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THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES INPSYCHOANALYSIS:
THE DEBATES ON MELANIE KLEIN AND JACQUES LACAN INTHE RIO DE LA PLATA
RICARDO BERNARDISantiago Vazquez 1142, Montevideo 11300, Uruguay
(Final version accepted9 Jan 2002)
Controversies are part of the process of scientic knowing. In psychoanalysis, thediversity of theoretical, technical and epistemological positions makes the debate
particularly necessary and by the same token difcult. In this paper, the author
examines the function of controversies and the obstacles to their development, taking as
examples the debates held in the Ro de la Plata (Buenos Aires and Montevideo) during
the nineteen seventies, when the dominant Kleinian ideas came into contact with
Lacanian thought. The author examines different examples of argumentative dis-
courses, using concepts taken from the theory of argumentation. The major difculties
encountered did not hinge on characteristics pertaining to psychoanalytic theories (i.e.
the lack of commensurability between them), but on the defensive strategies aimed at
keeping each theorys premises safe from the opposing partys arguments. A true debateimplies the construction of a shared argumentative eld that makes it possible to lay
out the different positions and see some interaction between them and is guided by the
search for the best argument. When this occurs, controversies promote the disciplines
development, even when they fail to reach any consensus.
Keywords: Controversies, argumentation, incommensurability, Klein, Lacan,
Baranger.
Introduction
Certain methodological and epistemological
problems of present-day psychoanalysis
emerge quite clearly when situations of theor-
etical or technical dissent among analysts are
studied. Confronted with discrepancies, each
of the positions is invitedat least in princi-
pleto substantiate its afrmations, elucidat-
ing the reasoning that supports them. The
study of this reasoning should make it possi-
ble to better understand the problems under
discussion, evaluate the different solutions
that were proposed and identify any consen-
sus or points where there is no agreement and
further research is needed. As analysts, too,
we know that it is necessary to remain aware
of the unconscious forces that can inect the
apparent rationality of a given discourse. Ex-
amining the substantiations used in situations
of dissent should open the way to greater un-
derstanding of how the problem of narcissism
and alteritywhich any discussion stirs up
is being managed at the unconscious level.
That would also lead every participant to
self-examination of his/her unconscious
Int. J. Psychoanal. (2002)83, 851
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relationship with analytic theories and with
whatever signicance particular authors or
ideas might have in each individuals personal
history. If events did happen in the way I have
just described, we would be looking at a
heartening panorama where successive gen-
erations of analysts would have ready accessto a clear vision of the previous generations
advances, of the different theoretical and
technical paths opening the way to possible
new steps and of the reasons proffered for
preferring certain paths over others. At the
same time, the experience of personal analy-
sis would make it possible to more efciently
manage the uncertainty and hostility debate
generates, and also the unconscious conictsand remnants of transference inecting the
choice of theory. I believe that at this point no
one doubts that I am describing a panorama
more ideal than real, which in this post era
sounds like a dream of the Enlightenment.1
The fact is that scientic debates or
controversies are possible, though difcult. If
we observe the debates that take place in
psychoanalysis, whether in written or oral
form, or internally (when a person examinesa topic in his/her own mind), we discover
that there are a series of factors tending to
restrict the scope of the exercise. The number
and heterogeneity of positions existing in our
discipline, and the indeterminate character of
the limits between them, make it quite
difcult if not impossible to consider all
positions when entering into a debate. Even
those controversies that have had the greatestinternational repercussions, like those of the
British Society in the nineteen forties, were
limited to the ideas dominant within the local
tradition. But even though it is necessary to
accept the restricted nature of debates, it
proves to be of the greatest importance, for
the integrity of the eld of psychoanalysis, to
examine those debates that break out between
psychoanalytic conceptions differing substan-
tively in their theoretical, technical and
epistemological suppositions. Such research
should centre on particular instances, thoughit should at the same time arrive at conclu-
sions that could be generally valid.
From a historical perspective, Freuds in-
uence did not make it easy to create a
culture of debate and free examination of
differences; instead, the use of authority-
based arguments and the exclusion of diver-
gent positions were favoured. Only recent
decades have witnessed slow but sure pro-gress in the recognition of the fact of, and
right to, theoretical and technical pluralism in
psychoanalysis. However, the existence of a
diversity of positions made it necessary to
clarify the points of agreement and disagree-
ment between them, to identify, not only
instances of real consensus, but also points
open to discussion. Scientic controversies
thus become unavoidable paths opening the
way for the discipline to advance through anarray of opinions.
For controversy to be possible there must
exist minimum prior agreement regarding the
methodological procedures and epistemologi-
cal bases that will govern the discussion, so
that the arguments offered by each party can
be evaluated by mutual consent. But arriving
at shared criteria is no easy matter. Studying
the editorial policies of psychoanalyticaljournals, Tuckett reached the following con-
clusion: For those who believe in psycho-
analysis, the disciplines frequent failure to
develop an ongoing methodology of rigorous
debate to sustain it should be a major
1We must, withal, be cautious in surrendering the dreams of the Enlightenment. The critique of a too narrow
conception of reason does not mean that all forms of rationality must be given up. Psychoanalysis itself wasborn of, and continues tied to, a certain form of rationality, as Steiner states: In fact, both the scientic and the
curative norms of psychoanalysis imply the acceptance and the use of logical presidia and moral values which
stem from a particular blending of the liberal radical tradition with the Enlightenment and Romantic traditions
of Western European culture without which psychoanalysiscould not have been born (1995, p. 442).
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concern (1998, p. 446). The rst require-
ment, then, is to have procedures that make it
possible to discuss procedures.
Freud had advised taking instances of
dissent to the court of clinical experience,
testing divergent positions on the basis of
particular cases and clinical problems. Hestated:
As a rule, however, theoretical controversy is unfruit-
ful. No sooner has one begun to depart from the
material on which one ought to be relying, than one
runs the risk of becoming intoxicated with ones own
assertions and, in the end, of supporting opinions that
any observation would have contradicted. For this
reason it seems to me to be incomparably more
useful to combat dissentientinterpretationsby testingthem upon particular cases and problems (1918
[1914], p. 48).
Facts and all, it is not easy for the clinical
court to reach unanimous and incontroverti-
ble decisions, and discrepancies regarding the
correct interpretation of a particular material
are frequent. The insufcient reliability of
clinical judgements constitutes a problem
when basing theoretical developments onthem. This problem becomes more manage-
able when one species the different contexts
to which clinical judgements may pertain and,
in light of those contexts, the different paths
forward that become available.
I will now discuss three types of contexts.
First, psychoanalytical clinical judgements
can be used to support decisions in the eld
of health sciences. Medicine has met with asimilar problem of lack of consensus in the
clinical area. The evidence-based medicine
movement (Sackett et al., 1997) attempts to
confront the disparity in clinical judgements
bearing on the efcacy of treatments, deve-
loping methodological procedures that make
it possible to evaluate the degree of scientic
support accorded to different therapeutic ap-
proaches. The idea of empirically supported
treatments is a current subject of discussion
for the different psychotherapies, and psycho-
analysis is also involved.2 It is probable thatadvances in systematic research on the pro-
cess and the results of treatments will make it
possible to answer certain kinds of questions
with increasing precision, such as which
therapeutic approach benets, in what
evidence-based way, what types of patients
and by what means does it achieve this. It is
probable, too, that neighbouring elds (the
neurosciences, the study of child develop-ment, cognitive psychology, epidemiological
studies etc.) could contribute useful know-
ledge on a number of other issues that
psychoanalysis is questioning at present
(though certainly not on all of them). It is
worth noting that in all these cases, know-
ledge is supported by well-dened methodo-
logical procedures and, when discrepancies
arise, the procedures themselves become the
focus of the discussion, for they supply thecriteria that support the argumentation.3
Second, other issues pertaining to psycho-
analytical controversies, however, are not
amenable to this type of standardised proce-
dure. Some of these issues are irresolvable;
that is, with the present state of knowledge, it
is not possible to reach decisions regarding
their truth. While these questions may refer to
problems of undoubted ultimate or philoso-phical interest (i.e. many meta-psychological
topics such as the nature of the unconscious,
or of drives etc.), there are no procedures
within the discipline that make it possible
to answer these questions conclusively.
2For example, at the 42nd Congress of the International PsychoanalyticalAssociation (Nice, 2001) there was a
Panel devoted to Evidence-basedMedicine.3See, for example, the discussion on empirically based treatments in the Special Section devoted to the topic in
Psychotherapy Research(1998, vol. 8, No. 2: 115171). See also Fonagy et al., 1998: 5258, An open door
review on outcome studies in psychoanalysis. Electronic publication of the International Psychoanalytical
Association atwww.ipa.org.uk.
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Mentioning them in the course of the debate,
however, can prove useful in providing
information about each partys premises
or frame of reference, or for heuristic
purposesto encourage the emergence of
new ideas.
A third type of issue, located at the heart ofclinical research and psychoanalytical theory,
elicits another class of problem, giving rise to
questions referring to the unconscious mean-
ing of the subjective and inter-subjective
experiences that occur in analysis, and to the
best way of conceptualising these clinical
discoveries. In the disciplines present state,
discussion of these topics takes place mostly
on a hermeneutical plane, and arguments aresupported by clinical intuition enhanced by
the personal experience of analysis, and by
critical reection on the concepts used. When
divergent interpretations arise there are no
standardised procedures for resolving the
issue, nor is there agreement about whether
this would be possible or even desirable,
given the distortion these methods could
introduce in the consideration of certain
problems.Thus, we nd that different types of ques-
tions have a place in psychoanalysis and, in
each case, the pertinent answer is supported
by evidentiary criteria that are also different.
Frequently in psychoanalytic controversies
issues of different natures are discussed at the
same time, without having previously estab-
lished what procedure to consider valid when
approaching each class of problem. To under-stand this difculty we must remember that
historically psychoanalysis has drawn from
both the scientic and the humanistic tradi-
tions, and the literature of psychoanalysis is
sometimes closer to one or the other of these
traditions. Yet the criteria governing contro-
versies and also the procedures for achieving
consensus are different in each tradition. The
humanities do not aspire to the same type of
consensus that the sciences seek. The pro-
blem of what is decidable plays an important
role here. Discussing Rortys ideas about
problems of commensurability in the sciences
and humanities, Connolly & Keutner (1988,
pp. 578) noted that, although there are
decidable and non-decidable issues in both
the sciences and the humanities, there is a
difference between them on this point. While
decidability occupies a central position in the
matters with which science is concerned (atleast normal Kuhnian science), in the huma-
nities non-decidable issues predominate. The
fact that psychoanalysis should include both
types of issue prominently quite often leads
to discussions being conducted not in a
common language but in different ones with
different regimes for truth. This impels us to
examine the extent to which the participants
in a debate share the same premises.
The conditions necessary for a truedebate
To argue implies enunciating something in
a form that will be supported by or grounded
in other statements, which are taken as
premises. When arguments that are convin-
cing for one of the parties in a debate have novalue for the other, this frequently stems from
each of them having started from different
premises and suppositions, and may not have
been made explicit in the debate. When
speaking of premises I refer to the general
principles and categories that organise know-
ledge in a particular theory; by personal
suppositions I mean each authors own con-
text of ideas, reecting his/her vital experi-ences, including experience as analyst and as
patient.
It is not easy for the participants in a
controversy to accede to discussing their
premises and suppositions. The reasons for
this are of different natures: some are of a
logical and rational order, while others can
be best understood from a psychoanalytical
perspective.
From a logical point of view, for each
partys premises to enter in the discussion
there must at least be some shared criteria
providing a neutral arena, that is, a eld for
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discussion that does not favour one position
or the other. This makes it possible for the
participants to convert any of the discrepan-
cies arising in debate into a subject of debate
itself; thus in principle all the truths
accepted by the different psychoanalytical
schools can be questioned. At the beginningof the debate these minimum shared criteria
need not go beyond the processes governing
the secondary process. It is a function of the
controversy itself to esh out these premises,
establishing progressive agreements about
the nature of the issues discussed and the
criteria governing the validity of the reason-
ing. However, these minimum initial agree-
ments about premises can be difcult orimpossible to establish when the basic rules
governing the use of scientic language are
being discussed, as has occurred in a number
of recent controversies (Sokal & Bricmont,
1997; Bouveresse, 1999).
The difculty of including personal pre-
mises and assumptions in the discussion can
be better understood if we examine the
problem from a psychoanalytical perspective.
Controversies challenge a persons con-scious and unconscious relation with his/her
assumptions and theories. In the case of an
analyst, his/her theoretical and technical ideas
not only have an intellectual value but are
also linked to personal history and analytic
experience as patient and analyst. To call into
question these assumptions and premises gen-
erates strong feelings of uncertainty, reacti-
vates remnants of the transference datingback to analytical training and institutional
life, and mobilises narcissistic conicts. All
this tends to limit the analysts capacity to
operate with a reversible perspective, that is,
to adopt, if only as a methodological exercise,
the positions of the other parties. For to do so
is tantamount to accepting the possibility that
the solutions he/she has adopted in his/her
own lifeas analyst or patientcould be
incomplete or provisional.
Elsewhere (Bernardi, 1992; Bernardi &
Nieto, 1989; Bernardi & de Leon, 1992), I
have referred extensively to the analysts
unconscious relation with his/her theories,
and also to the need for examining this
relation in personal analysis or in a reection
open to self-analysis. It is worth adding that
such personal willingness is necessary if the
analyst wishes a scientic controversy to
enrich him/her. If there is no attitude open toexamining the unconscious signicance of
ones own certainties, these can give rise to
processes of identication that lead to narcis-
sistic withdrawal. In a controversy, a number
of personal issues are at stakeamong them
the hunger for power or prestige, loyalties
and enmities of different sorts etc. But
controversies also make it possible for some-
thing of the love for truth to come to light. Inthe eld of psychoanalysis, love for truth
starts with being willing to think about
oneself from the vantage point the other
offers us. Thus, we reach a point where the
epistemological perspective and the psycho-
analytical one proper converge: for any true
debate to exist, the existence of an inter-
subjective eld must be accepted where the
different parties can be governed by common
laws. Ultimately, to be guided by the logic ofthe best argument is to show interest for
something new that the other can tell us, and
be willing to change if necessary.
In this paper I propose to demonstrate the
usefulness of the ideas of the theory of
argumentation for examining some of the
problems elicited by controversies in psycho-
analysis and to identify possible paths
forward.
The theory of argumentation
The theory of argumentation has grown
apace in recent times. This branch of philoso-
phy is part of the tradition of Greek dialectics
and rhetoric, and epistemological, linguis-
tic, psychological, sociological and other
approaches now converge there. It studies
how to proceed if one wants agreement in a
eld where it is impossible to obtain the
necessary demonstrations in the modes of
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logic or geometry (Toulmin, 1985). As Perel-
man states, The very nature of deliberation
and argumentation is opposed to need and
evidence, because there is no deliberating
when the solution is necessary and no arguing
against the evidence (1983 [1958], p. 1). In
his opinion, if we forget that the proofs usedin argumentation are not logically necessary
truths, we fall into the fanaticism that strains
to impose such proofs as universal truths or
into the scepticism that rejects the validity of
any adhesion or commitment in the absence
of this type of truth.
Toulmin points out that epistemology must
study the arguments as they appear really in
the different scientic elds. He states:
In the natural sciences, for instance, men such as
Kepler, Newton, Lavoiser, Darwin and Freud have
transformednot only our beliefs, but also our ways of
arguing and our standards of relevance and proof:
they have accordingly enriched the logic as well as
the contentof natural science (1958, p. 257).
In consequence, what Toulmin proposes is
to look at the history, the logic, the structureand the modus operandi of the sciences
through the eyes of a naturalist, without
prejudices imported from outside. In a word,
what is required, in his view, is not epistemo-
logical theorybut epistemologicalanalysis.
Toulmin uses the idea of argumentative
eld to designate the logical ambit where the
different arguments can interact. He notes
that depending on the logical nature of thearguments used, the argumentative elds can
become non-reducible (pp. 14 38). Sandler
took note of the same problem in other terms:
To the extent that different psychoanalysts share the
same meaning-space for a concept or theoretical
term, they can communicate relatively satisfactorily
in that particular area. However, it may happen that
their meaning-spaces for the concept are different,
and then problems of lack of communication or
pseudo-communication may arise (1983, p. 36).
The Dutch School, analysing argumenta-
tion, posits the convergence of a descriptive
dimension and a normative or ideal one,
which makes it possible to do a rational
reconstruction of the argumentative discourse
and also construct an ideal model of the
critical discussion. The critical discussion
model is a theory of how discourse would
be structured if it were purely resolutionoriented (van Eemeren et al., 1993, p. 26).
Argumentation is seen as a special kind of
regulation of disagreements: Our particular
choice has been to develop a model that
construes argumentation as a methodical
exchange of speech acts among cooperative
discussants (p. 22).
Returning to Toulmins idea about argu-
mentative elds, he denes them as institu-tional frameworks that give content to the
conduct of argument (p. 143). Argumenta-
tive elds: provide standards or authority,
legitimacy, objectivity, rationality, and ac-
ceptability. The eld notion, then, stresses
that all argumentative deliberation occurs
within some socio-historical context and
that all reasoning is reasoning-in-context
(p. 143).
This path for resolving discrepancies im-plies a number of steps: 1) identify the
disagreements between the two parties; 2)
establish agreements regarding the means by
which the disagreement can be settled; 3)
allow indenite exploration of the merits of
each position; which culminates in step 4)
reach agreement, or mutually recognise that it
is not possible to achieve one for the time
being.In my opinion, the agreement provided for
in point 2 (procedures for managing diver-
gences) is often lacking in psychoanalytical
discussions, with the problem never becom-
ing a topic for discussion. In consequence,
there is no way of proceeding with the
indenite exploration, as wide ranging as
necessary, of the different positions (as point
3 stipulates), because the prior issues to be
claried before the dialogue could continue
were not identied and accepted (p. 26).
Van Eemeren et al. consider that a dialec-
tical reconstruction of the argumentative
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discourse must include appropriate consider-
ation of the following aspects: a) the points to
be questioned in the debate; b) the positions
of the parties with regard to these points; c)
the explicit and implicit arguments the parties
bring to bear in support of their points of
view; d) the structure of the argumentation,that is, the relations between arguments
(1993, p. 60). The debate should then be
governed exclusively by the value of the
arguments.
It is well known that in reality controver-
sies involve not only ideas in conict but also
confrontations of human interests of different
orders, among which are issues of power. For
the controversy to be fruitful there must be awillingness to accept a series of prior condi-
tions of diverse psychological, social, episte-
mological and ethical natures, guaranteeing
that the value of the argumentation will be
recognised. This is hard, but not impossible.
The dimensions lying just beneath the
discussion itself (reason, truth, communica-
tion) are on the agenda of contemporary
philosophic thought. The possibility of a
search for truth through communicationbetween the speakers has been analysed both
in the Continental hermeneutic tradition
(Dilthey, Heidegger, Habermas, Gadamer),
and in the school inspired by Frege, Wittgen-
stein, Quine and Davidson. The very idea of
truth, for Habermas, must be enlarged in such
a way as to give a central place to the
communicative processes that, through dialo-
gue and confrontation, make it possible toreach uncompelled consensus where truth
follows the logic of the best argument.
Davidson has reviewed the philosophical
problems of the nature of the interpretation of
what goes on in other minds; from the
externalist position he assumes, interpersonal
understanding serves as a model for self-
knowledge. From a similar perspective,
Cavell (1993) notes that the idiolect of any
person can, in principle, be translated into
that of any other: the difference in points of
view would make no sense if there was notsomething common to both of them; some-
thing true for both of them even if they state
it in different ways (Davidson, 1984, in
Cavell, 1993), which reduces the pretensions
of scepticism and relativism.
I should like to return, from these different
contributions, to the topic of controversies in
psychoanalysis and especially to the difcul-
ties that exist when constituting a sharedargumentative eld.
Incommensurability as a defensivestrategy
In previous articles (Bernardi, 1989, 1992),
I have noted the difculty of determining
with any precision to what extent different
psychoanalytic theories are coincident,opposed (or even contradictory) or comple-
mentary. I also explored the possibility that
certain aspects of the theories could be in a
relation of incommensurability, in Kuhns
(1962) sense: that because they start from
different premises they will lack common
measure.4 It seemed to me then that incom-
mensurability depended on the nature of the
theories themselves, each of which constitu-tes a heterogeneous paradigm or disciplinary
matrix organised according to its internal
need for logical and semantic coherence.
Today I am willing to revise this opinion in
the case of psychoanalysis.
4
Kuhn (1962) noted that during periods of normal science there is a single dominant paradigm. Scienticrevolutionsare characterised by the appearance of a new paradigm, which may not be commensurate with the
previous one, in which case logical compatibility or semantic congruency between them is not assured.
Disciplines having multiple paradigms constitute a situation of another type (Masterman, 1972), which could
be that of psychoanalysis(Bernardi, 1989).
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Psychoanalytic theories become incom-
mensurable when it is accepted that their
hypotheses can only be discussed from the
premises on the basis of which they were
formulated. Instead of what should occur in a
hermeneutical circle, where theory and ex-
perience are each in turn enhanced by theother, in the above-mentioned case each
premise ends up providing the basis for its
own validity, limiting the possibility of being
questioned from outside, or from the dimen-
sion of observable facts. Britton and Steiner
(1994) noted the difference between selected
facts, which are patterns arising from experi-
ence and overvalued ideas, where the facts
are forced to t into an analysts priorhypothesis or theory. In this last case, each
theorys postulates and premises end up
determining what is and what is not to be
considered true psychoanalysis. In conse-
quence, circularity is engendered, whereby to
question certain ideas one must rst agree
with them. Here the premises of each position
elude any radical critique, for anyone starting
from different premises can nd no common
eld for discussion. Any psychoanalytic idea,no matter how valuable (i.e. the unconscious
conict, primary decits, early anxiety, the
role of language etc.) can become a barrier to
discussion if taken as an incontrovertible
premise instead of being recognised as a
hypothesis that must be submitted to scrutiny.
In a related way, it is interesting to note that
frequently those who do not agree with
certain premises tend to both reject them andignore themen bloc, without treating them as
alternates to be tested against the hypotheses
of those standing in disagreement. As a result
of this reduction of the eld of discussion,
discourses become incommensurable.
What looks like incommensurability can
thus be explained as a strategy to defend ones
own position. This strategy makes it possible
to limit the argumentative eld to the circle
of certain ideas and exclude rival hypotheses.
The controversy is interrupted when it
reaches the points of greatest intellectualand emotional tension, that is, when each
partys premises and hypotheses should be
questioned. 5
The situation of incommensurability can
be masked by an apparent integration or
pseudo-integration of theories. This is the
case when highly different psychoanalytic
theories are used with no comparison of any
sort and no attention paid to the reasoningsinternal coherence. True integration among
theories, on the other hand, implies the
existence of a debate, at least in ones mind,
ensuring the interaction of different ideas and
the possibility of mutual transformation.
Why do psychoanalytic ideas change?
Controversy supposes a willingness tosearch for the truth, and thus to receive new
ideas and modify the previous ones. In fact,
psychoanalytic ideas change through time.
This change elicits a number of questions:
Which ideas change? When and why? With
what effects or consequences? The problem
of change is not exclusive to psychoanalysis
but is a concern in science, leading both to
normative discussions (When should an oldtheory be abandoned? When should a new
one be accepted?) and also descriptive ones
(How does the change in ideas really happen?
What does history teach about this?).
In a quite simplied way, we can look to
5From the perspective of the theory of argumentation, this closing of the eld of debate shows up a aw in the
debates pragmatic preconditions,that is, in both parties willingness to continue to examine the foundations of
the positions and be guided by the logic of the best argument. Analysing fundamentalistdiscourse from theviewpoint of the theory of argumentation, van Eemeren at al. stated: Incommensurability and the apparent
closure of each eld to the objections and challenges of the other are aspects of the way that representativesof
those elds manage their encounters with one another (1993, p. 164). Regarding this point, where purely
logical analysis is insufcient, psychoanalysis,as we have seen, has much to contribute.
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three models to explain the mechanisms that
lead to the substitution of certain ideas by
others:
A) The classical scientic model, whereby
new hypotheses are accepted when they
are able to resist attempts at contrasting(Popperian falsication), or adduce more
compelling evidence than rival hypo-
theses (eliminative inductivism).
B) The Kuhnian model, whereby a domi-
nant paradigm persists despite the
anomalies it does not explain until enter-
ing a phase of exhaustion in its capacity
to explain new evidence, which leads to
the emergence of a new generation of
scientists with other paradigms.C) Hermeneutical models, where different
ideas coexist without either coming into
conict or totally replacing one another,
though they can lose their dominance.
There are no decisive proofs, or refuta-
tion, neither does a previous theory be-
come exhausted, but there is competition
among diverse interpretations of reality,
where those demonstrating a heuristicpower more in accordance with the
demands of the moment triumph. Meta-
phors and analogies play an important
role in the processes of understanding.
These models, markedly metaphorical
and analogical in nature, can be seen in
all sciences in the context of discovery,
but are especially important in the arts,
the humanities and in elds with incipi-
ent status as disciplines.
Each of these models guides the argumen-
tation through different courses. I will exam-
ine the debates in the Ro de la Plata at a time
(the nineteen seventies) when changes in
dominant ideas occurred. I will attempt to
identify the reasons advanced for preferring
some ideas to others, with the support of a
dialectical reconstruction of the argumenta-
tive process. Studying the context in which
the debates took place also makes it possible
to understand the potential value of debate in
the process of receiving new ideas.
The historical context of the Ro delaPlata debates
Two moments in the history of psycho-
analysis in the Ro de la Plata are especially
apt for studying the processes through which
ideas change. The rst of them was charac-terised by the reception and development of
the Kleinian ideas, which happened for the
most part in the nineteen fties. These ideas
made it possible to develop a local psycho-
analysis, with noteworthy original contribu-
tions. The second moment was when those
dominant, locally inected Kleinian ideas
gave way to a diversity of inuences, includ-
ing a number of authors (Winnicott, Bion,Kohut etc.) and especially French psycho-
analysis, accompanied by the higher valua-
tion of the Freudian canon. I will refer
particularly to the debate between Kleinian
and Lacanian ideas that continued throughout
the nineteen seventies, a decade characterised
by crisis and change in psychoanalytical
institutions and society at large.
The rst ascertainable fact that results from
revising the Revista de Psicoanalisis (APA)
and the Revista Uruguaya de Psicoanalisis
(APU), as well as other publications of the
period, is that while the above-mentioned
changes are noticeable, there were few arti-
cles where the author discussed the new
ideas, examined how they related to previous
ones, described changes in his/her own ideas
and made explicit the reasons for changing.
Etchegoyens (1986) volume on technique isamong those that most clearly present a
systematic comparison of different positions,
but it belongs to a later decade than the one
we are considering.
The reception of new ideas can be followed
through a number of indicators: changes in
journal indexes, in the frequency of descrip-
tive terms or in authors mentioned in biblio-
graphies etc. In general, references to
Melanie Klein or local authors decreased
while quotations from Freud and the other
authors mentioned increased. While there
was no systematic quantitative research into
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how much quotation there was, a study of this
for the term countertransference (de Leon et
al., 1998) makes it possible to conrm the
impression.
The changes were not only theoretical but
also affected analytic practice. Research con-
ducted in Uruguay (Bernardi et al., 1997) onthe types of interpretation mentioned in the
articles of associate members shows appreci-
able changes in several aspects. Between the
nineteen sixties and the nineteen nineties
transference interpretations and those refer-
ring to aggression decreased in a statistically
signicant manner. Interpretations referring
to sexuality or narcissism or those occupied
with the patients infantile experience alsodecreased, though not by a statistically sig-
nicant amount. From the qualitative stand-
point the change of style was marked, and
this is quite apparent in interpretations that
the researchers evaluated as badly adjusted to
the patients material. Interpretations having
little clinical precision in the nineteen sixties
sought to impose the Kleinian theory on the
patient: the language was direct, assertive and
favoured a ping-pong style of dialogue.Inadequate interpretations in the nineteen
nineties were open, shaky and diluted, giving
the impression that the analyst expected the
patient to reach some conclusion on his/her
own; defences were excessively considered
and the negative transference was more
tranquillised than worked through. Questions,
virtually non-existent in the nineteen sixties,
constituted nearly one-third of all analystinterventions in the nineteen nineties.
It is possible that not only the new currents
or authors inuenced these changes, but also
the circumstance of theoretical and technical
pluralism itself. The existence of diverse
frameworks probably induced a more cau-
tious attitude and perhaps introduced some
discomture at having to choose among
them. It is probable that the controversies that
occurred at the time between old and new
ideas proved insufcient for the purpose of
clarifying the differences between the various
theoretical and technical options, and propos-
ing paths conducive to obtaining evidence for
or against particular ideas.
It is a fairly general truth that new currents
emerging in psychoanalysis are not for the
most part submitted to systematic comparison
with other existing currents; in general, only
the most salient points of discrepancy orcoincidence with some of the others receive
any notice. In the case of Lacanian ideas it
was not even easy to establish their relation to
Freudian ideas or to the rest of French
thought. Even today in France, for those who
are not followers it is not easy to delimit the
inuence of these ideas, as Wildlocher (2000)
noted.
The initial controversies betweenKleinian and Lacanian thought
One of the rst confrontations between
Kleinian thought (as known in the Ro de la
Plata) and Lacanian thought occurred in the
conversations held on the occasion of the visit
of Leclaire (a disciple of Lacan) to Buenos
Aires and Montevideo. The discussions at
the Asociacion Psicoanaltica Uruguaya in
August 1972 were compiled in two volumes
that include Leclaires conferences and the
dialogues with the members of the Associa-
tion (Leclaire, 1972). There was already a
measure of knowledge of Lacans thought,
which several analysts had been studying for
some time. And that same year, O. and M.
Mannoni had visited the region.The activity consisted of seven theoretical
seminars and ve meetings to discuss clinical
material, which was supplied by the partici-
pants. As to the seminars, they did include
dialogue, though, except for Leclaires, the
names of speakers were not recorded.
A remark of Leclaires from the second of
these seminars shows how the focus of
interest was established:
Somebody (at the rst meeting) wanted me to speak
about our theoretical conception of fantasy. The other
question. . .was about the possible relation between
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language and the force of the drive. . .In any case, I
thought the conferences I was to give would be
devoted to the problem of drives, of the object of the
drive, the force of the drive and its relation with . . .
words.
The third of the seven seminars introducedthe topic of how to conceive the body and the
mechanisms of introjection. Leclaire, who
had just discussed similar topics at the
Argentine Psychoanalytical Association, di-
rectly interrogated the audience in the follow-
ing terms, inviting controversy:
Serge Leclaire: Do you represent the body to
yourselves in any other way than as a recipient
equipped with some openings. . .
? If I ask you thisquestion it is because I believe that this representa-
tion is too ingenuous by far and, above all, does not
correspond to the psychoanalytic data of our experi-
ence (p. 29).
Intervention: The problem, it seems to me, is that
when you use the term Korper-ich [as synonym of]
vessel-body you murder the metaphor, you objectify
it, because a closed vessel, a closed body, is not
presupposed. . .So I do not believe that there is an
outside and an inside, though I do know that I
incorporate something. It is the way the ego-body
expressed this act, but not in a vessel that closes
(p. 33).
SL: I am glad to hear you say [that], but I cannot help
having the impression that the digestive reference of
the fantasy of happiness continues to mark your way
of using, at least, the term introjection. For my part, I
believe that it is far more important to consider what
is being played out in the process called introjection,as an attempt or a modality of integration in the
structure, of introducing an element that could
modify its structure . . .(p. 33).
I: . . . When you speak of the introduction of an
element in the structure, are you thinking of an intra-
psychic system or structure?
SL: Here again we nd that intra that always annoys
me (p. 34).
At this juncture, Leclaire explained his
conception of the body with the support of
the Moebius strip as a model. Lacan used this
gure from topology to demonstrate his
conception of certain relations that at rst
seem to constitute binary oppositions. The
Moebius strip is a three-dimensional gure or
ring that is made by joining the points of a
rectangle or a strip of paper after twisting one
of them 1808. In the case of the body, thisgure shows that it is not possible to oppose
outside and inside because in the Moebius
strip both faces appear in a continuum.
Phenomena related to the body are thus seen
as if they were elements in a structure. This
structure is of a particular nature, that is, it is
a system determined fundamentally as an
attempt to organise its own decit (manque)
(1972, p. 28). By using this model, Lacan wasalso distancing himself from the way in which
the Kleinians were using unconscious fantasy
to support their theoretical constructs:
In the Moebius strip model there is only one face. I
prefer this as a model and image of the body. It is at
any rate the only model that permits us to not enter
into the fantasy-laden contradictions of the patient
we have to analyse. And as I have said, it is always
preferable to not enter into fantasy if we are to be
able to analyse it (pp. 35 6).
The discussion subsequently centred on the
importance of unconscious fantasy, or struc-
tural models, for conceptualising the body:
I: The phrase element in a structure. . . is not the
language of the ego-body, ego-patient. My heart is
aching, that is quite clear, but I do not know how or
why, because neither do I know what an element is.
Yet I do know that it devours me, here, inside. This isthe language of the ego-body, this is how I speak and
make myself intelligible. On this level, that is the
advantage of such language (pp. 367).
SL: But I would put it another way. You were evoking
the problem of elements. I just spoke to you about the
representation of a surface, which seemed preferable
to me for speaking of the body, to delineate, to
represent the function of the body (p. 37).
[There was then an explanation of Lacans
conception of the body.]
I: When you proposed this role of the surface, I
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thought that you would continue speaking of the
surface, but as a membrane, as a place of exchange.
And that perhaps here lies the source of the
differences between the thinking you explained and
what we are closest to admitting. This situation of
exchange, I think it is the origin of the pre-eminence
of the oral model (p. 43).
SL: Im going to tell you why I dont do this [speak
of the body in the manner suggested to him]. Because
I believe that there is no other substance in the body
. . . I believe that the substance itself is made with
these coincident and antinomian elements. It is this
that constitutes the very texture of the surface, that is,
of the body . . .(p. 43).
I would now like to comment on thesedialogues, emphasising not so much the
content of the discussion but the way of
arguing and especially those aspects that
facilitated or made it difcult for the two
hypotheses to be examined in depth and on
equal footing. I will limit myself to the initial
exchanges.
Leclaires initial question had a particular
rhetorical form: Do you represent the body
to yourselves in any other way than. . .
? Thisquestion encloses two aspects: the way he
understands the other partys position, and an
argumentation against this position, under-
stood in that way. This argumentation centred
on two criticisms: ingenuity and distance
from the clinical.
Among several answers, the one I tran-
scribed is the one that answered Leclaires
question most directly: Whoever was speak-ing rejected the attributed position and the
way of describing it (You murder the
metaphor. . .),6 and reformulated the ques-
tion in terms of unconscious fantasy, ex-
pressed in experiential language. Leclaire
reiterated his opinion about the digestive
aspect of the metaphor of incorporation, and
proposed as an alternative the metaphor of
introducing an element into a structure (else-
where in the text he noted the need to distance
oneself from biology to differentiate the
object of necessity from the object of desire).But before continuing along this path, which
is the one the discussion took, we might well
examine the arguments that were used at
greater length.
Leclaires rst argument was about the
ingenuity of the other position. In this context
the word can have several meanings. At one
extreme, ingenuous implies a disparage-
ment, connoting a lack of sophistication orworldliness (as when one says that someone
from the provinces is ingenuous compared to
an inhabitant of the metropolis). Nothing
explicit alludes to this meaning, yet it cannot
be totally disregarded, for it is present in
many controversies that crop up between the
metropolis and the periphery. Explicitly, the
word ingenuous seems rather to refer to
philosophic ingenuousness, in the sense of
insufcient critical reection about problems.The listeners appear to have taken it in this
sense, for at another moment one of the
participants said:
I: I believe we must completely separate the meaning
of splitting in the Lacanian school and the Kleinian
school. Klein imagines an ingenuous level, one might
say from a philosophical viewpoint, while Lacan is
much closer to what Heidegger called the ontological
difference. . .
(p. 111).
This attribution of philosophical ingenu-
ousness, to all appearances, was accepted
tacitly since it elicited no further discussion.
6Regarding the treatment of the metaphor, it is possible to state, in the terms of Lakoff and Johnson, that
Leclaire was considering as a simple physical metaphor what was originally a structural metaphor expressingan experiential gestalt (1980, p. 101). This argumentative procedure converts the adversary into a straw man.
In consequence, examination and discussion of the differences at the level of the premises was interrupted, that
is, in respect of the role the experiences of projection and introjectionplay in psychoanalyticaltheorising about
the body.
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summed up the differences in outlook as
follows:
SL: On the whole, to give you an idea of how we
work, we intervene in a much less systematic way,
and there are sessions where we do not intervene at
all. [We intervene] when something has begun to bedominantsomething of the order of repetition, or a
certain insistence, in words, gures, formulas, evoca-
tions of situations. My impression here is that a series
of interventions [by the analyst] do not allow the
patients discourse to develop. That would end up
adding something to the patients own personal
imbroglio (p. 181).
. . . We do not believe that the transference is the
presence of real feelings. We consider as transference
what is displayed in the eld of our non-response to
the patients desire. . .We do not respond as a human
person (p. 182).
. . . If we ourselves reintroduce representations of
inter-personal relations, we attenuate and in certain
cases annul the specicity of the analytic relation. . .
He (the patient) speaks, that is what we ask of him
and it is sufcient to know that the words really are
carriers of the drive-based tensions, to not have to
appeal to that kind of sentimental ambiance. Feeling,by denition, is confusion (p. 183).
In fact, Leclaires comments about the
previously presented clinical cases had been
limited to general aspects of the patient and
his psychopathology, or to theoretical issues,
even though the audiences questions were
aimed at very concrete matters related to the
moment-by-moment of the session. But these
differences in the way of considering clinical
material were not included in the discussion
points.
The subsequent discussion
The comparison of Kleinian and Lacanian
ideas reappeared sporadically in certain pub-
lications of the decade. The instances I have
found are not of a true debate between two
contestants but of accounts from within one
of the perspectives. Despite this unilateral
character, they make it possible to study the
type of argumentation used.
One of the rst topics discussed was the
relation between the early Oedipus de-
scribed by Melanie Klein and the late
Oedipus as it emerged from Lacans re-
reading of Freud.One of these papers considers the Kleinian
contribution valuable, but holds that it must
be reformulated from Lacanian premises:
It is important to note that these considerations do
not imply devaluing or ignoring the profound and
important Kleinian contributions, but only point to
the need to place them in the context of images to
which they belong and so be able to connect them
more adequately with the pertinent symbolic struc-ture (Szpilka, 1976, p. 295).
The author noted what in his opinion
constituted the weakness of the Kleinian
position:
The concept of early Oedipus or late Oedipus
dissolves the Oedipus itself. . .The Oedipus is or it is
not. We are, then, [in the case of the Kleinian early
Oedipus] at the centre of a theoretical and methodo-logical error that we could call inverting and making
empirical the times of determination(p. 294).
We see that in this case the point of
departure is the superiority of certain pre-
mises (which make empirical or chronologi-
cal descriptions look insufcient and uphold
the need for a structural perspective) and
from these the bankruptcy of the other posi-tion is inferredthe result of not taking these
premises into account in the same way.
A somewhat different position of the same
period held that while in Klein the concept of
the fathers symbolic function remained ab-
sent, this did not make her way of working
with the problem at the clinical level any less
valid. For Faimberg, the treatment of Richard
demonstrated that Klein was able to accord
symbolic signicance to her patients war
experience despite not having the concept of
the fathers symbolic function. Thus, Klein
was able to provide a response from the
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clinical angle to the question she did not ask
at the theoretical level (1976, p. 161). I
believe that the concept which is lacking in
Kleinian theory is the one that dynamically
connects the idea of absent penis with that
of phallus (p. 157).
In this article, though the author explicitlydisregarded the problems of compatibility
between the different referential schemes (p.
149), she proposed a solution implying a
measure of complementation, where Lacan
offered the general theoretical framework
inside which certain aspects of Kleinian
clinical practice could once again be given
value, and formulated in another way.
Baranger was the author who compared theideas of Klein and Lacan in the deepest and
most systematic way in that period. I will
mention only some fragments of his publica-
tions, especially those where he returned to
the polemic with the ideas of Leclaire.7
Baranger (1976, 1980a, 1980b) tried to
delimit the zones of validity of the Kleinian
and Lacanian theories. He began by noting
the zones of divergence between Klein and
Lacan: the Oedipus complex, the oralisationof instinctual life, the total object as synthesis
of partial objects, the process of symbol-
formation, the role of introjection and projec-
tion in the modication of the object, locating
the breast as the prototype object, the concept
of partial object as the sole primitive type of
object relation. He also noted coincidences,
for example the description of the fantasy of
the fragmented body (1980a, p. 133). Hebelieved to be Lacan right in his criticism of
the notion of passage from the partial object
to the total object, or in marking the differ-
ence between demand and desire, or showing
the fetishs character of being a decoy. Yet he
did not believe that this made it possible to
consider resolved the problem of the diversity
of the possible categories of object, or even
less, abandon all the concepts of one author
for the others. He resumed the dialogue with
Leclaire, comparing the clinical scope of
ideas like internal object, signicant or repre-
sentation:
To speak of representation, as Freud did, or of
signicant, as Lacan does, or Letter, as Leclaire does,
stops short of what Freud meant in Mourning and
Melancholiaregarding the existence of objects. Do
not say that these phantoms are metaphorical, that it
is a matter of imaginary objects. Freud sometimes
uses the term imaginary object (or imagined, or
fantasised object), but he leaves us in no doubt that
he is then referring to something quite different from
what he describes in the process of mourning, orsomething that does belong to the order of the
representation (1980b, pp. 316 17).
For Baranger different types of objects
exist, and none can be reduced to any other:
One cannot treat a fetish like a living-dead8,
or like an omnipotent self-image. This is a
clear example of cases where prematurely
unied theory can engender simplistic tech-nique (1980b, p. 319).
Baranger tried to nd support in arguments
taken from clinical experience, resuming the
discussion with Leclaire on that basis:
If we were to give up working on the object, give up
reducing splitting, give up the movement that is the
inverse of projective identication, we would at the
same time be giving up not only the Kleinian concept
of internalised object but also the Kleinian andFreudian concept of internal world. Why, Leclaire
asked us, the phenomena always in terms of outside
and inside, introjection and projection, when there
are other possible categories . . .? Because, we
might answer, an entire aspect of our work, a very
important one, consists of managing this type of
ambiguous existence, endowed with a certain sub-
stantiality that is different from representation and
7An analysis of the way in which Baranger compared the ideas of Klein and Lacan in the case of the
countertransference can be found in de Leon (2000) and in de Leon & Bernardi (2000).8Baranger uses this term to describe a particular kind of object characteristic of mourning processes, which
transforms this kind of object in a group of memories similar to the other representations(1980b, p. 316).
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closer to the type of existence of the subject. . .that
we call internalisedobject (p. 320).
Both the quoted texts and later ones leave
the impression of a controversy that was not
at all argued out, or that only managed to
develop by ts and starts, or even in a circularway.
During a recent debate in Buenos Aires
(2000) between Lacanian analysts (Miller,
Laurent and others) and Kleinians (Etche-
goyen, Zysman and others), some of the
topics mentioned above reappeared with little
change. Miller, for example, stated:
. . .
the idea of introjection and projection presup-poses the differentiation of the external and the
internal, and I know that for many people present [at
the debate] thinking about these terms implies a
particular mental framework. They must know that
Lacan does not think in those terms, and his use of
topology is used precisely to express another cong-
uration, not suited to the difference between the
internal and the external (Stagnaro & Wintrebert,
2001, p. 122).
Despite the efforts of different participants,and especially Etchegoyen (ibid., pp. 83, 84),
to focus the debate on the points where there
existed a clear discrepancy (the role of the
patients resistances, of envy and voracity, of
the relation with the body and biology etc.),
the confrontation of ideas did not manage to
advance compared to similar exercises of the
nineteen seventies. Though the meeting as
announced was to include shared clinicalresearch, references to patients material
were virtually non-existent and it is possible
to infer that it would have been quite difcult
to nd common criteria for clinical evidence.
Certainly, these difculties are not only
features of debate in the Ro de la Plata. If
one reviews the literature from anywhere else
in the world, it becomes apparent that the
absence of systematic confrontation between
different psychoanalytic approaches has been
the general case. It is therefore convenient to
examine more closely the processes obstruct-
ing progress in argumentation.
Characteristics of theargumentation
Are there any reasons, based on what has
been described, explaining when and why the
development of the argumentation halted? Is
it possible to offer hypotheses about the pathsthat might have made the debate advance? I
believe that these questions are fundamental,
for they speak to the practical usefulness of
this kind of analysis.
Let us return to the discussion with
Leclaire. A signicant advance was had there
in identifying and stating certain important
points of discrepancy. As we saw, the explora-
tion of both parties arguments made itpossible to confront concepts like intention-
ality and unconscious fantasy, on the one
hand, and structure and divided self, on the
other. But from that point advance was halted:
the question remained formulated in terms of
the intrinsic superiority of certain concepts
over others, and that, in the abstract, turns out
not to be a decidable question for psycho-
analysis. And what happened when the con-
frontation was stated at the level of thepremises? The attempt to generate conviction
no longer rested on the dialectical argumenta-
tive process but on the persuasive power of
enunciates, as occurs in the epidictic style
used in preaching or proclamations (Perel-
man, 1958, p. 62). Afrmations became self-
evident and, to produce adhesion to them,
reliance was placed on their expressive power
alone, which leads to reason in a circle(petitio principii).
What paths might have permitted an ad-
vance? There were two possible paths, but
both of them led nowhere, for reasons I will
explain. If it was a matter of discussing the
concepts (intentionality, structure etc.) in
their philosophic dimension, then it was
necessary to situate the controversy in the
eld of philosophy and avail oneself of its
methods. But this placed the discussion out-
side the purview of psychoanalysis, formu-
lating questions that could not be resolved
from its method. This does not mean that
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psychoanalysis cannot include a philosophi-
cal dimension; but for psychoanalysis to be
able to express well-founded judgements
there, problems must be formulated in a
language that makes it possible to refer to the
empirical sources of evidence that are part of
the psychoanalytic method. Now this shiftedthe debate towards the second alternative:
discussion of the clinical usefulness of the
concepts under discussion.
However, this clinical dimension could not
be developed either, because there was no
shared language making it possible to discuss
at that level. The sorts of observations about
patients Leclaire proffered during the discus-
sion of the clinical material required prioracceptance of Leclaires technical-level pre-
mises, which were different from theirs. In
turn, Leclaire experienced the same con-
straint when requested to conduct a moment-
by-moment analysis of the session, something
he considered irrelevant and inappropriate.
This left out of the discussion an entire series
of concepts and approaches to understanding
that had had essential signicance in Ro de
la Plata psychoanalysis, like the concepts ofeld, link, analytic situation, countertransfer-
ence, communicative interaction etc.
Would it have been feasible to constitute a
eld for debate with room for manoeuvre for
both perspectives? Yes, but this would have
required both parties to accept discussing
their way of considering clinical material and
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
both approaches. Judgement of the appropri-ateness or relevance of moment-by-moment
analysis of movements of the transference, or
of having a longer time-frame for listening to
the patients discourse, should not proceed
from any previously formed judgement but
from examining the effects of these technical
positions on the analytic process and the
analytic results. For this, there had to be
discussion of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of one or another way of considering
the material, or of considering important
affects or signicants, or of the analysts
intervening in one way or another etc.,
allowing both positions to be displayed on an
equal footing throughout the debate. We have
seen that this kind of openness held true only
at certain moments, but was quickly lost.
Thus, because it was incapable of generating
any further exploration of each positions
suppositions, the controversy foundered on apoint that could have relaunched it.
In later confrontations, a signicant change
did occur. In the discussion with Leclaire,
differences had been stated in terms of
counterpoised positions, leading to arguments
favouring one position exclusively at the
expense of the other. But in later published
material, though certain areas of opposition
or contradiction between the two approacheswere noted, there was also an attempt to nd
some complementary or coincidental points
in them.
Taking these debates as a whole, we see
that the successive steps prescribed by van
Eemeren et al., that is, agreement about how
to proceed regarding disagreements, and as
broad an exploration as necessary of the
positions, met with difculties of different
sorts.Regarding the rst point, we found no clear
statement of the procedures or criteria mak-
ing it possible to demonstrate the superiority
of certain ideas or technical approaches over
others. The different lines of argument
except for Barangersrested on the evident
character that each party attributed to their
premises.
Closer examination of the type of argumentused shows that it cannot be afrmed that any
explicit or implicit appeal was made to the
Popperian criteria of refutation or to those of
eliminative inductivism. Possibly some clin-
ical references used by Baranger in his
argument could at a pinch be further devel-
oped in this direction (1980c, p. 55), though
the author did not take that route. Nor did we
nd that the Kuhnian model of scientic
revolutions could be applied here. Observing
the subsequent evolution of Kleinian and
Lacanian ideas, both in the Ro de la Plata
and other regions, it would not be true to say
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that a new paradigm substituted a preceding
one, because the new ideas coexistedand,
to a great extent, coexistwith the previous
ones. Returning to analysis of the argumenta-
tion, we see that no effort was made to
demonstrate the lack of coherence of one or
another of the positions. At most, the weak-ness or inconsistency of certain approaches
(i.e. the Kleinian) to theoretically explain
particular phenomena (i.e. the fathers sym-
bolic role) was noted; or the limitation of the
Lacanian approach for registering the emo-
tional qualities of the analytical experience
was noted. But it was not, properly speaking,
a question of internal criticism, being pre-
dicated on the postulates of the other theoryand not on the basis of common premises.
Arguments based on external consistency
that is, on concordance with the present state
of knowledge in other areasmight be im-
plicit in Leclaires afrmation of the super-
iority of the structuralist position. As in
previous cases, this superiority depends on
the point of view adopted at the outset, and
the argumentative strategy then consists in
placing the burden of proof on the other party(Gaskins, 1992). But if both parties employ
this strategy, communication is necessarily
severed.
To a great extent, the debates examined
above can be described as a competition
between analogical metaphors and models
(the body as recipient or as Moebius strip, the
Oedipus complex as structure etc.). Meta-
phors and analogies can play a double role inthe discussion. On the one hand they serve to
express clinical intuitions that could not be
communicated by other means.9 But those
same metaphors can become cliches or
stereotypes that promote the isolation of
theories, or empty them of their concepts
(Bouveresse, 1999), if their use is not accom-
panied by an examination of what in clinical
experience they allow us to apprehend, and
how they facilitate translating this into theor-
etical terms.
For psychoanalytic controversies to ad-
vance, they must be able to examine simulta-neously what each position allows us to gain
in terms of theoretical intelligibility and
clinical understanding. Exclusively theor-
etical discussions tend to veer off into philo-
sophical speculation, and for its part the
search for purely empirical evidence can
ignore the way theoretical concepts inuence
the observation of the facts. Critical reection
on theoretical concepts must then be coupledwith empirical research, whether clinical or
extra-clinical.
Incommensurability between theories was
not an argument used in the discussion but
one that arose as an effect of the collapses in
communication. When Leclaire noted that
the patients emotions were not relevant in his
clinical listening (which was attuned to
another type of signier) he was saying that
he took into account aspects of the clinicalfacts that were different from those Klein
placed rst; for her, any anxiety surfacing
during the analytic session played the essen-
tial role. In consequence, the rened fact (that
is, the one taken into account in formulating
the theory) is not the same one in the two
cases; this could lead to thinking of a
situation of empirical incommensurability in
Stegmullers (1979) denition, because thetwo theories are not, strictly speaking, refer-
ring to the same facts (Bernardi, 1989).
However, it is evident that in principle
nothing hindered Leclaire and his inter-
locutors from overcoming this situation of
mutual isolationby examining the clinical
9From a perspective inspired by Davidson, it is possible to state that the creation of metaphors expresses
passing theories that the interpreter must develop to understand unusual verbal behaviour. While in general
there is insistence on the role metaphors play in transmitting meaning, for Davidson metaphors full a function
of conceptualcreation and are instances of radical interpretation(Quintanilla, 1999, p. 81).
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consequences of both positions, that is, the
pros and cons of paying attention to the
affects arising in the moment-to-moment
evolution of the session, or else abstaining
from interfering to favour the patients free
association. The barriers are not of a logical
nature, but psychologicalthat is, the reluc-tance to place oneself, even experimentally,
at a vantage point that one does not consider
truly psychoanalytical.
Thus, the controversy oscillated between
two poles. At certain moments it was possible
to explore the ideas and clinical foundations
of both parties, but for the most part each
position remained barricaded inside its own
premises, and the opportunity of examiningthem all from a shared argumentative eld
was lost.
Signicant, too, as a phenomenon, were
those arguments that were not used. Absent,
for example, was the question about the
possible effects on the outcome results of the
analysis of the analysts adopting one or
another position. Leclaire noted that each
position would create differences in the
analytic process, yet no mention was made ofhow these differences in the process could
lead to differences in achieving the objectives
of the analysis. Yet the issue of evaluating the
results of analysis was being discussed just
then in the Ro de la Plata, as publications
from the period show.
Finally, it is striking that the original
contributions from the Ro de la Plata did not
become part of the discussion of the newideas. With the exception of Baranger, the
discussants appealed to Kleins original ideas
without the benet of the additions and
modications introduced in the Ro de la
Plata by authors like Pichon Riviere, Racker,
Liberman, Bleger, Baranger, etc. Not to put
too ne a point on it, psychoanalysis from the
Ro de la Plata did not play any role in that
dialogue, and never spoke its true mind about
certain issues. Yet to include those concepts
in the controversies would have helped to
impart greater historical continuity to psycho-
analytic thought in the region.
Conclusions
A review of the case presented here elicits
some thoughts of a more general character.
Scientic controversies are necessary, despite
their difculties. Some of the difculties
mentioned above probably crop up in allelds of knowledge. Other problems, which I
will concentrate on here, are typical of
debates between theories that, though they
belong to a single discipline, diverge in their
way of comprehending the particular discipli-
nes methodological and epistemological cri-
teria. This is frequently the case with
psychoanalysis and with the social sciences.
The possibility of true debates betweenmembers of different psychoanalytical cul-
tures challenges psychoanalysis on two
fronts. From the epistemological side, it tests
the disciplines capacity to create a unitary
eld for argumentation when there are differ-
ences in premises. But, at the same time, this
invites us to work on the psychoanalytic
understanding of whatever unconscious fac-
tors encumber the dialogue.
When controversies erupt between psycho-analytic approaches differing in their pre-
mises, it becomes so difcult to circumscribe
the discussion to particular theoretical or
technical problems. Though not always ex-
plicitly, examining argumentative discourses
reveals that what is being discussed, too, is
each partys way of conceiving the rationality
and scientic nature of psychoanalysis, that
is, the type of scientic reasoning each partyuses to substantiate its theoretical and techni-
cal postulates. For their part, the points where
the discussion founders indicate problems the
discipline cannot resolve because it has not
been able to establish pertinent procedures
acceptable to all parties.
Two situations of this kind deserve
special notice. First, there is the difculty
of discerning the particular nature of each
issue that could be included in the debate.
Absent this, there is no way of identifying
the most appropriate methodology for ap-
proaching each issue. For example, in the
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above-mentioned discussion on structuralism
and Brentanos philosophy, for the debate to
advance it would have been necessary rst to
specify the different levels of the problem,
and then separate the purely philosophical
debate from the consequences for psycho-
analytical practice of particular philosophicalideas. This distinction would have also made
it possible to take the discussion on to a
terrain accessible to analytical experience.
Let us mention a second example: if the
discussion had considered the consequences
of the two ways of conducting an analysis, it
would then have been pertinent to debate the
different methodologies that could be used to
ascertain the results of analysis, thus broad-ening the scope of the discussion. Emphasis-
ing methodological problems imparts a
particular direction to the debate, for it
implies debating not so much what is known
as how we get to know (Tuckett, 1998, p.
445).
A second obstacle jeopardising progress in
the controversies was how difcult it was for
each party to include their premises and
suppositions in the discussion. When eachposition locks itself into its suppositions, the
situations of seeming incommensurability
that I have analysed here are created. In this
case, divergences at the epistemological level
made it difcult to nd common criteria for
evaluating the quality of the argumentation.
Even soas we have seenit is possible to
create a shared argumentative eld if people
accept comparing the different positions onthe basis of what each of them contributes in
terms of theoretical intelligibility or clinical
efcacy. More than a comparative confronta-
tion of theoretical or clinical arguments
piecemeal, what proves useful in these cases
is a comparison of the advantages and
disadvantages of the way each position in-
terweaves theoretical ideas with clinical
practice.
At this juncture, we can see that reaching
consensus is not the sole aim of controversies.
Rather, we must manage them so that the
different hypotheses interact and in so doing
acquire better foundations. This is the way to
further the development of the discipline. We
might also expect that the effort of looking at
the problem from different perspectives
should lead to personal development. Debate
can materialise only if there is the willingness
to engage in it, that is, if desire and hopepredominate, so that in the course of the
discussion we nd something we had not
thought about previously, or at least not
thought about in that way. If as analysts we
lose the desire and hope of nding something
new, perhapsto avoid the consequences of
professional burnout (Cooper, 1986)the
time for reanalysis has arrived.
Controversies demand a particular intellec-tual and emotional effort, connected to the
acceptance of the other as different. The
reward we can expect from such effort does
not reside exclusively in a reduction of
disagreements; indeed, controversies are also
good for developing better substantiated the-
ories, encouraging more careful examination
of our clinical evidence and reminding us that
there always are alternate hypotheses, whose
careful consideration can both lead us tostrengthen our previous convictions or see the
need to revise and modify them, in both cases
carrying us forward in the search for new
ideas.
Translations of summary
Kontroversen sind Teil des Prozesses wissenschaf-tlichen Wissens. In der Psychoanalyse macht dieMannigfaltigkeit der theoretischen, technischen undepistemologischen Positionen die Debatte besondersnotwendig und gleichzeitig entsprechend schwierig.Es werden die Funktion von Kontroversen und auchdie Widerstande gegen ihre Entwicklung erortert undals Beispiele werden die Debatten genommen, die inRio de la Plata (Buenos Aires und Montevideo)wahrend der 70-er Jahre gehalten wurden, als diedominierenden Kleinianischen Ideen mit Lacania-nischen Gedanken in Kontakt kamen. Die verschie-
denen argumentativen Diskurse werden uberpruftund dafur werden Konzepte der Argumentationsthe-orie benutzt. Die dabei auftretenden Hauptschwier-igkeiten drehten sich nicht um Besonderheiten, diepsychoanalytischen Theorien zu eigen sind der
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objeto en psicoana lisis. Buenos Aires: Ed.Amorrortu: 4663.
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