinstance.Sureenough,thecollectiveintelligencescorepredicted the team’s performance on various assignments. Intriguingly, teamswithahighercollectiveintelligencekeptonbuildingontheiradvantageduringthisproject:notonlyweretheybetterinitially;theyalsoimprovedthemostovertheeightweeks.Woolleyhasalsoappliedhertestinthearmy,inabank,inteamsofcomputer

programmers, and at a large financial services company,which ironically hadone of the lowest collective intelligence scores she had ever come across.Disappointingly, she wasn’t asked back; a symptom, perhaps, of their poorgroupthink.The test ismuchmore than a diagnostic tool, however. It has also allowed

Woolley to investigate theunderlying reasonswhysome teamshavehigherorlowercollectiveintelligence–andthewaysthosedynamicsmightbeimproved.One of the strongest and most consistent predictors is the team members’

social sensitivity. Tomeasure this quality,Woolley used a classicmeasure ofemotionalperception, inwhichparticipantsaregivenphotosofanactor’seyesand asked to determinewhat emotion that person is supposed to be feeling –whether they are happy, sad, angry or scared, with the participants’ averagescore strongly predicting how well they would perform on the group tasks.Remarkably, theverysamedynamicscandetermine the fateof teamsworkingtogetherremotely,acrosstheinternet.9Eventhoughtheyaren’tmeetingfacetoface, greater social sensitivity still allows them to read between the lines ofdirectmessagesandbettercoordinatetheiractions.Beyond the ‘reading themind in theeyes’ test,Woolleyhasalsoprobed the

specific interactions that can elevate or destroy a team’s thinking. Companiesmay value someone who is willing to take charge when a group lacks ahierarchy, for instance– thekindofpersonwhomay thinkof themselvesasa‘natural leader’.YetwhenWoolley’s teammeasured how often eachmemberspoke,theyfoundthatthebettergroupstendtoalloweachmembertoparticipateequally;theworstgroups,incontrast,tendedtobedominatedbyjustoneortwopeople.

Thosemoredomineeringpeopledon’thavetobeexcessivelyloudorrude,butif they give the impression that they know everything already, other teammemberswillfeeltheyhavenothingtocontribute,whichdeprivesthegroupofvaluable information and alternative points of view.10 Untempered enthusiasmcanbeavice.The most destructive dynamic,Woolley has found, is when team members

start competing against each other. This was the problem with the financialservicescompanyand theirbroadercorporateculture.Eachyear, thecompanywouldonlypromotea fixednumberof individualsbasedon theirperformancereviews–meaningthateachemployeewouldfeelthreatenedbytheothers,andgroupworksufferedasaresult.Since Woolley published those first results, her research has garnered

particular interest for its insights into sexism in the workplace. The irritatinghabitsofsomemento‘mansplain’,interruptandappropriatewomen’sideashasbeen noted by many commentators in recent years. By shutting down aconversation and preventing women from sharing their knowledge, those areexactlythekindsofbehavioursthatsabotagegroupperformance.Sureenough,Woolleyhasshownthat–atleastinherexperimentsintheUSA

– teams with a greater proportion of women have a higher collectiveintelligence,andthatthiscanbelinkedtotheirhigher,overall,socialsensitivity,comparedtogroupsconsistingofalargerproportionofmen.11ThiswasequallytruewhenWoolleytestedthecollectiveintelligenceofonlineteamsplayingtheLeagueofLegendscomputergame,whentheplayers’genderwasobscuredbytheir avatar: it wasn’t simply that the men were acting differently when theyknewawomanwaspresent.12Wedon’tyetknowtheexactcauseofthesegenderdifferences.Theremaybe

a biological basis – testosterone has known effects on behaviour and higherlevels make people more impulsive and dominant, for instance – but somedifferencesinsocialsensitivitycouldbeculturallylearnttoo.Woolley told me that these findings have already changed opinions. ‘Some

organisationshavetakenwhatwehavefoundandjustflippeditintohiringmorewomen.’Whetherornotyouwoulddeliberatelychangethegenderbalanceonthebasis

ofthesefindings,hiringpeopleofbothsexeswithgreatersocialsensitivityisanobviouswaytoboostthecollectiveintelligenceofanorganisation.The very name – soft skills – that we attribute to social intelligence often

implies that it is the weaker, secondary counterpart to other forms of

intelligence,andthetestsweusetoexploreinterpersonaldynamics–suchastheMyers-BriggsTypeInventory–arepoorpredictorsofactualbehaviour.13Ifyouareattemptingtorecruitasmartteam,Woolley’sresearchstronglysuggeststhatthese social skills should be a primary concern, and in the sameway thatwemeasure cognitive ability using standardised tests, we should begin to usescientificallyverifiedmeasurestoassessthisquality.

By showing that collective intelligence has such a weak correlation with IQ,Woolley’stestsbegintoexplainwhysomegroupsofintelligentpeoplefail.Butgiven the research on the individual intelligence trap, I was also interested inwhetherhighperformersareeveratanevenhigherriskoffailingthanteamsoflessaverageability.Intuitively, we might suspect that especially smart or powerful people will

struggle to get along, due to the over-confidence or closed-mindedness thatcomeswith their status, and that thismightdamage their overall performance.Butaretheseintuitionsjustified?AngusHildrethatCornellUniversitycanofferussomeanswers.Hisresearch

wasinspiredbyhisownexperiencesataglobalconsultingfirm,whereheoftenoversawmeetingsfromsomeofthetopexecutives.‘Theywerereallyeffectiveindividualswhohadgottowheretheywerebecausetheyweregoodatwhattheydid,butwhentheycametogetherinthesegroupcontextsIwassurprisedatthedysfunction and the difficulties they faced,’ he told me during one of hisfrequent visits back home to London. ‘I was expecting this platonic ideal ofleadership: you put all the best people in the room and obviously somethinggoodisgoingtohappen.Buttherewasaninabilitytomakedecisions.Wewerealwaysrunningbehind.’ReturningtostudyforaPhDinorganisationalbehaviourattheUniversityof

California,Berkeley,hedecidedtoprobethephenomenonfurther.In one experiment, published in 2016, he gathered executives from a

multinational healthcare company, assigned them togroups and asked them toimaginethattheywererecruitinganewchieffinancialofficerfromaselectionofdummycandidates.Thespreadofpowerbetweenthegroupswasnotequal,however:somewerecomposedofhigh-flyingexecutives,whomanagedlotsofpeople,whileothersweremostlymadeupoftheirsubordinates.Toensurethathewasnotjustseeingtheeffectsofexistingcompetitionbetweentheexecutives,he ensured that the executives within the groups had not worked togetherpreviously. ‘Otherwise there might be this past history, where someone had

beatensomeoneelsetoaposition.’Despitetheircredentialsandexperience,thegroupsofhigh-flyersoftenfailed

toreachaconsensus;64percentofthehigh-powerteamsreachedanimpasse,compared with just 15 per cent of the low-power teams; that’s a four-folddifferenceinthegroups’effectiveness.14One problem was ‘status conflict’ – the high-power members were less

focusedonthetaskitself,andmoreinterestedinassertingtheirauthorityinthegroupanddeterminingwhowouldbecome topdog.But thehigh-flying teamswere also less likely to share information and integrate each other’s points ofview,makingitmuchhardertocometoasuccessfulcompromise.You could argue that you need greater confidence to get ahead in the first

place; perhaps these people had always been a little more self-serving. But afurtherlabexperiment,usingstudentsasparticipants,demonstratedthatittakessurprisinglylittleefforttosendpeopleonthatkindofegotrip.Thestudents’firsttaskwassimple:theywereseparatedintopairsandtoldto

makeatowerusingbuildingblocks.Ineachpair,onewastoldthattheywerealeader and the other a follower, ostensibly based on their answers to aquestionnaire. Their success or failure in the taskwas unimportant;Hildreth’sgoalwas toprime someof theparticipantswith a senseofpower. In thenextexercise,herearrangedthestudentsintogroupsofthree,composedeitherofallleadersorallfollowers,andsetthemsometestsoncreativity,suchasinventinganeworganisationandlayingoutitsbusinessplan.Drunkonthetinybitofpowerbestowedinthepreviousexercise,theformer

leaders tended to be less cooperative and found it harder to share informationandagreeonasolution,draggingthegroups’overallperformancedown.Theyweredemonstratingexactlythekindofmutuallysabotagingbehaviours,inotherwords, that Woolley had found to be so destructive to a team’s collectiveintelligence.Hildrethsaysthepowerstruggleswereplaintoseeasheobservedthegroups

atwork.‘Theywereprettycoldinteractions,’he toldme.‘Reasonablyoftenatleast one student in the group withdrew, because the dynamics were souncomfortable–ortheyjustdidn’twanttoengageintheconversationbecausetheir ideas weren’t being heard. They thought, “I’m the one who makes thedecisions,andmydecisionsarethebestones.”’AlthoughHildreth’sstudyonlyexploredthesedynamicsinasinglehealthcare

company, various field studies suggest these dynamics are ubiquitous. Ananalysis of Dutch telecommunications and financial institutions, for instance,

examinedbehaviourinteamsacrossthecompany’shierarchies,findingthatthehigherupthecompanyyougo,thegreaterthelevelofconflictreportedbytheemployees.Crucially,thisseemedtodependonthemembers’ownunderstandingoftheir

positions in thepeckingorder. If the team,asawhole,agreedontheir relativepositions,theyweremoreproductive,sincetheyavoidedconstantjockeyingforauthority.15 The worst groups were composed of high-status individuals whodidn’tknowtheirrankinthepeckingorder.Themoststrikingexampleofthesepowerplays–andtheclearestevidencethat

toomuchtalentcanbecounter-productive–comesfromastudyof‘star’equityanalysts in Wall Street banks. Each year, Institutional Investor ranks the topanalysts in each sector, offering them a kind of rock star status among theircolleaguesthatcantranslatetomillionsofdollarsofincreasedearnings;theyarealsoregularlypickedasmediapundits.Needlesstosay,thesepeopleoftenflocktogetheratthesameprestigiousfirms,butthatdoesn’talwaysbringtherewardsthecompanymighthavehoped.Studying five years of data across the industry, Boris Groysberg of the

Harvard Business School found that teams with more star players do indeedperform better, but only up to a certain point, after which the benefits ofadditional star talent tailed off. And with more than 45 per cent of thedepartment filled with Institutional Investor’s picks, the research departmentactuallybecomeslesseffective.The groups appeared to be particularly fragile when the stars’ areas of

expertise happened to coincide, putting them inmore direct competition witheachother,anditwaslessofafactorwhentheyfell intodifferentsectors,andwere therefore in less direct competition with each other. Then, the companycould afford to recruit a few more stars – up to around 70 per cent of theworkforce–beforetheirruttingegosdestroyedtheteam’sperformance.16

Hildreth’s theory is based on the group interactions among the powerful. Butbesides disrupting communication and cooperation, status conflict can alsointerferewiththebrain’sinformationprocessingability.Atleastforthedurationofthemeeting,theindividualmemberscanthemselvesbealittlebitmorestupidasaresultoftheirinteractions.Thestudy,whichtookplaceatVirginiaTech,gatheredsmallgroupsofpeople

andgavethemeachsomeabstractproblems,whilebroadcastingtheirprogress–relativetotheotherteammembers–ontheircomputerinterface.Thefeedback

turnedouttoparalysesomeofthecandidates,loweringtheirscorescomparedtotheir performance on a previous test. Despite having started out with roughlyequal IQs, the participants eventually separated into two distinct strata, withsomepeopleappearingtobeparticularlysensitivetothecompetition.17ThediminishedbrainpowerwasalsoevidentinfMRIscanstakenatthetime

of the test: it appeared to be associated with increased brain activity in theamygdala–analmond-shapedbundleofneurons,deepin thebrain,associatedwith emotional processing – and reduced activity in prefrontal cortices behindtheforehead,whichareassociatedwithproblemsolving.The team concluded that we can’t separate our cognitive abilities from the

social environment: all the time, our capacity to apply our brainpowerwill beinfluenced by our perceptions of those around us.18 Given these findings, it’seasy toseehowthepresenceofabrilliant–butarrogant– teammembermayhurtboth thecollectiveand individual intelligenceofhisorhermoresensitivecolleagues, a double whammy that will reduce their productivity across theboard.Asoneoftheresearchers,ReadMontague,putsit:‘Youmayjokeabouthow

committeemeetingsmakeyoufeelbraindead,butourfindingssuggestthattheymaymakeyouactbraindeadaswell.’

Thesportsfieldmayseemafarcryfromtheboardroom,butweseeexactlythesamedynamicsinmanysports.ConsiderthefateoftheMiamiHeatbasketballteamintheearly2010s.After

signingupLeBronJames,ChrisBoshandDwayneWade–the‘BigThree’–theteamwasoverflowingwithnatural talent–but theyendedthe2010?11seasonrankedtwenty-ninthoutofthirtyteams.ItwasonlyafterBoshandWadefelloutofthegamewithinjuriesthattheywouldeventuallywinanNBAchampionshipthefollowingyear.AsthesportswriterBillSimmonsputit:‘Lesstalentbecamemore.’19To find out if this is a commonphenomenon, the social psychologistAdam

Galinskyfirstexaminedtheperformanceoffootball(soccer)teamsinthe2010WorldCupinSouthAfricaandthe2014WorldCupinBrazil.Todeterminethecountry’s‘toptalent’,theycalculatedhowmanyofitssquadwerecurrentlyonthe payroll of one of the top thirty highest-earning clubs listed in theDeloitteFootball Money League (which includes Real Madrid, FC Barcelona andManchesterUnited).Theythencomparedthisvaluetothecountry’srankinginthequalifyingrounds.

JustasGroysberghadobservedwiththeWallStreetanalysts,Galinsky’steamfounda‘curvilinear’relationship;ateambenefitedfromhavingafewstars,butthe balance seemed to tip at about 60 per cent, after which the team’sperformancesuffered.TheDutch football teamoffered a perfect case in point.After disappointing

resultsintheEuro2012championships,thecoach,LouisvanGaal,reassembledthe team – reducing the percentage of ‘top talent’ from 73 per cent to 43 percent.Itwasanextraordinarymove,butitseemsthathehadjudgedthedynamicscorrectly: as Galinsky and his co-authors point out in their paper, theNetherlands did not lose a single game in the qualifying rounds of the 2014WorldCup.

To check the ‘too-much-talent’ effect in a newcontext,Galinsky then appliedthesamethinkingtobasketballrankings, lookingat thetenNBAseasonsfrom2002 to 2012. To identify the star players, they used ameasure of ‘estimatedwinsadded’–whichusesthestatisticsofthegametocalculatewhetherateammember was often a deciding factor in a match’s outcome. The ‘top talent’,Galinsky’s teamdecided, layinthetopthirdof theserankings–anadmittedlyarbitrarycut-offpoint,butonethatisoftenusedinmanyorganisationstodecideexceptional performance. Crucially, many of the players within their rankingcoincided with the players selected for NBA’s own All-Star tournament,

suggestingitwasavalidmeasureoftoptalent.Once again, the researchers calculated the proportion of star players within

eachclub,andcompared it to the team’soverallwinswithineachseason.ThepatternwasalmostidenticaltotheresultsfromthefootballWorldCup:

Inonefinalexperiment,theteamexamineddatafromMajorLeagueBaseball,asport that does not require somuch coordination between players. Here, theyfound no evidence of the too-much-talent effect, which supports the idea thatstatusisonlyharmfulwhenweneedtocooperateandbringoutthebestineachother.20Forsports, likebaseball, thatare less interdependent thanbasketballorfootball,itpaystobuyallthetoptalentyoucanafford.Ifwe lookbackat Iceland’sunexpectedvictoryagainstEngland in theEuro

2016 football championships, it’s clear that its success stems from manydifferentfactors.Thecountryhadspentyearsinvestinginimprovingitstrainingprogrammes, and the teamwas in excellent hands under Swedish coach LarsLagerbac and his assistantHeimirHallgrímsson. The quality of the individualplayerswasundoubtedlybetterthaniteverhadbeen.Butalthoughmanyworkedfor international footballclubs, justoneof themat the time(GylfiSigurðsson)had a contract in one of the top-thirty clubs in Deloitte’s Football Money

League.Theyhadn’tyetachievedthekindof internationalstatus thatcouldbesodestructive.England, in contrast, had pulled twenty-one of its twenty-three players from

thesesuper-richteams,meaningtheyaccountedformorethan90percentofthesquad, far above the optimum threshold. In fact, according to my owncalculations, not one of the teams that succeeded in passing through to thequarter-finalshadasmanystarplayers (theclosestwasGermany,whohad74per cent). England’s defeat against Iceland at the Allianz Riviera Stadium inNiceisanalmostperfectfitwithGalinsky’smodel.AlthoughtheymaynothavebeenawareofGalinsky’sscientificwork,football

pundits noted the disastrous team dynamics at the time of the tournament.‘England, forall their individual talents, lackedsomuchasone’, sportswriterIanHerbertwrote in the Independent after Iceland’swin. ‘The reasonwhy thenationstrugglestofeelempathyorconnectionswithmanyoftheseplayersistheego.Too famous, too important, too rich, toohighandmighty todiscover thepace and the fight and the new dimensions to put it on when against one ofEurope’smostdiminutivefootballnations.ThatisthisEngland.’21Theeventualchampions,Portugal, incidentally tookonly fourof theirplayers from theeliteclubsintheDeloitteMoneyLeague.TheteammayhavehadCristianoRonaldo– arguably the biggest star in the game – but it had not exceededGalinsky’sthreshold.The ‘Miracleon Ice’during the1980WinterOlympicsatLakePlacid,New

York,showsexactlythesamepattern.TheSovietteamhadanunbrokenrecord,returning home with gold in each of the past four Games. Of twenty-ninematches,theyhadwontwenty-seven.Eightoftheirplayershadcompetedinatleast someof thoseOlympicGames and also played for high-profile teams intheirhomecountry.TheUSteam,incontrast,wereabunchofcollegekids,withan average age of twenty-one –making them the youngest teamof thewholetournament–andlittleinternationalexperience.Thecoach,HerbBrooks,wasundernoillusions that itwasacaseof‘David

againstGoliath’.YetDavidtriumphed;AmericabeattheSovietUnion4?3,andtheyenteredthesecondmedalroundwithFinland.Theywalkedawaywiththegoldmedal.Andyoudon’tneedtobeaninternationalsuperstarforthiskindofdynamicto

apply to you and your colleagues; as Hildreth found with his universityexperiments, elite performance depends in part on your perception of yourtalentsrelativetothosearoundyou.

AnitaWilliamsWoolley, who first alerted me to Galinsky’s research, evensawit inhersons’amateursoccer team.‘Theyhadaverygoodteamlastyearandwonthestatecup,’shetoldme.‘Andthentheyattractedallofthesereallygoodplayersfromotherclubsanditruinedtheirdynamic.They’venowlostfivegamesthisyear.’

With thisnewunderstandingof collective intelligenceand the too-much-talenteffect,wearenowveryclosetobeingabletodiscoversomesimplestrategiestoimproveanyteam’sperformance.Beforewedoso,however,weneedtoexplorethe roleof the leader inmoredetail–and thebest case-studyemerges fromatragedyonEverest’sslopes.On9May1996,atanaltitudeof26,000feet, twoexpeditionswereready to

departfromCampIVontheSouthColrouteinNepal.RobHall,athirty-five-year-oldNewZealander, led the teamfromAdventureConsultants.TheywerejoinedbyagroupfromMountainMadness, ledbyforty-year-oldScottFischerfrom Michigan. Each team included the leader, two additional guides, eightclients,andnumerousSherpas.Theirexpertisewasunquestionable.Hallhadalreadyreachedthesummitfour

timespreviously,successfullyguidingthirty-nineclientsintheprocess;hewasknowntobemeticulouswithhisorganisation.FischerhadonlymasteredEverestonce before, but he had earned his stripes on many of the world’s mostchallengingpeaks.Andhewasconfidentofhismethods.‘We’vegottheBigEfigured out . . . we’ve built a yellow brick road to the summit,’ one of thesurvivingmembers,JonKrakauer,recalledFischersaying.Although theycamefromdifferentcompanies,HallandFischerhaddecided

towork together on the final bid – but theywere soon besetwith delays anddifficulties.OneoftheirSherpashadfailedtoinstalla‘fixedline’toguidetheirascent–addinganhourtotheirjourney–andabottleneckofclimbersbegantoamassfurtherdowntheslopeastheywaitedforthelinetobeinstalled.Byearlyafternoon,itbecameclearthatmanywouldnotbeabletoreachthesummitandreturnbythetimedarknessfell.Afewdecidedtoturnback,butthemajority–includingHallandFischer–pressedon.Itprovedtobeafataldecision.At15:00,snowbegantofall;by17:30itwasa

full-blownblizzard.Hall,Fischerandthreeoftheirteammembersdiedontheirdescent.Whydidtheydecidetocontinueuptothesummit,evenwhentheconditions

were worsening? Fischer himself had previously spoken of the ‘two o’clock

rule’–to turnaroundif theyfailedtoreachthesummitby2p.m.sothat theycouldbesure theywerebackatcampbynightfall.Yet theycontinued to theirdeaths.MichaelRoberto,fromHarvardBusinessSchool,hasanalysedaccountsofthe

disaster–includingabest-sellingbookbyJonKrakauer–andhebelievesthatthe teams’ decisionsmay have been influenced by the now familiar cognitivebiases,includingthesunkcosterror(theclimbershadeachinvested$70,000intheattempt,andweeksofpotentiallywastedeffort)andover-confidenceonthepartofHallandFischer.22Moreinterestingforourpurposes,however,werethegroupdynamics–andin

particular, thehierarchy thatHall andFisherhadestablishedaround them.Wehavealready seen some reasonswhyahierarchymightbeproductive, since itcouldsettoreststatusconflictandinfightingwithinagroup.Inthiscase,however,thehierarchybackfired.BesidesHallandFischer,there

weremorejuniorguidesandlocalSherpaswithintimateknowledgeofthepeak,whomight have corrected their errors.But the groupdid not feel comfortableexpressing their concerns. Krakauer describes a kind of strict ‘pecking order’thatmeant the clientswere scared toquestion theguides, and theguideswerescared to question the leaders, Hall and Fischer. As one of the more juniorguides, Neal Beidleman, later put it: ‘I was definitely considered the thirdguide...soItriednottobetoopushy.Asaconsequence,Ididn’talwaysspeakupwhenmaybe I should have, and now I kickmyself for it.’Another guide,AnatoliBoukreev,wassimilarlywaryofexpressinghisconcerns that the teamhadnot acclimatised to the thin air. ‘I triednot tobe argumentative, choosinginsteadtodownplaymyintuitions.’AccordingtoKrakauer,Hallhadmadehisownfeelingsonthehierarchyquite

clearbeforetheydeparted:‘Iwilltoleratenodissensionupthere.Mywordwillbeabsolutelaw,beyondappeal.’LouKasischke,oneof the teamwhohaddecided to turnback,agreed. ‘You

need candour between the leader and the followers,’ he told PBS. On anexpedition, he said, the leader needs feedback from his or her team, but Hallwasn’treceptivetothoseopinions.‘Robdidn’tfosterthatrelationshipwhereheexpectedus to say these things.’23Ahierarchy, then, canbebothaproductiveandadangerousthing.We have to be wary of basing our conclusions on a single case-study, but

Adam Galinsky has confirmed this conclusion by analysing records of 5,104Himalayan expeditions. Unable to question all the climbers themselves, he

instead examined cultural differences in attitudes to authority.Various studieshavedemonstratedthatsomenationalitiesaremorelikelytobelieveyoushouldstrictlyrespectpeople’spositionwithinagroup,whileothersacceptthatyoucanchallengeandquestionyoursuperiors.PeoplefromChina,IranandThailand,forinstance, tend to respect hierarchy far more than citizens of the Netherlands,Germany,ItalyorNorway,accordingtoonewidelyacceptedmeasure;theUSA,AustraliaandtheUKfallsomewhereinthemiddle.24Comparing this data with the Everest records, Galinsky found that teams

composedofpeople from thecountries that respectedahierarchywere indeedmore likely to reach the summit – confirming the suspicions that a hierarchyboosts productivity and eases coordination between the team members. Butcrucially,theywerealsomorelikelytoloseteammembersintheattempt.To check that they weren’t accidentally measuring other traits – such as

individual determination – thatmight also have correlatedwith the prevailingcultural attitudes to hierarchy, and influenced their chances of success,Galinsky’s group examined data frommore than a thousand solo trips. Now,theyfoundnooverarchingdifferencesbetweenthedifferentcultures.Itwastheirgroupinteractionsthatreallymadeadifference.25The same dynamic may lie behind many business disasters. Executives at

Enron,forinstance,hadakindofreverenceforthoseabove,anddisagreementordoubtwasseenasaseveresignofdisloyalty.Tosurvive,theysaid,‘youhadtokeepdrinkingtheEnronwater’.There is an apparent paradox in these findings: if team members clearly

understand theirplace in thepeckingorder,overallgroupperformancewillbeboosted;butthisistrueonlyifteammembersthemselvesfeelthattheiropinionsare valued, and that they can challenge their leaders in the event of problemsarisingorpoordecisionsbeingtaken.

StretchingfromtheSaint-EtiennefootballstadiumtoWallStreetandtheslopesof Everest, we’ve now seen how some common dynamics shape groupinteractions and determine a team’s collective intelligence. This new researchappearstohavecapturedtheforcesunderlyingteamworkinanycontext.And in precisely the same way that our understanding of the individual

intelligence trap offers simple strategies to escape error, this research alsosuggests some tried-and-tested ways to avoid the most common mistakes ingroupreasoning.FromWoolleyandGalinsky’sresearch,wecanchangethewaywerecruitnew

teammembers. In light of the too-much-talent effect, itwould be tempting toargue that you should simply stop selecting people of exceptional ability –particularlyifyourteam’scompositionhasalreadypassedthatmagicthresholdof50?60percentbeing‘star’players.At this stage it’s probably best not to be too fixated on that number – the

specific ratiowill almost certainly depend on the personalitieswithin a groupand the amount of cooperation it requires – but the scientific research at leastsuggeststhatweneedtoplaceagreateremphasisoninterpersonalskillsthatwillenhancetheteam’scollectiveintelligence,evenifthatmeansrejectingsomeonewhoscores farhigheronmore standardmeasuresofability.Thatmay includejudging someone’semotionalperceptivityandcommunication skills–whethertheydrawpeopleoutandlisten,orwhethertheyhaveatendencytointerruptanddominate. If you are leading a multinational team, you might also choosesomeonewithhighculturalintelligence(whichweexploredinChapter1)sincetheywouldfinditeasiertonavigatethedifferentsocialnorms.26Given what we know about status conflict, we can also improve the

interactionsofthetalentyoudohave.Hildreth,forinstance,foundstrategiestoavoidtheclashofegosduringhispreviousjobataglobalconsultingfirm.Oneexample, he says, is to underline each person’s expertise at eachmeeting andtheir reason for appearing at the group,which helps ensure that they have thechance to share relevant experience. ‘Often that’s kind of lost in themelee ofconflict.’Hildrethalsorecommendsallottingafixedamountoftimeforeachpersonto

contributehisorheropinionatthestartofthemeeting.Thetopicofdiscussionneednotberelatedtotheproblemathand,butthispracticeallowseachpersontofeelthatheorshehasalreadymadeacontributiontothegroup’sfunctioning,furtherdefusingthestatusconflictandeasingtheensuingconversation.‘Yougetalotmoreequalitywithinthediscussionsothateveryonecontributes,’Hildrethsaid.Andwhenyoufinallycometotheproblemathand,hesuggeststhatyousetouta firmstrategy forwhenandhowyouwillmake thedecision–whether itwill be by unanimous or majority vote, for instance – to avoid the kind ofimpassethatmaycomewhentoomanyintelligentandexperiencedpeoplebuttheads.Lastly,andmostimportantly,theleadershouldembodythekindsofqualities

heorshewantstoseeinateam–andshouldbeparticularlykeentoencouragedisagreement.Itisherethattheresearchofgroupthinkingcomesclosesttothenewscience

of evidence-basedwisdom, asmore andmoreorganisational psychologists arecomingtoseehowtheintellectualhumilityofaleadernotonlyimprovestheirindividual decisionmaking but also brings knock-on benefits for their closestcolleagues.Using staff questionnaires to explore the top management teams of 105

technologycompanies,AmyYiOuattheNationalUniversityofSingaporehasshownthatemployeesunderahumble leaderof thiskindare themselvesmorelikely to share information, collaborate in times of stress and contribute to asharedvision.Bytapping into thecollective intelligence,suchbusinesseswerebetter able to overcome challenges and uncertainty, ultimately resulting ingreaterannualprofitsayearlater.27Unfortunately, Ou says that CEOs themselves tend to be very split in their

opinions on the virtue of humility,withmany believing that it can underminetheirteam’sconfidenceintheirabilitiestolead.ThiswastrueeveninChina,shesays,whereshehadexpectedtoseegreaterrespectforahumblemindset.‘Eventhere, when I’m talking to those high-profile CEOs, they reject the termhumility,’shetoldme.‘TheythinkthatifI’mhumble,Ican’tmanagemyteamwell.Butmystudyshowsthatitactuallyworks.’Historyoffersussomestrikingexamplesofthesedynamicsatplay.Abraham

Lincoln’scapacity to listen to thedissentingvoices inhiscabinet–a ‘teamofrivals’ – is famously thought tohavebeenoneof the reasons that hewon theAmerican Civil War – and it apparently inspired Barack Obama’s leadershipstrategyaspresident.Jungkiu Choi, head of consumer banking at Standard Chartered Banking in

China,meanwhile,givesusonemoderncase-studyofhumilityatthetop.Beforehetooktherole,topexecutiveshadexpectedtoreceivethered-carpettreatmentwhentheyvisitedindividualbranches,butoneofJungkiu’sfirstmoveswastoensurethateachmeetingwasfarmoreinformal.Hewouldturnupunannouncedandorganisefriendly‘huddles’withtheemployeestoaskhowhecouldimprovethebusiness.He soon found that these meetings generated some of the company’s most

fruitful ideas. One of his groups, for instance, had suggested that the bankchangeitsoperatinghours,includingweekendshifts,tomatchothershopsinthearea.Withinmonths, theywere earningmore from those few hours than theyhadinthewholeoftherestoftheweek.Witheveryemployeeabletocontributeto the bank’s strategy, its entire service was transformed – and customersatisfactionrosebymorethan50percentwithintwoyears.28

WecanalsoseethisphilosophyinGoogle’sCEOSundarPichai,whoarguesthattheleader’ssingleroleisto‘letotherssucceed’.Asheexplainedinaspeechto his almamater, the Indian Institute ofTechnology-Kharagpur: ‘[Leadershipis]lessabouttryingtobesuccessful(yourself),andmoreaboutmakingsureyouhavegoodpeople,andyourworkis toremovethatbarrier, removeroadblocksforthemsothattheycanbesuccessfulinwhattheydo.’Like themanyotherprinciplesofgood teamwork, thehumilityof the leader

canbringbenefits to thesportsfield.Onestudyfoundthat themostsuccessfulhigh-school basketball teams were those whose coaches saw themselves as a‘servant’ to the team, comparedwith thosewhose coaches saw themselves assitting apart from and above their students.29 Under the humbler coaches, theteamplayersweremore determined, better able to copewith failure, andwonmoregamesperseason.Thehumilitymodelledbythecoachpushedeveryonetoworkalittleharderandtosupporttheirotherteammates.Consider JohnWooden, commonly regarded as the most successful college

basketballcoachofalltime.HeledUCLAtowintennationalchampionshipsintwelveyears,andbetween1971and1974,theywentundefeatedforeighty-eightgames.Despite these successes,Wooden’s every gesturemade it clear that hewasnot above the players on his team, as seen in the fact that hewould helpsweepthelockerroomaftereverygame.InthememoirCoachWoodenandMe,hisformerplayerandlifelongfriend,

Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, described many instances of Wooden’s unfailinghumility, evenwhen dealingwith difficult confrontationswith his players. ‘Itwasmathematically inevitable thatCoachwould take toheartwhat oneof hisplayers said, feel compelled to patch things up, and teach us all a lesson inhumilityat the same time.’30Woodenmade it clear that theycould learn fromeach other, him included – and the teamwent from strength to strength as aconsequence.

After Iceland’s unexpected success at the Euro 2016 tournament, manycommentators highlighted the down-to-earth attitude of Heimir Hallgrímsson,oneof the team’s twocoaches,who stillworkedpart timeasadentistdespiteleading the national team. He was apparently devoted to listening andunderstandingothers’pointsofview,andhetriedtocultivatethatattitudeinallofhisplayers.‘Team-building is amust for a country like ours; we can only beat the big

teamsbyworkingasone,’hetoldthesportschannelESPN.‘Ifyoulookatour

team,wehaveguys likeGylfi Sigurðsson atSwansea [FootballClub],who isprobablyourhighest-profileplayer,buthe’sthehardestworkeronthepitch.Ifthatguyworksthehardest,whointheteamcanbelazy?’31Aswiththeotherelementsofevidence-basedwisdom,thestudyofcollective

intelligenceisstillayoungdiscipline,butbyapplyingtheseprinciplesyoucanhelptoensurethatyourteammembersplayalittlemorelikeIceland,andalittlelesslikeEngland–astrategythatwillalloweachpersontobringoutthebestinthosearoundthem.

10

Stupidityspreadinglikewildfire:Whydisastersoccur–andhowtostopthem

Weareonanoilriginthemiddleoftheocean.Itisaquieteveningwithalightbreeze.The teamof engineers has finished drilling, and they are now trying to seal

theirwellwithcement.Theyhavecheckedthepressureattheseal,andallseemstobegoingwell.Soonextractioncanbegin,andthedollarswillstartrollingin.Itshouldbetimetocelebrate.But thepressure testswerewrong; thecementhasnotsetandthesealat the

bottomofthewellisnotsecure.Astheengineershappilysignofftheirjob,oilandgashasstartedtobuildupwithinthepipe–andit’srisingfast.Inthemiddleoftheengineers’celebrations,mudandoilstartsspewingontotherigfloor;thecrewcantastethegasontheirtongues.Iftheydon’tactquickly,theywillsoonfaceafull-on‘blowout’.If youhave even a passingknowledgeof theworldnews in2010, youmay

think you knowwhat happens next: an almighty explosion and the largest oilspillinhistory.Butinthiscase,itdoesn’thappen.Maybetheleakisfarenoughawayfromthe

engineroom,or thewind isblowing,creatingamovementofair thatpreventstheescapinggasfromcatchinglight.Ormaybetheteamonthegroundsimplynoticethebuild-upofpressureandareabletodeploythe‘blowoutpreventer’intime.Whatever the specific reason, adisaster is averted.Thecompany losesafewdaysofextraction–andafewmilliondollarsofprofits–butnoonedies.

This isnotahypothetical scenarioorawishful reimaginingof thepast.TherehadbeenliterallydozensofminorblowoutsintheGulfofMexicoaloneinthetwentyyearsbefore theDeepwaterHorizonspillat theMacondowell inApril2010–but thanks to randomcircumstancessuchas thedirectionandspeedofthe wind, full-blown disasters never took place, and the oil companies could

containthedamage.1Transocean,thecompanyinchargeofcementingtheDeepwaterHorizonrig,

had even experienced a remarkably similar incident in theNorthSea just fourmonths previously, when the engineers had also misinterpreted a series of‘negativepressuretests’–missingsignsthatthesealofthewellwasbroken.Buttheyhadbeenabletocontainthedamagebeforeanexplosionoccurred,resultinginafewdays’lostworkratherthananenvironmentalcatastrophe.2On20April2010,however,therewasnowindtodissipatetheoilandgas,and

thankstofaultyequipment,alltheteam’sattemptstocontaintheblowoutfailed.As the escaping gas built up in the engine rooms, it eventually ignited,unleashingaseriesoffireballsthatrippedthroughtherig.The rest is history. Eleven workers lost their lives, and over the next few

months, more than 200 million gallons of oil were released into the Gulf ofMexico,makingittheworstenvironmentalcatastropheinAmericanhistory.BPhadtopaymorethan$65billionincompensation.3Whywouldsomanypeoplemisssomanywarningsigns?Frompreviousnear

misses toa failed readingof the internalpressureon thedayof theexplosion,employeesseemedtohavebeenoblivioustothepotentialfordisaster.AsSeanGrimsley, a lawyer for aUSPresidentialCommission investigating

thedisaster,concluded:‘Thewellwasflowing.Hydrocarbonswereleaking,butforwhateverreasonthecrewafterthreehoursthatnightdecideditwasagoodnegativepressuretest...Thequestioniswhytheseexperiencedmenoutonthatrigtalkedthemselvesintobelievingthatthiswasagoodtest...Noneofthesemenwantedtodie.’4Disasters like the Deepwater Horizon explosion require us to expand our

focus, beyond groups and teams, to the surprisingways that certain corporatecultures can exacerbate individual thinking errors and subtly inhibit wiserreasoning. It is almost as if the organisation as a whole is suffering from acollectivebiasblindspot.The same dynamics underlie many of the worst manmade catastrophes in

recenthistory,fromNASA’sColumbiadisastertotheConcordecrashin2000.You don’t need to lead a multinational organisation to benefit from this

research;itincludeseye-openingfindingsforanyoneinemployment.Ifyou’veever worried that your own work environment is dulling your mind, thesediscoverieswillhelpexplainyourexperiences,andoffertipsforthebestwaystoprotectyourselffrommindlesslyimitatingthemistakesofthosearoundyou.

Before we examine large-scale catastrophes, let’s begin with a study of‘functionalstupidity’inthegeneralworkplace.TheconceptisthebrainchildofMats Alvesson at Lund University in Sweden, and André Spicer at the CassBusiness School in London, who coined the term to describe the counter-intuitivereasonsthatsomecompaniesmayactivelydiscouragetheiremployeesfromthinking.Spicer told me that his interest stems from his PhD at the University of

Melbourne, during which time he studied decision making at the AustralianBroadcasting Corporation (ABC).5 ‘They would introduce these crazy changemanagementprogrammes,whichwouldoftenresultinnothingchangingexceptcreatingahugeamountofuncertainty.’Many employees acknowledged the flaws in the corporation’s decision

making. ‘You found a lot of very smart people thrown together in anorganisation and many of them would spend a lot of time complaining howstupid the organisation was,’ Spicer told me. What really surprised him,however,was the number of peoplewho failed to acknowledge the futility ofwhat they were doing. ‘These extremely high-skilled and knowledgeableprofessionals were getting sucked into these crazy things, saying “this isintelligent,thisisrational”,thenwastinganincredibleamountoftime.’*

*The sameculture can alsobe seen in theBBC’soffices– a fact thebroadcaster itself lampoons in itsmockumentaryTVseries,W1A.Havingworkedat theBBCwhile researching thisbook, itoccurs tomethatdecidingtocreateathree-seriessitcomaboutyourownorganisationalfailings–ratherthanfixingthem–isperhapsthedefinitionoffunctionalstupidity.Years later hewoulddiscuss suchorganisational failingswithAlvesson at a

formal academic dinner. In their resulting studies, the pair of researchersexamineddozensofotherexamplesoforganisationalstupidity,fromthearmedforcestoITanalysts,newspaperpublishersandtheirownrespectiveuniversities,to examinewhethermany institutions really domake themost of their staff’sbrains.Their conclusionswere deeply depressing.AsAlvesson andSpicerwrote in

theirbook,TheStupidityParadox:‘Ourgovernmentsspendbillionsontryingtocreate knowledge economies, our firms brag about their superior intelligence,and individuals spenddecadesof their livesbuildingup fineCVs.Yet all thiscollective intellectdoesnot seem tobe reflected in themanyorganisationswestudied . . . Far from being “knowledge-intensive”, many of our most well-knownchieforganisationshavebecomeenginesofstupidity.’6

In parallel with the kinds of biases and errors behind the intelligence trap,Spicer and Alvesson define ‘stupidity’ as a form of narrow thinking lackingthree important qualities: reflection about basic underlying assumptions,curiosity about the purpose of your actions, and a consideration of thewider,long-term consequences of your behaviours.7 For many varied reasons,employeessimplyaren’tbeingencouragedtothink.This stupidity is often functional, they say, because it can comewith some

benefits. Individualsmay prefer to gowith the flow in theworkplace to saveeffort and anxiety, particularly if we know there will be incentives or even apromotioninthisforuslater.Such‘strategicignorance’isnowwellstudiedinpsychological experiments where participants must compete for money: oftenparticipantschoosenottoknowhowtheirdecisionsaffecttheotherplayers.8Byremaininginthedark,theplayergainssome‘moralwiggleroom’(thescientificterm)thatallowsthemtoactinamoreselfishway.Wemightalsobepersuadedbysocialpressure:noonelikesatrouble-maker,

after all, who delaysmeetings with endless questions. Unless we are activelyencouragedtoshareourviews,stayingquietandnoddingalongwiththepeoplearounduscanimproveourindividualprospects–evenifthatmeanstemporarilyturningoffourcriticalcapacities.Besides helping the individual, this kind of narrow-minded, unquestioning

approachcanalsobringsomeimmediatebenefitsfortheorganisation,increasingproductivityandefficiencyintheshorttermwithouttheemployeeswastingtimequestioning thewisdomof theirbehaviours.Theresult is thatsomecompaniesmay – either accidentally or deliberately – actually encourage functionalstupiditywithintheiroffices.SpicerandAlvessonarguethatmanyworkpracticesandstructurescontribute

toanorganisation’s functionalstupidity, includingexcessivespecialisationanddivisionofresponsibilities.Ahumanresourcesmanagermaynowhavetheveryparticular, single task of organising personality tests, for instance. As thepsychological research shows us, our decision making and creativity benefitsfromhearingoutsideperspectivesanddrawingparallelsbetweendifferentareasof interest; ifwemine the sameveindayafterday,wemaybegin topay lessattention to thenuances anddetails.TheGerman language, incidentally, has aword for this: theFachidiot, a one-track specialistwho takes a single-minded,inflexibleapproachtoamultifacetedproblem.Butperhapsthemostpervasive–andpotent–sourceoffunctionalstupidityis

thedemandforcompletecorporateloyaltyandanexcessivefocusonpositivity,

where the very idea of criticism may be seen as a betrayal, and admittingdisappointmentoranxietyisconsideredaweakness.Thisisaparticularbugbearfor Spicer, who told me that relentless optimism is now deeply embedded inmanybusinesscultures,stretchingfromstart-upstohugemultinationals.He described research on entrepreneurs, for instance,who often cling to the

motto that they will ‘fail forward’ or ‘fail early, fail often’. Although thesemottossoundlikeanexampleofthe‘growthmindset’–whichshouldimproveyourchancesofsuccessinthefuture–Spicersaysthatentrepreneursoftenlookto explain their failings with external factors (‘my idea was before its time’)ratherthanconsideringtheerrorsintheirownperformance,andhowitmightbeadaptedinthefuture.Theyaren’treallyconsideringtheirownpersonalgrowth.Thenumbersarehuge:between75and90percentofentrepreneurslosetheir

firstbusinesses–butbystrivingtoremainrelentlesslyupbeatandpositive,theyremainoblivioustotheirmistakes.9 ‘Insteadofgettingbetter–whichthis“failforward” ideawouldsuggest– theyactuallygetworseover time,’Spicersaid.‘Becauseof theseself-servingbiases, they justgoandstartanewventureandmakeexactly thesamemistakesoverandoveragain . . .andtheyactuallyseethisasavirtue.’The same attitude is prevalent among much larger and more established

corporations, where bosses tell their employees to ‘only bring me the goodnews’.Oryoumayattendabrainstormingsession,whereyouaretoldthat‘noideaisabadidea’.Spicerarguesthatthisiscounter-productive;weareactuallymore creative when we take on board a criticism at an early stage of adiscussion.‘You’vetestedtheassumptionsandthenyouareabletoenactuponthem,insteadoftryingtopushtogetherideastocoverupanydifferences.’

I hope you will now understand the intelligence trap well enough to seeimmediatelysomeofthedangersofthismyopicapproach.The lack of curiosity and insight is particularly damaging during times of

uncertainty. Based on his observations in editorial meetings, for instance,Alvesson has argued that overly rigid and unquestioning thinking of this kindpreventednewspapersfromexploringhowfactorsliketheeconomicclimateandrising taxeswere influencing their sales; editorswere so fixatedon examiningspecificheadlinesontheirfrontpagesthattheyforgoteventoconsidertheneedtoexplorebroadernewstrategiesoroutletsfortheirstories.ButNokia’simplosionintheearly2010soffersthemostvividillustrationof

thewaysthatfunctionalstupiditycandriveanoutwardlysuccessfulorganisation

tofailure.Ifyouownedacellphoneintheearly2000s,chancesarethatitwasmadeby

theFinnishcompany.In2007,theyheldaroundhalftheglobalmarketshare.Sixyearslater,however,mostoftheircustomershadturnedawayfromtheclunkyNokiainterfacetomoresophisticatedsmartphones,notablyApple’siPhone.Commentators at the time suggested that Nokia was simply an inferior

companywith less talent and innovation thanApple, that the corporation hadbeen unable to see the iPhone coming, or that they had been complacent,assumingthattheirownproductswouldtrumpanyothers.Butas they investigated thecompany’sdemise, theFinnishandSingaporean

researchersTimoVuoriandQuyHuyfoundthatnoneofthiswastrue.10Nokia’sengineerswere among thebest in theworld, and theywere fully awareof therisks ahead.Even theCEOhimself had admitted, during an interview, that hewas‘paranoidaboutallthecompetition’.Yettheyneverthelessfailedtorisetotheoccasion.OneofthebiggestchallengeswasNokia’soperatingsystem,Symbian,which

was inferior to Apple’s iOS and unsuitable for dealing with sophisticatedtouchscreen apps, but overhauling the existing software would take years ofdevelopment, and the management wanted to be able to present their newproducts quickly, leading them to rush through projects that needed greaterforwardplanning.Unfortunately, employeeswere not allowed to express any doubts about the

way the companywas proceeding. Seniormanagerswould regularly shout ‘atthe tops of their lungs’ if you told them something theydid notwant to hear.Raise a doubt, and you risked losing your job. ‘If you were too negative, itwould be your head on the block,’ one middle manager told the researchers.‘The mindset was that if you criticise what’s being done, then you’re notgenuinelycommittedtoit,’saidanother.As a consequence, employees began to feign expertise rather than admitting

theirignoranceabouttheproblemstheywerefacing,andaccepteddeadlinesthattheyknewwouldbeimpossibletomaintain.Theywouldevenmassagethedatashowingtheirresultssoastogiveabetterimpression.Andwhenthecompanylost employees, it deliberately hired replacements with a ‘can do’ attitude –peoplewhowouldnodalongwithnewdemandsratherthandisagreeingwiththestatusquo.Thecompanyevenignoredadvicefromexternalconsultants,oneofwhom claimed that ‘Nokia has always been the most arrogant company evertowardsmycolleagues.’Theylostanychanceofanoutsideperspective.

Theverymeasures thatweredesigned to focus theemployee’sattentionandencourageamorecreativeoutlookweremakingitharderandharderforNokiatostepuptothecompetition.Asaresult,thecompanyconsistentlyfailedtoupgradeitsoperatingsystemto

asuitablestandard–andthequalityofNokia’sproductsslowlydeteriorated.BythetimethecompanylaunchedtheN8–theirfinalattemptatan‘iPhoneKiller’– in2010,most employeeshad secretly lost faith. It flopped, andafter furtherlossesNokia’smobilephonebusinesswasacquiredbyMicrosoftin2013.

The concept of functional stupidity is inspired by extensive observationalstudies, including an analysis of Nokia’s downfall, rather than psychologicalexperiments, but this kind of corporate behaviour shows clear parallels withpsychologists’workondysrationalia,wisereasoningandcriticalthinking.Youmightremember,forinstance,thatfeelingsofthreattriggertheso-called

‘hot’,self-servingcognitionthatleadsustojustifyourownpositionsratherthanseekingevidencethatchallengesourpointofview–andthisreducesscoresofwise reasoning. (It is the reasonwe arewiserwhen advising a friend about arelationship problem, even if we struggle to see the solution to our owntroubles.)Ledbyitsunyieldingtopmanagement,Nokiaasanorganisationwastherefore

beginning to act like an individual, facedwithuncertain circumstances,whoseego has been threatened. Nokia’s previous successes, meanwhile, may havegivenitasenseof‘earneddogmatism’,meaningthatmanagerswerelessopentosuggestionsfromexpertsoutsidethecompany.Various experiments from social psychology suggest that this is a common

pattern:groupsunderthreattendtobecomemoreconformist,single-mindedandinward looking.More andmoremembers begin to adopt the sameviews, andtheystarttofavoursimplemessagesovercomplex,nuancedideas.Thisisevenevidentatthelevelofentirenations:newspapereditorialswithinacountrytendtobecomemoresimplifiedandrepetitivewhenitfacesinternationalconflict,forinstance.11No organisation can control its external environment: some threats will be

inevitable. But organisations can alter the way they translate those perceiveddangers to employees, by encouraging alternative points of view and activelyseekingdisconfirminginformation.It’snotenoughtoassumethatemployingthesmartestpeoplepossiblewillautomaticallytranslatetobetterperformance;youneedtocreatetheenvironmentthatallowsthemtousetheirskills.

Even the companies that appear to buck these trends may still incorporatesomeelementsofevidence-basedwisdom–althoughitmaynotbeimmediatelyobviousfromtheirexternalreputation.ThemediacompanyNetflix,forinstance,famouslyhasthemottothat‘adequateperformanceearnsagenerousseverance’– a seemingly cut-throat attitude that might promote myopia and short-termgainsoverlong-termresilience.Yet they seem to balance this with othermeasures that are in linewith the

broader psychological research. A widely circulated presentation outliningNetflix’s corporate vision, for example, emphasises many of the elements ofgood reasoning thatwehavediscussed so far, including theneed to recogniseambiguity and uncertainty and to challenge prevailing opinions – exactly thekindofculturethatshouldencouragewisedecisionmaking.12Wecan’t,ofcourse,knowhowNetflixwillfareinthefuture.Butitssuccess

todatewouldsuggestthatyoucanavoidfunctionalstupiditywhilealsorunninganefficient–somewouldsayruthless–operation.

Thedangersoffunctionalstupiditydonotendwiththeseinstancesofcorporatefailure.Besidesimpairingcreativityandproblemsolving,afailuretoencouragereflection and internal feedback can also lead to human tragedy, as NASA’sdisastersshow.‘Often it leads toanumberof smallmistakesbeingmade,or the [company]

focuses on the wrong problems and overlooks a problem where there shouldhave been some sort of post mortem,’ notes Spicer. As a consequence, anorganisation may appear outwardly successful while slowly sliding towardsdisaster.Consider theSpaceShuttleColumbiadisaster in2003,whenfoaminsulation

brokeoffanexternaltankduringlaunchandstrucktheleftwingoftheorbiter.The resulting hole caused the shuttle to disintegrate upon re-entry into theEarth’satmosphere,leadingtothedeathofallsevencrewmembers.The disaster would have been tragic enough had it been a fluke, one-off

occurrencewithoutanypotentialwarningsigns.ButNASAengineershadlongknown the insulation could break away like this; it had happened in everypreviouslaunch.Forvariousreasons,however, thedamagehadneveroccurredintherightplacetocauseacrash,meaningthattheNASAstaffbegantoignorethedangeritposed.‘Itwentfrombeingatroublesomeeventforengineersandmanagerstobeing

classified as a housekeeping matter,’ Catherine Tinsley, a professor of

managementatGeorgetownUniversity inWashingtonDCwhohasspecialisedinstudyingcorporatecatastrophes,toldme.Amazingly, similarprocesseswerealso thecauseof theChallenger crash in

1986, which exploded due to a faulty seal that had deteriorated in the coldFloridawinter.Subsequent reports showed that thesealshadcrackedonmanypreviousmissions,but rather than see thisasawarning, the staffhadcome toassume that itwould alwaysbe safe.AsRichardFeynman– amemberof thePresidential Commission investigating the disaster – noted, ‘when playingRussianroulette,thefactthatthefirstshotgotoffsafelyislittlecomfortforthenext’.13YetNASAdidnotseemtohavelearntfromthoselessons.Tinsleyemphasisesthatthisisn’tacriticismofthoseparticularengineersand

managers. ‘Theseare really smartpeople,workingwithdata,and trying reallyhard to do a good job.’ ButNASA’s errors demonstrate just how easily yourperceptionofriskradicallyshiftswithoutyouevenrecognisingthatachangehasoccurred.Theorganisationwasblindtothepossibilityofdisaster.The reason appears to be a form of cognitive miserliness known as the

outcomebias,whichleadsustofocusontheactualconsequencesofadecisionwithoutevenconsideringthealternativepossibleresults.Likemanyoftheothercognitive flaws that afflict otherwise intelligent people, it’s really a lack ofimagination: we passively accept the most salient detail from an event (whatactuallyhappened)anddon’tstoptothinkaboutwhatmighthavebeen,hadtheinitialcircumstancesbeenslightlydifferent.Tinsley has now performedmany experiments confirming that the outcome

biasisaverycommontendencyamongmanydifferentprofessionals.Onestudyasked business students, NASA employees and space-industry contractors toevaluate the mission controller ‘Chris’, who took charge of an unmannedspacecraft under three different scenarios. In the first, the spacecraft launchesperfectly,justasplanned.Inthesecond,ithasaseriousdesignflaw,butthankstoa turnof luck(itsalignment to thesun) itcanmakeitsreadingseffectively.Andinthethird,thereisnosuchstrokeoffortune,anditcompletelyfails.Unsurprisingly, the complete failure is judgedmost harshly, butmost of the

participantswere happy to ignore the design flaw in the ‘near-miss’ scenario,and instead praised Chris’s leadership skills. Importantly – and in line withTinsley’s theory that theoutcomebiascanexplaindisasters like theColumbiacatastrophe – the perception of future dangers also diminished after theparticipants had read about the nearmiss, explaining how some organisationsmayslowlybecomeimmunetofailure.14

Tinsleyhasnowfoundthatthistendencytooverlookerrorswasthecommonfactor in dozens of other catastrophes. ‘Multiple near-misses preceded andforeshadowed every disaster and business crisis we studied,’ Tinsley’s teamconcludedinanarticlefortheHarvardBusinessReviewin2011.15TakeoneofthecarmanufacturerToyota’sbiggestdisasters.InAugust2009,a

Californian family of four died when the accelerator pedal of their Lexusjammed,leadingthedrivertolosecontrolonthemotorwayandploughintoanembankmentat120milesperhour,wherethecarburstintoflames.Toyotahadtorecallmorethansixmillioncars–adisasterthatcouldhavebeenavoidedifthe company had paid serious attention tomore than two thousand reports ofacceleratormalfunction over the previous decades,which is around five timesthe number of complaints that a car manufacturer might normally expect toreceiveforthisissue.16Tellingly, Toyota had set up a high-level task force in 2005 to deal with

quality control, but the company disbanded the group in early 2009, claimingthatquality ‘waspartof thecompany’sDNAand therefore theydidn’tneedaspecial committee to enforce it’. Seniormanagement also turned a deaf ear tospecific warnings from more junior executives, while focusing on rapidcorporategrowth.17Thiswasapparentlyasymptomofagenerallyinsularwayofoperatingthatdidnotwelcomeoutsideinput,inwhichimportantdecisionsweremadeonlybythoseattheverytopofthehierarchy.LikeNokia’smanagement,it seems they simply didn’t want to hear bad news thatmight sidetrack themfromtheirbroadergoals.Theultimatecost toToyota’sbrandwasgreaterthananyofthesavingsthey

imaginedtheywouldmakebynotheedingthesewarnings.By2010,31percentof Americans believed that Toyota cars were unsafe18 ? a dramatic fall fromgrace for a company that was once renowned for its products’ quality andcustomersatisfaction.Or consider Air France Flight 4590 from Paris to New York City. As it

preparedfortake-offon25July2000,theConcordeairlinerranoversomesharpdebrisleftontherunway,causinga4.5kgchunkoftyretoflyintotheundersideoftheaircraft’swing.Theresultingshockwaverupturedafueltank,leadingittocatch light during take-off. The plane crashed into a nearby hotel, killing 113peopleintotal.Subsequentanalysesrevealed57previousinstancesinwhichtheConcorde tyrehadburston the runway,and inonecase thedamagewasverynearlythesameasforFlight4590–except,throughsheergoodluck,theleakingfuelhadfailedtoignite.Yetthesenearmisseswerenottakenasseriouswarning

signsrequiringurgentaction.19These crises are dramatic case studies in high-risk industries, but Tinsley

argues that the same thinking processes will present latent dangers for manyother organisations. She points to research on workplace safety, for instance,showingthatforeverythousandnearmisses,therewillbeoneseriousinjuryorfatalityandatleasttensmallerinjuries.20Tinsleydoesnot frameherworkasanexampleof ‘functionalstupidity’,but

theoutcomebiasappearstoarisefromthesamelackofreflectionandcuriositythatSpicerandAlvessonhaveoutlined.Andevensmallchangestoacompany’senvironmentcanincreasethechances

thatnearmissesare spotted. Inboth labexperiments anddatagatheredduringrealNASAprojects,Tinsleyhas found that people are farmore likely to noteandreportnearmisseswhensafetyisemphasisedaspartoftheoverallculture,in itsmission statements – sometimeswith asmuch as a five-fold increase inreporting.21Asanexample,consideroneofthosescenariosinvolvingtheNASAmanager

planning the unmanned space mission. Participants told that ‘NASA, whichpushes the frontiers of knowledge, must operate in a high-risk, risk-tolerantenvironment’ were much less likely to notice the near miss. Those told that‘NASA,asahighlyvisibleorganization,mustoperate inahigh-safety, safety-first environment’, in contrast, successfully identified the latent danger. Thesame was also true when the participants were told that they would need tojustifytheirjudgementtotheboard.‘Thenthenearmissalsolooksmorelikethefailurecondition.’Rememberweare talkingaboutunconsciousbiaseshere:noparticipantshad

weigheditupandconsideredthenearmisswasworthignoring;butunlesstheywereprompted,theyjustdidn’treallythinkaboutitatall.Somecompaniesmayexpect that the value of safety is already implicitly understood, but Tinsley’swork demonstrates that it needs to be highly salient. It is telling thatNASA’smottohadbeen‘Faster,Better,Cheaper’formostofthedecadeleadinguptotheColumbiadisaster.Beforewe endour conversation,Tinsley emphasises that some riskswill be

inevitable; thedanger iswhenwearenot evenaware theyexist.She recalls aseminarduringwhichaNASAengineerraisedhishandinfrustration.‘Doyounotwantustotakeanyrisks?’heasked.‘Spacemissionsareinherentlyrisky.’‘Andmyresponsewas that I’mnothere to tellyouwhatyour risk tolerance

should be. I’m here to say that when you experience a near miss, your risk

tolerance will increase and you won’t be aware of it.’ As the fate of theChallengerandColumbiamissionsshows,noorganisationcanaffordthatblindspot.

Inhindsight,itisalltooeasytoseehowDeepwaterHorizonbecameahotbedofirrationality before the spill. By the time of the explosion, it was six weeksbehindschedule,with thedelaycosting$1millionaday,andsomestaffwereunhappywiththepressuretheyweresubjectedto.Inoneemail,writtensixdaysbeforethelaunch,theengineerBrianMorellabelledit‘anightmarewellthathaseveryoneallovertheplace’.Theseareexactly thehigh-pressureconditions thatarenowknowntoreduce

reflection and analytical thinking. The result was a collective blind spot thatpreventedmanyofDeepwaterHorizon’semployees (fromBPand itspartners,HalliburtonandTransocean) fromseeing thedisaster looming,andcontributedtoaseriesofstrikingerrors.To try to reduce the accumulating costs, for instance, they chose to use a

cheapermixofcement to secure thewell,without investigating thepossibilitythatitmaynothavebeenstableenoughforthejobathand.Theyalsoreducedthetotalvolumeofcementused–violatingtheirownguidelines–andscrimpedonthenecessaryequipmentrequiredtoholdthewellinplace.Onthedayoftheaccidentitself,theteamavoidedcompletingthefullsuiteof

tests to ensure the sealwas secure,while also ignoring anomalous results thatmighthavepredictedthebuild-upofpressureinsidethewell.22Worsestill, theequipmentnecessarytocontaintheblowout,onceitoccurred,wasinill-repair.Each of these risk factors could have been identified long before disaster

struck;aswehaveseen,thereweremanyminorblowoutsthatshouldhavebeensignificant warnings of the underlying dangers, leading to new and updatedsafetyprocedures.Thanks to luckycircumstances,however–even the randomdirection of the wind – none had been fatal, and so the underlying factors,including severe corner-cutting and inadequate safety training, had not beenexamined.23Andthemoretheyplayedwithfate,themoretheywerelulledintoafalsesenseofcomplacencyandbecamelessconcernedaboutcuttingcorners.24Itwasa classic caseof theoutcomebias thatTinsleyhasdocumented–and theerrorseemedtohavebeenprevalentacrossthewholeoftheoilindustry.Eight months previously, another oil and gas company, PTT, had even

witnessedablowoutandspillintheTimorSea,offAustralia.Halliburton,whichhadalsoworkedontheMacondowell,wasthecompanybehindthecementjob

there, too,andalthoughasubsequentreporthadclaimedthatHalliburton itselfheldlittleresponsibility,itmighthavestillbeentakenasavividreminderofthedangers involved. A lack of communication between operators and experts,however, meant the lessons were largely ignored by the Deepwater Horizonteam.25Inthisway,wecanseethatthedisasterwasn’tdowntothebehaviourofany

one employee, but to an endemic lack of reflection, engagement and criticalthinkingthatmeantdecisionmakersacrosstheprojecthadfailedtoconsiderthetrueconsequencesoftheiractions.‘It is the underlying “unconscious mind” that governs the actions of an

organizationand itspersonnel’, a report from theCenter forCatastrophicRiskManagement (CCRM) at the University of California, Berkeley, concluded.26‘These failures . . . appear to be deeply rooted in a multi-decade history oforganizational malfunction and short-sightedness.’ In particular, themanagement had become so obsessedwith pursuing further success, they hadforgotten their own fallibilities and the vulnerabilities of the technology theywereusing.Theyhad‘forgottentobeafraid’.Or asKarlene Roberts, the director of the CCRM, toldme in an interview,

‘Often, when organisations look for the errors that caused somethingcatastrophictohappen,theylookforsomeonetoname,blameandthentrainorgetridof...Butit’srarelywhathappenedonthespotthatcausedtheaccident.It’softenwhathappenedyearsbefore.’If this‘unconsciousmind’representsanorganisational intelligencetrap,how

cananinstitutionwakeuptolatentrisks?In addition to studying disasters, Roberts’ team has also examined the

common structures and behaviours of ‘high-reliability organisations’ such asnuclearpowerplants,aircraftcarriers,andairtrafficcontrolsystemsthatoperatewith enormous uncertainty and potential for hazard, yet somehow achieveextremelylowfailurerates.Much like the theories of functional stupidity, their findings emphasise the

need for reflection, questioning, and the consideration of long-termconsequences–including,forexample,policiesthatgiveemployeesthe‘licencetothink’.Refining these findings to a set of core characteristics, Karl Weick and

Kathleen Sutcliffe have shown that high-reliability organisations alldemonstrate:27

Preoccupationwithfailure:Theorganisationcomplacentwithsuccess,andworkersassume‘eachdaywillbeabadday’.Theorganisationrewardsemployeesforself-reportingerrors.

Reluctancetosimplifyinterpretations:Employeesarerewardedforquestioningassumptionsandforbeingscepticalofreceivedwisdom.AtDeepwaterHorizon,forinstance,moreengineersandmanagersmayhaveraisedconcernsaboutthepoorqualityofthecementandaskedforfurthertests.

Sensitivitytooperations:Teammemberscontinuetocommunicateandinteract,toupdatetheirunderstandingofthesituationathandandsearchfortherootcausesofanomalies.OnDeepwaterHorizon,therigstaffshouldhavebeenmorecuriousabouttheanomalouspressuretests,ratherthanacceptingthefirstexplanation.

Commitmenttoresilience:Buildingthenecessaryknowledgeandresourcestobouncebackaftererroroccurs,includingregular‘pre-mortems’andregulardiscussionsofnearmisses.LongbeforetheDeepwaterHorizonexplosion,BPmighthaveexaminedtheunderlyingorganisationalfactorsleadingtoprevious,lessseriousaccidents,andensuredallteammemberswereadequatelypreparedtodealwithablowout.

Deferencetoexpertise:Thisrelatestotheimportanceofcommunicationbetweenranksofthehierarchy,andtheintellectualhumilityofthoseatthetop.Executivesneedtotrustthepeopleontheground.ToyotaandNASA,forinstance,bothfailedtoheedtheconcernsofengineers;similarly,aftertheDeepwaterHorizonexplosion,themediareportedthatworkersatBPhadbeenscaredofraisingconcernsincasetheywouldbefired.28

The commitment to resilience may be evident in small gestures that allowworkers to know that their commitment to safety is valued. On one aircraftcarrier,theUSSCarlVinson,acrewmemberreportedthathehadlostatoolondeckthatcouldhavebeensuckedintoajetengine.Allaircraftwereredirectedtoland– at significant cost –but rather thanpunishing the teammember forhiscarelessness,hewascommendedforhishonestyinaformalceremonythenextday.Themessagewasclear–errorswouldbe tolerated if theywere reported,meaning that the team as a whole were less likely to overlookmuch smallermistakes.The US Navy, meanwhile, has employed the SUBSAFE system to reduce

accidents on its nuclear submarines. The system was first implementedfollowing the loss of theUSSThresher in 1963,which floodeddue to a poorjoint in itspumpingsystem,resulting in thedeathsof112Navypersonneland17 civilians.29 SUBSAFE specifically instructs officers to experience ‘chronicuneasiness’,summarisedinthesaying‘trust,butverify’,andinmorethanfivedecadessince,theyhaven’tlostasinglesubmarineusingthesystem.30Inspired by Ellen Langer’s work, Weick refers to these combined

characteristics as ‘collectivemindfulness’.The underlying principle is that the

organisation should implement any measures that encourage its employees toremainattentive,proactive,opentonewideas,questioningofeverypossibility,and devoted to discovering and learning from mistakes, rather than simplyrepeatingthesamebehavioursoverandover.There is good evidence that adopting this framework can result in dramatic

improvements. Some of the most notable successes of applying collectivemindfulnesshavecome fromhealthcare. (We’vealready seenhowdoctors arechanging how individuals think – but this specifically concerns the overallculture and group reasoning.) The available measures involve empoweringjunior staff to question assumptions and to be more critical of the evidencepresentedtothem,andencouragingseniorstafftoactivelyengagetheopinionsofthosebeneaththemsothateveryoneisaccountabletoeveryoneelse.Thestaffalsohaveregular‘safetyhuddles’,proactivelyreporterrorsandperformdetailed‘root-cause analyses’ to examine the underlying processes that may havecontributedtoanymistakeornearmiss.Using such techniques, one Canadian hospital, St Joseph’s Healthcare in

London,Ontario,has reducedmedicationerrors (thewrongdrugsgiven to thewrongperson)tojusttwomistakesinmorethan800,000medicationsdispensedin the second quarter of 2016. The Golden Valley Memorial in Missouri,meanwhile,hasreduceddrug-resistantStaphylococcusaureusinfectionstozerousing the same principles, and patient falls – a serious cause of unnecessaryinjuryinhospitals–havedroppedby41percent.31Despite the additional responsibilities, staff in mindful organisations often

thriveontheextraworkload,withalowerturnoverratethaninstitutionsthatdonot impose thesemeasures.32Contrary to expectations, it ismore rewarding tofeel like you are fully engaging your mind for the greater good, rather thansimplygoingthroughthemotions.

In these ways, the research on functional stupidity and mindful organisationsperfectlycomplementeachother, revealing theways thatourenvironmentcaneither involve the group brain in reflection and deep thinking, or dangerouslynarrow its focus so that it loses the benefits of its combined intelligence andexpertise. They offer us a framework to understand the intelligence trap andevidence-basedwisdomonagrandscale.Beyond these general principles, the research also reveals specific practical

stepsforanyorganisationhopingtoreduceerror.Giventhatourbiasesareoftenamplified by feelings of time pressure, Tinsley suggests that organisations

should encourage employees to examine their actions and ask: ‘If I hadmoretime and resources,would Imake the same decisions?’ She also believes thatpeopleworkingonhigh-stakesprojectsshouldtakeregularbreaksto‘pauseandlearn’,wheretheymayspecificallylookfornearmissesandexaminethefactorsunderlyingthem–astrategy,shesays,thatNASAhasnowapplied.Theyshouldinstitutenear-missreportingsystems;‘and ifyoudon’t reportanearmiss,youarethenheldaccountable’.Spicer, meanwhile, proposes adding regular reflective routines to team

meetings, including pre-mortems and post-mortems, and appointing a devil’sadvocatewhose role is to questiondecisions and look for flaws in their logic.‘There’slotsofsocialpsychologythatsaysitleadstoslightlydissatisfiedpeoplebut better-quality decisions.’ He also recommends taking advantage of theoutside perspective, by either inviting secondments from other companies, orencouraging staff to shadow employees from other organisations and otherindustries,astrategythatcanhelppuncturethebiasblindspot.Theaimistodowhateveryoucantoembracethat‘chronicuneasiness’–the

sensethattheremightalwaysbeabetterwayofdoingthings.Looking to research fromfurther afield,organisationsmayalsobenefit from

testssuchasKeithStanovich’srationalityquotient,whichwouldallowthemtoscreenemployeesworkingonhigh-riskprojectsand tocheckwhether theyaremoreorlesssusceptibletobias,andiftheyareinneedoffurthertraining.Theymight also think of establishing critical thinking programmes within thecompany.They may also analyse the mindset embedded in its culture: whether it

encouragesthegrowthoftalentorleadsemployeestobelievethattheirabilitiesare set in stone.CarolDweck’s teamof researchers askedemployees at sevenFortune 1000 companies to rate their level of agreement with a series ofstatements,suchas:‘Whenitcomestobeingsuccessful,thiscompanyseemstobelieve that people have a certain amount of talent, and they really can’t domuch to change it’ (reflecting a collective fixed mindset) or ‘This companygenuinely values the development and growth of its employees’ (reflecting acollectivegrowthmindset).Asyoumighthope,companiescultivatingacollectivegrowthmindsetenjoyed

greaterinnovationandproductivity,morecollaborationwithinteamsandhigheremployee commitment. Importantly, employees were also less likely to cutcorners, or cheat to get ahead. They knew their development would beencouraged and were therefore less likely to cover up for their perceived

failings.33During their corporate training, organisations could also make use of

productive struggle and desirable difficulties to ensure that their employeesprocess the information more deeply. As we saw in Chapter 8, this not onlymeans that the material is recalled more readily; it also increases overallengagementwith theunderlyingconceptsandmeans that the lessonsaremorereadilytransferabletonewsituations.Ultimately, thesecretsofwisedecisionmaking for theorganisationarevery

similar to the secrets of wise decision making for the intelligent individual.Whether you are a forensic scientist, doctor, student, teacher, financier oraeronauticalengineer,itpaystohumblyrecogniseyourlimitsandthepossibilityoffailure,takeaccountofambiguityanduncertainty,remaincuriousandopentonew information, recognise the potential to grow from errors, and activelyquestioneverything.

In the Presidential Commission’s damning report on the Deepwater Horizonexplosion, one particular recommendation catches the attention, inspired by arevolutionarychangeinUSnuclearpowerplantsasamodelforhowanindustrymaydealwithriskmoremindfully.34Asyoumighthave come to expect, the triggerwas a real crisis. (‘Everyone

waitstobepunishedbeforetheyact,’Robertssaid.)Inthiscaseitwasthepartialmeltdown of a radioactive core in the Three Mile Island Nuclear GeneratingStation in 1979. The disaster led to the foundation of a new regulator, theInstituteofNuclearPowerOperations(INPO),whichincorporatesanumberofimportantcharacteristics.Eachgenerator isvisitedbya teamof inspectorsevery twoyears, eachvisit

lastingfivetosixweeks.Althoughone-thirdofINPO’sinspectorsarepermanentstaff, themajority are seconded from other power plants, leading to a greatersharingofknowledgebetweenorganisations,andtheregularinputofanoutsideperspectiveineachcompany.INPOalsoactivelyfacilitatesdiscussionsbetweenlower-levelemployeesandseniormanagementwithregularreviewgroups.Thisensures that the fine details and challenges of day-to-day operations areacknowledgedandunderstoodateverylevelofthehierarchy.Toincreaseaccountability, theresultsof the inspectionsareannouncedatan

annualdinner–meaningthat‘Yougetthewholetopleveloftheutilityindustryfocusedonthepoorperformer’,accordingtooneCEOquotedinthePresidentialCommission’sreport.Often,CEOsintheroomwilloffertoloantheirexpertise

to bring other generators up to scratch. The result is that every company isconstantlylearningfromeachother’smistakes.SinceINPObeganoperating,USgeneratorshaveseenatenfoldreductioninthenumberofworkeraccidents.35Youneednotbeafanofnuclearpowertoseehowthesestructuresmaximise

thecollectiveintelligenceofemployeesacrosstheindustryandgreatlyincreaseeach individual’s awareness of potential risks, while reducing the build-up ofthose small, unacknowledged errors that can lead to catastrophe. INPO showsthe way that regulatory bodies can help mindful cultures to spread acrossorganisations, uniting thousands of employees in their reflection and criticalthinking.Theoilindustryhasnot(yet)implementedacomparablyintricatesystem,but

energy companies have banded together to revise industry standards, improveworkertrainingandeducation,andupgradetheirtechnologytobettercontainaspill, should it occur. BP has also funded a huge research programme to dealwith the environmental devastation in theGulf ofMexico.Some lessons havebeenlearnt–butatwhatcost?36

The intelligence trap often emerges from an inability to think beyond ourexpectations–toimagineanalternativevisionoftheworld,whereourdecisioniswrongrather thanright.Thismusthavebeen thecaseon20April2010;noone can possibly have considered the true scale of the catastrophe they werelettingloose.Overthesubsequentmonths,theoilslickwouldcovermorethan112,000km2

oftheocean’ssurface–anareathatisroughly85percentthesizeofEngland.37According to the Center for Biological Diversity, the disaster killed at least80,000 birds, 6,000 sea turtles and 26,000 marine mammals – an ecosystemdestroyedbypreventableerrors.Fiveyearslater,babydolphinswerestillbeingbornwithunder-developedlungs,duetothetoxiceffectsoftheoil leakedintothe water and the poor health of their parents. Only 20 per cent of dolphinpregnanciesresultedinalivebirth.38That’snottomentiontheenormoushumancost.Besidestheelevenliveslost

ontherigitselfandtheunimaginabletraumainflictedonthosewhoescaped,thespill devastated the livelihoodsof fishing communities in theGulf.Twoyearsafterthespill,DarlaRooks,alifelongfisherpersonfromPortSulfur,Louisiana,described finding crabs ‘with holes in their shells, shells with all the pointsburnedoffsoallthespikesontheirshellsandclawsaregone,misshapenshells,andcrabsthataredyingfromwithin...theyarestillalive,butyouopenthem

upandtheysmelllikethey’vebeendeadforaweek’.The level of depression in the area rose by 25 per cent over the following

months, andmany communities struggled to recover from their losses. ‘Thinkabout losing everything that makes you happy, because that is exactly whathappenswhen someone spills oil and sprays dispersants on it,’Rooks toldAlJazeerain2012.39‘Peoplewholivehereknowbetterthantoswiminoreatwhatcomesoutofourwaters.’This disaster was entirely preventable – if only BP and its partners had

recognisedthefallibilityofthehumanbrainanditscapacityforerror.Nooneisimmune,andthedarkstainintheGulfofMexicoshouldbeaconstantreminderofthetrulycatastrophicpotentialoftheintelligencetrap.

Epilogue

WebeganthisjourneywiththestoryofKaryMullis–thebrilliantchemistwhohas dabbled in astrology and astral projection, and even defended AIDSdenialism.Itshouldnowbeclearhowfactorssuchasmotivatedreasoningcouldhaveledhimtoignoreeverywarningsign.ButIhopeithasbecomeclearthatTheIntelligenceTrapissomuchmorethan

thestoryofanyindividual’smistakes.Thetrapisaphenomenonthatconcernsusall,giventhekindsofthinkingthatwe,asasociety,havecometoappreciate,andtheoneswehaveneglected.Interviewing somany brilliant scientists for this book, I came to notice that

eachexpertseemed,insomeway,toembodythekindofintelligenceorthinkingthatthey’vebeenstudying.DavidPerkinswasunusuallythoughtful,frequentlypausing our conversation to reflect before we continued; Robert Sternberg,meanwhile, was tremendously pragmatic in conveying his message; IgorGrossmannwasextremelyhumbleandtookextracaretoemphasisethelimitsofhisknowledge;andSusanEngelwasanimatedwithendlesscuriosity.Perhaps theywere attracted to their fieldbecause theywanted tounderstand

their own thinkingbetter; or perhaps their own thinking came to resemble thesubject of their study. Either way, to me it was one more illustration of theenormousrangeofpotentialthinkingstylesavailabletous,andthebenefitstheybring.James Flynn describes the rise in IQ over the twentieth century as our

‘cognitive history’; it shows the ways our minds have been moulded by thesocietyaroundus.Butitstrikesmethatifeachofthesescientistshadbeenableto present and promote their work in the early nineteenth century, before theconceptofgeneralintelligencecametodeterminethekindofthinkingthatwasconsidered‘smart’,ourcognitivehistorymighthavebeenverydifferent.Asitis,theabstractreasoningmeasuredbyIQtests,SATsandGREsstilldominatesourunderstandingofwhatconstitutesintelligence.Wedon’t need to deny the value of those skills, or abandon the learning of

factual knowledge and expertise, to accept that other ways of reasoning andlearningareequallydeservingofourattention.Indeed,ifIhavelearntanythingfromthisresearch,itisthatcultivatingtheseothertraitsoftenenhancestheskillsmeasured by standard tests of cognitive ability, as well as making us moreroundedandwiserthinkers.

Study after study has shown that encouraging people to define their ownproblems,exploredifferentperspectives,imaginealternativeoutcomestoevents,and identifyerroneousargumentscanboost theiroverallcapacity to learnnewmaterialwhilealsoencouragingawiserwayofreasoning.1I found it particularly encouraging that learning with these methods often

benefits people across the intelligence spectrum. They can reduce motivatedreasoningamongthehighly intelligent, for instance,but theycanalso improvethe general learning of people with lower intelligence. One study by BradleyOwensattheStateUniversityofNewYorkinBuffalo,forinstance,foundthatintellectual humility predicted academic achievement better than an IQ test.Everyonewithhigherintellectualhumilityperformedbetter,but–crucially–itwasofmostbenefitforthosewithlowerintelligence,completelycompensatingfor their lower ‘natural’ ability.2Theprinciplesof evidence-basedwisdomcanhelpanyonetomaximisetheirpotential.

Thisnewunderstandingofhumanthinkingandreasoningcouldnothavecomeatamoreimportanttime.AsRobertSternbergwrotein2018:‘ThesteepriseinIQhasboughtus,asa

society,much less thananyonehadany right tohope for.Peopleareprobablybetter at figuringout complex cell phones andother technological innovationsthantheywouldhavebeenattheturnofthetwentiethcentury.Butintermsofourbehaviourasasociety,areyouimpressedwithwhat30pointshasbroughtus?’3Although we have made some strides in areas such as technology and

healthcare,wearenoclosertosolvingpressingissuessuchasclimatechangeorsocialinequality–andtheincreasinglydogmaticviewsthatoftencomewiththeintelligencetraponlystandinthewayofthenegotiationsbetweenpeoplewithdifferentpositionsthatmightleadtoasolution.TheWorldEconomicForumhaslisted increasing political polarisation and the spread of misinformation in‘digitalwildfires’4astwoofthegreatestthreatsfacingustoday–comparabletoterrorismandcyberwarfare.Thetwenty-firstcenturypresentscomplexproblemsthatrequireawiserway

ofreasoning,onethatrecognisesourcurrentlimitations,toleratesambiguityanduncertainty, balances multiple perspectives, and bridges diverse areas ofexpertise.Anditisbecomingincreasinglyclearthatweneedmorepeoplewhoembodythosequalities.Thismaysoundlikewishfulthinking,butrememberthatAmericanpresidents

whoscoredhigheronscalesofopen-mindednessandperspectivetakingwerefarmore likely to find peaceful solutions to conflict. It’s not unreasonable to askwhether,giventhisresearch,weshouldbeactivelydemandingthosequalitiesinourleaders,inadditiontomoreobviousmeasuresofacademicachievementandprofessionalsuccess.

Ifyouwanttoapplythisresearchyourself, thefirststepis toacknowledgetheproblem.Wehavenowseenhowintellectualhumilitycanhelpussee throughour bias blind spot, formmore rational opinions, avoid misinformation, learnmoreeffectively,andworkmoreproductivelywiththepeoplearoundus.Asthephilosopher Valerie Tiberius, who is now working with psychologists at theChicagoCenterforPracticalWisdom,pointsout,weoftenspendhugeamountsoftimetryingtoboostourself-esteemandconfidence.‘ButIthinkthatifmorepeoplehadsomehumilityaboutwhattheyknowanddon’tknow,thatwouldgoatremendousdistancetoimprovinglifeforeveryone.’Tothisend,Ihaveincludedashort‘taxonomy’ofdefinitionsintheappendix,

outliningthemostcommonerrorsattheheartoftheintelligencetrapandsomeofthebestwaystodealwiththem.Sometimes,justbeingabletoputalabelonyour thinkingopens thedoor toamore insightfulframeofmind.Ihavefoundthat it can be an exhilarating experience to question your own intelligence intheseways, as you rejectmanyof the assumptionsyouhave always taken forgranted. It allows you to revive the childlike joy of discovery that droveeveryonefromBenjaminFranklintoRichardFeynman.It iseasy,asadults, toassumethatwehavereachedour intellectualpeakby

the timewe finishoureducation; indeed,weareoften told toexpect amentaldeclinesoonafter.Buttheworkonevidence-basedwisdomshowsthatwecanall learn new ways of thinking. Whatever our age and expertise, whether aNASAscientistoraschoolstudent,wecanallbenefitfromwieldingourmindswithinsight,precisionandhumility.5

Appendix:TaxonomiesofStupidityandWisdomATaxonomyofStupidityBiasblindspot:Ourtendencytoseeothers’flaws,whilebeingoblivioustotheprejudicesanderrorsinour

ownreasoning.

Cognitive miserliness:A tendency to base our decision making on intuitionratherthananalysis.Contaminatedmindware:Anerroneousbaselineknowledgethatmaythenleadto further irrational behaviour. Someone who has been brought up to distrustscientificevidencemaythenbemoresusceptibletoquackmedicinesandbeliefsintheparanormal,forinstance.Dysrationalia:Themismatchbetweenintelligenceandrationality,asseeninthelifestoryofArthurConanDoyle.Thismaybecausedbycognitivemiserlinessorcontaminatedmindware.Earneddogmatism:Ourself-perceptionsofexpertisemeanwehavegainedtherighttobeclosed-mindedandtoignoreotherpointsofview.Entrenchment:Theprocessbywhichanexpert’sideasbecomerigidandfixed.Fachidiot:Professionalidiot.AGermantermtodescribeaone-trackspecialistwhoisanexpert in theirfieldbut takesablinkeredapproachtoamultifacetedproblem.Fixedmindset:Thebelief that intelligence and talent are innate, and exertingeffort is a sign ofweakness.Besides limiting our ability to learn, this attitudealsoseemstomakeusgenerallymoreclosed-mindedandintellectuallyarrogant.Functional stupidity: A general reluctance to self-reflect, question ourassumptions, and reason about the consequences of our actions.Although this

may increaseproductivity in the short term (making it ‘functional’), it reducescreativityandcriticalthinkinginthelongterm.‘Hot’cognition:Reactive,emotionallychargedthinkingthatmaygivefullreintoourbiases.PotentiallyonesourceofSolomon’sparadox(seebelow).Meta-forgetfulness:Aformof intellectualarrogance.Wefail tokeeptrackofhow much we know and how much we have forgotten; we assume that ourcurrentknowledgeisthesameasourpeakknowledge.Thisiscommonamonguniversitygraduates;yearsdowntheline,theybelievethattheyunderstandtheissuesaswellastheydidwhentheytooktheirfinalexams.Mindlessness:A lack of attention and insight into our actions and the worldaroundus.Itisaparticularissueinthewaychildrenareeducated.Mosesillusion:Afailuretospotcontradictionsinatext,duetoitsfluencyandfamiliarity.Forexample,whenansweringthequestion,‘HowmanyanimalsofeachkinddidMoses takeon theArk?’,mostpeopleanswer two.Thiskindofdistractionisacommontacticforpurveyorsofmisinformationandfakenews.Motivatedreasoning:Theunconscioustendencytoapplyourbrainpoweronlywhen the conclusions will suit our predetermined goal. It may include theconfirmation or myside bias (preferentially seeking and rememberinginformation that suits our goal) and discomfirmation bias (the tendency to beespecially sceptical about evidence that does not fit our goal). In politics, forinstance,wearefarmorelikelytocritiqueevidenceconcerninganissuesuchasclimatechangeifitdoesnotfitwithourexistingworldview.Peterprinciple:Wearepromotedbasedonouraptitudeatourcurrentjob–notonourpotentialtofillthenextrole.Thismeansthatmanagersinevitably‘risetotheir level of incompetence’. Lacking the practical intelligence necessary tomanage teams, they subsequently underperform. (Named after managementtheorist Laurence Peter.) Pseudo-profound bullshit: Seemingly impressiveassertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuousunder further consideration. Like the Moses illusion, we may accept theirmessageduetoagenerallackofreflection.

Solomon’sparadox:NamedaftertheancientIsraeliteking,Solomon’sparadoxdescribes our inability to reason wisely about our own lives, even if wedemonstrategoodjudgementwhenfacedwithotherpeople’sproblems.Strategicignorance:Deliberatelyavoidingthechancetolearnnewinformationtoavoiddiscomfortandtoincreaseourproductivity.Atwork,forinstance,itcanbebeneficialnottoquestionthelong-termconsequencesofyouractions,ifthatknowledgewill interferewiththechancesofpromotion.Thesechoicesmaybeunconscious.The too-much-talent effect: The unexpected failure of teams once theirproportion of ‘star’ players reaches a certain threshold. See, for instance, theEnglandfootballteamintheEuro2016tournament.

ATaxonomyofWisdomActivelyopen-mindedthinking:Thedeliberatepursuitofalternativeviewpointsandevidencethatmayquestionouropinions.

Cognitive inoculation:A strategy to reduce biased reasoning by deliberatelyexposingourselvestoexamplesofflawedarguments.Collective intelligence:A team’s ability to reason as one unit.Although it isverylooselyconnectedtoIQ,factorssuchasthesocialsensitivityoftheteam’smembersseemtobefarmoreimportant.Desirabledifficulties:Apowerfulconceptineducation:weactuallylearnbetterifourinitialunderstandingismadeharder,noteasier.SeealsoGrowthmindset.Emotional compass: A combination of interoception (sensitivity to bodilysignals), emotion differentiation (the capacity to label your feelings in precisedetail) and emotion regulation that together help us to avoid cognitive andaffectivebiases.Epistemic accuracy: Someone is epistemically accurate if their beliefs aresupportedbyreasonandfactualevidence.Epistemic curiosity:An inquisitive, interested, questioning attitude; a hungerfor information. Not only does curiosity improve learning; the latest research

showsthatitalsoprotectsusfrommotivatedreasoningandbias.Foreign language effect: The surprising tendency to become more rationalwhenspeakingasecondlanguage.Growthmindset:Thebeliefthattalentscanbedevelopedandtrained.Althoughthe early scientific research on mindset focused on its role in academicachievement, it isbecoming increasinglyclear that itmaydrivewiserdecisionmaking,bycontributingtotraitssuchasintellectualhumility.Intellectualhumility:Thecapacitytoacceptthelimitsofourjudgementandtotrytocompensateforourfallibility.Scientificresearchhasrevealedthatthisisacritical, but neglected, characteristic that determines much of our decisionmakingandlearning,andwhichmaybeparticularlycrucialforteamleaders.Mindfulness: The opposite of mindlessness. Although this can includemeditative practice, it refers to a generally reflective and engaged state thatavoidsreactive,overlyemotionalresponsestoeventsandallowsustonoteandconsider our intuitions more objectively. The term may also refer to anorganisation’sriskmanagementstrategy(seeChapter10).Moralalgebra:BenjaminFranklin’sstrategytoweighuptheprosandconsofan argument, often over several days. By taking this slow and systematicapproach,youmayavoid issuessuchas theavailabilitybias–our tendency tobasejudgementsonthefirst informationthatcomestomind–allowingyoutocometoawiserlong-termsolutiontoyourproblem.Pre-mortem: Deliberately considering the worst-case scenario, and all thefactors thatmayhavecontributedtowards it,beforemakingadecision.This isoneofthemostwell-established‘de-biasing’strategies.Reflective competence:The final stage of expertise,whenwe can pause andanalyseourgutfeelings,basingourdecisionsonbothintuitionandanalysis.SeealsoMindfulness.Socrateseffect:Aformofperspectivetaking,inwhichweimagineexplainingourproblemtoayoungchild.Thestrategyappearstoreduce‘hot’cognitionand

reducebiasesandmotivatedreasoning.Toleranceofambiguity:Atendencytoembraceuncertaintyandnuance,ratherthanseekingimmediateclosureontheissueathand.

Notes

Chapter11ThesequotescanallbefoundinMullis’sautobiography:Mullis,K.(1999),DancingNakedintheMindField,London:Bloomsbury.Healsoexpressesthemonhiswebsite:https://www.karymullis.com/pdf/On_AIDS_and_Global_Warming.pdf.Theyarefrequentlyquotedonwebpagesandforumsdiscussingastrology,climatechangeandHIV/AIDSconspiracytheories.Forinstance,heisquotedonthewebsiteoftheprominentAIDSdenialist,PeterDuesberg:http://www.duesberg.com/viewpoints/kintro.html.AndnumerousvideointerviewsofhimdescribingAIDSconspiracytheoriescanbeseenonYouTube:e.g.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IifgAvXU3ts&t=7sandhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rycOLjoPbeo.

2Graber,M.L.(2013),‘TheIncidenceofDiagnosticErrorinMedicine’,BMJQualityandSafety,22(Suppl.2),21?7.

3It’sworthnotingthatEdwarddeBonohasdescribedan‘intelligencetrap’inhisbooksonlearning.Similarly,theHarvardUniversitypsychologistDavidPerkinsrefers,inpassing,to‘intelligencetraps’inhisbookOutsmartingIQ(Simon&Schuster,1995).Perkins’ideas,inparticular,haveinformedsomeelementsofmyargument,andIwouldthoroughlyrecommendreadinghiswork.

4AccordingtotheclassicistChristopherRowe,thesedetailsofSocrates’appearanceandlifearebroadlyconsistentacrossmultiplesources.AllofthequotationshavealsobeentakenfromRowe’stranslationofPlato’sApologycontainedinthisvolume:Rowe,C.(2010),TheLastDaysofSocrates,London:Penguin(KindleEdition).TheparallelsbetweenSocrates’trialandtheresearchonthebiasblindspotmaynotbetheonlyinstanceinwhichGreekphilosophypre-emptedbehaviouraleconomicsandpsychology.InanarticlefortheonlinemagazineAeon,thejournalistNickRomeofindsexamplesofframing,confirmationbiasandanchoringinPlato’steaching.SeeRomeo,N.(2017),‘PlatonicallyIrrational’,Aeon,https://aeon.co/essays/what-plato-knew-about-behavioural-economics-a-lot.

5Descartes,R.(1637),ADiscourseontheMethod,trans.Maclean,I.(2006),Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,p.5.

6Shurkin,J.(1992),Terman’sKids:TheGroundbreakingStudyofHowtheGiftedGrowUp,Boston,MA:Little,Brown,p.122.

7Shurkin,Terman’sKids,pp.51?3.8Shurkin,Terman’sKids,pp.109?16.9Shurkin,Terman’sKids,pp.54?8.10Terman,L.M.(1922),‘WereWeBornThatWay?’World’sWork,44,657?9.QuotedinWhite,J.

(2006),Intelligence,DestinyandEducation:TheIdeologicalRootsofIntelligenceTesting,London:Routledge,p.24.

11Terman,L.M.(1930),‘TrailstoPsychology’,inMurchison,C.(ed.),HistoryofPsychologyinAutobiography,Vol.2,p.297.

12Terman,‘TrailstoPsychology’,p.303.13Nicolas,S.,etal.(2013),‘SickOrSlow?OntheOriginsofIntelligenceasaPsychologicalObject’,

Intelligence,41(5),699?711.14FormoreinformationonBinet’sviews,seeWhite,S.H.(2000),‘ConceptualFoundationsofIQ

Testing’,Psychology,PublicPolicy,andLaw,6,33?43.15Binet,A.(1909),Lesidéesmodernessurlesenfants,Paris:Flammarion.16Perkins,D.(1995),OutsmartingIQ:TheEmergingScienceofLearnableIntelligence,NewYork:Free

Press,p.44.17Terman,L.M.(1916),TheMeasurementofIntelligence:AnExplanationofandaCompleteGuidefor

theUseoftheStanfordRevisionandExtensionoftheBinet-SimonIntelligenceScale,Boston,MA:HoughtonMifflin,p.46.

18Terman,TheMeasurementofIntelligence,p.6.19Terman,TheMeasurementofIntelligence,p.11.20Shurkin,Terman’sKids.21Shurkin,Terman’sKids,pp.196?292.22Honan,W.(9March2002),‘ShelleyMydans,86,authorandformerPOW’,NewYorkTimes.23McGraw,C.(29December1988),‘Creatorof‘‘Lucy’’TVshowdies’,LosAngelesTimes.24Oppenheimer,J.andOppenheimer,G.(1996),Laughs,Luck?andLucy:HowICametoCreatethe

MostPopularSitcomofAllTime.Syracuse,NY:SyracuseUniversityPress,p.100.25Terman,‘TrailstoPsychology,p297.26InChina,forinstance,mostschoolsmaintainrecordsofeachchild’sperformanceonnon-verbal

reasoningtests.SeeHiggins,L.T.andXiang,G.(2009),‘TheDevelopmentandUseofIntelligenceTestsinChina’,PsychologyandDevelopingSocieties,21(2),257–75.

27Madhok,D.(10September2012),‘CramSchoolsBoomWidensIndiaClassDivide’,Reuters,https://in.reuters.com/article/india-cramschools-kota/cramschools-boom-widens-indias-class-divide-idINDEE8890GW20120910.

28Ritchie,S.J.,etal.(2015),‘BeyondaBiggerBrain:MultivariableStructuralBrainImagingandIntelligence’,Intelligence,51,47?56.

29Gregory,M.D.,Kippenhan,J.S.,Dickinson,D.,Carrasco,J.,Mattay,V.S.,Weinberger,D.R.andBerman,K.F.(2016),‘RegionalVariationsinBrainGyrificationareAssociatedwithGeneralCognitiveAbilityinHumans,CurrentBiology,26(10),1301?5.

30Li,Y.,Liu,Y.,Li,J.,Qin,W.,Li,K.,Yu,C.andJiang,T.(2009),‘BrainAnatomicalNetworkandIntelligence’,PLoSComputationalBiology,5(5),e1000395.

31Forfurtherdiscussionofthis,seeKaufman,S.(2013),‘Ungifted:IntelligenceRedefined,NewYork:BasicBooks(KindleEdition).See,inparticular,hisreviewoftheresearchbythePosseFoundation(pp.286?8),whoselecteduniversitystudentsbasedonawidevarietyofmeasuresbesidestraditional,abstractintelligence–includingindepthinterviewsandgroupdiscussionsthatmeasurequalitiessuchasleadership,communication,problemsolvingandcollaborativeskills.AlthoughtheirSATscoresarewellbelowthenormfortheiruniversity,theirsubsequentsuccessatuniversityisroughlyequaltotheaverageofotherstudents.

32Thefollowingpaper,writtenbysomeofthemostprominentIQresearchers,explicitlymakesthispoint:Neisser,U.,etal.(1996),‘Intelligence:KnownsandUnknowns’AmericanPsychologist,51(2),77?101.Seealsothefollowingpaper,whichprovidesafurtheranalysisofthisidea,includingthefollowingstatement:‘Overonehundredyearsofresearchonintelligencetestinghasshownthatscoresonstandardizedtestsofintelligencepredictawiderangeofoutcomes,buteventhestrongestadvocatesofintelligencetestingagreethatIQscores(andtheirnearcousinssuchastheSATs)leavealargeportionofthevarianceunexplainedwhenpredictingreal-lifebehaviors.’Butler,H.A.,Pentoney,C.andBong,M.P.(2017),‘PredictingReal-worldOutcomes:CriticalThinkingAbilityIsaBetterPredictorofLifeDecisionsthanIntelligence’,ThinkingSkillsandCreativity,25,38?46.

33Schmidt,F.L.andHunter,J.(2004),‘GeneralMentalAbilityintheWorldofWork:OccupationalAttainmentandJobPerformance’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,86(1),162?73.

34Neisser,U.,etal.,‘Intelligence’.Strenze,T.(2007),‘IntelligenceandSocioeconomicSuccess:AMeta-AnalyticReviewofLongitudinalResearch’,Intelligence,35,401?26.

35ForadiscussionofthedifficultieswithlinkingIQtojobperformance,see:Byington,E.andFelps,W.(2010),‘WhyDoIQScoresPredictJobPerformance?AnAlternative,SociologicalExplanation’,ResearchinOrganizationalBehavior,30,175?202.Richardson,K.andNorgate,S.H.(2015),‘DoesIQReallyPredictJobPerformance?’AppliedDevelopmentalScience,19(3),153?69.Ericsson,K.A.(2014),‘WhyExpertPerformanceIsSpecialandCannotBeExtrapolatedFromStudiesofPerformanceintheGeneralPopulation:AResponsetoCriticisms’,Intelligence,45,81?103.

36Feldman,D.(1984),‘AFollow-UpofSubjectsScoringAbove180IQinTerman’sGeneticStudiesofGenius’,ExceptionalChildren,50(6),518?23.

37Shurkin,Terman’sKids,pp.183?7.38Shurkin,Terman’sKids,p.190.39Foramorerecentanalysiscomingtobroadlythesameconclusions,seealsoDeanSimonton’sanalysis

oftheTermanstudiesofgenius.‘Notonlydodifferencesingeneralintelligenceexplainlittlevarianceinachievedeminence,buttheexplanatorypowerofintelligenceisapparentlyalsocontingentonhavingintelligencedefinedinmoredomainspecificterms.Inessence,intellectualgiftednessmustbereconceivedasthedegreeofaccelerationinexpertiseacquisitionwithinanindividuallychosendomain.Furthermore,personalitydifferencesandearlydevelopmentalexperienceshaveanevenbiggerparttoplayintheemergenceofgenius,althoughtheseinfluentialfactorsmustalsobetailoredtothespecificdomainofachievement.’Simonton,D.K.(2016),‘ReverseEngineeringGenius:HistoriometricStudiesofSuperlativeTalent’,AnnalsoftheNewYorkAcademyofSciences,1377,3–9.

40ElementsofthisinterviewfirstappearedinanarticleIwroteforBBCFuturein2016:http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160929-our-iqs-have-never-been-higher-but-it-hasnt-made-us-smart41Clark,C.M.,Lawlor-Savage,L.andGoghari,V.M.(2016),‘TheFlynnEffect:AQuantitativeCommentaryonModernityandHumanIntelligence’,Measurement:InterdisciplinaryResearchandPerspectives,14(2),39–53.Inlinewiththeideaofscientificspectacles,recentresearchhasshownthattheFlynnEffectcanlargelybeaccountedforinthetimepeopletaketoanswerthequestions.Youngergenerationsdoitmorerapidly,asifabstractthinkinghasbeenautomatedandbecomesecondnature:Must,O.andMust,A.(2018),‘SpeedandtheFlynnEffect’,Intelligence,68,37–47.

42SomemodernIQresearchershaveinfactsuggestedthattrainingintheseabstractthinkingskillscouldbeawayofclosingthesocialdividebetweenlow-andhigh-IQindividuals.ButtheFlynnEffectwouldsuggestthatthiswouldbeoflimitedbenefitforthingssuchascreativethinking.See,forinstance,Asbury,K.andPlomin,R.(2014),GIsforGenes,Oxford:WileyBlackwell,pp.149–87.

43Infact,thereissomeevidencethatcreativityhasactuallydecreasedoverthesameperiod,bothintermsoflab-basedmeasuresofcreativeproblemsolvingandreal-worldmeasuresofinnovation,suchastheaveragenumberofpatentsperperson.SeeKim,K.H.(2011),‘TheCreativityCrisis:TheDecreaseinCreativeThinkingScoresontheTorranceTestsofCreativeThinking’,CreativityResearchJournal,23(4),285–95.Kaufman,J.(2018),‘CreativityasaSteppingStonetowardaBrighterFuture’,JournalofIntelligence,6(2),21.Huebner,J.(2005),‘APossibleDecliningTrendforWorldwideInnovation’,TechnologicalForecastingandSocialChange,72(8),980–6.

44Flynn,J.R.(1998),‘IQGainsOverTime:TowardFindingtheCauses’,inNeisser,U.(ed.),TheRisingCurve:Long-TermChangesinIQandRelatedMeasures,Washington,DC:AmericanPsychologicalAssociation,pp.25?66.

45Harms,P.D.andCredé,M.(2010),‘RemainingIssuesinEmotionalIntelligenceResearch:ConstructOverlap,MethodArtifacts,andLackofIncrementalValidity’,IndustrialandOrganizationalPsychology:PerspectivesonScienceandPractice,3(2),154–8.SeealsoFiori,M.,Antonietti,J.P.,Mikolajczak,M.,Luminet,O.,Hansenne,M.andRossier,J.(2014),‘WhatIstheAbilityEmotionalIntelligenceTest(MSCEIT)GoodFor?AnEvaluationUsingItemResponseTheory’,PLOSOne,9(6),e98827.

46SeeWaterhouse,L.(2006),‘MultipleIntelligences,theMozartEffect,andEmotionalIntelligence:ACriticalReview’,EducationalPsychologist,41(4),207–25.AndWaterhouse,L.(2006),‘InadequateEvidenceforMultipleIntelligences,MozartEffect,andEmotionalIntelligenceTheories’,EducationalPsychologist,41(4),247?55.

47Inthefollowingpaper,RobertSternbergcontrastshistheoriestomultipleintelligencesandEQ:Sternberg,R.J.(1999),‘SuccessfulIntelligence:FindingaBalance’,TrendsinCognitiveSciences,3(11),436?42.

48Hagbloom,S.J.,etal.(2002),‘The100MostEminentPsychologistsofthe20thCentury’,ReviewofGeneralPsychology,6(2),139?52.

49Sternbergdescribesthisjourneyinmoredetailinthefollowingwebpost:http://www.cdl.org/articles/the-teachers-we-never-forget/.

50Foramoreindepthdiscussion,seeSternberg,R.J.andPreiss,D.D.(eds)(2010),InnovationsinEducationalPsychology:PerspectivesonLearning,Teaching,andHumanDevelopment.NewYork:Springer,pp.406?7.

51Sternberg,‘SuccessfulIntelligence’.52See,forinstance,Hedlund,J.,Wilt,J.M.,Nebel,K.L.,Ashford,S.J.andSternberg,R.J.(2006),

‘AssessingPracticalIntelligenceinBusinessSchoolAdmissions:ASupplementtotheGraduateManagementAdmissionsTest’,LearningandIndividualDifferences,16(2),101–27.

53SeethefollowingPBSinterviewwithSternbergforamoreindepthdiscussionoftheseideas:https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/interviews/sternberg.html.

54Forsummariesoftheseresults,seeSternberg,R.J.,Castejón,J.L.,Prieto,M.D.,Hautamäki,J.andGrigorenko,E.L.(2001),‘ConfirmatoryFactorAnalysisoftheSternbergTriarchicAbilitiesTestinThreeInternationalSamples:AnEmpiricalTestoftheTriarchicTheoryofIntelligence’,EuropeanJournalofPsychologicalAssessment,17(1),1?16.Sternberg,R.J.(2015),‘SuccessfulIntelligence:AModelforTestingIntelligenceBeyondIQTests’,EuropeanJournalofEducationandPsychology,8(2),76?84.Sternberg,R.J.(2008),‘IncreasingAcademicExcellenceandEnhancingDiversityAreCompatibleGoals’,EducationalPolicy,22(4),487?514.Sternberg,R.J.,Grigorenko,E.L.andZhang,L.F.(2008),‘StylesOfLearningandThinkingMatterinInstructionandAssessment’,PerspectivesonPsychologicalScience,3(6),486?506.

55Sternberg,R.J.(2000),PracticalIntelligenceinEverydayLife,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.144?200.SeealsoWagner,R.K.andSternberg,R.J.(1985),‘PracticalIntelligenceinReal-worldPursuits:TheRoleofTacitKnowledge’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,49(2),436?58.SeealsoCianciolo,A.T.,etal.(2006),‘TacitKnowledge,PracticalIntelligenceandExpertise’,inEricsson,K.A.(ed.),CambridgeHandbookofExpertiseandExpertPerformance,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.ForanindependentdiscussionofSternberg’sstudies,seePerkins,D.(1995),OutsmartingIQ:TheEmergingScienceofLearnableIntelligence,NewYork:FreePress,pp.83?4.AndNisbett,R.E.,Aronson,J.,Blair,C.,Dickens,W.,Flynn,J.,Halpern,D.F.andTurkheimer,E.(2012),‘Intelligence:NewFindingsandTheoreticalDevelopments’,AmericanPsychologist,67(2),130.AndMackintosh,N.J.(2011),IQandHumanIntelligence,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.222–43.

56In1996,theAPA’scomprehensivereporton‘Intelligence:KnownandUnknowns’concludedthat‘althoughthisworkisnotwithoutitscritics,theresultstothispointtendtosupportthedistinctionbetweenanalyticandpracticalintelligence’.Neisser,etal.,‘Intelligence’.

57See,forinstance:Imai,L.andGelfand,M.J.(2010),‘TheCulturallyIntelligentNegotiator:TheImpactofCulturalIntelligence(CQ)onNegotiationSequencesandOutcomes’,OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,112(2),83–98.Alon,I.andHiggins,J.M.(2005),‘GlobalLeadershipSuccessthroughEmotionalandCulturalIntelligences’,BusinessHorizons,48(6),501–12.Rockstuhl,T.,Seiler,S.,Ang,S.,VanDyne,L.andAnnen,H.(2011),‘BeyondGeneralIntelligence(IQ)andEmotionalIntelligence(EQ):TheRoleofCulturalIntelligence(CQ)onCross-BorderLeadershipEffectivenessinaGlobalizedWorld’,JournalofSocialIssues,67(4),825–40.

58Marks,R.(2007),‘LewisM.Terman:IndividualDifferencesandtheConstructionofSocialReality’,EducationalTheory,24(4),336?55.

59Terman,L.M.(1916),TheMeasurementofIntelligence:AnExplanationofandaCompleteGuidefortheUseoftheStanfordRevisionandExtensionoftheBinet-SimonIntelligenceScale.Boston,MA:HoughtonMifflin.

60Lippmann,W.(25October1922),‘TheMentalAgeofAmericans’,NewRepublic,p.213.61Terman,L.M.(27December1922),‘TheGreatConspiracyortheImpulseImperiousofIntelligence

Testers,PsychoanalyzedandExposedByMrLippmann’,NewRepublic,p.116.62Shurkin,Terman’sKids,p.190.63Minton,H.L.(1988),LewisM.Terman:PioneerinPsychologicalTesting,NewYork,NewYork

UniversityPress.

Chapter21Thesepassagesdrawonthefollowingmaterial:Ernst,B.M.L.andCarrington,H.(1933),HoudiniandConanDoyle:TheStoryofaStrangeFriendship,London:Hutchinson.ConanDoyle,A.C.(1930),TheEdgeoftheUnknown,London:JohnMurray.Kalush,W.andSloman,L.(2006),TheSecretLifeofHoudini:TheMakingofAmerica’sFirstSuperhero,NewYork:Atria.Sandford,C.(2011),HoudiniandConanDoyle,London:DuckworthOverlook.Gardner,L.(10August2015),‘HarryHoudiniandArthurConanDoyle:AFriendshipSplitbySpiritualism’,Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2015/aug/10/houdini-and-conan-ConanDoyle-impossible-edinburgh-festival.

2Wilk,T.(2May2012),‘Houdini,SirDoyleDoAC’,AtlanticCityWeekly,http://www.atlanticcityweekly.com/news_and_views/houdini-sir-doyle-do-ac/article_a16ab3ba-95b9-50e1-a2e0-eca01dd8eaae.html.

3InOfMiracles,theeighteenth-centuryphilosopherDavidHumeputitlikethis:‘Notestimonyissufficienttoestablishamiracle,unlessthetestimonybeofsuchakind,thatitsfalsehoodwouldbemoremiraculous,thanthefact,whichitendeavourstoestablish.’Inotherwords,anextraordinaryclaimrequiresextraordinaryevidencethatdiscountsanyphysicalexplanations.

4FoxnewsreelofaninterviewwithSirArthurConanDoyle(1927).AvailableatPublicDomainReview,https://publicdomainreview.org/collections/sir-arthur-conan-doyle-interview-1927/.

5Eby,M.(21March2012),‘HocusPocus’,ParisReviewblog,https://www.theparisreview.org/blog/2012/03/21/hocus-pocus/.

6Tversky,A.andKahneman,D.(1974),‘JudgmentunderUncertainty:HeuristicsandBiases’,Science,185,1124?31.

7Foranaccessibledescriptionofthisargument,seeStanovich,K.E.(2009),‘RationalandIrrationalThought:TheThinkingThatIQTestsMiss’,ScientificAmericanMind,20(6),34?9.

8Thereisgoodevidence,forinstance,thatchildrennaturallyrejectinformationifitcontradicts‘commonsense’theoriesoftheworld,andtheyneedtolearnthescientificmethodfromthepeopletheytrust.Soachildgrowingupinanenvironmentthatrejectssciencewillnaturallyadoptthoseviews,regardlessoftheirintelligence.Bloom,P.andWeisberg,D.S.(2007),‘ChildhoodOriginsofAdultResistancetoScience’,Science,316(5827),996–7.

9‘Knowledgeprojectionfromanislandoffalsebeliefsmightexplainthephenomenonofotherwiseintelligentpeoplewhogetcaughtinadomain-specificweboffalsitythat,becauseofprojectiontendencies,theycannotescape.Suchindividualsoftenusetheirconsiderablecomputationalpowertorationalizetheirbeliefsandtowardofftheargumentsofskeptics.’Stanovich,K.E.,West,R.F.andToplak,M.E.(2016),TheRationalityQuotient:TowardaTestofRationalThinking,Cambridge,MA:MITPress.KindleEdition(KindleLocations3636–9).

10Stanovich,K.(1993),‘Dysrationalia:ANewSpecificLearningDifficulty’,JournalofLearningDifficulties,26(8),501?15.

11Forahelpfulexplanationoftheprinciples,seeSwinscow,T.D.V.(1997),StatisicsatSquareOne,ninthedition.Availableonlineathttp://www.bmj.com/about-bmj/resources-readers/publications/statistics-square-one/11-correlation-and-regression.

12Stanovich,WestandToplak,TheRationalityQuotient(KindleLocations2757,2838).Someearlystudieshadsuggestedthecorrelationstobeevenweaker.SeeStanovich,K.E.andWest,R.F.(2008),‘OntheRelativeIndependenceofThinkingBiasesandCognitiveAbility’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,94(4),672?95.

13StanovichandWest,‘OntheRelativeIndependenceofThinkingBiasesandCognitiveAbility’.14Xue,G.,He,Q.,Lei,X.,Chen,C.,Liu,Y.,Chen,C.,etal.(2012),‘TheGambler’sFallacyIsAssociated

withWeakAffectiveDecisionMakingbutStrongCognitiveAbility’,PLOSOne,7(10):e47019,https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0047019.

15Schwitzgebel,EricandFieryCushman(2015),‘Philosophers’BiasedJudgmentsPersistDespiteTraining,ExpertiseandReflection’,Cognition,141,127–37.

16West,R.F.,Meserve,R.J.andStanovich,K.E.(2012),‘CognitiveSophisticationDoesNotAttenuatetheBiasBlindSpot’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,103(3),506?19.

17Stanovich,WestandToplak,TheRationalityQuotient.18Stanovich,K.E.andWest,R.F.(2014),‘WhatIntelligenceTestsMiss’,Psychologist,27,80?3,

https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-27/edition-2/what-intelligence-tests-miss.19Stanovich,WestandToplak,TheRationalityQuotient(KindleLocation2344).20BruinedeBruin,W.,Parker,A.M.andFischhoff,B.(2007),‘IndividualDifferencesinAdultDecision

MakingCompetence’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,92(5),938?56.21Kanazawa,S.andHellberg,J.E.E.U.(2010),‘IntelligenceandSubstanceUse’,ReviewofGeneral

Psychology,14(4),382?96.22Zagorsky,J.(2007),‘DoYouHaveToBeSmartToBeRich?TheImpactofIQonWealth,Incomeand

FinancialDistress’,Intelligence,35,489?501.23Swann,M.(8March2013).Theprofessor,thebikinimodel,andthesuitcasefulloftrouble.NewYork

Times.http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/magazine/the-professor-the-bikini-model-and-the-suitcase-full-of-trouble.html24Rice,T.W.(2003),‘BelieveItOrNot:ReligiousandOtherParanormalBeliefsintheUnitedStates’,JournalfortheScientificStudyofReligion,42(1),95–106.

25Bouvet,R.andBonnefon,J.F.(2015),‘Non-reflectiveThinkersArePredisposedToAttributeSupernaturalCausationToUncannyExperiences’,PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,41(7),955?61.

26Cooper,J.(1990),TheCaseoftheCottingleyFairies,London:RobertHale.27ConanDoyle,A.C.(1922),TheComingoftheFairies,London:Hodder&Stoughton.28Cooper,J.(1982),‘Cottingley:AtLasttheTruth’,TheUnexplained,117,2338?40.29Miller,R.(2008),TheAdventuresofArthurConanDoyle,London:HarvillSecker,p.403.30Hyman,R.(2002),inWhySmartPeopleCanBeSoStupid,ed.Sternberg,R.,NewHaven:Yale

UniversityPress,pp.18?19.31Perkins,D.N.,Farady,M.andBushey,B.(1991),‘EverydayReasoningandtheRootsofIntelligence’,

inPerkins,D.,Voss,JamesF.andSegal,JudithW.(eds),InformalReasoningandEducation,Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum,pp.83?105.

32Forafullerdiscussionofthisstudy,seePerkins,D.N.(1995),OutsmartingIQ,NewYork:FreePress,pp.131?5.

33Perkins,D.N.andTishman,S.(2001),‘DispositionalAspectsofIntelligence’,inCollis,J.M.andMessick,S.(eds),IntelligenceandPersonality:BridgingtheGapinTheoryandMeasurement,Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum,pp.233?57.

34Kahan,D.M.,Peters,E.,Dawson,E.C.andSlovic,P.(2017),‘MotivatedNumeracyandEnlightenedSelf-government’,BehaviouralPublicPolicy,1,54?86.

35Forafullerdiscussionofthewaysthatincreasedknowledgecanbackfire,seeFlynn,D.J.,Nyhan,B.andReifler,J.(2017),‘TheNatureandOriginsofMisperceptions:UnderstandingFalseandUnsupportedBeliefsaboutPolitics’,AdvancesinPoliticalPsychology,38(S1),127?50.AndalsoTaber,C.S.andLodge,M.(2006),‘MotivatedSkepticismintheEvaluationofPoliticalBeliefs’,AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience,50,755–69.

36Kahan,D.M.,etal.(2012),‘ThePolarizingImpactofScienceLiteracyandNumeracyonPerceivedClimateChangeRisks’,NatureClimateChange,2(10),732?5.Kahan,D.M.,Wittlin,M.,Peters,E.,Slovic,P.,Ouellette,L.L.,Braman,D.andMandel,G.N.(2011),‘TheTragedyoftheRisk-perceptionCommons:CultureConflict,RationalityConflict,andClimateChange’,https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871503.Bolsen,T.,Druckman,J.N.andCook,F.L.(2015),‘Citizens’,Scientists’,andPolicyAdvisors’BeliefsaboutGlobalWarming’,Annalsofthe

AmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience,658(1),271?95.37Hamilton,L.C.,Hartter,J.andSaito,K.(2015),‘TrustinScientistsonClimateChangeandVaccines’,

SAGEOpen,5(3),doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015602752.38Kahan,D.M.,Landrum,A.,Carpenter,K.,Helft,L.andHallJamieson,K.(2017),‘ScienceCuriosity

andPoliticalInformationProcessing’,PoliticalPsychology,38(S1),179?99.39Kahan,D.M.(2017),‘OrdinaryScienceIntelligence’:AScience-ComprehensionMeasureforStudyof

RiskandScience’,JournalofRiskResearch,20(8),995?1016.40Nyhan,B.,Reifler,J.andUbel,P.A.(2013),‘TheHazardsofCorrectingMythsaboutHealthCare

Reform’,MedicalCare,51(2),127?32.ForadiscussionofthemisperceptionsaroundObamaCare,seePolitifact’sLieoftheYear:‘DeathPanels’,Politifact,18December2009,http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2009/dec/18/politifact-lie-year-death-panels/.

41Koehler,J.J.(1993),‘TheInfluenceofPriorBeliefsonScientificJudgmentsofEvidenceQuality’,OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,56(1),28–55.SeealsoDanKahan’sdiscussionofthepaper,inlightofrecentresearchonmotivatedreasoning:Kahan,D.M.(2016),‘ThePoliticallyMotivatedReasoningParadigm,Part2:WhatPoliticallyMotivatedReasoningIsandHowtoMeasureIt’,inEmergingTrendsintheSocialandBehavioralSciences,doi:10.1002/9781118900772.

42Including,apparently,$25,000fromhisUSbooktourof1922.Ernst,B.M.L.andCarrington,H.(1971),HoudiniandConanDoyle:TheStoryofaStrangeFriendship,NewYork:BenjaminBlom,p.147.

43InthisrecordingfromtheBritishLibrary,ConanDoyleexplainsthemanybenefitshehasdrawnfromhisbeliefinspiritualism:http://britishlibrary.typepad.co.uk/files/listen-to-sir-arthur-conan-doyle-on-spiritualism.mp3.

44FoxnewsreelofaninterviewwithSirArthurConanDoyle(1927).AvailableatPublicDomainReview,https://publicdomainreview.org/collections/sir-arthur-conan-doyle-interview-1927/.

45Ashisbiographer,RussellMiller,describes:‘OnceConanDoylemadeuphismind,hewasunstoppable,impervioustoargument,blindtocontradictoryevidence,untroubledbyself-doubt.’Miller,TheAdventuresofArthurConanDoyle,chapter20.

46Bechtel,S.andStains,L.R.(2017),ThroughaGlassDarkly:SirArthurConanDoyleandtheQuesttoSolvetheGreatestMysteryofAll,NewYork:StMartin’sPress,p.147.

47Panek,R.(2005),‘TheYearofAlbertEinstein’,SmithsonianMagazine,https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/the-year-of-albert-einstein-75841381/.

48FurtherexamplescanbefoundinthefollowinginterviewwiththephysicistJohnMoffat,includingthefactthatEinsteindeniedstrongevidencefortheexistenceofblackholes:Folger,T.(September2004),‘Einstein’sGrandQuestforaUnifiedTheory’,Discover,http://discovermagazine.com/2004/sep/einsteins-grand-quest.SeealsoMackie,G.(2015),‘Einstein’sFolly:HowtheSearchforaUnifiedTheoryStumpedHimuntilHisDyingDay’,TheConversation,http://theconversation.com/einsteins-folly-how-the-search-for-a-unified-theory-stumped-him-to-his-dying-day-49646.

49Isaacson,W.(2007),Einstein:HisLifeandUniverse,London:Simon&Schuster,pp.341?7.50Schweber,S.S.(2008),EinsteinandOppenheimer:TheMeaningofGenius,Cambridge,MA:Harvard

UniversityPress,p.282.SeealsoOppenheimer,R.(17March1966),‘OnAlbertEinstein’,NewYorkReviewofBooks,http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1966/03/17/on-albert-einstein/.

51Hook,S.(1987),OutofStep:AnUnquietLifeinthe20thCentury.London:Harper&Row.SeealsoRiniolo,T.andNisbet,L.(2007),‘TheMythofConsistentSkepticism:TheCautionaryCaseofAlbertEinstein’,SkepticalInquirer,31(1),http://www.csicop.org/si/show/myth_of_consistent_skepticism_the_cautionary_case_of_albert_einstein.

52Eysenck,H.(1957),SenseandNonsenseinPsychology,Harmondsworth:Penguin,p.108.53Theseareexceptionalcases.Buttheissueofbiasintheday-to-dayworkingsofsciencehascometo

increasingprominenceinrecentyears,withconcernsthatmanyscientistsmayengageinthewishfulthinkingthathadplaguedConanDoyle.Inthe1990sandearly2000s,thepsychologistKevinDunbarspentyearsstudyingthethinkingofscientistsateightdifferentlaboratories–attendingtheirweekly

meetingsanddiscussingtheirlatestfindings.Hefoundthatmysidethinkingwasrife,withmanyscientistsunconsciouslydistortingtheinterpretationoftheirexperimentalresultstofittheircurrenthypothesis,ordeliberatelysearchingfornewandmoreconvolutedreasonstomaketheirhypothesesfitthedata.Medicalresearchersappearparticularlylikelytoclingtonewsworthyresults,whileoverlookingseriousmethodologicalflaws.See,forinstance,Dunbar,K.(2000),‘HowScientistsThinkintheRealWorld’,JournalofAppliedDevelopmentalPsychology,21(1),49?58.Wilson,T.D.,DePaulo,B.M.,Mook,D.G.andKlaaren,K.J.(1993),‘Scientists’EvaluationsofResearch:TheBiasingEffectsoftheImportanceoftheTopic’,PsychologicalScience,4(5),322?5.

54Offit,P.(2013),‘TheVitaminMyth:WhyWeThinkWeNeedSupplements’,TheAtlantic,19July2013,https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/07/the-vitamin-myth-why-we-think-we-need-supplements/277947/.

55Enserink,M.(2010),‘FrenchNobelistEscapes‘‘IntellectualTerror’’ToPursueRadicalIdeasInChina’,Science,330(6012),1732.Forafurtherdiscussionofthesecontroversies,see:Butler,D.(2012).NobelfightoverAfricanHIVcentre.Nature,486(7403),301-2.https://www.nature.com/news/nobel-fight-over-african-hiv-centre-1.10847

56King,G.(2011),‘Edisonvs.Westinghouse:AShockingRivalry’,SmithsonianMagazine,http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/edison-vs-westinghouse-a-shocking-rivalry-102146036/.

57Essig,M.(2003),EdisonandtheElectricChair,Stroud,Gloucestershire:Sutton.58Essig,EdisonandtheElectricChair,p.289.59Essig,EdisonandtheElectricChair,p.289.60Isaacson,W.(2011),SteveJobs,London:Little,Brown,pp.422?55.Swaine,J.(21October2011),

‘SteveJobs“RegrettedTryingtoBeatCancerwithAlternativeMedicineforSoLong”’,DailyTelegraph,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/8841347/Steve-Jobs-regretted-trying-to-beat-cancer-with-alternative-medicine-for-so-long.html.

61Shultz,S.,Nelson,E.andDunbar,R.I.M.(2012),‘HomininCognitiveEvolution:IdentifyingPatternsandProcessesintheFossilandArchaeologicalRecord’,PhilosophicalTransactionsoftheRoyalSocietyB:BiologicalSciences,367(1599),2130–40.

62Mercier,H.(2016),‘TheArgumentativeTheory:PredictionsandEmpiricalEvidence’,TrendsinCognitiveSciences,20(9),689?700.

Chapter31ThedetailsofBrandonMayfield’sexperienceshavebeentakenfrommyowninterviews,aswellashispressinterviews,includingavideointerviewwithOpenDemocracy(30November2006)athttps://www.democracynow.org/2006/11/30/exclusive_falsely_jailed_attorney_brandon_mayfield.IamalsoindebtedtoMayfield,S.andMayfield,B.(2015),ImprobableCause:TheWaronTerror’sAssaultontheBillofRights,Salem,NH:Divertir.Ihavecross-checkedmanyofthedetailswiththeOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral’sreportontheFBI’shandlingofMayfield’scase.

2JenniferMnookinofUCLA,in‘FingerprintsonTrial’,BBCWorldService,29March2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00fvhl3.

3OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral(2006),‘AReviewoftheFBI’sHandlingoftheBrandonMayfieldCase’,p.80,https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0601/final.pdf.

4OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,‘AReviewoftheFBI’sHandlingoftheBrandonMayfieldCase,p.80.5Kassin,S.M.,Dror,I.E.andKukucka,J.(2013),‘TheForensicConfirmationBias:Problems,Perspectives,andProposedSolutions’,JournalofAppliedResearchinMemoryandCognition,2(1),42?52.

6Fisher,R.(2011),‘EruditionBeDamned,IgnoranceReallyIsBliss’,NewScientist,211(2823),39?41.7Kruger,J.andDunning,D.(1999),‘UnskilledandUnawareofIt:HowDifficultiesinRecognizingOne’sOwnIncompetenceLeadtoInflatedSelf-assessments’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,77(6),1121?34.

8Dunning,D.(2011),‘TheDunning–KrugerEffect:OnBeingIgnorantofOne’sOwnIgnorance’,inAdvancesinExperimentalSocialPsychology,Vol.44,Cambridge,MA:AcademicPress,pp.247?96.

9Chiu,M.M.andKlassen,R.M.(2010),‘RelationsofMathematicsSelf-ConceptandItsCalibrationwithMathematicsAchievement:CulturalDifferencesamongFifteen-Year-Oldsin34Countries’,LearningandInstruction,20(1),2?17.

10See,forexample,‘WhyLosersHaveDelusionsofGrandeur’,NewYorkPost,23May2010,https://nypost.com/2010/05/23/why-losers-have-delusions-of-grandeur/.Lee,C.(2016),‘RevisitingWhyIncompetentsThinkTheyAreAwesome’,ArsTechnica,4November2016,https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/11/revisiting-why-incompetents-think-theyre-awesome/.Flam,F.(2017),‘Trump’s“DangerousDisability”?TheDunning?KrugerEffect’,Bloomberg,12May2017,https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-05-12/trump-s-dangerous-disability-it-s-the-dunning-kruger-effect.

11Fisher,M.andKeil,F.C.(2016),‘TheCurseofExpertise:WhenMoreKnowledgeLeadstoMiscalibratedExplanatoryInsight’,CognitiveScience,40(5),1251?69.

12Son,L.K.andKornell,N.(2010),‘TheVirtuesofIgnorance’,BehaviouralProcesses,83(2),207?12.13FisherandKeil,‘TheCurseofExpertise’.14Ottati,V.,Price,E.,Wilson,C.andSumaktoyo,N.(2015),‘WhenSelf-PerceptionsofExpertise

IncreaseClosed-MindedCognition:TheEarnedDogmatismEffect’,JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,61,131?8.

15QuotedinHammond,A.L.(1984).APassiontoKnow:TwentyProfilesinScience,NewYork:Scribner,p.5.Thisviewpointisalsodiscussed,indepth,inRoberts,R.C.,Wood,W.J.(2007),IntellectualVirtues:p253.AnEssayinRegulativeEpistemology,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

16MuchofthisinformationondeGroot’slifecomesfromanobituaryintheObserveroftheAmericanPsychologicalSociety,publishedonlineon1November2006:http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/in-memoriam-adriaan-dingeman-de-groot-1914-2006#.WUpLDIrTUdV.

17Mellenbergh,G.J.andHofstee,W.K.B.(2006),‘CommemorationAdriaanDingemandeGroot’,in:

RoyalNetherlandsAcademyofSciences(ed.),LifeandMemorials,Amsterdam:RoyalNetherlandsAcademyofSciences,pp.27?30.

18Busato,V.(2006),‘InMemoriam:AdriaandeGroot(1914?2006)’,NetherlandsJournalofPsychology,62,2?4.

19deGroot,A.(ed.)(2008),ThoughtandChoiceinChess,Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,p.288.SeealsoWilliamChaseandHerbertSimon’sclassicfollow-upexperimentthatprovidesfurtherevidencefortheroleofchunkinginexpertperformance:Chase,W.G.andSimon,H.A.(1973).PerceptioninChess.CognitivePsychology,4(1),55-81.

20Hodges,N.J.,Starkes,J.L.andMacMahon,C.(2006),‘ExpertPerformanceinSport:ACognitivePerspective’,inEricsson,K.A.,Charness,N.,Feltovich,P.J.,etal.(eds),CambridgeHandbookofExpertiseandExpertPerformance,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

21Dobbs,D.(2006),‘HowtoBeaGenius’,NewScientist,191(2569),40?3.22Kalakoski,V.andSaariluoma,P.(2001),‘TaxiDrivers’ExceptionalMemoryofStreetNames’,Memory

andCognition,29(4),634?8.23Nee,C.andWard,T.(2015),‘ReviewofExpertiseandItsGeneralImplicationsforCorrectional

PsychologyandCriminology’,AggressionandViolentBehavior,20,1–9.24Nee,C.andMeenaghan,A.(2006),‘ExpertDecisionMakinginBurglars’,BritishJournalof

Criminology,46(5),935?49.25Foracomprehensivereviewoftheevidence,seeDane,E.(2010),‘ReconsideringtheTrade-Offbetween

ExpertiseandFlexibility:ACognitiveEntrenchmentPerspective’,AcademyofManagementReview,35(4),579?603.

26Woollett,K.andMaguire,E.A.(2010),‘TheEffectofNavigationalExpertiseonWayfindinginNewEnvironments’,JournalofEnvironmentalPsychology,30(4),565?73.

27Harley,E.M.,Pope,W.B.,Villablanca,J.P.,Mumford,J.,Suh,R.,Mazziotta,J.C.,Enzmann,D.andEngel,S.A.(2009),‘EngagementofFusiformCortexandDisengagementofLateralOccipitalCortexinTheAcquisitionofRadiologicalExpertise’,CerebralCortex,19(11),2746?54.

28See,forinstance:Corbin,J.C.,Reyna,V.F.,Weldon,R.B.andBrainerd,C.J.(2015),‘HowReasoning,Judgment,andDecisionMakingAreColoredByGist-BasedIntuition:AFuzzy-TraceTheoryApproach’,JournalofAppliedResearchinMemoryandCognition,4(4),344?55.Thefollowingchapteralsogivesamorecompletedescriptionofmanyofthefindingsintheprecedingparagraphs:Dror,I.E.(2011),‘TheParadoxofHumanExpertise:WhyExpertsGetItWrong’,inTheParadoxicalBrain,ed.NarinderKapur,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

29Northcraft,G.B.andNeale,M.A.(1987),‘Experts,Amateurs,andRealEstate:AnAnchoring-and-AdjustmentPerspectiveonPropertyPricingDecisions’,OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,39(1),84?97.

30Busey,T.A.andParada,F.J.(2010),‘TheNatureofExpertiseinFingerprintExaminers’,PsychonomicBulletinandReview,17(2),155?60.

31Busey,T.A.andVanderkolk,J.R.(2005),‘BehavioralandElectrophysiologicalEvidenceforConfiguralProcessinginFingerprintExperts’,VisionResearch,45(4),431?48.

32Dror,I.E.andCharlton,D.(2006),‘WhyExpertsMakeErrors’,JournalofForensicIdentification,56(4),600?16.

33Dror,I.E.,Péron,A.E.,Hind,S.-L.andCharlton,D.(2005),‘WhenEmotionsGettheBetterofUs:TheEffectofContextualTop-DownProcessingonMatchingFingerprints’,AppliedCognitivePsychology,19(6),799–809.

34OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,‘AReviewoftheFBI’sHandlingoftheBrandonMayfieldCase’,p.192.

35OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,‘AReviewoftheFBI’sHandlingoftheBrandonMayfieldCase’,p.164.

36Dror,I.E.,Morgan,R.,Rando,C.andNakhaeizadeh,S.(2017),‘TheBiasSnowballandtheBiasCascadeEffects:TwoDistinctBiasesThatMayImpactForensicDecisionMaking’,JournalofForensic

Science,62(3),832?3.37OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,‘AReviewoftheFBI’sHandlingoftheBrandonMayfieldCase’,p.

179.38Kershaw,S.(5June2004),‘SpainatOddsonMistakenTerrorArrest’,NewYorkTimes,

http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/05LAWY.html.39OfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,‘AReviewoftheFBI’sHandlingoftheBrandonMayfieldCase’,p.52.40Dismukes,K.,Berman,B.A.andLoukopoulos,L.D.(2007),TheLimitsofExpertise:RethinkingPilot

ErrorandtheCausesofAirlineAccidents,Aldershot:Ashgate,pp.76?81.41NationalTransportSafetyBoard[NTSB](2008),‘AttemptedTakeoffFromWrongRunwayComair

Flight5191,27August2006’,AccidentReportNTSB/AAR-07/05.Thisreportspecificallycitesconfirmationbias–thekindexploredbyStephenWalmsleyandAndrewGilbeyasoneoftheprimarysourcesoftheerror–andWalmsleyandGilbeyciteitasaninspirationfortheirpaper.

42Walmsley,S.andGilbey,A.(2016),‘CognitiveBiasesinVisualPilots’Weather-RelatedDecisionMaking’,AppliedCognitivePsychology,30(4),532–43.

43Levinthal,D.andRerup,C.(2006),‘CrossinganApparentChasm:BridgingMindfulandLess-MindfulPerspectivesonOrganizationalLearning’,OrganizationScience,17(4),502–13.

44Kirkpatrick,G.(2009),‘TheCorporateGovernanceLessonsfromtheFinancialCrisis’,OECDJournal:FinancialMarketTrends,2009(1),61?87.

45Minton,B.A.,Taillard,J.P.andWilliamson,R.(2014).FinancialExpertiseOftheBoard,RiskTaking,andPerformance:EvidencefromBankHoldingCompanies.JournalofFinancialandQuantitativeAnalysis,49(2),351-380.JuanAlmandozattheIESEBusinessSchoolinBarcelonaandAndrásTilcsikattheUniversityofTorontohavefoundthesamepatternsintheboardmembersandCEOsoflocalbanksintheUnitedStates.LikeWilliamson,theyfoundthatthemoreexpertsthebankshadontheirboard,themorelikelytheyweretofailduringtimesofuncertainty,duetoentrenchment,over-confidenceandthesuppressionofalternativeideas.Almandoz,J.andTilcsik,A.(2016),‘WhenExpertsBecomeLiabilities:DomainExpertsonBoardsandOrganizationalFailure’,AcademyofManagementJournal,59(4),1124–49.MonikaCzerwonkaattheWarsawSchoolofEconomics,meanwhile,hasfoundthatexpertstockmarketinvestorsaremoresusceptibletothesunkcostbias–thetendencytopourmoremoneyintoafailinginvestment,evenifweknowitismakingaloss.Again,thegreatertheirexpertise,thegreatertheirvulnerability.Rzeszutek,M.,Szyszka,A.andCzerwonka,M.(2015),‘Investors’Expertise,PersonalityTraitsandSusceptibilitytoBehavioralBiasesintheDecisionMakingProcess’,ContemporaryEconomics,9,337–52.

46JenniferMnookinofUCLA,inFingerprintsonTrial,BBCWorldService,29March2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00fvhl3.

47Dror,I.E.,Thompson,W.C.,Meissner,C.A.,Kornfield,I.,Krane,D.,Saks,M.andRisinger,M.(2015),‘LettertotheEditor?ContextManagementToolbox:ALinearSequentialUnmasking(LSU)ApproachforMinimizingCognitiveBiasinForensicDecisionMaking’,JournalofForensicSciences,60(4),1111?12.

Chapter41Brown,B.(2012),‘Hot,Hot,Hot:TheSummerof1787’,NationalConstitutionCenterblog,https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/hot-hot-hot-the-summer-of-1787.

2FormuchofthebackgrounddetailontheUSConstitutionIamindebtedtoIsaacson,W.(2003),BenjaminFranklin:AnAmericanLife,NewYork:Simon&Schuster.

3Franklin,B.(19April1787),LettertoThomasJefferson,Philadelphia.RetrievedfromFranklin’sonlinearchives,courtesyoftheAmericanPhilosophicalSocietyandYaleUniversity,http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=44&page=613.

4MadisonDebates(30June1787).RetrievedfromtheAvalonprojectatYaleLawSchool,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_630.asp.

5MadisonDebates(17September1787).RetrievedfromtheAvalonprojectatYaleLawSchool,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_917.asp.

6Isaacson,W.(2003),BenjaminFranklin:AnAmericanLife,NewYork:Simon&Schuster,p.149.7Lynch,T.J.,Boyer,P.S.,Nichols,C.andMilne,D.(2013),TheOxfordEncyclopediaofAmericanMilitaryandDiplomaticHistory,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,p.398.

8ProceedingsfromBenjaminFranklin’sdebatingclubdefinewisdomas‘TheKnowledgeofwhatwillbebestforusonallOccasionsandofthebestWaysofattainingit.’Theyalsodeclaredthatnomanis‘wiseatallTimesorinallThings’though‘somearemuchmorefrequentlywisethanothers’(ProposalsandQueriestobeAskedtheJunto,1732).

9‘ConversationsonWisdom:UnCutInterviewwithValerieTiberius’,fromtheChicagoCenterforPracticalWisdom,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFuT0yY2otw.SeealsoTiberius,V.(2016),‘WisdomandHumility’,AnnalsoftheNewYorkAcademyofSciences,1384,113–16.

10Birren,J.E.andSvensson,C.M.(2005),inSternberg,R.andJordan,J.(eds),AHandbookofWisdom:PsychologicalPerspectives,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.12?13.AsBirrenandSvenssonpointout,earlypsychologistspreferredtolookat‘psychophysics’–exploring,forinstance,thebasicelementsofperception?andtheywouldhaveconsideredwisdomtoocomplextopindowninalaboratory.Andthetopictendedtobeshunneduntilwellintothetwentiethcentury,withanotableabsenceinmanyofthemajortextbooks,includingAnIntellectualHistoryofPsychology(DanielRobinson,1976)andtheHandbookofGeneralPsychology(BenjaminWolman,1973).

11Sternberg,R.J.,Bonney,C.R.,Gabora,L.andMerrifield,M.(2012),‘WICS:AModelforCollegeandUniversityAdmissions’,EducationalPsychologist,47(1),30?41.

12Grossmann,I.(2017),‘WisdominContext’,PerspectivesonPsychologicalScience,12(2),233?57.13Grossmann,I.,Na,J.,Varnum,M.E.W.,Kitayama,S.andNisbett,R.E.(2013),‘ARoutetoWellBeing:

Intelligencevs.WiseReasoning’,JournalofExperimentalPsychology.General,142(3),944–53.14BruinedeBruin,W.,ParkerA.M.andFischhoffB.(2007),‘IndividualDifferencesinAdultDecision

MakingCompetence’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,92(5),938?56.15Stanovich,K.E.E.,West,R.F.andToplak,M.(2016),TheRationalityQuotient,Cambridge,MA:MIT

Press.Alongsimilarlines,variousstudieshaveshownthatopen-mindedreasoning–animportantcomponentofGrossmann’sdefinitionofwisdom?leadstogreaterwellbeingandhappiness.Italsoseemstomakepeoplemoreinquisitiveaboutpotentialhealthrisks:Lambie,J.(2014),HowtoBeCriticallyOpen-Minded:APsychologicalandHistoricalAnalysis,Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,pp.89?90.

16Seehttp://wici.ca/new/2016/06/igor-grossmann/.17Atthetimeofwritingthiswasapre-printofthepaper,awaitingpeerreviewandpublication.Santos,

H.C.,andGrossmann,I.(2018),‘RelationshipofWisdom-RelatedAttitudesandSubjectiveWellBeingoverTwentyYears:ApplicationoftheTrain-Preregister-Test(TPT)Cross-ValidationApproachto

LongitudinalData’.Availableathttps://psyarxiv.com/f4thj/.18Grossmann,I.,Gerlach,T.M.andDenissen,J.J.A.(2016),‘WiseReasoningintheFaceofEveryday

LifeChallenges’,SocialPsychologicalandPersonalityScience,7(7),611–22.19Franklin,B.(1909),TheAutobiographyofBenjaminFranklin,p.17.Publicdomainebookofthe1909

Collier&Sonedition.20LetterfromBenjaminFranklintoJohnLining(18March1775).RetrievedfromthewebsiteoftheUS

NationalArchives,https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-05-02-0149.21Lord,C.G.,Ross,L.andLepper,M.R.(1979),‘BiasedAssimilationandAttitudePolarization:The

EffectsofPriorTheoriesonSubsequentlyConsideredEvidence’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,37(11),2098?2109.ThankstoTomStaffordforpointingmetowardsthispaperanditsinterpretation,inhisarticleforBBCFuture:Stafford,T.(2017),‘HowtoGetPeopletoOvercomeTheirBias’,http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170131-why-wont-some-people-listen-to-reason.

22Isaacson,W.(2003),‘ABenjaminFranklinReader’,p.236.NewYork:Simon&Schuster.23LetterfromBenjaminFranklintoJonathanWilliams,Jr,(8April1779).RetrievedfromFranklin’s

onlinearchives,courtesyoftheAmericanPhilosophicalSocietyandYaleUniversity,http://franklinpapers.org/franklin//framedVolumes.jsp?vol=29&page=283a.

24Jonas,E.,Schulz-Hardt,S.,Frey,D.andThelen,N.(2001),‘ConfirmationBiasinSequentialInformationSearchafterPreliminaryDecisions:AnExpansionofDissonanceTheoreticalResearchonSelectiveExposuretoInformation’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,80(4),557–71.Youcanalsofindadiscussionofthispaper,anditsimplicationsfordecisionmaking,inChurch,I.(2016),IntellectualHumility:AnIntroductiontothePhilosophyandScience,Bloomsbury.KindleEdition(KindleLocations5817?20).

25Baron,J.,Gürçay,B.andMetz,S.E.(2016),‘Reflection,Intuition,andActivelyOpen-MindedThinking’,inWeller,J.andToplak,M.E.(eds),IndividualDifferencesinJudgmentandDecisionMakingfromaDevelopmentalContext,London:PsychologyPress.

26Adame,B.J.(2016),‘TrainingintheMitigationofAnchoringBias:ATestoftheConsider-the-OppositeStrategy’,LearningandMotivation,53,36?48.

27Hirt,E.R.,Kardes,F.R.andMarkman,K.D.(2004),‘ActivatingaMentalSimulationMindSetThroughGenerationofAlternatives:ImplicationsforDebiasinginRelatedandUnrelatedDomains’,JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,40(3),374?83.

28Chandon,P.andWansink,B.(2007),‘TheBiasingHealthHalosofFast-FoodRestaurantHealthClaims:LowerCalorieEstimatesandHigherSide-DishConsumptionIntentions’,JournalofConsumerResearch,34(3),301–14.

29Miller,A.K.,Markman,K.D.,Wagner,M.M.andHunt,A.N.(2013),‘MentalSimulationandSexualPrejudiceReduction:TheDebiasingRoleofCounterfactualThinking’,JournalofAppliedSocialPsychology,43(1),190–4.

30Forathoroughexaminationofthe‘considertheoppositestrategy’anditspsychologicalbenefits,seeLambie,J.(2014),HowtoBeCriticallyOpen-Minded:APsychologicalandHistoricalAnalysis,Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,pp.82?6.

31Herzog,S.M.andHertwig,R.(2009),‘TheWisdomofManyinOneMind:ImprovingIndividualJudgmentswithDialecticalBootstrapping’,PsychologicalScience,20(2),231?7.

32Seethefollowingpaperforarecentexaminationofthistechnique:Fisher,M.andKeil,F.C.(2014),‘TheIllusionofArgumentJustification’,JournalofExperimentalPsychology:General,143(1),425?33.

33Seethefollowingpaperforareviewofthisresearch:Samuelson,P.L.andChurch,I.M.(2015),‘WhenCognitionTurnsVicious:HeuristicsandBiasesinLightofVirtueEpistemology’,PhilosophicalPsychology,28(8),1095?1113.Thefollowingpaperprovidesanexplanationofthereasonsaccountabilitymayfail,ifwedonotfeelcomfortableenoughtosharethesourcesofourreasoninghonestly:Mercier,H.,Boudry,M.,Paglieri,F.andTrouche,E.(2017),‘Natural-bornArguers:TeachingHowtoMaketheBestofOurReasoningAbilities’,EducationalPsychologist,52(1),1?16.

34Middlekauf,R.(1996),BenjaminFranklinandHisEnemies,Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,p.57.

35Suedfeld,P.,Tetlock,P.E.andRamirez,C.(1977),‘War,Peace,andIntegrativeComplexity:UNSpeechesontheMiddleEastProblem,1947–1976’,JournalofConflictResolution,21(3),427?42.

36ThepsychologistJohnLambieoffersamoredetailedanalysisofthesepoliticalandmilitarystudiesinLambie,HowtobeCriticallyOpen-minded,pp.193?7.

37See.forexample,thefollowingarticlebyPatriciaHogwood,areaderinEuropeanPoliticsattheUniversityofWestminster:Hogwood,P.(21September2017),‘TheAngelaMerkelModel–orHowtoSucceedinGermanPolitics’,TheConversation,https://theconversation.com/the-angela-merkel-model-or-how-to-succeed-in-german-politics-84442

38Packer,G.(1December2014),‘TheQuietGerman:TheAstonishingRiseofAngelaMerkel,theMostPowerfulWomanintheWorld’,NewYorker:https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/01/quiet-german.

39Parker,K.I.(1992),‘SolomonasPhilosopherKing?TheNexusofLawandWisdomin1Kings1?11’,JournalfortheStudyoftheOldTestament,17(53),75?91.AdditionaldetailsdrawnfromHirsch,E.G.,etal.(1906),‘Solomon’,JewishEncyclopedia.Retrievedonlineat:http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/13842-solomon.

40Grossmann,I.andKross,E.(2014),‘ExploringSolomon’sParadox:Self-DistancingEliminatestheSelf?OtherAsymmetryinWiseReasoningaboutCloseRelationshipsinYoungerandOlderAdults’,PsychologicalScience,25(8),1571?80.

41Kross,E.,Ayduk,O.andMischel,W.(2005),‘WhenAsking“Why”DoesNotHurt:DistinguishingRuminationfromReflectiveProcessingofNegativeEmotions’,PsychologicalScience,16(9),709–15.

42Forawide-rangingreviewofthisresearch,seeKross,E.andAyduk,O.(2017),‘Self-distancing’,AdvancesinExperimentalSocialPsychology,55,81?136.

43Streamer,L.,Seery,M.D.,Kondrak,C.L.,LamarcheV.M.andSaltsman,T.L.(2017),‘NotI,ButShe:TheBeneficialEffectsofSelf-DistancingonChallenge/ThreatCardiovascularResponses’,JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,70,235?41.

44GrossmannandKross,‘ExploringSolomon’sParadox’.45Finkel,E.J.,Slotter,E.B.,Luchies,L.B.,Walton,G.M.andGross,J.J.(2013),‘ABriefInterventionto

PromoteConflictReappraisalPreservesMaritalQualityOverTime’,PsychologicalScience,24(8),1595–1601.

46Kross,E.andGrossmann,I.(2012),‘BoostingWisdom:DistancefromtheSelfEnhancesWiseReasoning,Attitudes,andBehavior’,JournalofExperimentalPsychology:General,141(1),43?8.

47Grossmann,I.(2017),‘WisdomandHowtoCultivateIt:ReviewofEmergingEvidenceforaConstructivistModelofWiseThinking’,EuropeanPsychologist,22(4),233–246.

48Reyna,V.F.,Chick,C.F.,Corbin,J.C.andHsia,A.N.(2013),‘DevelopmentalReversalsinRiskyDecisionMaking:IntelligenceAgentsShowLargerDecisionBiasesthanCollegeStudents’,PsychologicalScience,25(1),76?84.

49See,forexample,Maddux,W.W.,Bivolaru,E.,Hafenbrack,A.C.,Tadmor,C.T.andGalinsky,A.D.(2014),‘ExpandingOpportunitiesbyOpeningYourMind:MulticulturalEngagementPredictsJobMarketSuccessthroughLongitudinalIncreasesinIntegrativeComplexity’,SocialPsychologicalandPersonalityScience,5(5),608?15.

50Tetlock,P.andGardner,D.(2015),Superforecasting:TheArtandScienceofPrediction,p.126.London:RandomHouse.

51Grossmann,I.,Karasawa,M.,Izumi,S.,Na,J.,Varnum,M.E.W.,Kitayama,S.andNisbett,R.(2012),‘AgingandWisdom:CultureMatters’,PsychologicalScience,23(10),1059?66.

52Manuelo,E.,Kusumi,T.,Koyasu,M.,Michita,Y.andTanaka,Y.(2015),inDavies,M.andBarnett,R.(eds),ThePalgraveHandbookofCriticalThinkinginHigherEducation,NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,pp.299?315.

53Forareviewofthisevidence,seeNisbett,R.E.,Peng,K.,Choi,I.andNorenzayan,A.(2001),‘Culture

andSystemsofThought:HolisticVersusAnalyticCognition’,PsychologicalReview,108(2),291?310.Markus,H.R.andKitayama,S.(1991),‘CultureandtheSelf:ImplicationsforCognition,Emotion,andMotivation’,PsychologicalReview,98(2),224?53.Henrich,J.,Heine,S.J.andNorenzayan,A.(2010),‘BeyondWEIRD:TowardsaBroad-basedBehavioralScience’,BehavioralandBrainSciences,33(2?3),111?35.

54FormoreinformationonthesenseofselfhoodinJapan(and,inparticular,thewayitisencodedinlanguageandeducation),seeCave,P.(2007),PrimarySchoolinJapan:Self,Individuality,andLearninginElementaryEducation,Abingdon,England:Routledge,pp.31?43,Smith,R.(1983),JapaneseSociety:Tradition,Self,andtheSocialOrder,Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.68?105.

55See,forexample,Talhelm,T.,Zhang,X.,Oishi,S.,Shimin,C.,Duan,D.,Lan,X.andKitayama,S.(2014),‘Large-scalePsychologicalDifferencesWithinChinaExplainedByRiceVersusWheatAgriculture’,Science,344(6184),603?8.

56Henrich,HeineandNorenzayan,‘BeyondWEIRD’.57See,forinstance,Grossmann,I.andKross,E.(2010),‘TheImpactofCultureonAdaptiveVersus

MaladaptiveSelf-reflection’,PsychologicalScience,21(8),1150?7.Wu,S.andKeysar,B.(2007),‘TheEffectofCultureonPerspectiveTaking’,PsychologicalScience,18(7),600?6.Spencer-Rodgers,J.,Williams,M.J.andPeng,K.(2010),‘CulturalDifferencesinExpectationsofChangeandToleranceforContradiction:ADecadeofEmpiricalResearch’,PersonalityandSocialPsychologyReview,14(3),296?312.

58Reason,J.T.,Manstead,A.S.R.andStradling,S.G.(1990),‘ErrorsandViolationontheRoads:ARealDistinction?’Ergonomics,33(10?11),1315–32.

59Heine,S.J.andHamamura,T.(2007),‘InSearchofEastAsianSelf-enhancement’,PersonalityandSocialPsychologyReview,11(1),4?27.

60Santos,H.C.,Varnum,M.E.andGrossmann,I.(2017),‘GlobalIncreasesinIndividualism’,PsychologicalScience,28(9),1228?39.Seealsohttps://www.psychologicalscience.org/news/releases/individualistic-practices-and-values-increasing-around-the-world.html.

61Franklin,B.(4November1789),LettertoJohnWright.Unpublished,retrievedfromhttp://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp.

62Franklin,B.(9March1790),ToEzraStiles,withastatementofhisreligiouscreed.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bartleby.com/400/prose/366.html.

Chapter51Kroc,R.,withAnderson,R.(1977/87),GrindingItOut:TheMakingofMcDonald’s,NewYork:StMartin’sPaperbacks,pp.5–12,39–59.

2QuotedinHastie,R.andDawes,R.M.(2010),RationalChoiceinanUncertainWorld:ThePsychologyofJudgmentandDecisionMaking,ThousandOaks,CA:Sage,p.66.

3Damasio,A.(1994),Descartes’Error,NewYork:AvonBooks,pp.37–44.4Thiswasalsotruewhentheparticipantsviewedemotionallychargedphotographs.Unlikemostparticipants,thepeoplewithdamagetothefrontallobesshowednochangetotheirskinconductance:Damasio,Descartes’Error,pp.205–23.

5Kandasamy,N.,Garfinkel,S.N.,Page,L.,Hardy,B.,Critchley,H.D.,Gurnell,M.andCoates,J.M.(2016),‘InteroceptiveAbilityPredictsSurvivalonaLondonTradingFloor’,ScientificReports,6,32986.

6Werner,N.S.,Jung,K.,Duschek,S.andSchandry,R.(2009),‘EnhancedCardiacPerceptionIsAssociatedwithBenefitsinDecision-making’,Psychophysiology,46(6),1123–9.

7Kandasamy,etal.,‘InteroceptiveAbilityPredictsSurvivalonaLondonTradingFloor’.8Ernst,J.,Northoff,G.,Böker,H.,Seifritz,E.andGrimm,S.(2013),‘InteroceptiveAwarenessEnhancesNeuralActivityduringEmpathy’,HumanBrainMapping,34(7),1615–24.Terasawa,Y.,Moriguchi,Y.,Tochizawa,S.andUmeda,S.(2014),‘InteroceptiveSensitivityPredictsSensitivitytotheEmotionsofOthers’,CognitionandEmotion,28(8),1435–48.

9Chua,E.F.andBliss-Moreau,E.(2016),‘KnowingYourHeartandYourMind:TheRelationshipsbetweenMetamemoryandInteroception’,ConsciousnessandCognition,45,146–58.

10Umeda,S.,Tochizawa,S.,Shibata,M.andTerasawa,Y.(2016),‘ProspectiveMemoryMediatedbyInteroceptiveAccuracy:APsychophysiologicalApproach’,PhilosophicalTransactionsoftheRoyalSocietyB,371(1708),20160005.

11Kroc,withAnderson,GrindingItOut,p.72.SeealsoSchupackv.McDonald’sSystem,Inc.,inwhichKrocisquotedabouthisfunnybonefeeling:https://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/1978/41114-1.html.

12Hayashi,A.M.(2001),‘WhentoTrustYourGut’,HarvardBusinessReview,79(2),59–65.SeealsoEugeneSadler-Smith’sfascinatingdiscussionsofcreativityandintuitioninSadler-Smith,E.(2010).TheIntuitiveMind:ProfitingFromthePowerofYourSixthSense.Chichester:JohnWiley&Sons.

13FeldmanBarrettrelatesthisstoryinherfascinatingandengagingbook,HowEmotionsAreMade:FeldmanBarrett,L.(2017),HowEmotionsAreMade,London:PanMacmillan,pp.30–1.I’vealsowrittenaboutthisworkforBBCFuture:http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20171012-how-emotions-can-trick-your-mind-and-body.

14Redelmeier,D.A.andBaxter,S.D.(2009),‘RainyWeatherandMedicalSchoolAdmissionInterviews’,CanadianMedicalAssociationJournal,181(12),933.

15Schnall,S.,Haidt,J.,Clore,G.L.andJordan,A.H.(2008),‘DisgustasEmbodiedMoralJudgment’,PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,34(8),1096–109.

16Lerner,J.S.,Li,Y.,Valdesolo,P.andKassam,K.S.(2015),‘EmotionandDecisionMaking’,AnnualReviewofPsychology,66.

17ThisquotewastakenfromLisaFeldmanBarrett’sTEDtalkinCambridge,2018,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYAEh3T5a80.

18Seo,M.G.andBarrett,L.F.(2007),‘BeingEmotionalDuringDecisionMaking—GoodorBad?AnEmpiricalInvestigation’,AcademyofManagementJournal,50(4),923–40.

19Cameron,C.D.,Payne,B.K.andDoris,J.M.(2013),‘MoralityinHighDefinition:EmotionDifferentiationCalibratestheInfluenceofIncidentalDisgustonMoralJudgments’,Journalof

ExperimentalSocialPsychology,49(4),719–25.SeealsoFenton-O’Creevy,M.,Soane,E.,Nicholson,N.andWillman,P.(2011),‘Thinking,FeelingandDeciding:TheInfluenceofEmotionsontheDecisionMakingandPerformanceofTraders’,JournalofOrganizationalBehavior,32(8),1044–61.

20See,forinstance,Füstös,J.,Gramann,K.,Herbert,B.M.andPollatos,O.(2012),‘OntheEmbodimentofEmotionRegulation:InteroceptiveAwarenessFacilitatesReappraisal’,SocialCognitiveandAffectiveNeuroscience,8(8),911–17.AndKashdan,T.B.,Barrett,L.F.andMcKnight,P.E.(2015),‘UnpackingEmotionDifferentiation:TransformingUnpleasantExperiencebyPerceivingDistinctionsinNegativity’,CurrentDirectionsinPsychologicalScience,24(1),10–16.

21SeealsoAlkozei,A.,Smith,R.,Demers,L.A.,Weber,M.,Berryhill,S.M.andKillgore,W.D.(2018),‘IncreasesinEmotionalIntelligenceafteranOnlineTrainingProgramAreAssociatedwithBetterDecision-MakingontheIowaGamblingTask’,PsychologicalReports,0033294118771705.

22BruinedeBruin,W.,Strough,J.andParker,A.M.(2014),‘GettingOlderIsn’tAllThatBad:BetterDecisionsandCopingWhenFacing“SunkCosts”’,PsychologyandAging,29(3),642.

23Miu,A.C.andCrişan,L.G.(2011),‘CognitiveReappraisalReducestheSusceptibilitytotheFramingEffectinEconomicDecisionMaking’,PersonalityandIndividualDifferences,51(4),478–82.

24Halperin,E.,Porat,R.,Tamir,M.andGross,J.J.(2013),‘CanEmotionRegulationChangePoliticalAttitudesinIntractableConflicts?FromtheLaboratorytotheField’,PsychologicalScience,24(1),106–11.

25Grossmann,I.andOakes,H.(2017),‘WisdomofYodaandMr.Spock:TheRoleofEmotionsandtheSelf’.Availableasapre-printonthePsyArxivservice:https://psyarxiv.com/jy5em/.

26See,forinstance,Hill,C.L.andUpdegraff,J.A.(2012),‘MindfulnessandItsRelationshiptoEmotionalRegulation’,Emotion,12(1),81.Daubenmier,J.,Sze,J.,Kerr,C.E.,Kemeny,M.E.andMehling,W.(2013),‘FollowYourBreath:RespiratoryInteroceptiveAccuracyinExperiencedMeditators’,Psychophysiology,50(8),777–89.Fischer,D.,Messner,M.andPollatos,O.(2017),‘ImprovementofInteroceptiveProcessesafteran8-WeekBodyScanIntervention’,FrontiersinHumanNeuroscience,11,452.Farb,N.A.,Segal,Z.V.andAnderson,A.K.(2012),‘MindfulnessMeditationTrainingAltersCorticalRepresentationsofInteroceptiveAttention’,SocialCognitiveandAffectiveNeuroscience,8(1),15–26.

27Hafenbrack,A.C.,Kinias,Z.andBarsade,S.G.(2014),‘DebiasingtheMindthroughMeditation:MindfulnessandtheSunk-CostBias’,PsychologicalScience,25(2),369–76.

28Foranindepthdiscussionofthebenefitsofmindfulnesstodecisionmaking,seeKarelaia,N.andReb,J.(2014),‘ImprovingDecisionMakingthroughMindfulness’,forthcominginReb,J.andAtkins,P.(eds),MindfulnessinOrganizations.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress.Hafenbrack,A.C.(2017),‘MindfulnessMeditationasanOn-the-SpotWorkplaceIntervention’,JournalofBusinessResearch,75,118?29.

29Lakey,C.E.,Kernis,M.H.,Heppner,W.L.andLance,C.E.(2008),‘IndividualDifferencesinAuthenticityandMindfulnessasPredictorsofVerbalDefensiveness’,JournalofResearchinPersonality,42(1),230?8.

30Reitz,M.,Chaskalson,M.,Olivier,S.andWaller,L.(2016),TheMindfulLeader,HultResearch.Retrievedfrom:https://mbsr.co.uk/userfiles/Publications/Mindful-Leader-Report-2016-updated.pdf.

31Kirk,U.,Downar,J.andMontague,P.R.(2011),‘InteroceptionDrivesIncreasedRationalDecision-MakinginMeditatorsPlayingtheUltimatumGame’,FrontiersinNeuroscience,5,49.

32Yurtsever,G.(2008),‘Negotiators’ProfitPredictedByCognitiveReappraisal,SuppressionofEmotions,MisrepresentationofInformation,andToleranceofAmbiguity’,PerceptualandMotorSkills,106(2),590–608.

33Schirmer-Mokwa,K.L.,Fard,P.R.,Zamorano,A.M.,Finkel,S.,Birbaumer,N.andKleber,B.A.(2015),‘EvidenceforEnhancedInteroceptiveAccuracyinProfessionalMusicians’,FrontiersinBehavioralNeuroscience,9,349.Christensen,J.F.,Gaigg,S.B.andCalvo-Merino,B.(2018),‘ICanFeelMyHeartbeat:DancersHaveIncreasedInteroceptiveAccuracy’,Psychophysiology,55(4),e13008.

34Cameron,C.D.,Payne,B.K.andDoris,J.M.(2013),‘MoralityinHighDefinition:Emotion

DifferentiationCalibratestheInfluenceofIncidentalDisgustonMoralJudgments’,JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,49(4),719–25.

35Kircanski,K.,Lieberman,M.D.andCraske,M.G.(2012),‘FeelingsintoWords:ContributionsofLanguagetoExposureTherapy’,PsychologicalScience,23(10),1086–91.

36AccordingtoMerriam-Webster’sdictionary,thefirstwrittenuseofthewordappearedin1992inTheLondonMagazine,butitonlyrecentlyenteredmorecommonusage:https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/hangry-meaning.

37ZadieSmithoffersusanotherlessoninemotiondifferentiationinthefollowingessayonjoy–a‘strangeadmixtureofterror,pain,anddelight’–andthereasonsthatitshouldnotbeconfusedwithpleasure.Besidesbeinganastonishingread,theessayisaperfectillustrationofthewaysthatwecancarefullyanalyseourfeelingsandtheireffectsonus.Smith,Z.(2013),‘Joy’,NewYorkReviewofBooks,60(1),4.

38DiStefano,G.,Gino,F.,Pisano,G.P.andStaats,B.R.(2016),‘MakingExperienceCount:TheRoleofReflectioninIndividualLearning’.Retrievedonlineat:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2414478.

39CitedinPavlenko,A.(2014),TheBilingualMind,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,p.282.40Keysar,B.,Hayakawa,S.L.andAn,S.G.(2012),‘TheForeign-languageEffect:ThinkinginaForeign

TongueReducesDecisionBiases’,PsychologicalScience,23(6),661?8.41Costa,A.,Foucart,A.,Arnon,I.,Aparici,M.andApesteguia,J.(2014),‘“Piensa”Twice:Onthe

ForeignLanguageEffectinDecisionMaking’,Cognition,130(2),236–54.SeealsoGao,S.,Zika,O.,Rogers,R.D.andThierry,G.(2015),‘SecondLanguageFeedbackAbolishesthe“HotHand”EffectduringEven-ProbabilityGambling’,JournalofNeuroscience,35(15),5983–9.

42Caldwell-Harris,C.L.(2015),‘EmotionalityDifferencesbetweenaNativeandForeignLanguage:ImplicationsforEverydayLife’,CurrentDirectionsinPsychologicalScience,24(3),214–19.

43YoucanreadmoreaboutthesebenefitsinthisaccessiblearticlebyAmyThompson,aprofessorofappliedlinguisticsattheUniversityofSouthFlorida.Thompson,A.(12December2016),‘HowLearningaNewLanguageImprovesTolerance’,TheConversation:https://theconversation.com/how-learning-a-new-language-improves-tolerance-68472.

44Newman-Toker,D.E.andPronovost,P.J.(2009),‘DiagnosticErrors—TheNextFrontierforPatientSafety’,JournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation,301(10),1060?2.

45Andrade,J.(2010),‘WhatDoesDoodlingDo?’AppliedCognitivePsychology,24(1),100?6.46ForSilviaMamede’sreviewandinterpretationofthese(andsimilar)results,seeMamede,S.and

Schmidt,H.G.(2017),‘ReflectioninMedicalDiagnosis:ALiteratureReview’,HealthProfessionsEducation,3(1),15?25.

47Schmidt,H.G.,VanGog,T.,Schuit,S.C.,VandenBerge,K.,VanDaele,P.L.,Bueving,H.,VanderZee,T.,VanderBroek,W.W.,VanSaase,J.L.andMamede,S.(2017),‘DoPatients’DisruptiveBehavioursInfluencetheAccuracyofaDoctor’sDiagnosis?ARandomisedExperiment’,BMJQuality&Safety,26(1),19–23.

48Schmidt,H.G.,Mamede,S.,VandenBerge,K.,VanGog,T.,VanSaase,J.L.andRikersR.M.(2014),‘ExposuretoMediaInformationaboutaDiseaseCanCauseDoctorstoMisdiagnoseSimilar-LookingClinicalCases’,AcademicMedicine,89(2),285?91.

49Forafurtherdiscussionofthisnewunderstandingofexpertise,andtheneedfordoctorstoslowtheirthinking,seeMoulton,C.A.,RegehrG.,MylopoulosM.andMacRae,H.M.(2007),‘SlowingDownWhenYouShould:ANewModelofExpertJudgment’,AcademicMedicine,82(10Suppl.),S109–16.

50Casey,P.,Burke,K.andLeben,S.(2013),MindingtheCourt:EnhancingtheDecision-MakingProcess,AmericanJudgesAssociation.Retrievedonlinefromhttp://aja.ncsc.dni.us/pdfs/Minding-the-Court.pdf.

51ThefirstfourstagesofthismodelareusuallyattributedtoNoelBurchofGordanTrainingInternational.52Theideaof‘reflectivecompetence’wasoriginallyproposedbyDavidBaume,aneducationresearcherat

theOpenUniversityintheUK,whohaddescribedhowexpertsneedtobeabletoanalyseandarticulatetheirmethodsiftheyaretopassthemontoothers.ButthedoctorPatCroskerryalsousesthetermtodescribethefifthstageofexpertise,inwhichexpertscanfinallyrecognisethesourcesoftheirownbias.

Chapter61‘BananasandFlesh-eatingDisease’,Snopes.com.Retrieved19October2017,http://www.snopes.com/medical/disease/bananas.asp.

2Forster,K.(7January2017),‘Revealed:HowDangerousFakeNewsConqueredFacebook’,Independent:https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/fake-news-health-facebook-cruel-damaging-social-media-mike-adams-natural-health-ranger-conspiracy-a7498201.html.

3Binding,L.(24July2018),‘IndiaAsksWhatsapptoCurbFakeNewsFollowingSpateofLynchings’,SkyNewsonline:https://news.sky.com/story/india-asks-whatsapp-to-curb-fake-news-following-spate-of-lynchings-11425849.

4Dewey,J.(1910),HowWeThink,p101.Mineola,NY:DoverPublications.5Galliford,N.andFurnham,A.(2017),‘IndividualDifferenceFactorsandBeliefsinMedicalandPoliticalConspiracyTheories’,ScandinavianJournalofPsychology,58(5),422?8.

6See,forinstance,Kitai,E.,Vinker,S.,Sandiuk,A.,Hornik,O.,Zeltcer,C.andGaver,A.(1998),‘UseofComplementaryandAlternativeMedicineamongPrimaryCarePatients’,FamilyPractice,15(5),411–14.Molassiotis,A.,etal.(2005),‘UseofComplementaryandAlternativeMedicineinCancerPatients:AEuropeanSurvey’,AnnalsofOncology,16(4),655?63.

7‘Yes,WeHaveNoInfectedBananas’,CBCNews,6March2000:http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/yes-we-have-no-infected-bananas-1.230298.

8Rabin,N.(2006),‘InterviewwithStephenColbert.TheOnion,https://tv.avclub.com/stephen-colbert-1798208958.

9Song,H.andSchwarz,N.(2008),‘FluencyandtheDetectionofMisleadingQuestions:LowProcessingFluencyAttenuatestheMosesIllusion’,SocialCognition,26(6),791?9.

10Thisresearchissummarisedinthefollowingreviewarticles:Schwarz,N.andNewman,E.J.(2017),‘HowDoestheGutKnowTruth?ThePsychologyof“Truthiness”’,APAScienceBrief:http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2017/08/gut-truth.aspx.Schwarz,N.,Newman,E.andLeach,W.(2016),‘MakingtheTruthStick&theMythsFade:LessonsfromCognitivePsychology’,BehavioralScience&Policy,2(1),85–95.SeealsoSilva,R.R.,Chrobot,N.,Newman,E.,Schwarz,N.andTopolinski,S.(2017),‘MakeItShortandEasy:UsernameComplexityDeterminesTrustworthinessAboveandBeyondObjectiveReputation’,FrontiersinPsychology,8,2200.

11Wu,W.,Moreno,A.M.,Tangen,J.M.,&Reinhard,J.(2013),‘HoneybeescandiscriminatebetweenMonetandPicassopaintings’,JournalofComparativePhysiologyA,199(1),45–55.Carlström,M.,&Larsson,S.C.(2018).‘Coffeeconsumptionandreducedriskofdevelopingtype2diabetes:asystematicreviewwithmeta-analysis’,NutritionReviews,76(6),395–417.Olszewski,M.,&Ortolano,R.(2011).‘Knucklecrackingandhandosteoarthritis’,TheJournaloftheAmericanBoardofFamilyMedicine,24(2),169–174.

12Newman,E.J.,Garry,M.andBernstein,D.M.,etal.(2012),‘NonprobativeWords(orPhotographs)InflateTruthiness’,PsychonomicBulletinandReview,19(5),969?74.

13Weaver,K.,Garcia,S.M.,Schwarz,N.andMiller,D.T.(2007),‘InferringthePopularityofanOpinionfromItsFamiliarity:ARepetitiveVoiceCanSoundLikeaChorus’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,92(5),821–33.

14Weisbuch,M.andMackie,D.(2009),‘FalseFame,PerceptualClarity,orPersuasion?FlexibleFluencyAttributioninSpokespersonFamiliarityEffects’,JournalofConsumerPsychology,19(1),62–72.

15Fernandez-Duque,D.,Evans,J.,Christian,C.andHodges,S.D.(2015),‘SuperfluousNeuroscienceInformationMakesExplanationsofPsychologicalPhenomenaMoreAppealing’,JournalofCognitiveNeuroscience,27(5),926–44.

16Proctor,R.(2011),GoldenHolocaust:OriginsoftheCigaretteCatastropheandtheCaseforAbolition.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,p.292.

17Seethefollowingpaperforathoroughdiscussionofthiseffect:Schwarz,N.Sanna,L.J.,Skurnik,I.andYoon,C.(2007),‘MetacognitiveExperiencesandtheIntricaciesofSettingPeopleStraight:ImplicationsforDebiasingandPublicInformationCampaigns’,AdvancesinExperimentalSocialPsychology,39,127?61.SeealsoPluviano,S.,Watt,C.andDellaSala,S.(2017),‘MisinformationLingersinMemory:FailureofThreePro-VaccinationStrategies’,PLOSOne,12(7),e0181640.

18Glum,J.(11November2017),‘SomeRepublicansStillThinkObamaWasBorninKenyaasTrumpResurrectsBirtherConspiracyTheory’,Newsweek,http://www.newsweek.com/trump-birther-obama-poll-republicans-kenya-744195.

19Lewandowsky,S.,Ecker,U.K.,Seifert,C.M.,Schwarz,N.andCook,J.(2012).‘MisinformationanditsCorrection:ContinuedInfluenceandSuccessfulDebiasing’.PsychologicalScienceinthePublicInterest,13(3),106–131.

20Cook,J.andLewandowsky,S.(2011),TheDebunkingHandbook.Availableathttps://skepticalscience.com/docs/Debunking_Handbook.pdf.

21NHSChoices,‘10MythsabouttheFluandFluVaccine’,https://www.nhs.uk/Livewell/winterhealth/Pages/Flu-myths.aspx.

22Smith,I.M.andMacDonald,N.E.(2017),‘CounteringEvidenceDenialandthePromotionofPseudoscienceinAutismSpectrumDisorder’,AutismResearch,10(8),1334?7.

23Pennycook,G.,Cheyne,J.A.,Koehler,D.J.,etal.(2016),‘IstheCognitiveReflectionTestaMeasureofBothReflectionandIntuition?’BehaviorResearchMethods,48(1),341?8.

24Pennycook,G.(2014),‘EvidenceThatAnalyticCognitiveStyleInfluencesReligiousBelief:CommentonRazmyarandReeve(2013)’,Intelligence,43,21?6.

25MuchofthisworkontheCognitiveReflectionTesthasbeensummarisedinthefollowingreviewpaper:Pennycook,G.,Fugelsang,J.A.andKoehler,D.J.(2015),‘EverydayConsequencesofAnalyticThinking’,CurrentDirectionsinPsychologicalScience,24(6),425?32.

26Pennycook,G.,Cheyne,J.A.,Barr,N.,Koehler,D.J.andFugelsang,J.A.(2015),‘OntheReceptionandDetectionofPseudo-ProfoundBullshit’,JudgmentandDecisionMaking,10(6),549?63.

27Pennycook,G.andRand,D.G.(2018),‘Lazy,NotBiased:SusceptibilitytoPartisanFakeNewsIsBetterExplainedbyLackofReasoningthanByMotivatedReasoning’,Cognition,https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011.SeealsoPennycook,G.andRand,D.G.(2017),‘WhoFallsforFakeNews?TheRolesofBullshitReceptivity,Overclaiming,Familiarity,andAnalyticThinking’,unpublishedpaper,https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3023545.

28Swami,V.,Voracek,M.,Stieger,S.,Tran,U.S.andFurnham,A.(2014),‘AnalyticThinkingReducesBeliefinConspiracyTheories’,Cognition,133(3),572?85.Thismethodofpriminganalyticthoughtcanalsoreducereligiousbeliefsandparanormalthinking:Gervais,W.M.andNorenzayan,A.(2012),‘AnalyticThinkingPromotesReligiousDisbelief’,Science,336(6080),493?6.

29LongbeforethemodernformoftheCognitiveReflectionTestwasinvented,psychologistshadnoticedthatitmaybepossibletoprimepeopletobemorecriticaloftheinformationtheyreceive.In1987,participantsweregivendeceptivelysimpletriviaquestions,withatemptingmisleadinganswer.Theprocesscuredtheirover-confidenceonasubsequenttest,helpingthemtocalibratetheirconfidencetotheiractualknowledge.Arkes,H.R.,Christensen,C.,Lai,C.andBlumer,C.(1987),‘TwoMethodsofReducingOverconfidence’,OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,39(1),133?44.

30Fitzgerald,C.J.andLueke,A.K.(2017),‘MindfulnessIncreasesAnalyticalThoughtandDecreasesJustWorldBeliefs’,CurrentResearchinSocialPsychology,24(8),80?5.

31Robinsonhimselfadmittedthatthenameswereunverified.Hebert,H.J.(1May1998),‘OddNamesAddedtoGreenhousePlea’,AssociatedPress:https://apnews.com/aec8beea85d7fe76fc9cc77b8392d79e.

32Cook,J.,Lewandowsky,S.andEcker,U.K.(2017),‘NeutralizingMisinformationthroughInoculation:ExposingMisleadingArgumentationTechniquesReducesTheirInfluence’,PLOSOne,12(5),

e0175799.33Forfurtherevidence,seeRoozenbeek,J.andVanderLinden,S.(2018),‘TheFakeNewsGame:

ActivelyInoculatingagainsttheRiskofMisinformation’,JournalofRiskResearch.DOI:10.1080/13669877.2018.1443491.

34McLaughlin,A.C.andMcGill,A.E.(2017),‘ExplicitlyTeachingCriticalThinkingSkillsinaHistoryCourse’,ScienceandEducation,26(1?2),93?105.Forafurtherdiscussionofthebenefitsofinoculationineducation,seeSchmaltz,R.andLilienfeld,S.O.(2014),‘Hauntings,Homeopathy,andtheHopkinsvilleGoblins:UsingPseudosciencetoTeachScientificThinking’,FrontiersinPsychology,5,336.

35Rowe,M.P.,Gillespie,B.M.,Harris,K.R.,Koether,S.D.,Shannon,L.J.Y.andRose,L.A.(2015),‘RedesigningaGeneralEducationScienceCoursetoPromoteCriticalThinking’,CBE-LifeSciencesEducation,14(3),ar30.

36See,forinstance,Butler,H.A.(2012),‘HalpernCriticalThinkingAssessmentPredictsReal-WorldOutcomesofCriticalThinking’,AppliedCognitivePsychology,26(5),721–9.Butler,H.A.,Pentoney,C.andBong,M.P.(2017),‘PredictingReal-WorldOutcomes:CriticalThinkingAbilityIsaBetterPredictorofLifeDecisionsthanIntelligence’,ThinkingSkillsandCreativity,25,38?46.

37See,forinstance,Arum,R.andRoksa,J.(2011),AcademicallyAdrift:LimitedLearningonCollegeCampuses,Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress.

38‘Editorial:Louisiana’sLatestAssaultonDarwin’,NewYorkTimes(21June2008),https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/21/opinion/21sat4.html.

39Kahan,D.M.(2016),‘ThePoliticallyMotivatedReasoningParadigm,Part1:WhatPoliticallyMotivatedReasoningIsandHowtoMeasureIt’,inEmergingTrendsintheSocialandBehavioralSciences:AnInterdisciplinary,Searchable,andLinkableResource,doi:10.1002/9781118900772.

40Hope,C.(8June2015),‘CampaigningAgainstGMCropsIs‘‘MorallyUnacceptable’’,SaysFormerGreenpeaceChief’,DailyTelegraph,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/agriculture/crops/11661016/Campaigning-against-GM-crops-is-morally-unacceptable-says-former-Greenpeace-chief.html.

41Shermer,M.(2007),WhyPeopleBelieveWeirdThings,London:SouvenirPress,pp.13?15.(Originallypublished1997.)42YoucanreadoneoftheseexchangesontheSkepticwebsite:https://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/05-05-03/.

43YoucanfindtheSkepticism101syllabus,includingareadinglist,atthefollowingwebsite:https://www.skeptic.com/downloads/Skepticism101-How-to-Think-Like-a-Scientist.pdf.

44Formoreinformation,seeShermer,M.(2012),TheBelievingBrain,London:Robinson,pp.251–8.Ifyouarelookingforacourseininoculation,I’dthoroughlyrecommendreadingShermer’swork.

Chapter71Feynman,R.(1985),SurelyYou’reJokingMrFeynman:AdventuresofaCuriousCharacter,NewYork:W.W.Norton.

2Thefollowingarticle,aninterviewwithoneofFeynman’sformerstudents,offersthisinterpretation:Wai,J.(2011),‘APolymathPhysicistonRichardFeynman’s“Low”IQandFindinganotherEinstein’,PsychologyToday,https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/finding-the-next-einstein/201112/polymath-physicist-richard-feynmans-low-iq-and-finding-another.

3Gleick,J.(1992),Genius:RichardFeynmanandModernPhysics(KindleEdition),pp.30?5.4Gleick,J.(17February1988),‘RichardFeynmanDeadat69:LeadingTheoreticalPhysicist’,NewYorkTimes,http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/17/obituaries/richard-feynman-dead-at-69-leading-theoretical-physicist.html?pagewanted=all.

5TheNobelPrizeinPhysics1965:https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1965/.6Kac,M.(1987),EnigmasofChance:AnAutobiography,Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,p.xxv.

7Gleick,‘RichardFeynmanDeadat69’.8Feynman,R.P.(1999),ThePleasureofFindingThingsOut,NewYork:PerseusBooks,p.3.9Feynman,R.P.(2006),Don’tYouHaveTimetoThink,ed.Feynman,M.,London:Penguin,p.414.10Darwin,C.(2016),LifeandLettersofCharlesDarwin(Vol.1),KrillPressviaPublishDrive.Available

onlineat:https://charles-darwin.classic-literature.co.uk/the-life-and-letters-of-charles-darwin-volume-i/ebook-page-42.asp.

11Darwin,C.(1958),SelectedLettersonEvolutionandNaturalSelection,ed.Darwin,F.,NewYork:DoverPublications,p.9.

12Engel,S.(2011),‘Children’sNeedtoKnow:CuriosityinSchools’,HarvardEducationalReview,81(4),625–45.

13Engel,S.(2015),TheHungryMind,Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,p.3.14VonStumm,S.,Hell,B.andChamorro-Premuzic,T.(2011),‘TheHungryMind:IntellectualCuriosity

IstheThirdPillarofAcademicPerformance’,PerspectivesonPsychologicalScience,6(6),574?88.15Engel,‘Children’sNeedtoKnow’.16Gruber,M.J.,Gelman,B.D.andRanganath,C.(2014),‘StatesofCuriosityModulateHippocampus-

DependentLearningviatheDopaminergicCircuit’,Neuron,84(2),486?96.Aprevious,slightlylessdetailedstudyhadcometobroadlythesameconclusions:Kang,M.J.,Hsu,M.,Krajbich,I.M.,Loewenstein,G.,McClure,S.M.,Wang,J.T.Y.andCamerer,C.F.(2009),‘TheWickintheCandleofLearning:EpistemicCuriosityActivatesRewardCircuitryandEnhancesMemory’,PsychologicalScience,20(8),963?73.

17HardyIII,J.H.,Ness,A.M.andMecca,J.(2017),‘OutsidetheBox:EpistemicCuriosityasaPredictorofCreativeProblemSolvingandCreativePerformance’,PersonalityandIndividualDifferences,104,230–7.

18Leonard,N.H.andHarvey,M.(2007),‘TheTraitofCuriosityasaPredictorofEmotionalIntelligence’,JournalofAppliedSocialPsychology,37(8),1914–29.

19Sheldon,K.M.,Jose,P.E.,Kashdan,T.B.andJarden,A.(2015),‘Personality,EffectiveGoal-Striving,andEnhancedWellBeing:Comparing10CandidatePersonalityStrengths’,PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,41(4),575–85.

20Kashdan,T.B.,Gallagher,M.W.,Silvia,P.J.,Winterstein,B.P.,Breen,W.E.,Terhar,D.andSteger,M.F.(2009),‘TheCuriosityandExplorationInventory-II:Development,FactorStructure,andPsychometrics’.JournalofResearchinPersonality,43(6),987–98.

21Krakovsky,M.(2007),‘TheEffortEffect’,StanfordAlumnimagazine,

https://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=32124.22Trei,L.(2007),‘NewStudyYieldsInstructiveResultsonHowMindsetAffectsLearning’,Stanford

Newswebsite,https://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/february7/dweck-020707.html.23HarvardBusinessReviewstaff(2014),‘HowCompaniesCanProfitFroma“GrowthMindset”’,

HarvardBusinessReview,https://hbr.org/2014/11/how-companies-can-profit-from-a-growth-mindset.24Alongtheselines,arecentstudyfoundthatgiftedstudentsareparticularlyatriskofthefixedmindset:

Esparza,J.,Shumow,L.andSchmidt,J.A.(2014),‘GrowthMindsetofGiftedSeventhGradeStudentsinScience’,NCSSSMSTJournal,19(1),6–13.

25Dweck,C.(2012),Mindset:ChangingtheWayYouThinktoFulfilYourPotential,London:Robinson,pp.17?18,234?9.

26Mangels,J.A.,Butterfield,B.,Lamb,J.,Good,C.andDweck,C.S.(2006),‘WhyDoBeliefsaboutIntelligenceInfluenceLearningSuccess?ASocialCognitiveNeuroscienceModel’,SocialCognitiveandAffectiveNeuroscience,1(2),75?86.

27Claro,S.,Paunesku,D.andDweck,C.S.(2016),‘GrowthMindsetTemperstheEffectsofPovertyonAcademicAchievement’,ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences,113(31),8664?8.

28Forevidenceofthebenefitsofmindset,seethefollowingmeta-analysis,examining113studies:Burnette,J.L.,O’Boyle,E.H.,VanEpps,E.M.,Pollack,J.M.andFinkel,E.J.(2013),‘MindsetsMatter:AMeta-AnalyticReviewofImplicitTheoriesandSelf-regulation’,PsychologicalBulletin,139(3),655?701.

29QuotedinRoberts,R.andKreuz,R.(2015),BecomingFluent:HowCognitiveScienceCanHelpAdultsLearnaForeignLanguage,Cambridge,MA:MITPress,pp.26–7.

30See,forexample,Rustin,S.(10May2016),‘NewTestfor“GrowthMindset”,theTheoryThatAnyoneWhoTriesCanSucceed’,Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/may/10/growth-mindset-research-uk-schools-sats.

31Brummelman,E.,Thomaes,S.,OrobiodeCastro,B.,Overbeek,G.andBushman,B.J.(2014),‘“That’sNotJustBeautiful?That’sIncrediblyBeautiful!”TheAdverseImpactofInflatedPraiseonChildrenwithLowSelf-esteem’,PsychologicalScience,25(3),728?35.

32Dweck,C.(2012),Mindset,London:Robinson,pp.180?6,234?9.SeealsoHaimovitz,K.andDweck,C.S.(2017),‘TheOriginsofChildren’sGrowthandFixedMindsets:NewResearchandaNewProposal’,ChildDevelopment,88(6),1849–59.

33Frank,R.(16October2013),‘BillionareSaraBlakelySaysSecrettoSuccessIsFailure’,CNBC:https://www.cnbc.com/2013/10/16/billionaire-sara-blakely-says-secret-to-success-is-failure.html.

34See,forinstance,Paunesku,D.,Walton,G.M.,Romero,C.,Smith,E.N.,Yeager,D.S.andDweck,C.S.(2015),‘MindsetInterventionsAreaScalableTreatmentforAcademicUnderachievement’,PsychologicalScience,26(6),784?93.Forfurtherevidenceofthepowerofinterventions,seethefollowingmeta-analysis:Lazowski,R.A.andHulleman,C.S.(2016),‘MotivationInterventionsinEducation:AMeta-AnalyticReview’,ReviewofEducationalResearch,86(2),602?40.

35See,forinstance,thefollowingmeta-analysis,whichfoundasmallbutsignificanteffect:Sisk,V.F.,Burgoyne,A.P.,Sun,J.,Butler,J.L.,Macnamara,B.N.(2018),‘ToWhatExtentandUnderWhichCircumstancesAreGrowthMindSetsImportanttoAcademicAchievement?TwoMeta-Analyses’,PsychologicalScience,inpress,https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617739704.Theexactinterpretationoftheseresultsisstillthematterofdebate.Generallyspeaking,itwouldseemthatthegrowthmindsetismostimportantwhenstudentsfeelvulnerable/threatened–meaningthattheinterventionsaremosteffectiveforchildrenofpoorerhouseholds,forinstance.Andwhileone-shotinterventionsdoprovidesomelong-termbenefits,itseemsclearthatamoreregularprogrammewouldbeneededtomaintainlargereffects.See:Orosz,G.,Péter-Szarka,S.,Bőthe,B.,Tóth-Király,I.andBerger,R.(2017),‘HowNottoDoaMindsetIntervention:LearningFromaMindsetInterventionamongStudentswithGoodGrades’,FrontiersinPsychology,8,311.Foranindependentanalysis,seethefollowingblogontheBritishPsychologicalSocietywebsite:https://digest.bps.org.uk/2018/03/23/this-cheap-brief-growth-mindset-intervention-shifted-struggling-students-onto-a-more-successful-trajectory/.

36Feynman,R.P.andFeynman,Michelle(2006),Don’tYouHaveTimetoThink?,London:Penguin.37ThisepisodeisdescribedingreaterdetailinFeynman’smemoir,SurelyYou’reJokingMrFeynman.38FeynmanandFeynman,Don’tYouHaveTimetoThink,p.xxi.39Feynman,R.(1972),NobelLectures,Physics1963?1970,Amsterdam:Elsevier.Retrievedonlineat

https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1965/feynman-lecture.html.40Kahan,D.M.,Landrum,A.,Carpenter,K.,Helft,L.andHallJamieson,K.(2017),‘ScienceCuriosity

andPoliticalInformationProcessing’,PoliticalPsychology,38(S1),179?99.41Kahan,D.(2016),‘ScienceCuriosityandIdentity-ProtectiveCognition...AGlimpseataPossible

(Negative)Relationship’,CulturalCognitionProjectblog,http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2016/2/25/science-curiosity-and-identity-protective-cognition-a-glimps.html.

42Porter,T.andSchumann,K.(2017),‘IntellectualHumilityandOpennesstotheOpposingView’,SelfandIdentity,17(2),1–24.IgorGrossmann,incidentally,hascometosimilarconclusionsinoneofhismostrecentstudies:Brienza,J.P.,Kung,F.Y.H.,Santos,H.C.,Bobocel,D.R.andGrossmann,I.(2017),‘Wisdom,Bias,andBalance:TowardaProcess-SensitiveMeasurementofWisdom-RelatedCognition.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,advanceonlinepublication,http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000171.

43Brienza,Kung,Santos,BobocelandGrossmann,‘Wisdom,Bias,andBalance’.44Feynman,R.P.(2015),TheQuotableFeynman,Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,p.283.45Morgan,E.S.(2003),BenjaminFranklin,NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,p.6.46Friend,T.(13November2017),‘GettingOn’,NewYorker,

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/11/20/why-ageism-never-gets-old/amp.47Friedman,T.L.(22February2014),‘HowtoGetaJobatGoogle’,NewYorkTimes,

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/opinion/sunday/friedman-how-to-get-a-job-at-google.html.

Chapter81DetailsofthisstorycanbefoundinoneofStigler’searliestworks:Stevenson,H.W.andStigler,J.W.(1992),TheLearningGap,NewYork:SummitBooks,p.16.

2Waldow,F.,Takayama,K.andSung,Y.K.(2014),‘RethinkingthePatternofExternalPolicyReferencing:MediaDiscoursesOverthe“AsianTigers”’PISASuccessinAustralia,GermanyandSouthKorea’,ComparativeEducation,50(3),302–21.

3Baddeley,A.D.andLongman,D.J.A.(1978),‘TheInfluenceofLengthandFrequencyofTrainingSessionontheRateofLearningtoType’,Ergonomics,21(8),627–35.

4Rohrer,D.(2012),‘InterleavingHelpsStudentsDistinguishAmongSimilarConcepts’,EducationalPsychologyReview,24(3),355?67.

5See,forinstance,Kornell,N.,Hays,M.J.andBjork,R.A.(2009),‘UnsuccessfulRetrievalAttemptsEnhanceSubsequentLearning’,JournalofExperimentalPsychology:Learning,Memory,andCognition,35(4),989.DeCaro,M.S.(2018),‘ReversetheRoutine:ProblemSolvingBeforeInstructionImprovesConceptualKnowledgeinUndergraduatePhysics’,ContemporaryEducationalPsychology,52,36–47.Clark,C.M.andBjork,R.A.(2014),‘WhenandWhyIntroducingDifficultiesandErrorsCanEnhanceInstruction’,inBenassi,V.A.,Overson,C.E.andHakala,C.M.(eds),ApplyingScienceofLearninginEducation:InfusingPsychologicalScienceintotheCurriculum,Washington,DC:SocietyfortheTeachingofPsychology,pp.20?30.

6See,forinstance,Kapur,Manu(2010),‘ProductiveFailureinMathematicalProblemSolving’,InstructionalScience,38(6),523–50.AndOveroye,A.L.andStorm,B.C.(2015),‘HarnessingthePowerofUncertaintytoEnhanceLearning’,TranslationalIssuesinPsychologicalScience,1(2),140.

7See,forinstance,SusanEngel’sdiscussionofRuthGranerandRachelBrown’sworkinEngel,S.(2015),TheHungryMind,Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,p.118.

8Seethefollowingarticlesforareviewofthesemetacognitiveillusions:Bjork,R.A.,Dunlosky,J.andKornell,N.(2013),‘Self-regulatedLearning:Beliefs,Techniques,andIllusions’,AnnualReviewofPsychology,64,417?44.Yan,V.X.,Bjork,E.L.andBjork,R.A.(2016),‘OntheDifficultyofMendingMetacognitiveIllusions:APrioriTheories,FluencyEffects,andMisattributionsoftheInterleavingBenefit’,JournalofExperimentalPsychology:General,145(7),918?33.

9Formoreinformationabouttheseresults,readStigler’searlierandlaterresearch.Hiebert,J.andStigler,J.W.(2017),‘TheCultureofTeaching:AGlobalPerspective’,inInternationalHandbookofTeacherQualityandPolicy,Abingdon,England:Routledge,pp.62–75.Stigler,J.W.andHiebert,J.(2009),TheTeachingGap:BestIdeasfromtheWorld’sTeachersforImprovingEducationintheClassroom,NewYork:Simon&Schuster.

10Park,H.(2010),‘JapaneseandKoreanHighSchoolsandStudentsinComparativePerspective’,inQualityandInequalityofEducation,Netherlands:Springer,pp.255–73.

11HiebertandStigler,‘TheCultureofTeaching’.12Foramoreindepthdiscussionoftheseideas,seeByrnes,J.P.andDunbar,K.N.(2014),‘TheNatureand

DevelopmentofCritical-analyticThinking’,EducationalPsychologyReview,26(4),477–93.13Seethefollowingforfurthercross-culturalcomparisons:Davies,M.andBarnett,R.(eds)(2015),The

PalgraveHandbookofCriticalThinkinginHigherEducation,Netherlands:Springer.14Foracomprehensivesummaryofthiswork,seeSpencer-Rodgers,J.,Williams,M.J.andPeng,K.

(2010),‘CulturalDifferencesinExpectationsofChangeandToleranceforContradiction:ADecadeofEmpiricalResearch’,PersonalityandSocialPsychologyReview,14(3),296–312.

15Rowe,M.B.(1986),‘WaitTime:SlowingDownMayBeaWayofSpeedingUp!’JournalofTeacherEducation,37(1),43–50.

16Langer,E.(1997),ThePowerofMindfulLearning,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,p.18.

17Ritchhart,R.andPerkins,D.N.(2000),‘LifeintheMindfulClassroom:NurturingtheDispositionofMindfulness’,JournalofSocialIssues,56(1),27?47.

18AlthoughLangerhaspioneeredthebenefitsofambiguityineducation,otherscientistshaveshowncomparablypowerfulresults.Similarly,RobertS.SieglerandXiaodongLinhavefoundthatchildrenlearnmathematicsandphysicsbestwhentheyareaskedtothinkthroughrightandwronganswerstoproblems,sincethisencouragesthemtoconsideralternativestrategiesandtoidentifyineffectivewaysofthinking.See,forexample,Siegler,R.S.andLin,X.,‘Self-explanationsPromoteChildren’sLearning’,inBorkowski,J.G.,Waters,H.S.andSchneider,W.(eds)(2010),Metacognition,StrategyUse,andInstruction,NewYork:Guilford,pp.86?113.

19Langer,ThePowerofMindfulLearning,p.29.AndOveroye,A.L.andStorm,B.C.(2015),‘HarnessingthePowerofUncertaintytoEnhanceLearning’,TranslationalIssuesinPsychologicalScience,1(2),140.SeealsoEngel,S.(2011),‘Children’sNeedtoKnow:CuriosityinSchools’,HarvardEducationalReview,81(4),625–45.

20Brackett,M.A.,Rivers,S.E.,Reyes,M.R.andSalovey,P.(2012),‘EnhancingAcademicPerformanceandSocialandEmotionalCompetencewiththeRULERFeelingWordsCurriculum’,LearningandIndividualDifferences,22(2),218–24.Jacobson,D.,Parker,A.,Spetzler,C.,DeBruin,W.B.,Hollenbeck,K.,Heckerman,D.andFischhoff,B.(2012),‘ImprovedLearninginUSHistoryandDecisionCompetencewithDecision-focusedCurriculum’,PLOSOne,7(9),e45775.

21Thefollowingstudy,forinstance,showsthatgreaterintellectualhumilitycompletelyeradicatesthedifferencesinacademicachievementthatyounormallyfindbetweenhigh-andlow-abilitystudents.Hu,J.,Erdogan,B.,Jiang,K.,Bauer,T.N.andLiu,S.(2018),‘LeaderHumilityandTeamCreativity:TheRoleofTeamInformationSharing,PsychologicalSafety,andPowerDistance’,JournalofAppliedPsychology,103(3),313.

22Forthesourcesofthesesuggestions,seeBjork,DunloskyandKornell,‘Self-regulatedLearning’.Soderstrom,N.C.andBjork,R.A.(2015),‘LearningVersusPerformance:AnIntegrativeReview’,PerspectivesonPsychologicalScience,10(2),176–99.Benassi,V.A.,Overson,C.andHakala,C.M.(2014),ApplyingScienceofLearninginEducation:InfusingPsychologicalScienceintotheCurriculum,AmericanPsychologicalAssociation.

23See,forexample,thefollowingblogpostbypsychologistandmusicianChristineCarterformoreinformation:https://bulletproofmusician.com/why-the-progress-in-the-practice-room-seems-to-disappear-overnight/.

24Langer,E.,Russel,T.andEisenkraft,N.(2009),‘OrchestralPerformanceandtheFootprintofMindfulness’,PsychologyofMusic,37(2),125–36.

25ThesedatahavebeenreleasedontheIVA’swebsite:http://www.ivalongbeach.org/academics/curriculum/61-academics/test-scores-smarter-balanced.

Chapter91Taylor,D.(2016,June27),‘EnglandHumiliatedasIcelandKnockThemOutofEuro2016’,Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/27/england-iceland-euro-2016-match-report.

2See,forexample,http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/england-vs-iceland-steve-mcclaren-reaction-goal-euro-2016-a7106896.html.

3Taylor,‘EnglandHumiliatedasIcelandKnockThemOutofEuro2016’.4Wall,K.(27June2016),‘IcelandWinsHeartsatEuro2016asSoccer’sGlobalUnderdog’,Time,http://time.com/4383403/iceland-soccer-euro-2016-england/.

5Zeileis,A.,Leitner,C.andHornik,K.(2016),‘PredictiveBookmakerConsensusModelfortheUEFAEuro2016’,WorkingPapersinEconomicsandStatistics,No.2016–15,https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/146132/1/859777529.pdf.

6Woolley,A.W.,Aggarwal,I.andMalone,T.W.(2015),‘CollectiveIntelligenceandGroupPerformance’,CurrentDirectionsinPsychologicalScience,24(6),420?4.

7Wuchty,S.,Jones,B.F.andUzzi,B.(2007),‘TheIncreasingDominanceofTeamsinProductionofKnowledge’,Science,316(5827),1036?9.

8Woolley,A.W.,Chabris,C.F.,Pentland,A.,Hashmi,N.andMalone,T.W.(2010),‘EvidenceforaCollectiveIntelligenceFactorinthePerformanceofHumanGroups’,Science,330(6004),686?8.

9Engel,D.,Woolley,A.W.,Jing,L.X.,Chabris,C.F.andMalone,T.W.(2014),‘ReadingtheMindintheEyesorReadingbetweentheLines?TheoryofMindPredictsCollectiveIntelligenceEquallyWellOnlineandFace-to-face’,PLOSOne,9(12),e115212.

10Mayo,A.T.andWoolley,A.W.(2016),‘TeamworkinHealthCare:MaximizingCollectiveIntelligenceviaInclusiveCollaborationandOpenCommunication’,AMAJournalofEthics,18(9),933?40.

11Woolley,AggarwalandMalone(2015),‘CollectiveIntelligenceandGroupPerformance’.12Kim,Y.J.,Engel,D.,Woolley,A.W.,Lin,J.Y.T.,McArthur,N.andMalone,T.W.(2017),‘WhatMakes

aStrongTeam?UsingCollectiveIntelligencetoPredictTeamPerformanceinLeagueofLegends’,inProceedingsofthe2017ACMConferenceonComputerSupportedCooperativeWorkandSocialComputing,NewYork:ACM,pp.2316?29.

13See,forexample,Ready,D.A.andConger,J.A.(2007),‘MakeYourCompanyaTalentFactory’,HarvardBusinessReview,85(6),68?77.Thefollowingpaperalsooffersoriginalsurveysaswellasabroaderdiscussionofourpreferencefor‘talent’attheexpenseofteamwork:Swaab,R.I.,Schaerer,M.,Anicich,E.M.,Ronay,R.andGalinsky,A.D.(2014),‘TheToo-much-talentEffect:TeamInterdependenceDeterminesWhenMoreTalentIsTooMuchorNotEnough’,PsychologicalScience,25(8),1581?91.SeealsoAlvesson,M.andSpicer,A.(2016),TheStupidityParadox:ThePowerandPitfallsofFunctionalStupidityatWork,London:Profile,KindleEdition(Kindlelocation1492?1504).

14ThisworkwasacollaborationwithCameronAnderson,alsoattheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley.Hildreth,J.A.D.andAnderson,C.(2016),‘FailureattheTop:HowPowerUnderminesCollaborativePerformance’,JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,110(2),261?86.

15Greer,L.L.,Caruso,H.M.andJehn,K.A.(2011),‘TheBiggerTheyAre,TheHarderTheyFall:LinkingTeamPower,TeamConflict,andPerformance’,OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,116(1),116?28.

16Groysberg,B.,Polzer,J.T.andElfenbein,H.A.(2011),‘TooManyCooksSpoiltheBroth:HowHigh-StatusIndividualsDecreaseGroupEffectiveness’,OrganizationScience,22(3),722?37.

17Kishida,K.T.,Yang,D.,Quartz,K.H.,Quartz,S.R.andMontague,P.R.(2012),‘ImplicitSignalsinSmallGroupSettingsandTheirImpactontheExpressionofCognitiveCapacityandAssociatedBrainResponses’,PhilosophicalTransactionsoftheRoyalSocietyB,367(1589),704–16.

18‘GroupSettingsCanDiminishExpressionsofIntelligence,EspeciallyamongWomen’,VirginiaTech

CarilionResearchInstitute,http://research.vtc.vt.edu/news/2012/jan/22/group-settings-can-diminish-expressions-intelligen/.

19Galinsky,A.,Schweitzer,M.(2015),‘TheProblemofTooMuchTalent’,TheAtlantic,https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/hierarchy-friend-foe-too-much-talent/401150/

20Swaab,R.I.,Schaerer,M.,Anicich,E.M.,Ronay,R.andGalinsky,A.D.(2014),‘TheToo-much-talentEffect’.

21Herbert,I.(27June2016),‘EnglandvsIceland:TooWealthy,TooFamous,TooMuchEgo?JoeHartEpitomisesEverythingThat’sWrong’,Independent,http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/england-vs-iceland-reaction-too-rich-too-famous-too-much-ego-joe-hart-epitomises-everything-that-is-a7106591.html.

22Roberto,M.A.(2002),‘LessonsFromEverest:TheInteractionofCognitiveBias,PsychologicalSafety,andSystemComplexity’,CaliforniaManagementReview,45(1),136?58.

23https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/everest/stories/leadership.html.24Schwartz,S.(2008),‘The7SchwartzCulturalValueOrientationScoresfor80Countries’,doi:

10.13140/RG.2.1.3313.3040.25Anicich,E.M.,Swaab,R.I.,&Galinsky,A.D.(2015).Hierarchicalculturalvaluespredictsuccessand

mortalityinhigh-stakesteams.ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences,112(5),1338?43.26Jang,S.(2017).‘CulturalBrokerageandCreativePerformanceinMulticulturalTeams’,Organization

Science,28(6),993–1009.27Ou,A.Y.,Waldman,D.A.andPeterson,S.J.(2015),‘DoHumbleCEOsMatter?AnExaminationof

CEOHumilityandFirmOutcomes’,JournalofManagement,44(3),1147?73.Forfurtherdiscussionofthebenefitsofhumbleleaders,andthereasonswedon’toftenvaluetheirhumility,seeMayo,M.(2017),‘IfHumblePeopleMaketheBestLeaders,WhyDoWeFallforCharismaticNarcissists?’HarvardBusinessReview,https://hbr.org/2017/04/if-humble-people-make-the-best-leaders-why-do-we-fall-for-charismatic-narcissists.Heyden,M.L.M.andHayward,M.(2017),‘It’sHardtoFindaHumbleCEO:Here’sWhy’,TheConversation,https://theconversation.com/its-hard-to-find-a-humble-ceo-heres-why-81951.Rego,A.,Owens,B.,Leal,S.,Melo,A.I.,eCunha,M.P.,Gonçalves,L.andRibeiro,P.(2017),‘HowLeaderHumilityHelpsTeamstoBeHumbler,PsychologicallyStronger,andMoreEffective:AModeratedMediationModel’,TheLeadershipQuarterly,28(5),639–58.

28Cable,D.(23April2018),‘HowHumbleLeadershipReallyWorks’,HarvardBusinessReview,https://hbr.org/2018/04/how-humble-leadership-really-works.

29Rieke,M.,Hammermeister,J.andChase,M.(2008),‘ServantLeadershipinSport:ANewParadigmforEffectiveCoachBehavior’,InternationalJournalofSportsScience&Coaching,3(2),227?39.

30Abdul-Jabbar,K.(2017),CoachWoodenandMe:Our50-YearFriendshipOnandOfftheCourt,NewYork:GrandCentral.ThefollowingarticleprovidesamoreindepthdiscussionofWooden’scoachingstyleandthelessonsitmayteachbusinessleaders:Riggio,R.E.(2010),‘TheLeadershipofJohnWooden’,PsychologyTodayblog,https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/cutting-edge-leadership/201006/the-leadership-john-wooden.

31Ames,N.(13June2016),‘MeetHeimirHallgrimsson,Iceland’sCo-managerandPracticingDentist’,ESPNblog,http://www.espn.com/soccer/club/iceland/470/blog/post/2879337/meet-heimir-hallgrimsson-icelands-co-manager-and-practicing-dentist.

Chapter101See,forinstance,Izon,D.,Danenberger,E.P.andMayes,M.(2007),‘AbsenceofFatalitiesinBlowoutsEncouraginginMMSStudyofOCSIncidents1992–2006’,DrillingContractor,63(4),84–9.Gold,R.andCasselman,B.(30April2010),‘DrillingProcessAttractsScrutinyinRigExplosion’,WallStreetJournal,30.

2https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/dec/07/transocean-oil-rig-north-sea-deepwater-horizon.3Vaughan,A.(16January2018),‘BP’sDeepwaterHorizonBillTops$65bn’,Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/16/bps-deepwater-horizon-bill-tops-65bn.

4Barstow,D.,Rohde,D.andSaul,S.(25December2010),‘DeepwaterHorizon’sFinalHours’,NewYorkTimes,http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/26spill.html.AndGoldenberg,S.(8November2010),‘BPHadLittleDefenceagainstaDisaster,FederalInvestigationSays’,Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/nov/08/bp-little-defence-deepwater-disaster.

5Spicer,A.(2004),‘MakingaWorldView?GlobalisationDiscourseinaPublicBroadcaster’,PhDthesis,DepartmentofManagement,UniversityofMelbourne,https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35838.

6Alvesson,M.andSpicer,A.(2016),TheStupidityParadox:ThePowerandPitfallsofFunctionalStupidityatWork,London:Profile,KindleEdition(KindleLocations61?7).

7AlvessonandSpicer,TheStupidityParadox(KindleLocations192?8).8Grossman,Z.(2014),‘StrategicIgnoranceandtheRobustnessofSocialPreferences’,ManagementScience,60(11),2659?65.

9SpicerhaswrittenaboutthisresearchinmoredepthforTheConversation:Spicer,A.(2015),‘“FailEarly,FailOften”MantraForgetsEntrepreneursFailtoLearn’,https://theconversation.com/fail-early-fail-often-mantra-forgets-entrepreneurs-fail-to-learn-51998.

10Huy,Q.andVuori,T.(2015),‘WhoKilledNokia?NokiaDid’,INSEADKnowledge,https://knowledge.insead.edu/strategy/who-killed-nokia-nokia-did-4268.Vuori,T.O.andHuy,Q.N.(2016),‘DistributedAttentionandSharedEmotionsintheInnovationProcess:HowNokiaLosttheSmartphoneBattle’,AdministrativeScienceQuarterly,61(1),9?51.

11Grossmann,I.(2017),‘WisdominContext’,PerspectivesonPsychologicalScience,12(2),233?57;Staw,B.M.,Sandelands,L.E.andDutton,J.E.(1981),‘ThreatRigidityEffectsinOrganizationalBehavior:AMultilevelAnalysis’,AdministrativeScienceQuarterly,26(4),501?24.

12Theentireslideshowisavailablehere:https://www.slideshare.net/reed2001/culture-1798664.13Feynman,R.(1986),‘ReportofthePresidentialCommissionontheSpaceShuttleChallengerAccident’,

Volume2,AppendixF,https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/outreach/SignificantIncidents/assets/rogers_commission_report.pdf.

14Dillon,R.L.andTinsley,C.H.(2008),‘HowNear-missesInfluenceDecisionMakingunderRisk:AMissedOpportunityforLearning’,ManagementScience,54(8),1425?40.

15Tinsley,C.H.,Dillon,R.L.andMadsen,P.M.(2011),‘HowtoAvoidCatastrophe’,HarvardBusinessReview,89(4),90?7.

16Accord,H.andCamry,T.(2013),‘Near-missesandFailure(Part1)’,HarvardBusinessReview,89(4),90?7.

17Cole,R.E.(2011),‘WhatReallyHappenedtoToyota?’MITSloanManagementReview,52(4).18Cole,‘WhatReallyHappenedtoToyota?’19Dillon,R.L.,Tinsley,C.H.,Madsen,P.M.andRogers,E.W.(2016),‘OrganizationalCorrectivesfor

ImprovingRecognitionofNear-missEvents’,JournalofManagement,42(3),671?97.20Tinsley,DillonandMadsen,‘HowtoAvoidCatastrophe’.21Dillon,Tinsley,MadsenandRogers,‘OrganizationalCorrectivesforImprovingRecognitionofNear-

missEvents’.22Reader,T.W.andO’Connor,P.(2014),‘TheDeepwaterHorizonExplosion:Non-TechnicalSkills,

SafetyCulture,andSystemComplexity’,JournalofRiskResearch,17(3),405?24.SeealsoHouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonEnergyandCommerce,SubcommitteeonOversightandInvestigations(25May2010),‘Memorandum“KeyQuestionsArisingFromInquiryintotheDeepwaterHorizonGulfofMexicoOilSpill”’,onlineathttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/homepage/memo_bp_waxman.pdf.

23Tinsley,C.H.,Dillon,R.L.andCronin,M.A.(2012),‘HowNear-MissEventsAmplifyorAttenuateRiskyDecisionMaking’,ManagementScience,58(9),1596?1613.

24Tinsley,DillonandMadsen,‘HowtoAvoidCatastrophe’.25NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill(2011),DeepWater:TheGulfOil

DisasterandtheFutureofOffshoreDrilling,p.224,https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.

26DeepwaterHorizonStudyGroup(2011),‘FinalReportontheInvestigationoftheMacondoWellBlowout’,CenterforCatastrophicRiskManagement,UniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley,http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/dhsgfinalreport-march2011-tag.pdf.

27Weick,K.E.,Sutcliffe,K.M.andObstfeld,D.(2008),‘OrganizingforHighReliability:ProcessesofCollectiveMindfulness’,CrisisManagement,3(1),31?66.Plain-languageexplanationsofthecharacteristicsofmindfulorganisationswerealsoinspiredbythefollowingpaper:Sutcliffe,K.M.(2011),‘HighReliabilityOrganizations(HROs)’,BestPracticeandResearchClinicalAnaesthesiology,25(2),133?44.

28Bronstein,S.andDrash,W.(2010),‘RigSurvivors:BPOrderedShortcutonDayofBlast’,CNN,http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/06/08/oil.rig.warning.signs/index.html.

29‘TheLossofUSSThresher(SSN-593)’(2014),http://ussnautilus.org/blog/the-loss-of-uss-thresher-ssn-593/.

30NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill(2011),DeepWater:TheGulfOilDisasterandtheFutureofOffshoreDrilling,p.229,https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.

31Cochrane,B.S.,HaginsJr,M.,Picciano,G.,King,J.A.,Marshall,D.A.,Nelson,B.andDeao,C.(2017),‘HighReliabilityinHealthcare:CreatingtheCultureandMindsetforPatientSafety’,HealthcareManagementForum,30(2),61–8.

32Seethefollowingpaperforoneexample:Roberts,K.H.,Madsen,P.,Desai,V.andVanStralen,D.(2005),‘ACaseoftheBirthandDeathofaHighReliabilityHealthcareOrganisation’,BMJQuality&Safety,14(3),216–20.Afurtherdiscussioncanalsobefoundhere:Sutcliffe,K.M.,Vogus,T.J.andDane,E.(2016),‘MindfulnessinOrganizations:ACross-levelReview’,AnnualReviewofOrganizationalPsychologyandOrganizationalBehavior,3,55–81.

33Dweck,C.(2014),‘Talent:HowCompaniesCanProfitFroma“GrowthMindset”’,HarvardBusinessReview,92(11),7.

34NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill,DeepWater,p.237.35Carter,J.P.(2006),‘TheTransformationoftheNuclearPowerIndustry’,IEEEPowerandEnergy

Magazine,4(6),25?33.36Koch,W.(20April2015),‘IsDeepwaterDrillingSafer,5YearsafterWorstOilSpill?’National

Geographic,https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/04/150420-bp-gulf-oil-spill-safety-five-years-later/.Seealsothefollowingforadiscussionoftheoilindustry’sself-regulation,andthereasonsitisnotcomparabletoINPO:‘AnUpdateonSelf-RegulationintheOilDrillingIndustry’(2012),GeorgeWashingtonJournalofEnergyandEnvironmentalLaw,https://gwjeel.com/2012/02/08/an-update-on-self-regulation-in-the-oil-drilling-industry/.

37Beyer,J.,Trannum,H.C.,Bakke,T.,Hodson,P.V.andCollier,T.K.(2016),‘EnvironmentalEffectsoftheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill:AReview’,MarinePollutionBulletin,110(1),28?51.

38Lane,S.M.,etal.(November2015),‘ReproductiveOutcomeandSurvivalofCommonBottlenose

DolphinsSampledinBaratariaBay,Louisiana,USA,FollowingtheDeepwaterHorizonOilSpill’,ProceedingsoftheRoyalSocietyB,282(1818),20151944.

39Jamail,D.(20April2012),‘GulfSeafoodDeformitiesAlarmScientists’,AlJazeera.com,https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/201241682318260912.html.

Epilogue1BesidesthematerialcoveredinChapters1,7and8,seethefollowing:Jacobson,D.,Parker,A.,Spetzler,C.,DeBruin,W.B.,Hollenbeck,K.,Heckerman,D.andFischhoff,B.(2012),‘ImprovedLearninginUSHistoryandDecisionCompetencewithDecision-focusedCurriculum’,PLOSOne,7(9),e45775.

2Owens,B.P.,Johnson,M.D.andMitchell,T.R.(2013),‘ExpressedHumilityinOrganizations:ImplicationsforPerformance,Teams,andLeadership’,OrganizationScience,24(5),1517–38.

3Sternberg,R.J.(inpress),‘RacetoSamarra:TheCriticalImportanceofWisdomintheWorldToday’,inSternberg,R.J.andGlueck,J.(eds),CambridgeHandbookofWisdom(2ndedn),NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

4Howell,L.(2013),‘DigitalWildfiresinaHyperconnectedWorld’,WEFReport,3,15–94.5Wang,H.andLi,J.(2015),‘HowTraitCuriosityInfluencesPsychologicalWellBeingandEmotionalExhaustion:TheMediatingRoleofPersonalInitiative’,PersonalityandIndividualDifferences,75,135?40.

Acknowledgements

This book could not exist if it were not for the generosity of many people.Thanksmost of all tomy agent,Carrie Plitt, for her enthusiastic belief inmyproposalandhersupportandguidanceeversince.ThanksalsototherestoftheteamatFelicityBryanAssociates,ZoëPagnamentainNewYork,andtheteamatAndrewNurnbergAssociatesforhelpingtospreadthewordintherestoftheworld.I have been lucky to have been guided by my editors, DrummondMoir at

Hodder&StoughtonandMattWeilandatWWNorton.Theirwise judgementandtactfuleditshaveimprovedthisbooknoendandIhavelearntsomuchfromtheiradvice.ThanksalsotoCameronMyersatHodderforhissuggestionsandforallhishelpinensuringtheeditorialprocessflowedassmoothlyaspossible.I am incredibly grateful to the many experts who shared their insights and

knowledge with me. These include: David Perkins, Robert Sternberg, JamesFlynn,KeithStanovich,WändiBruinedeBruin,DanKahan,HugoMercier,ItielDror, RohanWilliamson, Igor Grossmann, Ethan Kross, AndrewHafenbrack,Silvia Mamede, Pat Croskerry, Norbert Schwarz, Eryn Newman, GordonPennycook,MichaelShermer,StephanLewandowsky,JohnCook,SusanEngel,CarolDweck,TenellePorter, JamesStigler,RobertandElizabethBjork,EllenLanger,AnitaWilliamsWoolley,AngusHildreth,BradleyOwens,AmyYiOu,Andre Spicer, Catherine Tinsley, Karlene Roberts – and the many otherinterviewees who have not been quoted, but whose expertise neverthelesscontributedtomyargument.ThanksalsotoBrandonMayfieldforkindlysharinghisexperienceswithme;

Michael Story,who gaveme a little glimpse ofwhat itmeans to be a super-forecaster;andJonnyDavidsonforhishelpwiththediagrams.IamalsogratefultothestaffandstudentsattheIntellectualVirtuesAcademyinLongBeach,whocouldnothavebeenmorewelcomingduringmyvisit.RichardFisheratBBCFuturefirstcommissionedmetowriteapieceon the

‘downsidesofbeingintelligent’ in2015.Thanksforsetting theball inmotion,and for the continued encouragement and advice throughout my career. Andthanks to my friends and colleagues, including Sally Adee, Eileen and PeterDavies, Kate Douglas, Stephen Dowling, Natasha and Sam Fenwick, SimonFrantz,MelissaHogenboom,OliviaHowitt, Christian Jarrett, Emma and SamPartington, Jo Perry,AlexRiley,MatthewRobson,Neil and Lauren Sullivan,

Helen Thomson, Richard Webb and Clare Wilson, who have all offeredinvaluable support. I owe you all many drinks. A Marta, Luca, Damiano eStefania,grazieinfinite.I owemore than I can describe tomy parents,Margaret andAlbert, and to

RobertDavies, foryoursupport ineverystepof this journey. Icouldnothavewrittenthisbookwithoutyou.

PictureCreditsThepublisherwouldliketothankthefollowingfortheirpermissiontoreproducetheseimages.Everyattempthasbeenmadetocontactthecopyrightholders,howeverifanyomissionshaveoccurredpleasecontactthepublishersandwewillrectifyanyerrorsattheearliestopportunity.

CourtesyofNationalLibraryofMedicine/NCBIWikimedia/Life of Riley. CC BY-SA 3.0https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.enOur World in Data/Max Roser CC BY-SAhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/au/Kahan,D.M.‘Ordinaryscienceintelligence’:ascience-comprehensionmeasurefor study of risk and science communication, with notes on evolution andclimatechange,J.RiskRess20,995–1016(2017).Courtesy of theUSDepartment of Justice’sOffice of the InspectorGeneral’sreport ‘Review of the FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case’https://oig.justice.gov/special/s1105.pdf Diagram and captions created by theauthorRoderick I. Swaab, Michael Schaerer, Eric M. Anicich, et al. ‘TheTooMuchTalentEffect: Team InterdependenceDeterminesWhenMoreTalentIsTooMuchorNotEnough’PsychologicalScience25(8),1581–1591(2014).ReprintedbyPermissionofSAGEPublications,Inc.