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The Intertemporal Dimension of Political Decision-Making:

A Foreign Policy Perspective Through the Lens of the 2003 War in

Iraq

Matthew J. Barr University of Southampton

Abstract: Based on an initial empirical investigation of pre-war decision-making

regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq this paper theorises a generalisable nexus

between temporality and cognitive mechanisms for dealing with complexity in foreign

policy decision-making. In doing so it develops a cognitive-temporal (C-T) model

based on four principles; that complex political decision-making takes places in a

task environment of procedural rationality and that increased complexity narrows

attentional dynamics; that resultantly various cognitive mechanics are used to help

navigate through complex decision-making processes; that heuristics are subdivided

into two parts; and that temporality plays a part in defining which biases and

heuristics arise and which do not. Another component of the model that stems from

these principles is a re-categorisation into greater specificity notions of procedural

rationality and heuristics. That heuristics and cognitive biases are the product of

certain task environments is well understood, but the mechanics of which heuristic

rise over others is less so; the theoretical explanatory framework herein elucidates

the particular incarnations of which are partially temporal defined. Consequently, the

analysis of complex decision-making processes should not only be viewed through a

cognitive lens but also a temporal one and that such a procedural focus will help

provide better explanations of foreign policy outcomes.

Introduction

The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a policy arena where Western policies can be depicted as both

instrumental and conspiratorial but also to have been implemented with imprecision and one

whereby policy failure and on-going problems, as evidenced by the current crisis, resulted.

This foreign policy failure can be assessed from a number of different IR perspectives that

accordingly offer different explanations for choices and outcomes as well as the influential

factors impressing upon decision-making actors and processes. Rather than a focus on

material and/or structural elements as the root of failure, alternatively it could be held that

Iraq policy was incoherently constructed and implemented, indeed, it is this reading that the

paper takes forward by looking at the infrastructure of how foreign policy is assembled.

Simply put, foreign policy judgement errors are all too frequently and rather than focus on the

substance of decision-making there is use in looking at its process, namely the combination

of cognitive limitations and the complexity of decision-making tasks, a process conditioned

in turn by temporal factors. This paper suggests that remedies would be better suited with a

focus less on elements of the international system and substantial outcomes but instead more

on decision-making procedures.

As such, this paper theorises a cognitive-temporal (C-T) nexus to model the rise of specific

heuristics over others that actors adopt in complex political decision-making processes. It

does so by invoking and combining certain elements of the concepts of bounded rationality

and path dependence and also proposes a reconceptualisation of particular aspects of these

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concepts that broadens and adds specificity to the notions of procedural rationality and

heuristics. This latter part of widening particular components is based on the contention that

the increased specificity of these two terms has the potential to provide a powerful

explanatory framework to unpack why certain heuristics rise and others do not in particular

complex decision-making tasks.

In regards to the first of these two re-categorisations the world of politics is one replete with

complex decision-making tasks and of temporal uncertainties and whilst this general attribute

of political life is pervasive this does not preclude there also being certain policy choices that

are additional complex and pressurised. Indeed, the focus on foreign policy herein initially as

a testing ground for the C-T model is precisely because such decision-making often has

additional levels of complexity relative to other political choice tasks. Given the combination

of the limited computational capacity of actors and the complexity of the general political

tasks at hand such decision-making requires actors to adopt cognitive strategies to help

mitigate these levels of complexity but as the tasks become increasing complex so too are

these cognitive strategies increasingly relied upon.

Although these cognitive mechanisms are broadly understood in terms of the environments in

which they arise and the behavioural impacts they can have, there is, however, a relatively

small literature on the dynamics of why certain heuristics are adopted over others. At the

heart of this paper is an attempt to add volume to this literature by theorising a model not of

how or why heuristics arise, this is well understood, but instead to understand and outline

why particular heuristics arise over others in any given complex decision-making task.

Indeed, as Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982: xii) point out, a “large body of research has

been devoted to uncovering judgmental heuristics and explaining their effects”, but where

there are gaps in the literature are in regards to which heuristics are adopted during those

processes; whilst the current cognitive models for complex decision-making accurately

describe the environment in which such decisions are made and explain aspects of cognitive

processes, an additional temporal element is required when considering what guides the

adoption of certain heuristics and mental constructs over others that are then being utilised in

foreign policy decision-making in a bounded environment.

Whilst this gap exists, some useful attempts to reduce and remove it have occurred in regards

to the role ideas have on the adoption of certain heuristics in processes of uncertainty (Jacobs

2009, 2011). Without explicitly focusing on it as a concept, these ideas are formed and re-

enforced over time in ways akin to path dependence; information that is seen as the most

salient is that which is most likely to draw attention (Knudsen 2007; Fiske and Taylor 1991;

Jacobs 2011: 40), indeed, attention grabbing information is also more likely to be that of

which that has been primed through repeated mention or highlighted by a prominent frame

(Zaller 1992; Iyengar 1991). In this sense, this paper is also drawing out an emphasising this

temporal dimension.

Paper Outline

Initially an outline of various theories of complex decision-making is presented that spans the

spectrum from expected utility to bounded rationality. Included in which is a brief section on

miscalculation in foreign policy that denotes the difference between expected utility and

actor’s decisions, this also helps locate the issues at hand within a broad historical context of

foreign policy decisions. Another brief section is on the cognitive turn that outlines the role

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psychology has played in charting cognitive mechanisms for dealing with complexity. Whilst

the paper will briefly outline the literature on heuristics, the prime focus here is on heuristics

veneers and why particularly veneers are taken on over overs in the decision-making process

and does so by focusing on the role of ideas in intertemporal decision-making. This literature

outlines the rise of heuristics in complex decision-making tasks and begins to unpack what

influences the rise of some over others in any given complex decision-making task.

There are then two sections dedicated to the C-T model, firstly to outline it and secondly to

discuss potential benefits of adopting such a model. Ultimately, the paper concludes by

positing that to understand the rise of specific heuristic scholars need to focus not just on

cognitive elements but also temporal ones and the intersection between the two. In doing so,

this also goes some way towards explaining institutional change – whilst concepts of path

dependence and historical institutionalism are good at explaining stability this can pose

problems for punctuations of equilibrium. In a simply sense, institutional change can be

explained by the crossing of complexity thresholds that are at the heart of the re-

categorisation of procedural rationality.

Literature Review

Complex Political Decision-making

Whilst history is littered with evidence that states and statespersons miscalculate this does not

necessarily undermine a rationalist model. Mearsheimer (2009: 244), for example, has

outlined how “rational states miscalculate from time to time because they invariably make

important decisions on the basis of imperfect information.” In this conception states “hardly

ever have complete information about any situation they confront” and are therefore forced

into making “educated guesses.” The consequence of which is that “rational states sometimes

guess wrong and end up doing themselves serious harm.” Without explicitly doing so

Mearsheimer is nonetheless invoking a procedural argument, that the process of decision-

making is rational but the substance of that process may not be. Others, such as Waltz (1979:

118),1 have argued against an explicit assumption of rationality as a cornerstone of theory and

instead posit that irrational actions are punished by the international system and therefore the

nature of the international arena itself incentivises strategic decision-making and action.

Waltz (1997: 915) has also argued that state actors “sometimes blunder when trying to

respond sensibly to both internal and external pressures” and that they do not have to behave

rationally in accordance with structural pressures but that they will be rewarded if they do so

and punished for not doing so.2 The distinction between the two positions, as Mearsheimer

(2009: 244-245) points out, is that in the Waltzian conception it is evident from history that

great powers make massive strategic miscalculations but that this is not because of imperfect

information rather it is the product of states acting foolishly by “ignoring relevant

information” or by paying attention to the wrong or “largely irrelevant information.”

1 In Theory of International Politics Waltz contends that his “theory requires no assumptions of rationality”.

2 On this point also see, for example, Waltz (1979: 73-74): “structure designates a set of constraining

conditions” and “acts as a selector”, consequently, structure “select[s] by rewarding some behaviours and

punishing others”.

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Even within structural realist arguments miscalculation and misperceptions3 have played a

key role in international relations theorising as evidenced by Waltz’s (1964) classic text on

the stability of bipolarity at the height of the Cold War. Waltz argues that in a bipolar world

great powers only have to concern themselves with the other great power thus freeing them

from having to simultaneously monitor and be vigilant towards multiple states. This, Waltz

argued, dramatically reduced uncertainly and the likelihood of miscalculation which in turn

leads to greater stability as it is possible to constantly keep an eye on ones adversary without

the need to constantly look towards various adversaries. Again, without explicitly linking it to

the concept, Waltz could well be invoking arguments about the impact of complexity on

cognitive mechanics, something embedded in the concept of bounded rationality.

Given this proneness towards foreign policy folly (Tuchman 1985) and miscalculation, what

then explains policy failures such as in Iraq? There are those such as Bueno de Mesquita

(1981, 1984, 1985, 1988) that have argued nations are led by rational, expected-utility-

maximising leaders, the strategies of which are selected as a function of “the values they

attach to alternative outcomes and the beliefs they hold regarding how their adversary will

respond to their strategic decisions” (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990: 750). In this

sense, such decision-makers evaluate the costs and benefits associated with each alternative

to obtain “the largest net gain (expected utility) at an acceptable level of risk” (Bueno de

Mesquita 1984: 228).4 5 As Mintz (1993: 597-598) has argued, however, whilst the rationalist

expected utility approach to decision-making is a powerful one in that it has produced

numerous instances of accurate predictions, it nonetheless has limitations as such models

“seldom capture the underlying cognitive processes involved in decision making.” In regards

to such limitations, cognitive psychologists (Schwab, Olian-Gotlieb and Heneman 1979;

Klein 1989; Mitchell and Beach 1990) and students of behavioural organisation theory

(Simon 1985) attribute to the expected utility and other analytical decision-making strategies

the requirement for extensive processing time, cognitive effort, concentration, and skills that

in many cases are not available, especially under time pressures and rapidly changing

conditions.

There are then a number of different decision-making and foreign policy choice models that

span the spectrum of rational assumptions but following advances in understandings of

psychology and neural science there has been a cognitive turn in both economics and political

science. One of the primary consequences of this turn has been a shift away from the rational

choice model of human behaviour, instead, psychologists and behavioural economists have

pointed to “a panoply of empirical departures from rationalist tenets” about the assumption of

full rationality paired with full information (Jacobs 2011: 38-39).

One such departure from such rational choice models is bounded rationality which explains

how instead of operating in conditions akin to those outlined by notions of maximum utility

the combination of limited cognitive capacity and the particulars of the task environment can

bind rationality. In this sense, actual human inferences about the world are made “with

limited time, knowledge, and computational power” (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000: 728) and as

a consequence of these limits in computing speeds and power, relative to the complexity of

3 For Jervis (1988: 675) the term misperception is used broadly and includes “inaccurate inferences,

miscalculations of consequences, and misjudgements about how others will react to one’s policies.” 4 Bueno de Mesquita has altered this position somewhat since. See for example Bueno de Mesquita (2011) in

which he adds to his ‘old’ position of expected utility by introducing a structure that is more complex. 5 Cited in both Hybel and Kaufman (2006: 10), and Minz (1993: 596)

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the task environment, “[o]ptimality is beyond their capabilities” meaning that “intelligent

systems must use approximate methods” instead (Simon 1990: 17).

The concept of bounded rationality, at its heart, is simply the acceptance of the notion that

human cognitive is finite rather than infinite and that relative to the task environment this can

limit our decision-making abilities, lowering them to levels below optimisation. This later

point that it is the combining of these two elements that form bounded rationality is crucial,

in this sense rational human behaviour “is shaped by a scissors whose blades are the structure

of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor.” (Simon 1990: 7) Whilst

there are numerous definitions of the term, Simon (1985: 294) adopts the term rational to

reference behaviour “that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation”.

Beyond this general description Simon (1976) also points out that rationality can be

subdivided into the two concepts of substantive and procedural rationality, terms which were

analogous to and “borrowed from constitutional law” and the legal notion of due process. As

the names would suggest procedural due process is to judge the fairness of the “procedure

used to reach a result” of a hearing or trail, whereas for substantial due process this is judged

“by the substance of the result itself.” Using such analogous tools of procedure and

substance, one can either “judge a person to be rational who uses a reasonable process for

choosing” or alternatively to “judge a person to be rational who arrives at a reasonable

choice.” (Simon 1985: 294)

Within neoclassical economics the rational person always reaches the decision that is

objectively or substantively what is best in terms of the given utility function, in contrast,

however, the rational person of cognitive psychology makes a decision in a manner that “is

procedurally reasonable in the light of the available knowledge and means of computation.”

(Simon 1997: 369) This being the case, there is then a “fundamental difference between

substantive and procedural rationality” (Simon 1985: 294), the importance of which is

particularly evident when looking at the mechanics of decision-making rather than simply

assessing outcomes. The emphasis on process and not on outcome makes bounded rationality

“analogous to the legal concept of procedural due process,” which asks whether the

procedure that led to the result was fair, rather than whether the outcome itself is fair. Such an

emphasis on procedure is in stark contrast to traditional economic concept of rationality that

“stresses rational outcomes, that is, outcomes occurring not necessarily from a rational

process but as if they had resulted from that process” (Monroe 2001: 154). It is such a focus

on process that is at the centre of the paper here.

Ideational Heuristics

When bounded by the combination of complexity and the limits of human cognition actors

must “typically forego comprehensive calculation and allocate their attention selectively

across features of their choice situations.” Ideas play a critical role in shaping decision-

makers’ preferences by systematically guiding this allocation of attention. As elites argue and

process information mental models channel their reasoning toward certain causal possibilities

and obscure others from view while biasing their search for and weighting of available

evidence. Jacobs (2009: 272-3) argues that these same attentional dynamics also make ideas

self-reinforcing and fundamental learning rare, that it “typically takes repeated, dramatic,

unambiguous evidence of failure to open cognitive space for major ideational change”, but as

outlined below this is not the only way such spaces can open up, that shifts across complexity

thresholds to lower levels can also do so.

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Whilst complex human decision-making falls short of the rationalist idea and requires the use

of approximate methods, it does, however, do so in patterned ways. Indeed, as information

competes for access to the working memory of the actors involved attention allocation is

influenced in both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ processes; by features of the information itself

and by the characteristics of the recipient respectively (Jacobs 2011: 39-40). Within ‘bottom-

up’ cases, the information that is the most salient, in that it stands out for some reason, is the

information that is most likely to draw attention (Knudsen 2007; Fiske and Taylor 1991;

Jacobs 2011: 40). Information that grabs actor’s attention is also more likely to be that of

which that has been primed through repeated mention or highlighted by a prominent frame

(Zaller 1992; Iyengar 1991). Additionally, time constraints and the limits on processing

capacity result in information that is relatively easy to process and simply cues are likely to

disproportionately influence actor’s inferences. With ‘top-down’ cases, one of the most

important factors is that prior beliefs and mental representations of the world make actors

more likely to place positive weight on confirmatory rather than discrepant information

(Jacobs 2011: 40; Smith 1998; Fiske and Taylor 1991; March and Olsen 1989; Higgins and

Bargh 1987). An additional component of which is that even “when individuals notice

disconfirmatory information, they often reinterpret or recategorize it in ways that make it

more consistent with prior expectations” (Jacobs 2009: 258; Nickerson 1998).

Whilst actor’s mental models do not “mechanically determine their policy and institutional

preferences” they can still have a profound effect on them. The standard expected utility

model of decision-making sees comprehensively rational decision-makers reasoning through

and process information about the probability and utility of each potential outcome of the

available options and then the weighting of a cost or benefit is dependent on the probability

of occurring and its magnitude. Attentional theory holds the contrasting view, that the range

of consequences and data informing an actor’s calculations is “substantially narrowed before,

rather than after, most analytical effort.” (Jacobs 2009: 259) Indeed, although set in a

different context this narrowing theme is also picked up by the C-T model in regards, again,

to shifts across complexity thresholds; as complexity increases the attentional dynamics of

actors narrow and in doing so also increase the importance of procedural mechanics like

heuristics (Figure 3).

In an ideational sense, whilst decision-makers still actively reason their way through and seek

information about consequences and options, as also outlined by the procedural elements of

bounded rationality, actors are, however, constrained in this analytical process by their pre-

existing mental models. Such constraints skew their attention “across potential causal

sequences independent of those outcomes’ objective probabilities or magnitudes.”

Disproportionate attention is devoted to those lines of causal reasoning that are captured by

the actor’s mental model, meaning a focus on “information that [is] relevant to and support[s]

those causal logics.” Concurrent to which, fewer cognitive resources will be invested in

“processing arguments and data that are inconsistent with or orthogonal to the model.”

Consequently, any entrenched mental model will generate a systematically biased set of

causal beliefs that will then influence policy/choice preferences (Jacobs 2009: 259-260).

The attentional argument is more than simply a theory of ideas as it also suggests a unifying

logic whereby it is possible to understand when ideas, rather than material conditions, will

matter most. When calculations are driven by material considerations it may not be simply

because they are material, often the choice environment is structured in a manner that makes

those material consequences appear more salient than other causal possibilities; due to

cognitive effort being drawn to a set of clearly signalled material stakes, attentional effects

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are still operating in such choice situations. Contrastingly, where the most valued or biggest

consequences of a choice are distant, complex, or ambiguous, then “actors’ attention is less

likely to be directed by objective parameters of the choice and more likely to be guided by

simplified mental representations” (Jacobs 2009: 273). Relating this to the C-T model, again,

as attentional dynamics are narrowed due to increased complexity the importance of the

mental representations of heuristics and ‘ideas’ increase, meaning also that there is linkage

between crossing complexity thresholds, attentional dynamics and the potency of the role of

heuristics.

A focus on attention carries important methodological advantages for the study of ideas as it

focuses not just on affirmative evidence of the role of ideas - such as actors being exposed to

an idea, explicitly discussed its propositions, and choosing options consistent with it – but

crucially also on how ideas obscure or limit information and possible consequences from

deliberation (Jacobs 2009: 273). These advantages are also present in the C-T model but

removes them one step by focusing not on how the ideas then impact on deliberative

processes, as this is increasingly covered in the literature already, but rather to add, or

emphasise, a temporal dimension to this literature to show how those ideas are partly

temporality defined; Jacobs’ focus is on the impact of these ideas in obscuring and limiting

information whereas the C-T model looks at how those ideas were formed to the point of

becoming heuristic devices. Combining the two sequentially helps explain and draw a fuller

picture of the mechanics of choice.

Politics in Time

Notions of politics in time have become increasingly pervasive in recent years (Pierson

2004), notably in regards to historical intuitionalism and path dependence. In its broadest

definition path dependence refers to the causal relevance of preceding stages in a particular

temporal sequence, that events at the beginning or an early point of a sequence affect the

possible outcomes occurring later down the line (Pierson 2000: 252) with a narrower

definition invoking high costs of reversal arguments (Levi 1997: 28) whereby preceding steps

in a particular direction induces further movement along the same path. Path dependence is

not, however, simply a complex disguise for historical determinism, but is instead a

representation of a particular type of cause-effect relationship “wherein institutions and

collective actors find themselves in a temporal inertia” that is “heavily influenced by crucial

decisions in the past” (Allen 2010: 416). In addition to which path dependence is described

by Arthur (1994) as a process whereby sunk costs exist as “self-reinforcing mechanisms” or

historical “lock-in” of the path on which a collective identity is evolving. Once this lock-in is

reached, Garrouste and Ioannides (2001) argue, that it cannot be overcome without “some

sort of organized collective action” and that decision-makers find it difficult to motivate

themselves to make path altering decision (Allen 2010: 415-6). By following in the lead of a

number of prestigious economic historians who have proposed the notion that the analysis of

path dependence opens whole new frontiers of research, historical sociologists have begun to

argue that the field of historical sociology offers tools of analysis that are especially well

suited for the study of path dependence (Mahoney 2000; Aminzade 1992; Tilly 1994; North

1990).

Unfortunately, analysts have yet to define the concept of path dependence in a manner that

demonstrates why it is that path dependent patterns and sequences merit special attention,

indeed, it is often the case that path dependence is simply defined in vague notions such as

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“history matters” (North 1990) or that “the past influences the future” (Berman 1998). Such

general definitions, Mahoney (2000: 507) argues, have inappropriately led scholars to

understand path dependence “as a form of analysis that simply traces outcomes back to

temporally remote causes.” Whilst such historical research may employ various path analysis

modes that consider the relationships among temporally sequenced variables, “it does not

necessarily examine path-dependent processes of change.” Mahoney goes on to argue that

path dependence “characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent

events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic

properties.” Identifying path dependent outcomes therefore involves both tracing back a

given outcome to a particular set of historical events and “showing how these events are

themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior historical

conditions.”

Moving specifically into the political realm, it is also increasingly common to describe

political processes as being path dependent and generally speaking such usage tends to

support a number of key claims; specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting

from similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large

consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of

action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse; and consequently, political

development is often punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic

contours of social life (Pierson 2000: 251). Pierson (2000) posits that prominent arguments

and explanations within political science tend to attribute large outcomes to large causes and

in doing so emphasise “the prevalence of unique, predictable political outcomes, the

irrelevance of timing and sequence, and the capacity of rational actors to design and

implement optimal solutions” to the problems they face. All of the aforementioned path

dependent features, however, “stand in sharp contrast” to this mode of argument. As such, in

the same way as Jacobs (2008, 2011a) does, Pierson (2000: 251) argues that conceptions of

path dependence appropriately applied across substantial areas of political life results in the

shaking up of “subfields of political inquiry.”

Towards a New Model: The Cognitive-temporal Nexus

An important initial caveat to note is that the proposition of a cognitive-temporal nexus is not

necessarily to argue that the factors outlined here will impact on policy outcomes but rather

that they make certain ones more likely and others less so. In this sense whilst there is an

underlying argument of social construction within this paper, nonetheless, invoking Waltz

(1979: 73) in relation to his theory of international politics is perhaps useful for allegorical

reasons as he was at pains to outline that the strict adherence to system theory “can tell us

what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure,

but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those

pressures and possibilities.” Indeed, as Waltz and Spiegel (1971: 471) concisely outlined,

structure “establishes behavioral tendencies without determining behavior.” Adopting such a

Waltzian framework for analogous purposes helps emphasis the point that these decision-

making factors do not in of themselves determine an outcome but rather can inform scholars

about which pressures are being exerted on decision-making processes and thus help better

gauge and understand likely outcomes. As such, cognitive-temporal ‘structures’, or

intersections, help influence and weigh certain outcomes over others but what actors in fact

decide is indeterminate. In this sense, as with Waltz’s systems theory, the model describes

processes rather than outcomes.

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Four Principles of the Model

Although the C-T model requires additional layers of description, the core components can be

distilled down into four interrelated principles:

(1) Political decision-making takes places in a task environment of procedural rationality

and that as it crosses increasing thresholds of complexity the impacts of attentional

dynamics narrow;

(2) Resultantly various cognitive mechanics are used to help mitigate these attentional

deficits from increased complexity;

(3) That heuristics are viewed to have two component parts; the generic heuristic (tool’s

function) and the particular veneer a heuristic adopts (tool’s calibration for task at

hand);

(4) That temporality plays a part in defining the adoption of the specific heuristics

(veneer).

In regards to the first principle, this paper re-categorises procedural rationality into two

subsets, procedural rationality 1.0 (PR1.0) and procedural rationality 2.0 (PR2.0), the key

distinction being the threshold of complexity in which they respectively operate; foreign

policy decision-making is not inherently more complex than domestic politics but it has been

noted that, “Few national undertakings are as complex, costly, and time-consuming as

reconstructing the governing institutions of foreign societies” in statebuilding projects and

that planning for such projects is “outstandingly complex” (Pei et al 2006: 68-9). In this

sense, one could also look at such additionally complex decisions as being akin to mega

projects relative to everyday complex political decisions. Ultimately, as decision-making

tasks increasingly pass through complexity thresholds so too do the attentional dynamics of

decision-makers narrow and in such narrowed attentional contexts the role of heuristic

become increasingly important as navigational tools through complexity.

In regards to the third principle, heuristics are divided into the rise of heuristics (generic) in

general as useful cognitive tools to help mitigate issues of complexity and lack of cognitive

capacity, and the specific incarnation that those heuristics adopt in regards to the particulars

of the task (veneer). A simple analogy of which would be that generic heuristics are tool for a

certain function but the veneer would be the particular calibrations of that tool in the same

way sockets wrenches are used for the same task but one adopts different calibrations for the

specific task at hand. A more detailed analogy invokes the distinction between catalysts

(generic heuristic) and enzymes (heuristic veneer). Catalysts is the description of the function

(catalytic chemical reaction), whereas an enzyme, although a catalysts, undertakes only

specific chemical reactions of particular chemical agents, adding a layer of specificity for

particular tasks. This subdivide helps distinguish between the well-established understanding

of the rise of heuristics (generic) as a functional tool and the less established notions about

the specific heuristic in a particular task. In this sense, it is the environment of procedural

rationality that gives rise to the need for the procedural mechanics of cognitive short cuts and

that it is ideas that give those mechanics specific calibrations.

In addition to these four principles this paper also adopts four important points of nuance:

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(1) There is an important distinction between bounded rationality and procedural

rationality: Bounded rationality is the product of limited human cognition combined

with a complex task environment, the two blades of a pair of scissors in Simon’s

(1990) analogy, whereas procedural rational is the behaviour, or mechanics, of how

actors deal with these bounds in complex task environments. Crucially then, this

paper focuses not on the mechanics of how actors deal with the bounds of rationality

but rather addresses the specifications of theses cognitive devices, that is to say the

calibration of the socket wrench/enzyme (heuristic veneer) rather than on the

wrench/catalyst itself (generic heuristic).

(2) Utilising the procedural rationality concept rather than being a subset of bounded

rationality: Adopting procedural rationality means one can take on board the ‘scissors

blades’ without necessarily also having to also adopt particular search processes (like

satisficing). There are also other factors beyond empirical overload and impact on

complex decision-making, notably time-constraints, which can limit the application of

available cognitive resources to specific tasks to a given task.

(3) Similarly, the temporality element of the C-T model only invokes concepts of path

dependence rather attempting to become a subset of the theory: No clear definition of

path dependence currently exists the central tenets of the theory are utilised in both a

broad and narrow sense in the literature. The temporal element of the C-T model

adopts certain aspects of the broader definition of path dependence.

(4) The same heuristic has different impacts relative to the level of task environment

complexity: There is a distinction between the ingrained institutional heuristic

thinking (PR1.0) in the everyday political sense and their operational forms under a

condition of PR2.0 that relates to the impact of increasing levels of complexity on

decision-makers and the subsequent narrowing of attentional dynamics.

Herein complexity is used as a broad term and as shorthand to describe a multitude of aspects

such as the computational power required to undertake a given task in a mathematical or

multivariable sense but to also incorporate factors such as uncertainty; complexity is used to

denote all aspects that make a task cognitively more difficult or resource intensive. In regards

to the environment of procedural rationality this paper adopts a position akin to Lewin’s

(1935; 1943) treatment of environment6 to include both social factors as well as the materials

of the physical realm; procedurally rational behaviour is a product of both the actor’s

cognition and the context in which the task occurs.

Procedural Rationality

For Simon (1990), procedural rationality is the simplifications in the mechanisms of choice in

a bounded context, but as outlined above for the purposes here this paper invokes rather than

adopts notions of bounded rationality. Herein the notion of procedural rationality is instead to

suggest that its impact is relative to the task at hand in terms of the behavioural responses that

are triggered, that there are degrees to which procedural rationality mechanics operate

relative to the decision-making task. Indeed, Simon (1990) himself outlines the crucial

distinction that bounded rationality is not simply about the bounds of human cognition but

6 In Lewin’s B = f (P, E) equation behaviour is the product of the both the actor and the environment.

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about these bounds relative to the task at hand and denotes this in his two blades of a pair of

scissor analogy. An example of an actor who inherently has limited cognitive capacity not

producing a bounded decision would be adding two small numbers the sum of which is not

known, and thus not simply a memory recall process, a relatively simple task whereby the

normal bounds of an adult’s cognitive capabilities are not breached by the task at hand. Such

cognitive simple tasks only have one of the two scissor blades and represent ‘non-scissor’

tasks whereas any decision that incorporates both blades is a ‘scissor task’ (Table 1).

Table 1: Scissor and Non-scissor decision-making Tasks

Limited Cognition Procedural Task Environment Complexity Bounded Rationality

Non-scissor

tasks

Yes Yes No No

Scissor tasks Yes Yes Yes Yes

Of these so-called scissor tasks there are also degrees of variability that suggest a need to

move away from a simple binary view of ‘non-scissor and scissor tasks and to incorporate

variations of scissor tasks; for the purposes of explanation procedural mechanics are

subdivided into two parts, PR1.0 and PR2.0. In its simplest terms, the cognitive component of

the C-T model operates within the bounds of human cognition, a relatively set data point,

then subdivided into three parts - non-scissor tasks, PR1.0 and PR2.0 - defined respectively

by increasing levels of complexity (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Subdivides of Task Environments

The boundaries between these two variants of complexity are fluid and in real-time may well

be hard to spot which is somewhat problematic for a clear determination of which variant a

decision-making process is operating under whilst they are occurring. That said, given that

the detail and nuance of most political decisions are taken behind closed doors a lack of real-

time determination is not necessarily problematic for political scientists as there is a need for

a depth of primary empirical data which, in the case of the documentary record for instance,

General bounds of human cognition

Non-Scissor Decisions

Procedural Rationality 1.0

Procedural Rationality 2.0

12

is often not publically released for decades. One potentially powerful tool to help overcome

this issue is to apply the ‘balancing of the equation rule’ from mathematics that has a

reciprocal relationship either side of the equation or similarly the diffusion process of

osmosis across a semi-permeable membrane occurs until both sides of the membrane reach a

concentration equilibrium. This to say that complexity and attentional dynamics and

interrelated, that as complexity increases correspondingly attentional dynamics narrow and as

complexity decreases attentional dynamics widen (Figure 3). If, for example, a specific focus

of attention that is drawing considerable cognitive resources is removed from the left-hand

side of the equation one would expect to see a reciprocal shift in policy considerations, even

if not necessarily in manifested policy outcomes due to the indeterminacy of actor’s actual

decisions, thus the focus on procedures not outcomes. Figure 3: Attentional Scope across Thresholds of Complexity

N-S Tasks

Attention Scope

Increasing Complexity

PR1.0 PR2.0

N-S Tasks

Level of Task Complexity

PR1.0 PR2.0

Increasing Complexity

13

Cognitive Management

Another aspect of the relationship between levels of complexity and attentional scope is that

this also has an impact on the importance of procedural mechanics, that as the attentional

dynamic reduce by narrowing the role of heuristics is increased. Cognitive management

becomes increasingly important as the levels of complexity increase as this additional

complexity narrows the scope of information that is assessed for processing and the ability of

decision-makers to process the full range of data produced by the task. In such an

environment heuristics and other such procedural mechanics become increasingly important

to help compensate for and to navigate increased complexity. These tools that are turned to

also have to be pre-existing and immediately to hand of decision-makers as these actors do

not have the ability or time to undertake a detailed or sustained search for them given the

attentional narrowing that complexity has imposed on the process. This prioritises what is to

hand, previously established and institutionally ingrained in terms of which heuristics are

seen as useful by actors to help navigate the complex task in front of them either consciously

or subconsciously; such elements are in part temporally defined.

The Temporal Component

Viewed through a path dependence lens complex decision-making process should be seen not

as a snapshot in time but rather as part of a longer temporal sequence and causal line (Pierson

2000, 2004) and, indeed, this is where the intersection of temporality begins to play a role in

the C-T model’s nexus. The central thesis of the temporal line of argument is that the specific

attribute(s) of the heuristics (veneer) that arise as a procedural mechanic of complex political

decisions are selected and deselected not at the moment of policy choice deliberation but

rather they have been primed at a prior temporal point. As such, particular heuristics

(veneers) arise over others in the face of complexity as a result (in part) of the temporal

dynamic that has instilled this heuristics over a period of time. Whilst ideas play a key role in

the establishment of the heuristic veneers that do rise in such contexts (Jacobs 2009), they

themselves are ingrained and are the product of temporal processes and as such the temporal

dimension is an important component to heuristic decision-making that is current under

theorised.

There are four stages of the decision-making process of the C-T model: the two blades of

Simon’s bounded rationality across a complexity threshold (stage 1) create an environment of

PR2.0 (stage two) but it is in stage three that the temporal component influences the cognitive

mechanics of decision-making under PR2.0 (figure 2). Whilst the deliberative and decision-

making processes of PR1.0 do in fact mirror those of PR2.0 as it is the case that the second

model simply occurs in a more extreme overall context of the first, the main practical

distinction between the two is that the additional layer of complexity likely results in checks

and balances and additional (or counteractive) search processes being limited in PR2.0 cases

relative to PR1.0 tasks. Crucially this is also the distinction between institutional thinking and

path dependent infused heuristics emanating from such thinking, that institutional thinking

operates in a space that is relatively speaking more open to other information sources and

cognitive and physical resources are not so heavily in demanding being a widen attentional

scope compared to path dependent infused heuristics in PR.2.0.

High levels of informational complexity combined with the limits of human cognition means

in a decision-making process that actors must “typically forego comprehensive calculation

14

and allocate their attention selectively across features of their choice situations.” Under such

conditions ideas play a critical role in shaping decision-makers’ preferences by systematically

guiding their limited allocation of attention. Mental models channel political decision-

maker’s reasoning toward certain causal possibilities whilst also obscuring others from view

and thus biasing their search for and weighting of available evidence (Jacobs 2009: 272-3).

The C-T model argues that this channel process is partly temporality defined as it posits that

institutional thinking takes on an increased potency in the form of path dependent infused

heuristics when levels of complexity are such that they significantly narrow decision-makers

attentional scope.

As the attentional narrowing occurs and heuristics become more potent tools to help decision-

making, institutional thinking and the mental constructs of key actors that have developed

over time become mixed with the generic heuristic to create a partially temporally defined

heuristic veneer that matches actors pre-existing believes but also act as navigational tools

through the complex task at hand. Call them ideas or name them something else, but the

veneers are temporality influenced, indeed, simplified notions of complex issues become

powerful in conditions of PR2.0 (the attentional narrowing effect on heuristic potency) but

these notions have to not only be simplified so as to fit through the attentional filter that is so

narrowed under PR2.0 but they have to be ingrained and institutionalised also. The

institutionalisation and ingraining of simplified representations occur in a number of ways but

each require temporality to help stabilise them to the point of becoming constituent parts of

institutional thinking and actors general simplified worldviews

Figure 2: Path Dependence Influence on Procedural Rationality 2.0 Decision-making

Exploring the Benefits of a New Model

There are a number of potential benefits of adopting this new model, one practical use is that

a C-T model helps explain how a decision was made mechanically in regards to process but

can also help explain the link between this mechanical process and substantive policy

Procedural

Rationality 2.0

Complexity

Limited Human

Cognition

Path

Dependence

Heuristics Policy

Decision

Stage 1 Inst

itu

tio

nal

Th

inki

ng

Pro

ced

ura

l Rat

ion

alit

y 1

.0

Complexity Threshold

Stage 2 Stage 4 Stage 3

15

outcomes; understanding process can help explain outcomes. The temporal dimension of this

also allows scholars to process-trace the evolution of the heuristic veneer and its possible

relation to outcomes when the rise of ideas is seen not as a snapshot of the decision-making

process but rather as a path of many parts across time, a moving image rather than a

photograph (Pierson 2004). The C-T model therefore broadens the horizon of inquiry which

in turn expands explanatory scope.

Evidence of C-T model’s explanatory power is available by returning to the 2003 Iraq war.

As Dodge (2009) points out, whilst there has been a proliferation of accounts most are

atheoreitical and only a handful are more than simply descriptions of how events unfolded.

The C-T model, however, helps explain the failings in Iraq through the analysis of process

rather than through other lenses to help elucidate the mechanics of failure; crucially, it does

so with a temporal awareness. In short, the post-war planning was based on what has been

termed the decapitation thesis (Dodge 2009, 2010) that operated under an assumption that it

would be possible to remove Saddam from power and remove the highest tiers of Ba’athists

from state institutions but for those institutions themselves “hold”. Having held, the planning

assumptions posited these institutions would be available to the occupying powers and the

transitioning authorities to use to administer the country. Such assumptions about the ability

for these institutions to have sufficient capacity and to hold belied empirical reality (Tripp

2004) and upon their almost immediate collapse along with the Ba’athists regime following

the invasion this reality hit decision-makers and exposed the failures of the key assumptions

upon which policy was based.

The C-T model helps explain both the decision-making failure in a general sense and the rise

of such inaccurate notions in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary. The empirical

data to repudiate these key inaccurate assumptions could readily have been available to

decision-makers and given the scale and political importance of the task at hand one would

expected actors to not adopt such assumption without first undergoing some form of test

against available evidence or other such process of gaining assurances about the validity of

assumptions upon which policy was so heavily placed. The lack of doing so, which would

have revealed the folly of such a choice, is explained by a combination of the narrowing of

attentional dynamics by the complexity at hand and the pre-existing beliefs of actors and

institutional thinking that would have biased any such processes if it were to happen

significantly towards reconfirming these existing beliefs. One can process-trace the beginning

of the institutional ingraining of the linkage between a decapitation thesis, removing Saddam

from power, and seeing the Iraq ‘problem’ as largely being solved to the Gulf War and its

evolution and strengthen over time. Concurrent to which, one can also process-trace sanctions

denial in the form of their negative humanitarian impact on the civilian population and the

removal of Saddam being the solution to such problems. The hollowing out of state

institutions was also understood by scholars (Tripp 2004). Overall, the path dependence of

these notions, ingrained over time, formed powerful heuristics that superseded empirical

reality in a task environment of PR2.0 (whereby attentional dynamics were narrowed and the

potency of heuristics are heightened). In this sense, the post-war failings in Iraq can be seen

as a process failure rather than a material one that was partly temporally defined.

Another potential benefit is that a C-T nexus can help explain institutional change, indeed,

the punctuation of path dependent processes has long since posed a potential problem for the

theory as it often better explains stability rather than change although in part this can be

because path-dependence is also often wrongly equated with path-determinacy. It may well

only be relative change but the balancing equation hypothesis of the shifts between

16

procedural rationality model numbers can help explain certain parts of institutional change.

Again, the Waltzian caveat is important to emphasise, that this in not in fact a mathematical

process so balancing is not guaranteed with the shifts between model numbers, but it is still

likely to be the case and crucially can explain policy change when it does occur following a

model number shift.

It has been argued that only after a repeated flow of discrepant information that represent

dramatic and clear empirical divergences “will actors devote intense attention to the

discrepant data” making existing decision-making outcomes “vulnerable to replacement”

(Jacobs 2009: 260). Whilst this is certainly a compelling ideational explanation of the factors

required for change, another that can run in parallel refers to the task environment itself rather

than necessarily just a focus on discrepant information. With the narrowing of attentional

dynamics across complexity thresholds resulting in a greater entrenchment of pre-existing

institutional thinking and reliance of cognitive short-cuts, if the factors that make up

complexity are reduced or removed so too should there be an opening up of the space for a

corresponding shift in the potency of these heuristics and the imperviousness of them to

discrepant information and empirical departures from expected outcomes. As with the

difference between institutional heuristics in PR1.0 and in PR2.0 whereby the impact of

narrowing is reduce in PR1.0 with a reduction of complexity from PR2.0, so to can this help

explain change because complexity levels do not necessarily remain static following a

decision outcome.

A potential real-world example of which can again be seen in the Iraq case relating to the

post-war period whereby, in simple terms, the primary attentional focus on either sides of the

Atlantic in the build up to war were away from post-war concerns; the US was primary

focused on the military part of fighting the war and the UK was focused on domestics politics

it terms of gain legitimacy and legality for military action to which the Blair government was

committed. Whilst the post-war period was a concern of policy makers, it was relatively low

on a hierarchy of immediate tasks meaning that attentional resources were diverted away to

these other more immediate prioritised tasks at a cognitive cost to the post-war planning. The

result was that inaccurate pre-existing institutionalised notions about Iraq disproportionately

influence policy outcomes as such imbedded heuristics were the best available tools to time-

poor actors and likely helped block empirical realities that deviated from these established

beliefs. The pressure of the narrowing of attentional dynamics by these time constraints was,

however, then released once the war itself was over, thus opening up the space for a greater

array of information to reach actors and a more deliberative processes of assess the broader

information set. Whilst the policy itself did not change until later, there was nonetheless a

shift in how that policy was to be undertaken, moving away from a swift transition to Iraqi

authority and US withdrawal (with Iraqi state capacity and institutions supposedly up and

running after light reforms) to the full occupation of the country under the form of the

Coalition Provisional Authority and a massive reconstruction project.

The weak signal amplification problem

The role of heuristics are to act as simplified iterations of complex phenomena to help

decision-makers navigate that complexity but this process of simplification is both their

virtue and their curse; complexity necessitates simplification to assimilate and process

[virtue] but complex events such as statebuilding projects also require for success a broad

understanding and addressing of a large number of inter-related parts that cannot be

17

sufficiently simply addressed [curse]. This means that once a decision has been made these

simplified notions will at some point need to be inflated resulting in what is termed here the

weak signal amplification problem.

Perhaps a useful analogy is to music file compression and a comparison between lossless files

and MP3s. Lossless files such as FLAC maintain the full dynamic range of frequencies from

the original master recording and represent a significantly larger file size relative to a

compressed file such as an MP3. The hertz range of an MP3 relative to a lossless file is

significantly smaller meaning that the distance between bass and high frequencies is much

narrower, thus less dynamic. Once a file is compressed and rendered in its new format this

dynamic range cannot be re-gathered from the new file but rather one would have to return to

the master copy for a return to full dynamic range.

The benefits of compressed music files are for reasons of storage but also everyday practical

use. For analogous purposes an MP3 could be seen as akin to a heuristic, an easily stored and

retrieved file but one that has significant informational compression. A problem arise when

trying to boost the compressed file as it is a weak signal to begin with any amplification has

the net effect of increasing the empathise of the compressed dynamics. In decision-making

terms, the post-decision-making point of a PR2.0 made decision has as its foundation

essentially weak informational signals in the form of the heuristics that helped navigate actors

to the policy choice. If either the task environment does not change, in terms of a decrease in

complexity, or if it does and actors do not use the relative space this opens up to undertake

more considered and deliberative assessments of information then the policy path now being

undertaken grows from this weak signal base. In short, there needs to be a punctuation of this

process to allow in more detailed information to help restore the dynamics lost by

compression rather than boost a weak signal. In practical terms the C-T model can potentially

help illustrate when there is more cognitive space to in which actors can effectively deal with

more information.

Conclusion

The decision to invade Iraq and the subsequent post-war failings has prompted a proliferation

of descriptive accounts of events but very few locate the failure within the bounds of theory.

The (ongoing) catastrophic failure in Iraq poses the significant question as to why the policy

went so awry, deviating dramatically from expected outcomes. This paper holds that Iraq

policy was incoherently constructed and implemented and resultantly looks at the

infrastructure of how foreign policy is assembled; the foundational assumptions upon which

Iraq policy was based were significantly inaccurate in terms of their relation to empirical

reality and the expectations that stemmed from them regarding the holding of key state

capacity in the country. Focusing in on how these assumptions were able to permeate the

decision-making process and form the basis of eventual policy was the starting point of

creating the C-T model presented herein.

Extrapolating and theorising beyond this single case the C-T model posits that adding a more

focused temporal dimension to current cognitive understandings of complex decision-making

will help increase explanatory scope and does so by focusing on why certain heuristics arise

over others; whilst scholars have a relatively firm understanding of the cognitive and social

mechanics of how and why heuristics arise, and under what conditions, less focus has been

directed towards understanding the incarnations of those heuristics in particular cases.

18

Modelling the rise of specific heuristics over others that are adopted by actors in complex

political decision-making situations by more fully fusing largely disparate literatures on

temporality on cognitive science grants scholars a useful tool with explanatory power for

failed foreign policy decision-making and beyond. The model gains this explanatory scope by

adopting a focus on decision-making procedures, that in turn focuses on the intersecting

elements of such processes; the cognitive-temporal nexus. The C-T model suggests that the

referent object of foreign policy analysis should be on the procedures of creating that policy

rather than a focus on substantive outcomes.

In addition to the well-established cognitive biases, this paper essentially hypotheses a ‘path

dependence bias’ that impacts on the particular mental processes adopted for specific policy

decision-making tasks. The addition of a greater temporal focus within the mechanics of

decision-making helps explain the rise of certain heuristics over others and denotes that

complex decision-making tasks should not be seen as operating in a snap-shot environment of

a picture but rather as part of a longer temporal processes akin to a moving image. This

aspect of the C-T model would necessitate the opening up analysis of the decision-making

process of any particular policy to wider investigation beyond just the context of the temporal

point the decision was made.

The benefits of adopting a C-T model not only range in explanatory power for certain policy

outcomes, such as the Iraq case, but have additional benefits regarding understanding the

processes that can influence institutional change as well as modelling the points at which key

actor’s attentional dynamics are likely to be more receptive to additional or competing

information. Beyond retrospective analysis benefits, this later point has the potential to help

pinpoint the availability of likely opportunities to introduce empirical data into complex

decision-making processes whilst policies are still actively being implemented.

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